NARCOTICS REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00685R000100090002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Seeret-
Intelligence
Narcotics Review
February 1986
DI NR 86-001
February 1986
Copy 419
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Narcotics Review
February 1986
I Colombia: San Andres Island Ripe for Expanded Drug Activity
San Andres Island has the potential to play a more vital role in the Caribbean drug
trade. The island's location and the increasing amount of maritime container cargo
flowing through the port make San Andres an attractive alternative to traditional
staging areas.
5 Nepal: From Shangri-La to Trafficker's Delight
corruption and ineptitude prevent effective action.
Heroin abuse and trafficking in Nepal are growing at alarming rates. Although
the government now recognizes the severity of its drug problem, high-level
9 Haiti: Drug Trafficking Infrastructure
improvements in enforcement by the Haitian Government.
Haiti is proving an attractive alternative for drug traffickers seeking to avoid
enforcement pressure along traditional trafficking routes in the Caribbean. Most
of the drugs are carried by ship, although commercial and private aircraft are also
used. A lack of resources and trained personnel is likely to preclude significant
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The military operation mounted by the Zia government in December against
unruly border tribes is not likely to have any long-term effect on the narcotics
trade. The operation allowed President Zia to provide a public display of his
leadership before the national elections and demonstrate a commitment to resist
efforts by Kabul to strengthen its influence among Pakistan's border tribes. 25X1
Secret
DI NR 86-001
February 1986
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Iran: Playing to an International Audience
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Iran achieved a public relations coup by playing host to the UN Subcommission on
Illicit Drug Traffic and Related Matters in the Near and Middle East last
September. Iran emerged from the meeting in the guise of a champion of regional
cooperation, but its proposals are more likely intended to allow the government to
23 Worldwide Narcotics Highlights
A summary of key developments from 1 December 1985 to 1 February 1986.
This review is published bimonthly by the Directorate of Intelligence and
examines international, regional, and functional issues related to the worldwide
drug problem. Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well
as other US Government agencies will be considered for Publication
Secret ii
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Colombia: San Andres Island
Ripe for Expanded
Drug Activity
Isla de San Andres (San Andres Island), located 200
kilometers (km) east of Nicaragua and about 600 km
northwest of Colombia, is an ideal locale to facilitate
the movement of Colombian drugs to the United
States:
? The island is far removed from the focus of
Colombian antidrug enforcement on the mainland,
ensuring a relatively risk-free environment for
trafficking operations.
? Proximity to the heavily used trafficking routes in
the western Caribbean makes the island a
convenient transshipment point and refueling and
repair stop for ships and aircraft carrying illicit
drugs.
? Numerous hidden inlets can provide cover for the
transfer of narcotics from a mothership to a smaller
boat.
? The island's airport and maritime port facilities
offer traffickers the availability of commercial craft
for smuggling purposes.
Reporting in
1981 from the US Embassy in Bogota cited the
emergence of the island as a distribution center for
Colombian narcotics. In 1985, Colombian traffickers
stepped up their use of San Andres as a transshipment
area, probably as a
response to intensified enforcement efforts in
northeastern Colombia. Thus far, we have no credible
evidence to suggest the role of San Andres has
expanded beyond that of an intermediate drug
drugs enter and leave San
Andres in a variety of ways en route to the United
States, Mexico, and Europe.
By Mothership. According to the US Embassy,
Colombian motherships-typically a mixed lot of
fishing vessels and small coastal freighters-sail to
San Andres's waters where their cargo is transferred
to smaller craft, called lighters, for transport to the
island. According to Coast Guard sources, as recently
as December 1985 a vessel was observed offloading
marijuana in the vicinity of San Andres Island, near
Roncador Bank.
the Caribbean straits to the next stop.
the San
Andres Archipelago is a preferred location for
smuggling activities involving pairs of motherships. In
this operation, the objective is to avoid interdiction
while transporting multiton loads of illicit narcotics
through the narrow, constantly patrolled passages
between Mexico, Cuba, and Hispaniola. The first
mothership, which may have been identified as a
smuggling vessel in a Colombian port, takes on its
contraband and sails to San Andres waters. Instead of
being met by smaller boats, it delivers its shipment to
a second mothership. The second mothership, never
close enough to Colombia to attract the attention of
enforcement officials, carries the drugs safely through
By Aircraft. Drug trafficking aboard commercial
aircraft is facilitated by Colombian airline service to
San Andres International Airport-a small but
modern facility capable of handling about 25 flights a
day. Colombian-based Avianca operates flight 68
weekly between Santa Marta and Miami, which stops
at San Andres. US Customs seizure statistics show
frequent use of Avianca flights for drug smuggling. In
May 1985, US Customs made two seizures of cocaine
hidden aboard flight 68. Private aircraft on smuggling
missions have used the island as a stopover point,
Secret
DI NR 86-001
February 1986
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Narcotics Trafficking Routes From Colombia
United
States
San Andriis
International
Airport
'San
Andris
Isla de
San Andres
(Colombia)
Mexico
Miami
Honduras
1 caragua -47 Jamaica
Pantament.
7
Costa Rjca tstA d
A dres
Pram;
rr
P
ena Manta
Marty
Road
0 3 Kilometers
The
Bahamas
ILLEGIB
Barranquilla
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Traffickers have
arranged for aircraft to fly to the island to be refueled
and modified in preparation for smuggling operations.
By Air and Sea. Cocaine smugglers have employed a
combination of air and sea transportation.
drugs wrapped
in waterproof packages are dropped from aircraft
overflying the island and are then loaded onto
merchant ships and pleasure craft for the journey
the Archipelago-700 personnel, spotter and tactical
aircraft, and several patrol boats-is primarily
engaged in the protection of Colombian national
interests. The San Andres police force focuses its
attention on the protection of the tourist industry, and
lacks a formal antidrug unit.
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north. In addition,
Colombian freighters carrying cocaine and staging
out of Colombia's Pacific coast travel to Costa Rica,
where they meet with small fishing boats and transfer
their cargo. The fishing boats reportedly transport the
cocaine to Puntarenas, Costa Rica. At this point it is
likely that the narcotics are moved by air to US
destinations with San Andres a logical transshipment
and refueling location.
By Maritime Cargo Container.
San Andres may already be a
heavily used staging area for containerized narcotics
trafficking. US Customs officials citing Journal of
Commerce statistics report that, between September
1983 and December 1984, 3,912 containers were
imported to the United States from Colombian ports;
3,591 of them were empty containers being returned
to US ports. Customs officials suspect that illegal
narcotics were smuggled in some portion of these
containers because such containers are not routinely
inspected. Significantly, San Andres was the port of
origin for 1,048 of the empty containers. Moreover,
two of the three shipping lines calling at San Andres
are suspected of being involved in narcotics
trafficking, and there have been several reports of
altered containers at the island's port. A fourth US
shipping line, owned and operated by an alleged
narcotics dealer, is preparing to begin servicing San
Andres from the Miami River area.
Colombia's Enforcement Posture
Drug control is a low priority in the San Andres
Archipelago, and the Colombian Government does
not conduct a coordinated and comprehensive
antinarcotics effort there. Reporting from the US
Embassy in Bogota indicates that the Colombians are
particularly sensitive to violations of sovereignty in
the Caribbean. The rather sizable military presence in
Potential for Increased Activity
We believe that traffickers are likely to increase their
use of traditional smuggling methods around San
Andres as interdiction in busier Caribbean drug
routes improves. The most common technique of
smuggling to the area-aboard motherships-will be
facilitated by recent efforts by traffickers to obtain
more ships of non-Colombian registry to haul drugs.
Such countermeasures complicate interdiction by
increasing the number and type of vessels to be
monitored.
The most rapid expansion, however, will probably be
in the smuggling of narcotics using maritime cargo
containers. Maritime transportation of containerized
cargo offers several advantages to smugglers:
? The large number of containers entering US ports
and the extensive repositioning and transshipping of
containerized cargo complicates the screening of
such cargo for illegal items.
? The physical dimensions of a container-standard
sizes of 8 by 8 by 20 feet and 8 by 8 by 40 feet-
provide a large storage area for concealing illegal
goods, requiring fewer smuggling attempts and
allowing larger shipments. Containers are easily
modified to provide hidden compartments for
contraband.
? A relatively unsophisticated port handling facility
can service ships with containerized freight.=
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US Government statistics indicate that the
Colombian drug industry is increasing its use of
maritime containers. From 1982-84, according to US
Customs, seizures involving container alterations were
up-totaling over 5,700 kilograms of cocaine in
Panama City, Panama, Puerto Limon, Costa Rica,
and Barranquilla, Colombia. The San Andres
container-handling facility-a secured area consisting
of two 12-bay rectangular warehouses, six support
buildings, and a gantry crane-is sufficient to handle
the volume of container cargo flowing through the
island's port. Moreover, we judge that, even if large
quantities of narcotics are not currently being
transported in maritime containers from San Andres,
the large number of empty containers shipped from
the island may be impossible to resist.
Despite
recent success in the marijuana eradication campaign
in northeastern Colombia, the government still faces a
costly undertaking to achieve a more permanent
reduction in marijuana cultivation. In addition,
according to US Embassy officials, a more effective
drug interdiction effort within Colombia is needed,
which will also require a greater amount of resources.
Discussions are under way between the US and
Colombian authorities concerning the installation of a
radar system on San Andres, but it is not likely to
improve the narcotics control effort. According to the
US Embassy, Bogota has requested a sophisticated
radar system from the United States, along with
technical support and training. Although a radar
system would provide a capability for tracking ships
and aircraft suspected of carrying illegal drugs, the
primary purpose of the system would be to track
vessels suspected of carrying arms.
The Colombian Government is aware of the growing
use of legitimate export shipments to traffic narcotics.
The US Embassy reported in March 1985 that there
was a consensus among Colombian businessmen and
Customs authorities that a crackdown on general
cargo and container smuggling was needed to prevent
a disruption in the export trade. Discussions between
US and Colombian Customs officials have resulted in
more conscientious screening of export shipments, but
US Customs officials believe a more far-reaching and
sustained effort is needed.
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Trafficker's Delight
Nepal: From Shangri-La to
Evolution of the Drug Trade
Marijuana has been an accepted part of Nepal's
heritage for centuries. A traditional source of income
for villagers in the mountain regions, marijuana and
hashish were frequently used as a medicine and in
religious rites and smoked by Nepalese at all levels of
society. The Western hippies that streamed into
Nepal in the 1960s and 1970s to take advantage of lax
drug laws and low prices caused dramatic changes in
the local drug scene. A thriving marijuana trade
developed, opium and heroin-most of it coming from
Burma, Thailand, Pakistan, and India-became
available to service the foreign market. The Nepalese
inevitably became involved in the trade, and
Kathmandu now is confronting a rampant drug abuse
and trafficking problem far beyond the meager means
of the government to control.
Drug Abuse on the Rise
No reliable data are available on drug abuse in Nepal,
but the US Embassy believes addicts may number
from 12,000 to 18,000 of Nepal's 17 million
inhabitants, up from less than 500 addicts in the late
1970s. The Embassy estimates that some 12,000
addicts reside in Kathmandu alone, a city of only
400,000. According to social workers involved in
treating drug abusers, as many as 10,000 of
Kathmandu's addicts are hooked on heroin. Once
confined to the lower socioeconomic classes, drug
addiction has become a middle- and upper-class
authorities estimate 8 percent of
university students use hard drugs. The number of
female addicts is also rising
Trafficking Trends
Although it was the catalyst, marijuana was soon
supplanted by more profitable heroin. Nepalese
entered the heroin trade as carriers for international
networks but have recently developed their own
sophisticated organizations. Nepalese have for years
been involved in smuggling many kinds of
contraband, such as gold and foreign currency, and
we believe the same system is now used to smuggle
heroin. Most of the heroin enters Nepal from
Pakistan, Burma, and India and is moved to markets
in the United States and Europe. Although we have
little information on the identities of these rings, they
are apparently transshipping sizable amounts of
heroin through Nepal. Nepalese have been arrested in
increasing numbers in the United States and other
consumer countries.
The Nepalese heroin rings recruit couriers who are
members of the licit trade or travel industries-
employees of trekking companies, carpet shops, travel
agencies, and hotels. The most prominent offenders
are Sherpas, often employed as guides by trekking
companies. Sherpas
are turning to narcotics to supplement reduced
incomes from the highly competitive trekking
are also turning to drug trafficking to supplement
their incomes
Nepal's emergence as a drug transshipment center
stems partly from the rise in the number of direct
international flights to Kathmandu. These flights
provide reliable links to the sources of supply and the
Secret
D/ NR 86-001
February 1986
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PN?Mrs
1"P a f "".. frihhwen
- ~ lnf ~mehOn a/
Road Track
100 Kilometers
100 Miles
Reluctance To Confront the Drug Problem
Until 1985, the Nepalese Government officially
denied the country had a drug problem. Nepal refused
to sign international narcotics control accords,
maintaining that the large number of foreigners using
drugs in Kathmandu was the only problem and that
Nepalese society was not affected. The only
antinarcotics legislation enacted during this period-
The Narcotics Drug Control Act of 1974-authorized
prison terms of three to 14 years and fines of up to
$5,500 but was rarely enforced. Under this law
Nepalese and foreigners caught trafficking were given
minimal fines, some as low as $1.30.
The government was particularly reluctant to take
any action against the marijuana trade, fearing
serious disturbances would occur in mountain villages
dependent on growing marijuana as a cash crop,
The government
believed that suppressing marijuana in these villages
would cause greater numbers of people to migrate to
the Tarai region, a lowland area near the border of
India where the soil is more fertile and arable.
Secessionist tendencies and discontent with the
monarchy are particularly strong in the Tarai, and
officials fear that an influx of disaffected farmers
would exacerbate this problem.
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proved to be more confusing than helpful.
International Drug Conference in September 1985, it
topics presented by Nepalese
Government Ineptitude
In early 1985 the government began to face up to the
burgeoning narcotics problem. By order of the King,
the Home Affairs Ministry publicly announced that
Nepal had a drug addiction crisis. A frightening rise
in the number of addicts, increased pressure from the
On the basis of its performance since the King's
declaration, the Nepalese Government may have one
of the most inefficient and uncoordinated drug
programs on record. No government ministry wants to
deal with the abuse problem, and there is currently
only one official drug treatment facility in the
country. Responsibility for the growing problem was
first given to the Drug Control Section of the Home
Affairs Ministry, which in turn passed it on to the
Health Ministry (claiming it was a health-related
problem) and the government-sponsored National
Nepal Youth Organization (since most of the addicts
were young people). No facilitating or strengthening
legislation has been passed, and, although the Nepal
Youth Organization sponsored the 7th Annual
health education.
representatives at the conference were the
glorification of Hinduism, a survey of smoking habits
in small villages, and poetry by the Kubla Khan. The
only appropriate topic was an article concerning
two of the new unit's investigative officers were sent
to the United States in October 1985 to study
advanced narcotics control techniques, but they were
chosen on the basis of their friendship with the
focus on narcotics.
The government has also been unable to mount a
strong effort against trafficking, lacking both the
resources and the expertise. A small narcotics
investigation squad was formed in July 1985 and is
currently the only investigative force in the country to
that Customs officials, who could intercept drugs
passing through Kathmandu, still focus on gold
seizures for which they receive monetary bonuses. We
request for basic narcotics identification kits.
believe the only significant move by Nepal came in
early January 1986 when, according to Embassy
officials, Kathmandu approached Washington with a
The Role of Private Groups
Nepalese citizens are dissatisfied with the
government's inept performance on the narcotics
issue. When drug abuse became more prevalent
among middle- and upper-class youth, more
influential voices began demanding that something be
done. As concerned individuals came to the conclusion
that the government either could not or would not
take any significant action, several groups started
their own drug awareness programs and opened
rehabilitation facilities. A group of businessmen in
Boudhanath, a Kathmandu suburb, set up a private
drug addiction center in mid-November 1985. They
volunteer their own time and use no professional staff
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or medical help. Unfortunately, their record of
success is poor. Another group, the Kupandole Youth
Society founded in early November 1985, is
attempting to respond to the needs of youth and plans
to print posters against drug abuse to be spread across
the country. They also plan to make contact with
important political leaders to heighten their
awareness of the situation. Finally, there is the
Godavari School Alumni Association, a group of
alumni from the Godavari School, a prestigious
institution founded and operated by Jesuit fathers in
Nepal. They recently decided to sponsor a drug
education campaign using videotapes on drug abuse,
and they are receiving funding from the World
Health Organization through the Queen's social
services coordination committee.
Outlook
Such nascent antinarcotics movements, with private
citizens willing to take matters into their own hands,
suggest that people no longer see drug abuse as a
problem to which Nepalese society is immune. With
growing public awareness it is likely that pressure on
the government to take firmer action will increase.
We doubt effective action will be forthcoming, largely
out of reluctance to embarrass powerful officials in
the current regime,
The issue of government corruption, we
believe, is likely to become an opposition rallying
point as the country prepares for national elections
this spring. In our judgment, King Birendra fears the
loss of valuable support for his leadership if he
promotes an investigation of national corruption
before renewing his regime's mandate at the polls in
April. We do not expect narcotics trafficking and
abuse in themselves to pose a threat to the regime, but
fallout from the growing narcotics problem-the
increasing number of addicts in the kingdom, the
sudden influx of narcodollars, the mounting numbers
of Nepalese involved in international crime-will add
to the many domestic issues that collectively challenge
the government today and in the foreseeable future.
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Haiti: Drug Trafficking
Infrastructure
Interdiction efforts by law enforcement agencies have
made the traditional trafficking routes-through the
Yucatan Channel or through Jamaica and The
Bahamas-more hazardous for drug smugglers.
Haiti's location makes it a convenient alternate
transshipping zone. It lies approximately 960
kilometers (km) south of Florida and less than 160 km
east of Jamaica, providing a refueling point for
aircraft that allows illicit drugs to be flown deep into
the United States. Located on the Windward Passage,
Haiti is also on the key maritime access route to the
Panama Canal and South America through the
As a result, drug trafficking is heavy from lie a
Vache, Haiti, to Isla Beata, Dominican Republic.
Ile a Vache is the focal
point and possibly serves as a staging area. Suspect
drug trafficking vessels have been observed anchored,
being repaired, or being replenished in the small coves
and inlets in the area.
Caribbean Sea.
Interdiction efforts combined with intensified law
enforcement efforts in Colombia and Jamaica have
made Haiti an important base of operations and a
transshipment point for marijuana and cocaine.
the over 900 kilograms of cocaine
seized in Haiti during the first half of 1985 was only a
fraction of the total moving through there that year.
Maritime Transshipment Areas
Most of the trafficking through Haiti is conducted by
commercial and private ships, including freighters,
fishing vessels, sailing ships, and luxury yachts. The
Windward Passage is a convenient maritime route for
moving illicit drugs from Colombia and Jamaica to
The Bahamas and finally to the United States. Ships
sailing in the Passage and surrounding international
waters have traditionally used Haitian waters to
esca e interdiction.
t e entire aitian coast me wit
its numerous sma arbors and coves is used for
refueling and transshipment.
The southern peninsula is especially attractive to
smugglers because the small Haitian Navy does not
effectively patrol it.
The major maritime trafficking areas in central Haiti
consist of the capital city of Port-au-Prince, lie de la
Gonave, and the port of Gonaives. Port-au-Prince,
Haiti's major commercial port, is well developed and
has container-handling facilities available
he port is widely used by drug
marijuana
moving within the country usually moves through
Port-au-Prince
ccording to Embassy sources, vessel activity
has increased at the port of Gonaives, evidently as the
result of a US interdiction operation in late 1984 and
the Haitian interdiction efforts in Port-de-Paix.F__
the Haitian Government apparently has no interest in
the area and the US Coast Guard has no authority.
Secret
DI NR 86-001
February, 1986
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k at Port-
au-Prince have discovered that a majority of the
aircraft are suspected of narcotics-related activities.
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The prime maritime trafficking areas in northwestern
Haiti are Cap-Hatien and Port-de-Paix. Cap Hatien,
Haiti's second-largest port, has container facilities
available and handles both private and commercial
Haiti has become an important
refueling point for suspect aircraft traveling between
South America and North America. A 1984
photographic survey of Haiti revealed 22 private and
commercial airfields, 14 of which are usable with the
remainder appearing abandoned or unusable. Haiti
has three major airfields-Port-au-Prince and Bowen
Military Base, both located near Port-au-Prince, and
Cap-Hatien airfield. Traffickers apparently make use
of airfields, both private and commercial.
The Port-au-Prince Airport has been the most widely
used airfield for drug trafficking.
In 1985 the Haitian authorities began to intensify
security efforts against drug trafficking at Port-au-
Prince Airport. New measures included:
doublechecking all flight plans; searching small
aircraft for hidden compartments; increasing the
number of uniformed and plainclothes agents; and
close inspection of all arriving Colombians.
Traffickers have already tried to circumvent these
efforts by attempting to bribe Haitian military and
police officers stationed at the airfield
Traffickers can also avoid Port-au-Prince airfield and
use other commercial airfields. The government lacks
the means to patrol these more isolated airfields and
the officials stationed there are poorly paid and highly
susceptible to bribery. Cap-Hatien and Port-de-Paix
are the most prominent of these isolated airfields.
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Commercial airlines are also used for trafficking
illicit drugs. Those airlines that have direct flights
from Colombia and Jamaica to Haiti and on to the
United States are most popular
the use of commercial airlines for trafficking
shoul not be overlooked or underestimated. In
December 1982 a Colombian trafficking organization
sent cocaine via the Port-au-Prince airfield, where the
drugs were transferred from a commercial aircraft to
a private aircraft and then flown to The Bahamas and
the United States.
The Francisco
Burgos-Martinex organization allegedly ships cocaine
and marijuana from Colombia to Puerto Rico using
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2bAl
Trafficking Organizations
Until 1982 we had little evidence that any trafficking
organization was based in Haiti, although
international trafficking organizations based in
Colombia or Jamaica use it as a transshipment point.
Franz Bennett,
Interdiction Efforts and Capabilities
A bilateral agreement between Haiti and the United
States has heightened interdiction efforts in the area
since 1981. Under the agreement, the United States
provides petroleum products, performs routine
maintenance for the Haitian Navy, and trains
Haitians in the maintenance of naval vessels and in
interdiction strategy. The United States is also
creating a parts warehouse complete with an
inventory control system. Fuel facilities being built
with US help along the southern peninsula will enable
the Haitian Navy to better patrol this key smuggling
known Haitian trafficker and a member of an
international trafficking organization, who used his
fuel concession at Port-au-Prince Airport to refuel
aircraft smuggling cocaine and marijuana from
Colombia to the United States. After Bennett's arrest,
the Haitian Police Narcotics Bureau arrested several
of his associates, reportedly breaking up the
organization.
By 1984, evidence that well-organized smuggling
rings are based in Haiti was beginning to surface.
The Haitian Government provides the US Coast
Guard with the locations and descriptions of suspect
vessels and the direction in which they are traveling.
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The US Coast Guard gave the Haitian Navy an Inter-
American Intelligence Network telex to facilitate
reporting these suspect vessels in Haitian waters, but
it has not been used because of lack of operation and
maintenance skills. The Haitian Government has
further proposed placing Haitian civilians as liaison
officials on US Coast Guard vessels while in Haitian
territory. This proposal, if enacted, would help to
legitimize US Coast Guard presence and actions in
Haitian waters.
Haiti's antinarcotics efforts have been hampered by
inadequate equipment, personnel, and training. The
primary responsibility for narcotics interdiction rests
with the Haitian Police Narcotics Bureau, although
other agencies are involved, including the Navy, the
Air Corps, and the Customs Bureau. In theory, the
Bureau coordinates all interdiction efforts within the
various agencies, but in fact politically motivated
divisions within the military prevent coordination
among antinarcotics agencies. As a result, US
Embassy officials have become de facto liaison
officers between the various agencies. The Police
Narcotics Bureau lacks trained personnel and funds.
Basic training for new officers consists of a one-week
course, and, occasionally, higher level officers receive
US-style training in records management and in the
operations and management of an office. Police
investigative methods are unsystematic and
incomplete, and, because the Bureau is based in Port-
au-Prince, it lacks regional expertise necessary for
effective law enforcement.
The military is in little better shape. The Haitian
Navy is small and inadequate. It has few long-range
vessels, and the small, short-range vessels are aging
and unsuitable for ocean patrol. The lack of refueling
The Customs Bureau, like the other agencies, is
understaffed and poorly trained. Customs agents
receive less training than their Police Narcotics
Bureau counterparts. The agency has been trying to
develop effective methods of controlling airfields and
harbors, but the efforts are hampered by a lack of
funds and skills. Enforcement is further hampered by
the easy access to illegal entry points where customs
agents are not stationed.
The Haitian Government has attempted to improve
its law enforcement personnel. Many police, naval,
and customs officers have attended US-sponsored
training courses. These courses, taught by DEA and
the US Coast Guard, include methods of search and
seizure, narcotics recognition, inspection procedures,
management skills, and ship maintenance and repair.
Those who have attended these courses teach their
fellow Haitian officers at local seminars.
The government has instituted more severe drug laws.
In 1982 the crimes of using and trafficking narcotics
became distinguishable and their penalties
differentiated. The penalty for using narcotics is three
to five years and/or a $50,000 to $400,000 fine; the
penalty for trafficking narcotics is five to 20 years
and/or a $100,000 to $2 million fine. Few arrests
result in conviction, however. It is common for police
to hold the arrestees for an indeterminate period and
then release them without the benefit of judicial
proceedings. Nonresident foreigners are deported in
lieu of any judicial proceedings.
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facilities on the long southern coast prevents the Navy Data on the number of convictions from those cases
from effectively patroling that area. Therefore, it that reach the courts are unavailable, but the
mainly patrols the northwestern coast and currently sentences handed down tend to be lenient. The
averages approximately 100 hours of patrols per average sentence served is four months; the average
month. The Haitian Air Corps, although it has fine ranges from several hundred to several thousand
narcotics responsibilities, has not been active. This dollars. The Haitian Government has been attempting
may, in part, be due to a lack of any radar system in to reform its judicial system, hoping to improve
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suspicious aircraft patterns.
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Besides obtaining better training for narcotics police
and creating harsher drug laws, the government has
made other efforts toward interdiction. It increased
security at Port-au-Prince Airport, but this effort may
be undercut by the easy availability of other airfields
and the susceptibility of officials to corruption. n
Secret 14
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Pakistan: Narcotics and
Tribal Politics
A military operation mounted last December against
several unruly border tribes in the Pakistani-Afghan
border region was widely touted in the Pakistani press
as a crackdown against illicit drug trafficking,
although we judge that the operation also served
important political purposes for President Zia-ul-Haq.
The use of more than 3,000 Army personnel to
destroy the homes of tribal leaders and establish
control over the main tribal villages provided a highly
visible demonstration to Western aid donor nations
that Zia is attempting to reduce narcotics trafficking
in Pakistan. It also demonstrated Islamabad's
commitment to resist efforts by the Soviet-backed
regime in Kabul to strengthen its influence among
Pakistan's border tribes and proved the government's
ability to project force into the traditionally
independent border regions. Finally, the operation
provided a public display of Zia's leadership on the
eve of national elections.
Islamabad's crackdown against tribes along its
Western border and in the North-West Frontier
Province (N W FP) in December disrupted some tribal
drug traffickers and forced others to move their bases
into Afghanistan. The effort probably will not
decrease the overall amount of drugs produced,
processed, or trafficked through the area, however,
because the tribal growers and producers apparently
had moved much of their activity across the border
into Afghanistan prior to the December operations.
The advent of the new civilian government on
1 January, in our view, will also make future
antinarcotics operations against the border tribes
more difficult.
Tribal Traditions and Narcotics
The central government has always had trouble
exercising its authority in the western border regions
of the country, making it exceedingly difficult to
obtain local compliance with Islamabad's
antinarcotics programs. Many of Islamabad's
problems in maintaining control in the NWFP and
the semiautonomous tribal areas south of the Khyber
Pass can be traced to the colonial-style administration
Pakistan inherited from the British. Responsibility for
civil administration in the main tribal areas stretching
from the NWFP south to Baluchistan is shared
between Islamabad and representatives of the major
tribes. Even under the centralized martial law regime,
Zia had difficulty extending effective control in the
area. Many tribal areas remain nearly autonomous,
much as they did under the British. Pitched battles
between officials of the local military governor,
federal administrators of tribal areas, and armed
tribesmen have been increasingly common over the
last 18 months
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 disrupted
existing drug-producing and -trafficking
arrangements in the entire Golden Crescent area and
exacerbated the already strained relations between
the border tribes and Islamabad. Nearly 3 million
Afghan refugees fled into Pakistan to escape the war:
many of them had been involved in opium growing.
The war, as well as shifts in Iranian narcotics
production and trafficking in the early 1980s,
contributed to changes in trafficking patterns that
resulted in routing much of the South-West Asian
opiate traffic through the Pakistani border regions,
then south through Baluchistan and west into Iran.
The war has not disrupted the hold that the Shinwari,
Afridi, and other tribes of the Pushtun (Pathan) ethnic
group who control much of the territory along the
Afghan border have traditionally maintained over
narcotics production and processing in the area. The
opium trade offers substantial economic return to
tribal grows and it adapts easily to wartime
conditions.
drug growing and processing had replaced food
production in many of the small valleys between
Kabul and the Pakistani border.
Secret
DI NR 86-001
February /986
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Major Narcotics Trafficking Route of the Afridi and Shinwari Tribes
MT . / ( Pakistan
KAPISA
.Gardeyz
PAKTIA
PAKTIKA
O
FED.
Narcotics traffx
route to 1rac
.Gadal Shihi Kowl
~
NANGARHAR
mod;
Khyber Pass Mtal
Tribe
Narcotics trafficking route
Province boundary
0 15 30Kilometers
I I ' I
0 15 30Miles
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Afghan refugees based in camps in Pakistan can still
return home to grow and harvest opium. Although
leaders of many Afghan insurgent groups are
reluctant to allow narcotics production in areas under
their control,
the insurgents have to accept that, until they
are able to establish firmer control in contested areas,
farmers are forced to turn to drug growing to
guarantee an adequate income. Poppy is a lucrative
crop, and ombat operations in
Afghanistan rarely destroy poppyfields.
Islamabad Moves Against the Tribes
Pakistan responded to international calls in the early
1980s to limit the flow of illicit narcotics by allowing
concerned foreign agencies to begin a relatively
successful rural development program to induce
Pakistani farmers not to grow opium. These
programs, however, have not been initiated in tribal-
administered regions for a number of security and
political reasons. A combination of falling opium
prices in local markets beginning in 1979, a system of
subsidies for compliance with government regulations
and penalties for continued growing, and poor
weather led to a reduction in Pakistan's production of
opium from a high of more than 700 metric tons in
1979 to a low of an estimated 45 metric tons in 1984,
according to Embassy reports. In 1985, however,
production increased to an estimated 60 to 70 tons as
a result of expanded cultivation in the tribal areas
along the Afghan border.
Under international pressure to undertake additional
efforts to control the flow of contraband drugs to the
West, Islamabad began a program of political and
military actions against Pushtun drug traffickers in
the Khyber area in 1985. Embassy sources in
Islamabad indicate that the local representative of
Zia's martial law regime, North-West Frontier
Province Governor Fazle Haq, also saw operations
against the traffickers as a way to enhance his
political standing. Haq, who has been governor for
nearly six years, hopes to be offered a diplomatic post
for his success in containing the province's narcotics
problems, according to an Embassy source.
1982 November Islamabad sends Army to destroy tribal
heroin laboratories in Landi Kotal near
the Khyber Pass.
1983 Early Members of the Pakistan Shinwari tribe
relocate in Afghanistan at Kabul's
invitation and guickli reestablish their
r ss' operations.
eport seeing many
heroin a oratories in the Afghan
provinces bordering Pakistan.
1985 March Islamabad sponsors meeting of tribal
leaders (jirga) to announce government
crackdown on narcotics.
Leader of Kukikhel clan of the Afridi
tribe, Wali Khan, stages militant
antigovernment demonstrations in NWFP
tribal areas.
April Afridi jirga rejects leadership of Wali
Khan, supports government antinarcotics
program.
September Wali Khan supporters denounce
Islamabad and Washington and praise the
Soviet Union for its "support of
traditional tribal prerogatives."
November Islamabad convenes all-tribal jirga in
NWFP, issues ultimatum to tribes
involved in narcotics to surrender before
December.
2 December Beginning of military operations in NWFP
and Khyber region. Government forces
mount five-day search and sweep
operation in NWFP.
4 December Jirga called by Afridi leadership to
denounce Wali Khan. Two hundred
government troops of the Afridi tribe
defect to join Wali Khan.
7 December Government forces attack narcotics
trafckers'strongholds in Khyber Pa.s.c,
numerous fatalities on both sides.
13 December Governor of N WFP tells tribal jirga Wali
Khan is an outlaw drug dealer,
encourages others to surrender, promises
leniency.
15 December Majority of N WFP heroin laboratories
surrender to government, Wali Khan Nees
to Kabul.
24 December Zia announces end of operation; 100
houses destroyed, 25 laboratories
smashed.
30 December Zia lifts martial law; elected civilian
government takes over.
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Government attempts to control drug trafficking in
the tribal areas culminated in the December military
operations against trafficker strongholds in the
Khyber Pass region. The target was Wali Khan
Kukikhel, a prominent Pushtun leader of the Afridi
clan and a major trafficker who had accepted Kabul's
patronage. Haq's political detractors-who include
the military governors of the provinces bordering the
tribal zone-have charged that he overstepped his
authority in destroying more than 100 homes in Afridi
villages. His critics charge, further, that Haq misused
the Pakistani military to rouse tribal tensions in the
region to inflate the crisis, hoping to prove the need
for military intervention. Concerns were also raised
about the security implications.
Haq's actions caused
other Afridi clans to rally to Wali Khan's support and
led some to appeal to Kabul for support. By late
December, however, most Afridi leaders had publicly
repudiated Wali Khan, hoping to distance themselves
from further punishment by Islamabad. According to
press accounts, some local tribesmen further
distanced themselves from those producing narcotics
by denouncing Wali Khan and surrendering arms and
drug-processing equipment to the Pakistani
Government.
We believe Haq had the blessing of President Zia to
move against Wali Khan because Zia believed such
an antinarcotics operation could achieve several
political goals:
? Demonstrate to foreign aid donors-specifically the
United States-that his regime was prepared to
take a hard line on reducing the amount of
Pakistani narcotics entering the West.
? Demonstrate Islamabad's ability to project central
government authority in a traditionally unruly
section of the country.
? Send a signal to uncommitted Pushtun tribes that
Islamabad was serious about maintaining control in
the contested border area and resisting Kabul's
continued courting of Pakistan's tribes.
? Emphasize his leadership and authority on the eve
of the transition to civilian rule.
We judge that the impact of the campaign on tribal
narcotics operations was mitigated because the major
tribes involved in the trade-the Afridis and
Poppies, Opium, Smugglers in
Pakistan's NWFP
Although opium poppies have been a traditional cash
crop for many of the Pushtun tribes on both sides of
the Pakistani-Afghan border, most of the raw opium
produced in Pakistan prior to 1979 was trafficked
through a series of middlemen across Afghanistan to
consumers in Iran or international traffickers in
Turkey. According to academic sources, the growing
and harvesting of opium poppies and the marketing of
opiates are traditional skills well integrated into the
seminomadic tribal life of the region.
Turkey's efforts to reduce narcotics trafficking in the
late 1970s, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
1979, and falling international prices for opiates in
the early 1980s brought shifts in the traditional
growing, processing, and trafficking patterns in the
Golden Crescent. The disruption of conventional
agriculture in the Pakistani-Afghan border area
resulting from the anti-Kabul insurgency has made
the economic benefits of growing and processing
opium more attractive. Similarly, Soviet control of
the roads linking Afghanistan and Iran has
encouraged new trafficking routes for Afghan opiates
into western Pakistan, then south through
Baluchistan, and finally into southeastern Iran.
Local Pushtun tribes in the Khyber region of the
Pakistani-Afghan region dominate the processing and
trafficking of opiates in the border. Large subclans of
the Pushtun Afridi and Shinwari tribes over the last
few years have taken control of the local
infrastructure on both sides of the border. Afridi and
Shinwari leaders dominate the smuggling apparatus
to move the heroin through Pakistan to the world
market or overland to transshipment points in
Baluchistan and western Afghanistan for land
shipment to consumers in Iran, the Middle East, and
the West.
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Shinwaris-had anticipated Islamabad's actions some
time earlier and had moved much of their operations
across the border. Wali Khan withdrew with his
followers into Afghanistan in December after the
Army destroyed his home village. We believe he has
been given refuge with Afghan Afridi subclans,
themselves involved in narcotics production and
trafficking. Wali Khan has had close relations with
the Kabul regime for several years, according to
Embassy reports. The Shinwaris have moved most of
their processing laboratories into a number of small
valleys just across the border in areas controlled by
members of Afghanistan's Shinwari tribesmen. A US
journalist traveling through Nangarhar Province in
Afghanistan in November was taken on a tour of
active heroin laboratories. His guides told him local
farmers were increasing their poppy crops because the
Afghan Army does not target opium fields.
View From Kabul
We believe that the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul
supports the Afridis and related Afghan tribes
regardless of their involvement in narcotics, in the
hope that their activities will disrupt Pakistani
security efforts in the border area. Wali Khan's son
attended a Soviet-sponsored meeting of tribal leaders
(jirga) in Kabul last summer, and his lieutenants
maintain contact with Afghan Government officials.
Other Afridi and Shinwari leaders, according to
diplomatic reports, have aided Kabul in security
operations in Afghanistan's border regions since at
least the summer of 1984. Wali Khan has made
statements against Pakistan and the United States on
several occasions, and in late December issued a
number of declarations through the Afghan press,
vowing that the Afridis would resist Pakistani
pressures to subdue "the traditional tribal life"-
including narcotics trafficking.
In our view, Kabul undoubtedly believed that much of
the impetus behind the December military operation
in Khyber was related to Pakistan's efforts to extend
its control over the border region and that suppression
of narcotics trafficking was secondary. The Soviet-
backed regime in Kabul will continue to court Afridi
and Shinwari leaders, we believe, hoping to enlist
their aid against the anti-Kabul insurgents who use
the same border areas to mount operations against the
Afghan Communists.
Outlook
We do not believe Islamabad's recent operations in
the Khyber area will result in a major reduction in the
total volume of narcotics moving out of the Golden
Crescent. Not only have the major tribes involved in
processing and trafficking opiates moved much of
their infrastructure into Afghanistan, but diplomatic
reports of late January also indicate local opium
prices are rising and leading traffickers have been
encouraging Pakistani farmers to resist Islamabad's
antinarcotics efforts.
As a result of the December operations, we believe
new political alignments are beginning to develop in
the Pakistani-Afghan border region, and that such
tribal politics will continue to complicate narcotics
control. Kabul and Islamabad will continue to vie for
the allegiance of the semi-independent border tribes,
whose leaders will demand higher stakes to guarantee
their support. Inter- and intra-tribal tensions will
continue as tribal groups on both sides of the border
compete for shares of the lucrative narcotics trade.
The presence of approximately 3 million Afghan
refugees and the use of the border area by Afghan
insurgents to launch attacks against Kabul will
continue to complicate narcotics control efforts in the
region. We believe the new civil administration in
Islamabad faces a major challenge in attempting
simultaneously to extend its control over the border
tribes and not alienate tribal leaders who will look to
Kabul for support against increased pressure from
Islamabad.
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Iran: Playing to an
International Audience
Iran regularly uses its participation in the United
Nations Economic and Social Commission committee
on narcotic drugs to publicize its own opium
eradication campaign, criticize neighbors for laxity in
drug enforcement, and lambaste the United States for
implying that poppy continues to be cultivated under
the current regime. Iran scored an international
public relations coup in September when it hosted the
20th session of the Subcommittee on Illicit Drug
Traffic and Related Matters in the Near and Middle
East. Iran emerged from the meeting in the guise of a
champion of regional cooperation in the war on drugs,
but its proposals seem designed more to allow the
Khomeini government to manipulate and control
narcotics information in the region.
Public Relations Coup
According to official pronouncements to international
organizations, the world press, and domestic media,
Iran claims to have eliminated opium cultivation
shortly after the Islamic revolution. Responsibility for
the country's massive drug abuse problem is laid at
the feet of Afghanistan and Pakistan as narcotics
source countries, with the United States depicted as
stimulating the traffic from behind the scenes. The
Iranian Government categorically and vehemently
denies claims that Iran remains a major opium
producer-as put forth in the International Narcotics
Control Board (INCB) report for 1984, for example.
Iranian representatives routinely invite their UN
counterparts to "come and look" for the alleged
cultivation in Iran as guests of the government. For
the past two years, while meeting in Vienna, Iran has
maintained that sessions of the drug trafficking
subcommission would have more significance if they
took place within the region "where problems
associated with the illicit traffic could be observed
and studied in their actual context." The convening of
the subcommission composed of Iran, Pakistan,
Turkey, and Sweden in Tehran last year was the first
time this offer was accepted. The Iranians
undoubtedly were delighted finally to play host to the
group under carefully staged conditions in Tehran, far
from poppy-growing areas.
Iranian Proposals
At the meeting, the Iranians proposed projects that
would further the regime's public relations and
propaganda campaign on narcotics issues. Iran
offered to take the lead in regional antidrug efforts
by:
? Establishing a central regional laboratory for drug
analysis to determine source countries of opium.
? Conducting an aerial survey of likely illicit poppy
areas.
The first proposal rests on the dubious assumption
that it would be possible to identify "with a high
degree of accuracy" the source country of seized
opium by chemical analysis. Even if such analysis
were possible, Iran today is poorly equipped to carry it
out. Similarly, the Iranians have neither resources nor
expertise to conduct an aerial survey of regional
poppy-growing areas.
We judge that the Iranian initiatives proposed to the
UN subcommission are calculated to enhance
Tehran's control of drug information so it can be cast
in terms favorable to the regime and unfavorable to
its enemies. The Iranians maintain that all illicit
drugs originate beyond their borders; we believe their
offer to set up a laboratory to determine the country
of origin of seized opium samples is a ploy to lend
"scientific substantiation" to such claims. Similarly,
any aerial survey conducted by the regime would
undoubtedly "miss" the growing areas in Iran that are
a small proportion of the country's total agricultural
area-only an estimated 0.3 percent of cultivated land
was planted in poppy even in the bumper opium year
1979. Alternatively, since the Iranians do not admit
the possibility that any poppy is cultivated in Iran,
Secret
DI NR 86-001
February 1986
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their vaguely worded aerial survey proposal might be
intended to provide this service for drug-producing
neighbors.
Iranian Government reporting on narcotics has a
history of distortion and bias. The Iranians told the
subcommission they have spent 150 billion rials (US
$1.6 billion at the current official exchange rate) for
drug suppression, treatment, and education over the
past seven years-a figure we believe is vastly
inflated. In an even more graphic example of Iranian
distortion, the public prosecutor of the Court of the
Islamic Revolution recently announced over Tehran
radio that on 11 January 1986 the government had
destroyed in excess of 8,000 metric tons of seized
heroin. At the normal 10 to 1 conversion rate, such a
quantity of heroin would have been refined from
roughly 80,000 tons of opium. We estimate
that total world production of opium
averages about 1,500 tons per year. Such
exaggerations render Iranian narcotics data
meaningless. By allowing Iran an uncritical forum for
its propaganda campaign, the UN subcommission
plays into the hands of the regime and helps further
cloud the narcotics situation in Southwest Asia.
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Worldwide Narcotics Highlights
South America In December, Colombian President Betancur approved plans to spray 1,000
hectares of coca with the herbicide triclopyr. The decision comes after over a year
of testing to determine the most effective chemicals and aerial application
techniques. Spraying is to begin as soon as the chemicals arrive from the United
States. If the herbicide proves effective against the hardy coca plant, the operation
will mark a major advance toward eradicating Colombia's 13,000 hectares of coca.
In recent years, Colombian authorities have been destroying coca by hand, an
arduous and hazardous task for eradication teams who risk confrontations with
guerrilla groups that are active throughout much of Colombia's coca-growing
areas. The US Embassy reports that some 2,000 hectares were destroyed by hand
in 1985 and predicts that a successful aerial spray operation could destroy 10,000
hectares in 1986. The destruction of Colombia's coca crop, however, will have little
immediate effect on the US cocaine market. According to the Embassy, much of
Colombia's coca is marketed locally as basuco-a cigarette laced with coca base-
or low-quality cocaine. Colombia's international drug traffickers prefer to use
better quality Bolivian or Peruvian coca in the cocaine they smuggle to the United
States. Successful spraying in Colombia, however, could become an incentive for
Bolivia and Peru to consider similar operations against their much larger coca
crops.
In a case that will measure Colombia's willingness to crack down on drug-related
corruption in the judiciary, Judge Rafael Ortega Castro has been indicted for
"betrayal of trust" in his investigation of the March 1984 Tranquilandia raid.
Tranquilandia is the name given to the laboratory complex in the Llanos where
several tons of cocaine were confiscated by the national police. Despite this record
drug seizure, no major traffickers were arrested. A pilot has told US Embassy
officials that the traffickers were forewarned of the raid and managed to escape
the night before it occurred. About 100 laboratory guards and workers were
arrested, but later released under orders from Judge Ortega. Because of these
irregularities, the Supreme Tribunal in Florencia suspended Ortega in September
and ordered the re-arrest of the 100 defendants-none of whom has been
apprehended. According to the Embassy, judicial authorities want the maximum
penalty imposed on Ortega so that his case will serve as a deterrent to other
potentially corrupt judges.
Interdiction operations off the north coast of Colombia are causing marijuana
traffickers to withhold shipments. major
traffickers, who have good intelligence on the size-,-o-cation, an timing of
interdiction operations, nearly ceased maritime shipments of marijuana from the
north coast in early December 1985. US Coast Guard officials, citing lower levels
of maritime smuggling compared to the same time last year, believe traffickers are
waiting out interdiction operations scheduled to end in February. Large traffickers
probably can absorb the costs involved in a temporary suspension of operations,
Secret
DI NR 86-001
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but smaller traffickers with less financial cushion and fewer markets will be forced
to attempt to evade interdiction units. We expect that most of the shipments seized
during the current interdiction effort will continue to belong to small exporters.
Meanwhile, large traffickers continue to make preparations to move marijuana
north once interdiction operations end. US Coast Guard officials report that
Colombian ports are full of vessels waiting to pick up marijuana from
predetermined locations. marijuana packaged for
export is being stashed at sites in the mountains on the Peninsula de la Guajira.
Once traffickers decide that routes are safe, this marijuana will probably be moved
to the coast and loaded onto motherships bound for the United States.
A comprehensive narcotics bill continues to flounder in the Bolivian Congress,
according to the US Embassy in La Paz. Draft legislation, prepared under
Embassy auspices, was introduced at the end of October but has yet to make its
way through various committees. The lengthy bill was designed to tighten laws on
coca production and marketing first established in a May 1985 decree by the
previous administration. The draft law also includes provisions for a new Ministry
of Narcotics Affairs with authority over all government drug agencies. The
Embassy reports, however, that the bill has only minimal support in Congress from
lawmakers fearing that attempts to strengthen narcotics control laws are
politically risky and possibly dangerous. Moreover, archaic debate rules are likely
to stall the bill once it reaches the full Congress for consideration. Unless the bill
regains its original momentum, and its detailed provisions are streamlined, chances
of passage in the near future remain dim.
Movement of coca paste from the Yungas region along Bolivia's major river
systems has recently increased, Yungas
coca farmers are transferring paste they produce to nearby rivers for
transportation to the Puerto Sucre and Guayaramerin areas near the Brazilian
frontier for export or refining. Corrupt police officials reportedly are taking bribes
to allow coca paste to be transported from the growing areas to the headwaters of
the Beni and Mamore river systems. increased
trafficking in the Yungas may be an effect of expanded police presence in the
Chapare, Bolivia's largest coca-producing region where the government is trying to
mount eradication and interdiction operations.
Peruvian authorities maintained pressure on drug traffickers during November
and December with Condor 111-an operation to disrupt the flow of coca base and
paste from the Upper Huallaga Valley to cocaine-conversion laboratories in
northern Peru and southern Colombia. As initially planned, the Guardia Civil-
the agency responsible for controlling drug production and movement in Peru-
was to support expanded coca eradication operations near Uchiza and cooperate
with the Air Force in destroying airstrips used by drug traffickers in the Upper
Huallaga. The coca eradication phase of the operation was postponed because of
insufficient protection for the eradication teams, but the rest of the operation went
smoothly, according to US Embassy reports. Operating under the cover of Air
Force helicopters, Guardia Civil personnel reportedly set off dynamite charges
that severely cratered 36 airstrips in the area. The operation was important
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because it struck a key trafficking center and demonstrated that police and
military units could work together, but it probably set back trafficking only
temporarily. In our judgment, authorities almost certainly were bribed to avoid
destroying some airstrips during the operation, and we know from similar
operations elsewhere that cratered airstrips can be repaired easily and put back
into service quickly. Moreover, we have no evidence that processing centers in
northern Peru or southern Colombia are experiencing a shortage of coca base or
paste, and indeed believe large shipments of these drugs continue to arrive by air.
The 6 December order by the Government of Peru lifting the State of Emergency
in the Upper Huallaga Valley will have mixed effects on narcotics control in this
important coca-producing area. Imposed in the summer of 1984 to quell growing
violence attributed to Sendero Luminoso terrorists, the State of Emergency
suspended nearly all constitutional guarantees and conferred full political control
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military commanders-who did not view themselves as drug enforcers-impeded
narcotics control by not authorizing coca eradication operations and frequently
diverting police resources to terrorism. Lifting the State of Emergency has
returned narcotics control to civilian authorities, enabling the police to plan and
execute their own coca eradication and interdiction operations. This should result
in more consistent drug enforcement efforts in the valley. It has already given rise,
however, to increased drug-related violence that may stymie these operations. The
Embassy and media report that the mayor of Aucayacu, where a USAID coca
substitution program is headquartered, was murdered by drug traffickers in early
December, and, in Uchiza, rival trafficking organizations are waging a war that
claimed 24 lives in January. The military remains stationed in the Upper Huallaga
to support antiterrorism operations in neighboring areas and could be used to
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A Peru-Ecuador antinarcotics operation in planning since the Foreign Ministers of
the two countries met last October was canceled in late January, according to the
US Embassy in Lima. The operation probably would have been similar to the ones
conducted by Colombia and Peru and Colombia and Ecuador last summer. We
suspect authorities were planning to share intelligence and equipment to strike
drug-processing centers located between the Rio Putumayo and Rio Santiago
along the Peruvian-Ecuadorean border and interdict drugs and processing
chemicals smuggled through this area. According to the Embassy, the operation
was canceled following publicity given it by Peruvian Interior Vice Minister
Mantilla. Although Ecuador's President Febres-Cordero strongly supports a joint
operation with Peru, he has reservations about holding paramilitary operations in
this area. This stretch of the border has long been contested by Peru and Ecuador,
and Febres-Cordero told the US Ambassador in Quito that a less sensitive area
should be targeted. He also said Ecuador's military could have problems
participating in an operation proposed by the police. The plan probably will be
resurrected once the two countries work out their differences, but it almost
certainly will avoid attacking important trafficking sites in areas that are
politically sensitive to both countries.
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The US Embassy reports that President Febres-Cordero plans to reassign
enforcement responsibilities among Ecuador's narcotics agencies in an effort to
improve drug control in 1986. Under the presidential plan, the National
Directorate Against Narcotics (DINACTIE) will be stripped of its drug
enforcement responsibilities and its long-time bureaucratic rival, the National
Police, will be given the leading role in drug control. This decision apparently was
made after evidence revealed that mismanagement and corruption persisted in
DINACTIE even after President Febres-Cordero reshuffled its top leadership last
summer and put the agency under his direct control.
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National Police has a cleaner reputation than DINACTIE. It currently has some
500 men out of its total strength of 15,000 assigned to coca eradication and drug
interdiction. Once it begins taking over the investigation of drug cases, however, its
officers may find traffickers' bribes as difficult to resist as did the DINACTIE
investigators before them.
plentiful supply of cheap labor for traffickers and growers.
The recent decline in oil prices will almost certainly have an adverse impact upon
narcotics control in Mexico. The annual revenue loss caused by lower prices may
be as much as $3.3 billion by some estimates. The chances for a needed increase in
funding for antidrug programs are remote, and, in a worst case scenario, a cutback
is possible. At the same time, anticipated cuts in social programs and a further
erosion of employment opportunities in legitimate sectors of the economy are
certain to preclude a shift by members of the drug industry into licit activities.
Moreover, a greater number of subsistence farmers and other marginal elements
of the economy will be attracted to the more lucrative drug trade, thus providing a
allowing more effective planning and execution of eradication missions.
The Mexican Government has taken a positive step toward better drug control.
According to the US Embassy in Mexico City, the Mexican Government is
scheduled to begin a US-funded aerial survey of poppy cultivation. Flights will
stage out of Culiacan and Chilpancingo and will cover approximately 7,250 square
kilometers in the key northern tristate growing area and some 5,440 square
kilometers in the southern growing region. Information from the survey should
provide reliable information on the number and locations of poppyfields, thus
As the Mexican Government continues to struggle with opium production, the
marijuana and cocaine sectors of the drug trade continue to prosper:
? Reports of widespread marijuana cultivation continue to surface.
marijuana is being grown in at least three locations in the
south and central areas of the state of Chiapas.
IIn December 1985) (some 70
hectares of marijuana were being cultivated near the town of Ciudad Obregon,
in the state of Sonora. The marijuana was planted in plots surrounded by corn.
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source of marijuana entering the United States.
the first report of large-scale production in Chiapas. Colombia's major
marijuana-growing area has recently been taken out of production by
eradication, and we believe Mexico could compete with Colombia as the biggest
a more frequently used cocaine transshipment point.
cocaine traffickers are
reportedly hiring private planes to transport cocaine from Colombia to Mexico.
Once in Mexico, the cocaine is shipped by truck or car to the United States. As
interdiction in the busier Caribbean straits improves, Mexico is likely to become
trafficking schemes.
Jamaica, a major marijuana exporter to the United States, made significant
progress against the illicit crop in 1985. Analysis of aerial surveys flown in the
spring and fall showed that 1985 cultivation was at about the same level as 1984.
Prime Minister Seaga has stepped up the eradication and interdiction programs,
however, and reduced the amount of marijuana harvested and exported from the
1985 crop to about 900 tons, down from an estimated 1,750 tons in 1984. Further
progress in controlling Jamaica's marijuana production depends on how long the
effectiveness of the eradication work force can be sustained and on the ability of
Jamaican security forces to counter increasingly sophisticated air and maritime
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amphetamines and/or methaqualone tablets are manufactured in a clandestine lab
in Costa Rica
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the Cayman Islands are a major
The Cayman Islands are ideally located for drug transshipment from
South America to the southeastern United States, but, until recently, have usually
escaped US drug enforcement scrutiny.
Southeast Asia In the continuing battle between rival trafficking groups, the Shan United Army
(SUA) has reoccupied most of the territory near Loi Htwe on the Thai-Burmese
border lost to the Thai Army during a raid last November. According to Embassy
reporting, the SUA has mined the area around its strongholds to make it less
accessible to the Thai Army or the Chinese Irregular Force (CIF), its main enemy
in the current border conflict. Some officers in the Thai Army had hoped the CIF,
which it supports in the current fighting, would take over the positions captured
from the SUA. When the Thai pulled out, however, CIF hesitation allowed the
SUA to retake its fortifications. We judge the CIF leadership believed it would be
unable to hold the positions against an SUA counterattack. Although fighting has
died down over the last several weeks, we expect the two sides to clash again when
large opium caravans begin to move south before the rainy season.
A mobile heroin refinery was operating in the Sadao district of southern Thailand
during November 1985,
- The refinery, allegedly protected by Malaysian Communists, was
converting raw opium to heroin base. Laboratories have long been suspected to
exist in southern Thailand, a traditional trafficking route for Golden Triangle
opiates destined for Malaysian and European markets. Malaysian and Thai
Communists operate along the border-much of which is not under either
government's control. In addition, traffickers in the area have ready access to
processing chemicals, notably acetic anhydride, which is smuggled illicitly into
Malaysia in great quantity. Traffickers may be relocating their refining
laboratories to the Thai-Malaysian border as a result of increased competition and
enforcement in northern Thailand.
Burma and Thailand have completed their eradication operations for the 1985/86
opium season. The US-supported Burmese aerial eradication spray campaign
began in late December in Kutkai and Hsenwi townships in the northern Shan
State, areas in which the Burmese Communist Party operates. As of 22 January,
the last day of spraying in the north, Burmese officials were claiming the operation
had destroyed about 5,800 hectares of opium poppy. Burma had an estimated
71,000 hectares planted to poppy in the 1984/85 season.
farther south in the Shan State but, in our judgment, will have little impact
because most of it has been harvested already. This year's program was regarded
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as a learning experience by the Burmese, and operations were restricted to areas
outside the direct control of insurgent groups. If the Burmese Government remains
committed to the program and expands operations east of the Salween River where
cultivation is the most intense, it may be able to reduce the supplies of raw
narcotics moving south to the refineries on the Thai-Burmese border. The Thai
Army is in the final stages of its manual eradication campaign with a stated goal
of 4,000 hectares; Thai farmers planted an estimated 9,600 hectares in poppy last
Some officials fear that continued widespread eradication may drive some
hill-tribe growers to relocate in Burma.
Excellent weather and expanded planting in Burma will likely result in a bumper
opium crop in the Golden Triangle this year, despite stepped-up eradication
programs by the Thai and Burmese Governments.
Burma is up 10 to 15 percent over last year. Rising prices due to last year's
drought and expected losses due to interdiction have spurred farmers to plant more
POPPY.
Control Board currently estimates that cultivation in Thailand is about 30 percent
lower as a result of last year's eradication program and the heavily publicized
threats of eradication this year. During field observations in Thailand in January,
the crop appeared unusually vigorous, and yields are likely to be high enough to
outweigh the effect of reduced cultivation. Current eradication efforts will partly
offset the higher yields in both countries but not enough to prevent this crop from
being much larger than last year's drought-stricken one. In our judgment, if the
harvests are not impeded by rain and if planting levels in Laos are on a par with
last year, the opium crop in the Golden Triangle may exceed 950 tons.
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East Asia Previous unsuccessful Australian entreaties to UN officials to be designated a
traditional producer-which would enable it to capture a larger percentage of the
lucrative US narcotic raw material market-may prompt Australia to alter
strategies and call for the elimination of the traditional producer status accorded
to India and Turkey during the February CND meeting in Vienna. Currently, US
manufacturers are required to purchase 80 percent of all their narcotic raw
material from India and Turkey with the remaining 20 percent divided between
Australia and other licit opium poppy-producing countries. Johnson & Johnson's
affiliation with Australia's Tasmanian Alkaloid company in 1982, however,
guaranteed Australian access to the lion's share of US business after India and
Turkey. A declining world demand for concentrated poppy straw, because it does
not contain thebaine and noscapine, manufacturer-preferred alkaloids found in
opium, threatens Australia's market position. An Australian-initiated resolution to
abolish traditional producer status would most likely receive support from Spain,
France, Holland, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland-all licit poppy-producing
countries. Spain's poppy industry in particular-which possesses tremendous
production capabilities-would be in a position to take advantage of an open
market. The volatility of this issue and the potential political fall out-which
Turkey's recent public campaign condemning the United States for failure to
fulfill narcotics commitments exemplifies-suggests that it will be difficult to
achieve a consensus in the short term. Withdrawal of US support for the
traditional producer concept would most likely be viewed as favoring US business
interests given previous US attempts to elicit support for American cultivation of
bracteatum-a strain of poppy that is difficult to convert for illegal purposes.
Southwest Asia At a recent Interpol conference, President Zia of Pakistan spoke strongly in favor
of the death sentence for drug traffickers. According to a report in the
government-owned Pakistan Times, Zia also stressed the need for "stringent
punishment" of drug traffickers in the United States, where the judicial system is
"too lenient" and "jails are as comfortable as four-star hotels." Zia's comments
reflect the perception among narcotics-producing countries that, in order for them
to reduce illicit production, the West must reduce its drug consumption. They also
reflect Zia's efforts to shift the burden of responsibility to others and direct
attention away from Pakistan's own inadequate enforcement. A recent report by a
Muslim organization took his government to task for failing to trace and punish
the "big fish" involved in manufacturing and trafficking in Pakistan. This report
also challenged the general inefficiency of the Pakistan Government's narcotics
control agencies.
There has been a recent surge of official pronouncements against drug abuse in
Pakistan:
? At the US-supported National Conference of Non-Government Organizations
on the Prevention of Drug Abuse in early January, First Lady Begum Zia-ul-
Haq called for sections of society to join with the government to fight drug
abuse. An editorialist commenting on the conference proclaimed that "it is high
time that an all-out jihad should be started against drug addiction that has been
eating into the vitals of our society."
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? At the 16th Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers in early January,
Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, announced that Pakistan
had joined Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in evolving a decision that envisaged
cooperation among Muslim countries to control the problems of narcotics abuse
and trafficking.
? At the inauguration of the Third Interpol Conference of Heads of National Drug
Control Services in the Gulf area in mid-January, President Mohammed Zia-ul-
Haq said Pakistan's commitment for the eradication of drug abuse not only
within the country but also outside its frontiers is total and unqualified. Zia
suggested the formation of a cooperative council of the heads of national drug
control services to adopt tactical measures against narcotics and to review the
progress periodically. He also suggested an exchange of information through a
centralized communications network to provide information about drug
traffickers.
supporters or his domestic audience.
Zia and other Pakistani Government officials are probably sincere in wanting to
cut down on increasing drug use in Pakistan, but have a limited ability to
implement recent pronouncements. The government is constrained by widespread
corruption and limited control in poppy-growing areas, all of which make it
difficult for Pakistan to reduce domestic drug use. We believe Zia is also taking
political advantage of the narcotics problem by associating himself with popular
antidrug programs, an effort he knows will not be lost on Pakistan's Western
The Indian Directorate of Revenue Intelligence made one of the largest narcotics
seizures on record near Bombay in early January. In all, 4.6 metric tons of hashish
and 604 kilograms of heroin were found concealed under haystacks. This seizure,
as well as the seizure in early January of 2.95 tons of hashish at the Bombay docks,
point to an increase in drug trafficking through Bombay. According to the Times
of India, Ethiopians and Nigerians are acting as couriers to distribute the drugs.
Nigeria has a significant Indian population. We believe that those Indians involved
in drug trafficking establish ties to Nigerians to organize new networks to
transport the drugs to the West.
Opium poppy cultivation is increasing in the Al Biqa (Bekaa Valley) in Lebanon-
traditionally a hashish-producing area-J
The increase in poppy acreage and the shift from hashish is attributed to opium's
French authorities recently expressed concern that Guadeloupe, Martinique, and
French Guiana were becoming important transit points for cocaine destined for
Europe, according to US Embassy reporting. Their proximity to growing regions in
South America and their political relationship with France make all three ideal
transfer centers for cocaine traffickers bound for Europe. There are daily flights to
the islands from Bogota, Caracas, Lima, and Quito, and, because the islands are
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kilograms of cocaine.
political departments of France, daily flights also provide direct connections to
Paris. There are also daily flights to Frankfurt, Amsterdam, and London. French
authorities-currently investigating major cocaine distribution networks-note
that 11 seizures in Martinique and Guadeloupe in 1985 netted more than 20
International police cooperation has enabled European authorities to crack two
more international heroin trafficking networks. In both cases, the success of the
efforts has been attributed to close cooperation by enforcement authorities:
? Narcotics agents staged simultaneous raids on 14 January in France, Italy, and
the United States, arresting 17 suspected important heroin traffickers and
financiers. The drug ring had been operating between Sicily, Marseille, and the
US east coast. Among the six men taken into custody in Marseille was Mario
Piazza, whose late father, Pietro, was a key figure in Marseille's famous "French
Connection" in the 1960s.
Thailand to Spain via West Germany for a long time,
Danish and Swiss drug investigators, crushed a major heroin trafficking ring in
December 1985 by arresting 23 Spaniards and recovering 7.5 kilograms of high-
grade heroin. The heroin trading organization had been smuggling heroin from
? Narcotics authorities in West Germany, Spain, and Thailand, collaborating with
Five of the suspected traffickers caught in Madrid were members
notorious drug trafficking organizations in Europe
of a gang led by Juan Jiminez who is reported to be head of one of the most
in Peru.
The United Kingdom, in an effort to control the influx of cocaine, is assigning a
customs official as British Regional Narcotics Coordinator to the Andean Region,
according to US Embassy reporting. Based in Lima, the coordinator will be
accredited to the Governments of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Some
other European countries already have representatives in South America in
support of antinarcotics efforts. West Germany has narcotics liaison officers in
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru; France in Bolivia and Ecuador; and Denmark
Sub-Saharan Africa's escalating involvement in illicit narcotics activities is a topic
of growing concern among high-level US and European officials:
Another concern is the diversion of legal European-exported
pharmaceuticals to Africa's black market. French officials maintain that US
training and resources are needed to combat the African drug trade, particularly
in West Africa's anglophone countries.
enforcement efforts in the coming decade,
nature of the smuggling business-poses the greatest threat to French drug
? Heightened drug trafficking via Africa to European destinations-attributed to
the relatively free movement of Africans throughout Europe and the lucrative
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? US offers to conduct regional narcotics training programs to control
international narcotics transshipments through Kenya and the accompanying
threat of drug abuse received the tentative endorsement of senior Kenyan
Government officials. Kenyan enforcement officers-normally reluctant to
admit a narcotics problem even exists-disagreed with the US emphasis on
regional cooperation and training. Controlling cross-border movement of illicit
drugs is often hampered by animosity and mistrust between neighboring
countries, particularly Somalia and Kenya, and between Kenya's customs and
police departments.
? UN recognition of Africa's mounting drug problems prompted a recent UN
Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) mission to Senegal, Benin, Nigeria,
Congo, Zaire, and Madagascar. According to US officials in Vienna, the
transshipment of cocaine, marijuana, and psychotropics-a continentwide
phenomenon-is facilitated by the absence of border control and inefficient and
often corrupt enforcement officers. Nigeria, in particular, supports a well-
established drug operation and appears to have a significant drug abuse problem.
The arrest of four Mauritian parliamentarians in the Netherlands for drug
smuggling incited calls by the opposition for the resignation of the Jugnauth
government. The incident exemplifies the difficulties of controlling Africa's
escalating drug problem when political elites appear to be, at the very least,
providing tacit approval for illict drug activities. Although Prime Minister
Jugnauth appears to have averted a political crisis, the fallout from the drug
scandal places the opposition in a stronger position to call for an early general
election.
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