TERRORISM REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00685R000200260002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 4, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence 25X1
Terrorism Review
GI TR 85-022
4 November 1985
Copy 5 31
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Terrorism Review I 25X1
Against the United States and Israel
DI/OGI
5 Highlights
Terrorism and Narcotics Analysis Division, DI/OGI
13 Fatah's Security and Intelligence Organizations: Operational Capabilities I 25X1
27 Chronology of Terrorism-1985
Terrorism and Narcotics Analysis Division, DI/OGI
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor
This review is published every other week by the Directorate of Intelligence.
Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well as by other
agencies of the US Intelligence Community will be considered for publication.
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The Israeli bombing of the PLO Headquarters in Tunis on 1 October and the US
interception of the Achille Lauro hijackers will even more closely identify the
United States and Israel as a common foe in the view of Middle Eastern terrorists.
As a result, we can expect attacks against US targets by Middle Eastern groups
that previously limited themselves to targeting Israeli or Jewish interests.
While Iran has not been directly implicated in any terrorist attacks during the past
six months, Iranian-backed groups have remained active, and elements of the
Iranian regime have conducted operational planning.
Radical Lebanese Shias have exacted the highest price to US interests from
terrorist actions anywhere in the world. The apparent murder of US hostage
William Buckley by his Hizballah captors-ostensibly in retaliation for the Israeli
airstrike on Tunis-may demonstrate their frustration at their inability to secure
the release of Shia prisoners still held in Kuwait.
Hizballah
Hizballah will remain a potent threat to US and Israeli interests in Lebanon, the
Persian Gulf, and even Europe. The group may well carry out its threat to murder
its other American hostages. Even without that threat, all remaining US citizens
and the Israeli presence in the south remain vulnerable to terrorist attack. In
addition, radical Shias have demonstrated an increased capability to strike in the
Persian Gulf countries, particularly in Kuwait. The United States has a heavy
economic, diplomatic, and military presence in the Gulf, and US personnel and
facilities in the region remain vulnerable. In Europe, the plan to strike the US
Embassy in Rome last November indicates the potential for Iranian-supported
operatives there.
Palestinian Groups
Palestinian groups are likely to launch retaliatory attacks against US and Israeli
interests. PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat probably will have to cope with increasing
demands from the PLO Executive Committee to retaliate against the United
States. Fatah hardliners have long advocated a more militant posture, and they are
now in a stronger position to press Arafat to approve more frequent and
spectacular terrorist attacks.
Palestinian leaders have grown increasingly frustrated with what they view as
Washington's unquestioned support for Israel. The PLO may soon conclude that
the only way to keep attention on its grievances with Israel-and demonstrate its
capability as a national liberation movement-is to step up operations against
Israel and to attack Israel's prime benefactor, the United States.
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GI TR 85-022
4 November 1985
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Arafat probably will sanction an increase in attacks on Israeli interests worldwide
in an effort to preserve Fatah unity. He may continue to resist pressure for attacks
against US interests-in an effort to avoid further loss of international
credibility-but he may not discourage freelance operations by PLO splinter
groups.
Some Palestinian groups may be planning attacks to obtain the freedom of the four
men who took over the Achille Lauro. Abu Abbas, leader of the Palestinian faction
responsible for the Achille Lauro hijacking, stated that efforts would be
undertaken to free the hijackers. The PLO representative in West Germany
predicted that an American or Italian airplane would be hijacked during October
or that another American would be killed to force the release of the hijackers.
Libya
Libya's primary targets continue to be Libyan exiles and the Governments of
Egypt, Tunisia, Chad, and Zaire. Although Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qadhafi
may continue to avoid targeting US personnel or facilities out of fear of retaliation,
he may be willing to work through surrogates to hit US targets if he feels the
potential benefits outweigh the risk of discovery. Qadhafi might be tempted to
attack the United States in countries where he believes he could exploit a surge of
anti-US sentiment-such as Sudan or Tunisia.
Libya has already sponsored terrorist attacks against Tunisian interests this year,
and strong US support for President Bourguiba against the Libyans has made the
United States a potential target. Zaire, whose President Mobutu has close ties
both to the United States and Israel, remains a third-echelon target for anti-US
attacks.
Israel's reputation for swift and successful retribution strongly discourages
Qadhafi from targeting that nation's interests. Should operational ties between
Libya and radical Palestinian groups become closer, however, Libya may consider
using Palestinian surrogates to hit Israeli targets.
Syria
Syria has acted as a patron and director of international terrorism, rather than as a
direct practitioner, during the past two years. Damascus will encourage attacks by
groups it supports if such attacks serve Syrian interests and Damascus's hand can
be concealed. Among the groups likely to be encouraged by the Syrians are the
anti-Arafat Palestinians and the Syrian Socialist National Party (SSNP). The
Syrians will make every effort to retard progress in the peace process, using
terrorist attacks to keep the level of antagonism high among Israel, Jordan, and
the pro-Arafat Palestinians. Moreover, Damascus will continue its efforts to make
the Israeli presence in south Lebanon as costly as possible. It is providing logistic
support and encouragement to the SSNP's car bomb campaign against the Israeli
armed forces and their allies in the Army of South Lebanon, for example.
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Middle Easterners have already increased their attacks against Israel outside of
their home region, chiefly in Europe. Israeli and Jewish targets have been hit six
times in the first six months of 1985-twice the 1984 rate. Both the Achille Lauro
hijacking and the murders of three Israelis at a yacht club in Cyprus on 25
September indicate this trend will continue.
The United States has already been threatened, along with Israel, since the ship
hijacking. Two Palestinians were arrested in Rome on 15 October carrying
explosives they said they intended to use against Israel and the United States. In
addition, an unknown caller made a bomb threat against the US section of
Sigonella Airbase in Sicily on 15 October.
US and Israeli interests could also be targeted by indigenous West European
terrorist groups. Some of these groups attacked Israeli targets "in solidarity" with
Middle Easterners following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.
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Highlights
Threats to US Interests
The US interception of the Achille Lauro hijackers has significantly increased the
terrorist threat to US and NATO interests in Italy. In recent weeks, US facilities
have been the targets of bomb threats and surveillance activity by Middle Eastern
individuals. The indigenous Red Brigades terrorist group announced on 18
October that it too would protest the US action by attacking NATO targets. ~~ 25X1
Brigades and other indigenous Italian terrorist groups.
US and NATO facilities located in Italy remain vulnerable to surreptitious entry
and auto bombings, as indicated by the increasing number of military uniforms
and base passes either lost or stolen in recent months. We believe the long-term
threat posed by Palestinian and other Middle Eastern terrorist groups to US
interests in Italy is likely to continue and overshadow that posed by the Red
movement.
Communist Combatant Cells Broaden Target Spectrum
On 19 October the Combatant Communist Cells (CCC) bombed a Belgian armed
forces information office. In claiming responsibility for the attack, the group
announced the opening of a "second front" called the "Pierre Akkerman
campaign" against bourgeois militarism and pacifism. Akkerman was a Belgian
Communist killed in the Spanish Civil War in 1937. This was followed on 20
October-the day of a national antimissile demonstration in Brussels-by an
apparent CCC bombing of the vehicle and home of the president of the antinuclear
protests.
In its 19 October communique, the group declared that its "second front" is
directed against mass public demonstrations protesting missile deployment, which
it terms the "usual, useless, ineffective petit bourgeois sterile actions." The
antipacifist attack could have been the work of a dissident faction within the
group, or the first of several operations timed to coincide with the antimissile
of Belgian society and reduce its potential pool of recruits.
If the CCC is now targeting the pacifist movement-which might have provided it
with allies and supporters-it is likely to further isolate itself from leftist segments
operations. It has also bombed domestic political targets.
The attack against the pacifist leader marks the CCC's second change in targeting
recently, and the fourth in less than a year. In early October, it announced the
beginning of a "Karl Marx" anticapitalist campaign. The group emerged in
October 1984 and attacked mainly NATO and defense-related targets in its initial
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GI TR 85-022
4 November 1985
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September-one of several cover names it uses.
Abu Nidal Said Planning Terrorist Attacks
Seven members of the radical Palestinian terrorist group Abu Nidal reportedly are
planning to carry out terrorist operations against Turkish security forces. The
attacks apparently are intended to retaliate for Turkish successes against the
group following the assassination on 24 July of a Jordanian diplomat. The Abu
Nidal Group claimed responsibility for the incident under the name Black
are particularly concerned that the group has singled out
circulated the names of the seven terrorists already thought to be in Turkey.
accordingly. Another possible scenario involves the bombings of densely populated
areas. Authorities have enhanced security at the more likely targets and have
Kuwaiti interests as their primary target and have instructed their personnel
no casualties in any of the attacks.
Five Bombings in Six Days by Action Directe
In its busiest week this year, the leftwing terrorist group this October bombed
targets to protest South Africa's apartheid system and the activities of the rightist
National Front Party-accused by Action Directe and others of racism. Two
bombs severely damaged buildings housing the state-run radio and television
stations in Paris on 14 October. On 16 October, in Marseille, the group bombed
the offices of Securite et Liberte, an organization related to the National Front,
and on 17 October it attacked the offices of the French broadcasting authority. On
19 October the group bombed a French airline doing business with South Africa to
protest the execution of black poet Benjamin Moloise on the same day. There were
international faction has attacked defense-related targets.
These bombings were carried out by the "Symbolic Wing" of Action Directe and
may portend additional attacks against targets related to the rightist party or
South Africa. The "Symbolic Wing" previously bombed four French companies
with business interests in South Africa on 5 September. A second hardline
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for the death of the Beit Shemesh couple.
Palestinian Terrorist Cell Smashed
Israeli security forces in a firefight wiped out a five-man Palestinian terrorist cell
operating near Hebron. Four of the terrorists were killed and one was wounded in
the Israeli ambush. The cell was allegedly responsible for killing five Israelis and
wounding 18 others over the past year and a half, including murdering a couple
near Beit Shemesh on 2 October. An Israeli official said the group began its
activities independently and subsequently established links to the PLO in Jordan.
Fatah Force 17-Arafat's personal bodyguard-reportedly claimed responsibility
the SSNP militia's participation in the recent fighting in Tripoli.
Wave of Attacks on SSNP Centers and Officials
Between 1 and 3 October, five attacks occurred against facilities and personnel of
the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) in Beirut. One bomb exploded near the
SSNP main offices, another was thrown near the offices of the party's magazine,
and a third was defused near an SSNP local office. Assailants also tossed a
grenade at the home of a party official and fired rockets at the home of the SSNP
military commander. The attacks caused no casualties and only minor damage.
The Arab Struggle Organization and Islamic Jihad both claimed responsibility for
three of the incidents. In addition, a third group calling itself "Beirut's Free
Revolution," claimed credit for one of the other attacks. The attacks, however,
probably were conducted by the Islamic Unification Movement in retaliation for
Damascus. Neither device exploded, however.
Bombs Linked to Fighting in Lebanon
A bomb exploded in a shop on the ground floor of a hotel near Martyrs' Square in
Damascus on 25 September, killing an unknown number of persons. Four days
earlier, two car bombs were discovered at two different locations in downtown
militia forces attacking Sunni Muslim units in Tripoli, Lebanon.
Syrian officials strongly suspect that either members of the Islamic Unification
Movement (IUM) or pro-Arafat Palestinians planted the bombs. The IUM, which
is supported by pro-Arafat Palestinians, has been under attack by Syrian-backed
forces during recent fighting in Tripoli, Lebanon. One of these groups probably is
using the recent bombings to pressure Damascus to end its support for Lebanese
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and other locations in Kuwait in December 1983.
Dawa Party Terrorism Reemerges
Iraqi security forces on 13 October engaged in a daylong firefight with an
undetermined number of Dawa (Islamic Call) Party members in Al-Juzani, a small
village on the east side of the Tigris River
The deployment of an entire brigade of Iraqi security forces may indicate that the
Dawa group numbered more than the 100 officially estimated by Baghdad. On the
same day, Iraqi security forces intercepted five Dawa Party members in
Ridhwaniyz, killing three. These incidents were the first inside Iraq since April
1983 involving the Dawa Party. Dawa Party members bombed the US Embassy
Kuwaiti leaders.
Continued Likelihood of Terrorist Attacks
Iranian-backed Shia terrorists are still planning to launch attacks against Kuwaiti
and US interests . Iranian-
backed Dawa Party members, teamed up with Lebanese Hizballah, reportedly
intend to attack Kuwaiti or US interests in Kuwait-possibly the Kuwaiti ruling
family or the US Embassy. The Hizballah members reportedly left Beirut on 27
September. Meanwhile, Kuwaiti authorities have identified four individuals in
Cyprus planning to hijack a Kuwaiti or American civilian airliner in the name of
the Islamic Jihad Organization. These Iranian-sponsored attacks appear intended
to intimidate Kuwait into ending its support for Iraq, obtain the release of the 17
members of the Dawa Party imprisoned in Kuwait, and perhaps remove key
United Arab Tighter Security After Discovery of Iranian Terrorist Cell
Emirates following the discovery of an
Iranian-sponsored terrorist cell last July, government officials believe Iran is now
willing to conduct terrorist or conventional military attacks against the UAE.
the leaders previously believed that the benefits Iran
derived from trade with the UAE would restrain Tehran. But the large quantity of
weapons and explosives discovered with the cell, combined with the planned
targeting of Abu Dhabi leaders and US and French diplomatic installations,
convinced them otherwise.
among the UAE's security forces in the past can be resolved.
As a result of this, the UAE reportedly has tightened security measures. Nightly
patrols of the Gulf coastline and waters have also been instituted to interdict the
flow of men and arms. In addition, each individual of Iranian origin seeking
government employment must now submit to an extensive background
investigation. The Emirates are considering tightening entry restrictions on
nonresident Iranians as well. The effectiveness of these measures, however,
depends on whether interservice rivalries that have prevented close coordination
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ambulance was destroyed and two youths were seriously injured.
Terrorist Use of Mines
On 6 October, guerrillas of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
(FMLN) announced on Radio Venceremos that they would mine primary and
secondary roads to enforce their call for a nationwide traffic stoppage-the first
time the FMLN has done this. Calls for such stoppages have been increasingly
ignored by the general public. Since the mining began, a Salvadoran Red Cross
on their own.
US Missionaries Kidnaped
Three of four US citizens kidnaped on 5 October by Colombian guerrillas remain
in their custody. The New Tribes Mission-in which the hostages served-
reportedly has received a ransom demand from the Ricardo Franco Front, a
splinter group of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), but
evidence indicates that local FARC members probably conducted the kidnaping
The group kidnaped two US citizens in 1983 and released them following large
ransom payments. The recent kidnapings, however, violate the current truce that
the FARC leadership wants to extend and Colombian authorities believe that a
political settlement could soon release the hostages.
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demanding amnesty for political prisoners.
People's Revolutionary Command Resurfaces
Four persons claiming to represent the People's Revolutionary Command (CRP)
terrorist group briefly took over a Lima radio station on 18 October. The group
forced the broadcast of a tape attacking the government's economic policy and
links to the MRTA, the resurgence of the CRP may threaten US personnel.
The CRP first appeared in mid-July when it took over two radio stations and
claimed responsibility for the 14 July attack on a US Consulate building. It is not
known to have carried out any subsequent actions. The group's operational
similarity to the Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru (MRTA) suggests it
could be a splinter faction dissatisfied with the virtual halt in MRTA actions since
August. Because of its previous attack against a US installation and its possible
government coverup of a massacre.
Sendero Luminoso Prison Uprising
Approximately 30 persons died and about 20 were injured on 4 October when
violence erupted during a police search of a Sendero Luminoso cell block in Lima's
Lurigancho Prison. Nearly all of the victims died in a fire that the government
claims was started by the prisoners, but that several leftist groups claim was a
arrows, slings, lances, and homemade "flamethrowers."
preparation to escape. Prisoners barricaded the entrances with cement blocks, set
fire to their mattresses, and fired arrows at the police, who responded with
explosive charges and a bulldozer to enter the building and subdue the prisoners.
Police claim they discovered the charred bodies of 28 prisoners killed by other
Sendero Luminoso inmates, as well as an array of weapons including bows and
police came to the cell block housing the Sendero Luminoso terrorists, where
prisoners were making weapons in
and is quite capable of executing members in disfavor.
Several persons, mostly from the United Left political coalition (IU), claimed that
the police had killed the victims and then burned their bodies to hide the fact. The
government's credibility on such issues has deteriorated following admissions of
human rights violations by the military in the South Central Emergency Zone.
Sendero Luminoso, however, has a reputation for demanding absolute allegiance
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terrorist activity.
Crackdown on Rightwing Terrorism
The government claims to have rounded up a gang comprised of active duty and
retired military personnel and civilians responsible for a spate of bombings in
Buenos Aires during September and October. President Alfonsin has publicly
accused the group of attacking military targets to create the impression of leftist
The group probably wanted to erode public confidence in the president by
fostering an atmosphere of lawlessness and an impression of governmental
ineptitude. The individuals arrested, however, were discredited extremists who
would be especially hard pressed to garner the armed forces and political backing
needed to launch successfully any coup they may have been planning. Other
rightist groups are almost certainly operating undetected, and a bomb exploded
near a military installation shortly after the suspected terrorists were jailed. Such
sporadic acts, however, are unlikely to have much impact on Alfonsin's standing.
Plot By Libyan-Backed Dissidents
Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qadhafi-a longtime foe of President Mobutu-has
reportedly trained, funded and supplied Zairian dissidents who plan to disrupt
November festivities marking the 20th anniversary of Mobutu's takeover. Reports
of varying reliability indicate Qadhafi intends to send teams of Zairian dissidents
to assassinate Mobutu and to commit sabotage. a 25X1
Libyan trained and supported member of the dissident National Congolese Army
was arrested in September for plotting to assassinate Mobutu. As was
demonstrated by the September arrest, however, Mobutu's security has been good
enough to stop any assassins, despite poor border control and faulty intelligence.
Vaisand Devi Shrine, now guarded by paramilitary forces.
Sikh Violence To Commemorate Gandhi's Assassination
A recent spate of killings-two local Congress (I) Party officials and two customs
officials-may indicate growing Sikh terrorist activity to commemorate the
assassination of Indira Gandhi on 31 October 1984. This is the first outbreak of
violence since the September Punjab elections restoring local autonomy. Sikh
separatists have targeted Hindu and moderate Sikh leaders in response to the July
peace accord between the Hindu-majority Indian Government and Sikh
moderates. According to press reports, Sikh separatists will target the popular
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Fatah's Security and
Intelligence Organizations:
Operational Capabilities
Israel has charged the Western Sector and Force 17,
two of Fatah's key security organizations, with
responsibility for recent increased terrorist activity in
the West Bank. Israel states-and we believe that
mounting evidence tends to support Tel Aviv's
claims-that Force 17 was responsible for the killing
on 25 September of three Israeli yachtsmen at
Larnaca, Cyprus. Both Force 17 and the Western
Sector have main offices in Amman and would be
major targets should Israel carry out its threat to
bomb PLO facilities in Jordan.
Fatah's Security Apparatus
Fatah began training selected officers for its security
apparatus in 1968 to provide operational intelligence
and military support for guerrilla attacks in Israel. By
1970-71, Fatah's intelligence service had developed
into an elaborate structure. During the early 1970s,
whenever Fatah engaged in international terrorism, it
used the covert Black September Organization (BSO),
which gained its greatest notoriety by killing Israeli
athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972 and taking
over the Saudi Embassy in Sudan in 1973, killing the
US Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission. The
BSO has been dormant since 1974, following
widespread opposition from senior and middle-level
Fatah officials, including Arafat, to the BSO's
international operations. Although former BSO leader
Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) has tried to revive the
organization, he has not
found many takers. During its most active period in
the early 1970s, the BSO was believed to have
approximately 300 operatives.
Although Fatah's exodus from Lebanon in 1982-83
and the dispersal of the PLO Fatah leadership have
disrupted some Fatah command and control
capabilities, we believe Fatah maintains a fairly
competent operational ability to collect intelligence
and mount operations against its enemies.
judgments are based on what we know of Fatah's
operational performance and what we can surmise
from recent Fatah-inspired operations against Israel
and Syria. Several groups within Fatah's security and
intelligence apparatus-the Western Sector, Force
17, and the United Security Organization-are
specifically assigned the responsibility of carrying out
military operations in Israel and the Occupied
Territories and, more recently, reprisals against
Damascus for attacks by Syrian-supported
Palestinians on pro-Arafat Palestinians and
Jordanians.
Arafat maintains control over the various leaders of
the security groups by cultivating the internal rivalry
and jockeying for power that exists among his
subordinates who head these organizations. Arafat's
style of management may contribute to a lack of
cohesion in the security organizations, but it also
promotes competition among them to claim
responsibility for certain operations. In some cases
this practice has led to exaggerated or false claims.
We believe that such rivalries probably have been a
factor in the recently increased Fatah-directed
terrorism against Israelis on the West Bank. 125X1
The Organizations
Western Sector. The Western Sector, led by Deputy
Commander Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), is the
Fatah body primarily responsible for military
operations in Israel and the Occupied Territories.
Several "committees" located in the West Bank are
responsible for recruiting operatives and maintaining
specific underground networks. We have no specific
information about the methods or effectiveness of the
committees but judge they would have little trouble
finding eager recruits among young West Bank
Palestinians impatient with political solutions
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GI TR 85-022
4 November 1985
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Israel charges that the Western Sector's increased
presence in Jordan is directly responsible for recent
terrorist attacks inside Israel and the Occupied
Territories. Abu Jihad has taken credit for two
abortive seaborne attacks the Israelis stopped last
March and April. Abu Jihad has also claimed his
group was responsible for two attacks in August on
Israeli citizens living in the West Bank in which one
tendency to claim credit for independent operations
undertaken by West Bank Palestinians.
In spite of what we believe to be stringent Jordanian
efforts to monitor the activities of the Western Sector,
it is possible that Sector operatives may have
prompted recent attacks. Israel's release last May of
1,150 Palestinian prisoners, including some 600 that
Israel allowed to stay in the West Bank, may have
contributed to recent attacks by supplying
experienced manpower.
Abu Jihad has been made fully aware of the penalties
the Sector faces if it is caught planning or attempting
cross-border operations against Israel from Jordan.
We believe Amman will be more emphatic in warning
Arafat that any efforts to conduct or plan terrorist
operations from Jordanian soil will result in the
immediate expulsion of PLO leaders.
United Security Organization (USO). Controlled by
the PLO but staffed primarily with Fatah personnel,
the USO appears to be responsible for collecting
intelligence in Europe and the Middle East and may
be responsible for running the PLO's more "sensitive"
operations against anti-Arafat Palestinians. The
status and duties of the USO have evolved largely
from the influence of its head, senior PLO Fatah
official Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad). Abu Iyad's BSO
terrorist heritage, a legend that he has neither
encouraged nor dispelled, may color some of the
information about him and the USO.
Abu Iyad's headquarters are in Tunis, but most
operational activities appear to be run from the USO
office in East Berlin, which was opened in May 1983.
that office is
responsible for rebuilding an infrastructure to prepare
for terrorist activities in Western Europe and to
protect Fatah/PLO interests and personnel from
hostile terrorist activity mounted by Israel or by
radical Palestinian groups supported by Syria. Abu
Iyad may have smaller offices in Algeria and Eastern
Europe (possibly Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, or
Czechoslovakia).
USO in Amman where security officials meet to
coordinate their work. We have no further
information on the plans and activities of the Amman
USO office and believe that its purpose is more for
prestige than operational use. In early 1982, the USO
had a military headquarters in the Beirut area, which
we assume closed when Arafat departed Lebanon.
Arafat transferred some of the
duties from Fatah's Central Security Organization to
the USO following the assassination of PLO
Executive Committee member Fahd Qawasmah the
month before by Syrian-sponsored radical
Palestinians. The added duties included some
operations outside Israel and the Occupied Territories
as well as additional security functions in Tunis,
Amman, and the Gulf states. Arafat probably
intended this shift to unify Fatah's efforts at
launching a retaliatory campaign against Damascus,
as Abu Iyad is the senior security official for the PLO
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As leader of the hardline faction within Fatah, Abu
Iyad has often disagreed with Arafat's political
strategy, including his ban on international terrorism.
Although Abu Iyad supports Arafat's diplomatic
efforts, we believe he would be behind any militant
Recently, Force 17 has been linked with attempts
against Syrian interests in Western Europe, including
an unsuccessful operation in West Berlin last January
and another in May in which two Palestinians were
arrested in Madrid for planning an attack on the
Syrian Ambassador to Spain. Both men arrested in
Madrid claimed to be members of Force 17,
although no conclusive
information exists to verify this claim.
Force 17 was responsible for the
Israeli yachtsmen were killed.
attack on 25 September in Cyprus in which three
Abu Tayyib may be the most
Force 17. Force 17, headed by Mahmud Ahmad al-
Natur (Abu Tayyib), evolved during the mid-1970s
into a security organization to protect senior-level
PLO and Fatah officials. We judge that over the last
few years it has grown into an elite, tightly knit corps
that may sometimes act as a strike force against
opponents of Arafat and other senior PLO officials. In
1982, Force 17
We do not believe this group suffered
much from Arafat's departure from Lebanon, and the
organization may even have grown in the last three
years to accommodate its broader operational
activities.
Abu Tayyib's new headquarters are in Amman, but
only about 30 members reside in Jordan.
for carrying out the Larnaca attack.
prone of Arafat's aides to boasting, but the
competition for power and credibility within Fatah
probably was a major factor in Abu Tayyib's motives
Outlook
Arafat's security chiefs will press for reprisals against
Israel's airstrike on PLO headquarters. Stronger
warnings by King Hussein against conducting
terrorist operations from Jordan may cause Arafat to
urge restraint until Fatah operatives can carry out an
operation against Israeli targets that cannot be traced
to Fatah operatives in Jordan.
Looking ahead, Arafat cannot, and will not, renounce
terrorism and still retain leadership over the PLO and
the loyalty of Fatah members, his first priority. In our
judgment, Fatah operatives would be quite capable of
carrying out acts of terrorism against what Fatah
considered hostile international interests, including
those of the United States.
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South Korea: Security Preparations
for the 1988 Olympics
South Korea is now addressing the special security
requirements associated with its role as host of the
1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Summer Olympics.
Although it is too early to expect specific threat
information, Seoul has already begun to broaden its
security focus from primarily intercepting North
Korean espionage agents to dealing with attacks by
any foreign terrorists intent on disrupting the games.
Immediately after Seoul won the competition for the
Olympic site, President Chun Doo Hwan established
a legal and administrative framework to coordinate
security preparations. Early attention has focused on
preparing the large and otherwise well-trained police
force and Army to deal with terrorist tactics and
hostage situations-areas in which Seoul has had
limited experience. The current divisions and
competition among the security services, however,
suggest that bureaucratic wrangling could hamper
decisionmaking if a crisis were to arise at the
Olympics. So could potential political infighting as
the games approach in 1988-a time frame that
coincides with Chun's decision to step down and
transfer power to an as yet undetermined successor.
Counterterrorism Policymaking
South Korea has had 30 years of experience in dealing
with the threat posed by North Korean agents and
infiltrators, but its officials believe that hosting the
1988 Summer Olympic Games-which probably will
attract close to 30,000 participants and over 350,000
visitors-requires a specially focused security effort.
To start the process, President Chun Doo Hwan
issued Presidential Order No. 47 in early 1982,
creating the National Antiterrorism Planning
Committee. Chaired by the Prime Minister, the
committee meets on an ad hoc basis and includes the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, National
Defense, and Transportation, as well as the Director
of the National Security Planning Agency (NSP) and
the chief of South Korea's Customs Administration.
The National Executive Committee for
Antiterrorism, which in effect serves as a working
group, is subordinate to this national committee.F
These committees are responsible for police planning
and working-level coordination, but the NSP, as the
principal civilian intelligence and security
organization, retains overall responsibility for
antiterrorist activities and for ensuring that other
government agencies fulfill their specific
counterterrorism responsipiliies. To do so, the NSP
Counterterrorist Forces
The primary operational or "on-the-street"
responsibility for dealing with security threats rests
with the Home Ministry and its associated Korean
National Police. The Ministry maintains a team of
hostage negotiators and provides command and
control for the KNP's 100-man commando unit. The
police commandos form an assault unit to be used
only inside South Korea upon the order of the
President. The unit is authorized to draw on regular
police and combat police forces for additional support.
Secret
GI TR 85-022
4 November 1985
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The second operational arm of the government is the
Special Warfare Command (SWC) under the
Ministry of National Defense. It is responsible for
responding to terrorist incidents overseas-these
troops so far have not been actually deployed
abroad-and for retaliating against North Korean
attacks. The Defense Ministry has formed a
Counterterrorist Commando Group within the SWC's
seven 1,800-man commando brigades. The
Counterterrorist Group is composed of 140 men and
can be augmented as needed by men from the SWC
1st and 5th Brigades.
The military and police counterterrorist commandos
are proficient in traditional martial arts and have
received airborne, ranger, sniper, demolitions, and
specialized assault training. Most KNP commandos
have been recruited from military explosive ordnance
disposal and special forces units and trained at the
Special Warfare Training Center near Yongin, about
25 miles south of Seoul. The center also has facilities
for teaching various types of airborne operations.
In 1983 South Korea began adding counterterrorist
facilities to the center, including mockups of
buildings, aircraft, and vehicles.
modern in the world. There have been reports that the
facility will serve as the security operations center for
the Olympics, despite its distance from Seoul.
Seoul continues to seek foreign help to improve its
counterterrorist skills.
learly this year that West
Germany's elite commando unit was to train six
South Korean counterterrorist commandos for a two-
month period this summer. We do not know whether
this training actually occurred.
Security Organizations
In addition to these specialized units, Seoul has other
longstanding organizations that will also play roles in
Olympic security. These include:
? The Presidential Security Force (PSF), which
protects President Chun, his family, and his
residence, the Blue House. It could be used to
provide VIP protection and might be augmented by
police commando units.
? The Defense Security Command (DSC), which is
under the nominal control of the Defense Ministry,
reports directly to President Chun. It watches senior
military leaders, monitors student dissidents, and
keeps track of other persons who might threaten the
South Korean Government.
Protection against seaborne infiltration and entries
through airports are the responsibilities of other units.
Presidential Order No. 47 charges the Port and
Harbor Security Measures Working-Level
Consultative Council with providing protection
against surreptitious infiltration into the country.
Chaired by the chief of the NSP Airport Office, the
council is composed of midlevel officers from the
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Train cars, bus, and part of obstacle course used
in counterterrorist commando training, Special
Warfare Training Center, Maesan-ni, South
security crises involving foreigners that could arise
during the games. Seoul, therefore, is focusing both
on increased training for the safe rescue of hostages
and on the formation of a national-level negotiation
advisory team. The team-composed of scholars and
officials specializing in psychology, sociology, law,
criminology, and security-is supposed to meet at
least twice a year to advise the government on
nonviolent means of resolving terrorist incidents.
Finally, President Chun has ordered the formation of
a special security unit for the protection of athletes
staying at the Chamsil Olympic Village. Because
Chun regards the regular police force as already
overburdened, this unit reportedly will be separate
from the KNP. The size of this force has yet to be
Ministries of Home Affairs, Justice, Transportation,
National Defense, and Finance (Customs
Administration). Immigration officials of the Justice
Ministry are responsible for detecting terrorists who
may attempt to enter as legal travelers via ports and
airports, while the military and police are charged
with preventing clandestine infiltration, principally by
sea. The Customs Administration is tasked with
intercepting equipment that could be used by
terrorists. Protection of government buildings falls to
the Home Ministry, which can draw on police
manpower and expertise.
The KNP is responsible for civil security.
Recent press reports indicate that the
120,000-strong regular police force will grow by
16,000 next year-well above the usual annual
growth of about 1,000 men per year. The KNP is also
scheduled to become independent of the Home
Ministry and to be charged with conducting
investigations independently rather than under the
guidance of the Office of the Prosecutor.
The South Koreans' experience has been limited
largely to dealing with North Korean infiltrators; it
has not included hostage situations or the type of
determined.
Threat From the North
South Korea's priority, even in preparations for
Olympic security, remains the elimination of the
threat from North Korean infiltrators. The primary
threat comes from agents who might enter the
country and who are charged to carry out a specific
terrorist act. Fortunately, the South Korean security
services have long experience in dealing with North
Korean-sponsored agents and infiltrators. Sea
infiltration is now the major means by which North
Korea inserts operatives into the South,
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also vulnerable to infiltration. The 240-kilometer 7.!)X1
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are in place at a number of locations. We suspect that
most infiltrators by land are caught soon after
crossing the DMZ or shortly thereafter-although a
few do manage to penetrate more deeply. F___1
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Seoul not only capitalizes on the average
South Korean's strong anti-Communism but also
advertises the methods used by spies and saboteurs,
gives rewards for information leading to the arrest of
agents, and harshly punishes anyone who harbors
infiltrators. Moreover, since many assumed agents are
native-born South Koreans or have been in place for
some years, we doubt that North Korea could count
on them to carry out anything more than token
disruptive activities.
Coordination or Confusion? To date, the largest
security effort undertaken by the South Koreans
under the system created by Presidential Order No.
47 was for Pope John Paul II's visit in April 1984.
The NSP conducted a major effort that involved all
the security organizations, as well as regular military
units. The SWC deployed units at the airport and
provided security during the visit to the National
Cemetery. Regular military forces, meanwhile,
substituted for regular police forces, who were
brought in from outlying areas to enhance security in
Seoul. Although there were no reported problems in
this effort, difficulties were evident in the
coordination of both President Chun's trip to Japan in
September 1984 and the return of Kim Dae Jung to
Korea in February 1985. Events at Kim Dae Jung's
homecoming, in particular, point to some of the major
challenges Seoul must tackle.
Three issues, in our view, are especially important.
First, the South Koreans are conditioned to react to
security incidents with a rapid military or
paramilitary response. This predisposition makes the
escalation to tougher steps attractive and easy when
an incident unfolds unexpectedly, such as when Kim
Dae Jung did not follow the prearranged scenario for
his deplaning at Kimp'o Airport. That incident also
seemed to reveal the typical South Korean perspective
that regards a tough government posture as an
implicit affirmation of control over political and
security developments. In the Kim case, as well as the
more recent USIS sit-in, Seoul clearly regarded US
calls for restraint as threats to its image as a
government in control.
Second, concerns about international reaction, which
further complicated the treatment of Kim, will come
into play in any incident associated with the Asian
Games or the Olympics that involves non-Korean
victims or perpetrators. South Korean security
services do not normally accord high priority to
Foreign Ministry interests, either in bureaucratic
forums or during security incidents. To operate
effectively in the environment surrounding the
international games, the security services will have to
exercise patience, diplomacy, and restraint,
controlling their instincts to deal with problems in the
most expeditious way possible.
Finally, the successful handling of any security
incident will require improvements in coordination
and cooperation among the many bureaucracies
involved, a challenge that goes beyond the mere
establishment of a complex management
superstructure. Responsibility for handling Kim Dae
Jung at the airport was split between the two vice
directors of the NSP
. President Chun has
since explicitly charged NSP Director Chang Se
Dong with responsibility for security concerns
associated with the Asian Games and the Olympics.
Director Chang already appears to be consolidating
responsibility for Asian Games security within the
NSP's First Bureau.
The Political Imponderables
South Korea's domestic political situation probably
will affect security provisions for the Olympics.
President Chun has pledged to step down when his
term expires in 1988, and pressures are building for
him to begin taking positive steps toward political
modernization.
If Chun attempts to prolong his term of office or
otherwise disappoints public expectations, the security
services could well become preoccupied with the
resultant fallout and the probable widespread
domestic dissent. At the very least, in a confused
domestic situation, coordination among the services
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would deteriorate as each attempted to influence
events. Interservice rivalries could intensify if the
military felt forced to take a hand in the succession by
backing one of the candidates. Even if the transfer of
power is smooth, we see some complications for
Olympic security. At the very least, South Korea's
new leader would probably name new men to key
positions in the security services.
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1 December 1640
1 December 1918
1 December 1918
1 December 1942
2 December 1971
2 December 1975
2 December 1980
3 December 1934
4 December 1892
5 December 1982
7 December 1920
7 December 1960
8 December 1974
8 December 1982
9 December 1961
9 December 1962
10 December 1956
10 December 1966
The Terrorism Diary for December
Below is a compendium of December dates of known or conceivable significance to
terrorists around the world. Our inclusion of a date or event should not by itself
be construed to suggest that we expect or anticipate a commemorative terrorist
Portugal. Independence Day.
Iceland. Independence Day.
Yugoslavia. First independent state constituted.
Thailand. Founding of Thai Communist Party.
United Arab Emirates. Abu Dhabi National Day (federation of independent
emirates took effect).
Laos. National Day (proclamation of the republic).
El Salvador. Murder of four American nuns by government troops.
Peru. Birthday of Sendero Luminoso leader Abimail Guzman.
Spain. Generalissimo Francisco Franco's birthday.
Spain. Death of GRAPO leader Martin Luna.
Burma. National Day (commemorates student uprising against British rule).
Ivory Coast. Independence Day.
Greece. Declaration of parliamentary republic.
Suriname. Execution of 15 opposition leaders.
Tanzania. Independence Day.
Tanzania. Republic Day.
Angola. Founding of Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).
Middle East. Founding of Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).
Secret
GI TR 85-022
4 November 1985
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11 December 1958
12 December 1963
12 December 1964
12 December 1979
13 December 1974
16 December 1961
16 December 1961
16 December 1971
16 December 1971
16 December 1972
17 December 1907
18 December 1958
21 December 1923
21 December 1948
21 December 1967
23 December 1956
24 December 1951
25 December 1876
25 December 1979
25 December 1985
Burkina. Republic Day.
Kenya. Independence Day.
Kenya. Republic Day.
Europe. NATO decision to modernize nuclear forces by installing Pershing II and
ground-launched cruise missiles.
Kuwait. Bombing of US Embassy, other facilities by members of Iraqi Dawa
Party.
Bahrain. Accession of Shaykh Isa Bin Salman al-Kalifah.
South Africa. Founding of military arm of African National Congress (ANC),
Umkonto we Sizwe.
Bahrain. Independence Day.
Bangladesh. Victory Day (de facto independence).
Bangladesh. Republican constitution becomes effective.
Bhutan. National Day.
Niger. Republic Day.
Nepal. Independence Day.
Ireland. Proclamation of republic.
Palestinians. Founding of Palestine Liberation Organization.
Egypt. Victory Day (Port Said and Suez).
Libya. Independence Day.
Pakistan. Quaid-i-Azam's birthday.
Afghanistan. Beginning of occupation by Soviet troops.
Christian world. Christmas.
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26 December 1893
27 December 1949
28 December 1985
30 December 1896
31 December 1968
31 December 1983
China. Mao Zedong's birthday.
Indonesia. Transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands.
Latin America. Equivalent of US "April Fools' Day"-traditionally sees many
hoaxes and bomb threats.
Philippines. Execution of national hero Jose Rizal.
Philippines. Founding of Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist.
Nigeria. Coup overthrowing Shagari regime.
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Chronology of Terrorism-1985
Below are described noteworthy foreign and international events involving
terrorists, or the use of terrorist tactics, which have occurred or come to light
since our last issue. In some cases, the perpetrators and their motivations may not
be known. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in
this publication are not included.
11 September Sri Lanka: Bomb destroys offices of assistant government agent in northern town.
Later the same day, unidentified persons set fire to other buildings in the same
complex. No group has claimed credit, but Tamil separatist guerrillas are the most
likely culprits.
14 September Saudi Arabia: Truck attempts to crash into industrial pipeline in Jubail. The
truck stopped short of its target and authorities arrested four Lebanese Shia and
the Filipino driver.
24 September Japan: Homemade rockets fired at Narita Airport. Four of the five truck-mounted
projectiles were launched successfully, but caused no injuries or damage. An
anonymous caller later claimed credit in the name of the Revolutionary Workers
Party Hazama Faction, but truck mounted flame and rocket launchers have been
the trademarks of another group, Chukaku-ha (Nucleus Faction).
25 September Italy: Bomb explodes in British Airways office in Rome, injuring 15 persons. An
Arab arrested fleeing the scene later claimed to be a member of the Revolutionary
Organization of Socialist Muslims. He has been identified as the man who threw a
grenade at the Jordanian airline office in Athens last March.
Late September West Bank: Israeli authorities arrest eight members of Fatah terrorist cell in
Bethlehem area. The group reportedly was responsible for two previous West Bank
Secret
GI TR 85-022
4 November 1985
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26 September West Bank: Seven passengers wounded in attack on Israeli bus entering Halhul.
Shortly afterward, several hundred settlers from nearby Kiryat Arba entered
Halhul and reportedly set fire to two Arab houses and smashed car windows. Both
Fatah Force 17 and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed
responsibility for the ambush.
West Bank: Bomb explodes at Hadassah Hospital bus stop, wounding two people.
No group has claimed responsibility.
New Caledonia: Three bombs demolish top floor of government building after
political rally. No casualties were reported. The Radical Front of National
Liberation of Kanaky, a splinter faction of the Kanak Socialist National
Liberation Front, claimed responsibility for the attack.
27 September Gaza Strip: Israeli security forces raid two Palestinian terrorist cells. Both
groups-one based near Khan Yunis, the other in the Jabaliyeh refugee camp-
reportedly have mounted attacks on Israeli targets.
West Bank: Remote control bomb explodes on road from Jerusalem to Maaleh
Adumin settlement. No casualties or claims of responsibility have been reported.
Pakistan: Unidentified gunmen in Karachi shoot prominent tribal chieftain of
Iranian Buluchistan. The victim, who had been a member of the Iranian
Parliament under the Shah, had maintained active contact with Iranian exile
groups and provided some funds to anti-Khomeini elements in Iranian
Buluchistan. No group has claimed credit for the murder.
28 September West Bank: Thirteen-year-old Arab boy killed by grenade thrown at Israeli
soldiers near Hebron. A number of local residents were also wounded; no group
has claimed credit.
India: Punjab Police in Gurdaspur find five unexploded bombs. The bombs-four
small explosive devices resembling pens and one a transistor radio-were planted
in lunch boxes, probably by Sikh terrorists seeking to intimidate voters in the 25
September state elections.
29 September Israel: Seven persons reportedly injured in Haifa market explosion. A second
explosion minutes later caused no injuries. The General Command of the
Palestinian Revolution Forces claimed responsibility for both attacks.
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30 September Netherlands: Small bomb damages El Al office in Amsterdam. The Fatah
Revolutionary Council-one of several cover names for the Abu Nidal Group-
claimed responsibility.
the occupants were wounded in the grenade and incendiary attack.
Gaza Strip: Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command claims attack on
Israeli vehicle near Al-Shati camp. The Voice of Palestine radio reported two of
months; no group has claimed responsibility.
West Bank: Israeli citizen found shot through head near Kibbutz Sarid. His
murder may be part of a string of killings by young Palestinians over the last few
headquarters in Beit Al. The explosion caused some damage but no casualties.
responsibility in a PLO radiobroadcast.
West Bank: Three Israelis killed in machinegun and grenade attack south of
Nazareth. The General Command of the Palestinian Revolution Forces claimed
responsibility.
have so far claimed it was due to a gas leak.
West Bank: At least 10 persons injured in Jerusalem building explosion. Several
groups, including Abu Nidal, claimed responsibility for the blast, but authorities
in Ramallah. No one was injured and no group claimed responsibility.
Barcelona. Fatah's Force 17 reportedly claimed responsibility.
state visit to the United Kingdom.
United Kingdom: Police arrest 15 Sikhs and Kashmiris in Leicester. Four were
later charged with conspiracy to assassinate Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi during a
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name of the Ulrike Meinhof and Gudrun Ensslin Fighting Unit.
West Germany: Bombs damage Daimler-Benz auto showroom, high-tension
electrical tower in Schwaebisch-Gmuend. Extensive damage was reported, but no
injuries. The Revolutionary Cells claimed responsibility for both bombings in the
reported.
Greece: Three bombs at Athens branches of National Bank claimed by Kristos
Kasimis Revolutionary Group. One bomb exploded, a second was detonated by
police in a bomb disposal vehicle, and the third was defused. No casualties were
arrested a day later and claimed to be a lieutenant colonel in the PLO.
Italy: Two Arabs carrying identical suitcases containing plastic explosives
arrested at Rome airport. One of the Arabs told police he planned to attack an
unknown American target. A third Arab-suspected of being an accomplice-was
"Wild Geese of the Cities."
Greece: Arsonists damage two American-owned automobiles near Hellenikon Air
Base in Athens. The arson attack was claimed by the previously unknown group
Ecuador: AIfaro Vive, Carajo (A VC) members occupy Mexican Embassy in Quito.
Five young terrorists used the Embassy's telex to send a communique to two Quito
newspapers and a Spanish wire service in which they condemned Ecuador's break
in diplomatic relations with Nicaragua. The AVC also occupied two local radio
stations in Quito on the same day. There were no injuries in any of the incidents.
September election in the state.
India: Sikh gunmen kill prominent leader of Punjab branch of Prime Minister
Gandhi's Congress (I) Party. This was the first such assassination since the 25
responsibility.
Luxembourg: Explosive charge detonates outside Palace of Justice in city center.
The explosion caused extensive damage, but no injuries. No one claimed
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19-20 October Spain: Police arrest nine suspected members of ETA/M in northern Spain and
Morocco. An unspecified quantity of arms and explosives were also reported
seized.
20 October 25X6
Israel: Small bomb explodes behind suburban Tel Aviv billboard, slightly
injuring one person. No group claimed responsibility.
Israel: Bomb explodes at entrance to outdoor market in Beersheba. No casualties
or damage was reported and no group claimed credit.
Argentina: Bomb thrown at home of army deputy chief of staff in Buenos Aires.
Some damage resulted, but there were no casualties.
Gaza Strip: Bomb explodes outside Gaza Prison shortly before visit by Israeli
Public Security Minister. There were no casualties or damage, and no group
claimed responsibility.
Chile: Bombing of police station in Santiago causes minor damage. No group
claimed responsibility.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP87T00685R000200260002-8
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP87T00685R000200260002-8
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP87T00685R000200260002-8