TERRORISM REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00685R000200280002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 2, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Terrorism Review
See. et
GI TR 85-024
2 December 1985
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Terrorism Review I 25X1
Highlights
Lebanon: Release of the Soviet Hostages
Belgium: Coping With Terrorism
Chronology of Terrorism-1985
Terrorism and Narcotics Analysis Division, DI/OGI
This review is published every other week by the Directorate of Intelligence.
Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well as by other
agencies of the US Intelligence Community will be considered for publication.
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Terrorism Review F___-] 25X1
Focus Terry Waite, Hostage Negotiator
Terry Waite, a British aide to the Archbishop of Canterbury since 1980, has
assisted in the release of hostages in three separate incidents over the past five
years. Waite succeeded in freeing British hostages held in Iran and Libya in 1981
and 1985, respectively, and, according to the Weir family, played a role in the
release of American hostage Benjamin Weir last September. His previous efforts
have earned him accolades from all involved for his patience, humor, and
An Accomplished Adviser
Waite has earned his position as a trustworthy intermediary. His extreme caution
and discretion have made him a valuable person in the highly charged business of
hostage negotiating. Although Waite does not appear to have sought such a role,
he has extensive experience in church diplomacy and in the Third World.
Educated at the Church Army College-an independent adjunct to the Anglican
Church primarily concerned with mission work-and elsewhere, Waite's
international experience extends back to 1968. He spent four years in Africa as the
adviser on missionary activities to the first Anglican Bishop of Uganda, Rwanda,
and Burundi. He also organized the Sudan Relief Project. In 1972 he began a
seven-year stint as a consultant to the Roman Catholic Church on missionary
development and still maintains contact with the Vatican. He says he has held
consultations with the Pope on his efforts in the Lebanon hostage situation.
Previous Efforts
After he was appointed an aide to Archbishop Runcie for his missionary and
ecumenical work, Waite entered the minefield of hostage negotiations apparently
by chance:
? The Anglican Church became involved in efforts to obtain the release of British
citizens held in Iran in 1980 because three of the hostages were Anglican
missionaries.
? When Libya seized four British nationals in 1984, the wife of one hostage turned
to the Archbishop for help because her husband had been the organist at the
Anglican Church in Tripoli.
? His publicized success in these endeavors probably led American Presbyterian
Church leaders to ask for Waite's help in the case of the Reverend Weir, a
missionary held hostage in Lebanon since May 1984. The nature of Waite's role
has been kept secret by all parties.
In the case of the hostages in Iran and Libya, Waite acted as an impartial
mediator who made no claims to represent any government or institution other
than the Anglican Church. He argued that no purpose would be served by
continued detention of innocent persons and may have persuaded Iran and Libya
GI TR 85-024
2 December 1985
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that releasing the hostages would improve their international images. Waite met
with senior Iranian clerics and'government officials during three trips to Tehran.
The three Anglicans were released in February 1981; a businessman held on
criminal charges in addition to allegations of espionage was not released. After he
made several trips to Libya, Waite met with Qadhafi on Christmas day 1984.
Qadhafi freed the four British businessmen last February. In both cases, the freed
hostages were released into Waite's custody, and he accompanied them back to
Britain.
Although Waite's personal qualities-his widely cited patience, compassion,
humor, and the ability to listen-have been instrumental, his successes may also
have been fortuitous. The very fact that his position has been unofficial has been
used to embarrass governments by pointing up the failure of diplomacy. When the
Thatcher government appeared to take credit for the release of the British
nationals in Libya in February 1985, the Archbishop's office released a sharp
statement refuting the government's claim. In 1981 the Iranians may already have
decided to let the missionaries go: their release came just two weeks after the
American Embassy hostages were freed.
Waite stresses his unofficial role and his interest in hostage crises from the
viewpoint of a man of faith. This honest and disarming approach has gained him
access to leaders like Qadhafi and Iranian clerics when British diplomats could
not. It has helped him in Beirut, where he has already been in touch with the
Hizballah faction holding the US hostages.
Mission to Beirut
Waite flew to Beirut on 13 November apparently'at the invitation of the terrorists
who have held six Americans hostage, some since March 1984. The kidnapers had
released letters the previous weekend from four of the hostages addressed to
President Reagan, two Congressmen, and their own families. Also included in the
package was a confidential letter to Waite, evidently inviting him to Beirut.
The lack of information about Waite's role in the release of Reverend Weir makes
it difficult to assess his chances of success in this current mission. Waite has
avoided self-aggrandizing publicity: reports of his involvement came initially from
the Weir family and the Presbyterian Church. Only after this announcement did
Waite acknowledge his role in a typically low-key fashion. He indicated that he
had been in contact with an unidentified Lebanese intermediary for at least six
months prior to Weir's release, but refused to disclose further details.
There are several possible explanations for Waite's current involvement with the
American hostages in Lebanon. The terrorists are under increasing pressure from
the Syrians and may be willing to release the remaining hostages as a face-saving
end to the situation. They may believe that, by releasing the Americans to Waite,
they would prevent the US Government from implying that it was responsible for
their release. The kidnapers also may believe that turning them over to an
unofficial foreigner without specific power or authority would embarrass the US
Government. Alternatively, the Lebanese extremists may still believe their
demands will be met, and that involving Waite will grant their demands a more
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respectful hearing. They may be using him simply to reiterate their message to the
world as they attempted to do in releasing Weir. Obtaining the release of the
American hostages may prove beyond his reach, since Hizballah has not wavered
in its call for the release of the Dawa Party prisoners in Kuwait, and the Kuwaitis
will probably be reluctant to meet with Waite.
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 The gunmen had identified themselves only as "Egyptian revolutionaries," and it
is not yet known whether they had any connection to a group called the "Egyptian
Revolution," which claimed two shootings of Israeli diplomats in Cairo in 1984
and 1985. On 25 November a communique claiming credit for the attack was
issued in the name of the "Arab Revolutionary Brigades," a covername used by
the anti-Arafat Palestinian Abu Nidal Group. Either group could have conducted
the operation independently or could have received help from Libya. That country
5 Secret
G! TR 85-024
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Highlights
leftist guerrillas have received training in Nicaragua in the use of sophisticated
explosive devices and are surveilling US and Honduran intelligence assets as well
to provide attractive targets for potential terrorist attacks.
Possible Threat to US Military Personnel
US personnel participating in joint US-Honduran military exercises will continue
as US aircraft, billets, and other restricted areas of Palmerola Airbase.
Groups most likely to attack US targets include the Popular Revolutionary Forces-
Lorenzo Zelaya (FPR/LZ) group, the People's Revolutionary Union/Popular
Liberation Movement-Cinchoneros (URP/MPL), and the Marxist-dominated
United Federation of Honduran Workers. The first two are among the most
violence-prone and active insurgent groups in Honduras. The FPR/LZ is referred
to as "the vanguard group" in leftist circles and prides itself in undertaking high-
risk operations.
Malta, Egypt Sixty Die in Storming of Hijacked Airliner
On 23 November, three to five unidentified gunmen took over an Egyptair
passenger jet bound from Athens to Cairo. They diverted the aircraft to Malta
after damage from a midair shootout prevented it from landing in Tripoli or Tunis,
the hijackers' preferred destinations. During the takeover, a gun battle reportedly
took place, in which a hijacker and an Egyptian security guard were killed. Once
on the ground in Malta, the gunmen demanded fuel to fly on to Sigonella Airbase
in Italy but were refused. By the evening of the 24th, the hijackers were believed to
have executed six or seven hostages, among them one American woman.
That evening, nearly 24 hours after the hijacking began, Egyptian commandos
from the "777" counterterrorist unit stormed the plane in an attempt to rescue the
hostages. The terrorists threw grenades during the assault, which Egypt alleges
accounted for the nearly 60 persons killed in the resulting fire. Some of the 30
surviving passengers and crew claimed the commandos fired indiscriminately, but
Egyptian officials claim that their force fired only seven shots. One hijacker also
survived.
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motivation.
is the prime suspect in Egyptian eyes, but we currently lack sufficient evidence to
lay this act at Qadhafi's door, although he has demonstrated both means and
West Germany Car Bomb Wounds 32 in Frankfurt-am-Main
A car bomb exploded in a parking lot adjacent to a US military exchange in
Frankfurt-am-Main on 24 November. The vehicle, which had been parked outside
the secure zone maintained by the military police, contained an estimated 90
kilograms of explosives. There were no fatalities, but 32 persons were injured,
mostly US military personnel and dependents.
that a West German rightwing group conducted the attack.
Some West German officials believe that the bombing may have been carried out
by Middle Eastern terrorists. The car had been purchased the previous day by a
foreigner who spoke through a foreign interpreter and used a Moroccan passport-
commonly used by a number of Palestinian and other terrorist groups. This
Moroccan passport had a serial number close to those on forged passports of two
Palestinian terrorists arrested in Madrid last summer in an apparent plot against
the Syrian Ambassador to Spain. Other West German officials believe the
bombing may have been the work of indigenous leftist groups such as the Red
Army Faction (RAF). Even prior to this attack, those officials had noted an
increase in the RAF's activities over the past two months, including more travel by
suspected terrorists and more vigorous activity by imprisoned RAF members. As a
result, they came to believe that an RAF attack was imminent. It is also possible
installations may have influenced the group to attack a "softer" target.
security around obvious terrorist targets such as diplomatic and military
The use of a Middle Easterner and the choice of target would seem to be
significant departures for the RAF, but the group recently has evidenced other
unusual operational behavior. In the August car bombing at Rhein-Main Air
Force Base, for example-claimed by the RAF in a joint communique with the
French group Action Directe-the RAF killed a US serviceman in order to obtain
his identification card. The RAF had not previously killed noncombatants apart
from its actual attacks. The target-a shopping area known to be frequented
primarily by US military dependents-is atypical for the RAF, but the tightened
Dashnag Party, which it called "a ploy of American imperialists."
New Leftist Group Emerging?
In a communique to Armenian newspapers, a previously unknown group calling
itself the Armenian Revolutionary Federation-Revolutionary Movement (ARF-
RM) has threatened to execute "all traitors" in the service of the United States,
Israel, or Turkey. The communique called on members to quit the rightist
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This new group has claimed credit for abducting and killing two Dashnag Party
members last spring in Lebanon. An ARF-RM spokesman has also promised to
publish details of a plot by the Dashnag leadership-called the Bureau-against
the Armenian people. The plot is allegedly based on the confessions of Sarkis
Zeitlian, a leading member of the Bureau who was kidnaped last March in Beirut.
The leftwing Armenian press is now speculating that the ARF-RM may have been
responsible for the Zeitlian kidnaping.
The tone of the communique resembles those issued by the leftwing Armenian
Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and its affiliated groups. In
addition, the ARF-RM's name resembles that of ASALA's Revolutionary
Movement, known as ASALA-RM, which surfaced with a July 1983 bombing of
Paris's Orly Airport. It is possible that the ARF-RM consists of radical leftists
who want to undermine the Dashnag Party and discredit its leaders and moderate
policies. In any event, several ASALA splinter groups have emerged since the Orly
bombing, but none has obtained enough support to mount major terrorist attacks.
Canada, India Sikh Paramilitary Training
According to the Canadian press, Sikh separatists from the United States and
Canada are undergoing training at the Eagle Combat and Bodyguard School near
Vancouver, British Columbia. A Sikh spokesman has asserted that the training is
necessary for security personnel in Sikh temples to keep order. The school
allegedly is operated by a veteran of bush wars in Africa and provides security and
unconventional warfare training similar to that taught by a school in Alabama
that has also trained Sikhs.
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January that decimated the group.
GRAPO Attempts To Rebuild
The outlawed Spanish Communist Party (Reconstituted) (PCE-R), which
advocates the overthrow of the Spanish Government and the removal of all US
military installations, is attempting to rebuild its military wing, the First of .
October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO). Manuel Perez Martinez, alias
"Arenas," the Secretary General of the PCE-R and a leading member of GRAPO,
reportedly has been recruiting members and leaders for new GRAPO commando
units. He and several other senior GRAPO members escaped massive arrests last
members and probably will return to its previous level of activity.
GRAPO's previous rebuilding efforts were aided by recruits from the Association
of Families and Friends of Political Prisoners, a PCE-R front organization.
Although GRAPO's recent reverses and membership losses have severely
hampered its operational capabilities, the group retains the ability to recruit new
the US Embassy.
More Terrorists May Be Released
In late October a Milan court released 10 members of the Prima Linea terrorist
group who were appealing their convictions for terrorist activities. They were
released at least in part because their appeals could not be completed by 30
November, when the controversial 1984 preventive detention reform law is
scheduled to go fully into effect. This law requires that detainees be released
within six years if their trials and appeals have not been completed and further
stipulates that they may not be jailed for more than two years at any stage of the
process. As many as 200 potentially dangerous detainees-including an
undetermined number of terrorist suspects-may soon be released, according to
those detainees.
The Italian courts have completed the trials and appeals of some 1,300 criminals
since the original deadline was delayed in February. The Milan court decision may
indicate, however, that the government, unless it requests a second postponement,
probably will be unable to try the remaining 200 cases-resulting in the release of
US Embassy Annex, 300 meters away.
Bomb Disrupts Meeting of Christian Leaders
On 12 November a truck bomb exploded at a former monastery in East Beirut
where high-level Christians had gathered to discuss opposition to a Syrian-backed
plan for political reform. The truckdriver and three other persons were killed, and
another 36 persons were injured, including former President Camille Chamoun.
The bomb caused extensive damage to the monastery and broke windows at the
intimidate Christian opposition to its reform plan.
Responsibility for the bombing was claimed in the names of two previously
unknown Christian groups, but one of three Syrian-sponsored groups-the Syrian
Social Nationalist Party, the Lebanese Bath Party, or Eli Hubayka's Lebanese
Forces-are the most likely perpetrators. Syria would like to eliminate or
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Libya-Cuba-Chile Aid to MIR Terrorist Group
Tripoli reportedly has promised $1 million to the Chilean Movement of the
Revolutionary Left (MIR) to finance expanded terrorist operations, while Cuba is
also urging the group to increase its armed attacks. Havana and Tripoli are not
known to be coordinating their assistance to the group, however, and they are
bitter competitors for influence elsewhere in the Third World.
attacks.
Libya, which formerly provided only modest support to several far-left groups in
Chile, primarily training, evidently is now prepared to commit substantial aid to
the MIR-it has given $100,000 so far. The MIR has yet to demonstrate a
capacity to stage larger, more frequent operations, however, and Tripoli almost
certainly will make future payments contingent on more aggressive terrorist
The MIR is reportedly using the funds to rebuild its military cadre and create
arms-smuggling networks through Argentina and Bolivia. Group leaders are
worried that efforts to smuggle arms through Bolivia may have been compromised
after security forces there raided a safehouse in La Paz on 10 October. The group,
formerly the most active terrorist organization in the country, has been rebuilding
its armed wing for the past few months and now has an estimated 400 to 500
members
the Central Committee of the insurgent
Somali National Movement (SNM) recently approved plans to employ terrorism
and hit-and-run guerrilla attacks in Somali towns. The insurgents-mainly Issak
tribesmen who seek autonomy for northern Somalia-have been weakened by
leadership disputes and defections, and probably believe that such tactics will help
them regain the initiative in their struggle against the Siad regime. The
government also has undercut the SNM's strength with a successful amnesty
program and conciliatory gestures toward its disgruntled tribal supporters
Although the SNM usually concentrates its attacks along the northern Ogaden
border, the insurgents have in the past demonstrated an ability to carry out
effective guerrilla and sabotage operations deeper in northern Somalia. Because of
the SNM's pro-Western stance, however, we doubt it would target US personnel
at the northern port of Berbera. Terrorist operations-particularly in towns-are
likely to boomerang, as civilian casualties would probably alienate tribal support
and handicap the insurgents' intelligence gathering and fundraising
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Lebanon: Release of
the Soviet Hostages
The Soviets were able to secure the release of their
three surviving hostages in Lebanon on 30 October-
one month after their capture-because virtually all
the major actors in Lebanon sought to obtain the
hostages' release and had nothing to gain by their
continued detention. Resolution of the Soviet hostage
situation also suggests that cooperation among Syria,
Iran, and the various Lebanese militias probably is
essential for securing the release of the US hostages.
The incident underscores the support Moscow enjoys
in certain Middle Eastern quarters and demonstrates
the Soviets' unwillingness to use force when it
probably would have been counterproductive.
The Kidnapers and Their Demands
Four Soviet officials were kidnaped in Beirut on 30
September during a period of heavy fighting in
Tripoli, Lebanon, between pro-Syrian Lebanese
militias and Sunni fundamentalists of the Islamic
Unification Movement (IUM). An anonymous caller
claimed responsibility for the kidnaping on behalf of
the Islamic Liberation Organization, and threatened
that the four Soviets would be executed unless Syrian-
backed militias ceased their offensive against the
Sunni fundamentalists. We believe the kidnapers
probably were Sunni fundamentalists sympathetic to
the IUM. On 2 October one Soviet hostage-consular
officer Katkov-was shot and his body dumped in
West Beirut.
A cease-fire went into effect in Tripoli on 4 October,
but the kidnapers continued to hold the remaining
hostages. Callers claiming to represent the kidnapers
said they would not be freed until the USSR and the
United States ended Lebanon's 10-year-old civil war.
A statement published in a Lebanese newspaper later
added the liberation of Afghanistan to the kidnapers'
demands. Anonymous callers also demanded that
Moscow close its Embassy in Lebanon.
The kidnapers released the remaining three Soviet
hostages unharmed on 30 October in a Sunni
neighborhood of West Beirut after Lebanese militias
conducted extensive house-to-house searches. In a
communique, the kidnapers said that they released
the Soviets to show good will and persuade "others" to
stop harassment of Sunni fundamentalists in Tripoli.
The Soviet Response
The Soviet hostages were freed in Lebanon because
Moscow had important allies positioned to exert
pressure on the kidnapers. The lack of retaliation so
far also suggests that Moscow may have struck a deal
to secure the hostages' safe release.
Diplomatic. The Soviets appear to have relied almost
exclusively on diplomatic efforts. They responded
quickly to the kidnaping by asking every country and
organization in the region that had some influence in
Lebanon to render assistance. In Lebanon, Soviet
Charge Suslikov held almost daily meetings with
in close communication with the Syrians through its
Embassy in Damascus.
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Rhetorical. Publicly, the Soviet reaction to the
kidnaping was cautious and low key throughout.
Moscow carefully avoided making threats and
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Lebanon. The Soviet press service Novosti even stated
on 19 October that the kidnapers should fulfill their
promise and release the hostages because the fighting
in Tripoli had calmed.
Military. The Soviets may have considered the use of
force, but we discerned no activity that might indicate
preparations for either a rescue operation or a
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diminished the viability of such an option. Moreover,
they may well have decided that the political costs of
a military response were unacceptable. In mid-
October, a Soviet expert on the Middle East stated
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GI TR 85-024
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that Moscow had ruled out military action, claiming
that US experience had demonstrated the futility of
the military option in a hostage crisis. Moscow further
decided not to "show the flag" by stationing naval
forces off the Lebanese coast or sending military
forces to Syria.
The lack of retaliation against the kidnapers suggests
that Moscow may have struck a deal to secure the
hostages' safe release. A promise not to retaliate in
exchange for the hostages' freedom would give the
incident a low profile, an attractive option to Moscow
in that it would not antagonize Lebanese extremists or
remind the world that Soviet citizens are as
vulnerable in Lebanon as Westerners. Historically,
the Soviets have demonstrated a willingness to
negotiate and make political concessions when dealing
with a situation in which geographical constraints
make action impossible
Moscow's Allies
Syria played a crucial role in securing the release of
the Soviet hostages.
secured Iranian assistance, and, along with Moscow,
applied pressure on the Druze, Amal, and other
militias to search for the hostages. In Tripoli, Syria
imposed a settlement on the Sunni fundamentalists in
which Syrian forces occupied large parts of the city.
Lebanese Militias. In Lebanon, the Druze, Amal-
both of which have important military relationships
with the USSR-and virtually all of the leftist
militias worked hard to identify the kidnapers and
secure the release of the hostages.
pressure no doubt contributed to locating the
kidnapers and prompting them to end the crisis.
Although Moscow has avoided giving special praise to
any one group or country for resolving the incident,
the Druze probably expect to curry favor with the
Soviets for their assistance
Implications for the US Hostages
The outcome of the Soviet hostage situation indicates
that a concerted effort among the major actors in
Lebanon probably is essential for securing the release
of the US hostages. The similarity ends there,
however. The US hostages are held by Hizballah, a
fanatic Shia fundamentalist group that is much better
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organized and disciplined than the Sunni
fundamentalists who kidnaped the Soviets. Because of
its strength and experience, Hizballah is much less
likely to succumb to external pressures. It has not
wavered in its demand for the release of 17 Dawa
prisoners in Kuwait.
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Chronology of Events
30 September Four Soviet diplomats kidnaped in West Beirut.
Anonymous caller claims credit on behalf of Islamic Liberation Organization and
threatens to execute the hostages unless Syrian-backed militias cease their
offensive of Sunni fundamentalists in Tripoli. Photos are published showing guns
held to the hostages' heads.
Soviet consular officer Katkov's body found in West Beirut suburb.
Soviets appeal to Syria and to Lebanese groups for help in freeing the hostages.
Anonymous caller claiming to speak for the kidnapers threatens to blow up the
Soviet Embassy within 48 hours.
3 October Druze and leftist militias move to protect Soviet Embassy.
4 October Nearly half of the Soviet community evacuated from Lebanon to Syria.
Syrian-backed offensive in Tripoli ceases with Syrian-imposed truce.
6 October Cease-fire formally takes effect when 1,000 Syrian troops enter Tripoli.
Anonymous caller claiming to represent the kidnapers states the hostages will not
be freed until the USSR and the United States end Lebanon's 10-year-old civil
war.
10 October Kidnapers claim in newspaper statement that they will keep the hostages until
Afghanistan is liberated and the Lebanon crisis is over.
14 October An anonymous caller warns that, unless the Soviet Embassy is closed, the hostages
will be killed and the compound blown up.
24 October Amal and Druze militias conduct house-to-house searches in West Beirut,
rounding up 70 people for interrogations.
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26 October Soviet Ambassador to Lebanon returns to Beirut.
28 October Chief of Syrian military intelligence for Lebanon arrives in Beirut.
30 October Remaining three Soviet hostages released in Sunni neighborhood of West Beirut.
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Palestinians: An Update on
Abu Nidal Terrorism
The terrorist capabilities of the radical Palestinian
Abu Nidal Group remain strong, in our opinion,
whether its leader Sabri al-Banna (Abu Nidal) is dead
or alive. The Abu Nidal Group, which has long
rejected any political solution to the Arab-Israeli
dispute, in the past 12 months has intensified attacks
on pro-Arafat Palestinians and those moderate Arab
countries that support them, particularly Jordan. The
group has threatened further attacks on West
European and US interests for their involvement with
the peace process.
Senior members of the Abu Nidal Group apparently
have recently tightened an already tightly
compartmented structure and, during the process,
may have transferred more of its elements from Syria
to Lebanon. Along with strengthening the group's
capabilities, we believe these changes also reflect an
underlying concern among Abu Nidal leaders about
the reliability of Syria, their host since October 1983.
The group strives to maintain its independence, but
we believe it has conducted some terrorist operations
at the behest of Damascus.
Al-Banna: Elusive or Illusive?
Sabri al-Banna, the group's founder, was rumored to
have died and been buried in Iraq in mid-1984, but,
over the last few months, some reports-including
alleged interviews-have claimed that he is alive and
well in Libya. The aura of Al-Banna's leadership is
still important. His followers are trying to recoup the
losses in membership that followed rumors of his
death.
Three alleged interviews with Al-Banna have
appeared so far in 1985. No photographs, however,
have accompanied any of these interviews, and
explanations and details are either lacking or weak.
The first interview appeared last February when a
French journalist claimed to have talked with him in
Tripoli, Libya. The journalist later admitted,
however, that he could not be certain that the man to
whom he spoke was Al-Banna. A Kuwaiti journalist
also claimed to have interviewed him in Tripoli in
September. The most recent alleged dialogue with Al-
Banna was reported in an October edition of the West
German magazine Der Spiegel; no date or place for
the interview was cited.
Even if the interviews were genuine, we doubt reports
that Al-Banna is in "excellent" health. He has long
suffered from a serious heart condition and reportedly
suffered a major heart attack in 1978 and perhaps a
stroke in 1984. We believe that most of the group's
operations have been planned and directed in recent
years by his two top deputies, Mustafa Murad and
Abd al-Rahman Issa. The current capabilities of the
group to carry out terrorist operations do not depend
on Al-Banna's status.
Target: The Peace Process
The Abu Nidal Group's major goal is to derail,
through terrorist tactics, efforts for a negotiated
settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Since Abu
Nidal rejected the shift in PLO policy in 1974 toward
a diplomatic solution, moderate PLO figures have
been the primary targets of the group; PLO Chairman
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Following the Palestine National Council meeting in
Amman and the signing by King Hussein and Arafat
of a peace initiative last February, senior Jordanian
officials have been added to the Abu Nidal hit list.
The group claimed credit for the assassinations of
moderate PLO Executive Committee member Fahd
Qawasmah in Jordan in December 1984 and a
Jordanian diplomat in Romania that same month.
The group also is believed to be responsible for the
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July. (See chronology at end of article.)F___-] 25X1
The group recently threatened to assassinate two
other Executive Committee moderates, Muhammad
Milhim and Ilya Khuri, both of whom are prominent
supporters of the peace process and possible
participants in any future talks among the PLO,
Jordan, and the United States.
Secret
GI TR 85-024
2 December 1985
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In the alleged interview that appeared in Der Spiegel,
Abu Nidal threatened the United States and the
United Kingdom, as well as other governments, for
their roles in the peace process and their efforts
against international terrorism. The United Kingdom
has been the target of several Abu Nidal attacks
designed to force the release from British jails of
group members, including Al-Banna's nephew. The
French Government also has been threatened with
violent reprisals if it does not release two Abu Nidal
members jailed there since their conviction for the
murder of the PLO representative in Paris in 1979.
Organizational Changes in 1985
In mid-1985, the Abu Nidal organization
restructured its existing committees and covertly
transferred personnel from Syria to Lebanon,
IIn our view,
these recent measures reflect the group's efforts to
strengthen its operational capabilities, tighten
security against outside penetrations and informers
within the organization, and assure the group an
operational base should Syria withdraw its support
and expel the group as Iraq did in October 1983. F_
The most important new committee appears to be the
High Command, which runs an elite unit called the
Special Military Operations Committee to plan and
carry out the group's terrorist operations.
Modus Operandi and Capabilities
The Abu Nidal Group appears to be the best
organized and most effective of the radical
Palestinian terrorist groups. The group appears to
screen its recruits carefully and even conducts
periodic security checks and spot surveillance of its
more experienced members. Its practice of recruiting
more than one member of the same family helps
ensure a pool of steady recruits, maintains the
exclusivity of the group, and provides a means to
inhibit disloyalty.
the conduct of the actual operation.
Operations appear to be carefully planned. A
supervisor-operative arrangement reportedly is used
frequently to limit the damage to the overall group
should the operative be caught before he reaches the
target area. The operative receives only enough
information to carry out his mission. Once he reaches
his destination, he contacts a "supervisor," who
furnishes him with weapons and reportedly monitors
In 1985 Abu Nidal turned increasingly to bombings
and grenade attacks against commercial facilities,
although assassination attempts against selected
individuals have continued. Improved security for
senior-level PLO and Jordanian officials has made
accessibility to them more difficult. The increased
"popularity" of bombings and grenade attacks may
stem from the fact that such attacks require less
training and experience.
Aliases and Fronts
The Abu Nidal Group has used several different
names to cover its terrorist operations. It often uses
the name "Arab Revolutionary Brigades" in attacks
against Persian Gulf targets. Following the November
1984 Palestine National Council meeting in Jordan,
the group began to use the name "Black September"
to claim responsibility for attacks against Jordanian
and Palestinian targets. The name may have been a
reference to the Sabra and Shatila massacres that
took place in Lebanon in September 1982 or,
alternatively, use of the name may have been intended
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to mock and discredit the former Fatah Black
September terrorist organization, which has been
defunct since 1974. We believe the group has also
used the name "Revolutionary Organization of
Socialist Muslims" in attacks against British targets.
Bases of Operations and External Support
The Abu Nidal Group's central headquarters is in
Damascus and it apparently has carried out much of
its training at secret locations in Syria. We believe
that Syria has used the Abu Nidal Group, along with
other radical Palestinians, to do its bidding. Although
we have no specific evidence concerning Syrian
tasking of Abu Nidal operations, most of the group's
attacks have served Syrian interests.
The Abu Nidal Group also has strong support
networks in Europe. Based on reports from several
liaison services, the group has operatives in Bulgaria
and Yugoslavia, both of which may serve as transit
points and operational bases.
We believe Athens in
particular is a staging area for Abu Nidal,
presumably because of lax local security. In addition,
the group may have some operatives in Pakistan and
India.
In 1985 the Abu Nidal Group continued its
recruitment efforts among Fatah dissidents, probably
at Syrian urging.
Libyan hospitality toward the Abu Nidal organization
appears to have grown this year, another indication
that the group may be looking for alternatives to
Syrian backing. The Abu Nidal Group's track record
of successful terrorist operations probably also is
appealing to Qadhafi, given the recent failures of
many Libyan operations.
If Libya has increased
its support, we believe Qadhafi may seek a role in
selecting Abu Nidal targets, but he is unlikely to
suceed in exerting any real leverage over the group.
to offset growing Libyan backing of the group.
Prospects
Terrorism by the Abu Nidal Group is likely to
continue unabated. We believe that the status of the
peace process is irrelevant to decisions by the Abu
Nidal Group's targeting of PLO and other Arab
leaders working toward a political settlement of the
Arab-Israeli dispute. As long as the peace process
remains stalemated, Syrian-sponsored terrorism
against Jordan and Palestinians may decline. Should
the peace process regain momentum, Syria would be
likely to encourage terrorism by the Abu Nidal Group
and other radical Palestinians if it feels its interests
are not being considered. Syria probably also will
want to maintain its support for the Abu Nidal Group
Abu Nidal's grudge is against Arafat and his
supporters within the PLO. Although the Abu Nidal
Group may consider attacks against US interests-
possibly even against US officials involved in the
should not be traced back to Tripoli.
peace initiative-the group has only attacked US 25X1
targets twice in its history. Syria would be likely to
discourage such attacks for the time being, seeing the
risks as outweighing the benefits. Despite its
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the risk of US retaliation. It may, however, support
such operations if it were confident any such attacks
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Egypt has claimed that the Egyptair hijacking to
Malta was carried out by Abu Nidal with Libyan
backing. During the course of that incident,
passengers of Western origin were singled out for
execution. While we cannot confirm the Egyptian
claims of collusion, we believe they may be intended
to support Mubarak's public allegations that Libya
was behind the hijacking.
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Significant Abu Nidal Operations, 1985
25 September Italy: Bomb exploded at British Airways office in Rome, injuring 15. Claimed by
Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims (ROSM).
18 September Greece: Palestinian magazine publisher, Michael al-Numari, assassinated in
Athens. Claimed by Black September.
16 September Italy: Grenades thrown at the Cafe de Paris in Rome, injuring 38 tourists,
including 11 Americans. Claimed by ROSM.
3 September Greece: Grenades thrown at Glyfada Hotel in Athens, wounding 19. Attack
claimed by Black September and ROSM.
30 August Greece: Palestinian arrested in Athens plotting the assassination of the Jordanian
Ambassador. Claimed to be member of Black September.
8 August Greece: Bomb exploded at London Hotel in Athens, wounding 13 British tourists.
Claimed by ROSM.
24 July Turkey: First Secretary at the Jordanian Embassy in Ankara assassinated by a
lone gunman. Incident claimed by Black September, Islamic Jihad, and Hizballah.
21 July Lebanon: Bomb exploded outside the Kuwaiti Airlines office in Beirut. Claimed by
Arab Revolutionary Brigades.
11 July Kuwait: Two powerful bombs exploded within minutes of each other, killing eight
persons and injuring 89 at two crowded cafes about 10 kilometers apart. A third
bomb was defused at another cafe. Arab Revolutionary Brigades claimed
responsibility.
Spain: Bomb exploded at the British Airways ticket office in Madrid, also
damaging the TWA office upstairs. The nearby ticket office of the Jordanian
airline Alia was hit by automatic weapons fire and two grenades that failed to
explode. One person was killed and 24 others wounded. Claimed by the
Organization of the Oppressed, ROSM, and Black September.
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15 May Lebanon: UN refugee official kidnaped, but released the next day. Claimed by
ROSM.
23 April Kuwait: Ahmad Jarallah, a moderate newspaper editor, was wounded as he was
leaving his office. Arab Revolutionary Brigades claimed responsibility.
4 April Greece: A rocket was fired at a Jordanian airliner taking off from Athens airport.
The projectile hit the plane but did not explode. Claimed by Black September.
Italy: An antitank rocket was fired at the Jordanian Embassy in Rome. It missed
the Embassy and hit an apartment on the fourth floor of the building, but caused
no casualties. Claimed by Black September.
26 March Lebanon: Alec Collett, a British journalist working for the UN refugee
organization, was abducted from his automobile in Beirut. Claimed by ROSM.
21 March Greece: An unidentified man threw a handgrenade into a Jordanian airline office
in Athens, injuring three persons. Claimed by Black September.
Cyprus: An unidentified man threw two handgrenades into a Jordanian airline
office in Nicosia. Claimed by Black September.
United Arab Emirates: Bomb found on Jordanian airliner. The young Palestinian
who carried the bomb onto the Karachi-to-Amman flight said he thought he was
transporting drugs to support Abu Nidal terrorist operations.
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Belgium: Terrorist Attacks, October 1984 Through November 1985
Communist Combatant Cells (CCC).
Revolutionary Front for
Proletarian Action (FRAP)
Other groups
ANTWERPEN
Antwerp
LUXEMBOURG
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Belgium: Terrorist
Violence Escalates
Belgium is now afflicted with indigenous terrorism to
much the same degree as its French and West
German neighbors. The Communist Combatant Cells
(CCC) and a few other, lesser known, terrorist groups
have conducted some 30 attacks in Belgium in little
more than a year. The CCC has concentrated its
recent attacks against Belgian domestic interests, but
US and NATO targets are also at risk. Moreover,
CCC operations have become increasingly violent,
and the group is employing new and more dangerous
tactics. The inability of the Belgian security services
to effectively counter the group portends a high level
of terrorist activity.
Terrorism Emerges in Belgium
Belgium had experienced little of the terrorism
endemic to much of contemporary Western Europe
until the fall of 1984. It appeared that terrorists-
whether of West European or Middle Eastern
origin-viewed Belgium as a place of refuge, a safe-
haven to which revolutionaries could come, regroup,
and rebuild their logistic bases. Terrorists had
operated there only sporadically, and, in those few
instances, against non-Belgian targets. But in late
1984 an indigenous Belgian terrorist group calling
itself the Communist Combatant Cells carried out
five attacks in the Brussels area between 2 and 17
October. The group-which seemed to be functioning
as part of a loosely coordinated West European "anti- Honeywell
imperialist front"-began its campaign by attacking
defense-related targets-including the offices of the been extensively described in RAF documents
American firms Litton and Honeywell-but also discovered in July 1984, and one of the facilities on
bombed Belgian political targets. the RAF target list was among those bombed in the
CCC attack.
From 26 November 1984 until 15 January 1985, the
CCC concentrated on defense-related targets. It In what was to be the close of the group's "anti-
bombed a communications facility at the Bierset imperialist" campaign, the CCC set off a car bomb
military airfield near Liege, claiming that the attack (20 kilograms of TNT) outside a NATO support
was in solidarity with a 1981 attack by the Red Army building in Brussels on 15 January 1985. The blast
Faction (RAF) against Ramstein Air Force Base in wounded two military guards and caused extensive
West Germany. On 11 December, in its largest
operation, the CCC planted six bombs that exploded
in five different locations along NATO fuel pipelines
and claimed that "war against NATO has become the
principal aim of our movement." The pipeline had
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GI TR 85-024
2 December 1985
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damage. The size of the bomb and its apparent intent
to inflict casualties marked an escalation in CCC
violence. The communique dedicated the attack to the
Red Army Faction and said the CCC would target
US military personnel in the future. Following this
incident, however, the CCC called a halt to its
operations, apparently to evaluate the impact of its
actions and decide on its future course of action.
The CCC Returns-and Kills
The CCC resumed its operations on 1 May when it
placed a car bomb outside the Belgian Employers
Federation in Brussels. The group also used new
tactics in this operation; it set the vehicle on fire,
scattered leaflets warning of an impending explosion,
and phoned a bomb warning to the police. In spite of
these efforts to avoid casualties, two firemen were
killed by the blast-the first deaths resulting from a
CCC operation.
The deaths of the firemen caused the CCC to take
some unusual steps. The group immediately tried to
shift responsibility to the police for not keeping the
firemen away from the car bomb. It issued a
communique expressing regret over the deaths,
claiming that it had done everything possible to avoid
fatalities and declaring that the CCC did not intend
to kill or injure members of the Belgian working class.
Then, on 6 May the group bombed a police
administrative office, apparently to punish the police
for the firemen's deaths. The 1 May incident may
have precipitated dissension and self-criticism within
the CCC, because the group entered into another
period of inactivity that was to last five months.
On 8 October-the anniversary of its attack on
Honeywell-the CCC ended this hiatus by setting off
a car bomb outside a Brussels gas company complex.
It took elaborate precautions to avoid casualties by
broadcasting a tape-recorded message from the
vehicle, warning people to stay away from it. The
group seemed determined to avoid repetition of the
public outcry, which had ensued over the firemen's
deaths. The communique that followed this attack
announced the beginning of a "Karl Marx
anticapitalist campaign," which implied a
concentrated effort against business, industrial, and
labor targets. But the CCC also struck other types of
targets in rapid succession:
? On 12 October it expressed its intention to disrupt
national parliamentary elections by setting off two
bombs at a private metal company and at a
government tax office in Charleroi. Leaflets found
at the scenes were identical to those found outside
the Brussels gas company on 8 October. The
elections were held on 13 October without further
however.
? On 19 October a small bomb exploded outside an
armed forces information office.
? On 20 October a vehicle belonging to the president
of the National Action Committee for Peace and
Development-a pacifist organization opposed to
the deployment of NATO cruise missiles in
Belgium-was the target of an arson attack.
Although the last two attacks did not resemble
previous CCC operations-and may be the work of a
dissident faction within the CCC-copies of a
communique ostensibly prepared by the group were
found at both sites. This communique announced the
opening of a "second front," to be called the "Pierre
Akkerman' campaign," against bourgeois militarism
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CCC Origins and Ideology
Information concerning CCC membership is
fragmentary and speculative. Its communiques,
issued after several of its attacks, claim the group
was organized in 1982, supports itself through bank
robberies, plans its operations months in advance,
and shares explosives with other West European
terrorists. Following the 8 October 1984 attack
against Honeywell, the CCC communique claimed
the group was organized along the lines of the Italian
Red Brigades (BR).
the slogans, themes, and ideology were similar. The
CCC s emblem, a five pointed star, resembles that of
the Italian group, and even the name "Communist
Combatant Cells" was first used by Italian terrorists.
the CCC was either
an extension of the French leftwing terrorist group
Action Directe (AD), or composed of individuals who
had been members of support groups of the West
German Red Army Faction (RAF).
French and West German terrorists maintain
safehouses in Belgium, an RAF support network has
previously existed in Belgium, and that there were
known contacts between Belgian leftists-suspected
of membership in the CCC-and French terrorists.
The CCC's attacks against defense-related targets
appeared to be part of the so-called Euroterrorist
anti-NA TO campaign started by Action Directe in
Paris in the summer of 1984 and carried along by the
RAF in the following months.
The CCC, however, has maintained that it is an
indigenous and autonomous Belgian revolutionary
group, not politically associated with or subordinate
to Action Directe, the Red Army Faction, or any
other foreign revolutionary movement.
the group is
composed primarily of Belgian leftists who have
decided to emulate their counterparts in terrorism
along the lines of Italy, France, and West Germany.
and pacifism. The communique termed such acts as a
mass public demonstration protesting missile
deployment on 20 October as "the usual, useless,
ineffective petite bourgeois sterile actions."
If the CCC was responsible for the attack on the
pacifist movement, it marks a further broadening of
the group's roster of targets. Its attacks have been
mounted against NATO and defense-related targets,
domestic political parties, and "anticapitalist"
symbols. Should the CCC now begin attacking the
pacifist movement-which might have provided it
with recruits and supporters-it is likely to isolate
itself from those leftist segments of Belgian society it
sought to attract.
In early November the CCC demonstrated several
more new tactics in four attacks against banks:
? In one incident, the group placed a car bomb outside
a Brussels bank. When a security vehicle happened
on the scene, the terrorists sprayed it with automatic
weapons fire, slightly wounding a guard. The
terrorists, who had never before used firearms
during an operation, demonstrated that they were
both well armed-a subject of Belgian police
speculation heretofore-and willing to resort to
lethal force to avoid capture.
? In two of the incidents, members of the group
entered banks in Charleroi and Leuven during
business hours, chained suitcase bombs to the
premises and distributed leaflets warning of
imminent explosions. The buildings were evacuated,
and there were no injuries, but damage was
extensive. The placing of bombs in occupied
buildings suggests the CCC has become less
concerned about causing casualties than it
previously was, and that the group is growing
bolder.
? In the last bank attack, the CCC also set off a
suitcase bomb outside the Brussels branch of the
US-owned Manufacturers Hanover Bank, causing
major damage, but no injuries. This was its first
attack against a US target in 10 months.
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Taken together, the four attacks against banks form
part of the group's Karl Marx anticapitalist campaign
announced in October; the communique following
these attacks said that the banks had been chosen as
symbols of capitalism. Other Belgian, US, and foreign
business interests may be targeted if this phase of
CCC operations continues.
called Unknown Anarchist Group 1 placed a bomb
under a police van in Brussels. The device
malfunctioned, however, and was disarmed. Police
initially suspected the CCC, but it was, unlike CCC
attacks, a conspicuous failure, and it was not followed
by one of the CCC's usual lengthy communiques.
Then on the night of 20-21 April 1985-during a
period of CCC inactivity-a group calling itself the
"Revolutionary Front for Proletarian Action" (FRAP)
claimed responsibility for attacks upon the North
Atlantic Assembly building and the West German
electronics firm AEG-Telefunken. In separate
communiques, the group said it had attacked the
North Atlantic Assembly because of its political
connection with NATO and AEG-Telefunken
because of its NATO military contracts. The FRAP
claimed that it was created "to expand the
revolutionary struggle against NATO," and declared
itself to be a "revolutionary anti-imperialist
organization acting against everything that directly or
indirectly works at preparing for the imperialist war."
Little is known about either the "Unknown Anarchist
Group" or the FRAP-which may be one and the
same-but they do not appear to be covernames for
the CCC. FRAP
communiques tend to be anarchistic and less
thematically coherent than those of the CCC, which
takes a Marxist-Leninist line. In addition, CCC
bombs have been professionally constructed of high
explosives, more powerful and destructive than the
other groups' devices. It may be significant, however,
that the FRAP has used explosives stolen from the
3 Responsibility for two previous bombings in Brussels in 1984-of
the Palace of Justice on 19 May and the General Bank Association
on 29 June-was claimed by the self-proclaimed "Unknown
Ecaussines quarry in Belgium in June 1984-material
that has also been used by Action Directe in France
and the Red Army Faction in West Germany. We do
not know for certain that the CCC has used explosives
but the group has claimed to have
done so and has said that the quarry theft was carried
out by an "international revolutionary commando."
Outlook
Terrorist activities in Belgium probably will remain at
a high level for the remainder of 1985 and into 1986,
with the CCC continuing to pose the major threat.
The group has undergone significant changes in its
brief existence. Despite its early vow to wage an "anti-
imperialist" campaign against NATO, it has not
attacked a US military or NATO-related target since
mid-January. Over the past 10 months, the CCC has
focused on domestic rather than foreign targets and is
likely to continue to do so. The group's activities may
come to resemble those of Action Directe, which
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primarily focuses on French domestic interests, but
occasionally attacks a foreign target. As security is
tightened around the more important symbolic
targets, that is, military installations, government
offices, and utilities, the CCC probably will turn to
more vulnerable targets.
Additional attacks by the CCC against US or NATO
targets are still possible. The group warned of its
intention to kill US military personnel after the attack
on the NATO support facility, and it may yet carry
out its threat. As long as controversy continues over
deployment of NATO cruise missiles in Belgium, the
potential West European role in the Strategic Defense
Initiative program, and lack of success in arms control
negotiations, the CCC and other Belgian terrorists
may find it politically expedient to attack symbolic
targets relating to these issues.
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Belgium: Coping With Terrorism
Belgium, once relatively untouched by the terrorist
phenomenon, now finds itself increasingly vulnerable
because of its open borders, large number of attractive
international targets, and the appearance of
indigenous terrorist groups during the past year. A
national counterterrorist body, championed by
Minister of Justice Jean Gol, was established in
September 1984, but a lack of training and
experience, continuing interservice rivalries, and
austere budgets will impede Belgium's counter-
terrorist efforts.
Terrorism: Foreign and Domestic
Belgium historically has served as a supply base and
sanctuary for terrorist groups from all corners of
Europe. Foreign terrorists transit Belgium with ease.
The border with France alone has 600 crossing points,
only 40 of which are checked by police. The Spanish
Basque separatist organization Basque Fatherland
and Liberty (ETA) created an infrastructure in
Belgium in the 1960s and received open support from
some extremist movements. More than 100
sympathizers attended the trial of four ETA members
in 1983, and, according to ETA, the powerful bomb
that extensively damaged the Palace of Justice in
Antwerp was its retaliation for the extradition of two
of the four to Spain.
As host to numerous exiles, particularly Albanians
and Yugoslavs, as well as a growing Middle Eastern
community, Belgium has been the venue of violent
activity in the past. The Provisional Irish Republican
Army carried out bombings in 1978 and 1979; the
West German Red Army Faction attempted to blow
up NATO Supreme Commander Haig's car in 1979;
Palestinian guerrillas tried to seize an Israeli airplane
at Brussels airport the same year; and an Armenian
group claimed responsibility for the murder of a
Turkish attache in 1983. Following an attack on a
synagogue in 1982, Gol pushed for a central
policymaking group-the Antiterrorist College-to
collect intelligence and combat terrorism. Two years
of study and negotiations on the complicated and
politically sensitive organizational and control aspects
among the various police and security services.
Despite this progress, the Belgians were not fully
prepared to deal with the series of bombings begun in
October 1984 by the Communist Combatant Cells
(CCC), a domestic group, which emerged during the
heated debate on Intermediate Nuclear Force
deployment. The CCC initially attacked NATO
facilities and foreign subsidiaries of defense-related
businesses initially, but the group recently has
broadened its targets to include domestic companies,
banks, and even the pacifist movement. Two other
Belgian-based organizations, the Revolutionary Front
for Proletarian Action (FRAP) and a radical
environmental group, the Peace Conquerors, have also
claimed credit for bombings. The nation's
counterterrorist units have also had to deal with
mindless criminal violence committed by a gang-
nicknamed the Crazy Brabant Killers-which has
robbed supermarkets and killed bystanders
indiscriminately, as many as seven at a time.
Failures and Successes
Past performance by Belgian authorities has not been,
impressive, and such breakthroughs as have occurred
have been fortuitous:
? Pamphlets prepared by a Belgian printer, Pierre
Carette, for the French terrorist group Action
Directe (AD) in 1982 were discovered only after the
car delivering them had an accident on the Brussels-
Paris expressway.
? Operation Mammoth, a major counterterrorist
effort launched with much fanfare in the fall of
1984, yielded few concrete results, despite more
than 120 searches by hundreds of police officers.
? In March 1984 several AD leaders evaded arrest
despite surveillance by the Judiciary Police for
several days.
Secret
GI TR 85-024
2 December 1985
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? In June 1985 the Gendarmerie surprised a group
digging up weapons near Leuven, but the detainees
were later released because of a lack of evidence
tying them to a terrorist group.
Even successful antiterrorist operations often reveal
police clumsiness. In a major success this summer,
Belgian authorities discovered several apartments in
the Brussels suburbs linked to the FRAP. Searches of
the apartments yielded components for manufac-
turing bombs, money, weapons, false identification
cards, and terrorist literature. During the several
weeks in which police shadowed suspected FRAP
member Chantal Paternostre, however, she and her
husband copied down the license numbers of more
than 30 undercover vehicles that followed them. Most
of these belonged to the Groupe Diane, considered the
country's elite counterterrorist unit. Following her
arrest, she has not cooperated with police and is
unlikely to do so because the judicial system makes no
provision for plea bargaining.
Expanded Cooperation
Brussels has displayed some interest in exchanging
information with other countries. West Germany and
France, for example, drew Belgium into cooperative
efforts in February when they agreed to form a joint
operational working group to intensify police and
intelligence exchanges. The Belgian Interforces
Antiterrorist Group (GIA), the German Federal
Police (BKA), and the individual French services plan
to establish a direct secure communication link for
exchanging information pertaining to the Red Army
Foreign Minister Tindemans also has stressed
international cooperation. During Vice President
Bush's visit in June, Tindemans pointed out that the
Belgian Parliament had just approved a plan to work
within the Council of Europe against terrorism. In his
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UN speech in September, Tindemans also urged
countries to seek agreement on what acts constitute
terrorism and to take some universally recognized
measures to combat them.
Outlook Mixed
In a period of economic austerity, Brussels, until
recently, devoted few resources to counterterrorist
efforts. Between 1976 and 1983, the security budget
did not increase as a share of GNP. Last fall,
however, funds for security forces were augmented
substantially, and money was earmarked to automate
files of the State Security Service, establish a Senior
Police Institute, and equip and train regional
Gendarmerie special intervention units. These units
are scheduled to be fully trained by late 1986 and will
be responsive to tasking from both the GIA and the
Gendarmerie. In addition, Brussels has authorized an
increase in the strength of the Gendarmerie to nearly
17,000 by the end of 1986.
Rivalry among and within Belgium's various security
services is rampant and obstructs the sharing of
information. The services have been known to conduct
investigations independently and to refuse to share
evidence or leads. Different functional responsibilities
between the Gendarmerie and the State Security
Service also restrict cooperation. The Gendarmerie is
primarily a paramilitary organization with law and
order functions,
The lack of a clearly defined chain of command will
continue to create problems. Four different police
forces answer to three different ministries. The
Gendarmerie, for example, is tasked by the Ministry
of Defense but also assists the Ministries of Interior
and Justice. A study group is exploring the question of
command structure, but this is likely to be a lengthy
process.
As bombings by the CCC and criminal violence
continue unchecked, public anxiety is mounting. The
government has announced measures to increase the
coordination of police forces and to improve
counterterrorist training. Justice Minister Gol is
considering the formation of an as yet undefined
"superpolice." The death penalty, which has not been
applied since 1948, is again under discussion.
Despite the formation of the new Antiterrorist
College and expanded counterterrorist cooperation,
financial and personnel limitations and the
inexperience of the newly formed GIA do not augur
well for immediate results. For the time being,
Belgium's response to terrorism is likely to be reactive
rather than anticipatory, but public pressure should
ensure continued focus on the problem.
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1 January 1804
1 January 1956
1 January 1959
1 January 1960
1 January 1962
1 January 1965
1 January 1984
2 January 1984
4 January 1984
4 January 1948
4 January 1974
5 January 1956
6 January 1963
7 January 1979
8 January 1912
9 January 1964
Below is a compendium of January dates of known or conceivable significance to
terrorists around the world. Our inclusion of a date or event should not by itself
be construed to suggest that we expect or anticipate a commemorative terrorist
The Terrorism Diary for January 1986
Haiti. Independence Day.
Sudan. Independence Day (proclamation of republic).
Cuba. Liberation Day (day Batista government fell).
Cameroon. Independence Day.
Western Samoa. Independence Day.
Palestinians. Palestinian revolution; founding of Fatah.
Brunei. Independence Day.
Tunisia. Start of countrywide bread riots over removal of subsidies for bread and
pasta.
Armenians. Conviction of US citizen of Armenian descent for assassinating
Turkish Consul General in Los Angeles on 28 January 1982.
Burma. Independence Day.
Burma. Constitution of socialist republic adopted.
Laos. Founding of Lao Patriotic Front.
Colombia. Founding of National Liberation Army (ELN).
Cambodia. Vietnamese invasion overthrows Khmer Rouge regime of Pol Pot.
South Africa. Founding of African National Congress (ANC).
Panama. Martyrs' Day (day of mourning commemorating anniversary of anti-US
riots).
Albania. Proclamation of republic.
Yugoslavia. Suicide of two ethnic Albanian irridentists in Pristina, Kosovo, to
avoid arrest.
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GI TR 85-024
2 December 1985
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12 January 1964
13 January 1967
13 January 1972
14 January 1986
15 January 1918
15 January 1922
15 January 1985
16 January 1979
20 January 1981
22 January 1498
22 January 1918
22 January 1945
22 January 1946
24 January 1859
26 January 1918
26 January 1950
26 January 1978
28 January 1788
Tanzania. Zanzibar Revolution Day (people's republic established).
Togo. Liberation Day (military coup).
Ghana. National Redemption Day (anniversary of coup).
Sri Lanka. Tamil New Year (old calendar).
Egypt. Birthday of Jamal `Abd al-Nasir.
Ireland. Founding of Irish Free State.
West Germany, France. Red Army Faction and Action Directe issue joint
communique declaring anti-imperialist front.
Benin. Liberation Day; Martyrs' Day (repulsion of invasion by mercenary troops
from Gabon).
Iran. Shah Burning Day (departure of Shah from Iran).
Colombia. Nineteenth of April Movement (M-19) steals sword of Simon Bolivar
from Bogota Museum (group dates its founding from this act).
Egypt, Israel. Disengagement Agreement signed.
Guinea-Bissau. National Heroes Day (commemorating assassination of Amilcar
Cabral, founder of ruling party-PAIGC).
Iran. US Embassy hostages released.
St. Vincent and The Grenadines. Discovery Day.
Ukraine. Independence Day.
Kurdish regions. Qazi Muhammed uprising.
Iran. Kurdish Republic Day.
Romania. Union Day.
Romania. Birthday of President Ceausescu.
India. Republic Day (national day).
Tunisia. Black Thursday (anniversary of labor riots).
Australia. Australia Day.
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28 January 1853
28 January 1948
28 January 1961
28 January 1982
30 January 1933
30 January 1972
Cuba. Birthday of Jose Marti.
India. Assassination of Mahatma Gandhi by Hindu extremist.
Rwanda. Proclamation of the republic.
Italy. Freeing of Red Brigades captive US Army Brigadier General Dozier.
Germany. Accession to power by National Socialist (Nazi) Party.
Northern Ireland. Bloody Monday (13 killed, 16 wounded during demonstration in
Derry).
Nauru. Independence Day.
Guatemala. Occupation of Spanish Embassy by members of Guerrilla Army of the
Poor (EGP); subordinate group, People's Front of 31 January (FP-3 1), takes its
name from this event.
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Chronology of Terrorism-1985
Below are described noteworthy foreign and international events involving
terrorists, or the use of terrorist tactics, which have occurred or come to light
since our last issue. In some cases, the perpetrators and their motivations may not
be known. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in
this publication are not included.
appeared on a New People's Army "sparrow team" hit list seven weeks ago.
Philippines: Police sergeant assassinated in Guagua by four unidentified
individuals. No one has claimed credit for the murder, but his name reportedly
of Israelis and caused substantial damage.
West Bank: Time bomb explodes in building housing Military Governor in Bayt
Ayl. The Voice of Palestine claimed the attack by Palestinians wounded a number
intelligence operatives frequented the place
Israel: Bombs explode in Tel Aviv coffeehouse, reportedly killing several persons
and causing severe damage. The Voice of Palestine reported that the Palestinian
Revolution Forces General Command mounted the attack, claiming Israeli
12 October Israel: Bomb explodes in yard of private house in Tel Aviv. There was no damage
reported and no group claimed responsibility.
responsibility in a PLO radiobroadcast
West Bank: Several settlers reportedly killed in explosion in Barbis Shak
settlement. The Palestinian Revolutionary Forces General Command claimed
Gaza Strip: Seventy-year-old man in Khan Yunus injured by unknown assailant
wielding ax. The attack is the latest in a series of assaults believed to be terrorist
related, probably carried out by Palestinians.
West Bank: Bus carrying Israeli settlers and soldiers firebombed near Hebron
Gate in Jerusalem. A PLO radiobroadcast reported several Israelis were injured in
the attack, and said the Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command was
responsible.
Mid-October- Pakistan: Attacks against Afghan refugees in Peshawar increase. Two hotels, the
Mid-November office of the district refugee administrator, and a bazaar have been the targets of
bombings. One bomb blast shut down the Peshawar television station.
41 Secret
G1 TR 85-024
2 December 1985
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19 October Zimbabwe: Seven civilians killed in Nyaki Communal Lands. Security forces
killed three of those believed responsible and recovered three AK-type rifles.
resulted in a number of Israeli casualties.
West Bank: Martyr Shakib Group of the Palestinian Revolution Forces General
Command claims credit for explosion in Jerusalem. The attack reportedly
the explosion in the Shderot Yerushalayim area.
Israel: One person injured in Tel Aviv blast. No group claimed responsibility for
vehicle was burned and the occupants injured.
West Bank: Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command claims credit for
incendiary attack on Israeli vehicle in Nabulus. The PLO radio reported that the
claimed responsibility.
Lesotho: Suspected members of Lesotho Liberation Army burn six women to
death. The women were all political activists and one was related by marriage to
the King. A seventh person, a neighbor of the women, was also killed. No one has
Army.
Philippines: Gunmen kill 17 and burn houses on Mindanao. The attackers have
not been identified, but the area is a stronghold of the Communist New People's
responsible.
Israel: Bomb explodes in `Afula municipal market, injuring five persons. PLO
radio claimed the Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command was
Late October Turkey: Italian authorities capture leader of Dev Sol (Revolutionary Left), Pasha
Guven. Guven is being tried in absentia, and Turkey has requested his extradition.
bombs to be used against government forces.
Sri Lanka: Explosion wounds five members of Tamil separatist Eelam People's
Revolutionary Liberation Army in Jgfna. They were apparently assembling
the building.
South Africa: Grenade attack on Cape Town gas station. A Soviet-made grenade
failed to explode when unknown assailants tried to throw it through the window of
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29 October South Africa: Kwazulu member of Parliament killed, son wounded while fleeing
firebombed home. The victim was a political activist and former member of the
outlawed African National Congress.
India: Leading local member of Congress (I) Party assassinated in Punjab. Sikh
militants have been blamed in what reportedly was the seventh killing of party
1 November Mozambique: National Resistance Movement kidnaps three Portuguese farmers
near Maputo. More than 20 Portuguese citizens seized by RENAMO rebels are
still missing.
2 November Sweden: Turkish-speaking man assassinates Kurdish resident in Stockholm. The
victim was attending a Kurdish festival sponsored by the Kurdish Social
Democratic Party. The Swedish press reported that the rival Kurdish Labor Party
3 November Israel: Bomb explodes near `Afula high school. No casualties or damage were
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South Africa: Township councillor resigns after home firebombed. He was the
fourth member of the Guguletu Council to resign this year.
Mozambique: Kidnaped priests found dead in Tete Province. Members of the
National Resistance Movement had abducted the Portuguese and Mozambican
clergymen on 25 October.
4 November Israel: Bomb explodes in Haifa train station parking lot. There were no reported
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West Bank: Time bombs reportedly kill unknown number of Israeli soldiers and
settlers in separate attacks. The Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command
"Martyr Ismail Darwish Group" took credit for the attacks against what it said
were an intelligence center in `Afula and an observation post in Jerusalem
El Salvador: Guerrillas execute head of coffee-growing family in San Pedro
Nonualco. The victim reportedly had received extortion letters from the
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front but had refused to pay.
5 November Italy: Bomb sent to Iranian Ambassador to Vatican. Police defused the device,
which was hidden in an electronic calculator, arrived in a parcel marked
"personal" from Paris. No one has claimed credit, but anti-Khomeini groups based
in Paris are suspected.
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Greece: Explosive device found in Athens building housing TWA offices. The
homemade bomb was discovered in the stairway of the building.
West Bank: Roadside bomb explodes north of Jerusalem. No injuries or damage
were reported and no organization claimed responsibility
Israel: Timed explosions in Ashqelon and Haifa reportedly kill unknown number
of Israelis. The Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command claimed the
explosions also caused extensive damage and fires.
Chile: Four bombs explode at Mormon churches in La Serena, Rancagua, and
Santiago. No injuries were reported, and only the La Serena church reported
extensive damage. With these four incidents, there have been 14 attacks this year
on Mormon churches in Chile.
6 November France: Airport police seize suitcase full of weapons en route to Iran. The
unclaimed suitcase was discovered on embarkation when it went through an X-ray
device. It reportedly contained three handgrenades, an incendiary grenade,
submachineguns, magazines, and ammunition.
West Bank: Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command takes credit for
bomb in settlement north of Jerusalem. A PLO radiobroadcast claimed that a time
bomb caused a number of deaths and heavy damage
7 November Israel: Small bomb explodes near central bus station in Kefar Sava. In a PLO
radiobroadcast the Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command claimed
responsibility
Mozambique: Three civilians kidnaped from maternity clinic near Maputo by
National Resistance Movement. Besides taking a midwife, an orderly, and a four-
year-old girl, the guerrillas also took medicines, hospital uniforms, and powdered
milk.
Sri Lanka: Tamil militants kill 12 Sinhalese, burn homes in Trincomalee
District. Ten children were reportedly among the dead. Security forces later killed
33 suspects in a sweep operation.
8 November West Germany: Press receives letter from previously unknown group claiming
NATO pipeline bombings at Baal and Phillipsheim. A search located a defective
device at Baal, but no device was found in the second location. Police have stated
that the incidents were conducted by members of the militant periphery of the Red
Army Faction
Mozambique: Portuguese hostage held by National Resistance Movement dies.
He and his wife had lived in Zambezia Province for 30 years until they were
kidnaped last July.
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9 November France: Car bomb explodes outside palace of the Archbishop of Paris. There were
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Luxembourg: Two bombs destroy radar equipment at Findel Airport, slightly
injuring one man. The explosion also caused more than $1 million in damage. This
was the 12th bombing in Luxembourg since April.
Israel: Explosion in cotton storage area near Nazareth reportedly kills several
Israelis. In a PLO broadcast, the Palestinian Revolution Forces General
Command claimed credit.
Peru: Tupac Amaru (MRTA) terrorists throw bombs and fire machineguns at US
Embassy in Lima. MRTA members in two automobiles carried out the attack,
which damaged the Embassy's walls and windows, but caused no casualties. The
MRTA claimed the attack was intended "to reject US imperialist policy."
Peru: Tupac Amaru (MRTA) terrorists throw dynamite at Texaco office in Lima.
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South Africa: Firebomb extensively damages Mbekwani railroad station and
ticket office. There were no casualties reported and no group has claimed credit.
India: Two civilians killed by suspected Sikh militants in Punjab. This was
reportedly the third such shooting in the state within a week.0 25X1
India: Postmaster andfour postal workers killed by parcel bomb in Gujarat. No
group has claimed responsibility.
10 November West Bank: Resident of Nahalin killed in apartment explosion. Military sources
believe the man may have been preparing a bomb.0 25X1
West Bank: Resident of Bet Haggay settlement near Hebron wounded by gunfire.
The Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command claimed responsibility for
the attack-the third involving a resident of Bet Haggay in recent months.
Peru: Sendero Luminoso uses "burro bomb" in city of Huanta. The explosion
scattered propaganda leaflets urging citizens not to vote in 24 November
municipal elections. Except for the hapless burro, there were no casualties. 25X1
Sri Lanka: Six civilians killed by Tamil separatists in attack on village of
Uksirigama. A similar attack had taken place two days earlier, but there was no
report of casualties in that incident.
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11 November West Germany: Bomb damages office of Aeronautics and Aerospace Technology
Institute in West Berlin. Although no group claimed credit, the institute is listed
in the February 1985 edition of the "Antimilitaristic Tour Guidebook" published
by the West Berlin Independent Plenum, which includes suspected members of the
RAF periphery.
claimed responsibility
Chile: Gunmen in Santiago open fire on two policemen, killing one and seriously
wounding the other. There was no claim of responsibility for the attack.
Colombia: Two bombs in Medellin damage clothing warehouse, radio-television
repair shop. Property damage was estimated at 4 million pesos, approximately US
$26,640. The "Che Guevara Commando" group, thought to be part of the
National Liberation Army, has been blamed for the attacks.
West Germany: Explosion damages armed forces office in Neustadt. No injuries
were reported and no group has claimed responsibility
Spain: Bombs damage offices of Honeywell-Bull computer company in San
Sebastian and an Avis rental truck in Bilbao. The Basque terrorist group Iraultza
claimed responsibility for the bombing in San Sebastian, but there has been no
claim for the other incident.
Israel: Two Jerusalem youths sentenced to prison for Fatah membership. The
military court judge noted the two admitted membership but had not participated
in any terrorist attacks when he handed down 15-month terms for each youth.
West Germany: Moscow-Paris express train strikes barricade constructed on
outbound tracks in West Berlin. Leaflets found at the scene linked the incident to
the recent death in Amsterdam of a Dutch leftwing activist who had been detained
by police.
Colombia: Fourteen self-proclaimed 19th of April Movement members fail in
attempt to rob candy factory in Barranquilla. Unable to open the company safe,
they threw a bomb and a grenade into the warehouse, and set fire to large sacks of
sugar
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Lebanon: Senior Christian cleric assassinated in East Beirut. The deputy bishop
of the Maronite Christian community in Zahle and his nephew were shot by
unidentified gunmen. The murders came two months after Syrian troops moved
Iran: Three terrorists executed for bombing at Tehran University. The blast, at a
prayer meeting last winter, reportedly killed five persons and wounded 10 others.
One of the executed terrorists was said to have received sabotage training in Iraq.
I
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MRTA has attacked a target that was not Peruvian or American
Peru: Tupac Amaru (MRTA) terrorists attack Colombian Embassy and Colombian
airline office in Lima. A Colombian Embassy guard killed in the attack was the
first death resulting from an MRTA operation. There were no injuries in the
airline office attack, but minor damage was reported. This was the first time the
Colombia: Founder of National Liberation Army (ELN) shot to death near his
home in Barrancabermeja. The former ELN guerrilla leader had previously
received several death threats.
16 November Botswana: Car bomb in parking lot of Debora Relief Memorial, Hospital kills
four persons, wounds several others. No one has claimed responsibility for the
Lebanon freed all their prisoners.
17 November Car explodes in Paris underground parking garage, killing two persons. Police
believe the men were extreme rightwing activists.0 25X1
Lebanon: Shia Muslim group claims March kidnaping of four Lebanese Jews in
Beirut. A typewritten statement signed by the "Organization of the Oppressed"
said the four, among them the vice president of the Higher Council of the Jewish
Community in Lebanon, would be freed if Israel and its militia allies in South
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Chile: Tobalaba Airport in eastern Santiago attacked with handgrenades and an
RPG-2 rocket. The airport and a parked aircraft sustained minor damage. There
was no claim of responsibility, but the Movement of the Revolutionary Left
reportedly received RPG-2 weapons from Cuba in 1984 and 1985, and police
confiscated two RPG-2 rockets earlier this year that probably belonged to that
group
Peru: Sendero Luminoso bombs Ayacucho city hall, seriously injuring two
employees. The explosion damaged some offices in the municipal building.
20 November France: Four suspected members of Spanish Antiterrorist Liberation Group
arrested in Marseilles. Police believed they were involved in an attempted car
bombing in France's Basque country last September.
Lebanon: Representatives of International Red Cross kidnaped, released near
Tyre. Four unidentified gunmen seized two Swiss citizens, but released them
unharmed seven hours later. No group has claimed responsibility.
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