THE POLITICAL INSTABILITY QUARTERLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 70
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of rcrct
Intelligence
0T GIVE OUT
r:
OR MAMC ON
The Political Instability Quarterly
With 'a Special Retrospective Annex:
Instability Patterns and Trends, 1984-86
August 1986
--,veacret-
GI IPI 86-003
August 1986
Copy 7 8 1
ILLEGIB
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4T)
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The Political Instability Quarterly
With a Special Retrospective Annex:
Instability Patterns and Trends, 1984-86
This quarterly was produced by and coordinated
within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and
suggestions are welcome
Secret
GI IPI 86-003
August 1986
9 X1
25X1
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Contents
v
Summary: Levels of Concern
Part 1. Countries With Developments of Special Interest
South Africa: Into the Laager
Pakistan: Benazir Bhutto Plans "Street Politics" C ninai
nn
Part 2.
Developments and Trends
The prospects./or instability in 30 countries, based on a specific indicator checklist
art 4.
A Special Retrospective Annex:
Instability Patterns and Trends. 1994-R6
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9 Y1
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The Political Instability Quarterly
Preface This quarterly publication is designed to provide timely warning of
significant instability in countries of key importance to US interests. The
quarterly, which in this issue covers the period from 1 May through
3 1 July, examines events and processes that could lead to significant
instability, including any one or a combination of the following-irregular
regime change, coup d'etat, breakdown of order, major civil war, revolu-
tionary upheaval, or major policy shift. The paper assesses our levels of
concern regarding the potential for instability in the short term and over
the next two years through the consistent application of 24 indicators.
This quarterly includes four parts:
? Part I presents essays on selected countries in which there have been
developments of special interest. Included in each assessment are subsec-
tions listing indicators to be watched with reference to the scenarios that
we believe are most likely to unfold and alternative scenarios.
? Part 2 includes a brief assessment of the instability outlook in 30
countries, and country-specific tables tracing significant political and
economic changes during the past two years. The countries we assess
have been selected because they are key US friends or allies, located near
strategic choke points, major oil producers or debtors, geographically
close to the United States, or especially salient or influential in the Third
World.
? A Part 4 is included in some issues, such as the current one, for a special
annex or assessment of a topic related to instability.
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Status of Key Indicators
Developments in
Second Quarter, 1986,
and Prospects
Colombia
Venezuela
Spain
Greece
Legend
O Negligible concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
V Substantial concern
0 Serious concern
? Concern has increased since last quarter
? Concern has decreased since last quarter
Current Assessment
or SS ~~` D? t5 ~?
`~' so coo ~`
10
Kenya
Zaire
Prospects
Concern for
Significant
Instability
During next:
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The Political Instability Quarterly
Summary: The summary chart on the facing Levels of Concern concerns about prospects for instability currently sareegrcountries
eatest. where our
In Latin America our concern for stability in Peru has increased as the
brutal quelling of rioting by imprisoned Sendero Luminoso insurgents has
prompted a major crisis and aggravated already strained relations between
President Garcia and the military. Concern about Chile is mounting as
President Pinochet appears determined to crush growing antiregime pro-
tests. In El Salvador fighting between government forces and insurgents is
likely to increase as both sides try to strengthen their positions before talks
later this summer.
Prospects for stability have improved slightly in three Central American
countries: Guatemala, where the seven-month-old government of President
Cerezo has so far retained critical military backing; Honduras, where
President Azcona is continuing to put civilian-military relations on a more
even keel; and Panama, where President Delvalle remains subservient to
the defense chief, Noriega.
In the Near Eastern-South Asian region, Sudan remains very shaky.
Despite some recent improvements-including the installation of an elect-
ed, civilian government-this strategic country faces a formidable array of
problems, including insurgency in the south and Libyan machinations. Our
concerns about Pakistan have increased for the near term, mainly because
of the campaign of "street politics" Benazir Bhutto aims to mount later
this summer against the Zia-Junejo regime (see Part I essay).
Iraq remains high on the instability concern list because of its serious
economic problems and because it is bracing for a major Iranian offensive
that could produce heavy casualties and aggravate already significant
morale problems. Concern about Egypt centers on the prospect that
Mubarak may soon impose austerity measures recommended by the
International Monetary Fund that risk sparking widespread riots that
could result in his fall. Iran's substantial economic problems do not pose an
immediate threat to the regime, but they are prompting factional strife,
and we are concerned that in the longer term the deteriorating economy
combined with other possible developments-such as Khomeini's death or
war reversals-could result in significant instability.
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President Babangida's regime in Nigeria is in serious trouble. He faces
acute ethnic and economic problems and depends on volatile military
factions for support. In South Africa, the government of President Botha
and blacks are locked in an increasing spiral of violence, but the regime re-
tains the backing of the vast majority of whites and has formidable security
capabilities (see Part 1 essay).
Concern about South Korea remains at a substantial level, although both
the government and the opposition have signaled some flexibility on the
contentious issue of a direct presidential election. Elsewhere in East Asia,
President Aquino has made some progress toward consolidating power in
the Philippines-initiating constitutional reform and cease-fire talks with
rebels-but the recent abortive coup underscores the continuing uncertain-
ties in Manila.
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Part 1. Countries With
Developments of Special Interest
South Africa:
Into the Laager '
? The Botha government and the African National
Congress (ANC) likely are locked into an increasing
spiral of bloody ANC attacks and South African
cross-border reprisals.
? Pretoria's decision to carry out such reprisals and to
impose a state of emergency reflects its frustration
with being unable to end nearly two years of almost
constant black unrest and a growing perception in
white ruling circles that they must now prepare
more intently for "going it alone."
? The government's determination to crack down at
home is matched by a willingness to strike more
aggressively at neighboring black-ruled states that it
accuses of harboring or supporting the ANC. The
ANC appears to have launched a campaign of
bombings that includes civilian, as well as govern-
ment, targets.
? The Botha government also must contend with
increasing dissatisfaction among whites who believe
the government is moving too quickly in its reform
program. Although rightwing white groups present
no immediate political threat, the ruling National
Party will work hard to prevent the erosion of the
strong historical and cultural ties between Afrikan-
erdom and the National Party.
Dealing With the Unrest
? The Botha Government clearly is frustrated by its
inability to suppress almost two years of constant
black unrest. Over 2,000 people have died in unrest-
related incidents since the most recent violence
began in September 1984, according to the respect-
ed South African Institute of Race Relations. Some
213 people were killed in May 1986-the highest
The Afrikaner equivalent of "circling the wagons."
monthly figure to date. Despite Pretoria's claims, the
subsequent declaration of a state of emergency in
June has not appreciably lowered the average number
All indicators suggest that the situation in black
townships is continuing to degenerate and that many
townships are approaching a state of anarchy. South
African Government data indicate, for example, a
trend toward greater factional violence in the town-
ships, noting that thus far in 1986 more blacks have
been killed by other blacks than by security forces. In
some townships, government-backed black officials
have turned increasingly to vigilante squads to try to
reassert control and break the power of black activ-
ists, while other townships resemble "liberated areas,"
where gangs of militant youths calling themselves
"comrades" enforce decisions made by people's courts
and attack township residents who refuse to take part
in protests or boycotts. Throughout these areas,
attacks against black policemen, black townships offi-
cials, and more moderate blacks in general are justi-
fied by asserting that such people are "collaborators."
unrest is now
spreading to rural areas, including many of the black
The government increasingly has argued that, to
continue its reform program and permit moderate
blacks to come forward and negotiate, the government
must first crack down hard to "restore order." Given
this strongly held view, we see little likelihood that
Pretoria will quickly lift the current state of emergen-
cy; the government forced through new security legis-
lation that gives it the power to declare any part of the
country an "unrest area" and to detain people for 180
days without trial. Although the government may
gradually lighten restrictions on the press and media,
we anticipate that the widespread detention of activ-
ists, heavy police and Army presence in the townships,
and restrictions on black and multiracial political,
civic, labor, and church groups now constitute at the
very least a semipermanent feature of South African
i
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Pretoria's tough prosecution of emergency regula-
tions-including detention of black activists, a ban on
gatherings, press restrictions, and strong security
presence in black townships-may succeed in quieting
black protest temporarily. We believe that, while
many blacks may lie low for some time, antigovern-
ment groups will continue to be active. Some black
leaders probably accept Pretoria's crackdown as a
direct challenge and will continue efforts to circum-
vent security measures. The most credible black lead-
ers, in our view, will continue to refuse to participate
in talks with the government about constitutional
change unless Pretoria releases political prisoners,
remove the bans on the ANC and other organizations,
and indicates that it will discuss a genuine transfer of
power-all conditions that Pretoria is unlikely to
consider in the foreseeable future.
Meanwhile, Pretoria's crackdown is seriously disrupt-
ing day-to-day black politics and labor. For example,
leaders of the antiapartheid United Democratic Front
in eastern Cape Province, fearing detention, recently
broke off negotiations on local issues being held with
business and government representatives. Similarly,
as black leaders have been primary targets for deten-
tion, labor-management relations and contract negoti-
ations have been paralyzed. Retail workers have
staged strikes protesting the detention of union lead-
ers, and business leaders have complained that they
have no union leaders with whom to negotiate.
Pretoria's belief that it is following the correct path
probably will be strengthened by the recent wave of
bombings that have hit civilian as well as government
targets. Although the ANC has not claimed credit for
many of the recent attacks, the use of Soviet limpet
mines and landmines in many attacks, the sophistica-
tion of several operations, and the absence of other
effective guerrilla groups in South Africa strongly
suggest that most of the acts are the work of the
ANC. We believe the continued shift to civilian
targets probably reflects the growing influence of
restless, militant, rank-and-file youths opposed to
what they see as inaction by the ANC's relatively
moderate "old-guard" leadership
striking resemblance to a swastika, relates di-
rectly to the AWB's identification with Christian-
ity and its efforts to foster group identiy. The
emblem represents the seven angels, seven stars,
and seven seals alluded to in the Revelation of
St. John as the antithesis of the 666 that symbol-
In our judgment, Pretoria is likely to launch attacks
against ANC targets in neighboring states-attacks
that aim to inflict heavier guerrilla casualties than in
the past and that may result in more incidental
civilian deaths. South Africa's leading expert on the
ANC-a former police intelligence officer-has
boasted, for example, that an all-out effort by Pretoria
during any given six-week period would wipe out the
ANC. Some of President Botha's most influential
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security advisers almost certainly agree with the
assessment and probably are counseling the President
that just such a tougher policy is needed now.
Rightwing Backlash
Pretoria also must contend with a political challenge
to National Party dominance from white rightwing
political parties and cultural organizations. Although
public opinion polls indicate that a majority of whites
support the government's reform program, persistent
press reports about the possible release of jailed ANC
leader Nelson Mandela and reports of possible negoti-
ations with the ANC have fueled concerns among
already skittish conservative whites that the National
Party is not being firm enough in dealing with black
Although these groups show no signs of being able to
mount a credible challenge to the National Party's
hold on the white electorate, the revival of the ultra-
right Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB)-and
its courting by more mainline conservative parties-
represents a political reality that no white government
can ignore. President Botha is likely to attempt to use
a National Party Congress this August to gain a
renewed party and popular mandate for his twin
Since the early 1960s, Pretoria has engaged in a
program of import substitution and stockpiling that
has included borrowing from third-country banks and
subterfuge trade. In addition, South Africa has
financed some 90, percent of its own capital invest-
Over the longer term, effective sanctions would seri-
ously impede growth and intensify domestic political
conflict. Although sanctions initially would help unify
whites by involving them in a common struggle
against an external enemy, in the long term, economic
hardships, coupled with a realization that the world
will not tolerate a racially based system, would sharp-
en political divisions among whites. Sanctions also
would delay Botha's reform program, as spending
would be diverted from black education and housing
to vital industries, and black unemployment almost
certainly would rise, intensifying unrest.
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Pretoria almost certainly would retaliate for tough
international sanctions by imposing a selective block-
ade against economically dependent neighboring
black states. The government has contingency plans to
retaliate and magnify the impact of sanctions by 25X1
squeezing the more vulnerable economies in the
region, according to US Embassy sources.
policies of reform and strict security.
Bracing for Sanctions
Pretoria's willingness to impose harsh security mea-
sures in the face of growing international condemna-
tion reflects the government's belief that nothing it is
willing to do will satisfy the West or prevent addition-
al economic sanctions. As the pressure for sanctions
builds, we expect Pretoria to become more obstinate
in refusing to alter the pace of its reforms or to ease
security measures. President Botha, for example, has
stepped up his stern denunciations of Western at-
tempts to "meddle" in South African affairs. Botha's
harsher tone in part reflects Pretoria's feeling that it
In the short run-the next several years-we believe
South Africa is prepared for and probably capable of
weathering even comprehensive economic sanctions.
Key Indicators To Watch
Most Likely Scenario: In an attempt to give the 25X1
appearance of a return to "normalcy," Pretoria begins
gradually easing emergency regulations. At the same
time, the government pushes ahead with its gradual
reform program:
? Black organizations begin to regroup and adapt to
life under harsher security measures.
? Pretoria begins to shift from a blanket state of
emergency to a more selective application of securi-
ty laws.
? The government eases some press restriction in an
attempt to prove at least a partial return to normal
conditions.
? Botha uses the National Party Congress to win a
new mandate for his program of government-initiat-
ed and controlled reforms.
? Blacks show no signs of accepting government over-
tures, however.
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South Africa's Black-Ruled Neighbors: Targets for Cross- Border Reprisals
Zaire- More than 40 percent of minerals
exported in 1985 shipped through South
Africa ... three-fourths of food,
petroleum, and chemicals imported
through South Africa.
shipped through South Africa .. .
Ndola refinery receives some of its
feedstock from South Africa.
Botswana- All petroleum products
come via South Africa ... nearly
19,000 miners employed in South
Africa . . . receipts from Southern
African Customs Union account for
nearly 20 percent of government
revenues.
BounOry representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Selected African National
Congress (ANC) base or facility
Malawi- About 18,000 Malawians
work in South Africa and earn
nearly $12 million in foreign
exchange . . . approximately 95
percent of Malawi's petroleum
comes from South Africa.
Mozambique- South Africa
provides 60 percent of
electricity . . . more than 50,000
Mozambican miners work in
Swaziland- Southern African
Customs Union accounts for
more than 60 percent of
government revenues . . . more
than 13,000 Swazi miners work
in South Africa.
Lesotho- Remittances from 110,000 Basotho
miners employed in South Africa account for
about 50 percent of GNP . . . South Africa
supplies 100 percent of Lesotho's electricity
. over 95 percent of imports originate in
South Africa and all exports either sold to or
transshipped through South Africa.
? Despite Pretoria's statements, unrest-related deaths
in the townships remain at roughly pre-state of
emergency levels.
? The ANC continues to strike, and Pretoria persists
in launching cross-border strikes against ANC facil-
ities in neighboring black-ruled states.
Alternate Scenario: Pretoria-in the face of escalat-
ing unrest-cracks down even harder on opposition
groups, banning numerous black organizations and
lashing out at the ANC and neighbors:
? The Botha regime shows the West the danger of
economic sanctions by implementing its own sanc-
tions against its neighbors most critical of its poli-
cies, cutting transit facilities, or expelling guest
laborers.
? South Africa conducts larger-scale operations
against ANC facilities in neighboring countries with
less regard to civilian casualties.
? Violence intensifies under the state of emergency
and Pretoria attempts to stamp out completely all
black opposition by banning groups such as the
multiracial United Democratic Front and activist
labor unions.
r
:
Zimbabwe- About 90 percent of
Zimbabwe's export and import traffic
uses South African transport system
... South Africa is Zimbabwe's
largest trading partner, accounting
for about 20 percent of total.
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Pakistan: Benazir Bhutto Plans
"Street Politics" Campaign
? Prime Minister Junejo faces a difficult summer and
autumn. Preoccupied since early spring with the
challenge from Pakistan People's Party (PPP) leader
Benazir Bhutto, the Junejo government is now
trying to regain public confidence in its ability to
deal with security and law-and-order problems that
include a serious, Soviet-inspired sabotage cam-
paign along the border with Afghanistan and rising
banditry in Sind.
? Junejo's difficulties are likely to be compounded this
fall, when Bhutto is expected to launch a concerted
campaign for new party-based elections. Despite a
lack of broad support during the annual demonstra-
tions against Zia's imposition of martial law on
5 July, the cooler weather is likely to usher in
"street politics" by Bhutto and her party.
? The government probably will be able to contain
demonstrations or violence by PPP supporters. If
Junejo fails to do so, however, his regime would be
in serious trouble. In the worst case, with violence
becoming widespread in vital Punjab Province or
with public confidence in the Junejo government
collapsing, the Army would probably restore martial
The Challenge From Bhutto
The three-month honeymoon for the government of
Prime Minister Junejo-whose efforts to exert his
authority and demonstrate his independence from
President Zia had begun to win him popular approv-
al-came to an abrupt end with the return of PPP
leader Benazir Bhutto in early April. She demanded
that Zia step down as Army chief and called for new
party-based elections. Bhutto told US diplomats that
the first phase of her campaign-a whirlwind national
speaking tour that drew massive, peaceful crowds-
was designed not only to prove her popularity but also
to demonstrate that she is not a threat to Pakistan's
stability. Although she claims to want peaceful
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change, Bhutto declares that, if Zia fails to meet her
demands, her party will resort to "people power." She
told US diplomats she intends to start with small
demonstrations-one-hour strikes, one-day fasts-
that would increase in frequency but remain nonvio-
.
Publicly, Junejo has played down Bhutto's return,
refusing to mention her by name while rejecting her
call for early elections. In our view, Junejo believes
that Bhutto eventually will run out of steam and that
a precipitate move against her would be counter-
productive. His strategy is to give the PPP the
opportunity to discredit itself, believing that PPP-
induced violence could be contained. Junejo has not
joined with Zia in trying to discredit Bhutto by
charging that the PPP's activities are funded by India
and Libya. At the same time, Junejo almost certainly
sees himself as the "man in the middle" and fears that
a Bhutto-Zia confrontation might endanger his posi-
tion. He has hinted that legal measures-a revision of
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Pakistan People's Party leader Benazir Bhutto
(center).
legislation governing political activity-might be
needed to prevent the PPP from threatening the
fledgling civilian system.
Junejo probably sees the modest turnout-much
smaller than pre-Ramadan crowds-for the PPP's
demonstrations nationwide on the anniversary of the
coup against Prime Minister Bhutto as indication that
his low-key approach is succeeding. He probably sees
the summer-when hot weather will constrain street
activity-as an opportune time to put legal restric-
tions on the People's Party to prevent renewed activity
this fall.
Bhutto is likely to see the demonstrations on 5 July
more positively-as an indication of widespread popu-
lar support for the People's Party even without her
presence as a drawing card. She already has set
Pakistan's Independence Day, 14 August, as the next
national action day. Even if the results on that day are
disappointing, we believe that Bhutto is unlikely to
abandon plans for further demonstrations this fall.
She has demanded that the government hold national
elections this fall and almost certainly does not see a
conventional, moderate approach-for example, aim-
ing for a show of strength in local elections in
September 1987-as an alternative that would sup-
port the credibility of the People's Party. She proba-
bly will spend the remainder of the summer working
on the party's grassroots organization and making
provincial leadership more effective. She may also
now be convinced of the need to mend fences with the
opposition coalition Movement for the Restoration of
Democracy, which boycotted the 5 July demonstra-
tions.
Pressure on the Western Front
For months, Junejo has been preoccupied with the
threat from Bhutto, building up his own Pakistan
Muslim League with populist programs rather than
needed economic reforms in order to counter the
appeal of the People's Party. Meanwhile, according to
reporting from the US Embassy, Junejo has been
cautious about making decisions that might give the
opposition an easy target. Tensions with India have
risen because Junejo slowed the pace of rapproche-
ment in the face of potential resistance from the
Pakistani business community to the trade measures
New Delhi wants. According to reporting from the
US Consulate in Karachi, lawlessness in historically
troublesome Sind Province rose to embarrassing levels
until Junejo finally sent in paramilitary units to round
up bandits; he had delayed such a move out of concern
that it might be seen as a step toward martial law.
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Junejo also has been slow to address the serious
security, law-and-order, and other problems in North-
West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. The Kabul
regime is intensifying its efforts to pressure Islamabad
into reining in the Afghan resistance and to reaching
an early political settlement to end the insurgency:
? An escalating terrorist campaign claimed over 500
casualties in some 40 bombings between January
and June.
? Violations of the Pakistani border by Soviet and
Afghan aircraft more than doubled compared with
the same period last year, and attacks on insurgent
positions along the border increased. Between Janu-
ary and June, almost 200 Pakistanis were killed in
cross-border artillery attacks or bombings.
? Late last year, the Kabul regime temporarily suc-
ceeded in suborning Pakistani tribal dissidents in
the border area; only by a combination of force and
bribery was Islamabad able to quell the resulting
uprising. The allegiance of these tribes, however, is
notoriously short lived, and Kabul is likely to contin-
ue its subversive efforts.
? Enforcement of the ban on poppy cultivation along
the Frontier at the start of the early fall crop season
is likely to spark protests. Embassy reporting indi-
cates the government has delayed clarifying its
policy on this year's crop out of concern for local
Reporting from the US Consulate in Peshawar sug-
gests that Kabul has largely succeeded in turning
local popular opinion against the nearly 3 million
Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The government proba-
bly hopes its belated steps-measures to restrict the
movement of refugees, the formation of special anti-
terrorist units, and efforts to retaliate militarily
against Afghan air violations-will be enough to
shore up public confidence in Islamabad's ability to
protect Pakistanis along the border and prevent rising
domestic pressure for a peace settlement with Kabul.
Key Indicators To Watch
Most likely scenario: Benazir Bhutto mounts a cam-
paign of "people power" but intensifies pressure in a
measured way, and Junejo prevails for the next six
months:
? Bhutto and the People's Party organize numerous
late summer rallies, but they fall short of creating a
regime-threatening crisis atmosphere.
? Army support for Junejo and Zia remains firm.
? The government passes and enforces legislation
outlawing activity by the People's Party unless it
registers and accepts regulation.
? Counterterrorist measures succeed in building con-
fidence in Islamabad.
? Islamabad portrays enough progress in peace talks
with Kabul to stem rising pressure for early and
Alternative Scenario: Bhutto aggressively presses
"street politics," seeking an early confrontation with
Junejo, who fails to cope and is replaced:
? Bhutto's late summer rallies ignite widespread
antiregime sentiment; other opposition parties col-
laborate with the People's Party in street agitation.
? Members of the National Assembly defect to the
People's Party.
? The economic situation deteriorates, and unemploy-
ment among returning expatriates rises, creating
greater support for Bhutto's socialist policies.
? Islamic fundamentalist political parties, concerned
about Bhutto's leftist and secularist policies, engage
in the kind of antiopposition party violence that
brought down Benazir's father in 1977.
? Kabul steps up terrorist campaign along the border;
the Army becomes increasingly concerned about
Bhutto's antirefugee rhetoric and her conciliatory
stance toward Kabul.
? The government is unable to contain unrest inspired
by the People's Party; the Army steps in to restore
order, forcing Zia's departure as Army chief and
'
Junejo
s removal as Prime Minister.
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Part 2. Developments and Trends
The six categories of indicators used in the following
charts focus on a broad array of issues that may
impact on stability:
? The social change and conflict indicators examine
developments such as labor or religious unrest that
could undermine the regime's legitimacy and ability
to rule effectively.
? The economic factors link various dimensions of
economic performance to potential instability.
? Opposition activities assess whether the opposition
can mobilize effective antiregime activity or carry
out acts that undermine public security.
? The military attitude and activities category ad-
dresses the military's degree of dissatisfaction with
regime policies, involvement in coup plotting, and
behavior relevant to the political process.
? The external factors category looks at foreign influ-
ences that could affect internal stability.
? Finally, the regime capabilities and actions cate-
gory focuses on what the government is doing that
could lessen popular support, undermine its author-
ity, and affect its ability to govern efficiently.
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Selected Instability Indicators
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
------ - - Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six nrondrs
During next six months to two wars
Legend
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
General deterioration -
Decreased
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in economic policies
Fcwd/energy shortages
Inflation
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
s economic and financial problems remain high.
Early results from the elections in July indicate the rulin
g party is
continuing its policy of rolling back previous opposition victories in
key municipal races. The opposition is charging fraud, and protests
are likely as the official results are announced. Elections continue
through December, but the prospects for violence during the year
will most likely decrease if the government can contain unrest at this
juncture. Mexico has a new finance minister, but our concerns about
O Negligible concern V Substantial concern
Low concern
? Serious concern
Moderate concern
#198519,84 II ^ 111 IV
O O 1 0 O 0
O rt -1
?
fi O ~
O O O I O O Oj OtO
O
O U~ O O O
O
_
_
0 0 0 0 O 0+ 0 0
-t - - - I 4---t -
Threat to corporate military interests/dignity O O O O
Discontent over care- I -t --+ O O O O O O O
r
External support for opposition 0
lO 10 1 0 O n l n l
oss, pay, or benefits O 0 0 0 0 0 0
Discontent over government action/policies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 t 0
External support for government n rl i
inutanLy 0 0 0 T-0
Security capabilities r) n
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
O 07 O
?I?I
0 0
0 0
O ! O
309915 8.86
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El Salvador:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
O Negligible concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Food/energy shortages ?
Inflation
opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
strengthen its military position before the talks.
The timing of President Duarte's proposal to renew a dialogue with
leftist insurgents in August appears to have been an attempt to
divert public attention from economic problems. Both sides are
trying to mobilize popular support, even though neither is optimistic
that any significant progress will be made at the talks. The
government position probably will focus on integrating insurgents
into the democratic process, a proposal the guerrillas have already
rejected. Fighting probably will increase as each side a tries to
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two years
(jet Substantial concern
41 Serious concern
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Secret
Guatemala:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
O Negligible concern G Substantial concern
Low concern ? Serious concern
Moderate concern
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in economic policies
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
1984
I
1985
I
?
OTO
that could undermine the government.
The seven-month-old government of President Cerezo has main-
tained the critical support of the military. We believe the backing
results largely from Cerezo's moderate approach to reforming the
police and security forces and his consensus style of policy forma-
tion. Cerezo's austerity program continues to draw public criticism,
however, although protests against rising prices and unemployment
have been muted. Continued slow progress in turning the economy
around may increase the likelihood of more serious disturbances
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two wars
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Secret
Honduras:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
scattered labor strikes in coming months.
Our overall concern for stability in Honduras has eased slightly as
President Azcona continues efforts to put civilian-military relations
on a more even keel. The armed forces high command continues to
believe that the President is soft on the left, but there is no evidence
that the military's increasingly aggressive covert campaign against
suspected subversives in government, labor, and education is target-
ed against him. Azcona's slow start in reviving the economy
probably will continue to undermine his image and may encourage
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two wars
O Negligible concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Gi Substantial concern
40 Serious concern
1984
1 II III IV
1985
I II 111 IV
1986
1 II
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0
. 0
0
O
0 0
0
0
0 0
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0
0 1
0
0 0
0
0
0 0
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in economic policies
0
O O
0
0
O
O
Food/energy shortages
O
O
r(o
0
O
O
O
O
0
0
Inflation
O
0
0
0
O
O
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Public support
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0
0
0
0 O
0 0
0 0
Discontent over government action/policies
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0_11
Security capabilities
O
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
0
Loss of legitimacy
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
309918 886
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Secret
Panama:
Selected Instability Indicators
including complicity in drug trafficking
is content with President Delvalle and the opposition has been
unable to muster antiregime sentiment. Defense Chief Noriega
remains in control, despite press attacks charging him with crimes,
Prospects in Panama have improved marginally because the military
Opposition calls for Noriega to step
Legend
rallied to Noriega's support.
down were met with public apathy. Meanwhile, the general staff,
the ruling coalition, and Delvalle-who is subservient to Noriega-
Prospects for major regime or police change
During next six months
During next six months to two wars
O Negligible concern y Substantial concern
Low concern ? Serious concern
Moderate concern
1984
1985
1986
1
11
III
IV
I 11
111
IV
I
II
Social change/conflict
Ethnic/religious discontent
0
Demonstrations. riots. strikes
C)
~)
j
Economic factors
General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in economic policies
C;
Food/energy shortages
r
t
~ ;
Inflation
Opposition activities
Organizational capabilities _
;`
O
C
O
777-
F
O
C)
O
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
~~
o
O
_
-
Insurgent armed attacks
-
Public
support
;)
0
C
r
)
0
(
C
Military attitudes/activities
Threat to corporate mil itary interests/dignity
O
C)
C)
O
C 0
Discontent over career loss. pay, or benefits
O L
(')
1 O
O
0 C,
C
O
I
Di
scontent t over government action/policies
0
0
O
0
C C
?
0
0
Re orts/rumors of coup lotting
P
'
C?
C
0
O O
O
0
External factors
External support for government
O 0
0
O
O
C O
O
O
External support for opposition
O
C
O
0
O
Threat of military conflict
-
O
C~
C
C,
Regime actions/capabilities
Repression/brutality
C)
O
C
O
O
O
O
Security capabilities
C; !
C
I C`
0
O
O
c-
O
O
o
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
O
0
0
O
Loss of legitimacy
O
C'
O
O
O
o
1
309919 8.86
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Secret
Colombia:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
troops in the central mountains.
President-elect Virgilio Barco, who takes office this month, does not
appear to face an imminent crisis, but, in our judgment, the largest
insurgent group still poses a substantial threat. Tight security
prevented major guerrilla disruption of the election in May, but
insurgent violence continues at high levels throughout the country.
Attacks on rural authorities are increasing, insurgents are extending
their influence in the major oil-producing region, and the M-19
insurgent group and its allies continue to challenge government
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two years
C) Negligible concern V Substantial concern
Low concern 0 Serious concern
Moderate concern
1984
I 11 111 IV
1985
1 11 III IV
1986
I 11
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
01
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0
C
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
0
0
Unpopular changes in economic policies
0
0
0
0
0
O j
Food/energy shortages
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
C
0
Inflation
O
O
0
0
O
0
0
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
"'
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
0
0
0
0
C)
0
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
0
O
0
0
:
q
0
O
_
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
O
O
External factors External support for government
O
O
0
0
C
co
0
0
C)
External support for opposition
#
4
Threat of military conflict
C
O
CO
0
0
ime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality
Re
0
O
O
O
O
O
O
g
Security capabilities
0
0
0
0
O
rr
_ o
Political disunity/loss of confidence
O
O
O
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
Loss of legitimacy
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Secret 16
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Secret
Venezuela:
Selected Instability Indicators
Legend
Continuing economic stagnation and a deepening recession-caused
largely by the decline of oil revenues-are slowly undermining the
government's popularity and bolstering the political prospects of the
opposition for the 1988 election. There have been isolated protest
demonstrations-primarily by leftist students-and recent contro-
versy over press censorship. Despite these occasional disturbances,
organized labor remains a strong base of support for the ruling
party. In our opinion, Lusinchi is unlikely to face major challenges
Prospects for major regime or policy change
O During next six months
O During next six months to two wars
O Negligible concern V Substantial concern
Low concern 0 Serious concern
Moderate concern
1984
1985
1986
1 II III IV
if If III IV
1 11
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
O
~:)
C)
O
C)
O
C~
C
C1
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
O
O
C>
~~
~~
C0
C)
Economic factors General deterioration
~O
O
O
)
Decreased access to foreign funds
O
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in economic policies
Food/energy shortages
C
O
O
O
C)
C~
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
C)
(")
C)
)
C~
C)
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
O
O
)
)
O
O
Terrorism and sabotage
(
)
Insurgent armed attacks
)
f
,,
Public support
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
O
O
G
C)
O
0
0
O
~)
C)
i)
0
C)
0
C,
(C
C;
O
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
O
O
O
O
C:
~O
(
O
O
Discontent over government action/policies
O
O
C)
O
O~
O
0
O
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
O
O
O
O
0
C'
0
O
:)
O
External factors E
t
l
f
x
erna
support
or government
O
O
C?
0
O
O
O
O
O
0
External support for opposition
O
C>
C)
0
0
C
0
C)
O
0
Threat of military conflict
Regime actions/ca
abilities
O
C,
0
0
C)
O
p
I
nce
O
~)
O
O
O
C
O
O
O
Loss of legitimacy
O
~i
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
3099
21 886
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Secret
Peru:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
emergency has failed to curb terrorist acts.
The brutal suppression of prison riots in June, instigated by inmates
who are members of Sendero Luminoso, precipitated the most
serious crisis in Peru since President Garcia took office a year ago.
Amidst rumors of coup plotting, Garcia took disciplinary actions
against prison security police but largely avoided reprisals against
the military. Nonetheless, we believe that Garcia's ambivalent
counterinsurgency policy and propensity to appease leftwing critics
have further damaged his credibility with the Army. The state of
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
t
vi During next six months to
O Negligible concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
w Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1984
I 11 III IV
1985
1 11 III IV
1986
I II
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0
0
0
0
?
11
0
0
0 0 O~ O
? A
0-11 0
?
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
ht
ital fli
Ca
N1
?
?
?
?
~F
?
?
Idt
?
?
?
? _ ? ?
- ? ?
0
I
S -1 '
c
g
p
Unpopular changes in economic policies
Food/energy shortages
0
0 0
Inflation
ition activities Organizational capabilities
O
ppos
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
O
0
Terrorism and sabotage
?
?
?
?
a.
di
?
?
~4 ?6
Insurgent armed attacks
?
N
0
0
i'
to
0
5
a-
Public support
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
?
0
~?
?
A'
?
L?
External factors External support for government
0
0
O
0
O
0
External support for opposition
0
0
0
0 0
Threat of military conflict
C)
0
0
O
O
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
0
0
?
?
?
?
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
?
?
?
0
16
0
0
0
--
Loss of legitimacy
?
?
?
?
Ar
o
0
0
0
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Secret
Brazil:
Selected Instability Indicators
Legend
who will rewrite Brazil's Constitution.
President Sarney has maintained high popularity ratings largely
because of the immediate, dramatic benefits from his Cruzado
economic stabilization plan. The plan's success in curbing inflation
has sparked a consumer boom and retains widespread public and
political support, despite some muted criticism from the opposition
and labor. Sarney also is moving to defuse the explosive land reform
issue in order to prevent the left and right from exploiting it in the
crucial congressional election in November, which will determine
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two wars
' Negligible concern r Substantial concern
Low concern ? Serious concern
Moderate concern
1984
I ~ 11 1 111 I IV
1985
I ^ III IV
1986
I III
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
O
O
O 0
U O
0
O
FO
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
to
Economic factors General deterioration
?
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
7
Unpopular changes in economic policies
?
?
1
J
Food/energy shortages
- - -
-
0
Inflation
0
?
?
?
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
O
O
C
O
O
O
O
O
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
C)
0
0
0]
0--
0
O
C
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
Military att
itudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
O O
O Cj
C)
C O
C O
0 0
0 0
O
O
0
0
C C O
C C~ O
0 U 0
0 O
C) O
O I O
O O
C 0
Discontent over career loss, or benefit
pay,
0 C
s
C O
C C O r O
O O
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
Co
O
O(i
0
C O
O
O OO
0 0
O
0
O f O'
0 O
External factors External support for government
j
O
0 C
C~
O
C
C
O
O
External support for opposition
0-1
c
o
C
O
C
O
O
O
Threat of military conflict
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
O
O
O~
O
0
O
LO
O
0
C
0
O
O
O
J
O
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
O
O
>
J0 0
O
O I
O
01
J J
Loss of legitimacy
O ~O
0
0
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Secret
Argentina:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
military remain strained over human rights issues.
President Alfonsin and his Radical Party retain firm control over
the government, while the opposition Peronist Party is in disarray.
Nevertheless, we believe that Alfonsin's popularity is gradually
eroding because of his inability to resolve the country's most
pressing problems. He has not implemented structural reforms that
would significantly reduce the government's economic role and lay
the foundation for long-term growth. Inflation is beginning to inch
up and labor is resorting to more frequent strikes. Relations with the
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two wars
Negligible concern :s Substantial concern
Low concern Serious concern
Moderate concern
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III IV
1986
I II
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
o
O
C
C
O
C
O
O 0
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
O
C
O
'`
Capital flight
~
.
{
Unpopular changes in economic policies
O
C
O
C
C)
C
O
Food/energy shortages
C
0
C
C
O
0
0
_0
O
Inflation
pr
-
#-
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
O
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
0
0
0
0
0
C
O
O
Terrorism and sabotage
O
O
O
C
C
O
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
0
O
0
0
0
0 0
I
Public support
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
1
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
0
0
~
O
-
0
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
0
O
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
O
O
0
0
C
0
0
0
0
' O
External support for opposition
0
O
O
C
C
O
O
O
O
O
Threat of military conflict
O
0
0
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
C
Security capabilities
C
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 -
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
O
O
O
C
0
0
0
0
0-
Loss of legitimacy
0
0
0
0
C
0
0
0
O
O
Secret 20
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
Secret
Chile:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
Communists are expanding their terrorist operations.
Concern for stability in Chile is growing because President Pino-
chet, despite some rumblings in the military, seems determined to
crush all protests and to avoid political liberalization. The newly
formed moderate opposition group, the Civic Assembly, plans
additional antiregime protests in the coming months. The purpose is
to convince the military that the country is ungovernable under
Pinochet's harsh policies and that only a transition to civilian rule
can prevent total polarization of the country. Meanwhile, the
Prospects for major regime or police change
During next six months
During next six months to two wars
Negligible concern Substantial concern
Low concern Serious concern
Moderate concern
1984
1985
1986
I II i 111 IV
I I II i III IV
1 II
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0
i
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
4--
Unpopular changes in economic policies
0
~
~~
~O
O
O C)
0 C)
Food/energy shortages
O
O
0
O
O 0 0
0
C
Inflation
}
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
40
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
O
O
Public support
JI
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
O
0
0
0
C)
0
C)
O O
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
O
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
O
0
0
0
0
OOO
O t
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
C)
C
0
0
C
O
Security capabilities
Political dis
it
/l
f
un
y
oss o
confidence
0 O T
I
Loss of legitimacy
309925 886
'I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
Secret
Spain:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
ues to be a considerable, if slowly fading, problem.
Prime Minister Gonzalez will see his reelection with an absolute
parliamentary majority on 22 June as a mandate to continue his
moderate domestic and foreign policies. He is nonetheless likely to
press Washington hard in the current bilateral security talks to
reduce the US military presence in Spain. Basque terrorism contin-
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two wars
J Negligible concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
V Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1984
1985
1986
1 11 ! III IV
1 II III IV
I 11
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
O
O
O
0
O
O
0
0
0 O
0 O
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0
0
Economic factors General deterioration
0
0
0 J
0 0
O
t~
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
O
v
O O
O
Tot
O
c
}
Unpopular changes in economic policies
O
O
O O
0
C
G 0
Food/energy shortages
O
0
0
O
0
0
0
0 O
Inflation
0
0
0
0
0
osition activities Organizational capabilities
O
0
O
0
0
0
O
O
O
pp
/planning
Opposition conspiracy
O
O
O
O
t
O
O
O
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
O
O
O
O
o
O
O O
Public support
O
O
O
O
o
O
O O
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
O
10
O
()
1
0
0 0
O O
Discontent over career loss. pay, or benefits
O
~O
O
O
~
C
O
_O~
O
Discontent over government action/policies
0
0
O
O
C
0
0
~
0
0
0 0
0 0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
O
0
O
External factors External support for government
0
O
O
O
O
O
O
0
O
0
O
0
O j 0
0 0
External support for opposition
O
0
O
O
C)
0
0
0
0 O
Threat of military conflict
abilities Repression/brutality
ctions/ca
i
R
0
0
O
0
C)
0
0
0
0 0
p
me a
eg
O 1 O
Security capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
O
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
0
O
0
C)
O
0
0
0 0
O O
Loss of legitimacy
0
O
O
0
C)
O
O
Secret 22
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
Secret
Greece:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
lead to open conflict has increased.
The Greek economy continues to be a problem, but polls show Prime
Minister Papandreou's austerity measures have not significantly
affected his popularity. He remains firmly in control of his party and
faces few real challenges from either the Conservatives or the
Communists. Disagreements with Turkey stemming from long-
standing Aegean disputes and the Cyprus issue, however, have
created a tense atmosphere in the region. Although neither side
appears to want a fight, the likelihood that a miscalculation could
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two tears
Negligible concern r Substantial concern
Low concern ? Serious concern
Moderate concern
1984
1985
1986
I 11 ~ 111 IV
1 II III IV
I II
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
..
.
Demonstrations, riots. strikes
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular chan es in economic policies
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
P
bli
u
c support
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
-
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
309,927 8.86
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 i
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Secret
Turkey:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
also have increased recently to worrisome levels.
Recent political events have strengthened the parliamentary major-
ity of Prime Minister Ozal, boding well for his Motherland Party in
elections for 11 seats scheduled for this fall. Economic difficulties
persist, however, including large debt repayments and high inflation
and unemployment. Turkish security concerns continue to be exac-
erbated, in our judgment, by the Gulf war and suspicions of Syrian
encouragement of terrorism. Tensions caused by longstanding dis-
putes with Greece over problems in the Aegean and the Cyprus issue
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two years
Negligible concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
Serious concern
1984
1 II 111 IV
1985
I 11 111 IV
1986
I II
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
-
C+
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in economic policies
Food/energy shortages
-
='
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
~~'
-
-
External factors External support for governmen
t
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
C'
-
309928 886
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
Secret
Morocco:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
ing cuts in politically sensitive food subsidies.
King Hassan is coming under increased pressure from radical Arab
states for the recent meetings with Israeli Prime Minister Peres but
has not suffered an erosion of political support at home. Neverthe-
less, the talks almost certainly diminished the King's attention to
Morocco's pressing financial problems. Morocco has lost access to
IMF financial support because of Rabat's inability to meet Fund-
suggested economic performance targets. Establishing a new IMF
program probably requires even greater budget stringencies, includ-
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two tears
Negligible concern Substantial concern
Low concern Serious concern
Moderate concern
1984
I II [[I IV
1985
1 II 111 IV
1986
1 11
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
-te
r
General
Economic factors
t
e
to foreign funds
D
ecreased
access
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in economic policies
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
-
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
-
Discontent over career loss, pay. or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
-
-
Threat of military conflict
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
309929 8-86
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
Secret
Egypt:
Selected Instability Indicators
Legend
moreover, the greater the risk of serious unrest.
Civil disorders waned last quarter, but we believe Mubarak is
operating on a very narrow middle ground between an economic and
political crisis. The government faces an acute and worsening hard
currency shortage that already is hindering its ability to import food
and other necessities. We believe Mubarak, to counter this trend,
may be forced to impose unpopular austerity measures-including
cuts in the near-sacred food subsidies-that risk sparking wide-
spread acts of public discontent. The longer he delays reforms,
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
wo During next six months to two wars
Negligible concern yr Substantial concern
Low concern Ii! Serious concern
Moderate concern
1984
1 11 111 IV
1985
1 II III IV
1986
1 11
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
C:.
>
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
'ff
Capital flight
i
Unpopular changes in economic policies
f,
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
~,

0
0
0 O
O
O
O
O
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
External factors External support for government
O~
O
O]
O
O
O
0
0
O
O
0
O
O
O
0
0
O
-O~
t.~4
0
0 0
O
O
O
O
O
4O
O
0
O
O
0 U
0 0
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
O
0
O
O
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
O
0
O
O
O
O
0
0
Loss of legitimacy
0
0
0
O
O
O
O
O O
Secret 34
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
Kenya:
Selected Instability Indicators
Our overall concern about potential instability has abated somewhat
following the episode of tribal unrest in April in which supporters of
President Moi maneuvered against Vice President Kibaki, senior
politician of the influential rival Kikuyu ethnic group. In addition,
Kenya's top military position has passed smoothly to an ethnic
Somali general whom Moi chose for his professionalism and loyalty.
Although the government's economic policies have come under some
criticism, we believe the regime is benefiting from high coffee
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two wars
Legend
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations. riots, strikes
General deterioration
O Negligible concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in economic
policies
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
f0 Substantial concern
0 Serious concern
1984 1985
I ~ 11 1 111 I IV I I II
to 11 0+--t 0 0 1 0
1986
I i II
0 O O O 0 O O 0 0 } 0
0 0 0 O O O ~
O O 0
0 0 0 0 0 ~O O{
- - ! -10 oLO 00
O 0 00 O O Ot0 00
o 0 0- 1 0 o O
0 0tO
0
oI
O
O OO O O O O
_~ O 01 OHO O O O LO
0010 O 0 01
0 O
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity O 0 0 0 0 O 0
0
Regime actions/capabilities
utscontent over career loss, pay, or benefits O I 0 0 0 O O
Discontent over
over
i
/
T
t-
g
nment act
on
policies
O
0
0 0
Reports/rumors of cou lottin
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
PP g
External support for government
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
Repression/brutality
o O o0 0 0
o
-O 0t O_-O I O
~_O- 1 0j O 0
0
0 0 o 0
0ro10 0
n f n l n n
O r 0 1 0
Lo
0
_0
-0
-0
0
0
0 0
0 0
0j
P?H
0 { 01
001
010
00
0 0
OIOI
'I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
Zaire:
Selected Instability Indicators
Legend
Independence of Angola (UNITA).
President Mobutu remains in firm control, although he continues to
face daunting economic problems. His recent decision to increase
civilian and military salaries places the IMF program in jeopardy
and reflects his growing frustration with what he sees as the limited
result of four years of IMF-supported austerity. Meanwhile, accord-
ing to the US Embassy, Mobutu remains deeply concerned that
Angola is planning to renew support to Zairian dissidents in
retaliation for Zaire's support to the National Union for Total
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two wars
O Negligible concern (1i Substantial concern
Low concern 40 Serious concern
Moderate concern
1984
1985
1986
1 11 111 IV
1 11 III IV
I 11
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in economic policies
Food/energy shortages
O
i
Inflation
anizational capabilities
s Or
iti
i
i
i
--
g
v
e
on act
t
Oppos
osition conspiracy/planning
O
}
pp
Terrorism and sabotage
-
~
I
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
O O
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
~
O
O
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
C)
O
O
)
O
External factors External support for government
O
O
L O
External support for opposition
J
hreat of military conflict
T
U
ression/brutality
bilities Re
/
p
capa
Regime actions
0
0
0
0
O
0
Security capabilities
O
O
Political disunity/loss of confidence
O
O
O
t
Loss of legitimacy
0
0
0
O
O
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
Secret
South Africa:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
Substantial violence continues in the black townships
ships if it is to proceed with the limited reform of apartheid.
backing of the vast majority of whites and has formidable security
powers that make a regime-threatening crisis unlikely in the near
future. Pretoria is unlikely to ease the harsh security measures it
imposed in June; new legislation allows for a de facto state of emer-
gency in any part of the country. In our view, the government now
believes it must intensify efforts to reassert its control in the town-
The government, nonetheless, retains the
Prospects for major regime or policy change
yp During next six months
? During next six months to two wars
O Negligible concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
r Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1984
1 if III IV
1985
I 11 111 IV
1986
1 II
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
W
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
C
.-.
?
?
?
0
i
0
fE
Economic factors General deterioration
OO
l
Decreased access to foreign funds
O
C)
t ~
O
C)
p
?
wv
Capital flight
O
O
O
O
O
Unpopular changes in economic policies
0
0
0
O
C
_
Food/energy shortages
0
O
0
O
0
0
C
C)
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
C
O
C
O
0
C
0
C)
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
C
C)
O
O
C)
Cl
C
C)
Terrorism and sabotage
0
O
0
Insurgent armed attacks
C )
C)
;)
C
C
0
C
Public support
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
C)
0
')
O
O
O
O
O
C
O
Discontent over career loss, pay. or benefits
O
O
0
O
O
0
O
O
C
O
Discontent over government action/policies
O
0
11
O
O
C
C
O
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
0
O
0
O
0
O
C
External factors External support for government
0
O
O
O
40
External support for opposition
0
0
O
0
O
0
O
O
C)
Threat of military conflict
0
0
0
O
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality C O 0 ? ? ? ? ? ?
Security capabilities O (: 0 C 0 0 0 0 O C
Political disunity/loss of confidence 0 0 0 0
Loss of legitimacy C) C 0 0 0 0 0 O O O
309941 8.86
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
Secret
Philippines:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
year, she stands to lose considerable popular support.
President Aquino has made progress toward consolidating control by
convening a constitutional commission and initiating talks with
insurgents. We believe, however, that basic problems such as
infighting in the Cabinet continue to hamper her efforts. The recent
abortive coup by Marcos loyalists underscores Aquino's dependence
on the military. Both foreign and Filipino businessmen probably will
continue to withhold investment funds because of concerns over
stability. If Aquino fails to sustain the economic recovery into next
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
O During next six months to two years
O Negligible concern O Substantial concern
Low concern ? Serious concern
Moderate concern
1984
I 11 111 IV
1985
1 11 111 IV
1986
1 TI
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
O I
Economic factors General deterioration
?
?
?
?
? ?
O
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
?
0
?
0
?
0
0
0 C 0
0
0 O
0
Unpopular changes in economic policies
?
?
?
?
?
? i
0 0
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
O
?
? i
?
?
C
O
0
O
0
0
0 0
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
C
Insurgent armed attacks
?
?
?
?
?
Public support
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
?
?
?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
t
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
O
0 I
External support for opposition
0
0
j 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 j
Threat of military conflict
0
O
0
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
?
Loss of legitimacy
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
0
309942 8.86
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
 i
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Secret
Indonesia:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
harto as next year's national election approaches.
The rapid decline in oil prices is straining Indonesia's ability to earn
foreign exchange and plunging the nation into deeper recession.
Foreign donors pledged $2.5 billion in June, but the amount falls far
short of net financial requirements for the fiscal year, which could
reach $5 billion. We believe a failure by the government to foster
economic recovery would further alienate the beleaguered business
community, worsen already severe unemployment-estimated at 35
percent-and could produce political problems for President Soe-
Prospects for major regime or policy change
O During next six months
During next six mondts to two wars
O Negligible concern Substantial concern
Low concern ? Serious concerti
Moderate concern
1984
I 11 111 IV
1985
I 11 111 IV
1986
1 11
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0
0
4
-
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
Economic factors General deterioration
O
0 0 0
0
0
V
V
Decreased access to foreign funds
0
0 0 0
4
0 0
0
0
0
Capital flight
o
O
0 0
0
0
0 _
0
Unpopular changes in economic policies
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
Food/energy shortages
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Inflation
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0 1 0
0
0
1 0
0
0
0
0
Public support
0
0 1 0
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
O
0 0
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
O
0
0
1 0
1 0
0
0
Discontent over government action/policies
0
0 0
0
0 0 0
0
0
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0 0
0
0 1 0 0
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
0
0
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
0
0
0
0
0
1 0
0
0
0
0
Threat of military conflict
0
0
0
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
Security capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Loss of legitimacy
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
309943 886
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South Korea :
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
its campaign this fall.
Both the government and the opposition, under public pressure to
compromise on the key issue of direct presidential elections, have
signaled some flexibility. Both sides are privately pessimistic, howev-
er, that an agreement on constitutional reform can be reached. We
continue to have substantial concern, therefore, about the prospects
for stability. President Chun will try hard to avoid actions that could
cast a pall over the Asian Games in Seoul in late September, but a
continued impasse on elections could cause the opposition to escalate
Prospects for major regime or policy change
V During next six months
V During next six months to two wars
O Negligible concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
V Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1984
1 11 111 IV
1985
I II III IV
1986
1 11
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0
0
0
0
0
O
0
0
0
0
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
?
?
?
?
V
V
Economic factors General deterioration
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Decreased access to foreign funds
0
0
0
0
0
0
O O
0
0
Capital flight
O
0
O
0
0
O
0
0
0
Unpopular changes in economic policies
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Food/energy shortages
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Inflation
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
V
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
0
0
Public support
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over government action/policies
0
0
0
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
0
O
0
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality 0 0 0
Security capabilities 0 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 0
Political disunity/loss of confidence O 0 0 0
Loss of legitimacy
309944 8.86
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Part 4. A Special
Retrospective Annex
Instability Patterns and
Trends, 1984-86
This section reviews overall instability trends as pub-
lished in the Political Instability Quarterly since 1984.
During this period, coups or regime changes have
occurred in four of the countries covered-Sudan,
Nigeria, Panama, and the Philippines. We found that
the rankings reflecting our level of concern usually
anticipated what actually happened.
In order to track variations in our level of concern that
a country might experience major regime or policy
change, we generated a composite blue trend line
tracing the analysts' level of concern for each quarter
on each country.' As an analyst's concern grows (and
the blue line rises), the level of instability in a country
should be mounting. In preparing this retrospective
analysis, we found that change was more likely to be
imminent when a country's total score exceeded 65
and the blue line crossed into the area we have labeled
the "danger zone." In Sudan, Nigeria, and the Philip-
pines, the trend line was continuously above 65.
Of the 30 countries covered, about a third are in or
approaching the danger zone. Of the remainder,
about half showed steadily declining concern, with
fluctuating levels of concern reflected in the others.
As of this quarter, Sudan, Nigeria, and El Salvador
remain in the danger zone, and Peru-which had
fallen out-has returned. Recent arrivals in the zone
are Iraq, Chile, and Guatemala. Three others-South
Africa, Egypt, and Pakistan-are not there yet but
are approaching this level of instability.
' The composite score represents a weighted total using the follow-
ing scheme: green (one point), half yellow (two points), yellow (three
points), half red (four points), and red (five points). It can range
The use of half circles to rank indicators was begun
in the first quarter of 1986. As a result, some blue
trend lines show an abrupt change from 1985 to 1986.
The trend dropped markedly in Morocco and Turkey
and somewhat less in Colombia and Zaire. The trend
increased more sharply than it otherwise would have
in Egypt and South Africa. For simplicity of presen-
tation, the yellow and red lines at the bottom of the
graph aggregate both half and full circles.
One indicator-the threat of external military con-
flict-was not introduced until the first quarter of
1985. We have retroactively ranked this indicator for
each quarter in 1984 to keep the number of indicators
constant.
For the first time in two years Iran is now below the
zone. South Korea had been moving rapidly toward
the danger zone in 1985, but developments in the past
two quarters have halted the rise. The Philippines fell
dramatically from the zone following Marcos's depar-
ture. Our concern level for other countries like Brazil,
India, and Zaire has been steadily declining.
this publication remain Spain and Venezuela.
Several countries, including Argentina and Mexico,
have fluctuated at generally moderate levels of con-
cern. The most stable countries of the 30 monitored in
Part II.
25X1
25X1
25X1
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Secret
Instability Index
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III IV
1986
I II
during next six months
during next six to 24 months
Composite score' 100
90
80
7
0
60
50
40
3
0
Number of indicators 20
at each level of concern 15
10
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
1984
1 II 111 IV
1985
I II III IV
1986
1 II
during next six months
ye
during next six to 24 months
=
tir
ew
al
r
y
yp
y
'
Composite score' 100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
Number of indicators 20
at each level of concern
a The shaded area above 65 is the "danger zone':
Changes in the economic and electoral arenas have had the
greatest impact on our level of concern over stability in
Mexico. Concern has grown steadily with a dramatic drop
in oil prices and ill-advised economic policies that are
causing increased capital flight and decreased access to
foreign funds. The trend is moderated, however, by chang-
ing levels of concern during new election seasons. While the
economic factors have gradually increased concern, vari-
ables relating to opposition strength and the regime's ability
to control the elections have been more volatile. Concern at
the threat of violence rose before the elections in July
The trend toward greater instability since the third quarter
of 1985 indicates the potential for violence during this
year's elections and the effects of Mexico's worsening
economic situation. Economic factors will remain a key
predictor of future unrest, as will indicators of opposition
strength and regime capabilities.
The overall improvement in stability over the last 10
quarters reflects declining concern over military attitudes
and external factors as well as some increase in regime
capabilities under President Duarte. Since his election in
May 1984, Duarte has gained the cooperation of most
senior military officers, hastened the decline in political
violence, and helped moderate political forces gain strength.
Duarte and the armed forces also have kept the insurgency
on the defensive, and guerrilla credibility and support have
fallen sharply. The slight increase in our concern since mid-
1985 is largely attributable to greater public discontent-
which is still manageable-with Duarte's economic policies.
The high trend line reflects continuing concern about
stability and about the eventual impact of economic discon-
tent, opposition activities, and security force capabilities.
Key indicators of impending change would be military
attitudes and activities, leftist opposition activities, and
regime actions.
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Instability Index
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
198
I
4
^
111
IV
198
1
5
II
III
IV
198
I
6
11
The trend to
the end of 19
of power fro
tions and co
consumer pri
during next six months
-
1985. Since
1985. Since
during next six to 24 months
W
W
W
40
W
*j
d
V
W
instability ha
Composite score'
's em
C
100
90
erezo
military's co
80
-
-
operation fro
civilian cont
70
60
economy rem
5
through on h
The mo
t
nt
0
e
.
malan stabil
40
30
military atti
Number of indicators
at each level of concern 15
-
10
5
-
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
1984
I II Ill IV
1985
I II III IV
1986
I II
during next six months
0
during next six to 24 months
w
s
w
Composite score'
00
1
90
80
70
60
50
4
000,
40
30
-
Number of indicators
20
at each level of concern
15
10
Secret
ward rising instability in Guatemala through
85 mirrored the uncertainty over the transfer
m military to civilian rule. Violent demonstra-
up plotting over economic policies and rising
ces sharply boosted our level of concern in mid-
President Cerezo was elected last December,
s improved, but remains high.
phasis on consensus and his support for the
unterinsurgency program have gained him co-
m the armed forces, but he still must exert
rol over the security forces. The declining
ains a problem, and Cerezo will need to follow
is austerity program and better manage discon-
st important indicators for monitoring Guate-
ity will continue to be economic conditions,
tudes and actions, and regime capabilities.
The higher concern for political stability in Honduras in
1984 reflected the growing propensity of an emerging group
of military officers to become involved in civilian politics.
After forcing out former military chief Alvarez in March
1984, these officers meddled in a Cabinet reshuffle. In 1985
several were sympathetic to former President Suazo's plans
to disrupt the election, and in February 1986 they removed
former military head Lopez. We believe the politicized
Honduran colonels are not deeply committed to the demo-
cratic process, and we expect rumors of a coup against
We believe that the military will continue to play a critical
role in shaping Honduran politics. The country's poor
economic conditions, government disunity and incompe-
tence, and opposition capabilities warrant moderate con-
cern, but these areas have remained largely static since
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Secret
Instability Index
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
1984
1 II III IV
1985
I II ^I IV
1986
I II
during next six months
0
during next six to 24 months
0
0
0
c~
V
V
Composite score
0
10
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
Number of indicators 20
at each level of concern
IS
10
5
It
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
1984
I II ^I IV
1985
I 11 III IV
1986
1 II
during next six months
0
01
0
10
during next six to 24 months
0
01
6
0
Composite score' 100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
-
-
-
Number of indicators 20
at each level of concern
IS
I0
5
n
The shaded area above 65 is the "danger zone"
Concern about instability in Panama generally was low
until early 1985, with changes attributable to shifts in
military, regime, and economic indicators. The abrupt jump
in concern in the middle of the year reflected the military's
dissatisfaction with President Barletta's performance, fall-
out from the murder of regime opponent Hugo Spadafora,
and Barletta's ouster in September for failing to support the
military against calls for an independent investigation.
Our declining level of concern in 1986 reflects Panama's
improved stability. Delvalle's subservience to Noriega has
enhanced the prospects of Delvalle's completing his term,
and a general strike called in March was unsuccessful. Key
indicators of future instability would be military discontent
and political disunity within the regime.
Colombia's relatively stable political system has long sur-
vived chronic violence by several major insurgent groups.
Slowly rising levels of concern reflect gradually building
opposition activities, continuing economic problems, and
declining security forces capabilities. Heightened concern in
mid-1985 was attributable to the M-19 insurgent group's
withdrawal from a government truce and to labor unrest.
United insurgent actions and growing evidence of narcotics
involvement by guerrilla groups underlie the current upward
trend in concern for opposition and regime capability
We expect the trend toward greater instability to continue.
The M-19, which spearheaded the formation of a rural
guerrilla coalition, remains active in rural and urban areas,
and the largest insurgent group, the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia, has exploited its nominal truce with the
government, to continue arming and recruiting. An im-
proved financial situation has balanced social concerns, and,
unless a longstanding territorial dispute with Nicaragua
intensifies, opposition factors are likely to remain the major
7 947786 25X1
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Secret
Instability Index
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
1984
I II 111 IV
1985
I II Ill IV
1986
I II
during next six months
0
0
0
0
during next six to 24 months
0
0
0
Composite score a
100
9
0
80
7
0
60
50
40
30
Number of indicators 2
0
at each level of concern
15
0
1
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
1984
I II III IV
1985
I Il III IV
1986
1 11
during next six months
V
V
V
V
V
during next six to 24 months
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
Composite score'
00
1
9
0
80
70
60
50
40
30
Number of indicators
20
at each level of concern
5
1
;
10
5
A
I
F
I
ecret
Venezuela is South America's most stable democracy, and
we expect it will remain so. The drop in concern for
instability that occurred at the end of 1984 reflected the
popularity of the newly elected Lusinchi administration.
Growing economic difficulties and diminishing public sup-
port since the beginning of this year have renewed pressures
on the regime, and the democratic opposition is gaining in
popularity. Moreover, former President Carlos Andres Pe-
rez-who heads a dissident faction of the ruling Democratic
Action Party-is adding his own criticism to enhance his
prospects for reelection in 1988.
While a deepening recession is undermining the ruling
party's political prospects and President Lusinchi's ability to
ensure his party's nomination in 1988, we believe the
democratic system will remain intact. Economic factors will
continue to be the main source of pressure on the regime.
The high level of instability in Peru in 1984 and early 1985
largely reflected a stagnating economy, a spreading insur-
gency, and diminished confidence in the regime's capabili-
ties. The election of charismatic President Alan Garcia in
April 1985 and his implementation of populist economic
measures bolstered public confidence, but officers remain
chary of Garcia's human rights policies and doubt his
determination to eradicate the growing insurgency. Instabil-
ity surged again last quarter after the aborted prison
takeover by terrorist inmates, the summary execution of
prisoners by the security forces, and rumors of coup plot-
ting.
Garcia's current popularity probably will discourage a
military move to oust him, but we believe his government
has become more vulnerable. Key indicators of instability in
the near term will be military attitudes and regime capabili-
ties, with opposition and economic pressures continuing to
challenge the regime.
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Secret
Instability Index
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
1984
I II Ill IV
1985
I II III IV
1986
I II
during next six months
0
0
10
10
10
0
0
during next six to 24 months
Composite score a 100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
Number of indicators 20
at each level of concern
IS
l0
5
-
-
(5
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
1984
1 11 III IV
1985
1 II III IV
1986
I II
during next six months
during next six to 24 months
Composite score a 100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
Number of indicators 20
at each level of concern
IS
0
5
a The shaded area above 65 is the "danger zone"
Brazil has enjoyed considerable stability in the past two
years despite a complex transition from military to civilian
rule. Rising concern in late 1984 and in the second quarter
of 1985 reflected, respectively, waning public confidence in
the outgoing regime and the unexpected death of President-
elect Neves. Concern has declined steadily since then as the
new regime's legitimacy has grown. President, Sarney kept
the transition process moving, and Brazil's economic growth
last year was the highest in the world.
Since taking office Sarney has not been threatened by coup
plotting or significant unrest. His administration also con-
fronted the country's main economic problem-hyperinfla-
tion-with a shock program last February. While the
government appears to be on good footing, economic and
regime indicators will remain the most powerful predictors
of instability.
The shifting trends in levels of concern for Argentina reflect
changes in the economy and in the public's confidence in the
regime's ability to manage it. Concern over Alfonsin's poor
handling of the economy in late 1984 and early 1985 was
arrested when he implemented a major reform program in
June 1985. The program halted spiraling inflation and
dramatically boosted Alfonsin's popularity but began to run
out of steam in early 1986. Moreover, the unresolved issue
of human rights trials for the military continues to threaten
the long-term stability of the government.
In Argentina, the threat of a military coup-though cur-
rently faint-is ever present. Powerful predictors of such an
event would include a severe deterioration of one or more of
the economic indicators, combined with heightened military
discontent over government policies. Less likely, but still
possible, would be a coup precipitated by a threat to
corporate military interests.
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Secret
Instability Index
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
1984
I II III IV
1985
I ^ III IV
1986
1 II
during next six months
vs
during next six to 24 months
A
?
yr
a
*
410
40
4W
id
Composite score s
100
9
0
80
70
000,
60
50
40
30
Number of indicators 20
at each level of concern
5
-:PA
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III IV
1986
I II
during next six months
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
during next six to 24 months
0
0
0
01
01
0
0
0
0
0
Composite scores
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
Number of indicators
20
at each level of concern
15
10
Secret
The instability indicators for Chile reflect a gradually rising
trend in popular dissatisfaction with the Pinochet regime
and persistent protest actions by both moderate opposition
groups and the far left, which now are collaborating more
closely than in recent years. The indicators also illustrate
growing anxiety within the government and the military
over Pinochet's intransigence as well as concern about
whether and when power will be transferred to civilians.
The slight dip in instabilit inmid 84 largely reflected a
decline in protest activity.
The rises in the trend lines and prospects depict a gradual
polarization of society during the past year or so. There
have been recent large-scale, violent, antiregime demonstra-
tions, and leftist terrorist activity-consisting mainly of
harassing actions-has surged in 1986. The most useful
indicators in forecasting instability have been those tracking
the opposition's organizational capabilities and the attitudes
of the military toward government policies. Those concern-
ing terrorism and demonstrations, while accurately reflect-
ing levels of activity, have been less helpful in making
projections.
Spanish democracy has taken root, as indicated by our
negligible level of concern over prospects for instability. The
great bulk of the citizenry favors moderation, rewarding
middle-of-the-road parties while banishing antidemocratic
extremists to the political margins. The principal threat to
democracy-Basque terrorism-is gradually receding be-
cause of increasing Basque acceptance of home rule, better
police work, and cooperation with the French. The other
remaining problem is the internal conflict within the politi-
cal center right. An effective alternative to Prime Minister
Gonzalez's Socialist Party is not likely to emerge, however,
for several more years.
Despite real and continuing problems, Spain has remained
stable. The paucity of warning signs of instability has been a
good predictor that the moderation in the country's political
life will continue. Indicators of growing unrest would be an
upsurge in terrorism and declining regime capabilities.
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Secret
Instability Index
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
198
1
4
11
III
IV
198
I
5
II
III
IV
198
1
6
II
Fluctuating concern
reflected political unc
election and its persis
peaked in the first qu
Papandreou unexpect
during next six months
0
10
0
0
0
0
with a politically unk
during next six to 24 months
0
0
0
0
0
0
reports of military an
Composite score' 100
dreou's strong finish i
90
position justified redu
levels be
an to climb
80
g
deteriorate in late 19
70
of an austerity progr
60
0
50
40
0, 1
We see little likelihoo
term
but instabilit
30
,
y
economy around or i
indicators
to watch a
Number of indicators 20
factors.
at each level of concern IS
10
5
n
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III IV
1986
I II
during next six months
during next six to 24 months
Composite score' 100
90
80
70
60
-
50
40
30
-
Number of indicators 20
at each level of concern
IS
10
5
n
a The shaded area above 65 is the "danger zone"
for stability in Greece through 1985
ertainties before last June's national
tent economic problems. Tensions
arter of 1985 when Prime Minister
edly replaced President Karamanlis
nown jurist, adding credibility to
d public unrest. Subsequently, Papan-
n the election and the solidifying of his
cing our level of concern. Concern
again as the economy continued to
85, but the successful implementation
am last fall has eased them somewhat.
d of a regime change over the medium
could grow if austerity fails to turn the
f conflict erupts with Turkey. The key
re economic, opposition, and external
Events in 1984 raised serious concerns about the prospects
for Turkey's newly elected civilian government, as reflected
in the indicators. A spate of economic problems-primarily
a surge in inflation-provoked discussion among the politi-
cal opposition about holding a new election to replace the
administration. Concern over possible military involvement
also grew. Separatist terrorism in the southeastern Kurdish
region intensified, and reports circulated that officers were
pressing the government to eliminate rightwing extremists
from the ruling party.
Our level of concern has dropped as inflation declined and
rumblings from the military subsided. Moreover, reports
appeared that a working relationship based on mutual
respect was developing between the civilian prime minister
and the retired general-and former military junta leader-
serving as president. The trends have reflected the primacy
of economic factors for stability in Turkey, while highlight-
ing the significance of internal security issues as a major
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
Secret
Instability Index
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
1984
I II ^l IV
1985
I II III IV
1986
I If
during next six months
during next six to 24 months
Composite score'
100
90
80
70
0
6
50
40
30
Number of indicators
at each level of concern
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
1984
I II Ill IV
1985
I II Ill IV
1986
I II
during next six months
during next six to 24 months
V
V
Composite score'
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
MOST
T%
30
Number of indicators
20
at each level of concern 15
10
Secret
The slight rise in instability in 1985 is primarily a reflection
of economic deterioration and financial decline. Severe
droughts in several of the past five years have crippled
agriculture-a key source of employment and hard curren-
cy-and have put added pressure on imports. In addition,
the cost of the continuing conflict in Western Sahara-
perhaps as much as $500,000 per day-has reduced funds
urgently needed to modernize the country's agricultural,
industrial, and military sectors.
The trend line mirrors the general level of stability in
Morocco because of the unique position of the King as the
country's religious, military, and political leader. His ability
to co-opt the opposition and maintain tight control of the
military has resulted in a stable regime. Economic indica-
tors have been-and are likely to remain-the key predic-
tors of social change and low-level discontent in the mili-
tary.
ing steadily since the second quarter of 1985. The index has
been driven upward in particular by our growing concern
over social and economic factors-including unpopular
changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls. Recently, we
also have become concerned about diminishing confidence
in President Mubarak's ability to provide strong leadership
and the increasing likelihood of strikes and demonstrations
protesting economic austerity measures.
A series of events since late 1985-the Israeli raid on the
PLO headquarters in Tunis, the US interception of the
Achille Lauro hijackers, and the Egyptair hijacking-has
kept the Mubarak regime off balance and eroded popular
confidence in the President. Our concern over economic
factors also has grown this year as the precipitate drop in
world oil prices accelerated Egypt's general economic dete-
rioration and hastened the need for austerity and reform.
Rioting in February by the economically deprived security
police raised the prospect of more widespread unrest if
standards of living continue to erode. Further deterioration
in social, economic, and regime factors is most likely to
signal an impending regime change.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
Instability Index
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
1984
I 11 111 IV
1985
I 11 III IV
1986
I 11
during next six months
?
?
?
?
during next six to 24 months
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Composite score a 100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
Number of indicators 20
at each level of concern
15
10
5
n
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III IV
1986
I II
during next six months
0
0
0
0
0
0
during next six to 24 months
Composite scores 100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
Number of indicators 20
at each level of concern
IS
10
5
T
n
-
-
-
-
-
a The shaded area above 65 is the "danger zone"
The steeply rising composite instability score for Sudan
in the latter part of 1984 and early 1985 reflected a serious
deterioration in economic, political, and social conditions. In
early 1985 the regime of President Nimeiri faced an
increase in insurgent activity, a sagging economy, and
unrest sparked by food and energy shortages-making the
regime increasingly vulnerable to a coup. On 6 April 1985,
Nimeiri was toppled after 16 years in power.
The concern level for stability in Sudan dipped slightly in
this quarter because the Sudanese military delivered on its
promise of an election in April and the new civilian regime
has had a brief respite from opposition activities. Nonethe-
less, the combined weight of the economic, social change,
and military indicators-which have proved most important
for Sudan in the past-remains formidable.
The Saudi Government remains secure but has experienced
two periods of heightened uncertainty. The first, spanning
the last three quarters of 1984, was largely because of
external factors-the continuing Iran-Iraq war and tension
with Iran after the Saudis shot down an Iranian plane. The
increase apparent in the last three quarters of 1985 reflects
the domestic pressures produced by a dramatic change in
Saudi oil policy in August 1985, continuing concern about
the financial situation in the kingdom, and growing tensions
with OPEC militants Iran, Libya, and Algeria over Saudi
The overall trend lines reflect the relative stability of Saudi
Arabia. The two most powerful indicators of instability in
the kingdom are economic factors and regime actions and
capabilities. Others appear less significant-visible internal
opposition is nearly nonexistent, and there is little evidence
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
Secret
Instability Index
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III IV
1986
I IT
during next six months
V
V
O
O
during next six to 24 months
?
?
V
V
Q1
9
V
V
?
O
Composite score'
100
90
80
00
-
70
0
6
5
0
40
30
Number of indicators 20
at each level of concern
:
7N
0
5
198
4
198
5
198
6
Concern ab
primarily r
I
IT
l1I
IV
I
II
III
IV
I
11
decline in K
Prospects for major
beginning o
regime or policy change:
increasingly
during next six months
V
V
V
V
V
government
during next six to 24 months
V
O
V
V
V
V
V
V
were wides
regime follo
Composite score'
100
Our concer
90
80
in th
the regime
70
believe to b
60
acrus
tion
50
,
economy-
40
more of the
30
long-term p
Number of indicators
20
at each level of concern
Secret
Iraqi stability has deteriorated as the costs of the war with
Iran have grown. Increasing casualties, lackluster military
performance, and economic austerity-exacerbated by the
drop in oil prices-are serious problems that the regime has
been unable to resolve. Fluctuations in the levels of concern
for the indicators and the prospects also reflect the regime's
changing fortunes against the Kurdish insurgency.
There have been no changes in regime thus far, and our
concern varies according to Iraq's success on the battlefield.
Over the near term, we expect Saddam Husayn to remain in
power. The strongest indicators that his position is threat-
ened would be further decline in the economy, regime
capabilities, and military support.
out instability in Iran grew through late 1985,
eflecting the deteriorating economy and the
homeini's health. The sharp increase at the
f 1985 reflected reports that Khomeini was
incapacitated and no longer able to supervise
affairs closely. Strikes also occurred, and there
pread demonstrations against the war and the
wing Iran's failed offensive that spring.
n over the antiregime demonstrations and set-
e war has been balanced by our appraisal that
has considerable resiliency. The indicators we
e the most powerful predictors of instability-
unity following Khomeini's death or incapacita-
hing defeat in the war, or a crippling blow to the
have not yet occurred. The likelihood that one or
se will take place still inclines us to view the
rospects for stability with substantial concern.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
Instability Index
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II I^ IV
1986
1 11
during next six months
during next six to 24 months
Composite score' 100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
Number of indicators 20
at each level of concern
15
10
5
n
The sharp fluctuations in our levels of concern regarding
instability in Pakistan generally reflect variations in ethnic
tensions and opposition factors. The sudden rise in early
1985 tracked with ethnic unrest in Sind Province in 1984
and in 1985 with elections for the national and provincial
assemblies. Popular criticism about the economy also has
been a fairly constant source of concern despite generally
favorable conditions. Military factors-specifically coup
plotting-grew in importance toward the end of martial law
in December 1985. The sustained rise in instability since
then largely reflects the development of a serious opposition
The levels of concern generally have mirrored our knowl-
edge of the Zia regime's own perceptions of events, includ-
ing relatively high concern about the March 1985 polls-
elections in Pakistan traditionally are associated with unrest
and coups. We believe indicators of opposition activity and
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III IV
1986
I II
during next six months
during next six to 24 months
G
Composite score' 100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
Number of indicators 20
at each level of concern
15
to
5
Stability in India has fluctuated as social and opposition
factors-relating chiefly to the Sikhs-have varied. The
intensified activities of moderate and extremist Sikhs fol-
lowing the attack on their shrine culminated in the assassi-
nation of Indira Gandhi in October 1984, and brought
instability to its peak. Levels of concern dropped with the
relatively smooth transition of power but rose again in mid-
1985 when Rajiv Gandhi returned Punjab to the Sikhs.
Despite the continuing Sikh problem, prospects for change
in India have been low to moderate since the first quarter of
1985. Because of India's diversity and large size, serious
disturbances in one part of the country, such as Punjab,
may not affect national stability. Nonetheless, indicators of
social change and conflict have proved powerful predictors
of instability in India. We believe the near-term threat to
Gandhi comes from ethnic and sectarian conflicts that
challenge the nation's secular leaders and institutions. They
already have infected the military and weakened the securi-
ty capabilities of the regime.
a The shaded area above 65 is the "danger zone"
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
Instability Index
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
1984
1 ^ III IV
1985
I II III IV
1986
I II
during next six months
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
during next six to 24 months
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Composite score'
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
Number of indicators
20
at each level of concern
15
10
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
1984
I II ^I IV
1985
I II III IV
1986
I II
during next six months
0
0
01
0
01
01
0
0
during next six to 24 months
Composite score'
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
Number of indicators
20
at each level of concern
Secret
Indicators of instability over the past two years have
forecast high and increasing instability for Nigeria's central
government. We attribute this trend to a sharp deterioration
of the national economy, profound discontent among the
military, and widespread popular skepticism over Lagos's
power or ability to unify the country's factionalized popula-
tion and restore its economic prosperity. By early August
1985 ethnic and generational divisions in the military also
were intensifying.
A military coup replaced the Lagos government on
27 August 1985, but the anticipated honeymoon was short
lived. Plunging oil prices further depressed the economy,
and factionalism and violence over regional and religious
differences have mounted. Opposition capabilities remain
weak, leaving Babangida highly vulnerable to a challenge
from the military. Coup rumors have resurfaced, and we
expect instability to remain high this year and next.
with occasional fluctuations reflecting changing levels of
tribal infighting. However, our concern has increased this
year because of President Siad's eroding tribal support base,
growing military dissatisfaction with the level of US assist-
ance, and chronic economic stagnation. Moreover, Siad's
strategy for keeping power-rewarding loyal clan support-
ers with political and economic privileges while dividing and
repressing those opposed to him-is showing signs of strain
as he ages and his opponents gradually multiply. Neverthe-
less, his opponents remain isolated, and Siad maintains the
support of the military and the police-the key domestic
pillars of his regime.
The most powerful indicators of instability in Somalia have
been military, regime, and social factors. Peaks in the trend
line usually have corresponded to coup plotting and sporadic
tribal clashes. We believe ethnic and religious discontent
merits the closest watching because tribalism and intertribal
violence-both endemic to Somali society-reflect Siad's
ability to manipulate the clan rivalries and, consequently,
the general level of political stability.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
Secret
Instability Index
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III IV
1986
I II
during next six months
during next six to 24 months
Composite score a 100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
Number of indicators 20
it each level of concern
IS
10
5
n
Kenya has been relatively stable for the past two years, and
the regime remains strong. Most changes in our level of
concern have been due to fluctuations in the political
opposition and military indicators, although economic and
social factors also have played a role. The decline during the
second quarter of 1985 can be attributed largely to ebbing
tensions at the University of Nairobi and to agricultural
revival following the 1984 drought. The subsequent upward
trend in our level of concern reflected discontent within the
armed forces over pay, benefits, and politicization of the
military by President Moi, as well as reports of antiregime
There have been no major disturbances or coup attempts in
this period, but we remain concerned about the longer term
implications of the persistently high rate of population
growth. We believe that military attitudes toward the
regime and opposition planning-particularly activity moti-
vated by ethnic tensions and linked to the armed forces-
would key predictors of heightened instability in Kenya.
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III IV
1986
I II
during next six months
during next six to 24 months
Composite scores 100
90
80
70
60
so
40
30
Number of indicators 20
at each level of concern
15
10
5
Zaire has been relatively stable, with most changes the
results of economic factors and opposition activities. Con-
cern grew in late 1984 in anticipation of popular protests
against a harsh austerity program and in response to the
first attack by Tanzania-based rebels since the late 1970s.
The slight fluctuations in the trend line since then reflect
waxing and waning protests over continuing economic prob-
lems and concern over the potential for Libyan-supported
We believe President Mobutu's political supremacy will be
unchallenged for the near term. Key indicators of future
instability are likely to be protests over declining economic
conditions and diminishing regime capabilities.
a The shaded area above 65 is the "danger zone:
,I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
 I I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
Instability Index
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II 111 IV
1986
I II
during next six months
0
0
0
0
during next six to 24 months
0
01
?
Composite score'
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
Number of indicators
20
at each level of concern
L
L
I
T
5
-
198
4
198
5
198
6
Concern for s
throughout 1
I
^
III
IV
I
II
11I
IV
I
11
dence that de
Prospects for major
Marcos. Duri
regime or policy change:
opponents stil
during next six months
(..o
have been esp
have been es
during next six to 24 months
?
?
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
adversaries in
i
i
p
no
many Fil
Composite score'
ime was re
re
100
g
the military,
90
activity. Con
80
OEM
early as mid-
70
--W
that triggered
60
has
bilit
St
50
y
a
took office, b
40
insurgency, o
30
In t
economy.
be crucial ind
Number indicators
at each level of of concern
5
-Oft
Secret
Social change and conflict factors largely have been driving
South Africa's instability indicators to higher levels of
concern since 1984. Concern about deteriorating conditions
began to grow in late 1984 with the onset of unrest in South
Africa's black townships. It has continued to rise, reflecting
increasingly aggressive black protests, clashes with the
security forces, and the growing politicization of black labor
Levels of concern also have grown somewhat in most other
areas. Attacks by African National Congress guerrillas
have become more frequent and indiscriminate, Pretoria's
security measures have grown increasingly harsh, and South
Africa has become more isolated politically and economical-
ly-especially in its access to foreign funds. The only
indicator for which concern has not increased is military
attitudes, which remain a key source of government
strength. Although we expect a further deterioration of
social, economic, and political conditions, we believe a
significant worsening of the regime capabilities indicators
would be necessary before dramatic political change would
tability in the Philippines was substantial
984 and 1985, reflecting the crisis of confi-
veloped in recent years under former President
ng much of this period, however, Marcos's
l were fragmented. Three indicators appear to
ecially important in galvanizing Marcos's
February 1986-a growing perception by
s in the political center that the Marcos
pressive and unjust, growing discontent within
and an alarming increase in Communist
cern about each of these issues increased as
1985, setting the stage for subsequent events
Marcos's downfall.
improved markedly since President Aquino
ut she still must resolve problems posed by the
by Marcos sympathizers, and the
pposition
he near term, we believe military attitudes will
icators of her ability to consolidate power.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
Secret
Instability Index
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
1984
1 11 11 111 IV
1985
I II 111 ' IV
1986
I II
during next six months
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
during next six to 24 months
Composite score' 100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
Number of indicators
20
t each level of concern
15
10
5
0
Despite plummeting oil revenues and the regime's increas-
ing restrictions on opposition and Muslim political activity,
Indonesia has remained calm since the disturbances of late
1984 and early 1985. During that period social conflict and
opposition activity rose slightly with a surge of antiregime
violence. We believe the unrest can be traced to Islamic
radicals exploiting political and economic frustrations and
ethnic animosity. The more recent rise in concern since last
quarter is due more to economic factors. The sharp decline
in world oil prices has forced Jakarta to implement austerity
measures that have exacerbated unemployment.
The trend lines reflect Indonesia's basically sound economic
position and the ability of the Soeharto regime to maintain
internal order. Fiscal austerity, however, may undercut the
government's ability to attack the underlying economic
causes of Indonesia's political and social strains. Key indica-
tors of instability would be a rise in domestic discontent,
greater government repression, and deteriorating economic
Prospects for major
regime or policy change:
1984
111 III IV
1985
I 11 III IV
1986
I II
during next six months _
+
during next six to 24 months
+
Q
Q
Q
Q
Composite score' 100
90
80
70
60
50
ao
30
Number of indicators
20
t each level of concern
15
10
5
0
Warning signs of instability in South Korea moved upward
in late 1984 and early 1985, chiefly as a result of heightened
protests and the rebirth of a vigorous political opposition.
Military grumbling about President Chun's handling of the
unrest also became more audible, as did concern in military
circles that public opinion was turning against the military
generally. Our concern level moderated somewhat this year
as South Korea's export-driven economy rebounded strong-
Antiregime demonstrations and riots remain the most worri-
some short-term indicator because of the potential that a
government miscalculation could result in a spiral of con-
frontation and repression. The increase in opposition activi-
ties, as well as the Chun government's blemished legitimacy
and apparent lack of self-confidence, carry greater weight in
our longer term assessment. We will continue to monitor
government handling of constitutional reform as the politi-
a The shaded area above 65 is the "danger zone"
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a
a
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300510001-0
Secret
Secret
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