NARCOTICS REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00685R000100040003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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attached is our corrections to the Narco-pub dissem list. I have clipped the pages, in
same cases there are corrections on both sides of the clipped page so have your folks
check through carefully. I would like a clean copy when available. Thaks
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Directorate of Sccrct
Intelligence
Narcotics Review
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DI NR 85-002
June 1985
406
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Narcotics Review) 25X1
Measures proposed by the Betancur government to maximize the inflow of foreign
exchange could have the side effect of encouraging increased inflows of narcotics
profits to Colombia. In the mid-1970s, inflows of drug money helped mitigate
Colombia's balance-of-payments position, but more recently traffickers have
brought fewer dollars back.
Trinidad and Tobago is becoming an increasingly important transshipment point
for narcotics destined for North American and European markets and is also
experiencing a growing domestic drug abuse problem. These factors evidently have
contributed to increased police corruption, a rise in the crime rate, and an influx of
illegal weapons.
focus effectively on drug enforcement issues.
Since 1980, domestic consumption of illegal narcotics is up, trafficking has
attained major proportions, and Argentina is reemerging as an important center
for the storage and refining of cocaine. The government has the political will to
combat the drug problem, but economic and social conditions make it difficult to
international heroin pipeline from Southwest Asia to Western Europe.
Opium poppy is still cultivated in Iran, most of it to serve a large domestic addict
population. Iran also serves as a processing and transshipment center on the
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are hampered by the Tamil insurgency in the north.
The Sri Lankan Government, which neglected the narcotics problem for years, is
now concerned about domestic drug usage and the increasing participation of Sri
Lankans in the international drug trade. Government efforts to control the trade
trafficking.
Austria has taken steps to improve its drug law enforcement efforts in the face of
growing drug abuse problems and use of the country as a major drug trafficking
crossroads between Balkan and Mediterranean countries and Western Europe.
Deficiencies in the legislation will undercut its effectiveness as a deterrent to drug
A summary of key developments from 1 March to 1 June 1985.
This review is published bimonthly by the Directorate of Intelligence and
examines international, regional, and functional issues related to the worldwide
drug problem. Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well
as other US Government agencies will be considered for publication. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Terrorism/Narcotics
Analysis Division
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Colombia: "Narcodollars" and
the Balance-of-Payments
Problem
Only two countries in Latin America, Colombia and
Paraguay, survived the negative economic forces that
buffeted LDCs over the past several years without
rescheduling their external debt service obligations.
We judge that in the case of Colombia inflows of drug
money helped sustain its international position during
the years that the "oil price shock" crippled other
non-petroleum-producing countries. More recently,
however, traffickers have brought fewer dollars back
to Colombia and this combined with a sustained
depression in the coffee export business has
substantially reduced foreign exchange receipts. In an
effort to avoid harsh austerity measures, the Betancur
government is experimenting with measures designed
to maximize the inflow of foreign exchange. These
measures could have the side effect of encouraging
increased inflows of narcotics profits to Colombia
from foreign safehavens.
Background
We calculate that drug money flows first became
important in Colombia's external account balance
about a decade ago when dollars from the burgeoning
cocaine trade were added to the already substantial
receipts from the marijuana business. Most academic
research estimates indicate that by the mid-1970s
these drug money flows were at least equivalent to 15
percent of all foreign exchange receipts. The
clandestine inflow of US dollars was sufficient to
create a major upheaval in the exchange markets;
from 1975 through 1981 the value of the US dollar on
the Colombian black market was consistently below
that offered by the Central Bank (figure 1).
The annual drug money flow into Colombia
apparently peaked in 1980 at about $2 billion.
Although the Central Bank opened a ventanilla
siniestra (no-questions-asked window) in 1980 to
capture additional drug money revenues, the inflow
shrank to less than $1 billion in 1984, according to US
Embassy estimates. The traffickers' disinclination to
return funds to Colombia-a concern shared by
legitimate businessmen-was in part a result of
Colombia's deteriorating economic situation. It also
Figure 1
Colombia: Official and Black-
Market Dollar Rates, 1974-85
Pesos per $
140
reflected increased financial sophistication by
traffickers, who began to hold more of their profits
outside the country in dollars rather than spending
them in Colombia to enhance their lifestyle and their
position in society.
After 1982, trafficker disenchantment-reflected in
reduced dollar inflows-was reinforced by a number
of actions taken by the newly elected Betancur
administration. In October 1982, only two months
after taking office, President Betancur closed the
notorious ventanilla siniestra. The government
campaign against traffickers following the
assassination of Justice Minister Lara in May 1984
also altered patterns of drug money movement.
Secret
DI NR 85-002
June 1985
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Traffickers have rearranged their trafficking routes
and sought cocaine refining sites elsewhere, thus
redirecting new "business investment" to non-
Colombian sites. Some exodus of traffickers and their
money to safehavens also has occurred.
Betancur Administration Policy Changes
Faced with a worsening international cash-flow crisis
and under intense pressure to turn around a
deteriorating economy, Betancur has proposed two
measures designed to reverse capital outflow:
? A tax amnesty on funds from abroad provided that
they are invested in high-priority development
projects during a specified period of time.
? Legalized entry of imports purchased with private
foreign exchange held abroad.
These measures, if enacted, could have the additional
effect of encouraging inflows of narcotics dollars.
Most of the funds held abroad by Colombians are in
the hands of traffickers rather than legitimate
businessmen. Drug traffickers, most of whom are also
engaged in smuggling other contraband, will
especially welcome the second provision, which
legalizes this sideline.
traffickers take Bectancur's
proposal as signifying a new relaxed attitude and may
already be moving more drug money into Colombia.
During the first few months of 1985, $91 million
entered the country under the heading of service
income, including tourism, financial transfers, and
"other." Tourism alone showed income of $9.3 million
in the last week of February as compared to less than
$1 million during that period in 1984. Economic
experts say that the depressed tourist industry could
not possibly have generated such sums. We therefore
conclude that the increased "earnings" represent drug
money entering Colombia through the exchange
house system-a mechanism regularly employed to
transfer drug revenues under the cloak of tourist
income.
The Gold Rush
An action taken by the Betancur government last year
also has the effect of encouraging inflow of narcotics
profits. As a quick fix to reverse the decline in foreign
Before the Colombian traffickers discovered gold,
drug revenues generally entered Colombia as:
? Cash dollars or other dollar instruments smuggled
by traffickers. An unknown portion of such cash is
exchanged for pesos on the currency black market.
? Pesos supplied by exchange houses against dollars
received in Colombia or elsewhere. A considerable
share of these receipts may be reported falsely as
tourist revenues.
? Smuggled goods.
? Underinvoiced imports with the discounted balance
paid in dollars abroad.
? Receipts for phony or overinvoiced exports.
exchange holdings, in March 1984 the Colombian
Central Bank '-the sole legal purchaser of locally
produced bullion-set a peso price for gold some 30
percent above the world market level. The declared
purpose of this measure was to prevent illegal gold
exports, but the net effect is to enable the Central
Bank to finance the current account deficit in part by
reselling smuggled gold for foreign exchange. During
1984 gold purchases by the Central Bank totaled
700,000 troy ounces, but domestic output was less
than 500,000 troy ounces.
Colombia sold on the
international market in 1984 all the gold the Central
Bank had purchased plus 2.5 million troy ounces from
its stockpile.
drug traffickers
have been the principal beneficiaries of the inflated
gold price. Initially, the traffickers are said to have
responded by purchasing gold locally for resale to the
Bank. They subsequently turned to buying gold
abroad with the proceeds from illegal drug sales,
fabricating it into a variety of objects, and then
importing it into Colombia where it is melted down
and resold to the Central Bank.
' In Colombia the President of the Republic exercises control over
the Central Bank through his finance, planning, development, and
agriculture ministers, who constitute a majority of its board of
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Figure 2
Colombia: Gold Indicators, 1974-85
Production
Thousand troy ounces
600
200 1975 80 84
Based on amount reaching smelters.
Source: Repuhlica de Colombia. Ministerio de Minas c Energia..Memorla a/
Con,nresa /983/84. Volumen 2. Anexo Estadistico. Grupo de Publicaciones
del Ministerio de Minas N Energia con la colahoracion de INGEOMINAS.
1984.
Costa Rica almost certainly is one source of gold for
drug traffickers. According to the San Jose press,
Costa Rican officials claim that up to 70 percent of
the country's gold output is being smuggled abroad
despite premium prices offered by the government.
They allege that drug traffickers are the principal
purchasers. The Costa Rican press speculates that the
traffickers are outbidding the government for local
bullion, but we consider it more likely that they obtain
a discount by offering to deposit dollars in offshore
Stock, end of period
Million troy ounces
0 1975 80 85 (First Quarter)
officially recorded gold output of Brazil, Peru,
Bolivia, and Ecuador in 1983 was 1.8 million troy
ounces, and, in our view, substantial unrecorded
output probably enters the underground trade.
Whatever its origin, we judge the gold entered
Colombia from neighboring areas via established
smuggling routes exploited by traffickers.
Outlook
We judge that at present a small fraction of the
money earned by Colombia's narcotics traffickers
actually returns to Colombia. According to our
estimates, they remove between $3 billion and $6
billion annually from the United States-a sum at
least as large as the projected Colombian current
account deficit for 1985 (table). In addition,
Colombian traffickers obtain large profits from
Europe, the second most important market, and are
establishing operations in such other affluent areas as
Rica in 1984 could have supplied only 70,000 of the
200,000 troy ounces of non-Colombian gold
apparently acquired by the Colombian Central Bank.
Australia and the Persian Gulf.
allege Venezuela is a supplier. The
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Current account balance
-159
-1,885
-2,895
-2,838
-2,840
-2,995
Trade-balance
-238
-1,544
-2,189
-1,755
-1,650
-1,495
Exports, f.o.b.
4,062
3,219
3,215
3,002
2,950
3,205
Of which:
Coffee
2,375
1,459
1,577
1,537
1,799
1,850
Imports, f.o.b.
4,300
4,763
5,404
4,757 c
4,600 c
4,700 a
Net services and transfers
79
-351
-706
-1,083
-1,190
-1,500
Estimate.
Projection.
Reflects tightening of nonessential imports and accelerated
monthly devaluation pace.
a Reflects easing of import restrictions to comply with IMF-
monitored, self-imposed economic adjustments.
The availability of such large revenues may be too
much temptation for any financially strapped
government to withstand. How far the Colombian
Government will go to take advantage of the narcotics
profits will depend on a number of factors. Clearly,
other economic options will affect attitudes within
Colombia toward accommodation of drug money
movements. In the short term, interim bank loans
under IMF monitoring may reduce the temptation to
attract drug money, but persistent economic
problems-austerity and depressed living standards
over the longer term may provide an incentive to turn
a blind eye to the source of the needed revenues.
Antidrug pressure from the United States and other
consuming countries as well as the behavior of the
traffickers themselves will also influence government
actions. A relatively low profile by traffickers could
lead to easing of government pressure on them and
eventual facilitation of their financial transactions. A
new round of trafficker-promoted violence, on the
other hand, would undoubtedly cause an outraged
government to slam all the drug money windows shut.
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Trinidad and Tobago:
New Narcotics Trouble Spot
Trinidad and Tobago's involvement in the
international drug scene has increased sharply since
the early 1980s. US Embassy and Drug Enforcement
Administration officials in the region report that the
two-island nation has become particularly important
as a transshipment point for cocaine destined for the
United States, Canada, and Western Europe. We
believe several factors have escalated the country's
role as a drug supplier and market:
? US and Colombian interdiction efforts in the
Windward Passage between Jamaica and Cuba
have prompted some traffickers to shift to new
transit areas from South America.
? Inadequate law enforcement, abundance of secluded
harbors, and location between the major suppliers to
the south and markets to the north also have
encouraged the use of Trinidad as a drug
transshipment center or refueling stop.
? The favorable climate and availability of secluded
growing sites facilitate domestic marijuana
production.
? The four-year-old recession in Trinidad's oil-based
economy has increased the attractiveness of illegal
drug operations to some Trinidadians.
contraband. Trinidadian police officers also have
indicated some vessels carrying marijuana and
cocaine sail from Colombia to Trinidad. The boats
then proceed north into the Atlantic Ocean along the
Antillean chain or transfer their cargo to
"motherships" for the trip north. The US Embassy in
Guyana has indicated that Jamaican marijuana
traffickers may be using an indirect route from
Jamaica to Trinidad via Guyana because ships and
aircraft traveling directly between Jamaica and
Trinidad are suspected of drug smuggling.
Piarco International Airport, Trinidad's only such
facility, provides a major intermediate point for drug
transshipments, especially cocaine from South
America, according to the Embassy. Trinidadian
officials have indicated that traffickers posing as
businessmen or tourists traveling on commercial
airlines are smuggling cocaine and small amounts of
marijuana through the airport, near Port of Spain.
Iwe judge that Trinidadians act as
middlemen or local distributors for South
American-controlled narcotics rings. The US
Embassy indicated in 1983 that a Venezuelan drug
ring may be smuggling cocaine into the United States
Transit Routes and Traffickers
According to US Embassy reporting, marijuana
transshipped through Trinidad and Tobago originates
primarily in Colombia or Jamaica. The cocaine
entering the country reportedly is mainly from
Colombia and transits Trinidad through Venezuelan
ports located along the Orinoco River and the Gulf of
Paria. Commercial and private aircraft and ships are
the major means of transshipment, according to the
US Embassy. The Embassy indicates that the towns
of Carupano and Macuro in northern Venezuela are
the most likely sources for waterborne narcotics
traffic. Trinidadian customs officials have told
Embassy officials that freight containers have been
equipped with false walls to accommodate narcotics
We judge that Colombian organizations also are using
Trinidad for their operations to escape increased
interdiction efforts along traditional routes over the
past year.
Domestic Narcotics Problems
An Embassy source reports that marijuana-the only
narcotic substance produced in Trinidad and
Tobago-is cultivated primarily in central Trinidad
Secret
DI NR 85-002
June 1985
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Trinidad and Tobago
tamai~a
Honduras
and Nevis Domm,ca
St Vincent and St. facia
the Grenadines aarbados
Grenada
- Trinidad and Tobago
Cedros Point
Fullarton
I 'Or
Caribbean
Sea
Tobago
.Moriah
C. Pointl
Airport
North
Atlantic
Trinidad Ocean
Charlotteville
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between the towns of Biche and Rio Claro. This
remote region, thinly populated and sheltered by
dense forests and steep hills, makes detection difficult.
The same source reports that individual growers
rather than organized trafficking rings are responsible
for most cultivation. The source also reports that
eradication efforts against growers in the region have
encouraged a shift in some production to Trinidad's
north coast, where dense forests and rugged terrain
also facilitate cultivation.
Trinidadian police claim they seized 1.1 metric tons of
cured marijuana and destroyed 7.4 million marijuana
plants last spring, but the Embassy reports that
bumper harvests have lowered street prices this year.
According to Embassy reporting, a Trinidadian police
source has described marijuana plots as typically less
than one-tenth hectare in size. Police narcotics
officers have told Embassy officials that marijuana
cultivation on Trinidad alone encompasses a
maximum of 800 acres, producing two crops a year.
Marijuana reportedly is processed by drying and
packing in the field and transported by motor vehicles
to local consumers.
The domestic drug abuse problem seems to be a
relatively recent phenomenon. Virtually all marijuana
produced locally is consumed there, according to US
officials in the country. Marijuana enjoys a
particularly large following among Trinidadian youth,
who make up a growing share of the population.
According to Embassy reporting, sales are clustered
around Port of Spain, San Fernando, Arima, and Rio
Claro, but marijuana can be purchased easily
throughout the country. Although the use of drugs
has grown rapidly since the early 1980s, according to
Embassy and US Defense Department reports, no
official data are available on addiction rates.
30 to 40
percent of Trinidadian youth currently use marijuana
and that, more alarmingly, 10 to 20 percent use
cocaine. A US Embassy composite of police and
official health data indicates that the country
consumed some 45,000 kilograms of marijuana and
about 135 kilograms of cocaine in 1984, but we
believe these estimates are low. Marijuana and
cocaine appear to be the only narcotics substances
abused, although local police reportedly believe that
heroin and PCP (angel dust) have entered the country
in small quantities.
Government Response
Sensitive to its international image, the government of
Prime Minister George Chambers over the past year
has become increasingly concerned about the rise in
drug activity. According to the US Embassy, this
attention stems in part from extensive publicity about
drug trafficking activities elsewhere in the region-
particularly in The Bahamas, where involvement by
officials in narcotics trafficking has led to widespread
public criticism of the Pindling government. The
Trinidadian Government reportedly is aware that the
small Caribbean islands are ideally suited as transit
points for illegal trade and that many officials can be
easily tempted to augment their incomes by some
degree of participation.
Despite the government's increased concern,
numerous obstacles have slowed progress in curbing
the drug problem. The United States since 1976 has
been the only foreign country providing narcotics
control training to Trinidadian officials. According to
the US Embassy, Trinidadian participation in US
training programs has been poor because of the
inefficiency that has long typified the local
bureaucracy. Administrative delays and lack of
coordination among the various ministries have
hindered other government efforts to deal with the
country's drug problem. Of the four agencies
contributing to narcotics control in Trinidad and
Tobago, the police, immigration, and coast guard are
responsible to the Minister of National Security;
customs is separated under the Ministry of Finance
and Planning. Coordination between customs and the
other agencies reportedly is poor because of jealousy
and mistrust between the two ministries. Lax customs
and immigration procedures at air and sea ports have
further hindered progress. Moreover, no official
treatment programs for addicts currently exist in the
country.
A special police narcotics squad is responsible for
directing arrests for narcotics possession and
trafficking. When the squad was formed in 1977, its
primary activities consisted of periodic forays into the
countryside to destroy marijuana plants and
occasional visits to public schools to conduct drug
education. In response to the rise in drug activity, the
12-man squad was upgraded in late 1983 and put
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Major Narcotics Air Trafficking Routes
South
Pacific Ocean
0 Transshipment area
$ Financial center
Note Traffickers occasionally use
commercial air routes over Cuba
eoo~ae,y,e p,e Se~~ei~o~
nog necesse,ny amno,nen~e
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Major Narcotics Maritime Trafficking Routes
Turks and
Ca ccs Islands
The
Bahamas
Mexico , : $
Belize
Guatemala
Q( ,lylral
Islands
U K.)
Jamaica O
Nicaragua
PANAMA
Panama $
O Transshipment area
$ Financial center
0 300 Kilometers
f I'
0 300Miles
Haiti Dominican
Republic
Berr?ud r
UK
British Virgin
slands
K
Virg nts Angwllad K
Puerto
Rico
(U S!
(II S Antigu l and Barbuda
Sa nt
Ch stoptff ?Mnntserrat U K
~aaawev Guadeloupe In
Dominica
~renaote
i
nidad
Carupa4o Tr
MacuroO end
Tobago
PEDERNALES
REGION
Netherlands
An IiIf os
r"'fn} ?_
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under the direction of an assistant superintendent and
an inspector. Stepped-up raids on traffickers and
growers last year resulted in seizures of large
quantities of marijuana and cocaine that have helped
to focus the attention of the government and people
alike on the narcotics problem.
Trinidad's judicial system contributes to the narcotics
problem. The chief of the narcotics squad has
complained to Embassy personnel of the ease with
which even those relatively few traffickers arrested
can obtain bail, regardless of the charges against
them or their prior arrest records. He noted the
difficulty in obtaining strong criminal convictions
against them because Trinidad's bail regulations do
not restrict travel of those charged in drug-related
activities. As a result, local authorities are unable to
halt flight to avoid prosecution. According to the US
Embassy, the courts continue to treat leniently
possession of illegal drugs, particularly marijuana.
Offenders also are aided by the heavy backlog of
court cases and are generally fined less than $200.
Several policemen have complained to Embassy
officials that influence peddling among judges and
politicians makes conviction of large-scale dealers
nearly impossible. According to the Embassy,
however, no high-ranking elected officials have been
implicated in drug-related activities.
The circumstances surrounding the removal of Police
Commissioner Randolph Burroughs from his post
earlier this year lend credence to growing charges of
narcotics traffickers in moving large sums of US
currency through Trinidad. US officials report that
the identities of several narcotics traffickers in
Trinidad are well known, and their ability to operate
without police interference has prompted widespread
suspicion of police protection, particularly from
Burroughs. Larger-scale marijuana growers and drug
traffickers reportedly have paid as much as 10 percent
of their profits for police protection while well-
publicized raids were conducted against those
refusing to pay. The chief of the narcotics squad has
told US Embassy officials that he believes the
allegations against Burroughs are true. He also told
Embassy officials that major traffickers always seem
forewarned of any police raid, and he believes the
information is almost certainly leaked to them by
corrupt lower level police officials.
The Influx of Illegal Weapons
In addition to widespread police corruption, drug-
related activities are at least partly responsible for the
recent surge in imports of illegal weapons that
most weapons are purchased by citizens fearful of
rising crime, but some are bought by local narcotics
traffickers. The traffickers reportedly purchase the
weapons through their narcotics sources abroad, pay
in US dollars, and transport the arms by ship through
their usual smuggling channels.
-
-
an unspecified number of illegal firearms,
mainly used, reach Trinidad directly from the
Pedernales region of Venezuela and are transported
by fishermen and others who regularly sail between
the two countries. Most shipments reportedly are
landed near Cedros Point in southwestern Trinidad,
which is generally considered the main offloading
point for items smuggled from Venezuela. New
weapons-sometimes concealed in shipments of
electronics equipment-are purchased in the United
States and shipped to Trinidad by air through Piarco
the influx of illegal weapons consists
largely of handguns, although several types of
automatic weapons-including UZI
submachineguns-are available for purchase. No
official Trinidadian statistics are available on crime,
but press reports all indicate that
violent crime has increased dramatically in the past
year.
Outlook
Trinidad will almost certainly continue to be used by
South American traffickers as a transshipment point.
We do not expect the route through Trinidad and the
eastern Caribbean to become the major or most
important route for narcotics moving north. Rather, it
is a desirable alternate route when interdiction efforts
on more traditional routes intensify. Trinidad's
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potential as a transit point is likely to grow when the
Trinidadians complete conversion of Crown Point
Airport on Tobago from a small airstrip to an
international facility. According to local press reports,
this improvement is aimed at promoting tourism by
making Crown Point suitable for larger commercial
aircraft by March 1986. Traffickers are quick to
respond to new opportunities, and we suspect Crown
Point Airport, when refurbished, will become another
escape valve for narcotics traffickers seeking to avoid
pressure on other routes.
We consider it highly unlikely than any Trinidadians
will become trafficking kingpins for US-bound drugs.
Colombians and Jamaicans dominate marijuana
trafficking from this area to North America, while
the cocaine business is controlled by powerful,
entrenched South American traffickers. Neither
group is likely to let Trinidadians garner a share of
the US market. Trinidad does have well-established
local trafficking groups that should have little trouble
supplying narcotics to the local market.
The success of these local traffickers leads us to
conclude that increasing domestic use of narcotics,
particularly cocaine, will be the most serious problem
for Trinidadian officials. Increased use of this
expensive drug by various segments of Trinidadian
society appears to be contributing to a spiral of crime,
accompanied by police corruption and loss of public
confidence in law enforcement officials. In our view,
the increase in marijuana and cocaine use and
trafficking has worsened problems such as crime and
corruption, which previously either did not exist or
existed to a much lesser degree. Even if only a
fraction of the influx of illegal firearms has found its
way into the hands of drug traffickers, we judge this
development foreshadows increased trafficking and
violence in Trinidad.
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Argentina: Resurgence of the
Narcotics Trade
The drug situation in Argentina has steadily
deteriorated since 1980, arousing strong government
concern. Domestic consumption of illegal narcotics is
up, trafficking has attained major proportions, and
the country is reemerging as an important center for
the storage and refining of cocaine. This contrasts
with the 1970s when Argentina was a minor player in
the South American cocaine industry, serving
primarily as a conduit for Bolivian cocaine en route to
US and European consumers and as a safehaven for
international drug dealers. Even these activities were
sharply curtailed by the military regime that seized
power in 1976.
Origins of the Problem
The resurgence of the narcotics trade in Argentina
dates from involvement of elements of the Argentine
Army in the 1980 coup that brought the cocaine-
trafficking regime of Gen. Garcia Meza and Col.
Arce Gomez to power in neighboring Bolivia.
According to the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, some
Army officers began to cooperate with their Bolivian
counterparts in cocaine production and marketing.
When Garcia Meza and Arce Gomez were ousted in
1982, Arce Gomez fled across the border and
continued to direct drug operations from Argentina.
US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
officials,have speculated that the decline in Army
discipline and morale after Argentina's defeat in the
1982 Falklands war may have aggravated military
corruption and drawn some officers deeper into the
narcotics business.
The Bolivian connection and the ongoing Colombian
Government crackdown on drug trafficking may have
stimulated the growing Argentine involvement in the
illicit drug trade, but other factors facilitated it:
? Argentina's location near coca-producing countries
and extensive air and sea links with Western Europe
and the United States provide excellent channels for
smuggling cocaine.
? The relatively sophisticated Argentine economy
offers traffickers many means to launder money,
hide operations, and acquire and transship
chemicals used in cocaine production.
? Drug dealers seeking new consumers find
Argentina's relatively prosperous and largely
middle-class population a tempting target.
Dimensions of the Drug Trade
Argentina serves primarily as a transshipment center
for cocaine. Cocaine seizures by the Argentine
authorities have increased from 98 kilos in 1981 to
560 -kilos in 1983. The DEA currently estimates that
upward of 6,000 kilos per year of cocaine are
transshipped through Argentina. According to US
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provinces of Salta and Jujuy by air; over land to
Rosario, Buenos Aires, or other ports; and by sea or
air to Europe and the United States. Variations
include passage through Paraguay and northeastern
Argentina, as well as via Chile and the Argentine city
of Mendoza, to shipment points on the Atlantic coast.
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The Embassy has reported 25X1
the activities of a ring associated with Arce Gomez
and Bolivian cocaine magnate Roberto Suarez, and of
the "South American League," a loosely organized
gang that includes Argentines, Chileans, Brazilians,
and Europeans.
In recent years Argentina has also emerged as a
refining site, where coca paste and semirefined
cocaine base are converted to finished cocaine. The
DEA believes that there are at least 15 to 20 cocaine
refining laboratories in northwestern Argentina, as
well as an undetermined number in Metropolitan
Buenos Aires. US officials now estimate that roughly
75 kilos per month of cocaine are refined in
Argentina, just under the amount needed to
categorize the country as a "major producer" by DEA
standards.
At the same time, consumption is expanding. DEA
officials claim that cocaine use is growing among the
affluent and has penetrated the middle classes in the
Secret
DI NR 85-002
June 1985
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Narcotics Activity
South Atlantic Ocean
Trafficking route
Cocaine-refining laboratories
Provincia boundary
o Provincia capital
0 200 400 Kilometers
0 200 400 Miles
Falkland Islands
(Islas Malvinas)
[administered by U K.
claimed by Argentina]
Boundaryrepresentaion le
_ n..... rey mno,nen.e.
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northwestern provinces. The Argentine press reports
widespread abuse of both cocaine and marijuana in
resort areas such as Bariloche and Mar Del Plata.
The cocaine problem, however, has not yet reached
the proportions found elsewhere in South America.
Smoking basuco-primarily a mixture of coca paste
and marijuana or tobacco-which is a common form
of drug abuse among the lower classes in other South
American countries, has yet to appear in Argentina.
Although drug use is increasing among the Argentine
masses, press reports indicate the most common
problems are glue sniffing and abuse of over-the-
counter and prescription drugs.
Government Response
We judge that President Alfonsin appreciates the
degree and implications of the growing narcotics
presence in Argentina. The government has attempted
to educate the public regarding the drug problem
through statements by Alfonsin, official publications,
and cooperation with the media. Enforcement
capabilities, however, have not kept pace with
growing government concern. Budget deficits limit
the funds available for expanded drug enforcement
activities. Five separate federal agencies have drug-
related responsibilities, but coordination among them
is poor. Overlapping jurisdictions and rivalries
between federal and provincial law enforcement
bodies further hamper effective action.
The US Embassy reports that steps are being taken to
improve effectiveness. The Federal Police-the main
antidrug force-reorganized and expanded its
narcotics division. This unit alone seized 94 kilos of
cocaine during the first 10 months of 1984, according
to US Embassy officials, compared to 74 kilos seized
the previous year by all Argentine police agencies
combined. The Border Police and customs authorities
have intensified drug interdiction operations
particularly against chemicals used in cocaine
refining. The government has established an ad hoc
interagency committee to coordinate drug
enforcement. A more formal coordinating structure is
awaiting presidential approval; if effectively
implemented, we judge it could significantly enhance
Argentina's overall antinarcotics effort.
Obstacles to Enforcement
Effective enforcement is hampered by official
complicity in the drug business. The best documented
case involves Roberto Romero, the Governor of Salta
Province.
Some
reports indicate that other Federal deputies and some
provincial police may be working with traffickers.
We judge that Havana is too
interested in maintaining good relations with Buenos
Aires to jeopardize them through involvement in illicit
narcotics. The Montoneros, for their part, are
financially solvent, in our view, and do not need the
extra money-or want the police attention-that
would come from drug dealing.
We judge that a greater potential political threat from
drug money comes from the extreme right. Former
members of the military, along with elements of the
civilian far right, could reforge links with Bolivian
traffickers that were established during the Garcia
Outlook
Whether Buenos Aires can contain the narcotics
threat, in our judgment, will hinge largely on the
nation's overall political and economic health. Better
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economic conditions and a period of relative political
stability would probably lead to a substantial
improvement in Argentine enforcement capabilities.
The political will to combat the problem exists, and
Alfonsin is personally committed to taking action.
Official corruption, although growing, could probably
be controlled. We believe, for example, that the
central government would prosecute drug-tainted
individuals such as Governor Romero of Salta if it
had adequate evidence. The Argentine public is
becoming sensitized to drug issues and appears to
support a crackdown on narcotics trafficking. If the
government spends more for drug enforcement over
the next few years and is stable enough to establish a
long-term program, we expect that, although the
narcotics problem would remain an irritant,
Argentina could avoid the social and political ills that
have afflicted other South American countries
involved in the drug network.
We are less optimistic about the situation if-as
seems probable-Argentina continues its economic
decline and remains politically unstable.
Notwithstanding Alfonsin's good intentions, we doubt
that a government plagued by labor unrest,
hyperinflation, a large budget deficit, and the threat
of a military coup could effectively focus on drug
enforcement. Under such circumstances, official
corruption would probably spread, traffickers and
producers would take advantage of more tenuous law-
and-order situations to expand their activities, and
domestic consumption would likely rise. Although it
might take four to seven years before the problem
reached crisis proportions, the end result would be
Argentina's full integration into the South American
narcotics industry.
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Iran: International Trafficking
Despite Local Demand
Iran remains an active arena for the international
drug trade. Opium poppy is still cultivated in Iran,
most of it to serve a large domestic addict population.
Iran also serves as a processing and transshipment
center on the international heroin pipeline from
Southwest Asia to Western Europe.
Domestic Production and Addiction
The Revolutionary Government invariably describes
Iran as an aggrieved party in the international drug
trade. Although admitting to a massive addiction
problem, Tehran's representatives to international
organizations such as the United Nations steadfastly
maintain that domestic opium poppy cultivation was
wiped out after the revolution and that all opiates now
come from Afghanistan and Pakistan.
ignored and then attacked narcotics with draconian,
though unsuccessful, measures. It executed some
major traffickers, razed "red light" areas associated
with drug dealing, and exiled hardened abusers to an
"addicts' island."
The deputy director of the Iranian Narcotics Control
Administration and Drug Abuse Coordinating
Council in the Ministry of Health admitted in
February 1985 that Iran has over 800,000 opium
addicts and 100,000 heroin addicts,
Given the record of drug
abuse and current conditions in Iran, we suspect that
the proportion of addicts in certain segments of
Iranian society is much higher than the overall
J Preliminary analysis of
raditional poppy-growing
areas in northwestern Iran indicates poppy is still
grown there, although we have not yet determined the
extent of cultivation. International observers have
long assumed that Iran is a net importer of narcotics,
but lack of adequate information on either cultivation
or consumption makes it difficult to determine the
validity of this belief.
Cross-Border Narcotics Pipeline
Despite the heavy local demand,
Iran continues to play a role in supplying
foreign narcotics consumers.
Iran's addiction problem has continued to grow
despite vigorous, but sporadic efforts by the
Revolutionary Government to eliminate opium
production and drug trafficking. Under the previous
regime, a ban on opium cultivation and increased
enforcement had supposedly lowered the addict
population from some 2 million in 1955 to about
300,000 by 1960. The outflow of hard currency to
neighboring countries for illicit narcotics to support
the habits of addicts, however, prompted the
government in 1969 to institute domestic poppy
cultivation under tight controls. Smuggling,
nevertheless, continued, and the number of addicts
climbed throughout the 1970s. With the breakdown
of law and order attending the fall of the Shah, all
aspects of the drug problem worsened at an
accelerated rate. The Revolutionary Government first
Secret
DI NR 85-002
June 1985
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Figure 1
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
Gulf of
Oman
(Chah Bahar)
Airbase
4
Arabian
Sea
Despite the difficulties of transshipment and the price at the source in Afghanistan, and almost four
prospect of the death penalty if they are caught, times the Afghan price if delivered to a city in eastern
Iranian traffickers evidently find the financial Turkey.
benefits of international trafficking to be worth the
risks. Last year the price of morphine base delivered
at the Iranian-Turkish border was three times its
Kurdish-
nhabited *TEHRAN
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? An untested DEA source states that within Iran the
principal areas of morphine base and heroin
conversion are located around the cities of Zahedan,
on the border with Pakistan near Afghanistan, and
Tabriz, not far from Turkey-at both ends of the
smuggling route.
drugs are also processed
elsewhere along the pipeline in Kerman and
Esfahan for subsequent transshipment to Europe or
for selling on the local market.
Jreports that as of
January heroin manufactured in Pakistan was being
smuggled across Iran to the Turkish border by
groups of armed Iranians in pickup trucks.
morphine obtained from Iran and Afghanistan into
heroin for export to Europe or the United States.
Given the tenuous authority exercised by the
governments on both sides of the Iranian-Turkish and
also the Iranian-Afghan border, we expect cross-
border drug trafficking will continue with little
disruption. We also judge that this pipeline will
continue to serve the international heroin market,
primarily in Western Europe, as well as filling the
needs of Iran's own addict population.
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Major Heroin Smuggling Routes
Taken by Sri Lankans
1 Sri Lankan courier route
Heroin and opium movement route
m Heroin collection point
Major opium-andheroin-producing area
Marijuana cultivation
COLOMBO
Government-destroyed
heroin lab
Matara
BurmI
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Sri Lanka:
Growing Narcotics Awareness
The Sri Lankan Government, after years of
indifference, is growing concerned about the country's
narcotics problem. This sense of alarm is stimulated
by:
? Sri Lanka's developing international image as a
transit point for drug trafficking.
? Apprehension of large numbers of Sri Lankans
abroad as drug couriers.
? Rapidly escalating domestic drug abuse.
? Suspicions that Tamil insurgents are using the drug
Law enforcement and health officials reported that
the number of addicts rose from almost none in 1982
to 2,000 or more by late 1984.
The International Problem
Sri Lankans first came to the attention of European
narcotics authorities in the early 1980s, primarily as
low-level couriers. Most were young Tamil men
fleeing the political and social upheaval in Sri Lanka
and looking for work or political asylum in Europe.
trade to help finance their struggle.
Background
Drugs, particularly opium and cannabis, have been
available in Sri Lanka for centuries. Opium usually
enters the island from India via the Jaffna Peninsula,
a long-established smuggling route. Sri Lankan
authorities estimate that some 6 to 7 metric tons are
smuggled in annually. Most is consumed by an aging
local addict population, but some is used in legally
prescribed folk medicines.
Sri Lankan farmers in the south have a long history of
cannabis cultivation, which authorities have done
little to stop. In the 1970s, marijuana's widespread
availability attracted a drug-oriented tourist trade,
according to US Embassy reports. This market
probably stimulated the subsequent importation of
heroin from Southeast Asia and the eventual
establishment of the island as a transit point for
narcotics bound for Western markets. Despite
occasional heroin seizures, trafficking was not a major
problem, and police enforcement was rare.
The amount of narcotics smuggled to Sri Lanka rose
markedly in the early 1980s with the expansion of
Southwest Asian heroin in the international market.
Sri Lanka gradually developed into a favored stopover
for smugglers from Pakistan and India, and heroin
seizures at Sri Lanka's airports and seacoast resorts
rose from 300 grams in 1981 to 30 kilograms in the
first six months of 1984. At the same time, heroin
addiction spread rapidly among young Sri Lankans.
about $500 each and hid their drugs in false-bottom
suitcases, shoes, belts, and body cavities. Italian police
report that Tamils also have been arrested in London,
Rome, and Palermo for heroin smuggling. Europe, not
the United States, is the final destination for most of
the traffickers.
Many Tamil couriers took the low-cost air route from
Colombo to Moscow and East Berlin, then the train to
West Berlin and other West European destinations.
in 1983 Tamils
accounted for almost half the foreign drug traffickers
arrested in West Berlin and were largely responsible
for a doubling of heroin seizures that year. Stiffer
German enforcement in 1984 apparently contributed
to changes in the courier routes. US officials report
that the Sri Lankan role in the Berlin drug trade
declined;
during the same period Sri Lankans
emerged as the most important narcotics-trafficking
group in France.
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DI NR 85-002
June 1985
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Sri Lankans have graduated from being
couriers and are attempting to set up their own drug-
trafficking and distribution networks. In Italy,
authorities filed charges in March against 94 Sri
Lankan Tamils suspected of setting up a drug-
smuggling ring in Rome. According to press reports,
they had access to drugs worth over $2 million on the
retail market and distribution links in France and
West Germany. In another case, 16 Sri Lankans were
arrested in Naples last November with 7 kilograms of
pure heroin. According to diplomatic sources, the ring
had established its own laboratory for cutting the
heroin to street-level purities and was poised to begin
retail distribution. The suspects were in Italy as guest
workers, reportedly had made several trips to Sri
Lanka in the months before their arrests, and
confessed to trafficking on behalf of the Tamil
separatists.
The Tamils may find it difficult to carve out a
permanent niche in the international marketing
network for Southwest Asian heroin. They are up
against strong competition from established Pakistani,
Turkish, and Italian organized crime syndicates. The
number of Sri Lankans already arrested and the
success the Italian police in particular have had in
cracking Tamil organizations indicate that their
rudimentary networks are highly susceptible to law
enforcement penetration. To become more successful
drug traffickers, the Tamils would probably need to
recruit or ally themselves with established criminal
drug networks.
Separatist Involvement
Indications that the Tamil separatists are using drug
trafficking to support their insurgency is a matter of
growing concern:
? In a roundup of Sri Lankan drug traffickers in
March, Italian authorities discovered insurgent
political propaganda.
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most of the
Tamils arrested on drug charges in Germany and
France belonged to the People's Liberation
Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE}-the
largest and one of the most violent separatist groups
in Sri Lanka.
Government Responses
The Sri Lankan Government began to take a harder
look at the narcotics problem in 1983 after years of
lax enforcement. President Jayewardene pushed a
stiff new antinarcotics law through Parliament in
March 1984. Its provisions include:
? Death or life imprisonment for trafficking or
possession of more than 2 grams of heroin or
cocaine.
? Creation of a national Dangerous Drugs Control
Board with wide powers to formulate and review
national policy on drugs. The Board provides
Cabinet-level attention to the activities of the
National Narcotics Bureau, a police organization
that has been severely hampered by lack of
manpower, training, and equipment.
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Despite these actions, the government has made little
discernible progress. A year after its passage, no
major cases have been tried under the narcotics law,
which the government hailed as "the toughest in the
world." Crop eradication of the only known locally
produced drug, cannabis, is insignificant, and there
are no government crop substitution programs. Most
important, opium trafficking continues unabated
through the northern peninsula because the Army and
police are preoccupied with the insurgency and have
little time or resources to combat the drug trade.
Ironically, government success against Tamil
separatists could increase their involvement in drug
trafficking. Increased military pressures against
Tamil insurgents in the north and east, combined with
pressure from New Delhi to restrict their activities in
south India, will make drug trafficking more
attractive as a source of funds for the separatist
movement. The continuing communal conflict,
moreover, drives increasing numbers of young Tamils
out of the country, expanding the pool of potential
couriers from which international traffickers can
recruit.
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Austria: Implementation of
New Drug Legislation
In late April 1985, the Austrian Parliament passed
several amendments designed to strengthen its drug
laws. Austria is a major transit country for drugs
moving from Balkan and Mediterranean countries to
West European markets and is facing a small but
growing abuse problem. The legislative initiative was
originally intended to combat international drug
trafficking through improved enforcement and
interdiction measures and stronger prosecution
efforts. The legislation was later broadened to address
the drug abuse issue. We judge that the statutes will
probably improve Austria's drug law enforcement
efforts, but do not contain the kinds of sentencing
provisions necessary to deter drug trafficking.
Moreover, we suspect that drug abuse will not be
reduced significantly as long as Austria remains a
major drug-trafficking crossroad.
Compromise Broadens Laws
The legislation is clearly a response by both the
socialist government and the opposition to the media's
increased coverage of drug issues and demands for
government action. The opposition People's Party,
concerned about international drug smuggling
through Austria, initiated legislation aimed at
combating the activities of professional drug
traffickers. The ruling Socialist Party, however, was
resolved to fight Austria's current drug abuse
phenomenon, a social side effect of the drug
smuggling. It pressed for the introduction of milder
sentences for small-time dealers and the expansion of
prevention and rehabilitation measures under the
slogan "Help Instead of Punishment." Both concerns
were incorporated into the final legislation, which
passed the Parliament by unanimous consent.
Drug Enforcement Improved
The new regulations will strengthen enforcement and
interdiction efforts by increasing the police presence
at border crossings, airports, and train stations. In
addition, the police will be granted on a selective basis
the right to assist customs officials in making searches
and seizures at borders. Austria has already had some
success at interdicting drugs passing through its
territory:
? In late March, Vienna authorities cracked a five-
person drug ring that had been smuggling heroin,
cocaine, and LSD into Austria from West Germany
since 1979.
? In mid-April, Austrian customs officials arrested a
Turk and seized 15.35 kilograms of heroin at the
Spielfeld border checkpoint.
? In mid-April, Austrian drug officials arrested nine
persons in connection with the seizure of 93 letters
containing prepared heroin shipments.
? In late April, Vienna authorities arrested four Turks
in connection with a discovery of 2.7 kilograms of
heroin.
? In early May, Austrian customs officers arrested a
Turk and seized 8.5 kilograms of heroin at the
Spielfeld border checkpoint.
The increased presence at customs checkpoints is
likely to result in more of these seizures and may even
reduce-at least temporarily-the flow of drugs
through Austria. International trafficking
organizations are always quick to respond to law
enforcement efforts and may divert some drugs to
safer routes.
Lenient Legal Guidelines
The deterrent effect of these enforcement measures
will be mitigated by failure to address adequately the
penalties for drug trafficking. The new statutes
permit longer incarceration for convicted traffickers,
extending maximum sentences of from five to 10
years to 10 to 15 years for common dealers and up to
20 years for international drug ring criminals. They
do not mandate minimum sentences for trafficking
offenses, however. We judge that drug traffickers are
not deterred by the remote threat of lengthy
maximum sentences-which are rarely given-but by
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the certainty of a prison term. Maximum sentences
may sound more dramatic, but minimum prison
terms-assured in advance-are far more effective
deterrents.
One provision of the new legislation dilutes the
already weak effects of the sentencing increases.
Convicted traffickers who prove they are addicts and
trafficking only to satisfy their dependency can be
sentenced to no more than five years. Moreover,
cumulative fines levied concurrently with
imprisonment for drug offenders are repealed,
reducing the costs to convicted drug felons.
Drug Abuse Treatment Gets a Boost
Drug abuse, although mild compared to other West
European countries, is perceived with growing
concern within Austria. The new laws reflect the
ruling party's belief that drug use is an illness, not a
crime, and authorize an expansion of drug prevention
and rehabilitation programs. The eventual extent of
this expansion will be determined by the level of funds
appropriated by Parliament. Two provisions of the
new legislation also are designed to encourage drug
addicts to seek and take advantage of existing
treatment programs. One suspends or postpones
prison sentences if the addict is willing to undergo
medical treatment. The other eliminates the
requirement that hospitals inform the police when the
addict voluntarily chooses to undergo medical
treatment.
Outlook
The new drug legislation signals Austria's intention to
take a stronger and more active role in combating the
drug problem. The government's response-drug
abuse programs and stepped-up border interdiction-
is similar to that of other European countries alarmed
by increasing narcotics problems. Austria, like most
European countries with large numbers of tourists
and relatively lax border controls, faces a difficult
battle against drug trafficking. Austria's problem
highlights the need for more comprehensive narcotics
control programs in European countries and for
regional cooperation in fighting the drug trade.
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Worldwide Narcotics Highlights
South America Colombian authorities continue their campaign against the narcotics
industry:
? Bogota claimed recent interdiction and eradication operations in April
greatly reduced marijuana cultivation, destroyed 18 unregistered
airstrips and two large coca-processing labs, and seized a large marijuana
shipment.
? Authorities in Medellin continued a major crackdown in April on drug
traffickers in response to the recent assassination of a magistrate. Since
the killing, Medellin police claim to have carried out more than 30 raids
on suspected traffickers and to have seized cocaine refining chemicals
worth over US $1 million.
? Colombia and Ecuador agreed to conduct their first joint coca
eradication. According to US Embassy reporting, a four-week operation
is planned along the common border between Putumayo Department and
northeastern Ecuador. Officials expect to eradicate over 500 hectares of
coca. Operational planning began on 3 June.
? Colombian authorities arrested Jose Antonio Cabrera Sarmiento,
probably the third most important drug mafia boss in Latin America,
and drug kingpin Jose Ramon Matta-Ballesteros, a Honduran national
believed to have been involved in the murder of Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) agent Enrique Camarena in Mexico. US
authorities are seeking extradition of both traffickers, wanted in the
United States on a 1985 indictment for cocaine importation.
? Bogota is planning to tighten controls over Colombian banks with
branches in Panama,
Traffickers, among others, take advantage of Panamanian bank secrecy
laws to hide their funds from the Colombian Government and evade
taxation.
Although eradication and interdiction efforts have been successful along
Colombia's north coast, corruption continues to undermine overall
enforcement. cocaine is
transported from laboratories in the Amazon jungle to Leticia, Colombia,
with little difficulty because officers of the United Military Command of
the South, who are responsible for controlling private aircraft and fuel as
well as destroying unregistered airstrips, accept bribes to overlook
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DI NR 85-002
June 1985
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Colombian traffickers continue to respond to the crackdown by taking
countermeasures, altering smuggling routes, and relocating their
operations:
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Colombian businessmen generally believe
that the drug mafia has begun to move its more important officials out of
Colombia into Brazil, Midlevel
drug traffickers may remain in Colombia to oversee local activities.
a large portion of illicit drug traffic in Colombia has been
diverted to avoid interdiction along the traditional Atlantic routes.
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On 18 March police made the largest cocaine seizure ever in Ecuador-
over 600 kilograms, worth an estimated US $150 million-during a routine
highway interdiction operation south of the city of Esmeraldas. The
cocaine-one of several shipments ranging from 350 to 600 kilograms--
apparently had been flown in from Colombia for additional processing and
transshipment via the port of Esmeraldas to markets in the United States.
Further investigation by the police led to the arrest of several Colombian,
Chilean, and Ecuadorean nationals. The size of the cocaine seizure
indicates that Colombian traffickers are using Ecuador as a safehaven to
avoid Bogota's ongoing drug crackdown.
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President Febres-Cordero of Ecuador, despite preoccupation with a
number of domestic problems, took time to make an unprecedented
appearance at the graduation ceremonies of a US-sponsored antinarcotics
program. This underscores the importance he places on narcotics control as
an issue in the relations with the United States. The President was
accompanied by the Minister of Government, the Commanding General of
the National Police, the President's drug czar, Colonel Montesinos, and a
number of other high-ranking police officials.
President-elect Alan Garcia of Peru has told US Embassy officials that he
will crack down on drug trafficking.
= Garcia plans to launch an immediate investigation of corruption in
agencies involved in drug control, push for a drug law containing stiffer
penalties for use and trafficking, and give the military a more direct role in
drug enforcement. The centerpiece of Garcia's proposed program, however,
is land reform and crop substitution. By using various financial and
technical incentives, Garcia hopes to entice local coca growers to migrate
to areas more suited to the cultivation of traditional crops.
Drug eradication in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley resumed on 23 April,
and, by 2 May, over 400 workers were engaged in eradication operations.
Peruvian authorities hope to eradicate a minimum of 20 hectares of coca
daily, to reach a goal of 2,500 hectares by mid-July. Despite this
enforcement pressure, some valley coca growers are increasing their use of
nitrogen fertilizers to improve coca leaf quality and yield,
heavy rains, some growers also are using an adherent substance to bind the
fertilizers to the leaves.
The Director General of the Peruvian Investigative Police (PIP), Lt. Gen.
Rodolfo Ballesteros, resigned after receiving heavy public criticism for his
organization's poor performance during the attack on national elections
board director, Domingo Garcia Rada. Ballesteros reputedly is corrupt and
has been a major factor in PIP's poor performance in antinarcotics work,
according to the US Embassy. Ballesteros's successor, Lt. Gen. Munoz
Malaver, although a close associate of Ballesteros, is viewed by the
Embassy as more honest and competent. His tenure as director, however,
probably will be short. He is expected to be replaced after the new
administration takes office in late July.
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Dr. Arthur Castilho Netto resigned in March from his positions as
Secretary General of the Ministry of Justice and Chairman of the
Brazilian Federal Drug Council (CONFEN). Dr. Castilho had become
increasingly concerned over his and his family's security. Press reports
indicated that Colombian narcotics traffickers might attempt reprisals
against Brazilian officials involved in large-scale police raids in February
1985. The resignation of Dr. Castilho from his post in CONFEN-and his
probable loss of influence within the Ministry of Justice-may jeopardize
the future of the Drug Council. Castilho's resignation indicates that the
notorious reputation of Colombian narcotics traffickers can be a powerful
intimidator to South American drug control efforts.
The US Consulate in Sao Paulo, Brazil, reported in late May 1985 that
there is a growing threat from international narcotics trafficking in Mato
Grosso Do Sul, a state bordering on Paraguay and Bolivia. As of 27 May,
elements of the Paraguayan Frontier Battalion stationed at the border
town of Pedro Juan Caballero, Paraguay, were searching the area
southwest of the city for a marijuana trafficker who had killed a
noncommissioned officer. One of the accomplices reportedly fled into
Brazil. In addition, at least two light aircraft-allegedly transporting
narcotics into Brazil-have been destroyed by the Paraguayan Army in
recent weeks. Brazilian officials also claim that barrels of acetone and
ether enter from Paraguay, while cocaine enters the country from Bolivia.
The Pantanal marshland in the northwestern section of the state is also
utilized by traffickers. Additionally, numerous marijuana fields and
cocaine-refining labs are reportedly located on the Brazilian side of the
border near Ponta Pora. A favorable climate, secluded growing sites, and
relatively safe, convenient, and economical routes to the principal
international drug markets, coupled with stricter antinarcotics programs in
Colombia and other countries, account for Brazil's increased role in the
South American drug trade.
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Brazilian authorities, along with the general public, are beginning to
realize the extent of the drug abuse problem and the growing threat of the
narcotics trade in their country, although it is not yet clear what degree of
priority the new administration will attach to the narcotics problem nor the
resources it will be able to commit. The Minister of Justice, Fernando
Soares Lyra, is preparing an ambitious antinarcotics program, and he has
announced the creation of an organization within the Ministry to head up
antidrug efforts. Press reports state that Ministry of Justice Secretary Gen.
Jose Paulo Cavalcanti plans to form a committee composed of physicians,
psychiatrists, police, and other concerned entities to discuss the
effectiveness of existing legislation on narcotics and to propose
amendments. These amendments may include special laws concerning
narcotics, a provision for plea bargaining that may encourage small
traffickers to implicate ringleaders, and a resolution to adopt the US
system of confiscating in-country assets that traffickers acquired as a result
of their illegal activities. Lyra revealed that a fund to combat the narcotics
trade would be created with endowments from Brazil, international
organizations, and countries interested in drug control. It is not yet clear
whether the organizational changes portend any significant increase in
Brazil's ability to combat the narcotics trade. Serious economic difficulties
have forced the new administration of President Jose Sarney Costa to
impose austerity measures that will cut many government activities, and
narcotics enforcement is not immune. The austerity program has adversely
affected police operations, particularly those like drug enforcement that
are essentially discretionary.
Victory by either major party in the Bolivian national elections-
scheduled for 14 July-is unlikely to have a positive impact on narcotics-
reduction efforts. The narcotics industry has contributed large amounts of
money to both parties in order to prevent effective narcotics control,
whoever wins. Recent changes in the Cabinet do not bode well for new
narcotics reduction by the present government. New Interior Minister
Sanchez Salazar is
controlling the appointments of narcotics officials, diminishing the power
of uncorrupted personnel.
Coca producers in Bolivia are becoming more sophisticated.
campesinos are becoming more directly involved in cocaine
processing and are forming their own trafficking networks to replace the
traditional middleman and deal directly with major traffickers. In
addition, their efforts to lobby against new laws for coca reduction and
control of coca marketing are more coordinated. Several thousand
members of coca producers' unions met in mid-April and apparently
organized a large-scale protest against government coca reduction and
controls which resulted in the recent takeover of the city of Cochabamba
and its Agriculture Ministry building.
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first line of defense against the drug trade.
Less stringent enforcement efforts under the new democratic government
in Uruguay may create greater opportunities for drug trafficking,
according to US officials. Uruguayan drug enforcement officials have
already reported increased movement of known traffickers-mainly
Colombian, Chilean, and Bolivian-through Uruguay since the inception
of stepped-up narcotics control efforts in other South American countries.
Government officials in Montevideo expect that increased use of Uruguay
as a narcotics transshipment point poses the most immediate danger. In
order to meet the threat, Uruguayan customs officials have requested US
training assistance for both customs officers and local police, Uruguay's
President de la Madrid plans to convene a meeting of cabinet-level officials
with drug control duties in June to assess the effectiveness of Mexico's
antinarcotics programs and explore ways to improve them,
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This reportedly is the first session of the newly
Secretary Avelar a joint antidrug public awareness program.
created National Council Against Drug Dependence, expected to meet
periodically to review antidrug efforts and make recommendations to the
President. Attorney General Garcia believes that
drug control measures are being hampered by bureaucratic squabbling
between himself and Secretary of Government Barlett and by poor
communications between their two agencies. In addition, Garcia believes
the Foreign Ministry has been doing little through diplomatic channels to
try to ease drug-related tensions between Mexico City and Washington.
The Attorney General is said to have proposed to Defense Minister Arevalo
a new joint civilian-military program to discourage rural farmers from
planting marijuana-perhaps through tighter enforcement efforts or some
kind of financial incentives-and plans to propose to Public Education
President de la Madrid to increase Army participation.
Defense Secretary Arevalo intends to increase the military's role in
Mexico's antinarcotics effort and has already had some success in lobbying
Arevalo recently persuaded de la Madrid to
have stepped up drug eradication efforts
internal security problems, including the deteriorating narcotics situation.
Arevalo also sought, but has not received, sole authority over the country's
currently civilian-managed antinarcotics operations. Military units already
approve the formation of 10 new Army battalions-a manpower increase
of 16 percent-by citing the need for more troops to deal with a number of
We judge Arevalo may see current concerns over narcotics and
drug-related corruption as an opportunity for further expansion of the
military's role in domestic security matters. Although de la Madrid seems
disposed to give the military a greater role in combating illegal drugs, he
probably will not give it sole authority over the effort. With midterm
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elections coming in July, de la Madrid probably wishes to avoid further
publicizing the shortcomings of his anticorruption campaign.
The US Embassy reported in late April that the Mexican Government has
expressed official interest in assuming responsibility for all funding of its
drug eradication program. In recent years, the United States has provided
roughly half of the approximately $13-14 million that Mexico has devoted
each year to drug control, with Washington's contribution largely spent for
maintenance of Mexico's spray helicopter fleet. We concur with the
Embassy's view that some Mexican officials apparently are seeking to ease
the United States out of any role in the antidrug campaign expressly to
remove all legal basis for Washington to continue monitoring the program
within Mexico or suggesting administrative and operational changes.
According to a reliable DEA source, the Governor of
Sonora also has been involved in narcotics activity for some time and plans
to use the large sums of money he is acquiring to gain sufficient influence
in Mexico's ruling political party to make a bid for the presidency in 1988.
Mexican federal police in the northern border state of Sonora arrested the
Sinaloa State representative of the federal Attorney General's office in
mid-May for marijuana smuggling, according to a Mexico City press
report. The official reportedly was seeking to transport some 36 kilograms
of the drug to the border city of Nogales for sale to US traffickers. He is
said to be currently awaiting trial in Mexico City.
The Marxist-oriented Mexico City newspaper El Dia on 29 April charged
that the international narcotics problem largely is due to demand by US
users and accused Washington of seeking to make Mexico a "scapegoat" to
deflect criticism of US domestic production and consumption. The
newspaper pointed to recent Mexican Government arrests of major drug
traffickers and called for comparable action in the United States. Many
Mexicans view the Latin American drug situation as a US domestic
problem and look upon Washington's pressure for more forceful antidrug
action as an affront to Mexican sovereignty. Some senior officials almost
certainly welcome such newspaper commentary as an indirect means of
rebutting US criticism of Mexican drug control efforts and as a way to
arouse nationalism in support of the ruling political party prior to the July
elections.
The Mexican press reported on 15 May that an influential narcotics
trafficker in Veracruz State had been murdered in the latest instance of
rising drug-related violence there. The victim was said to have been
abducted and killed by state police officers believed to be
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in the employ of a rival drug leader.
during the past year or so narcotics activity in Veracruz has increased
markedly. The region may be emerging as a center of such activity on a
level comparable to the major producing and trafficking areas in the
northern tristate region of Sinaloa, Chihuahua, and Durango, and in the
southern growing region in and around Guerrero.
Caribbean Increasing use of the Caribbean islands as transshipment points for South
American drugs en route to the United States has caused growing concern
among security officials in the region:
? According to a recent report from
high-level military officers of the Dominican Republic have
identified drug trafficking as a potential long-term threat to national
security. Dominican officers told US officials that the island nation was
being increasingly used as a transshipment point for illicit drugs.
? In April, a security official of the Barbados Government expressed
concern over the apparent shift by narcotics traffickers toward the
eastern Caribbean, according to US Embassy reporting. The Barbadian
official claimed his government had evidence that more illegal drugs,
especially cocaine, were entering the island. The commander of the
Barbados Coast Guard told a US official that the Coast Guard was going
to become more involved in drug enforcement and asked for DEA
training to upgrade its capabilities.
Caribbean security authorities' concern is justified. Continued US pressure
on customary routes and drug enforcement campaigns by the Governments
of Colombia and Jamaica have caused traffickers to take countermeasures.
Caribbean security forces are poorly prepared to combat sophisticated
smuggling organizations and are likely to turn to the United States for
assistance.
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The Jamaican Government continues to make progress in its drug control
programs:
? Jamaican security forces have also made significant drug seizures in
recent months. In early January 1985, the JDF coast guard and the
Jamaican Constabulary Force Narcotics Squad carried out a joint
operation that netted over 4,500 kilograms of highly valued sinsemilla.
The operation ealt a serious
blow to the organization of major trafficker Trevor Dunkley. Another
joint operation on the north coast in May led to the seizure of more than
320 kilograms of cocaine, the second-largest cocaine seizure ever in
Jamaica. All five traffickers arrested were brothers of Carl Rhoden, a
known trafficker and a member of the Jamaican Parliament. This was
the first arrest of a group of traffickers with political connections.
Southeast Asia Regional cooperation against drug trafficking is gaining momentum in
Southeast Asia. Malaysia and Singapore have agreed to hold talks on
legislation that would allow confiscation of traffickers' assets. During a
May visit to Thailand, the Malaysian Prime Minister pushed for stronger
joint efforts to police the Thai-Malaysian border and stressed his
government's interest in coordinating asset seizure laws. Singapore is
seeking to cooperate more with its neighbors following US criticism of its
enforcement efforts against traffickers using the nation as a transshipment
point.
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Thailand's antinarcotics officials met in May to review progress made in
control of opium poppy cultivation in the 1984-85 season and to plan next
year's program. the amount of land
taken out of opium production through economic development projects and
eradication in the 1984-85 season totaled 1,082 hectares, a significant
improvement over last year's total. the
1984-85 operations were only a beginning in the Royal Thai Army's efforts
to end illicit opium poppy cultivation. Future plans include not only
continued development projects and eradication campaigns but also public
information programs aimed at warning opium growers of the
consequences of planting opium. According to US Embassy reporting,
commitment to ending opium cultivation is becoming more widespread in
both the civilian agencies and the military.
The Burmese Government has informed the US Embassy that it is
committed to carrying out a major aerial eradication campaign in the Shan
State during the 1985-86 season. A review of results from tests conducted
in December convinced officials that the herbicide tested would severely
damage opium poppies without harming nearby vegetation or livestock.
The eradication program should partially compensate for the military's
inability to shut down trafficking and refining activity in the Shan State. If
successful, the eradication program would put more pressure on traffickers
to seek raw opium farther to the north and raise production costs.
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Unconfirmed press reports indicate that an insurgent group in the
Philippines, the New People's Army (NPA), is growing and marketing
marijuana as a peripheral source of funds for its struggle against the
Marcos government. The Philippines, with its many secluded islands and
coves, is an ideal site for large-scale marijuana cultivation and trafficking.
For some time, it has supplied some marijuana to the United States and
Japan.
A press report indicates there is growing cocaine abuse in Hong Kong. So
far, however, the DEA has found no evidence of significant cocaine use in
the colony. A large expatriate population and a growing middle class make
Hong Kong a likely target for traffickers looking for new markets. In an
upwardly mobile, work-oriented society like Hong Kong's, cocaine could
become the drug of choice because of its reputation for not impairing
function and for giving the user an increased feeling of confidence.
Movement of cocaine to Hong Kong would pose few problems for
trafficking organizations because of the high volume of legal commercial
traffic that passes through the city
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of the fields are planted with poppy. Nearly 100 hectares were sighted in
Paktia Province, where much fighting has occurred and abandonment of
agricultural land is widespread. Afghanistan should produce a good opium
crop this year. We expect yields to be higher than last year in most areas as
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Indian authorities are seeking an early meeting
with the Burmese to stem the flow of drugs across their border. Increasing
amounts of Southeast Asian heroin are being smuggled into India to avoid
military pressure on heroin refining and trafficking along the Thai-
Burmese border.
Moreover, the Indians are also aware that chemicals
needed by Burmese traffickers to manufacture heroin are being
transported illegally through their country. New Delhi probably will offer
to share information with Rangoon in an attempt to arrest major
traffickers and to avert the possibility of heroin laboratories being
reestablished along the Indian-Burmese border.
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After considerable pressure by the United States, Pakistani authorities are
beginning to step up their investigations and arrests of major heroin
traffickers. Over the past two years, DEA agents have identified and
provided information on some 40 top-level traffickers to the Pakistanis.
According to the Embassy, at least four of these traffickers have now been
arrested. In addition, Pakistan's Minister of Interior recently told US
officials he is drafting legislation, modeled after US laws, that would
permit the government to seize the assets of major drug traffickers. Despite
these advances, however, Pakistan's drug enforcement efforts are
hampered by the courts' unwillingness to hand down stiff sentences for
major traffickers:
? A summary military court sentenced a major Lahore trafficker, who was
also a ranking Punjab police officer, to only three years in jail and fined
him $60,000.
? In April, a leading Karachi heroin trafficker was sentenced by a military
court to three years in jail and fined approximately $30,000.
Pakistan's judges have never used their authority to sentence major
traffickers to life in prison, and rarely hand down sentences longer than
three years
President Zia is very aware of Pakistan's international reputation as a
major heroin source and is sensitive to charges that high-level officials
could be involved in the trade. In February 1984 he demanded an intensive
investigation and prosecution of all Pakistani officials involved in a scheme
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to smuggle narcotics to Sweden through the diplomatic pouch.
A multilateral drug control program for Pakistan received a setback in
May when several European countries did not make new pledges to the
Special Development and Enforcement Project (SDEP). The SDEP is a $35
million, five-year, UN-administered program to eliminate poppy
cultivation in Dir and in some of Pakistan's tribe-controlled agencies. It is
modeled after a smaller, successful US State Department project that
combined rural development projects with enforcement pressure to
eliminate poppies in Malakand. At an aid-to-Pakistan meeting in Paris,
sponsored by the World Bank, the UN representative reported that the
SDEP needed $5 million to meet its current needs, and over $24 million to
fund all remaining aspects of the project. None of the European country
representatives was willing to provide funds. On the brighter side, the
European Economic Council representative said his organization would
consider pledging as much as $4 million-enough to rescue the project
temporarily. Even if these funds come through, the SDEP still faces an
uphill struggle. Many European countries do not attach a high priority to
narcotics and are skeptical about the effectiveness of the "income
substitution" approach unless it is coupled with strict enforcement
measures. Pakistan's eradication operation in Dir this April plus the
success of the Malakand project, however, could enhance the SDEP's
credibility and attract enough donations to keep the project going.
Western Europe Ireland's drug abuse problem is serious and becoming worse, according to
US Embassy officials. The Embassy reports that heroin addiction in some
parts of Dublin may run as high as 12 percent in the 15 to 24 age group.
Last year the principal medical treatment facility in Dublin reported
addiction cases involving patients as young as 7 and 8 years old. The
number of drug seizures in Ireland is low by world standards. The US
Embassy believes this reflects the inability of the Irish police to make
significant seizures rather than the amount of drugs entering the country.
Although currently only a consumer of narcotics, Ireland has the potential
to become a producer of marijuana and a transshipment point for other
drugs.
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