TERRORISM REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00685R000200270002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 18, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of -~-
Intelligence
Terrorism Review
met
GI TR 85-023
18 November 1985
Copy 5 31
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DI/ALA 25X1
3 Highlights
Terrorism and Narcotics Analysis Division, DI/OGI
Lebanon's Hizballah: Internal Dynamics and Foreign Support
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DI/OGI, and DI/NESA
DI/OGI
Chronology of Terrorism-1985
Terrorism and Narcotics Analysis Division, DI/OGI
This review is published every other week by the Directorate of Intelligence.
Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well as by other
agencies of the US Intelligence Community will be considered for publication.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor
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The September kidnaping of the daughter of El Salvador's President by elements
of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) was one of the bolder
acts of terrorism in 1985, and, despite her release in late October, may carry long-
term implications for the Salvadoran regime. Events thus far demonstrate how a
terrorist act and its aftermath can seriously affect the politics of a nation.
Fallout
President Duarte has been hurt politically by his handling of the negotiations to
secure his daughter's release and will feel compelled to retake the political
initiative quickly and to demonstrate that his government still holds the military
advantage against the rebels. Insurgent leaders are likely to try to build on what
they see as recent successes by launching dramatic terrorist attacks. Duarte hopes
the United States will provide not only increased economic and military assistance
but also ringing endorsements of him and his government.
Although Duarte won credit for striking a deal that included the release of the
hostage mayors as well as his daughter, he also was criticized for being too
involved in the negotiations, too willing to sacrifice the national interest for
personal reasons, and for setting a precedent that may encourage further
kidnapings. Condemnation has been particularly strong from the rightwing parties
and press
Challenges for Duarte
The damage the kidnaping did to Duarte's standing as a political leader and the
general impression that the rebels have stymied government military operations
will be most troubling to Duarte in the near term.
the kidnaping brought the government to a near standstill and deflected
attention from other pressing problems, including the economy.
Duarte will have to mend his relations with the military. Although senior officers
reportedly have been able to mollify much of the military, dissatisfaction is still
said to be running high.
The kidnaping on 26 October of a senior Air Force officer who formerly headed
the presidential staff can only intensify military frustration and increase demands
for a strong military response. At the same time, the military will be watching to
see whether Duarte gives as much attention to this case as he did his daughter's.
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GI TR 85-023
18 November 1985
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Insurgent Perspective
The kidnaping and its aftermath have had some adverse effects for the insurgents,
but, on balance, they likely see recent events as strengthening their prospects. The
kidnaping highlighted the government's vulnerability, renewed attention to El
Salvador's checkered human rights record, created conflict between Duarte and
the military, and reinforced the rebels' claims that they are still a force to be
reckoned with.
On the negative side, the kidnaping brought the insurgents adverse international
publicity, and reportedly also caused internal dissension between the political and
military wings of the rebel alliance. In particular, it appears to have sharpened the
debate over tactics between the political and military factions and confirmed the
dominant role now played by the military faction.
Outlook
Duarte probably will continue to express willingness to resume the dialogue with
the rebels, but, for the immediate future, he will be more concerned with proving
that he is in charge politically and ready to strike hard at them.
economic concerns will take a backseat to more urgent military and political
priorities.
The insurgents' increased visibility aside, they still do not have the ability to
sustain a prolonged military campaign. Nevertheless, the rebels are buoyed by
what they see as recent successes, and they almost certainly will continue their hit-
and-run attacks in the countryside and stage more frequent terrorist attacks in the
cities. From their viewpoint, keeping their cause in the public eye probably
outweighs international criticism of their tactics. The insurgents already have
declared their intention to strike at US personnel, particularly military and
intelligence officers, and are likely to accelerate such planning.
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Highlights
Iranian Presence May Pose Threat to US Interests
The recent opening of an unofficial office in Barcelona by Iran poses a potential
threat to US interests in Spain. Spanish authorities closed a previous unofficial
Iranian office in July 1984 after they obtained evidence that the Iranians planned
to hijack a Saudi airliner. The Iranians also were charged at that time with illegal
possession of arms and explosives.
find them.
Soviet Hostages Released
Three Soviet Embassy personnel who had been kidnaped on 30 September were
released in Beirut on 30 October. The body of a fourth hostage who was shot to
death had been found on 2 October. Their release may have been due to a
concerted effort by Syria, Iran, the Druze, Amal, and Lebanese leftist militias to
Increased Libyan Subversion May Include Terrorism
Large numbers of Libyans-including high-level officials with known ties to
terrorism-continue to pour into Sudan. Weapons smuggling-probably to supply
the Libyan-backed Sudanese Revolutionary Committees-continues via aid
3 Secret
GI TR 85-023
18 November 1985
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convoys and shipments of agricultural equipment and books. Revolutionary
Committee-instigated demonstrations do occur at the US and Egyptian
Embassie
the Libyans are gearing up to target one of several
Achille Lauro hijacking have also added to the anti-US feeling in the region.
US facilities, including the Embassy, Ambassador's residence, and Marine house.
Libya has refrained from engaging in terrorism in Sudan to date for fear of risking
its substantial gains in relations with Sudan. Qadhafi will be tempted, however, to
take advantage of anti-US sentiment generated by publicity surrounding the US
role in the evacuation of Falasha Jews. The Israeli raid on Tunis and the US
interception of an Egyptian plane carrying Palestinian terrorists responsible for the
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Sikhs Arrested in Air India Case
In the first break in the investigation into the Air India jetliner crash last June that
claimed 329 lives, a fundamentalist Sikh separatist leader and another Sikh have
been charged with firearms and explosives offenses. The two men were arrested
after Canadian police searched a temple and several Sikh homes for evidence. The
latest results of recovery operations off the coast of Ireland point to an onboard
explosion. There also are reports that physical evidence has been recovered, linking
the Air India crash with a bomb explosion at Tokyo's Narita Airport the same
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the group's targets was an American bank, its first US target since January.
New CCC Campaign Shows Disdain for Casualties
On 4-5 November the Communist Combatant Cells (CCC) carried out four
attacks in which-for the first time-they fired an automatic weapon at an
individual and placed bombs in occupied buildings during daylight hours. Among
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resort to lethal means to avoid capture.
In the first incident, the group placed a car bomb outside the offices of a Brussels
bank. A loudspeaker on the vehicle carrying the bomb broadcast warnings to
people to leave the area and announced that the CCC was responsible for the
attack. When a security vehicle happened on the scene, the terrorists sprayed it
with automatic weapons fire, slightly wounding a guard. CCC members previously
had never used firearms during their attacks; this incident indicates that they will
is growing bolder in carrying out its operations.
In the second and fourth incidents, unidentified persons entered banks in Charleroi
and Louvain during business hours, chained suitcase bombs to parts of the
buildings, and left CCC leaflets warning that the devices would explode in 30
minutes. The buildings were evacuated, and there were no injuries, although
damage was extensive in both incidents. The placing of bombs in occupied
buildings-carrying, like the firing of automatic weapons to cover an escape, the
attendant risk of causing casualties-is a new tactic for the group, and suggests it
phase of the CCC campaign continues.
In the third incident, the CCC also detonated a suitcase bomb in front of the
Charleroi office of the Manufacturers Hanover Bank, causing major damage, but
no casualties. The group had proclaimed a "Karl Marx anticapitalist campaign" in
October. Its communique claimed these four banks were chosen as symbols of
capitalism. We suspect other US businesses in Belgium will be targeted as this
problems within the group.
Key Action Directe Member Arrested
On 20 October, Paris police dealt another setback to the leftwing terrorist group
Action Directe (AD) with the arrest of Meyer Azeroual, formerly the group's
"chief financier." Azeroual had been sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment
for a bank holdup in Paris on 30 May 1980. For the past five years, he lived in
South America, Nicaragua, and in the French provinces. Press reports indicate
that, at the time of his arrest, he told police that he was a "salaried member" of
Action Directe. He also said he had returned to Paris to reconstruct the AD
network in the capital. His apparently voluntary and candid admission of his AD
connection and his purpose in Paris surprised the police and could indicate internal
Links Between Basque and French Terrorists
New information suggests that ties between the French terrorist group Action
Directe and the Spanish Basque separatist group Fatherland and Liberty (ETA
past.
French group is believed to have supplied ETA with weapons and explosives in the
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ETA long has claimed to have contacts with every major terrorist group in the
world, but its separatist "raison d'etre" has seemed to preclude long-term
alignments with Europe's more radical leftist groups. Action Directe, on the other
hand, in addition to its ties to ETA, probably has links to the Red Army Faction of
West Germany and to both the Prima Linea and Red Brigades of Italy.
PFLP-SC Responsible for Restaurant Bombing
he Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine-Special Command and not a Spanish group as
previously suspected-was responsible for the bombing of the El Descanso
Restaurant in Torrejon on 12 April 1985. The explosion destroyed the restaurant
and killed 18 Spaniards and wounded 82 persons, including 15 Americans. The
PFLP-SC allegedly selected the restaurant because it is frequented by large
numbers of US servicemen from nearby Torrejon Air Force Base. The PFLP-SC's
responsibility for the El Descanso bombing underscores the growing threat from
Middle Eastern terrorist groups operating in Europe.
The bombing was originally claimed by several terrorist groups, including the
Spanish Basque separatist group Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), the leftist First of
October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO), the Islamic Jihad Organization,
and the Armed Organization of the Jewish People. GRAPO, long known for its
anti-NATO stance, was originally believed responsible because both the explosives
used and the style of the attack resembled other GRAPO operations.
GRAPO was severely weakened by a
massive police sweep in January and that the group probably could not have
carried out the April attack. Moreover, the low level of GRAPO activity during
the rest of 1985 argues against its being the culprit in the restaurant bombing.
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French Caribbean Terrorists Announce Six-Month Truce
The Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance (ARC)-a leftwing separatist group
responsible for many bombings in Guadeloupe since 1983-has decided to halt its
terrorist activities for the present. Its announcement follows statements made by
the generally nonviolent separatist Union for the Liberation of Guadeloupe
(UPLG) that it is willing to begin a dialogue with the French Government. The US
Consulate reports that the UPLG is concerned about the effects of continued
violence on the island's precarious economic situation. It is also possible that the
ARC's truce is a tactical move designed to relieve police pressure and allow it time
to regroup and reorganize.
Guerrillas Kidnap Senior Military Officer
On 26 October, a group of armed men abducted Col. Omar Napoleon Avalos,
Civil Aeronautics director and former chief of the presidential staff, from his
family's farm about 200 miles east of San Salvador.
The abductors probably will seek to exchange Avalos for
continue.
imprisoned comrades. The military, which supported President Duarte during the
kidnaping of his daughter, may be reluctant to support negotiations with the rebels
and instead seek military action, especially if kidnapings of high-ranking officials
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Bombings Continue Despite Detentions
In response to a recent series of bombings, President Alfonsin on 22 October
ordered the detention of 12 suspects, including five civilians, an Army cadet, and
six active or retired members of the military. Their jailing, however, did not stop
the bombings-six more exploded over the next nine days. The bombing campaign
so far has targeted military installations, government officials and buildings,
Increased Terrorist Activity
Leftist terrorism has increased markedly in recent weeks and could signal a
change in leftist tactics. Since mid-October, more than 60 bombings were reported
and at least 15 buses were attacked throughout the country. In addition, at least 10
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civilians and five police officers were wounded in four separate attacks on police
headquarters or buses. Some of the more significant incidents include:
? 23 October. A bomb exploded outside the Chilean-American Binational Center
in Concepcion, causing extensive damage and seriously injuring a young girl.
The Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) claimed responsibility. This
marked the ninth bombing of various Binational Centers during the preceding 20
months.
? 23 October. A device exploded outside the Morgan Bank in Concepcion, causing
extensive damage. The FPMR probably was responsible.
? 2 November. Unidentified terrorists destroyed a bridge on the Pan American
Highway 200 miles south of Santiago and damaged a railroad bridge in the same
area.
? 2 November. In Vina del Mar, an incendiary device exploded in a supermarket,
killing five persons and destroying a large portion of the building. A second
supermarket in Vina del Mar was damaged by an incendiary bomb and the main
train station was heavily damaged by a bomb.
? 5-6 November. Antiregime protests were marked by scattered clashes with
security forces, gunfire exchanges, transportation disruptions, and numerous
terrorist bombings, leaving more than 30 people injured and about 400 arrested.
targeting, represent a new phase in the violence.
Many of these incidents probably were related to the antigovernment protests in
November over the continued imprisonment of six leftist labor leaders for
demonstrations held in early September and general public dissatisfaction with the
Pinochet regime. These recent incidents have gone beyond the earlier terrorist
attacks, which were primarily intended to intimidate and harass. The new attacks,
some of which occurred in middle-class areas and were indiscriminate in their
Burgeoning Violence in Matabeland
The recent murder of a white farm couple by rebels is the first killing of whites in
that country since May 1984, but is only the latest in a surge of killings that have
plagued Zimbabwe recently. The increased violence may be due partly to the
redeployment of some 9,000 soldiers to Mozambique-thus thinning local
security-or to a reported increase in recruiting by the Zimbabwe African
People's Union (ZAPU), the major rebel group.
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Lebanon's Hizballah:
Internal Dynamics and
Foreign Support
Lebanese fundamentalist Shia groups, known
collectively as the Hizballah (Party of God)
movement, comprise probably the most serious
terrorist threat to US interests today. With extensive
support from Iran, the movement has grown over the
past two years from a handful of small, disparate
groups into a large, sophisticated, and increasingly
well-organized network.' These groups are composed
of fanatic, fundamentalist Shias who are determined
to eliminate all Western, especially US, presence from
Lebanon as the first step to establishing an Islamic
republic there. Hizballah militants, often operating
under the covername "Islamic Jihad,"' have
conducted more than 20 significant international
terrorist attacks over the past three years, 14 of which
have been against the United States.'
Hizballah terrorists will continue to pose a much
greater threat to US interests inside Lebanon. They
are effective at carrying out destructive terrorist
attacks in Lebanon largely because they have a well-
developed support network in their native country.
Most Hizballah recruits are poor, uneducated youths
with little or no experience outside Lebanon. Unlike
many leftwing Palestinian terrorists, they generally do
not speak foreign languages and cannot easily blend
into the population of a European capital.
The Hizballah movement is now an important faction in
Lebanon's political scene. As the movement has grown in
popularity, it has developed an overt apparatus consisting of
political, religious, and social welfare offices and a conventional
militia. While terrorist elements are often intermingled with the
overt units of the movement, this article will focus strictly on the
apparatus of the paramilitary apparatus that provides a su ort
structure for those elements involved in terrorism.
It is important to note that every caller claiming to represent
Islamic Jihad does not necessarily represent the Lebanese
Hizballah. The covername has been used by other Iranian-backed
terrorists to claim responsibility for attacks in which the Hizballah
was not involved. In addition, an increasing number of anonymous
As US security precautions are strengthened in
Lebanon, however, we believe Hizballah terrorists will
pose an increasing threat to US interests elsewhere,
particularly in Europe. The Hizballah attempted to
blow up the US Embassy in Rome in 1985 and
became involved in the TWA hijacking from Athens
to Beirut. We believe it is determined to attempt
further such attacks and that the group's capabilities
almost certainly will improve over time as the
organization grows and trains more sophisticated
fighters.
Moreover, the radical Shias may turn to experienced
radical Palestinian factions for support in operations
in Western Europe.
prosper.
Origins
After decades of political passivity, Lebanese Shias
are now responsive to extremist ideologies. Shias
today comprise the largest religious community in
Lebanon-making up over 40 percent of the country's
population-but they feel they do not exercise a
commensurate share of political and economic
influence. The National Pact of 1943-based on the
last legal census taken in Lebanon-distributes the
major positions in government to Maronite Christians
and Sunni Muslims. Many Shias continue to live in
poverty while their Christian and Sunni neighbors
callers have made bogus claims in the name of Islamic Jihad.
For the purposes of this article, major bombings, hijackings,
Three events have served as important catalysts in
finally radicalizing the Shia population in Lebanon:
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GI TR 85-023
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? The rise to prominence in the 1960s and 1970s of
the Imam Musa Sadr, an Iranian-born cleric,
changed the outlook of many Shias. The
charismatic Musa Sadr demanded economic and
political reforms to aid the Shia, and he founded a
political and paramilitary organization-the Amal
militia-to motivate the traditionally passive Shias.
? The Iranian Revolution provided a model and a
well-formulated extremist ideology for Shia
fundamentalist activism. The Ayatollah Khomeini
has become a strong leadership figure whom the
Shias idolize.
? The prolonged Israeli occupation of southern
Lebanon radicalized many formerly passive Shias
and increased popular discontent by demonstrating
the inability of the central government in Beirut to
defend Shia interests.
In the summer of 1982, Husayn Musawi, a prominent
fundamentalist Shia, withdrew from the mainline
Amal movement when it refused initially to combat
the Israeli occupation forces. Musawi then formed the
extremist Islamic Amal group in the Bekaa Valley
town of Ba'labakk, laying the foundation for the
Hizballah movement.
Hizballah Ideology
Generally speaking, the Hizballah movement espouses
a pro-Iranian, fundamentalist Shia ideology.
Members of the group revere the Ayatollah Khomeini
and adhere to his view of the world. As such, the
group has a visceral hatred for the United States,
Israel, and France, believing they are the principal
oppressors of the Muslim world.
The Hizballah movement is dedicated to bringing
about an Islamic revolution in Lebanon and
establishing a fundamentalist Shia regime there. Its
adherents believe that the elimination of all
Western-especially US-and Israeli influence from
Lebanon is the first step toward this goal. The
fundamentalists see themselves as true believers
engaged in a jihad (holy war) to force all Americans,
Europeans, and Israelis out of Lebanon. They believe
terrorism is the most expedient means of achieving
their goals, and they justify the taking of lives and
hostages as part of the struggle against the infidels. F_
The car bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut in
April 1983 marked the beginning of the Hizbal-
Hizballah elements also target US personnel and
facilities as a means of indirectly challenging the
other factional militias and the Lebanese
Government. Successful terrorist attacks enhance
local perceptions of the Hizballah's strength and
demonstrate its ability to operate with impunity even
in areas under the nominal control of other groups.
Probably the best example of this was the bombing on
20 September 1984 of the US Embassy Annex, which
is located in a suburb of East Beirut controlled by
Lebanese Christian forces.
The Hizballah movement presents an increasing
threat to Israel as well. Over the past two years,
radical Shias have conducted many attacks in
southern Lebanon against Israeli military elements or
their Lebanese allies, and the Hizballah is increasing
its presence in that region. Even if all Israeli troops
withdraw from the "security zone," however, the
Hizballah is unlikely to end its attacks against Israel.
Adherents of the group believe they must "liberate
Jerusalem" and return "occupied Palestine" to
Muslim control. Hizballah militants consider
themselves Islamic warriors who are involved in a
long-term struggle against Israel itself. They believe
Lebanon's proximity to Israel places them in a unique
position to lead the Muslim struggle against Zionism.
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The destroyed US Marine headquarters at Beirut
airport, in which 241 died-Hizballah's most
successful terrorist operation.
Hizballah poses a greater terrorist threat, and its
attacks are often more destructive than those of other
terrorist groups, because some Hizballah recruits are
willing to die in their operations. Martyrdom and self-
sacrifice are essential elements of fundamentalist Shia
ideology, and it is this fanatic devotion to the cause
that distinguishes Hizballah from most other terrorist
groups. Shia suicide terrorists are indoctrinated to
believe that dying in the name of Islam will guarantee
them a place in paradise.
The Hizballah Network
Radical Shia leaders since 1982 have transformed this
collection of rival factions into a highly structured,
cooperative network. The original component groups
of the Hizballah maintain close contact with each
other and increasingly operate as one organization.
The groups comprising the network include:
? Islamic Amal. Still led by Husayn Musawi, the
original radical Shia organization is now probably
the largest group in the Hizballah network. Its
membership may total 1,000 to 1,400, but the
number of active, full-time members probably is
somewhat less at any given time. Islamic Amal
quarters and trains its members at several different
locations in the Bekaa Valley.
Islamic Amal leader Husayn Musawi surround-
ed by bodyguards at his headquarters in the
? Husayni Suicide Forces. Another member of the
Musawi family-Abd al-Illah Musawi (also known
as Abu Haydar)-leads this loosely organized
subgroup of Islamic Amal. Based in southern
Beirut, the Husayni Suicide Forces probably does
not function as a permanent organization but
consists of individuals recruited for specific
operations. The group's membership fluctuates but
probably does not exceed 100 at any given time.
? Muslim Students Union. Muhammad Husayn
Fadlallah controls this overt group based in
southern Beirut. We believe it serves as a front
organization for the Lebanese branch of the
clandestine Da'wa (Islamic Call) Party, which has
produced many Hizballah leaders. The Muslim
Students Union seeks to spread Hizballah's message
among Lebanon's Shias and to indoctrinate
Hizballah recruits. We believe the group also selects
promising members for terrorist training. The
Muslim Students Union probably has fewer than
500 full-time members, although Fadlallah
commands the loyalty of far greater numbers of
Shias in the southern slums of Beirut.
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Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah attending a fu-
neral for victims of a car bomb near his mosque.
? Hizballah militias. Hizballah clerics, such as Subhi
Tufayli, Abbas Musawi, and Abd al-Karim Ubayd
command distinct Shia militia contingents in the
Bekaa Valley, Beirut, and the south. These
paramilitary groups, based in the Bekaa Valley and
usually just referred to as "Hizballah," probably
have a membership in the hundreds.
? Council of Lebanon. Iran created this body in 1983
to coordinate radical Shia activities in Lebanon. It is
composed of senior Lebanese and Iranian Shias,
mostly clerics. Although the council is nominally
responsible for all religious, political, and military
activities of the Hizballah movement, it almost
certainly does not fully control the actions-
especially terrorist operations-of the groups under
its supervision.
? Others. Small cells of Hizballah militants
committed to terrorism have coalesced around
individual village clerics or local paramilitary
leaders, primarily in the southern suburbs of
Beirut.'
? It is extremely difficult to estimate the strength of the subunits in
the Hizballah network. An individual's affiliation often is based on
family ties or loyalty to a local shaykh or militia leader. Relatively
few individuals are full-time members of the groups that compose
the Hizballah network. The collective membership of the groups
has grown from several hundred to several thousand during the past
Hizballah Strongholds and Facilities
The Hizballah has succeeded in replacing Amal as the
dominant Shia organization in the Bekaa Valley. The
central Hizballah headquarters for all of Lebanon is
colocated with an Iranian Revolutionary Guard
command center in the former Lebanese Army
compound known as the Shaykh Abdallah barracks
on the southern edge of Ba'labakk. The
fundamentalists took over the compound in 1983,
renamed it the Imam Ali barracks, and made it the
nerve center for Hizballah activity. Here Hizballah
operatives receive paramilitary training, religious
indoctrination, and material supplies
In addition, the radicals almost
certainly have planned and staged terrorist operations
from the Shaykh Abdallah barracks.
The Hizballah and the Iranians also operate other
command and training facilities in the Bekaa Valley,
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Key Shia-Controlled Neighborhoods in South Beirut
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The most important of these centers are a
former hotel in Ba'labakk and facilities located in or
near the towns of Brital, Janta, An Nabi Shit, and
Buday
The Hizballah movement also is rapidly expanding its
influence-at Amal's expense-in West Beirut and
the southern suburbs of the capital.
Hizballah leaders are now focusing their efforts and
resources on the extensive Shia-populated areas of
southern Lebanon from which Israeli forces have
withdrawn. Here again, the Hizballah is competing
for support in areas traditionally controlled by the
mainline Amal militia. Southern Shias have been
more affluent and less prone to religious extremism
than their coreligionists in the Bekaa Valley or the
Iran's Role Declining?
Iran continues to provide a wide range of support to
the Hizballah movement. Some 300 to 500 Iranian
Revolutionary Guards remain at various locations in
the Bekaa Valley, and the
Iranians continue to train Hizballah recruits in
The two radical Shia hijackers of TWA Flight
847 warn the United States not to retaliate
against Lebanon. F_~
The former Iranian Ambassador to Syria, Ali Akbar
Mohtashami-pur, was instrumental in Iran's
involvement with the Hizballah movement. Until his
tour in Damascus ended in mid-September, he
presided over the Council of Lebanon from its
inception and provided a great deal of guidance and
Despite material support to the Hizballah, Tehran
often cannot control its Lebanese allies, and the
Hizballah increasingly appears to conduct terrorist
operations without the knowledge of Iranian officials.
Tehran was not involved
other terrorist attacks.
in planning hijackings of the Kuwaiti airliner in
December 1984 or TWA Flight 847 last June.
Hizballah operatives almost certainly have not
consulted with Iranian officials before conducting
Although the termination of Iranian support would
hurt the Hizballah and slow its progress, radical Shia
leaders can satisfy many of the movement's material
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Major Hizballah Terrorist Operations
(Selected significant international incidents in which
Hizballah members are known or suspected to have
participated)
1985
14 June TWA Flight 847 hijacked from Athens; one
American killed.
American University of Beirut (AUB) Professor
Thomas Sutherland kidnaped in West Beirut.
8 Mar
16 March
7 March
28 May American University Hospital administrator Dr. 5 March
David Jacobsen kidnaped in West Beirut.
22 March French diplomats Marcel Fontaine and Marcel 15 February
Carton kidnaped in West Beirut.
16 March Associated Press bureau chief Terry Anderson 10 February
kidnaped in West Beirut.
19 February Officer in French observer corps shot dead in 18 January
West Beirut.
14 January Two members of French observer corps 17 January
assassinated in West Beirut.
8 January
7 January
Catholic priest Lawrence Jenco kidnaped in West 8 January
Beirut.
Deputy commander of French observer corps shot 1983
dead in West Beirut. 12 December
1984
4 December Kuwait Airways Flight 221 hijacked from
Dubayy and diverted to Tehran; two US officials 23 October
killed.
25 November Seven Hizballah members in Italy and one in
Switzerland arrested with plans and materials to
blow up the US Embassy in Rome.
20 September US Embassy Annex in East Beirut destroyed in
suicide car bombing; two Americans killed.
31 July Air France airliner hijacked from Frankfurt,
West Germany, and diverted to Tehran.
1982
19 July
Presbyterian minister Benjamin Weir kidnaped
in West Beirut.
US Embassy political officer William Buckler
kidnaped in West Beirut.
Cable News Network bureau chief Jeremy Levin
kidnaped in West Beirut.
US defense attache in Beirut wounded in
assassination attempt.
French architect Christian Joubert kidnaped in
West Beirut.
AUB Professor Frank Regier kidnaped in West
Beirut.
AUB President Malcolm Kerr shot dead in West
Beirut.
Saudi diplomat Hu.sayn Farrash kidnaped in
West Beirut.
Marine guards at US Embassy in Beirut fired
upon; one Marine killed.
US and French Embassies in Kuwait and other
targets partially destroyed by suicide car
bombings.
Barracks of US and French Multinational Force
contingents .simultaneously destroyed by suicide
car bombings; 299 soldiers killed.
US Embassy in West Beirut destroyed in suicide
car bombing; 17 Americans killed.
Acting AUB President David Dodge kidnaped in
West Beirut.
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needs through the open market for arms in Lebanon
or from other Lebanese factions.
The Hizballah probably could exchange territory for
weapons and training with the Palestinian factions
trying to reestablish a stronghold in Lebanon.
Growing Syrian Displeasure
The Syrian Government has tolerated Hizballah
activity in Lebanon
facilitated Hizballah terrorist operations by allowing
the radicals to operate training facilities in the Bekaa
Valley and move men and materiel through Syrian
checkpoints.
Syria is gradually moving toward confrontation with
the fundamentalists. Disruptive Hizballah activity
suited Syrian interests in 1983 and early 1984. Syrian
President Assad probably saw the Hizballah as an
effective means of forcing the withdrawal of the
Multinational Force contingents from Beirut and
Israeli military units from southern Lebanon. By mid-
1984, however, Syrian and Hizballah strategies began
to diverge as Lebanese President Gemayel abrogated
the 17 May 1983 accord with Israel and the
multinational peacekeeping forces withdrew from
Lebanon. Moreover, the long-term objectives of Syria
and the Hizballah are fundamentally incompatible.
Damascus is determined to stabilize the security
situation in Lebanon and strengthen the Gemayel
government. Hizballah leaders, on the other hand,
want to overthrow Gemayel and replace his
government with a fundamentalist Islamic regime.
During the TWA 25X1
hijacking crisis, Vice President Khaddam met with 25X1
Hizballah leaders for 24 hours to pressure them to 25X1
release the four passengers they were holding,
according to the US Embassy in Damascus. Syria also
appears frustrated with the Hizballah's refusal to
release the US and French hostages it holds. Syrian
troops mounted another search for the hostages in the
northern Bekaa Valley on 1-2 November, according to
a contact of the US Embassy in Beirut. 25X1
Damascus occasionally has imposed restrictions on
Hizballah and Iranian activity in Lebanon-
sometimes provoking clashes between Syrian troops
and Shia gunmen-but these restrictions have been
short lived. More important, Damascus has not
stopped the radicals from conducting their training or
operational planning in their Bekaa Valley bases.
Assad has been reluctant to order a complete
crackdown on the radicals for several reasons:
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relationship, which provides Damascus with
valuable economic benefits, including high-quality
oil at very low prices.
? Assad may worry that a crackdown on the
Hizballah would provoke terrorist attacks against
Syrian interests.
? Damascus probably prefers to co-opt the Hizballah
movement and manipulate it to Syria's advantage.
serious problem.
Assad appears confident that the Hizballah does not
pose an immediate threat to Syrian policy goals in
Lebanon and that Syrian forces or their allies in 25X1
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We believe, however, that Assad underestimates the
capabilities of the Hizballah network and the
dynamics of Shia fundamentalism in Lebanon.
Moreover, Syria's ability to clamp down on the
Hizballah is limited. While Syrian forces could arrest
some Hizballah leaders and close its bases in the
Bekaa Valley, it would take a major commitment of
Syrian forces to stem the tide of Shia radicalism in
Beirut and southern Lebanon.
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On 6 November, an undetermined number of M-19
guerrillas, some disguised as policemen, shot their
way into the Palace of Justice in Bogota, trapping
more than 300 persons inside and seizing numerous
hostages. The Colombian Government's swift military
response caught the guerrillas unprepared, and the
crisis ended the following day, leaving at least 100
dead, including all the guerrillas and several Supreme
Court judges.
The temporary seizure of the Palace of Justice is the
most recent demonstration that extremist elements in
the M-19 are leading the group toward increased
guerrilla violence in Colombia. Activity by the M-19,
the second-largest guerrilla group in Colombia, has
increased steadily since the group broke a 10-month
truce with the government last June. Moreover, press
reports indicate that the M-19 has formed a tactical
alliance with several smaller guerrilla groups. These
developments probably signal the collapse of
President Betancur's peace process and may cause
him to give the military more leeway in their fight
against the M-19 and the other guerrilla groups.
Background
Organized in the early 1970s, M-19 officially
emerged in January 1974 when members of the group
stole the sword of Simon Bolivar from a Bogota
museum. Estimates on M- 19 membership today range
from 800 to 1,000 members. The group operates
throughout Colombia, but its traditional strongholds
are in the Valle de Cauca and Cauca Departments.
The M-19 also has urban support groups in Bogota. It
has been the most active guerrilla group in Colombia
during the past five years, but the deaths of two group
leaders, Jaime Bateman in 1983 and Carlos Toledo
Plata in 1984, left the group badly split over the
question of leadership and how to conduct its guerrilla
campaign. The M-19 entered the government-
sponsored truce in August 1984 before militant group
members gradually took control and led the group
back into armed action in June 1985. The Palace of
Justice operation was led by one of the more militant
The M- 19 has strengthened its leadership position in
the Colombian guerrilla movement at the expense of
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC), the largest and oldest guerrilla group in
the Alfaro Vive, Carajo! guerrilla group in Ecuador.
While recent M-19 actions suggest that it is trying to
become a leader of Colombian leftist guerrilla
groups-and possibly South American terrorist
groups-the FARC appears to play it alone and
publicly supports the truce and the peace process.
Colombian troops and M- 19 guerrillas have
skirmished on almost a daily basis since September,
and the attempted kidnaping and wounding of Army
Commander Samudio by the M-19 in late October
reportedly caused alarm in the military over the
growing strength and boldness of the group. The
current military strategy reportedly is to concentrate
its counterinsurgency efforts on M-19 as long as the
FARC continues to negotiate with the government.
Consequences
The storming of the Palace of Justice represents the
most spectacular action by the group to date. The
M- 19 apparently hoped to replicate its highly
successful seizure of the Dominican Embassy in 1980.
The M-19 probably planned to use the takeover to
garner maximum press coverage for its cause and to
spotlight its dissatisfaction with the lack of progress in
leaders of the group, Andres Almarales.
Secret
GI TR 85-023
18 November 1985
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The M-19, however, miscalculated. The military's
surprisingly quick action and Betancur's low profile
during the crisis caught the M-19 offguard. Instead of
starting a long, drawn-out process of negotiation that
would allow the M-19 to make its demands known
and eventually lead to a peaceful settlement, the
M-19 suffered a crushing defeat. We suspect that
among those killed were some of the M-19's best
tacticians and negotiators who almost certainly would
have been involved in an operation of this nature.
Outlook
Two courses of action are likely in the wake of the
failed takeover. The M-19 could decide to lay low,
licking its wounds and rebuilding the organization; or
it could strike again, but at a "safer" target, such as
an important embassy or the upcoming OAS
conference that is to be held in Cartagena in early
December. We suspect that, if the M-19 is to
maintain its credibility both with the Colombian
public and the leftist guerrilla groups, M-19 leaders
would opt for a second operation, but one that would
handcuff the Colombian military, such as the seizure
of foreign diplomats.
We fully expect that the M-19 will continue and
possibly even increase its terrorist operations over the
long term, especially if the group begins to lose
ground to counterinsurgency efforts by Colombian
troops. One of its primary targets will continue to be
US interests in Colombia. The M-19 claimed
responsibility for a series of bombings on 3
September, against two US-Colombian cultural
centers and the US Embassy, and, since mid-
September, M-19 threats against US business and
diplomatic facilities have increased.
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August-September
16 September
Early October
Chronology of Terrorism-1985
this publication are not included.
Below are described noteworthy foreign and international events involving
terrorists, or the use of terrorist tactics, which have occurred or come to light
since our last issue. In some cases, the perpetrators and their motivations may not
be known. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in
Police arrest five members of Dev Sol (Revolutionary Left) in Istanbul. They were
wanted for an armed attack on a police station in Karagumruk more than five
years ago.
Mozambique: RENAMO attacks two state farms near Maputo. Seven persons
were killed and three others wounded when guerrillas of the Mozambique
National Resistance Movement overran the 25 de Junho and Olsa citrus units.
overthrowing the Qadhafi regime.
Greece: Previously unknown group claims credit for attacks on Libya. A London
press office received a call from the "Libyan Organization of 7 April" claiming
responsibility for the Athens bombings of the Libyan People's Bureau and the
Libyan Arab Airlines office two days before and announcing the group's goal of
Somalia: Explosion damages officers 'club in Hargeisa, killing six, wounding 11,
and damaging three buildings.
authorities negotiate with the KPU leadership.
Iraq: Kurdish guerrillas kidnap two Soviets. Members of the Kurdistan Patriotic
Union (KPU) stated that the Soviets will not be released until appropriate
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Gl TR 85-023
18 November 1985
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13 October Philippines: Grenade attack in Lanao del Norte leaves 13 dead, 93 wounded. An
ex-policeman and two unidentified men reportedly were responsible for the attack.
several hours later.
Italy: Unsuccessful attack on Tunisian Embassy in Rome. According to press
reports, unknown persons attempted to set fire to a gas cylinder and an
"antiaircraft missile" in front of the building, but the small fire was extinguished
before the devices could explode. Prime Minister Mzali was due to arrive in Rome
military and civilian personnel reportedly will receive increased protection.
Burma: Kachin Independence Army assassinates commander of Burmese Army's
Northern Command and his aide in Myitkyinya. Following the murders, senior
17 October Lebanon: Explosion temporarily knocks out Voice of Hope radio station, killing
nine persons, including three attackers.
surrender since 1980.
Peru: Disillusioned Sendero Luminoso (SL) group surrenders in Ayacucho. This
defection involved 115 men, women, and children and was the largest such SL
West African People's Organization.
Namibia: Two bombs damage pumps at gas station in Caprivi Strip. This was the
first bombing in the area in several years and was probably the work of the South-
counterrevolutionaries.
Afghanistan: Head of Saudi Interests Section assaulted. He reportedly was
beaten by members of an Afghan militia unit who accused him-along with the
United States, France, Pakistan, China, and West Germany-of aiding
24 October Greece: Handgrenade in car wounds mayor of Rehtymnon, eight other persons on
Crete. No one claimed responsibility for the blast.
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civilian trains before, is most likely responsible.
Mozambique: Civilians taken off train in Maputo. Six of them were killed
outright. The Mozambique National Resistance Movement, which has attacked
outlawed African National Congress was probably responsible.
South Africa: Powerful bomb kills two terrorists at Grosvenor Girls' School in
Durban. The school was to serve as a polling station in legislative elections. The
30 Sendero Luminoso inmates in Lima's Lurigancho Prison.
Peru: Director of Lima's El Fronton Prison assassinated. The attack, which also
wounded his chauffer, occurred as he left his apartment with his 8-year-old son.
Peruvian authorities speculate that the murder was in retaliation for the deaths of
25 October Peru: Tupac Amara teams take over two cgfeterias in Cuzco. The guerrillas urged
their audiences to join their group. This was the terrorists' first public appearance
since their August declaration to suspend armed activities against the government.
26 October Sri Lanka: Bomb explodes near members of Multiracial Cease-fire Monitoring
Committee in Trincomalee. No injuries were reported. The committee was set up
to monitor a cease-fire between government forces and militant Tamil separatists.
27 October Mozambique: RENAMO raids Maputo suburbs. Guerrillas killed four civilians
and wounded another, and are suspected of killing two off-duty soldiers.
the Cities" claimed responsibility for the attacks.
Greece: Arson attacks damage two automobiles belonging to US Air Force
personnel in Ellinikon and Kypseli. The recently surfaced group "Wild Geese of
severe blow from police sweeps in January.
Spain: Police break up GRAPO unit in Vigo. Members of the leftist October First
Antifascist Resistance Group were attempting to reorganize in the wake of a
30 October Ecuador: Shootout with Alfaro Vive, Carajo! cell in Quito leaves one terrorist
dead, 10 captured. Both military and police forces took part in the operation.
31 October Greece: Explosion on Athens city bus injures 30 passengers. A previously unknown
group, the "Revolutionary Fighting Left," claimed credit for the bomb. It may
have detonated prematurely while being transported by an Iraqi citizen to another
target.
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Japan: Homemade missiles fired at Narita Airport cause minimal damage to two
runways, no casualties. No one has claimed responsibility, but police suspect the
leftist terrorist group Chukaku-ha (Nucleus Faction), which has staged many such
attacks on the airport this year.
Peru: Sendero Luminoso terrorists suspected in bombing ofAprista Party office in
Huancayo which wounded 15 persons. Four suspects were arrested.
1 November Peru: Masked members of People's Revolutionary Command attack Coca-Cola
truck in Huancayo. They distributed hundreds of bottles of the beverage to
townspeople.
2 November Iran: Attempted hijacking aborted. Security officers reportedly thwarted an
attempt to hijack an Iranian passenger plane on a domestic route. No injuries were
reported.
3 November Iran: Car bomb explodes in Tehran, injuring two persons. A smaller bomb had
been defused near Tehran's bazaar the previous day. No group has claimed
responsibility for either incident, the fourth and fifth such bombings in the last two
months
Peru: Tupac Amaru interrupts Lima broadcast of World Cup soccer playoff
between Chile and Peru. Their transmission denounced alleged human rights
abuses in Peru and commemorated the anniversary of a 1790 revolt against the
Spanish led by Indian leader Tupac Amaru.
7 November Iran: Car bomb explodes in downtown Tehran, wounding 15 persons. The 10-
kilogram device reportedly damaged seven other vehicles as well. No one has
claimed responsibility for the incident.
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