VULNERABILITIES OF THIRD WORLD MARXIST-LENINIST REGIMES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00685R000300530001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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r~E~~'?E~ Directorate of ~ ~ - SeCI'et
Vulnerabilities of Third .World
Marxist-Leninist Regimes
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Secret
DI CIQ 86-003
October 1986
COPY 6
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Intelligence 25X1
Vulnerabilities of Third World
Marxist-Leninist Regimes
This quarterly was produced by and coordinated
within the Directorate of Intelligence.
Secret
DI CIQ 86-003
October /986
25X1
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Contents
Angola: Trends and Outlook g
Summary: Developments and Outlook vii
Perspective: Insurgent Political Opportunities 1
Country Indicators, Briefs, and Essays 3
Nicaragua: Trends and Outlook
Afghanistan: Trends and Outlook 12
Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Developments 5
Economic Crisis and Popular Discontent 6
Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Developments 9
UNITA's Efforts To Win Foreign Sunuort 10
Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Developments 13
Tensions Between Kabul and Moscow 14
Ethiopia: Trends and Outlook 16
Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Developments 17
Mengistu's Coup Vulnerability
Mozambique: Trends and Outlook 20 25X1
Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Developments 21
South Yemen: Trends and Outlook 22
Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Developments 23
Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Developments 25
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Vulnerabilities of Third World
Marxist-Leninist Regimes 25X1
Preface This quarterly monitors key pressures and vulnerabilities of seven self-
proclaimed Third World Marxist-Leninist regimes opposed by insurgen-
cies: Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, South
Yemen, and Cambodia. The publication applies sets of indicators on a
regular basis that track a regime's economic/social pressures, political
opposition activity, military security problems, and external pressures. It
also monitors the military and political performance and capabilities of the
insurgency efforts. Analysts have made their evaluations of a country's
vulnerability to regime or major policy change within the next year. This
issue covers the period from 1 August through 31 October 1986. Articles in
this issue focus on insurgent political opportunities to exploit regime
pressures and vulnerabilities.
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D/ CIQ 86-003
October 1986
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Legend
? Evident high
tir Evident low
O Negligible/not evident
? No information
? Increase from last quarter "
~ Decrease from last quarter a
~
c
?
v
o
c-
[
v
~
ro
?~a?
c?
~
:c
c.
E
~-
~?
Z
Q
~
Q
w
N
~
~
~
U
Political Economic/social pressures
G
G
~ ~
G
?
?
?
Vulnerabilities
O
V
?~
O
G
??
V
Elite factionalism
Opposition activities (excludes insurgency)
G?
O
G?
O
C
O
O
Military discontent
O
O
G ?
G
? ~
? ~
?
Insurgent political performance/capabilities
O
?
G
?
G
O
G
Security Shortfalls in Soviet or Bloc military support
O
O
O
O
G
? ~
O
Vulnerabilities
Insurgent military performance/capabilities
G ~
?
G ~
V
?
G
O ~
Deficiencies in government capabilities
O
Q
?
O
? ?
?
G
External International pressures for policy change
O
O
V
O
?
?
O ~
Pressures
Differences with Soviet Bloc
O
~
_
~
~
~
~
~
Prospects for change in regime within next yearb
O
O
O
O
V ?
?
O
Prospects for major policy shifts within next yearb ..
O
O
O
O
? ?
G
O
d Indicates any incremental change from the previous quarter, including
change within the same overall level of Evident High or Evident Low.
n The following probabilities are assigned:
? 70 percent or higher
V 30-70 percent
O 0-30 percent
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25X1
Vulnerabilities of Third World
Marxist-Leninist Regimes 25X1
Summary Developments and Outlook
During August-October 1986, the regimes in Afghanistan, South Yemen,
Mozambique, and Nicaragua came under increased socioeconomic, politi-
cal, and military pressures. In Kabul party factionalism intensified both
between the rival Khalqi and Parchami factions and within the Parchami
faction itself, particularly among supporters of former party chief Babrak
Karmal and current leader Najibullah. Moreover, Babrak's removal last
May, Soviet efforts to persuade party hardliners to allow nonparty figures
and credible exiles to join the government, and reinvigorated efforts to
push the Afghan Armed Forces to assume more of the war burden are con-
tributing to rising tension between elites in Moscow and Kabul, in our
judgment. The insurgents seized the initiative during August and Septem-
ber, attacking urban areas-including destruction of a large surface-to-air
missile support facility in the capital-and extending their activity into the
northern provinces.
Divisions within the 10-month-old South Yemeni regime also grew, with
rival leaders and their ersonal militias engaged in often violent confronta-
tions. the regime is concerned that the threat
from former leader Ali Nasir's supporters exiled in North Yemen will
grow. The exiles began limited operations this quarter and small teams
have infiltrated into the South. Moscow is dissatisfied with the current
leadership in Aden, but we believe it is not willing to risk a repeat of the
January bloodbath and jeopardize its relations on the peninsula to try to
force a solution to the infighting. As the record of past events indicates,
however, Moscow may not exert sufficient influence in Aden to prevent a
change in regime alignment that would favor more hardline factions if
internal and external security pressures mount
Mozambique's new head of state, former Foreign Minister Chissano, faces
daunting security and economic problems. While we do not expect any
immediate policy shifts from the Machel loyalist, policy continuity and the
fragile consensus between hardliners and moderates will be difficult to
maintain if insurgent pressure mounts during the rainy season, which
begins in November. A sudden insurgent offensive in late September
overran all Mozambican districts bordering on Malawi, and attacks on the
important Beira transportation corridor ended atwo-year lull. Insurgent
leaders have vowed publicly to step up operations against the successor
government and have ruled out negotiations. The new government will
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DI C/Q 86-003
October 1986
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require the support of key military elements, and this support will be tied
directly to the security situation. If the government appears adrift and
insurgent pressure continues unchecked, we believe the possibility of a
military coup or emergence of pro-Soviet hardliners in the government will
increase.
In Nicaragua Moscow is providing increasing amounts of economic aid to
make up for the regime's continued economic shortfalls and provide a
consumer safety net. Opposition activity increased slightly during the
quarter as the government, reeling from international criticism of its
crackdown on dissidents in July, took a more conciliatory posture toward
major opposition figures. Rebels operating inside Nicaragua stepped up
ambushes on government targets and increased aerial resupply efforts,
enabling renewed activity on the long-dormant southern front. We expect
the Sandinistas to toughen their stance on internal opponents as US
military aid begins to flow. Managua almost certainly will appeal to the
Soviets for more advanced antiaircraft weapons to hamper rebel resupply.
In Angola and Ethiopia there was little change in the political-military
situation from the previous quarter. Backed by unprecedented levels of
Soviet Bloc arms shipments and extensive resupply efforts, Luanda
continued its incremental buildup of troops and equipment at forward
government bases near UNITA-controlled territory.
the government is concerned about UNITA's public relations
campaign in the West and is undertaking its own foreign propaganda
initiative to undercut UNITA and improve its image in the United States.
Rumors of coup plotting by senior military officers surfaced once again in
Addis Ababa, but we see no evidence of any concrete plan of action and
judge that Mengistu's efficient security apparatus is capable of keeping
military disgruntlement in check.
External pressures on the Cambodian regime-and its supporters in
Hanoi-to consider settlement negotiations increased slightly this quarter.
The most noteworthy developments were Gorbachev's public suggestion at
Vladivostok that Vietnam and China discuss Cambodia and the Soviet's
agreement to discuss Cambodia during the ninth round of Sino-Soviet
consultations in October. Communist Democratic Kampuchea forces-the
Khmer Rouge-continued their active interior campaign, while the num-
ber of non-Communist forces in the country decreased over the quarter, in
our assessment.
25X1
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For its part, Moscow continued to militarily support its Marxist clients
opposed by anti-Marxist insurgencies, albeit at differing levels:
? Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and Cambodia continued to receive large
amounts of arms. The second direct arms shipment to Nicaragua 0
~
-including MI-17 and MI-25 helicopters-arrived in Octo-
ber; we expect that total military deliveries to Managua for the year wily
double last year's tonnage levels. 25X1
? Although we have difficulty tracking the flow, we estimate that transfers
to Afghanistan are running at last year's level at least.
? South Yemen took delivery of several MIG-21 fighters from overhaul in
the USSR, the first such equipment replacement since last January's
coup.
? Deliveries to Angola dropped sharply, following a spring surge when
deliveries almost equaled the total for 1985.
? The level of transfers to Mozambique so far this year is running well be-
low peak levels of 1984 and at only one-third last year's level.0 25X1
At the same time, in our judgment, Moscow faces several potential
conflicts between continued support of Marxist clients and its broader
regional interests:
? In South Yemen military operations by the exiles, or other major
outbreaks of violence, are likely to provoke a strong Soviet response and
could jeopardize Moscow's efforts on the peninsula to establish and
improve relations.
? Moscow's efforts to broaden the social base of the Afghan Government
and its withdrawal of nonessential troops risks opposition from the party
elite in Kabul and intensified party infighting.
? Gorbachev's new interest in better relations with Asian countries implic-
itly requires that Hanoi moderate its stance on Cambodia-at least
diplomatically-and act in greater consonance with Soviet regional
objectives.
? Moscow's reluctance to support Mozambique in its hour of need risks
criticism from other Third World clients that Soviet commitment to the
ultimate security of its friends is weak.
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Perspective
Insurgent Political Opportunities
Our country indicators and briefs point up the socioeconomic pressures and
internal political problems faced by many Third World Marxist-Leninist
regimes. In our view, these weaknesses present opportunities for exploita-
tion by insurgent organizations or domestic opposition groups that over
time can cost the government loss of support. Analysis of modern
insurgency efforts shows that political mobilization in the form of propa-
ganda, recruitment, front organization, and international activity is a
critical component-along with guerrilla warfare-of an insurgency's
success in weakening government control and legitimacy and ultimately
forcing its collapse.
Social, economic, ethnic, and religious tensions run high in these regimes,
and despite the institution of a central party apparatus, political factional-
ism or opposition is prevalent. Moreover, in many cases government
responses have exacerbated these problems and created new ones for the
leadership. For example, government economic centralization and misman-
agement not only has been a major factor in consumer shortages, in our
judgment, but also has spawned corruption, a system of unequal privileges
and access to goods, and dependency on the Soviet Bloc, whose capacity to
meet longer term development needs is poor.
A regime becomes vulnerable to its problems when those affected come to
blame the government and have been offered a vehicle and incentives to
withdraw their support. Insurgent political mobilization efforts should aim
to exploit issues relevant to the audience and, at the same time, present an
appealing alternative program or ideology:
? On economic issues, Managua is vulnerable to loss of support from many
groups, in our judgment, including farmers, peasants opposed to collectiv-
ization, nongovernment urban consumers, industrial workers, and gov-
ernment bureaucrats. In addition, the regime is under international
criticism from the Catholic Church and Western nations for its repressive
tactics, and has recently taken a more conciliatory posture toward
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internal dissidents in an effort to defuse the criticism. These pressures
and constraints on further elimination of regime opponents provide the
opportunity for the insurgents or opposition parties to publicize religious,
censorship, and human rights injustices.
? In Angola, UNITA's attacks on economic targets have exacerbated the
regime's economic problems. To win greater support from government-
controlled areas and cities, however, UNITA must effectively exploit the
government's inept economic policies, including the near collapse of the
fishing industry, declining agricultural exports, and the siphoning off of
substantial foreign exchange earnings by the Soviets and Cubans. In
addition, exploitation of frictions between Angolans and Cubans at
several different levels and divisions within the ruling party over race and
education could undercut support for the government and help UNITA
create an urban support network.
? In Afghanistan, traditional resistance to foreign domination and control
by any central government as well as religious/secular themes could be
exploited to mobilize active armed support for the insurgents and help
deter Soviet efforts to co-opt or pacify the rural population. In Kabul,
factionalization exists along several lines-including rural versus urban
splits in the party, disagreement over Soviet policies and influence, and
supporters and opponents of party chief Najibullah-and present oppor-
tunities for insurgent groups to win urban informants and recruits.
A strong political organization and appealing political platform are
essential vehicles for the channeling of popular disaffection against the
regime. If the insurgency has articulated a nationalist ideology or charac-
ter as well as legitimate political goals, the insurgents will more easily win
both domestic and foreign supporters as they exploit government weakness-
es and champion popular concerns. Many successful insurgencies since
1945-including the Sandinista and Cuban efforts-developed a political
platform and shadow government that were decisive factors in winning
external material support and international recognition or inducing the
withdrawal of international support for the regime.
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Country Indicators and Briefs
Interpreting the Indicators
The indicators have been grouped into two sets to
monitor change in pressures on the regime and the
progress of the insurgency efforts. Analysts have
developed country-specific indicators of socioeconom-
ic pressures, political conflict and opposition activity,
security problems, and external pressures. Similarly,
they have developed indicators tailored to the insur-
gencies in their countries that are designed to measure
the progress of the insurgency relative to its particular
level of sophistication. The lists include indicators
currently in evidence as well as those not now evident
but that would be of significant importance if they
surfaced. Analysts have marked any incremental
changes from the previous quarter, even if the change
occurred within the same overall level of evident high
or evident low. Thus an increase or decrease from the
previous quarter does not necessarily represent move-
ment from one level to another.
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Moscow is helping to make up for Managua's economic shortfalls and
is increasing its military assistance substantially over 1985 levels.
Several emergency grain shipments have eased food shortages,
oscow as provt a ar currency support as well. The Soviets
increased shipments of additional MI-8 and MI-17 helicopters that
will more than double the size of the Sandinista Air Force by the end
of the year. We expect that total military deliveries for 1986 will
probably double last year's tonnage levels. ~
Managua, reeling from international criticism of its crackdown on
dissidents last July, took a more conciliatory posture toward major
opposition figures this quarter but continued to harass less visible
lower echelon dissidents. The government and the Catholic Church
renewed their long-stalled dialogue in September, which the regime
25X1
Legend Economic/Social Pressures
?Eviden[ high
QEvident low
O Negligible/
not evident
? No information
? Increase from
last quarter
? Decrease from
last quarter
portrayed as evidence of its flexibility. The government also agreed to
meet with opposition parties in the National Assembly who oppose
the heavily proregime draft constitution. At the same time, the
regime detained amid-level political opposition leader, and in
September it blocked another antiregime priest from reentering th25X1
country. 0 25X1
During the next quarter, we expect that food shortages will recede
somewhat as food crops are harvested and Soviet Bloc donations
arrive. We judge that the Sandinistas may decide to toughen their
stance on internal opponents as US military aid begins to flow. Soviet
aid will probably keep pace with Managua's need
Public reaction to harassment of church
Negative reaction to military conscription
Urban protests
Opposition Activity Anti-regime church activity
Military/Security Problems
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
Deficiencies in: assimilating/maintaining equipment
logistics
Insurgent performance/capability
Shortfalls in Soviet or Cuban military support
Shortfalls in Soviet economic support
Diplomatic pressure from regional states
Prospects for regime change within next year:
Prospects for major policy shifts within next year''
The following probabilities arc assigned:
? 70 percent or higher
V 30-70 percent
O 0-30 percent
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? While rebels in the northwest withdrew to Honduran camps to
await arrival of US military aid, those remaining inside Nicaragua
stepped up ambushes on truck convoys and military jeeps and
inflicted considerable casualties. Aerial resupply increased, allow-
ing renewed activity on the long-dormant southern front.
? The decline in activity in the northwest enabled the Sandinistas to
concentrate forces on the rebel buildup in central Nicaragua, move
? n an attempt to diminish tensions among competing factions and
among political and military leaders, the rebel high command
created a council of regional commanders to advise them on
military and political matters.
In coming months, fighting will intensify as US aid reaches the
rebels. We expect the insurgents to concentrate on reinfiltrating into
Nicaragua and establishing a reliable resupply network. Insurgent
resolve is likely to be tested by improving Sandinista air defenses. In
our judgment, Managua almost certainly will turn to the Soviets for
more advanced antiaircraft weapons to hamper rebel resupply.
Legend
? Evident high
V Evident low
~` Negligible/
not evident
Leadership/
Organizational Skills
? No information Military Performance
~ Increase from
last quarter
~ Decrease from
last yuartcr
Honduras
TE6UC16ALPA
San AndrAS
de Bocay~
Yamales~
Nicaragua ~
m
Pacific \MANAGUA
Ocean
~ Rebel base
? Rebel resupply
airdrop
~ 50 Kilometers
l.- ~ ~ ~ ~1
50 Miles
Lago `,
de ~'~.
~lVicarague
? (Caribbean
Sea
`~-.
Unity/coordination among faction leaders
Articulation of political program/ideology
Political organization with grassroots
Nationalist appeal of insurgent leaders
Attacks on government positions/military convoys
Attacks on economic targets
Ability to maintain multiple front operations
Use of small unit tactics
Discipline among cadres
Diversification/performance of resupply efforts
Stocks of weapons/equipment
Collection/utilization of tactical intelligence
Casualties/weapon losses after encounters
Recruitment and retention of personnel
Number of local informants and suppliers
Civic action programs
Urban presence/recognition
Ties to opposition groups or parties
Foreign military support
Recognition by foreign governments
Cooperation of neighboring states
Aug-Oct 1986
- - -
V 1
t t~
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We believe that Nicaragua's dismal economic situation may spur
growing domestic criticism and provide fertile ground for antiregime
sentiment, especially if battlefield losses mount as the insurgency
heats up. Managua is relying on tighter regulations and repressive
measures to retain political control, while increasing Soviet aid has
created a marginal economic safety net that has thus far helped to
contain popular discontent over economic policies. The situation,
however, will be more susceptible to propaganda exploitation by the
insurgents and other opposition forces.0
Economic Tailspin
The Nicaraguan economy is a shambles. Economic activity is con-
tracting for the fifth straight year, recent harvests have been the
worst in memory, and inflation is roaring along at a 600-percent
annual rate, according to official Nicaraguan estimates. Despite well-
publicized emergency food shipments from the Soviet Bloc, consumer
shortages were increasingly severe during the past quarter. According
to the US Embassy, a number of staples-including beans, rice, and
cooking oil-have been practically unavailable in recent months. A
variety of sources indicate that many Nicaraguans have cut their
Public discontent over economic shortages is underscored by unprece-
dented consumer disturbances, stepped-up criticism from opposition
leaders, and charges of government economic mismanagement of
food supplies in the government-controlled press. Since last June, the
US Embassy has reported food-related disturbances in Managua,
Leon, and San Juan del Sur. According to a variety of sources, the
government is concerned that Nicaraguans are blaming government
mismanagement and inappropriate policies for current shortages
rather than external forces for the growing economic problems.
During the past quarter, private-sector spokesmen stepped up verbal
attacks on regime economic policies in regional and national meetings
and in private publications. A collaborationist opposition party, with
representation in the National Assembly, used the progovernment
press to declare that Sandinista inefficiencies were wrecking the
economy and that Nicaraguans could not survive on current rations.
The statement also warned that corrective actions were needed
because "the counterrevolution begins in the kitchen."
Regime Response
The regime has reacted to the economic decline with several stopgap
measures that, in our view, have no chance of improving the
economy's performance. The Sandinistas have tightened marketing
regulations, assumed more direct control over wholesale and retail
distribution, further restricted access to food rations, and are increas-
ingly relying on Soviet Bloc food donations. Since mid-year, Mana-
gua has added 200 plainclothes inspectors to help monitor compliance
with regulations in food markets. The Sandinistas also have revoked
operating licenses for private perishable-food wholesalers, replacing
them with a new state company, and have taken over the country's
last privately owned supermarket. In August, the regime set aside two
fully stocked supermarkets for the exclusive use of designated
government employees, party officials, and their families; remaining
supermarkets, which are reserved for dependents of other public
employees, will be stocked with only half as many goods. Under this
scheme, families of private-sector workers are forced to depend on
black markets since their designated state stores are virtually empty,
according to US Embassy reporting
Secret 6
Nicaragua: Total Exports and
Foreign Economic Aid, 1979-86
? Total exports
3107`25X1
As the economic base deteriorates, 25X1
the regime is counting on a steady expan25X1
of Soviet Bloc grants and trade credits to maintain minimum
consumption levels. While new Bloc food donations apparently will
ease shortages for the near term and help keep the lid on popular
discontent, we calculate that probable increases in economic support
will not be enough to stem the decline in the economy. Little, if any,
extra Soviet Bloc financial support will be extended to boost capi25X1
goods and raw material imports needed to restore factory output ~,
increase farm production. In our judgment, Moscow increasingly will
insist that the regime curb waste and inefficiency and rely more
heavily on its own resources. 25X1
Political Implications
The economic plight, particularly if combined with increasing Sandi-
nista battlefield losses, will continue to erode public confidence in the
regime, and we believe there is almost no chance that economic
performance will improve over the near term. Rather, we see a
continued downward spiral as increased military pressure against the
regime diverts already scarce managerial and budget resources to the
war effort. Moreover, we believe that further economic centraliza-
tion, repressive policies, and distributive inefficiencies are likely to be
viewed by most Nicaraguans as callously unresponsive to the basic
needs of the people.0 25X1
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In our assessment, official corruption, if made public, could further
erode the regime's image. Indications of growing graft probably
would cause the average Nicaraguan to think that the Sandinistas
were unable or unwilling to control the bureaucracy and deliver food
and social services as promised. The US Embassy has noted several
reports of official corruption in connection with Soviet Bloc food
donations, including the export of grain donations for hard currency
by government officials.
The situation is susceptible to exploitation by the insurgents and other
opposition forces, and various reports indicate that the Sandinistas
are concerned about this prospect. While we believe that most
Nicaraguans oppose a return to pre-Sandinista economic policies,
many are not happy with the controls established by the government
on all phases of economic activity. At the same time, a majority of
Nicaraguans will, in our view, look for continuation of the positive
aspects of land reform and extended health, education, and other
social services in any alternate economic agenda put forth by regime
~~
~ Secret
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President dos Santos made additional personnel changes this past
quarter that further enhance his control over the party and place
more blacks in key positions formerly dominated by the mulatto
minorit .Dos Santos removed the Air Force commander in Septem-
ber
Dos Santos, in our judgment, continues to
strengthen his position since his successful emergence over party
hardliners at the party Congress last December, although divisions,
particularly over race and educational background, remain among.
the party elite.
Foreign exchange shorta es worsened this quarter as oil prices
continued to decline, and Luanda is
having difficulty meeting foreign payments to estern creditors. An
increase in the volume of oil exports and Soviet loans are helping to
forestall sharp cuts in military expenditures. Although observers in
Luanda have reported the absence of consumer goods, we see no signs
? Increase frum
last quarter
~ Decrease from
last quarter
Indicators
--- - __
Legend Economic/Social Pressures
? Evident high
v Evident low
O Negligible/
not evident
? No information
Political Conflict/
Opposition Activity
of severe food shortages or food-related disturbances in urban areas.
Press reports indicate, however, that food shortages are prevalent in
central rural areas where insurgent activity has affected crop produc-
tion and spurred the movement of refugees into the cities
Luanda appears to have initiated a foreign policy strategy aimed a25X1
undercutting UNITA's support in the West and improving Angola's
image in the United States. We believe that recent visits to Luanda
by prominent US citizens, the hiring of US public relations firms, and
overtures to US officials about reopening talks on Namibian indepen-
dence are part of this strategy. In our judgment, this effort, together
with increased attention on the battlefield to extensive logistic
preparation, suggests that Luanda is focused on the longer haul and is
playing for time. Luanda probably hopes that internal strife in South
Africa, combined with a change of US administrations, will diminish
external commitments to UNITA.
25X1
25X1
Foreign exchange shortages
Disruption of major transport routes
Food, consumer goods shortages
Refugees/population dislocations
Emigration of political elites
Urban protests
Factionalism within the ruling party and government
Military discontent with government policies
Military discontent with pay, supply shortages-
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
Deficiencies in: protection of key economic targets
defense of cities/major garrisons
conduct of offensive operations
command and control
arms/ammunition/equipment
training/discipline
Military casualties/defeats
Insurgent performance/capability
Shortfalls in Cuban troop support
Shortfalls in Soviet military support
Shortfalls in Western investment/economic support
Differences with Moscow or Havana
Prospect f'or ree~ime ~a ' w" tact y
Prospects for rttajor p~I3t s, ~vith~t ~G~tt 3'~'`
'~ The following probabilities are assigned:
~ 70 percent or higher
~ 30-70 percent
O 0-30 percent
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Secret
? Backed by unprecedented levels of Soviet Bloc arms shipments and
extensive Soviet resupply efforts, Luanda continued its incremental
buildup of troops and equipment at forward government bases in
the southeast. Luanda's counterinsurgency strategy-previously
grandiose and ill planned-has shifted toward a more cautious,
incremental approach with special attention to logistics.
? UNITA launched attacks at Cuito Cuanavale and Munhango in an
effort to disrupt government preparations for attacks in the south-
east. In the north the insurgents sustained activity against nonoil
economic targets, and in the central contested areas they main-
Although the extensive military buildup this year could enable
Angola to break precedent and initiate actions during the rainy
season, we judge that a major government offensive against UNITA
will probably wait until next year. We believe that Luanda will
continue to increase its already substantial military buildup over the
November-April rainy season, and it may seek to divide UNITA
politically by holding out the prospect of direct negotiations and
Intense
UN/TA
activity
~?Oeriw~wi.
,~ South African airbase
supporting UNITA
UNITA attack
Angolan support base
I
Zaire
0 200 Kilometers Namibia ,~ I Botswana
6mth^ni^
Legend
M Evident high
~ Evident low
~~ Negligible/
not evident
Leadership/
Organizational Skills
? No information Military Performance
? Increase from
last quarter
" Decrease from
last quarter
Unity of leadership
Broader ethnic representation in leadership
Grassroots political structure (country wide)
Articulation of political program inside Angola
Attacks on oil facilities
Attacks on non-oil economic/transport targets
Attacks on major government positions
Activity outside southeastern strongholds
Urban activity
Air-defense performance/capability
Anti-armor performance/capability
Stocks of weapons/equipment
Logistics resupply capability
Consolidation/expansion of territorial control
Administrative and social services (country wide)
Urban presence/propaganda efforts
Cross ethnic support
South African support
Western aid
Foreign recognition/political support
Insurgent propaganda efforts abroad
South
Atlantic
Ocean
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 ~,..., ~ ~, 1, ~.~4 ~,. a.. .. .1,. ~, ~ ~~ .. I~. ~ I. I lip. i, .i.u
~. 1 i .. ~.. ...
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UNITA leader Savimbi's recent trip to Western Europe provided him
international media exposure but failed to win him increased diplo-
matic recognition or significant material support. In our judgment,
UNITA's prospects for winning increased foreign support depend
largely on its ability to present itself as a legitimate black African
liberation movement with justifiable political goals; its ties to South
Africa are the largest obstacle to projecting this image.0
Savimbi's West European Initiative
Savimbi, bolstered by his successful visit to the United States last
January, has launched a public relations campaign to gain increased
support for UNITA in Western Europe. Savimbi recently addressed
an informal gathering of conservative members of the European
Parliament, met with senior French officials off the record, talked
with conservative French businessmen, and held numerous interviews
with the media. Press reports indicate that Savimbi stressed UNI-
TA's willingness to begin a dialogue without preconditions with the
dos Santos government. According to US Embassy reports, Savimbi
was well received by conservative circles in Europe.
At the same time, Savimbi was unable to meet with any European
government officials on an official basis, and London and Bonn
refused even on an unofficial basis. His off-the-record meetings with
French officials created considerable debate within the government
and drew protests from several domestic interest groups. In addition,
the European Parliament narrowly passed a resolution branding
UNITA as a terrorist organization and condemning US support.
Disturbed by US aid to UNITA and the prospects of increased
European support to the insurgents, Luanda has mounted an effort
with the help of the USSR, Cuba, and the Frontline States to
undermine Savimbi's campaign. Press reports indicate that Luanda
vigorously protested the UNITA leader's visit to West European
officials and threatened to reduce ties to any country whose officials
met with Savimbi. Frontline States' ambassadors in Europe added
protests of,their own, and European Communist movements also
condemned the visit. Luanda's strategy focuses on Savimbi's ties to
South Africa, probably in the hopes of causing divisions between
Washington and its European allies over support to UNITA. We
believe that overtures to US officials about reopening talks on
Namibian independence are also part of this public relations effort.
Prospects
In our judgment, UNITA's prospects for winning increased foreign
support depend largely on its ability to present itself as a legitimate
black African liberation movement with justifiable political goals.
Savimbi must convince people through sophisticated media use that
(1) despite the aid he gets from South Africa, he is a black nationalist
and not a puppet of Pretoria; (2) UNITA has broad ethnic support
Secret 10
within Angola and offers a viable political organization that is 25X1
capable of running the country; and (3) the dos Santos government
has little popular support, is unable to administer the country, and
has failed to provide the people an economic livelihood.
Savimbi's most difficult obstacle in projecting a more favorable 25X1
image is his relationship with South Africa. These ties are particular-
ly offensive to African states and provide easy ammunition for
Luanda with other Third World countries. Angola's almost universal
recognition in international organizations, its image of representing
"anticolonial" interests because of its struggle against the Portu-
guese, and substantial commercial ties in Europe also work against
UNITA's efforts to be recognized diplomatically. France, Britain,
Portugal, and Belgium have business interests in Angola's lucrative
A major gain on the battlefield would bolster UNITA's argument 25X1
that the insurgents cannot be defeated militarily. Increased use of
Zairian territory would improve UNITA capabilities in the north and
in the oil-rich exclave of Cabinda. So far, Zairian President Mobutu
has kept a tight rein on UNITA activities, probably because he fears
Angolan retaliation and increased regional isolation, in our view.
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Secret
By focusing on the large Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola,
Savimbi could attempt to wrestle the mantle of legitimacy from
Luanda as the embodiment of "black nationalism" and "anti-
colonialism." Moreover, exposure of the essential role of oil revenues
in maintaining Cuban troops and paying for unprecedented levels of
Soviet arms could increase public pressure on Western businessmen
to reduce ties to Luanda, in our judgment. Such an effort might
precipitate a withdrawal of a major oil company-an event that
would have a signficant psychological impact on Luanda and Western
public opinion, in our judgment
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Secret
Factionalism within the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghan-
istan (PDPA) has intensified over the past few months, according to
the US Embassy in Kabul
Infighting is prevalent both between the rival Khalgi and Parchami
factions of the PDPA and within the Parchami faction itself-among
supporters of former party chief Babrak Karmal, current PDPA head
Na tbullah, and Prime Minister Keshtmand.
the political conflict has sparked public protests, work
slowdowns in several government ministries, and dissension in Afghan
army units and security services.0
Babrak's removal, Soviet efforts to persuade PDPA hardliners to
allow nonparty figures and credible exiles to join the government, a
new conscription drive, and reinvigorated efforts to push the Armed
Forces to assume more of the war burden are contributing to rising
Legend F,conomic/Social Pressures
? Evident high
V Evident low
p Negligible/
not evident
? No information
? Increase from
last quarter
? Decrease from
last quarter
anti-Sovietism, even among elements of the Soviet-installed regime,
in our judgment. anew political party25X1
created by Babrak supporters in August has called for the ouster of ~Fv
1
the Soviets. 25)(1
For his part, Najibullah is moving steadily to consolidate his personal
power base, on his way to easing Babrak out of his position as 25X1
President of the Revolutionary Council-the rubberstamp legisla- LAX"I
ture-and as a member of the Politburo. Babrak's photographs have
disappeared from official government buildings, according to US 25X1
Embassy sources in Kabul. We judge that approval of the constitutiot_
establishing a new legislature this fall will provide a means for
Forced relocations of population
Restrictions on private sector activity
Military conscription
Opposition Activity Tension between Kabul and Moscow
Military/Security Problems
discipline/command and control
Government purges/dismissals
Slowdowns/strikes in government ministries
Afghan deficiencies in: defense of cities/major garrisons
intelligence capability
small unit tactics
SovietSoviet d~morale problems
Soviet military casualties
Insurgent performance/capability
l~s~r dratN?rt,+~+t t' ~,
The following probabilities are assigned:
? 70 percent or higher
r 30-70 percent
Q 0-30 percent
~'~""r25X1
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The insurgents attacked urban areas and key lines of communication
and extended their activity into the northern provinces during the
quarter:
? The insurgents increased activity in Kabul, Herat, and Qandahar
despite continuing Soviet and Afghan efforts to improve urban
security. Their most spectacular act was the destruction in late
August of a large surface-to-air-missile support facility and ammu-
nition dump near the capital; the Soviets responded with a month-
long pounding of the insurgent presence at Paghman, west of the
city.
Soviet/Afghan violations of Pakistani airspace increased and bomb-
ing of insurgent positions in Pakistan were some of the most intense
attacks to date. Soviet and Afghan efforts to control and disrupt food
supplies contributed to increased costs and some shortages. Soviet
withdrawal of six regiments followed an earlier troop augmentation,
leaving Moscow's net combat capability relatively unchanged. We
expect fighting to slow this winter as inclement weather makes
Legend Leadership/
? Evident high Organizational Skills
V Evident low
O Negligible/
not evident
Rack+~ Attacks ~ Kabul
19$3-sr~ b~ t~,~rtrter
? t9s3 sa ss
t9$6 data avat7abk through. September.
Articulation of political/military program
Unity of Afghan resistance
Cooperation among field commanders
Political organization with grassroots
? No information Military Performance Attacks on government/military positions
~ Increase from Tactical initiative/ops sophistication
l
t
as
quarter
? Decrease from
Air-defense performance/capability
last quarter Urban activity
Insurgent morale and discipline
Weapons/training
Provision of rural food/supplies
Supportive Pakistani posture at Geneva
Resistance alliance propaganda efforts
25X1
25X1
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Factional divisions stemming from the leadership change in Kabul
this spring continue to plague the ruling party and frustrate Moscow's
attempts to consolidate Najibullah's position as party head. In
addition, reinvigorated efforts to push "national reconciliation" with
nonparty members and to "Afghanize" the war effort will continue to
divide Moscow's and Kabul's ruling elite in the coming months, in our
view. Greater exposure-both internally and internationally~f
these fundamental differences between Moscow and Kabul could help
fuel anti-Sovietism among the regime elite and weaken Moscow's
efforts to portray the Kabul regime favorably to the international
community.
Sources of Tension
We believe intensified and unconcealed factionalism within the ruling
People's Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) over Moscow's replacement of
Babrak Karmal as party secretary general in May is probably causing
Moscow to wonder whether it made a serious error. Factionalism
between political supporters of Babrak, current party head Najibul-
lah, and Prime Minister Keshtmand is deep and is prevalent within
the military and government bureaucracy as well. Najibullah's
reputation for ruthlessness, his history of anti-Khalgi behavior, and
his hints that further purges will occur are sustaining party unrest
and eroding regime legitimacy, in our view. At the same time, Babrak
Other minorities 2%
Hazara 2%
continues to provide a rallying point for those opposed to Najibullah; New Committee (as of July 1986)
there were large demonstrations of support along Babrak's route to
last month's Soviet withdrawal ceremonies, according to the US
Embassy in Kabul.
Afghanistan: Ethnic Composition of
PDPA Central Committee a
As long as Najibullah retains Soviet backing, we believe it is only a
matter of time before he will be able to remove his principal rivals-
Babrak Karmal and Prime Minister Keshtmand--completely from
power and weaken the political strength of their supporters. Najibul-
lah already has obtained the backing of important Khalqi leaders
such as Interior Minister Gulabzoi and Defense Minister Nazar
Mohammad-support that we believe will help him cement his
control over the Armed Forces. He has appointed several of his
supporters to the Politburo and roughly doubled the size of the
Central Committee in a bid to stack it with people who would approve
future leadership changes aimed at consolidating his power. ~
However, Najibullah must still convince Moscow that it did not make
a mistake in appointing him party chief and that he can establish a
credible government. Even if he eliminates his main rivals, he will
face a difficult task in trying to achieve Moscow's primary objectives
of building a cohesive government and having the Afghan Armed
Forces assume more of the war burden. Basic policy differences
between Moscow and significant elements of the PDPA as well as
Najibullah's unpopularity will continue to fuel regime infighting for
some time, in our view.
Moscow's longstanding-and unsuccessful-strategy for political
consolidation of the regime centers on broadening the social base of
the government by appointing nonparty members to some government
posts. It also involves an effort to woo back credible figures in the
Afghan resistance and exile communities. Both Najibullah and
Babrak faced resistance from leftist party ideologues over how far
this so-called broadening campaign should go.
'Because of rounding, the sum of the components may
not add to 100.
25X1
3t~2"25X1
Secret 14
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Secret
Similarly, we believe Moscow's push to Afghanize the war is
contributing to uneasiness within the party over Moscow's reliability
as an ally. Another conscription drive this past quarter eliminated
student deferments and is affecting the sons and daughters of party
members. Most party officials realize that the poorly trained Afghan
Armed Forces are not up to the task of operating independently,
despite official press claims of numerous victories over the insurgent
forces. Moreover, victories often come at the cost of high casualties,
including among the Army's elite regiments. We believe that disgrun-
tled elements in Kabul almost certainly view efforts to Afghanize the
war at the expense of high casualties as a form of Soviet betrayal.
Moscow's Dilemma
In our judgment, these divisions within the ruling party and between
Moscow and Kabul complicate Moscow's diplomatic effort to portray
its-and Kabul's-negotiating posture as more conciliatory and could
fuel greater pressures for instability. For example, soon after Gorba-
chev announced the Soviet decision to withdraw six regiments from
Afghanistan, Najibullah went out of his way to explain that the
decision was undertaken with Kabul's consent and that Moscow had
no intention of abandoning the regime. We believe that, if significant
elements of the regime came to believe that the Soviets were serious
about disengaging from Afghanistan, defections in the militar ,
government, and party would probably occur.
At a minimum, we believe broader international and domestic
exposure of these deep-seated differences and divisions-perhaps
greater than at any time since the Communist coup in 1978-would
contribute to rising anti-Sovietism among the elite and frustrate
Moscow's efforts to build a reliable client state near its border. As
Moscow considers the pros and cons of purging Najibullah's major
opponents and continues to "buy" time on the Afghanistan issue in
diplomatic circles, there is the risk that competition among factions
will intensify even more and significantly weaken regime control.
15 Secret
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Secret
Rumors of coup plotting by senior military officers again surfaced in
Addis Ababa-a periodic occurrence-but we judge that Mengistu's
pervasive and efficient security apparatus remains capable of keeping
Mengistu postponed promulgation of a Soviet-style constitution, the
formation of a "People's Republic," and the end of military rule from
his September target date until early next year. According to US
Embassy reports, documentation, organization, and administration of
the process is requiring more time than originally anticipated.
Mengistu has allowed public debate over the proposed document,
and, according to the US Embassy, public misgivings over certain
provisions-such as the creation of a strong presidency-have sur-
faced. In our judgment, however, the regime is unlikely to make more
than token adjustments to the final draft.
Legend
? Evident high
V Evident low
O Negligible/
not evident
+ Nu information
~ Increase from
last quarter
~ Decrease from Political Conflict/
Military/Security Problems
According to US Embassy reporting, Mengistu hopes the new
constitution will legitimize his broad government powers and that
provisions allowing local autonomy for Ethiopia's ethnic groups will
undercut support for the insurgencies. The Eritreans have rejected
this offer, however, and we believe its appeal to the Tigreans will bt25X1
limited. The document is expected to give the Workers Party
prominence for remaking Ethiopian society along socialist lines.
25X1
The regime pushed on with its large-scale rural control program of
moving scattered peasants into new villages. "Villagization" affects
the large Oromo ethnic group the most, but apathy, religious
differences, and geographic dispersion have prevented Oromo resent-
ment from coalescing. Mengistu kept his more ambitious resettlement
program on hold during the past quarter in an attempt to remedy
human rights abuses publicized by Western critics. We expect, 25X1
however, that he will resume long-distance resettlement early next
year.0 25X1
Disruption major transport routes
Urban consumer goods shortages
Government brutality
Government repression of religious activity
Factionalism within leadership
Factionalism within bureaucracy
Anti-regime church activity
Student opposition
Ideological/generational conflict within military
Factionalism among senior officers
Military discontent over loss of influence
Military criticism of Soviet presence/influence
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
Deficiencies in: protection of key economic targets
defense of cities/major garrisons
police/security capabilities
Military casualties/defeats
Insurgent performances/capability
Shortfalls in Soviet or Cuban military support
Shortfalls in Soviet economic support
Pmspects far regime change within rtext }+eare
Prospects for ma,~tr poiic}+ shifts within next yekr?
The following probabilities are assigned:
? 70 percent ur higher
V 30-70 percent
O 0-30 percent
310716 ' ^ ?C
25X1
Secret 16
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Secret
Military activity in northern Ethiopia was light during the past
quarter:
? Marxist Eritrean rebels set off several bombs in Asmera, the
provincial capital, and raided military targets near the airport
before Ethiopian Revolution Day in September, but were unable to
produce a "spectacular," such as the destruction of Soviet military
aircraft, as they did at Asmera Airport in March 1984.
? In Tigray Province, neither side initiated major operations, al-
just out of training camps into existing units, precluding any major
For their part, the Christian-based Marxist EPLF and TPLF rebel
groups are likely to probe government defenses and to continue
attacking targets of opportunity. The capabilities of smaller Muslim
groups are unlikely to increase over the next few months despite an
increase in assistance from Saudi Arabia in an attempt to pressure
Legend Leadership/
~ Evident high Organizational Skills
Evident low
C Negligible/
not evident
? No information Military Performance
r Increase from
last quarter
+ Decrease from
last quarter
s~o ~taos
Sudan
Eri(; ~ .r
Asmera'
ADDIS ABABA
~ EPLF area of control
Q EPLF operating area
~ TPLF operating area
an
Articulation of political program/ideology
Attacks on key economic targets
Attacks on government/military positions
Interdiction of supply/transport routes
Expansion military action beyond home territory
Incidents of urban sabotage/terrorism
Stocks of weapons/equipment
Contact with other opposition groups
Propaganda efforts
Urban networks/undergrounds
,*tA~11A
Y.A.R. (( P.Q.R.Y.
{tiorMt In (South
Y?men) Yamen)
~~,*J~DEN Gu/f
i~8sb e/ Of
s
cs/
$01118!f?aos~CCts t`+D' regime ~ wiil}it- ~xt year"
is t'~t tna, st-it~ wIlhit~ next }
'' The following probabilities arc assigned:
? 70 percent or higher
Q 30-70 percent
C> 0-30 percent
31071E '^
25X1
Secret 20
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Secret
? A sudden insurgent offensive in late September overran all Mozam-
bican districts bordering on Malawi and seized several major towns,
according to US Embassy Government troops
fled across the border to safety, while a counterattack by Zimbab-
wean forces in Mozambique stalled in the face of stiff resistance by
RENAMO.
? The insurgents resumed sabotage of the important Beira transpor-
tation corridor-ending a virtual two-year lull following the signing
of a nonaggression pact between South Africa and Mozambique in
March 1984-and carried out several highly visible attacks near
Maputo. South African support probably aided RENAMO's
campaign.
? The government's forces are demoralized and unaggressive; we
judge that use of Soviet-supplied AN-26 transport aircraft to bomb
suspected guerrilla locations has had little effect on the insurgents,
who are well concealed and able to disperse quickly. The Frontline
States and the Soviet Bloc provided no increase in military aid this
quarter. 0
The guerrillas will almost certainly seek to consolidate gains on
transportation routes and Maputo during the rainy season now
beginning; RENAMO leaders have vowed publicly to step up opera-
tions. Various dissident exile groups formed a united front-
CUNIMO-but RENAMO military commander Jacama has re-
fused to deal with it.
Cohesion of in-country military council
Legend Leadership/
~ Evident high
V Evident low
~ Negligible/
not evident
? No information Military Performance
? Increase from
last quarter
? Decrease from
last quarter
Ca>peration between military council and exiles
JB~ira
Moza Cmbique
Articulation political program inside Mozambique
Attacks on key economic/transport targets
Attacks on major government positions
Activity outside central strongholds
Stocks of weapons/equipment
Consolidation/expansion of territorial control
South African support
Western support
Insurgent propaganda efforts abroad
Mozambique
Channel
~'{ RENAMO attack
Area of RENAMO
predominance
Beira corridor (port,
oil pipeline, rail-
road, and road)
?
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Secret
Divisions within the 10-month-old regime appear to be resurfacing
with renewed intensity. Rival leaders and their personal militias
increasingly manifest their political and tribal differences in violent
confrontations. We believe that the regime's decision to postpone the
party congress scheduled for October to next June is a tacit admission
of its inability to stage such an event without its erupting into
violence. In our view, the regime appears to be hanging together
because of Soviet pressure and the perceived common threat of
former leader Ali Nasir and his supporters exiled in North Yemen.
Increased factionalism and a growing exile threat, however, could
prompt a takeover bid by a more hardline faction.
Moscow is dissatisfied with the current leadership in Aden, but we
believe it is not willing to risk a repeat of the January bloodbath and
jeopardize its relations on the peninsula to try to force a solution to
the factional infighting. Moscow has been playing a mediating role
but has not achieved a viable accommodation between rival political
Legend Economic/Social Pressures
~ Evident high
G Evident low
Q Negligible/
not evident
. No information
? Increase from
last quarter
? Decrease from
last quarter
factions. In the months ahead, we expect the Soviets will maneuver to
increase their influence, as each of the factions looks to Moscow for
support. The return this quarter of MIG-21 fighters from overhaul in
the USSR may signal the beginning of deliveries to replace equip-
ment lost in January's coup.
The deteriorating economic and security situation is causing increas-
ing numbers of the population to flee to North Yemen. Border
tensions increased during the quarter, and the continued deployme25X~
of South Yemeni forces to the North Yemeni border indicates tha
Aden fears the threat from the exiles will grow, in our judgment.
Sanaa and Aden have taken steps to prevent a military confrontation
between North and South Yemeni forces over the presence and
activities of the exiles, but we judge that the likelihood of a major
incident remains high. 25X1
Food, energy, consumer goods shortages
Regional/tribal tensions
Harsh internal security measure
Population flight/elite emigration
Opposition Activity Assassinations or attempts against officials
Popular criticism of government/party elite
Military/Security Problems
Factionalism among senior officers
Military discontent with lack of influence/role
Rumors of military coup plotting
Deficiencies in: police/security forces control
defense of cities/strategic targets
manpower
arms/ammunition/equipment
Desertions/mutinies
Urban terrorism/sabotage
Exile guerrilla activity against government
Differences with Soviet Bloc
Differences with Gulf states
Shortfalls in economic aid
Regional/border hostilities
Shortfalls in Soviet military aid
Prospects f+~r instability or icteular Idership ' change within next yeas" - ;
a The following probabilities are assigned:
~ 70 percent or higher
~ 30-70 percent
O 0-30 percent
~'~~~25X1
Secret 22
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? The exiles began limited operations this quarter, with clashes and
? The exile groups continue to gain recruits, including a senior South
Yemeni Air Force commander. However, the exiles continue to lack
decisive military leadership, in our judgment, and are divided over a
common political and military agenda. Ali Nasir, although still
popular as titular head, has lost credibility as a military leader
capable of exerting effective control over the exiles, in our view.
South Yemen is increasingly
concerned that the threat from the exiles will grow. Aden reported-
ly believes that the exiles' antiregime propaganda efforts are
reaching sympathizers in the South, and it has deployed substantial
forces near the North Yemeni border to block the infiltration of
large exile groups. We judge that Aden will redouble its efforts to
obtain additional Soviet military aid.
Aden, in our view, is anxious to avoid a military confrontation with
Sanaa over the exiles, but a major increase in exile operations would
force Aden to consider cross-border attacks against exile sanctuaries
in North Yemen. We expect that the Soviets would react to a major
escalation of exile operations in an effort to prevent further disinte-
gration of the situation and to protect their interests,
Legend Leadership/
? Evident high
v Evident low
O Negligible/
not evident
? No information
~ Increase from
last quarter
? Decrease from
last quarter
Leadership confidence/unity
Saudi Arabia
Yemen Arab
Republfc
(N. Yemen)
BOVnCiry rlprpRlA?tptiOn 18
not noceieerlly eut~orltetiv0.
Organizational Skills Nationalist appeal of leadership
Articulation of political program
Attacks on political targets attributed to exiles
Attacks on economic targets
Availability weapons equ
Collection utilization of intelligence
Efforts to coop[ South Yemeni military units
Other foreign military support
Recognition by foreign governments
Arabian
Sea
Socotra
iP.D.R.Y.)
ba~ndarY ~y
sa \a~ Oman
a~"c ~c
?O \~P
People's Democratic
Republic of YemerY
(S. Yemen)
Military incidents_
attributed to exiles
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Under Vietnamese guidance, Phnom Penh continued its efforts to
build political and administrative institutions and to promote the
growth of apro-Vietnamese Communist party and mass organiza-
tions. Phnom Penh also lengthened conscription requirements and
stepped up training of air force officers as part of its effort to build a
military capable of taking over security duties from Vietnam.
External pressures on Phnom Penh-and its supporters in Hanoi-
increased slightly this quarter, although we do not expect them to
result in settlement negotiations any time soon. The most outstanding
developments were Gorbachev's public suggestion at Vladivostok that
Vietnam and China discuss Cambodia and the Soviets' agreement to
discuss Cambodia during the ninth round of Sino-Soviet consultations
in October. Although these Soviet gestures may have prompted
Legend Economic/Social Pressures
? Evident high
r Evident low
O Negligible/
not evident
? No information
? Increase from
last quarter
~ Decrease from
Military/Security Problems
Prospects for a negotiat
a The following probabilities are assigned:
? 70 percent or higher
30-70 percent
~` 0-30 percent
concern in Phnom Penh and Hanoi, we judge they do not signal
diminishing Soviet support for the fledgling regime in Cambodia.
More significant, China sent additional arms and cash to leaders of
the resistance groups as promised last July and stepped up milit25X1
pressure along its border with Vietnam in October. Finally,
ASEAN's UN resolution condemning the Vietnamese occupation of
Cambodia passed by the largest margin ever, despite flagging
enthusiasm among some ASEAN countries-primarily Indonesia
and Malaysia-for diplomatic pressure against Phnom Penh. ~
Reports/rumors of military coup plotting
Deficiencies in: defense of cities/major garrisons
arms/ammunition equipment
training/discipline
local militia performance/capability
Desertions/mutinies
Casualties/defeats
Withdrawal of Vietnamese troops
Insurgent performances/capabilities
ASEAN consensus on Cambodian policy
Chinese military pressure
Tension in Soviet-Vietnamese relations
Foreign economic/diplomatic sanctions against Hanoi
ttt within next yeah
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? Communist Democratic Kampuchea (DK) forces-the Khmer
Rouge-continued their active interior campaign with numerous
raids against civilian and military targets. DK
proselytizing activities are making some limited headway in bur-
nishing its image and gaining new recruits.
? The number of non-Communist forces in the country has decreased
over the past quarter, in our assessment. Supply shortages and lack
of awell-developed internal support structure are impediments to
sustaining operations.
? Hanoi has deployed the equivalent of one division since July from
Vietnam to the Cambodian interior, where the DK has been active.
The Vietnamese are also confiscating excess rice supplies and
closing all but state-controlled rice mills to restrict resistance access
During the next few months, we expect that Vietnam will take
advantage of improving weather conditions to intensif sweep opera-
tions and step up barrier construction n our
judgment, Hanoi's troop buildup in the interior and a likely increase
in airstrikes against guerrilla positions will increase the pressure on
the Khmer Rouge, which should, however, be able to sustain interior
operations, including raids on population centers.
Khmer Rouge Operating Area,
August-September 1986
Aug-Oct 1986
Non-communist Khmer
Forces Rowe
Legend Leadership/ Unity of leadership
? Evident high Organizational Skills Grassroots political structure
V Evident low Effective chain of command
O Ne
li
ible/
g
g
Articulation of political
ro
rams
p
g
not evident
? No information National appeal of leadership
o Increase from Attacks on government facilities
last quarter
Attacks on military positions
~ Decrease from
last quarter Attacks on economic targets
Seizure and control of territory
Availability weapons/equipment
Logistics resupply capability
Urban activity
Coordination of insurgent groups in field
Number of local informants and suppliers
Provision administrative/social services
Urban presence/propaganda efforts
Chinese military aid
Other foreign military aid
Foreign political support
25X6
25X1
25X1
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Secret
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