NARCOTICS REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00685R000100060002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of SEtI
Intelligence
Narcotics Review
DI NR 85-004
October 1985
Copy /l 2 3
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Secret
Narcotics Review
1 Thailand: Drug Trafficking in the South i
Southern Thailand is growing in importance as a transit area for Golden Triangle
narcotics destined for Malaysia and en route to markets throughout Asia and
Europe. Enforcement efforts in the south, although recently improved with the
advent of cooperation between the Thai and the Malaysians, have had little effect
on the drug trade.
7 International: Covert Ether Production, Viable Alternative
for Cocaine Traffickers
Efforts to control the movement of ether, a key cocaine-processing chemical, have
caused significant bottlenecks in the cocaine supply chain. Our analysis indicates
that a simple and cheap method of manufacturing this chemical is available to
traffickers that would allow them to manage more efficiently the cocaine-refining
process and boost cocaine output.
Saudi Arabia: A Developing Drug Problem
coordination, are likely to be expanded to fight the problem.
The drug problem in Saudi Arabia is small in comparison with other Middle
Eastern countries, but it is growing rapidly. The presence of a large foreign
community and the increased exposure of Saudi youth to Western drug cultures
are primarily responsible for the recent proliferation of drugs in the Kingdom.
Government enforcement efforts, currently hampered by lack of cooperation and
rising number of addicts signal an uphill battle ahead.
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi has pushed tough legislation through Parliament to
crack down on India's growing drug problem. Although the new laws update
obsolete, century-old statutes, official corruption, trafficker intransigence, and the
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17 Italy: Organized Crime and the Drug Trade
Italian law enforcement authorities view drugs and organized crime as inextricably
linked and classify them as the top law enforcement priority. The government is
increasing the amount of resources devoted to narcotics and has reorganized
groups involved in drug control. Despite some progress, we believe the Mafia
cannot be defeated as long as virtually unlimited supplies of drugs are available in
the Mediterranean region.
23 Worldwide Narcotics Highlights
A summary of key developments from 1 August to 1 October 1985.
In pocket Narcotics Smuggling: Major Routes and Cultivation Areas
Included at the back of this issue is an unclassified map showing international
trafficking routes, major narcotics crop areas, and drug money centers.
This review is published bimonthly by the Directorate of Intelligence and
examines international, regional, and functional issues related to the worldwide
drug problem. Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well
as other US Government agencies will be considered for publication. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Terrorism/Narcotics
Analysis Division,
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Thailand: Drug Trafficking
in the South
Drug trafficking through southern Thailand, for years
a secondary method for transporting Golden Triangle
opiates to markets in Malaysia and Europe, is
becoming a lucrative and growing business. Tighter
enforcement in northern Thailand has periodically
disrupted trafficking to Bangkok, traditionally the
primary exit for narcotics leaving the Golden
Triangle. Favorable market conditions in the south
also appear to be responsible for the increased
activity. The price of heroin in southern Thailand has
dropped steadily in the past three years, but it is still
more than two times higher than in northern
Thailand. Traffickers are expanding their businesses
and handling larger shipments to accommodate the
growing demand. Although the number of seizures in
the south has been relatively constant in the past few
years, US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
officials in Songkhla report that the weight seized has
risen 20 to 30 percent each year, a clear indication
that the drug trade in the south is big business and not
the small-time operation it used to be.
The Road to Market
We estimate that 15 to 20 percent-roughly 30 to 40
metric tons each year-of the Golden Triangle crop
that is exported transits southern Thailand. Although
all forms of opiates are trafficked through the south,
DEA officials in Songkhla believe that most is opium
and heroin. Some morphine continues to transit the
south, but traditional buyers of the opiate are
switching to heroin base to avoid the conversion
process that requires the use of the controlled
substance, acetic anhydride (see figure).
DEA officials in Songkhla estimate that at least 80
percent of the narcotics transiting southern Thailand
is bought by Malaysian buyers. Opium entering the
south is either consumed by Malaysian Chinese
smokers or en route to other Asian markets. Most, if
not all, of the morphine and heroin base is destined for
Pinang Province where it is refined into "smoking"
heroin, the drug of choice among Malaysia's 250,000
addicts. The higher purity heroin of the type injected
by addicts in the United States has few users in
Southeast Asia and transits southern Thailand on its
way to markets in Europe.
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Thai and Malaysian officials deny that there
is opium processing in the area. The great volume of
opium coming to southern Thailand, however,
suggests that opium is being processed in the Thai-
Malaysian border area. Small heroin laboratories
have been seized along the Malaysian border and
acetic anhydride has been transported into rubber
plantations around the Sadao district in Thailand.
These plantations are owned by wealthy Chinese,
some of whom are known traffickers. The border area
east of Sadao is controlled by Malaysian Communists,
and they could be protecting laboratories in this
region. DEA officials in Songkhla report that the
Communists provide security to traffickers smuggling
The Trafficking Network
The typical traffickers in southern Thailand are
ethnic Chinese businessmen based in Hat Yai, the
commercial center of the south and the hub for
smuggling and money laundering. They operate in
well-organized networks that include suppliers in
northern Thailand and buyers in other Asian
countries, primarily Malaysia. Traffickers in the
south may control only one aspect of the narcotics
business or may have a more diversified role. There
are a multitude of small traffickers who control only
one segment of the trade (for example, buying from
one broker to sell to another). DEA officials in
Songkhla know of at least 10 to 15 large groups
operating in the south, but the number is probably
much higher. These major traffickers handle
shipments from supplier to buyer and smuggle
Secret
DI NR 85-004
October 1985
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Figure 1
Southern Thailand Exit Routes for Golden Triangle Narcotics
Bangladesh
Indian
Ocean
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
Gulf
of
Thailand
Trafficking route
O Major narcotics
cultivation area
South
China
Sea
Malaysia
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Figure 2
Opium Refining
Extraction (10: I)a
Crude morphine base
(No. 1 Heroin)
Conversion (1:1)b
using acetic anhydride
Crude heroin base
(No. 2 Heroin)
a I part morphine is extracted from 10 parts opium.
b I part herion is converted from I part morphine.
Smoking heroin
(No. 3 Heroin)
Pure heroin
(No. 4 Heroin)
consumer goods or acetic anhydride from Malaysia
into Thailand using the same networks.
A typical narcotics transaction begins when the buyer
places an order with a broker, who then contacts his
source of supply in Bangkok or northern Thailand.
The supplier normally controls the load until it
reaches the south where it is turned over to the
broker. The broker is responsible for delivering the
narcotics to the buyer. The majority of the narcotics
are transported south via private auto, hidden in false
gas tanks. Narcotics also come by train, bus, domestic
airline, and by fishing trawler traveling down the Gulf
of Thailand. Once in the south, the drugs are stashed
in Hat Yai or towns along the Malaysian border
before transport by the broker's couriers to Malaysia
by land or sea.
Trafficking occurs along the entire Thai-Malaysian
border, especially at the established border crossings
that have good roads. The 12-kilometer stretch
between Pedang Besar and Sadao is one of the
shortest routes into Malaysia and a popular
smuggling route. Smugglers either cross at the
customs checkpoints at these two towns or traverse
the border surreptitiously through the rubber
plantations in the area. Traffickers also use ports on
the Andaman Sea-primarily Satun, but also Krabi,
Phuket, and Ranong-as exit points to move narcotics
and other contraband to Malaysia and Singapore.
Drugs are often hidden with tin ore and rubber
shipments or are smuggled on small boats posing as
fishing trawlers.
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Figure 3
Thai-Malaysian Border
Sura=
(Thant
Krabi
Malaysian Communist primary
operation area
Railroad
- Road
0 50 100 Kilometers
0 50 100 Nautical Miles
South
China
Sea
Indonesia'
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Enforcement Record
The Thai Government has sporadically attempted'to
crack down on drug smuggling in the south, but
official corruption and incompetence hinders
enforcement efforts. In some areas of the south,
provincial and marine police units have been
completely co-opted by traffickers. According to DEA
officials in Songkhla, smugglers notify these officials
when one of their boats is leaving and are guaranteed
safe passage. In big smuggling centers such as Sadao
and Satun, Customs officials already in place are
notoriously corrupt, and new ones are usually bought
off within a month of arrival, according to DEA
officials in Songkhla
The enforcement units tasked specifically against
narcotics-the Office of the Narcotics Control board
and the Police Narcotics Suppression Center-are
more effective. These units have a close working
relationship with DEA officials in Songkhla and have
a spectacular record of arrests of major traffickers
and drug seizures. In addition, the new Customs
director for southern Thailand has a reputation for
honesty and has already made several seizures of
goods being smuggled out of the country, including 47
kilograms of heroin-more than the total amount
seized in the previous five years.
Increased cooperation between Thai and Malaysian
officials is also improving the enforcement picture.
Friction arose between the two countries in the early
1980s when Kuala Lumpur complained that the Thai
were not doing enough to prevent narcotics from
entering Malaysia. Although some of this feeling
remains, both governments are now trying to work
together to attack drug trafficking across their
common border. In the past year, the Thai have
passed information to the Malaysians that resulted in
also are beginning their first-ever joint enforcement
operation.
of a fence with a parallel road and patrol towers along
the border in the Sadao area and tighter security by
both governments have increased the risk for
traffickers moving narcotics by land routes. As a
result, many traffickers are switching to boats to
transport narcotics to Malaysia, which gives them the
edge over enforcement officials. Customs officials and
marine police lack the equipment necessary to patrol
effectively the long coastline.
The tighter enforcement is driving some small
organizations out of the drug business in the border
area. Larger networks, however, have the resources to
withstand government pressure. Although a large
broker may halt operations temporarily if a shipment
is seized, he is not likely to abandon the drug trade.
Also, in the absence of a conspiracy law, the Thai
have found it exceedingly difficult to press charges
against brokers acting behind the scenes. Growing
Thai-Malaysian cooperation, however, may enable
enforcement agencies to attack a larger segment of
the networks spanning the two countries-resulting in
the arrest of brokers and buyers, for instance, rather
than isolated traffickers.
Outlook
The improved enforcement has disrupted the trade in
southern Thailand, forcing traffickers to turn to new
methods to transport drugs. Kuala Lumpur's erection
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International: Covert Ether
Production, Viable Alternative
for Cocaine Traffickers
Ethyl ether, the key chemical used to convert cocaine
base to cocaine hydrochloride (HCL), has been the
focus of US unilateral and multilateral control efforts.
The success of this program has driven the black-
market price of a 55-gallon drum of ether, which sells
on the open market in the United States for under
$200, to $4,000 in Brazil and to $7,000 in Colombia
in February 1985. As ether becomes more difficult
and expensive to procure, trafficking organizations
are increasingly seeking alternative means of
obtaining it, but this can be complicated and
cumbersome.
Some traffickers have sought substitutes for ether or
tried to develop a refining process that does not
require it.' Perhaps the most effective way for
traffickers to solve the problem would be to produce
ether themselves.
our analysis
indicates that not only is covert ether production a
feasible, relatively low-cost alternative, but it also
offers a number of advantages over current chemical
procurement methods.
flows to a storage tank. Details of this process are
available in many standard reference books on
chemical technology.
Equipment and Manpower Needs
The major pieces of chemical equipment required for
the process are a reactor, a scrubber, and a
fractionating column; pumps, piping, valves, and
gauges also would be required. The process would
require electricity and a source of steam. Most of this
equipment is available from new and used chemical
equipment suppliers throughout the world. The
fractionating tower would probably be smaller than
most in commercial use and might have to be specially
fabricated. A chemist, or preferably a chemical
engineer, would probably be required to design and
set up the process layout. Additional technicians and
labor would be required to operate the unit.
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Raw Material Availability
The process requires only ethanol, sulfuric acid, and 25X1
sodium hydroxide (caustic soda), commonly available
commercial chemicals. Ethanol is a widely used
solvent, antifreeze, chemical building block, and, of
course, beverage. In addition, in Brazil it is produced
The Process
Most ether today is produced as a byproduct in huge
integrated petrochemical plants, but an older process
exists that uses simple equipment and requires raw
materials that are easy to obtain. This process
converts ethanol (ethyl alcohol) to ether by
dehydrating it with sulfuric acid (see figure). The
ethanol and sulfuric acid are charged into a reactor
that is heated with steam to 125 to 140 degrees
Centigrade. A mixture of water, alcohol, and ether
vapors from the reactor are passed through a
scrubber. In the scrubber, sodium hydroxide removes
any remaining acid. The vapors are then separated in
a fractionating column with unreacted ethanol
recycled to the reactor. The ether is condensed and
in massive quantities as synthetic fuel. Sulfuric acid is
by far the most widely used industrial chemical, and
large amounts are consumed by the fertilizer,
chemical, petroleum refining, iron and steel, fiber,
and other industries. Sodium hydroxide, also known
as lye, is the most important commercial caustic, used
in chemical, pulp, paper, soap, textile, and other
industries. All three of these chemicals are widely
produced in massive quantities and are shipped to
numerous consumers, making effective control of
them a practical impossibility.
Space Requirements
Any trafficking organization attempting to build and
operate an ether plant would have few problems
Secret
DI NR 85-004
October 1985
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Ethyl ether
A
V
Ethyl alcohol
finding a suitable location. A small ether plant could
produce about 250 liters per day. This would supply
enough ether to process about 445 kilograms of
cocaine HCL per month and could meet the needs of
a major organization.2 It would occupy only a small
area, perhaps 7 meters on a side. The largest piece of
equipment would be a fractionating column about 5
meters tall and less than 1 meter in diameter.
Additional space would be needed for feedstock,
product storage, and steam and electric generators.
Such a plant could be located almost anywhere, with
the fractionating column its only distinguishing piece
of equipment.
Economic Feasibility
Our preliminary analysis of the costs of covert ether
manufacturing indicates that the process offers
traffickers significant cost advantages. Our
z The cocaine production estimate is based on the assumption that
12 kilograms of ether are needed to produce 1 kilogram of cocaine
hypothetical plant would require ethanol feedstocks of
about 1.4 liters for each liter of ether produced, or
about 50 55-gallon drums of ethanol per month to
produce 35 drums of ether. Sulfuric acid and sodium
hydroxide requirements would be minimal-one or
two drums of each-as would their cost. At normal
commercial prices, ethanol feedstocks cost about $140
per drum in the United States and as low as $75 in
Brazil. A small processing plant would require about
$7,000 worth of ethanol plus transportation and other
costs to produce 35 drums of ether monthly. The costs
of buying the same amount of ether on the Brazilian
black market would run about $140,000, and as much
as $245,000 on the Colombian black market. Even
after factoring in other costs such as transportation,
utilities, labor, equipment, or premiums for
feedstocks, operating a covert ether-processing plant
would be far cheaper than purchasing ether in the
current chemical-control environment.
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Advantages of Covert Ether Production
Aside from the cost savings, a steady and reliable
supply of ether from his own processing plant would
offer a trafficker the opportunity to manage more
efficiently the cocaine supply chain and ultimately to
boost cocaine HCL output. A major bottleneck in the
multistep conversion of coca leaf to cocaine HCL is
caused by the unreliability of the ether supplies
needed to manufacture HCL. If ether is temporarily
unavailable, a trafficker is either forced to store
cocaine paste or base-during which time cocaine
content is lost at a rapid rate-or to leave coca leaf on
the bush and possibly miss a harvest. Both result in
lower cocaine output and profits than the trafficker
could achieve with an assured ether supply.
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Saudi Arabia:
A Developing Drug Problem
The drug problem in Saudi Arabia is small in
comparison to other Middle Eastern countries, but it
probably is one of the fastest growing in the region.
Although precise statistics are not available, Saudi
and US Embassy officials report that the number of
drug users and the availability of drugs in the
kingdom have risen dramatically over the past 10
years. The presence of a large foreign community and
the increased exposure of many young Saudis to the
drug cultures of Europe and the United States are
primarily responsible for the proliferation of illicit
drug use. Growing networks in the kingdom that deal
in drugs and other contraband such as alcohol could
be exploited at some point for subversive purposes,
such as to facilitate the surreptitious entry of guns
and explosives.
Increased Use of Illicit Drugs in the Kingdom
The developing drug problem in Saudi Arabia is
viewed by most Saudis, including those in the
government, as typical of the evils of the outside-
particularly Western-world. Aside from a small
quantity of qat (a shrub cultivated for its leaves and
buds that are the source of a habituating stimulant
when chewed or used as a tea) that is grown in some
sections of the southwestern provinces of Asir and
Najran, virtually no drugs are produced in the
kingdom.
The use of drugs like hashish and opium occurs
among all social and economic groups throughout the
country. Other drugs, such as cocaine, amphetamines,
barbituates, and-on a more limited scale-heroin,
are used only in the larger cities and the foreign
worker compounds, and by the indigenous upper class.
Working-level Saudi drug officials believe that
cocaine is the fastest growing drug problem in the
The austerity of Saudi society is partly responsible for
drug use among young Saudis and Westerners
working in the kingdom,
Several young Saudis who
were arrested in Jiddah for cocaine possession
admitted to Saudi police officers that, although they
acquired "social drug habits" in the United States,
they used drugs more frequently in the kingdom out
of boredom. US Embassy officials report that cocaine
parties where young Saudis, Americans, and
Europeans intermingle are regular weekend events in
Jiddah and Riyadh.
Although the Saudi Government is aware of the
growing drug problem and has taken steps to curtail
the availability of drugs within the kingdom, Saudi
officials have not publicly admitted that drug use
among Saudis is on the rise. Government hesitation to
go public on the problem probably reflects a concern
that educating Saudi youth on the dangers of drug
abuse would risk a concomitant increase in
experimentation. Drug seizures are rarely publicized,
and, when they are, they usually involve non-Saudis.
Media treatment of narcotics revolves around the
portrayal of drugs as a manifestation of corrupt
Western ways rather than a social phenomenon that is
increasingly affecting young Saudis.
Sources of Illicit Drugs
Illicit drugs enter Saudi Arabia from many countries
and by many means. In a meeting with a visiting US
official in late 1983, Saudi Minister of Interior Prince
Nayif stated that Pakistan is Saudi Arabia's major
US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
officials in Pakistan have developed information that
some Pakistani traffickers smuggle heroin to Saudi
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DI NR 85-004
October 1985
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Arabia via the mail and consignments of fruit. Most
hashish shipments come from Lebanon (via overland
truck routes through Jordan), Egypt, and Sudan (via
cargo and passenger ships). Most cocaine is brought
into the kingdom by Westerners and Saudis via
transit points in Europe and the United States.
Government Enforcement
In addition to the regular police force of the Ministry
of Interior, three government agencies are directly
involved in the interdiction of illicit drugs and the
sentencing of drug offenders in Saudi Arabia:
? The Customs Department is responsible for the
interdiction of drugs at airports, seaports, and
border crossings. It makes most drug seizures in the
kingdom. The Customs Department is headed by a
director general who reports directly to the minister
of finance. Canine detection teams
have been used effectively
by Saudi Customs since 1982 at the major
international airports, and the government plans to
employ 121 dog handlers at airports, seaports, and
border crossings throughout Saudi Arabia by the
end of 1987.
? The Office of Narcotics Police is responsible for the
arrest and prosecution of drug offenders. It is
nominally under the Division of Public Security
within the Ministry of Interior, but it operates with
considerable autonomy. Headquartered in Riyadh,
it has about a dozen regional offices throughout the
kingdom and, according to senior narcotics police
officials, about 200 full-time officers.
? The Office of Narcotics Abuse, which is a
subsection of the Ministry of Interior, reviews all
drug convictions within the kingdom and
recommends sentences in accordance with
administrative decrees governing drug abuse. This
office, rather than Islamic law courts, determines
sentences in drug cases because narcotics-unlike
alcohol-are a relatively modern phenomenon not
specifically proscribed by Islamic law. It
coordinates the processing of drug cases with the
Office of Narcotics Police, the Islamic law courts
(where guilt or innocence is assessed), and the
provincial emirates, which must confirm sentences
for cases within their jurisdiction.
Drug Seizures
The fledgling network for importing and distributing
drugs in Saudi Arabia is growing and is becoming
increasingly sophisticated. Because of the
concealment devices now used, Saudi drug officials
believe that the bulk of illicit drugs entering the
kingdom are being brought in by experienced drug
traffickers. drug arrests
in 1983 and 1984 revealed connections to known
international drug dealers in Europe and Southeast
Asia.
Some significant drug seizures that US Embassy
officials are aware of include:
? November 1982: 300 kilos of hashish concealed in a
false-bottom truck crossing the Saudi-Jordanian
border.
? 1983: 80 kilos of hashish concealed in a shipment of
tabletops crossing the Saudi-Jordanian border.
? March 1983: 1,600 kilos of Lebanese hashish
concealed in the walls of prefabricated houses in Al
Jawf.
? July 1984: 4 kilos of heroin concealed in the walls of
prefabricated houses in Al Jawf.
? August 1984: 1 kilo of cocaine concealed in the
carry-on luggage of a Saudi national studying in the
United States arriving at King Abd al-Aziz Airport
in Jiddah.
? September 1984: 3 kilos of heroin taped to the body
of a Nigerian national arriving at King Abd al-Aziz
Airport in Jiddah.
According to US Embassy officials, there is frequent
lack of cooperation and coordination among the
government agencies concerned with drug issues.
Competition between the Narcotics Police and the
Saudi Customs is particularly acute, especially since
mid-1982 when the Saudi Government introduced
rewards for drug seizures. Based on the black-market
value of the drug seized, government officials receive
gold watches, money, cars, or land.
Ithe sharing of
information among agencies has declined steadily
since the introduction of rewards.
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Despite bureaucratic infighting, increased
government enforcement efforts have been successful,
and the number of drug seizures has increased
significantly since 1979. According to Saudi narcotics
officials, 200 drug-related arrests were made in 1979,
more than 1,000 in 1982, and over 4,600 in 1983 (the
first full year of the reward system). Some of these
seizures were of a significant amount of drugs.
The Saudis have relied on stiff penalties for drug
infractions to serve as deterrents to potential drug
offenders. Current sentencing calls for two years for
ingestion, five years for distribution, and 15 years for
importation. There are indications Riyadh is
considering even tougher sentencing for drug abusers
and traffickers, especially expatriates. The US
Embassy has reported that the Saudi Government is
considering the application of the death penalty for
the importation of large amounts of drugs into the
kingdom.
Detention Centers for Drug Offenders
In several of the kingdom's larger cities, the Narcotics
Police operate detention centers where individuals
charged with drug offenses are held until court
appearances. Time spent in the detention centers can
range from several hours to two and a half years-as
was the case of one unfortunate Afghan in the Jiddah
detention center.
US Embassy officials who have had access to the
detention center in Jiddah over the past two years
report it is small and crowded. From September 1982
until October 1984, the number of detainees at the
center ranged between 20 and 90. Detainees are held
in two large rooms, each with no more than 25 beds.
Detainees sleep on the floor when their numbers
exceed 50.E
According to US Embassy officials who interviewed
detainees, Saudi guards frequently use heavyhanded
interrogation tactics to elicit confessions. Bastinado,
deprivation of food and sleep, and threats of physical
abuse are common. Lower-class Saudis, Yemenis,
Asians, and Africans receive the worst treatment.
Americans and West Europeans are treated well
guardians or are held in regular prisons.
because of close monitoring by embassy and consular
officers. Meals are considered adequate by the
detainees, but sanitation is poor and the heat is
usually oppressive. There are no trained medical
personnel at the center and no facilities for drug-
related problems. There are no accommodations for
women. Women charged with drug-related offenses
are either remanded to the custody of their male
Security at the detention center is lax, and US
Embassy officials have been told by Saudi guards that
at least two detainees a week walk out of the center
unnoticed.
illicit drugs that have been seized by the police and
kept at the center as evidence frequently disappear.
After sentencing, drug offenders are sent to regular
Saudi prisons. Prison sentences are reduced by the
amount of time spent in the detention center.
Prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation programs
for drug abuse are minimal. The psychiatric sections
of some hospitals provide limited drug abuse and
addiction treatment, but they do so independent of
any government-sponsored program.
The Hajj: Peak Period of Drug Trafficking
Drug trafficking is at its peak in Saudi Arabia during
the hajj-the annual religious pilgrimage when nearly
2 million Muslims from all over the world converge on
Mecca to perform five days of religious rites. Saudi
drug officials have told US Embassy officials that
about half of all drug seizures made in the kingdom
each year take place during the monthlong pilgrimage
season. Many pilgrims finance their trip to Mecca by
selling drugs in the kingdom or by buying drugs to sell
in their native countries.
the pilgrims most involved with drug trafficking come
from Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, Africa, and
Southeast Asia. Although some of the pilgrims are
experienced drug traders who deal in large quantities,
Saudi Customs officials claim that most bring
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relatively small quantities into the kingdom.
According to Saudi Customs officials, an elderly
woman tried to walk through a customs checkpoint
during the 1984 pilgrimage with a gram of heroin
clasped in her hand.
Saudi Customs Department canine detection teams
monitor selected incoming pilgrimage flights-
particularly those coming from Pakistan-at the hajj
terminal at King Abd al-Aziz Airport in Jiddah.
Although police checkpoints in and around the city of
Mecca are designed primarily to interdict weapons
and deter potential troublemakers, drug seizures are
frequent. pilgrims who
have only a small amount of drugs for personal use
are usually deported. Pilgrims with large quantities
who are believed to be selling drugs are arrested,
detained, and-if found guilty-sent to prison.
Prospects
Drug abuse in Saudi Arabia is likely to grow over the
next decade as an increasing number of young Saudis
are exposed to the West, and the foreign population of
the kingdom remains high. An austere social
environment in combination with large amounts of
disposable income makes Saudi Arabia a fertile
ground for proliferation of drug activities.
Government efforts to interdict illicit drugs and deter
illicit drug activities are likely to be expanded as the
problem grows. Sentences for drug offenders,
particularly importers, are likely to be stiffened.
Although the Saudi Government will continue to
emphasize drug control and interdiction training for
its authorities, cost considerations in a period of
budget austerity may curtail some programs and
prevent the purchase of sophisticated detection
equipment.
The demonstrated ability of black-marketeers to
permeate Saudi borders could be exploited for
political purposes. Established networks for smuggling
drugs into the kingdom may be used for the
surreptitious entry of other contraband such as guns,
explosives, and propaganda. Drug smuggling in the
kingdom already piggybacks on more established and
extensive alcohol smuggling networks.
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India: Gandhi's New
Drug Initiatives
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, sensitized to narcotics
problems in his June visit to the United States and
stung by a flurry of press articles on India as a drug-
trafficking center, has recently pushed legislation
through Parliament to crack down on illicit narcotics.
The new measures:
? Impose stiff penalties on narcotics traffickers.
? Establish a national narcotics enforcement agency.
? Control the illegal shipment of an essential heroin
precursor chemical, acetic anhydride.
India had been operating under obsolete antinarcotics
legislation, dating back to 1867, that levied minuscule
fines and minimum prison terms of little deterrent
value. Although the new Narcotic Drug and
Psychotropic Substances Act falls short of either
Pakistan's or Sri Lanka's harsh new penalties for drug
offenses, it does reflect growing regional awareness of
the need to curb the subcontinent's rampant drug
trade in opium, heroin, and hashish.
major drug-trafficking center. Indian Government
statistics show domestic heroin seizures have shot up
sixfold, and worldwide drug arrest reports
increasingly cite Indian ports as transshipment points
for narcotics. At the same time, addiction is
increasing in Indian cities with hard drugs cheap and
readily available even to schoolchildren, according to
Indian press reporting.
India has an extensive licit cultivation of opium, and
some of this may be diverted to illicit channels, but
most of the drugs trafficked through India come from
neighboring countries,
Working with traffickers from
Southwest and Southeast Asia, Indian smugglers open
up new routes from the Golden Crescent and the
Golden Triangle as fast as the Thai, Burmese, and
Pakistani Governments can close them down. 0
Tough Penalties
The new antidrug legislation provides for minimum
10-year sentences for possession, sale, cultivation,
trafficking, or conspiracy in narcotics. The maximum
sentence for repeat offenses is 30 years with fines up
to $25,000. The new law gives prosecutors some key
advantages. Defendants tried under this act will be
presumed guilty, and prosecutors have been provided
with a new plea bargaining system granting immunity
to accused traffickers who cooperate fully with
government investigators.
Police are also given new search and seizure powers
that can be exercised without judicial warrants.
New Central Agency
The Central Economic Intelligence Bureau (CEIB)
has been created to coordinate the actions of the
numerous government agencies involved in narcotics
affairs. The CEIB will have a charter much like the
US Drug Enforcement Agency's in coordinating
narcotics intelligence, enforcement, and maintenance
of programs for addicts. Gandhi appointed M. L.
Wadhawan, an experienced narcotics intelligence
official from the Ministry of Finance, to head the
CEIB, and, according to US Embassy reporting, he
has given Wadhawan a "blank check" to get the new
agency going. Wadhawan recently commented to a
visiting US Congressional delegation that his Bureau
plans to cooperate with neighboring Pakistan and
Burma to fight growing trafficking across common
borders.7-1
In addition, acetic anhydride, an essential chemical in
the manufacture of heroin from opium, was placed
under the Essential Chemicals Act in order to impose
strict control over its distribution. India is one of the
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October 1985
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world's largest producers of acetic anhydride, which is
used in a variety of common industrial applications.
Through the years the Indian product has been
smuggled to Burma, Pakistan, and Afghanistan for
use in heroin refining. Indian officials suspect that
diversion of the chemical for such illicit purposes has
reached enormous proportions.
Outlook
Gandhi's actions reflect the realization that he has a
growing social dilemma on his hands and that India is
not exempt from the worldwide drug problem.
Although Indian police and prosecutors now have
improved tools to wage war on drug trafficking and
abuse, they will still have to overcome what is
probably substantial corruption associated with the
narcotics trade. Given the enormous amounts of
money involved in the drug trade, we judge corruption
will prove an obstacle to putting the new legislation to
work effectively.
Tougher laws do not ensure a significant reduction in
illicit narcotics activity. Enhanced enforcement
measures will probably inspire traffickers to fight
back with more resourceful smuggling techniques and
routes, bigger and better placed bribes, and products
that are more easily concealed and more profitable-
such as heroin rather than opium.
Dealing with source countries, Pakistan and Burma
remain yet another difficult hurdle for the Indian
Government. Strains in relations between India and
Pakistan are likely to limit cooperation on narcotics.
Ethnic unrest in the states bordering Burma probably
will complicate efforts to interdict illicit traffic from
that quarter.
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Italy: Organized Crime and
the Drug Trade
Italian Government officials, drug experts, and law
enforcement authorities view drugs and organized
crime as inextricably linked problems. Over the last
decade, the Mafia and other organized crime groups
in Italy have come to play an increasingly important
role in drug processing, trafficking, and distribution.
The drug trade is so lucrative that it outstrips all other
traditional areas of illicit activity combined. Extensive
bloodshed among Mafia clans for control of the trade
has helped to alienate the public and to prompt
previously unthinkable official statements and public
demonstrations against the Mafia.
Patterns of Narcotics Trafficking
The Sicilian Mafia controls much of the heroin
trafficking to the United States and Western Europe.
The most recent estimates by US and Italian
authorities indicate that from 60 to 80 percent of the
heroin arriving on the east coast of the United States
is either shipped, processed, or brokered through
Italy, mainly Sicily. The Mafia's primacy in the
international heroin trade was facilitated by the
disruption of the Corsican-run "French connection"
in the early 1970s when the Mafia was able to expand
into all stages of drug trafficking-importation,
processing, refining, transshipment, distribution, and
sales.
To obtain raw material for their heroin conversion
laboratories, the Mafia developed trafficking
networks from Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan
through eastern Turkey and the Middle East to Italy.
A leading Italian magistrate told a US Senate
subcommittee in 1984 that much of the heroin sold in
Italy comes from Lebanon and Syria via land routes
through Turkey, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. Italian
authorities recently reported that the Mafia has also
established trafficking networks in Thailand and uses
its own cargo vessels to transport opiates between the
southwestern coast of Thailand and Sicily.
The US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
reports that, when heroin production in Italy
increased in the late 1970s, Italian authorities
believed it was confined to three rather widely
separated areas of Italy-western Sicily, the area
around Milan, and the San Remo area near the
French border. These different production operations
almost certainly were interrelated; according to DEA
officials, the Milan-area operations responded to
production and distribution strategies developed by
the Sicilian Mafia.
Italian authorities report that the Mafia, with the
apparent approval of its US-based counterpart, helped
bring other Italian organized crime elements-
including the Calabrian 'Ndrangheta and particularly
the Nuover Camorra Organizzata of Naples-into
drug trafficking in a significant way in 1981 and
1982. Evidence indicates that the Mafia intended the
Calabrian and Neapolitan groups to serve as
distributors of heroin domestically and abroad, and
not participate in its processing, although some
reports around that time suggested there were heroin
laboratories in the Reggio di Calabria area. The
Camorra, by contrast, appears to have moved
successfully into the cocaine trade (see inset).
Domestically, the Mafia markets heroin from both
Southeast and Southwest Asia through areas
controlled by crime bosses. There are few independent
traffickers; those that exist probably are tolerated by
the Mafia as no real threat, or must share their profits
and contacts with the Mafia in order to operate. Such
apparently was the case with a Sri Lankan network
broken up by Italian authorities last year.
Italian officials have determined that a large
percentage of the heroin entering Italy comes in at
Trieste via private vehicles and sealed trucks not
liable for customs inspection under international
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October 1985
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According to US I officials, the Neapolitan
Camorra has moved aggressively into cocaine
trafficking. Press reports indicate that the US
crackdown on cocaine smuggling from South
America in the last few years has enabled the
Camorra to take up the slack with Bolivian,
Colombian, and Peruvian suppliers who previously
had dealt only with US traffickers.
Italian authorities believe some cocaine couriers
travel by commercial airlines to other countries in
Europe and then by train to Italy. Their goal,
is both to conceal their
original point of departure and to avoid airport
controls in Rome and Milan, where trained "sniffer"
dogs are routinely employed. Some of the cocaine
that arrives directly in Italy is then transshipped to
other West European countries. With relatively open
borders among EC countries, smuggling by
automobile is common.
According to the US Embassy, cocaine distribution
within Italy is organized mainly through a few
distributors who deal with outlets-mainly clubs and
restaurants-that deal directly with consumers.
Compartmentation of this distribution network has
made the task of ferreting out major traffickers even
more difficult, according to authorities. US drug
officials in Rome report that in the capital cocaine is
sold on the streets like heroin. The US Embassy
quotes an estimated price for cocaine in 1984 as $40
to $80 per gram for a probable purity level of 70 to 80
percent.
The drop in cocaine seizures last year, however,
combined with signs of the drug's increasing
availability suggests that traffickers and dealers are
becoming more resourceful in eluding authorities by
altering or varying patterns of distribution and sales.
The mushrooming cocaine market may be the next
battleground for organized crime, as ruthless young
criminals try to seize a share of it. Such clashes
could involve splits within the Camorra or outright
conflict between the Camorra and the Mafia, which
almost certainly wants to retain primary control of
convention. According to diplomatic reporting, local
authorities in the border city are concerned that it is
becoming the major transit point for Middle Eastern
heroin en route to Italy and other West European
countries. In the first 10 months of 1984, customs
agents in Trieste seized more than 60 kilos of heroin.
The pattern of seizures
however, indicate that heroin also comes in by ship
and by air through virtually every port of entry. F
Drug Revenues and Money Laundering
Drug trafficking is the primary source of income for
organized crime in Italy. Italian officials last year
estimated that the amount of all business transacted
by the Mafia and similar groups may constitute 5
percent or more of the country's gross national
product, which was more than $345 billion in 1984.
Italian experts on organized crime estimate that in
1984 the turnover from the illegal importation,
brokering, refining, and selling of drugs was as high
as $8 billion. In comparison, Fiat-Italy's single
largest private employer-recorded sales in 1984 of
about $13 billion.
According to the US Embassy, Italian authorities
believe hundreds of millions of dollars in drug profits
are ploughed back into the local economies of
Palermo, Naples, Rome, and Milan. According to
organized crime specialists, Mafia families in the
United States pay suppliers in Sicily perhaps $1
billion annually, out of total earnings exceeding $2.5
billion from heroin sales. This is approximately the
amount the financial authorities say fuels Sicily's
underground economy each year, producing otherwise
inexplicable pockets of wealth amid the prevailing
squalor. In 1984, for example, Italian Government
figures ranked Palermo, the seat of the Mafia's drug
empire, 75th among the nation's cities in reported
income, with an unemployment rate of more than 16
percent compared with the national average of 10
percent. Yet, scores of new banks have opened in
Palermo in the past several years, and the city ranks
fifth among Italian cities in consumer spending on
goods and services. We believe the gap may be
the most profitable drugs.
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attributed more to drugs than to traditional tax
evasion and a thriving, non-drug-linked underground
economy. It provides as clear an indicator as is
available of the economic disparities created by the
Mafia's drug business.
Milan has become an important center for laundering
or reinvesting drug money. This source may account
for as much as 20 percent of Lombardy's gross
regional income, according to reputable Italian
economic journalists. As Italy's commercial and
industrial capital, Milan offers a range and diversity
of financial services and is convenient to Switzerland,
whose credit and banking institutions maintain close
ties to those in Milan. We do not know how much of
the drug revenues pass through Milan to Switzerland,
but many Italian banking and government officials
reportedly believe that the bulk of narcotics profits
stay in Italy and are invested there. This is a source of
considerable concern to Rome because such infusions
of capital increase the degree of criminal influence
and control in otherwise legitimate commercial and
industrial enterprises. F__1
To some extent, drug money also finances the national
debt-a source of particular concern to the
government because of the devastating political
impact of any evidence that "subsidies" from
organized crime help keep Italy's economy afloat.
Although mutual funds, gold, and diamonds are
popular means of investing and recycling drug profits,
the US Consulate in Palermo has reported that
Italian Treasury bonds and Post Office bonds also
play an important role. Treasury bonds offer
reasonable interest and as bearer bonds are an
effective vehicle for laundering money. Post Office
certificates earn approximately half the interest of
Treasury bonds, but the Mafia buys them because
their issuance procedure makes them virtually
untraceable. According to then Anti-Mafia
Commissioner DeFrancesco, the Italian Government's
difficulty selling Treasury bonds in 1983 was caused
in part by the Mafia's awareness that financial
investigators were monitoring bond sales.
According to Italian press reports earlier this year, the
Parliamentary Anti-Mafia Committee has launched
an investigation into the mechanics of the Mafia's
money-laundering operations. The committee has
retained a prominent banking and finance expert to
lead a probe of selected patterns of money recycling.
Investigators are focusing specifically on currency 25X1
regulations, identifying the true owners of stock in
lending institutions, and examining a variety of
fraudulent banking operations. The findings
reportedly will form the basis for new legislation in
this area
The Surge in Anti-Mafia Sentiment
The growth of anti-Mafia attitudes in Sicily in the
past few years stems, in large measure, from the
organization's full-scale involvement in drug
processing and trafficking. A sharp increase in
violence among rival Mafia factions for control of the
drug trade has gone far to alienate the public in Sicily
and elsewhere, according to press and Embassy
reporting. The efforts of "young Turks" in the Mafia
to operate independently have exacerbated the
internecine struggles, which culminated in a record
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Omerta, the traditional "code of silence," still
conditions relations between law enforcement
authorities and most Sicilians, but a greater number
of people than ever before-especially young people-
are speaking out openly against organized crime.
many Sicilians 25X1
see the Mafia's decision to go heavily into the
narcotics trade as an attack on their most basic
values. The drug connection has also encouraged a
shift in attitude among some of the island's elite,
whose children were among the initial victims of the
increased availability of drugs.
Members of the clergy and the church hierarchy have
been the most vigorous proponents of a regional
campaign against the Mafia. Cardinal Salvatore
Pappalardo of Palermo-who began to denounce the
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Sicilian law enforcement authorities and gratitude
from many of his priests for his efforts to convince
Sicilians-and Italians generally-of the need to
resist the social and moral decay caused by organized
crime. The Cardinal's efforts were reenforced by Pope
John Paul II, who, in 1982 on the first papal visit to
Sicily in centuries, called on Sicilians to reject the
Mafia mentality.
The Cardinal's activism has, nonetheless, stirred
controversy; his predecessors avoided comment on the
Mafia, making Pappalardo's forthright appeals even
more jarring to Sicilian society. According to press
accounts, some members of Sicily's social and
political elite believe his anti-Mafia crusade threatens
their vested interests and would like to see him
transferred. When Pappalardo served Easter mass at
Sicily's main prison two years ago, no prisoners
attended-an occurrence widely interpreted as an
ominous warning from the Mafia. Four police
bodyguards carrying automatic weapons accompany
the Cardinal everywhere-evidence of his influence
and the dark power of the Mafia.
Catholic laymen of anti-Mafia conviction have been
assertive as well. The City of Man, a youthful anti-
Mafia civic group, successfully ran candidates in local
elections in Palermo in 1980 and captured about 10
percent of neighborhood government seats. One of the
group's leaders ran for mayor of Palermo in the May
1985 elections. Although unsuccessful, his candidacy
was symbolically significant and a boost for anti-
Mafia morale. Students from the University of
Palermo with ties to the group organized an anti-
Mafia campaign in 1983 aimed at teenagers.
According to Italian press reports, the group has
sought to cast the Mafia as an oppressor and exploiter
of the poor-a view at odds with the traditional 19th-
century folklore of the Mafia as defender of the
downtrodden
Enhanced media coverage of increasingly frequent
anti-Mafia statements by regional leaders, combined
with a program of anti-Mafia education adopted in
Sicilian schools last year, appears to be influential in
sparking public demonstrations against that
organization. According to press accounts, such
protests almost invariably link the Mafia to organized
drug trafficking:
? In an anti-Mafia march last fall, some 10,000
mostly young people boldly paraded through a
Mafia-infested suburb of Palermo.
? The Italian press gave prominent coverage to a
"March for Peace" in Palermo last New Year's day,
involving 5,000 people from throughout Italy. The
central theme of the march was an end to Mafia
violence, criminality, and drug trafficking.
? Last February, 5,000 schoolchildren accompanied
by parents, teachers, and prelates marched through
two Mafia-controlled quarters of Palermo, chanting
and carrying placards denouncing the Mafia and
drugs.
The Christian Democratic party, which has
dominated Sicilian politics in the postwar era,
supports the backlash against Mafia rule and
influence, but with some reluctance. Initially, the
party resisted efforts to expose Mafia control and
corruption of public officials because the party's
interests and its power base in Sicily have long been
enmeshed with those of the Mafia, making exposure a
risk to local politicians. The assassination by the
Mafia of the Christian Democratic president of
Sicily's regional government in 1980, coupled with
subsequent murders of political and law enforcement
officials, helped push the party toward a firmer anti-
Mafia position. Even then, it opposed enactment of an
anti-Mafia law until the assassination of Gen. Dalla
Chiesa-Prefect of Palermo and symbol of the
antinarcotics campaign-made such a position
politically indefensible.
As anti-Mafia policies take root, Christian
Democratic leaders in Sicily acknowledge the
importance of refurbishing the party's blackened
image. The party fielded fresh, "untainted"
candidates for the elections last May-as much as
two-thirds of their electoral list in some
municipalities-and many performed well. The
Christian Democratic leadership in Rome, however,
does not appear persuaded that an earnest campaign
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interests.
The Communist Party, on the other hand, has
strongly supported the campaign against the Mafia. It
strengthened this position in 1982, after the Mafia
assassinated the party's regional secretary, an
outspoken advocate of the need for an anti-Mafia law.
Communist opposition to the Mafia accords with the
party's record as the most forceful in raising narcotics
as a criminal, social, and political issue, according to
the US Embassy.
Outlook for Narcotics Enforcement
The Italian Government recently restructured the
groups involved in drug matters to improve
coordination among ministries and streamline
enforcement procedures. The key provisions of the
government's reorganization include:
? Establishment of an interagency National Policy
Council on Narcotics, chaired by the prime minister
and involving the ministers of health, interior,
justice, finance, and foreign affairs, all variously
concerned with the drug problem.
? Organization of an Interagency Committee on
Enforcement under the Interior Ministry that is
responsible for assuring equal utilization of the
three police forces.
? Creation of a National Observatory on the Drug
Phenomenon within the Interior Ministry to
centralize data on narcotics abuse, to establish
national standards for drug prevention and
rehabilitation programs, and to ensure that
treatment facilities are available.
US officials report that the new structure is proving
increasingly effective. It is hampered, however, by a
duality in the legal provisions for narcotics
suppression. On the one hand, the 10-year-old law
governing drug possession, use, and sale is quite
liberal; on the other hand, the anti-Mafia law of 1982
allows the government considerable scope in attacking
organized crime empires built with the proceeds from
Despite the progress, a number of factors, some of
them beyond the control of the Italian Government,
work against any real success. In recent talks with US
officials, Anti-Mafia Commissioner Boccia asserted
that the Mafia cannot be defeated unless some way is
found to destroy the traffic in narcotics, which
provides the vast sums of money with which "almost
anyone can be bought." We think few officials would
dispute Boccia's assessment. We believe, furthermore,
that criminal drug trafficking organizations
headquartered in Italy will continue to play a major
role in the heroin traffic as long as virtually unlimited
supplies of heroin-or the raw material to
manufacture it-are available in the Mediterranean
region. This situation is not likely to change unless
authorities in Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia, and
the Middle East can control narcotics production.
Similarly, the Camorra's cocaine traffic with South
America probably will continue to grow in the
absence of a successful, sustained program of crop
eradication and substitution in key producing
countries.
We also believe many Italian officials, especially
leaders of the Christian Democrats, will remain
reluctant to encourage anti-Mafia investigations that
could result in politically damaging revelations. Italy's
regional and municipal elections last May show
modest but positive signs that an anti-Mafia/antidrug
ethos may yet take root: Christian Democratic
candidates untainted by criminal associations, who
represent "renewal" in the party, fared well enough in
Sicily to demonstrate a moral victory of sorts. To
maintain this momentum, the party's leadership must
be convinced that it has more to lose by circling its
wagons in traditional bastions of electoral strength-
in organized crime's spawning grounds in southern
Italy-than by continuing to purge its ranks of Mafia-
linked local politicians. Southern voters' affirmation
in future elections of a trend of opposition to Mafia-
based regional politics may provide such incentive.
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drug trafficking.
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Worldwide Narcotics Highlights 25X1
Colombian drug traffickers may fear the threat of
members of his family, and other officials in the ministry.
extradition more than any other aspect of Colombia's drug crackdown. The US
Embassy in Bogota reports that drug traffickers, upset with the processing of
extradition requests, have threatened the lives of Minister of Justice Parejo,
a Supreme Court justice has received a letter warning that he
will be killed unless he attempts to nullify the extradition treaty.
lawyers for Jorge Ochoa, a Colombian drug kingpin
treaty even stronger.
jailed in Spain, are trying to have criminal charges brought against him in
Colombia so he can return there to stand trial instead of being extradited to the
United States. Traffickers fear their chances of being convicted and sentenced to
long jail terms are much greater in the United States, where there are severe
minimum sentencing requirements, than in Colombia, where they can use bribery,
intimidation, and coercion to try to stay out of jail. In light of the assassination last
year of Parejo's predecessor, Bonilla Lara, a strong advocate of extradition, and
the recent murder of the Superior Court judge investigating this case, authorities
are taking the death threats seriously. President Betancur, however, recently
assured the United States that his lawyers are working to make the extradition
now depicted as violent criminals increasingly tied to subversive groups.
Colombia's efforts to make the public more aware of the seriousness of the drug
problem and to build support for antinarcotics activities may be succeeding. Part
of this success is a result of the recent shift in media attitudes toward drug
traffickers. The US Embassy in Bogota reported in September that traffickers are
an increased willingness on the part of the press to openly
considerable support in the media
participation by US State Department officials. The media's turnaround may have
been influenced by elements of the business sector. Two of the country's major
trade associations have openly stated the need for more objective coverage of drug
activities, and a group of leading businessmen in El Valle reportedly submitted a
letter of President Betancur calling for stronger action against subservice
elements. In the past, traffickers has portrayed narcotics control efforts as US
interference in Colombia's internal affairs and used that theme to gain
discuss drug-related topics. On 25 September, Colombia's second-leading daily
newspaper sponsored a teleconference on narcotics affairs that included
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DI NR 85-004
October 1985
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Since taking office at the end of July, Peruvian President Alan Garcia has moved
swiftly to fulfill a campaign promise to crack down on drug trafficking. Within
three weeks, he authorized the first ever Peruvian-Colombian antidrug operation,
which resulted in the destruction of several clandestine airstrips and laboratories
near Leticia, Colombia. This remote area where Peru, Colombia, and Brazil meet
has become a center for Colombians manufacturing cocaine out of coca base and
paste flown in from Bolivia and Peru and chemicals imported from Brazil.
Authorities are keeping up the pressure, launching phase two of the operation with
fresh troops in early September. The seizure so far of five aircraft and more than a
ton of drugs and chemicals, the destruction of at least four sophisticated cocaine-
processing laboratories, and the continued presence of the troops in the area is
hindering trafficking operations, according to the US Embassy in Lima. No major
traffickers have been apprehended, however, and the trade is likely to resume if no
strong antinarcotics presence is maintained in Leticia once the operations are over.
Another front opened against the drug trade in Peru is President Garcia's
crackdown on official corruption through a sweeping reform of the police services.
discipline to these services, Garcia already has fired over 160 high-ranking
officials, 43 of them police generals. He has promised to remove additional
officers, including the commanders of the narcotics divisions. Garcia intends to
unite the various security agencies into one organization, to introduce legislation
that includes stiffer penalties for government officials guilty of drug-related
crimes, and to reorganize the judiciary as a warning to judges not to cover up
corruption in cases they try. The dismissals reportedly have caused morale in the
Investigative Police and Civil Guard to drop,
popularity and strong congressional support for the anticorruption campaign,
however, make police-led antigovernment actions unlikely.
drug traffickrs are threatening
violence to US and Peruvian drug control officials in retaliation for President
Garcia's drug control efforts. The US Embassy in Lima has unconfirmed reports
that hired assassins, allegedly of Colombian or Italian origin, attempted to enter
Peru in August to conduct unspecified actions against drug officials on behalf of
traffickers. In September, armed intruders broke into the home of the senior DEA
official in Lima. Although the agent was not there, the intruders beat up witnesses,
demanded the agent's weapons, and denounced him for attempting to destroy the
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drug trade. President Garcia believes death threats against him and his family are
the result of his police reform measures, If the
traffickers follow through on any of their threats, it would be a marked departure
from their habit of aiming violence and intimidation at uncooperative peasants,
lower level authorities, and eradication workers. Killing high-level officials could
backfire on the traffickers, prompting the government to intensify drug control
measures, including attempts to apprehend major traffickers, as happened after
drug officials were assassinated in C olombia and Mexico.
During his first two months in office, Bolivia's President Paz Estenssoro has
publicly supported the need for improved drug control. His administration,
however, has yet to draw up a comprehensive antinarcotics strategy or a timetable
for beginning coca eradication. Within a week after his inauguration, Paz met
with a delegation of key US legislators US Congressional sentiments that aid to
Bolivia be tied to coca eradication, and he pledged an attempt to destroy 4,000
hectares of coca this year-about 10 percent of Bolivia's cultivation. Paz warned
that such an operation would be difficult to undertake as long as Bolivia's treasury
remained depleted. More recently, Paz told the US Ambassador that coca
eradication will not begin until his struggle with Bolivia's combative labor
organizations is resolved and his economic reform measures show success. With
this indefinite postponement, Bolivia almost certainly will not be able to meet its
eradication target this year. Paz may try pointing to piecemeal operations to
interdict drugs and destroy laboratories as evidence of his commitment to drug
control. It is also likely, however, he will try to mount some form of eradication
operation before 1986 to keep the doors opened for future US assistance.
Bolivia's armed forces are willing to become
more involved in narcotics control under the new Paz Estenssoro administration.
The new Minister of Defense has pledged Air Force aircraft and logistic support to
police coca eradication operations, according to US Embassy sources.
the 18 T-33 jets-light attack aircraft-recently
purchased from France will be used in an antinarcotics role.
the T-33s will be deployed to the Beni and Pando regions of northern
Bolivia to intercept and, if necessary, shoot down aircraft smuggling coca products
between Bolivia and its neighbors. Despite the willingness of its leaders, the
military is not likely to become a factor in narcotics control any time soon. The T-
33s will be of little use without adequate radar, communications, and intelligence
support-none of which Bolivia has now. Moreover, popular officers such as
General Prado, who commands the army division in the drug-trafficking center of
Santa Cruz, believe that specially created police units and not the military should
conduct antinarcotics missions. Ultimately, the biggest obstacle to military
effectiveness will be the numerous corrupt officers who collaborate with and
protect the operations of Bolivia's major trafficking organizations.
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The 22-day Ecuadorean-Colombian border operation against cocaine trafficking
that concluded on 2 August produced modest results. The operation, which also
involved enforcement agents from Ecuadorean Interpol and the DEA, was the
fourth in a series of antinarcotics projects initiated by the Ecuadorean
Government. According to the US Embassy in Quito, the coordinated effort
resulted in the destruction of 192 hectares of coca and 39 coca paste laboratories.
The eradication total was higher than the 152 hectares achieved in the third
campaign in February, but well 'short of the preliminary target of 500 hectares.
The operation was hampered by heavy rains, which delayed the start from 12 July
to 16 July, and by limited air support from the military, which precluded more
aggressive measures. Nevertheless, the coordinated action represents a positive
step in the attempt to forge a multilateral approach to the drug problem; talks are
already under way concerning other joint efforts.
Ecuador, traditionally a transshipment point for cocaine headed for the US
market, is apparently becoming an important cocaine processor as well. The US
Embassy in Quito reports that imports of cocaine-processing chemicals have risen
dramatically in the last two years. Legal shipments of acetone and other essential
chemicals increased by 250 percent from 10 to 20 tons per year during 1980-83 to
3,000 to 5,000 tons in 1984-85. Accurate figures on illegal shipments are not
available, but a recent seizure of 165,000 liters of acetone/ether suggests that
amounts may be significant. The Embassy also reports larger seizures of cocaine
HCL, 1 ton so far this year compared to the 1984 total of only 80 kilograms. The
larger amounts of processing agents entering Ecuador and the lack of evidence
suggesting any transshipment of these chemicals indicate the existence of a large
number of clandestine cocaine HCL laboratories. The increased use of Ecuador as
a cocaine-refining point may be a result of intensified antinarcotic efforts in
Colombia forcing traffickers to relocate operations.
The recent extensive shakeup in the Ecuadorean Drug Agency, Dinactie, although
an encouraging sign of President Febres-Cordero's commitment to antinarcotics
policies, is unlikely to improve the Agency's effectiveness.
the shakeup, which took place from late July to
This rid the Agency of allegedly corrupt officials and placed the new'
director directly under the control of Febres-Cordero. Dinactie, long plagued by
mismanagement and inadequate resources, has been overshadowed by the
National Police Interpol Service, the other government body responsible for
narcotics enforcement. Given the rapid growth in narcotics activity in Ecuador, the
reorganization may allow the Agency to play a more important role in drug control
activities and improve its access to funding needed to correct deficiencies in
training and manpower.
The Government of Venezuela has taken steps to improve its drug interdiction
capabilities. Caracas recently concluded an agreement with Brazil to fight drug
trafficking along the border and has revised the extradition treaty with the United
States to include in it the crimes linked to trafficking. In the summer of 1984, the
Venezuelan Congress-in a record time of 90 days-passed a law against narcotic
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and hallucinogenic substances that established a legal infrastructure that did not
previously exist. Other recent initiatives include: creating a Drug Information
Center; a joint resolution by the Finance, Development, and Justice Ministers on
controlling the importation and sale of cocaine-processing chemicals; and signing
treaties with Colombia to establish joint border posts. The Venezuelan Air Force
also is becoming increasingly involved in antinarcotics efforts. The Air Force is
using a radar site near the Colombian border to detect drug traffickers' aircraft
taking off from clandestine airstrips and is flying photo reconnaissance missions to
detect narcotics activity. The government will probably adopt additional measures,
but interdicting the flow of drugs will be difficult. Colombia's narcotics-producing
highlands extend to the sparsely populated Venezuelan border, and numerous
routes are available from that area to the Caribbean coast.
until recently because it believed that narcotics transiting Argentina were having
little effect on the population, and that drugs were a problem only for consumer
countries. Significantly increased drug abuse in Argentina and the recognition that
transit countries can become consumer countries has caused the government to
intensify its intelligence collection and interdiction efforts.
The Government of Paraguay has for the first time publicly admitted that cocaine-
processing laboratories exist within the country, according to press reports. A joint
military and police operation in early September led to the confiscation of material
destined for construction of a laboratory allegedly under the control of Colombian
Frank Fernandez's trafficking organization. Local police officials believe that the
incipient operation enjoyed the protection of Third Army Corps Commander, Gen.
Eduardo Sanchez. In mid-September military authorities discovered a well-
equipped camp with a cocaine-processing laboratory allegedly run by Paraguayan
and Bolivian military personnel. The facility was located on a ranch owned by
Paraguayan Navy Lt. Walter Hoppe Quinonez.
Bolivian armed forces members also may have been involved-men dressed in
Bolivian military uniforms have been frequently seen at the ranch's airstrip. F
The Brazilian Navy's Amazon Flotilla is becoming increasingly involved in US-
funded coca eradication support missions. The Flotilla's river patrol craft have
been used in the far western section of Amazonas State to transport supplies and
members of the National Police into suspect coca-growing and -processing areas.
According to the US Embassy, naval support has enabled police to arrest 25
persons, destroy 981,378 coca stalks (branches), and seize two coca paste
laboratories in the recently completed first phase of Operation Frederico III-a
major eradication operation centered in the western Amazon. Although the
operations have been successful, the financially strapped Brazilian Government is
unlikely to continue them without US funding.
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and Tiajuana.
Recent large seizures of South American-produced cocaine in Mexico indicate
that authorities there are responding to US appeals for more forceful drug
interdiction. According to DEA and press reporting, Federal Police in August
seized over 680 kilograms of cocaine in the Mexican-US border town of Tiajuana,
believed to be the largest seizure of cocaine in the country's history. The high-
quality cocaine was found in a truck intercepted on the highway connecting Tecate
Two recent developments during the past month could greatly impair Mexico's
ability to suppress the resurgence of the drug trade:
created ideal conditions for crop cultivation,
this may result in a 1985 fall crop larger than we anticipated. Robust
drug crop production could continue into 1986, as the abundant rains will
facilitate irrigation during the dry season that extends from October through
March.
deflect US pressure for action against the drug trade.
? The Mexican Government's preoccupation with the aftermath of the earthquake
last month in Mexico City could temporarily cause authorities to shelve plans for
expanded antidrug measures. Moreover, humanitarian needs may result in
legitimate short-term diversions of aircraft and manpower previously devoted to
drug control. We anticipate that, even after the Mexicans have addressed the
worst consequences of the earthquake, some antidrug officials might be tempted
to use continued disaster-related financial and material burdens as a ploy to
officials and could lead to more efficient use of scarce resources.
The timing of the recently concluded large-scale Mexican antinarcotics operation,
Pacifico IV-just prior to the beginning of the traditional poppy-growing cycle in
late September and early October-is likely to contribute little to the eradication
effort and illustrates continued mismanagement in drug control programs. The
eradication operation, which started on 15 August and included unprecedented
amounts of equipment and manpower-70 aircraft, 300 land vehicles, and over
10,000 personnel-was targeted at fields in the northern tristate opium-growing
area of Chihuahua, Sinaloa, and Durango. The planning and timing of this action
was one of the last acts of Eradication Operations Director Dr. Sam Lopez, who
was believed to have ties to drug traffickers. Lopez's recent reassignment out of
the eradication program is an attempt to rid the program of allegedly corrupt
months-would enable the defendants to petition the court for release.
Recent Mexican press reports have criticized the de la Madrid government for its
lack of progress in prosecuting top drug traffickers Ernesto Fonseca Carrillo and
Rafael Caro Quintero. The two were arrested in March and indicted in April for
their alleged role in the abduction and murder in February of DEA agent Enrique
Camarena. Under Mexican law, the presiding judge has up to one year from the
time of arraignment to weigh arguments by the prosecution and defense and reach
a verdict. Failure to do so during the prescribed time-which will elapse in six
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Caribbean nations used as drug transit areas have begun to take measures aimed
at controlling drug trafficking and drug abuse.
officials of the Dominican Republic submitted to the
President in August a plan to create a National Narcotics Council resembling
those of Venezuela and Colombia and led by the Dominican attorney general. The
Dominican action followed a series of meetings of a mixed Dominican/Colombian
commission created last April to better coordinate drug control measures between
the two nations. In September, the Government of The Bahamas agreed to co-
sponsor a regional drug abuse conference with the assistance of the US Embassy in
Nassau. Public health authorities from the United States, Jamaica, Bolivia,
Colombia, and Peru were to be invited, according to US Embassy reporting.
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Jamaican and US officials agreed in August on steps to curb drug smuggling on
Air Jamaica aircraft. The agreement came after a series of marijuana seizures by
the US Customs Service and subsequent fines of Air Jamaica and brief detentions
of passenger aircraft by US authorities. Many of the specific antismuggling
measures followed recommendations of a US Customs team that visited Jamaica
in June to inspect airport security and advise the Jamaican Government how to
improve its procedures. Air Jamaica officials dismissed some 160 security guards
and cargo handlers at Norman Manley International Airport, restricted access to
cargo areas, and implemented a plan to photograph all shipping agents who export
goods on the island's national carrier. Jamaica's Minister of Public Utilities and
Transport Pearnel Charles announced that the security guards would be replaced
by Jamaican Constabulary Force Officers. These measures probably will improve
security at the island's two international airports, but smugglers will continue to
probe for weak points.
A Jamaica Defense Force (JDF) survey of the island in August revealed marijuana
cultivation substantially greater than last spring.
under military command is set to begin on 1 October.
growers who delayed planting last spring because of the glut of marijuana and the
intensified eradication program are now back in business. In early September, JDF
Chief of Staff Gen. Robert Neish briefed US officials in Kingston on his plans to
begin a major push to eradicate the new crop. A joint military/police operation
Central America Evidence points to complicity by Panamanian Defense Forces (FDP) in the recent
murder of popular national figure and former Vice Minister of Health Hugo
Spadafora~
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allow a special investigation of the murder, and, at the FDP's urging, 1st Vice
President Delvalle has pledged not to establish an impartial investigative
The long discussed aerial marijuana eradication campaign in Belize has again
been delayed as the government waffles over the startup date for an approved test
spray program using glyphosate. Fearing powerful marijuana traffickers may
attempt to incite violence, Belizean officials will delay spraying until after Queen
Elizabeth completes her 9-11 October visit. A US-funded agreement between the
Belizean Government and a private US firm to establish a public education and
drug abuse awareness program-a precondition for government approval of
eradication-removes one of the major obstacles and may force Belize to make at
least a token effort at spraying. Even if the widely publicized spray program does
get under way prior to peak harvest in November, it probably will have little effect
on the fall crop, since farmers are likely to harvest early to avoid total crop loss.
Southeast Asia Several hundred troops of the 3rd Chinese Irregular Force/Wa National Army
coalition (3rd CIF/WNA) began an assault on strongholds of a rival trafficking
organization, the Shan United Army (SUA), on the Thai-Burmese border along
Mae Hong Son Province on 21 September. The CIF seeks to break the SUA's hold
on drug trafficking and processing in the border area. Clashes between the two
groups also occurred to the northeast on the border near Fang, Thailand, where
When fighting spilled over into Thailand and threatened a village,
Royal Thai Army troops joined the fight against the SUA. Although the fighting
is unlikely to force the SUA out of the western border area, it has hampered SUA
attempts evelop the region into a major refining and trafficking center.
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Thailand's Office of Narcotics Control Board (ONCB) plans to conduct an aerial
survey of marijuana cultivation in northeast Thailand in October. The primary
goal of the survey is to produce tactical maps for use by manual eradication teams.
The Thai hope to monitor marijuana cultivation with techniques similiar to those
used to estimate opium production. The Thai Government is clearly concerned
about growing marijuana cultivation and trafficking. Unlike opium production,
which provides income to minority hill tribe farmers in the north, marijuana
cultivation is directed by large trafficking organizations, several of which
reportedly are foreign based. Several press reports indicate some opposition
politicians also involved in the marijuana trade. Because of this and the direct
foreign involvement, there is little resistance within the government to large-scale
eradication.
Stepped up Burma Army interdiction against the movement of acetic anhydride
from India to central Burma has forced traffickers to change to a less direct and
more costly route, Between June 25X1
and early August, narcotics suppression units operating in northwest Burma seized
about 4,300 liters of acetic anhydride. Until the successful interdiction operations,
traffickers used the Chindwin River, the cheapest and most direct route, as the
main conduit for chemicals moving from Tamu to the Mandalay market.
Chemicals are now being moved from Tamu east by land transport over rough
terrain until they are directly north of Mandalay, and then south using both land
and water transport. The Burma Army success and Thai interdiction of chemicals
routed through Thailand to the Thai-Burma border area are responsible for the
present shortage of chemicals suffered by refiners in the region. Higher chemical
prices along with the opium shortage from the drought have driven up heroin
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Southwest Asia The US Embassy reports that the government of the North-West Frontier
Province of Pakistan has approved the law enforcement agreement for the United
Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control Special Development and Enforcement
Project in Dir Agency, the major growing area in the province. The project is a $35
million, five-year, UN-administered program to eliminate poppy cultivation in Dir
and other agencies. Although the government's agreement clears the way for
preliminary project implementation, any presumptions of success are premature.
The inhabitants of Dir are reported to be as fierce and independent as those in the
tribal areas. Moreover, reducing poppy cultivation in Dir may merely result in
increased cultivation in tribal areas such as Bajaur, Mohmand, and Kurram.
In an apparent attempt to ensure adequate harvests in the future, Khyber Agency
opium traffickers have reportedly offered Pakistani farmers 10,000 rupees (US
$630) per acre to grow poppy. This report suggests that
eradication operations carried out in Dir Agency in April and May are having an
effect. Cash bonuses, combined with high prices offered by dealers, could blunt the
effects of future eradication operations and spur increased poppy cultivation in Dir
and elsewhere.
arrested for trafficking heroin to the United States.
Kathmandu, Nepal-where for years marijuana and hashish have been plentiful
and drug enforcement lax-has become a heroin trafficking center and is
developing a large addict population, numbering 12,000, up from 50 in the late
1970s. Opium poppy is not grown in Nepal, but comes from Burma and Pakistan
through India. The Sherpas and other ethnic groups have turned to heroin
trafficking apparently to supplement declining incomes. Trekking company em-
ployees, carpet workers, hotel workers, travel agents, and pilots have all been
time.
French authorities suspect that substantial quantities of heroin and cocaine are
being smuggled from Africa to France for eventual shipment to the United States.
According to US Embassy reporting, French drug enforcement officials have been
monitoring the movement of drugs through several West African countries,
particularly Nigeria, Benin, Togo, and Ghana. Their investigation indicates that
large quantities of both heroin and cocaine are smuggled from Lagos to Cotondu,
Lome, and Accra and then flown to Paris. The African couriers allegedly deliver
the drugs and collect their payment in Paris, and other couriers smuggle the drugs
from Paris into the United States. One pair of African couriers made seven trips to
Paris last year in one month, carrying between 4 and 6 kilograms of heroin each
Italian officials confiscated 5 kilograms of heroin on board an Air Ghana
aircraft at Rome's International Airport in August, and subsequently seized the
aircraft. Italian authorities previously had warned Ghana
to improve narcotics screening at all points of departure for Italy and were holding
the plane until Ghana conformed to established regulations for narcotics screening
at their terminals.
to implement strict enforcement measures,
An influx of drugs from West African countries has prompted Italian authorities
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According to 0 press, and DEA reporting, Chinese and Thai narcotics
traffickers who used to operate primarily in France are apparently expanding into
The Netherlands and Belgium. Dutch police recently arrested nine Chinese in
Amsterdam and seized 45 kilograms of Thai-produced heroin-the largest seizure
ever in the Dutch capital. In 1984, Belgian authorities noted an increase in ethnic
Chinese, Sino-Lao, and Sino-Thai traffickers residing in Antwerp and witnessed
about a 50-percent increase in heroin seizures. One investigation last year resulted
in a seizure of 18 kilograms of heroin found in a suitcase unloaded from a Thai
vessel at the port of Antwerp and revealed that another 54 kilograms of heroin
base had been delivered to several Sino-Thai traffickers in Antwerp. Antwerp is
one of the busiest and largest ports in the world, and has the potential to become a
major distribution center because of its relative lack of security and proximity to
Dutch and French markets.
Border control activity to counter drug trafficking in Africa countinues to be
ineffective. Although recent enforcement activity along the Nigeria/Niger/Benin
borders resulted in the seizure of small quantities of amphetamines and depres-
sants, successful narcotics interdiction by African border police is unusual. Most
border control units are poorly trained in the detection of cleverly concealed drugs,
and the level of corruption among border police and customs officials is high. Drug
traffickers travel freely throughout Africa and probably will continue to do so. If
President Babangida follows through on his plans to open Nigeria's borders to
sister countries, this will create an open invitation for drug traffickers to continue
to move drugs through this pivotal region.)
trafficking and illegal exportation of foreign currency.
Drug traders flaunting large quantities of money and expensive cars alerted the
Government of Zambia to gross profits made on sales of Mandrax, a powerful de-
pressant derived from the mandrake plant. President Kenneth Kaunda ordered the
arrest of drug smugglers that included diplomats, customs officials, prominent
businessmen, and former high-level government officials. Former Foreign Minister
Vernon Mwaanga, a longtime friend of Kaunda, has been detained on charges of
The arrests suggest the current ruling party is unwilling to tolerate
further blatant displays of wealth generated by drug-related activities.
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 Figure 1
Narcotics Smuggling: Major Routes and Cultivation Areas
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Mexico
Montreal
w York
'Bermuda
rU Kj
o.:.St C topher and neois
!`Ant and Barbuda
St. Luaz ;Do
r
Argentina
lobe 50
frenc
Arctic Ocean
Major Routes
Cocaine Marijuana
Hashish/Oil Opiates
Cultivation Areas
Coca ? Licit opium
Hashish ? Illicit opium
? Marijuana
$ Financial "laundering" center
The United States Gouemment has not reeogmted
the incorporation at Estonia. Latuta, and Lithuania
reta the Soviet Union Other boundary repreaantatton
snot necessar ty authantabve ?.. '~
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Arctic Ocean
France
reill
GaboC
inland
urand,
Tanzania
'mbique
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tal
Niger
arntbta
Cairo
Egypt
Angola
Zambia
Botswana
to Europe
Bahrer
Qata
Saudi Arabia "ud.E,
Pakistan
(G- Kar
r~
China
he Go/den
1rri
Ethiopia
lippin
to Europe
Taiwan
(,U icy
Korea
Korea
Iceland
C.A.R. -Central African Republic
F.R.G. -Federal Republic of Germany
G.D.R. -German Democratic Republic
P.D.R.Y.-People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
U.A.E. -United Arab Emirates
Y.A.R. -Yemen Arab Republic
New
Zealand
astern
. Samoa' ?..
:oeoe
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000100060002-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000100060002-1
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/06: CIA-RDP87T00685R000100060002-1