NARCOTICS REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00685R000100020013-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: April 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence 25X1
Narcotics Review
April 1985
Cc1/1c~C/oo1C/CC799 97
FXTRA CnPreS
STi1FF
CCNTkGL BRACH
ROOM 7G07 HGS
SC .i vt
DI NR 85-001
April 1985
Copy 3 5 4
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Narcotics Review) 25X1
Intensified counternarcotics programs by Burma and Thailand begun in 1984
could start to reduce opium production as early as the 1985-86 growing season.
Burma recently began a test program to determine the effectiveness of aerially
sprayed herbicides in eradicating poppy plants. Thailand has resumed a manual
eradication program suspended in 1982 after concerns raised by the royal family
about the economic impact on hill tribes who grow the poppy.F__1
parties to some of its proposed measures
The West German Government, more than any other West European regime, has
recognized the seriousness of the narcotics threat and developed a broad strategy
for combating it. Public opinion polls indicate that most West Germans favor
tough antidrug measures, but the government faces opposition from centrist leftist
International efforts to limit availability of essential processing chemicals to drug
traffickers have led South American cocaine traffickers to take a number of
countermeasures. They have sought new sources of supply, attempted to circum-
vent controls by transshipping through different countries, and in some cases
moved their processing operations into countries where chemicals are cheaper or
easier to obtain. Some traffickers are developing drug products and methods that
do not require the controlled chemicals.
transshipment to markets elsewhere.
The Israeli Government is concerned about the increased narcotics trafficking in
Israel that has resulted from its involvement in South Lebanon. Israeli, Lebanese,
and Sinai bedouin Arab organizations are cooperating to transport large quantities
of Lebanese-produced hashish to Israel both for local consumption and for
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Mexican President de la Madrid has removed several high-level drug control
officials suspected of aiding traffickers. His actions evidently are in response to
increased US pressure following the kidnaping and murder of a US Drug
Enforcement Administration officer in Guadalajara.
23 Worldwide Narcotics Highlights
A summary of key developments from 15 December 1985 through 1 March 1985.
This review is published bimonthly by the Directorate of Intelligence and
examines international, regional, and functional issues related to the worldwide
drug problem. Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well
as other US Government agencies will be considered for publication. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Terrorism/Narcotics
Analysis Division
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Southeast Asia:
Increased Efforts To
Curb Opium Production
Burma and Thailand are beginning to take a harder
line on opium production, after four years of bumper
opium harvests resulting from favorable weather and
strong market demand. Burma conducted its first test
of aerially sprayed herbicides and Thailand resumed
its manual eradication program; these represent
marked changes from past crop control practices.
These intensified efforts will have little impact on the
present crop, most of which has already been harvest-
ed, but if continued in 1985 they could reduce opium
cultivation in the 1985-86 growing season.
Obstacles to Narcotics Control
Since 1975 the Burmese have conducted manual
eradication of poppies and have officially supported
crop substitution programs-but to little effect. The
eradication campaign is carried out by the Army, the
police, and local village militias in about half of the
52 opium-producing townships in Shan State near
military bases and other generally secure areas. Bur-
ma's poppy destruction program,
appears to have leveled off during
the past few years at about 4,000 hectares annually,
or some 5 to 10 percent' of the country's estimated
poppy-growing area. Several problems have hampered
the effectiveness of the control program:
? Many of the poppy fields are located in remote,
rugged terrain in areas where roads are poor or
nonexistent.
? Most of the growing areas are located in parts of
Burma controlled or contested by narcotics-
trafficking insurgents or criminal groups involved in
the drug trade.
? Crop control authorities and other government per-
sonnel stationed in opium-producing regions are
often bribed or intimidated by threats to ignore or
directly abet trafficking activities. In some instances
entire communities have become involved in narcot-
ics production, with local officals helping trafficking
groups to thwart Rangoon's enforcement efforts.
The Burmese Government conducts eradication pri-
marily to try to reduce the large drug revenues earned
by insurgents involved in trafficking. Ironically, these
efforts have the practical effect of pushing poppy
production into insurgent-held areas, thereby severely
limiting the impact of government eradication efforts
in more secure regions. Statistics
indicate that between 1983 and 1984 about 15
percent more cultivators shifted production from safe
or contested areas to areas where insurgents and other
narcotics traffickers are too strong for government
forces.
During 1984 the Burinese had planned to eradicate
more than 10,000 hectares of poppies, but their efforts
were stymied by increased countermeasures on the
part of growers, by narcotics traffickers' harassment
of control officials, and by inability of government
forces to enter insurgent-held areas. Destruction ef-
forts even in government-controlled areas were often
limited to the more obvious, easily accessible fields.
The government claims, however, to have destroyed
manually nearly 4,500 hectares of poppy fields.
The success of Burmese crop substitution efforts has
been more limited. According to the United Nations
Fund for Drug Abuse Control, which supports this
program, it has not yet been implemented fully and
has been plagued by mismanagement and corruption.
Reports tell of government officials and farmers
selling equipment, food, seeds, and fertilizer intended
for the substitution projects to traffickers. The pro-
gram is unlikely to be expanded until the security
situation in the Shan State improves.
Thailand's efforts to limit opium production also have
been largely ineffective. Bangkok has focused chiefly
on crop substitution programs to try to wean opium
farmers away from planting poppy. The program is
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April 1985
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Secret
Poppy intercropped with coffee,
a common practice in many
crop-substitution villages in
Thailand.)
working in some locations and its acceptance by poppy
farmers is spreading, but Thai authorities have not yet
been able to replace the poppy on a large scale in
highland fields where most of the cultivation takes
place. Farmers there have just diversified their crop
mix rather than stop planting poppy. In 1980 the
government banned all opium poppy cultivation in
some villages designated as opium-free zones, but
enforcement was lax. Bangkok subsequently has done
little to seek wider participation by the majority of
tradition-bound hill-tribe farmers, who continue to
grow poppies even during those periods when prices
are down and the money they could earn from opium
is less than they could make by switching to other
crops.
Thailand's intermittent and limited attempts at opium
eradication also have had little impact. As a result of
US diplomatic pressure, the government of Prime
Minister Prem began manual eradication during the
1981-82 growing season in northern areas where
Bangkok had banned opium cultivation. The effort
was quickly suspended, however, after many govern-
ment officals and some members of the royal family
cause security problems in the rural areas.
The King has long been a spokesman for the interests
of the country's hill-tribe minorities, and he has
resisted eradication because he believes it is too
traumatic and, therefore, counterproductive. His in-
fluence and the widespread view among politically
powerful segments of Thai society that continued
progress can be achieved without resorting to eradica-
tion have prevented the government from obtaining
sufficient political support to take strong action
against poppy cultivators.
Increased Efforts by Burma
The numerous complex problems facing Burma's crop
control program recently prompted Rangoon to initi-
ate aerial herbicide eradication. This tougher stand
appears to be the result of an increased awareness of
the deepening involvement of insurgents-principally
the Burmese Communist Party-in expanding and
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Poppy field in early stage of growth in Burma.
Severalfields planted close together is character-
Eradicated poppy field. Numbered stakes used to
help in scient'if'ic evaluation of the sprayed fields.
Turbo Thrush fixed-wing herbicide spray air-
craft, applying 2-4-D chemical. Large load capac-
ity and wide orgy swath particularly suited for
protecting poppy cultivation, the rapid expansion of
the hectarage-devoted to poppy growing, and the
ineffectiveness of the manual eradication program
and its accompanying rising financial costs. The
United States' increased willingness to support a more
forceful eradication effort in Burma also has contrib-
uted to Rangoon's decision to begin spraying.
In December 1984 the Burmese Government conduct-
ed its first test of the effectiveness of aerial eradica-
tion. The Burmese Air Force used a US-supplied
Turbo Thrush fixed-wing aircraft to spray about 100
hectares of poppies with 2-4-D chemical. This single-
engine plane is specifically designed for precise appli-
cation of agricultural chemicals, and its large load-
carrying capacity and wide spray swath are
particularly suited for the large fields found in
Burma. Positive results from the test have prompted
Rangoon to expand the program during the 1985-86
poppy-growing season.
The expanded aerial eradication program will depend
heavily on US assistance. Preliminary plans call for
Washington to provide three Thrush aircraft. Burma
also intends to use low-level aerial reconnaissance to
find fields and better direct its spray program. We
expect Rangoon to look to Washington for advice and
perhaps for additional aircraft for observation and
spotting.
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Thailand's Approach
The Prem government, under increasing pressure
from the United States and from international donors
to do more against narcotics activity, has worked in
recent years to establish a political consensus in favor
of crop eradication. Since 1982 Bangkok has taken
strong actions against Communist activity in the
north and northeast and has reduced the party's
influence in rural poppy-growing areas, somewhat
lowering the risk that an increased crackdown there
would lead to a strong insurgent response that could
heighten security problems. The government also has
established Civilian-Police-Military (CPM) com-
mands to enhance security in the northern areas, and
Prime Minister Prem has moved to involve more Thai
agencies in the hill-tribe program, including the De-
partment of Welfare, the Department of Interior, the
Royal Northern Project, Department of Forestry, and
the Office of Narcotics Control Board (ONCB).F-
The Prem government resumed small-scale manual
eradication during 1984-too late in the growing
season to have much of an effect-possibly in an
attempt to test the King's willingness to tolerate at
least somewhat stronger action in rural areas where
increasing amounts of poppy have been planted. This
effort drew no criticism from the King. In a well-
planned campaign during the 1984-85 crop season the
Thai military eradicated between 600 and 800 hect-
ares of poppies, more than three times the hectarage
destroyed during the previous year. The eradication
program, carried out by the Thai Army with assis-
tance from the Border Patrol Police and the ONCB,
focused on two different types of targets. In the CPM
project areas, the military eradicated all the poppy
that had been planted in violation of villagers' agree-
ments to halt poppy cultivation in exchange for
receiving development aid. In other areas, the Army
conducted intensified eradication in villages that had
benefited from major crop substitution and develop-
ment programs but where there had been significant
increases in opium production in recent years. F_
Outlook
The immediate impact of increased Burmese and
Thai narcotics enforcement on production is likely to
be offset by the expansion in acreage under cultiva-
tion in the 1984-85 growing season. Any shortfall in
production from this crop, therefore, almost certainly
would be due to poor weather. Continued expansion of
both countries' control programs, however, could
begin to have an appreciable effect on opium produc-
tion during the 1985-86 season. Growers will probably
respond to the strengthened programs with counter-
measures-such as planting smaller fields-and the
permanence of any near-term gains will depend on
each government's flexibility and adaptability in re-
sponding in turn to such measures.
Over the longer term, any effective effort to stop the
production and trafficking of opium in Burma would
require government control over the affected areas in
the Shan and Kachin States. Rangoon has neither the
will nor the resources to wrest control physically of
the opium-producing regions from the insurgents or to
halt narcotics activities there entirely. A strong aerial
eradication program offers the best chance of over-
coming the obstacles posed by the remote location of
most of the opium cultivation and the strength of the
trafficking groups and reversing the rising trend in
opium production.
Burma would require considerable military and finan-
cial assistance to launch and sustain effective large-
scale narcotics control operations in insurgent-occu-
pied areas. Because of Burma's nonaligned foreign
policy and its sensitivity about relations with neigh-
boring China, Rangoon would be reluctant to under-
take operations that would require massive foreign
military assistance. If Rangoon were to accept large-
scale military aid from the United States or another
major world power, this probably would result in
increased Chinese diplomatic, financial, and military
support for Communist insurgents in Burma. This in
turn could lead to a further deterioration of security
conditions in Burma. Such large infusions of arms and
funds intended to strengthen antidrug efforts might
heighten regional tensions by adding to longstanding
suspicions between Burma and Thailand.
Thailand can be expected to sustain its eradication
campaign to limit commercial production of opium,
particularly in those villages that have received finan-
cial and crop substitution assistance. Thailand can no
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Secret
Poppy Eradication
make
Tevvlivyi~
it Hong ton
dam-
i6 M
AThrailay
Sukhothai N
S& CA tato
~t m a,
TThe
ttaradit I
Nakhon
Thai
f J
Phetchabun Chanthaburi
Eradication area
( _? Poppy cultivation area
Internal administrative
boundary
O Administrative center
Provinces in Thailand are named only when
they differ from administrative centers.
75 Kilometers
lute Miles
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Poppy Cultivation Areas in the Golden Triangle
Bay
of
Bengal
Boundary repregentation is not
arily authoritative. Names
tnam are shown without
in Via
diacritical marks.
Intensive poppy
cultivation
Less intensive poppy
cultivation
Internal administrative
boundary
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longer tout the effectiveness of a gradual approach to
curtailing the narcotics trade to deflect international
calls for more effective action.
Achieving substantial headway against cultivation in
Thailand's more rural areas would require extensive
programs to widen economic opportunities for cultiva-
tors and develop better transportation to these areas.
Such measures would take considerable time and
place further strains on government resources. Migra-
tion of poppy-growing hill-tribe people from Burma
and Laos into remote areas of Thailand exacerbates
the problem. A concerted aerial eradication program
in Burma could greatly increase such migration. =
Both Burma and Thailand have openly acknowledged
serious domestic drug abuse problems and their inter-
national reputations are tarnished as a result of their
roles as drug-producing nations. For these reasons,
neither country is likely to back away from narcotics
control already currently under way, particularly so
long as both judge that the United States remains
acutely concerned about regional and global narcotics
activities.
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West Germany:
Drugs and Government Policy
Over the past decade drug abuse and trafficking in
West Germany have taken on increasingly worrisome
dimensions. The government has recognized the seri-
ousness of the narcotics threat, and, more than other
West European countries, has developed a broad
strategy for combating it at home and abroad. The
Social Democratic Party (SDP)-the principal opposi-
tion party-has strongly supported the government's
narcotics control program, but the iconoclastic Greens
and the left wing of the Free Democratic Party (FDP)
have advocated legalization of all types of drugs and
adoption of a methadone maintenance program simi-
lar to the Dutch one. Recent public opinion polls show
that a majority of West Germans favor tough anti-
drug measures, particularly against large-scale traf-
fickers.
Magnitude of the Threat
Statistics published annually by the Federal Criminal
Police (BKA) showing the number of narcotics viola-
tions permit a rough assessment of drug abuse trends.
According to the BKA, illegal use of cannabis has
increased steadily since the mid-1970s, and cocaine
abuse shows a strong upward tendency. Heroin con-
sumption, which had grown at a disconcerting rate
until 1980, has declined slightly. The number of
heroin addicts is estimated at 50,000 in an overall
population of 62 million. The rate of deaths resulting
from drug overdose, which had fallen after a peak in
1979, is beginning to rise again because of the higher
purity of the heroin now being sold in West Germany.
Drug dealing and smuggling offenses, as well as
crimes to obtain illicit narcotics, such as pharmacy
burglaries, also have taken on disturbing proportions.
Abuse Among the Young. A 1981 national survey of
nearly 12,000 young people ranging in age from 12 to
24 showed that:
? 9.7 percent of respondents had taken drugs at least
once; 4 percent were current users; 6 percent fell
into the category of "experimenters"; and 1 percent
belonged to the "heavy users" group.
? Among those having taken drugs, cannabis was the
preferred substance.
? Drug abuse was concentrated in the group of 18- to
24-year-olds. It was also strongly correlated with
upper socioeconomic class, unemployment, and a
"broken home" situation
Trafficking. BKA statistics indicate that drug traf-
ficking offenses have more than tripled since 1972.
Narcotics seizures in West Germany also have in-
creased markedly, and the current influx of cocaine
appears to be beginning to rival that of heroin. The
drug trade in West Germany is controlled by interna-
tional trafficking rings, but we have no reason to
believe that any West European terrorists are linked
to the narcotics trade in West Germany. There is also
no indication that traffickers use West Germany as a
money "laundering" center.
New Narcotics Legislation
In 1981 the Bundestag passed an extensively revised
narcotics law that included the following changes:
? The maximum sentence for organized drug traffick-
ing was increased from 10 to 15 years.
? The maximum sentence for illegal possession and
small-scale trading of narcotics was increased from
three to four years.
? A conspiracy provision was added.
? Defendants who are addicts were permitted to
choose between jail and therapy.
The federal government also was given the authority
to control imports and exports of narcotics, as well as
shipments transiting West Germany, including free
ports. This latter provision has increased the West
German Government's ability to support US efforts to
prevent drug shipments destined for the United
States. Before the new law went into effect, West
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Figure 1
West Germany: Deaths From Drug Abuse,
1970-83
Number of persons
700
-__ 11 _.1.._
0 1970 72
74 76 78 80 82
Source: 1982 Annual Narcotics Report
published by the BKA.
German free ports-particularly Hamburg-were im-
portant transit points for shipments of methaqualone
and other substances which enter the United States in
tablet form via processing plants in Colombia and
some other Latin American countries.
Thus far, German police have no effective legal means
for seizing assets of drug traffickers. According to US
Embassy officials, however, discussions are under way
with the Minister of Justice to draft the necessary
laws. Many officials involved in narcotics control,
moreover, have advocated the adoption of a Bank
Secrecy Act-analogous to that in the United
Figure 2
West Germany: Trends in Narcotics Offenses,
1972-82
Thousand persons
70
Source: 1982 Annual Narcotics Report
published by the BKA.
Illegal trade
and smuggling
States-that would help monitor international finan-
cial flows related to drug trafficking. At present,
West Germany has no law requiring individuals or
organizations to report cross-border financial transac-
tions.
Enforcement
Enforcement of the federal narcotics law, which also
applies to state and local jurisdictions, generally is
strict. The training and technical equipment of nar-
cotics enforcement personnel are quite sophisticated,
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Table 1
West Germany: Drug Users a
Drug Users
Current
Drug Users
12-14
15-17
18-20
14
6
21-24
16
4.5
Social background
Lower class
10
3.5
Lower middle class
9
3
Upper middle class
12
4
Upper class
13
5.5
Education/ profession
Elementary school
3
High school (technical field)
6
3
High school (humanities field)
9
4
University
11
5
Vocational training
14
4.5
Blue-collar worker
Community size (number of
inhabitants)
Under 2,000
7
3
2,000-4,999
6
2.5
5,000-19,999
_
9
3
20,000-99,999
9
3.5
100,000-499,999
11
4
500,000-1,499,999
15
5
1,500,000 or more
20
a Excluding Bremen, Hesse, and West Berlin.
b Data are arranged by demographic categories; for example, 1 1
percent of all males in the sample have used drugs at one time or
another, but only 4 percent are current users.
Source: 1981 survey on drug abuse among the young sponsored by
the Federal Government and eight Laender.
Table 2
West Germany: Source of Illicit
Drugs at First Consumption a
Percent b
(except where noted)
Total c
Experi-
menters
Occasional
Users
Heavy
Users
Sample (number
of persons)
1,000
593
261
109
Friend(s)
38
35
45
47
Clique/group
26
27
28
27
Acquaintance(s)
25
26
27
22
Spouse/sexual
partner
5
6
3
4
Sibling
4
3
3
7
Dealer
3
1
5
8
Home medicine
cabinet
3
2
2
5
a Excluding West Berlin, Bremen, Hesse, Baden-Wuerttemberg.
b Columns do not add up to 100 percent because respondents were
allowed multiple responses.
No opinion was given by 37 persons.
Source: 1981 survey on drug abuse among the young sponsored by
the Federal Government and eight Laender.
but, as in the United States and other countries, law
enforcement agencies have concentrated their re-
sources on fighting the more dangerous drugs. Ac-
cording to US Embassy reports, cooperation between
the police and the judiciary has been good and
acquittals of drug offenders are rare. The new narcot-
ics law has also resulted in fewer sentences with
probation. A West German study shows that, in 1981,
69 percent of defendants receiving a sentence of one
to two years were put on probation compared with 42
percent in 1983. We have no information about how
frequently judges impose maximum penalties on
large-scale traffickers.
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Education and Prevention
The Federal Institute for Health Education, with the
help of the health ministers of the Laender and
semiofficial and private institutions, has developed a
variety of materials to instruct parents, educators, and
young people about the drug threat. To maximize the
effectiveness of these materials, the impact on target
groups is evaluated periodically. The Institute also has
attempted to involve parent groups in drug education
and prevention, but, according to a staff member, the
"parent movement" is still much weaker than in the
United States.
The mass media also are playing a growing role in
publicizing the drug threat. Both printed and elec-
tronic media reports, however, often suffer from a
tendency toward sensationalism, superficiality, and
failure to differentiate among types of drugs. A recent
article in a popular magazine about cocaine, for
example, emphasized the sexually stimulative effect
of the drug and largely ignored the fact that cocaine
creates a strong psychological dependence.
Treatment
Although the number of outpatient programs has
grown, long-term treatment generally takes place in
the confines of a therapeutic institution. During the
detoxification process, the patient receives sedatives
but no methadone. The majority of drug therapists
oppose the use of methadone in detoxification pro-
grams and as a long-term treatment alternative for
heroin addicts, arguing that the drug cannot cure and
that it has negative side effects. Once the patient has
been detoxified, he enters the long process of psycho-
social rehabilitation. To make it easier for the former
addict to start a new life, federal laws provide for
rehabilitation assistance in the form of disability
payments, subsidies to employers, and vocational
training.
An assessment of the effectiveness of the treatment
system is difficult because West Germany is only
beginning to develop coordinated data bases on drug
abusers and therapeutic facilities. West German
health officials estimate that approximately 5 percent
of the addict population is motivated for therapy and
that, of these, 30 percent finish the long-term treat-
ment programs. However, almost half of those com-
pleting treatment suffer a relapse.
International Cooperation
West Germany is a signatory to the UN Single
Convention of 1961 and the Convention on Psychotro-
pic Substances of 1971. It is a major contributor to
the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC)
and an active participant in the Pompidou Group. It
also has cooperated closely with the United States on
drug matters.
Assistance to Producer and Transit Countries. The
West German Government has financed various nar-
cotics control projects-both through UNFDAC and
directly-in Asia, the Middle East, and South Ameri-
ca. In the past, West Germany-unlike the United
States-did not specifically link economic assistance
to producer countries' narcotics control efforts. A
high-level Ministry of Interior official recently indi-
cated to US diplomats that West Germany may
rethink this policy in view of increases in poppy
production in areas where West German aid is provid-
ed unconditionally. West Germany also gives police
assistance to various producer and transit countries in
the form of training and technical equipment. The
Minister of the Interior, moreover, plans to send more
liaison officers to key producer regions.
Cooperation With the United States. For more than a
decade, West Germany and the United States have
worked together to combat drug abuse and traffick-
ing, both domestically and internationally. US-West
German cooperation was formalized in the Narcotics
Control Agreement of 1978. The agreement estab-
lished the Central Working Group whose permanent
subcommittees are charged with the implementation
of proposals on such subjects as improvements to the
quality of life of US military personnel in West
Germany, reduction of narcotics problems among US
forces, and organization of bilateral workshops on
epidemiology and treatment.
The BKA and the US Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion also have developed a close relationship. The
BKA has strongly supported US efforts to achieve
greater control of legal processing chemicals. It has
been successful in persuading pharmaceutical firms to
control ethyl ether and acetic anhydride used in the
manufacture of cocaine and heroin.
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Outlook
The Federal Republic of Germany probably will
continue to escalate its war against illegal drugs by
increasing even further its efforts in the areas of law
enforcement, prevention and treatment, and interna-
tional cooperation. Most Laender governments are
likely to allocate substantial resources to narcotics
control, but tight budgets and competing spending
priorities may cause some of them to play down the
seriousness of the narcotics threat.
Despite strong political support for harsher punish-
ment of drug traffickers, the Minister of the Interior
may face difficulties in attaining assets-seizure legis-
lation. The FDP's desire to refurbish its liberal,
independent image and improve its survival prospects
might lead it to challenge its Christian Democratic
partners on the assets seizure issue. The SPD and the
Greens also may use the assets-seizure issue to sup-
port their charges of government insensitivity to civil
liberties. Opposition from centrist and leftist parties
probably will not prevent assets seizures over the
longer term-particularly if the Christian Democrats
remain in power and if pressure in international
narcotics control forums to adopt such legislation
increases.
In the area of international cooperation, West Germa-
ny will place greater emphasis on West European
cooperation. The Minister of the Interior plans to
assign liaison officers to the United Kingdom, France,
Italy, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Scandi-
navia. He also intends to propose to his EC counter-
parts joint programs for equipment and training
assistance to producer and transit countries in close
cooperation with the United States and UNFDAC.
West Germany probably will continue to urge West
European countries to cooperate in narcotics enforce-
ment and to work for greater coordination of national
narcotics control legislation and research on drug
abuse and treatment.
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International: Reaction to
Controls on Cocaine
Processing Chemicals
The substantial growth of the cocaine industry during
the past several years has created a sizable new
demand for chemicals to process the coca leaf and
release the cocaine alkaloid. These include sulfuric
acid, potassium carbonate, potassium permanganate,
kerosene or gasoline, ammonia, acetone, alcohol, and
hydrochloric acid. Cutting off supplies of these chemi-
cals to cocaine manufacturers is difficult; most of
them are widely used in commercial processes and
readily available. In contrast, the final phase of the
cocaine-refining process requires a less common ingre-
dient-ethyl ether-which has fewer legitimate uses
and is made and sold on a smaller scale. The limited
use of this chemical and the likelihood that a sizable
portion of the amount produced worldwide is current-
ly used by the narcotics trade make ether a targetable
choke point for enforcement efforts.
In 1983 the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
instituted a program to control the sale and shipment
of chemicals used for cocaine processing, particularly
ether. Chemical manufacturers worldwide are cooper-
ating in this effort, and some countries have taken
steps to restrict the import and export of essential
cocaine chemicals. In Colombia-the principal pro-
ducer and exporter of refined cocaine-stringent im-
port restrictions have dramatically affected the avail-
ability and price of ether. Ether supplies stockpiled by
Colombian traffickers were reportedly depleted by
early 1984, and the price of a 55-gallon (210-liter)
drum of ether had risen from about $1,500 in 1980 to
a high of $7,000 in February 1985; the same quantity
currently sells legally for less than $200 in the United
States.
Shifts in Chemical Supply Sources
From 1978 through 1982, according to the DEA,
about 95 percent of the ether imported into Colombia
was purchased from manufacturers in the United
States and the Federal Republic of Germany. In a
cooperative effort with the DEA, these manufacturers
have largely halted shipments of ether believed to be
intended for cocaine refining. With supplies of ether
and other essential chemicals from the United States
and Europe dwindling, South American cocaine traf-
fickers are turning to other sources-direct and indi-
rect-for essential chemicals:
? Brazil is now the primary source country for ether
and acetone used to process Bolivian cocaine. Brazil
has legislated export restrictions on cocaine chemi-
cals but lacks the funds to enforce them consistent-
ly. Recently proposed legislation would further re-
strict the shipment of Brazilian ether, but Brazil's
ability to enforce its controls effectively has yet to
be demonstrated.
Ithe complex could
accommodate small-scale ether production. The sale
of ether is unrestricted in Chile
Traffickers are also attempting to obtain cocaine
chemicals, especially ether, by transshipping them
through other South American countries:
? US Embassy reporting
indicate that substantial amounts of ether have been
imported into Argentina in the past two years, most
of it shipped from Mexico and reshipped to Bolivia.
? US Embassy sources document
the involvement of key military officials in Para-
guay in obtaining essential chemicals and providing
protection for traffickers' activities.
Secret
DI NR 85-001
April 1985
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? Venezuela, according to DEA sources, has been
used in recent years as a major transit country for
cocaine chemicals. Recent Venezuelan legislation
has imposed strict controls on imports of essential
chemicals, and Brazilian and Venezuelan officials
are cooperating in an attempt to halt the transship-
ment of cocaine chemicals through the country.
capability. In 1984 the Peruvian Investigative Po-
lice, cooperating with the DEA, Interpol, and Scot-
land Yard, broke up a refined-cocaine distribution
operation in Callao, Peru's largest port. Information
from a reliable DEA source indicates that one
Peruvian trafficker is smuggling semirefined co-
caine into Mexico for final processing; and a narcot-
ic seizure in Florida last year netted Peruvian
semirefined cocaine.
Cocaine traffickers have established new lines of
supply by using legitimate fronts to obtain them and ? Bolivian and Peruvian traffickers are extending
by exploiting countries vulnerable to use as chemical their cocaine refining and distribution operations
conduits into other South American countries. According to
as legislative
and enforcement pressure builds, traffickers may also
use their purchasing power to encourage development
of new manufacturing sources.
Shifts in Production and Distribution
Some traffickers have also modified their production
and distribution systems in response to controls on
processing chemicals. The coca source countries-
primarily Peru and Bolivia-have traditionally
shipped crude coca paste and semirefined cocaine to
Colombia for final processing. As chemical import
restrictions make final processing more difficult and
expensive in Colombia,
cocaine traffickers are establishing
refining laboratories where controlled chemicals are
cheaper and easier to obtain and where enforcement
pressure is less intense. There is also increasing
evidence that traffickers in Colombia are developing
new drug channels, and traffickers in Bolivia and
Peru are beginning to develop more sophisticated and
independent cocaine production, refining, and distri-
bution structures. a dis-
quieting spillover of the cocaine-refining industry
from Colombia:
traffick-
ers in Bolivia are now producing semirefined and
refined cocaine on a larger and more organized
scale than has previously been documented. In 1984
at least seven laboratories were seized in a govern-
ment sweep of one important trafficking region.
Reliable DEA information
and press reports also indicate that significant
amounts of ether and acetone have been imported
into Bolivia during the past two years. Bolivia has
virtually no legitimate requirement for ether.
US Embassy and press reports, two cocaine-refining
laboratories were discovered last year in Venezuela.
laboratories are
operating-with protection from high-level offi-
cials-in both Argentina and Paraguay. DEA re-
porting indicates that one major Bolivian trafficker
plans to ship semirefined cocaine to both Argentina
and Paraguay for final processing and distribution.
Argentina and Paraguay are expected to play an
increasingly important role in the international drug
trade as the full effects of current enforcement
measures elsewhere are felt.
? In Chile, there are indications that cocaine traffick-
ers may be returning after a government crackdown
almost eliminated the narcotics trade during the
1970s. Reliable DEA sources say that three
cocaine-refining laboratories have been seized near
Santiago since late 1983, and that corruption in one
Chilean antinarcotics agency is a serious obstacle to
enforcement.
cocaine-refining
laboratories now operate in Brazil, using Brazilian
chemicals to process Bolivian and Peruvian coca
products. Brazil is South America's largest cocaine
chemical producer, and it has traditionally been a
transit country for cocaine shipments. The ready
availability of essential chemicals makes Brazil an
ideal location for traffickers, and stricter enforce-
ment of Brazilian export restrictions is likely to
result in the establishment of more laboratories in
the country. Moreover, according to US Embassy
reports, traffickers have encouraged Indians in sev-
eral areas of Brazil to grow coca, providing a ready
source of the drug for Brazilian laboratories.
? There is also evidence that Peruvian traffickers are
expanding their cocaine processing and distribution
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? Seizures of cocaine-refining laboratories in the
United States-most of them linked to Colombian
traffickers-have increased dramatically since the
tightening of controls on cocaine chemicals. Accord-
ing to DEA reporting, in the United States six
cocaine laboratories were seized in 1982, 11 in 1983,
and 21 in 1984. Of those discovered last year, 18
were in southern Florida, where a 55-gallon drum of
ether sells on the illicit market for about $1,000.
Before 1982, according to DEA reporting, there
were only scattered attempts to refine cocaine in the
United States. The expansion of cocaine-refining
operations in the United States, a source country for
ether, underscores the boldness of the cocaine
cartel's response to current enforcement measures.
ether, and thus basuco constitutes a less expensive
product, with effects reportedly similar to those of
freebasing refined cocaine. Given the sizable
number of marijuana smokers in the United States,
coca paste or semirefined cocaine distributed in
cigarette form could become an increasingly popu-
lar product.
Colombian traffickers are also taking steps to retain
their dominance of the world cocaine trade by devel-
oping ways to counter the control of essential chemi-
cals and the diversion of coca paste and semirefined
cocaine to other areas. According to US Embassy
reporting, some of the cocaine laboratories in Brazil
are run by Colombians, in the same region where new
cocaine traffickers are also
responding to chemical control in more aggressive
ways by developing products and methods that do not
require the use of controlled chemicals:
? In late 1983
was preparing a consignment
of a new product for shipment to the United States:
marijuana cigarettes laced with coca paste or semi-
refined cocaine, called basuco, widely used in Co-
lombia but seldom seen in the United States. The
group allegedly planned to distribute the basuco
free in order to develop a US market. DEA reports
now document the use of coca paste or basuco in
three major US drug distribution cities: Miami, Los
Angeles, and New York. The drug used in the
cigarettes does not require final processing with
Control of cocaine chemicals is achieving some suc-
cess, but it is only one step in the dismantling of the
international cocaine industry. The rapid response to
current enforcement efforts demonstrates that the
cocaine trade is an adaptable, resilient business, and
that traffickers are organizing, extending their reach,
and exploring new methods of producing, packaging,
and marketing their products. Heightened interna-
tional concern at the sophistication of this drive has
resulted in increased cooperative antinarcotics efforts,
particularly in the control of essential cocaine chemi-
cals. Such cooperation will almost certainly lead to
increased demands on US resources. Brazil, for exam-
ple, has requested US funds to computerize its chemi-
cal control system and Bolivia for computerized coca
regulation and aircraft/ airstrip control systems. Ef-
fective international eradication and interdiction will
require a continued strong US commitment. As inter-
national antinarcotics initiatives gather momentum,
the United States will be asked to play an increasingly
important role in all aspects of narcotics control-
training, enforcement, intelligence, and education.
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Israel:
Government Concern Over
Increased Drug Activity
narcotics trafficking in
Israel-largely involving smuggling of hashish-has
intensified during the past two years and is of increas-
ing concern to the Israeli Government. Israeli authori-
ties say that in 1983 arrests for drug smuggling in
northern Israel doubled and that arrests for drug use
throughout the country increased 30 percent. In late
1984, Israeli press reports citing local police officials
indicated that Israeli, Lebanese, and Sinai bedouin
Arab criminal organizations had begun working to-
gether closely to transport large quantities of Leba-
nese-produced hashish to Israel for local consumption
and for onward shipment to Egypt and other coun-
tries.
Hashish Trafficking
Nearly all of the hashish reaching Israel now comes
directly from Lebanon As
recently as two years ago, some 90 percent of hashish
and other drugs imported to Israel was coming
through European middlemen. The Israeli press has
claimed that both the increase in drug trafficking and
the emergence of Lebanon as a direct supplier are at
least partly the results of Israel's two-year-old mili-
tary occupation of its neighbor. The occupation evi-
dently has helped to create an expanded land trans-
port and supply infrastructure between the two
countries that inadvertently facilitates the movement
of illict drugs south.
Israeli authorities do not know exactly how much
hashish the large-scale traffickers have been bringing
into Israel, but recent antidrug raids there have
resulted in seizures of substantial quantities. In De-
cember 1984, for example, Israeli police intercepted
1 ton of hashish that they believe was smuggled across
the Lebanese border for distribution in the Negev
area, according to Lebanese press reports. In Febru-
ary 1985, the Israeli press reported the seizure in
Galilee of more than a half ton of hashish. In other
instances, quantities ranging from one-third to three-
In addition to the organized, large-scale hashish
traffickers, Israeli soldiers returning from tours of
duty in southern Lebanon reportedly are smuggling
small amounts of this and perhaps other illicit drugs
for personal use and for sale. Press reports say that
Israeli troops conceal the contraband in the hollow
handles of their US-manufactured assault rifles or in
the spare tires of jeeps.
some
Israeli drug-trafficking organizations are starting to
get involved in heroin and cocaine distribution. DEA
sources report that a group of Israeli smugglers based
in Paris, France, are smuggling heroin from Thailand
to Israel. The Embassy believes that heroin may be
coming into Israel from Turkey and Lebanon as well.
heroin has recently become available in the Haifa
area for $100 per gram.
Israeli drug
dealers have obtained cocaine from Corsica via south-
ern France, presumably through French or other
intermediaries with ties to South American cocaine
producers.
The Government's Response
The Israeli Government is concerned about the easy
availability of illicit drugs in its country and is
especially worried about the rapidly spreading use of
hashish among Israeli citizens, according to British
press reports. Following Tel Aviv's discovery last
summer that regional traffickers were cooperating to
transport hashish through Israel, Tel Aviv evidently
began to work with authorities in Cairo and elsewhere
in the region to try to disrupt narcotics activities. The
Israelis clearly are determined to do what they can to
suppress the local drug trade, and they are likely to
quarters of a ton have been confiscated.
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April 1985
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make some progress toward this goal during the
coming months. In the last six months, Israeli authori-
ties have arrested at least 49 drug smugglers. At the
same time, the traditional adaptability of the interna-
ticnal narcotics trade suggests Israel will have to cope
indefinitely with at least some increased level of drug
activity, particularly so long as the transportation
infrastructure supporting the Israeli military occupa-
tion of southern Lebanon remains in place for exploi-
tation by traffickers. Troop withdrawal from southern
Lebanon would likely temporarily disrupt the influx
of drugs until new smuggling techniques were estab-
lished.
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Mexico:
Widening Crackdown
on Drug Corruption
Mexico is intensifying its crackdown on narcotics
corruption-a key obstacle to more effective drug
control there-by removing from the antidrug cam-
paign several high-level officials known or suspected
to be aiding traffickers. The shakeup appears largely
due to US calls for Mexico to address shortcomings in
drug control measures following the kidnaping and
murder of a US Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) officer in Guadalajara in February.
de la Madrid recently has dismissed
several senior officials with drug control duties who
are known to have abetted the drug trade:
? He has fired the chief of the Directorate of Federal
Security and the head of Mexican Interpol.
? He has reassigned the military commander in the
Guadalajara area, where a major trafficking group
killed a DEA officer in February.
In addition, the Mexican President has promoted the
Second Deputy Attorney General-who oversees the
joint civilian and military drug crop eradication effort
and is alleged to have ties to traffickers-to First
Deputy. The position of First Deputy is actually a less
powerful position administratively and involves no
direct control over antidrug measures.
De la Madrid has ordered the successors to these
positions to punish other collaborators and take strong
action against trafficking in their respective jurisdic-
tions In particular, he
has instructed the new military chief in Guadalajara
to move forcefully against smugglers there to under-
score Mexico's determination to revive control meas-
ures.
make other changes in strategy and resource alloca=
tion to improve control measures. At the same time,
easily aroused nationalism will continue to make the
government reluctant to grant the United States a
more direct role in the program.
Mexico's powerful drug trafficking organizations al-
most certainly will seek to counter the anticorruption
crackdown by trying to bribe or intimidate the new
senior officials and the new subordinates they are
expected to appoint. The smugglers also may expand
further their recently increased use of violence against
Mexican and US field-level enforcement officials.
Any acts or threats of violence against top-level
Mexican authorities such as the Attorney General or
against senior US Embassy officials in Mexico City
would be a sign that the traffickers were beginning to
see themselves as seriously endangered by the intensi-
fied drive to curb drug graft and by other increased
control measures.
These personnel changes may curb the worst excesses
of drug malfeasance for a while and make control
efforts more effective in 1985 than they were in 1984,
but there are limits to which the government can act
to suppress such wrongdoing over the longer term.
Some observers believe corruption in general is essen-
tial to the operation and survival of Mexico's complex
form of government, which is based not so much on
the rule of law as on the exercise of privilege,
influence, and favors. Even attempting to make
abrupt, lasting changes to this structure, for whatever
purpose, would disturb the balance of political alli-
ances that has ensured stability for six decades.
These changes appear largely to be the result of
increased US pressure for stronger antidrug action
following the DEA officer's death. The Mexicans'
reported desire to prevent tensions with Washington
over the drug problem from causing relations in
general to cool will spur them to sustain at least
temporarily the increased drive against drug graft and
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Worldwide Narcotics Highlights) 25X1
South America Colombian authorities continued to make headway against the entrenched drug
industry in January and February:
? Operation Hat Trick, a joint US-Colombian enforcement operation, caused
traffickers to reduce their marijuana shipments to the United States and alter
their preferred trafficking routes.
? On the legal front, Bogota, in an unexpected move, extradited four traffickers to
the United States, taking the major drug organizations by surprise and leaving
them in a state of confusion. The Colombian Supreme Court subsequently
reaffirmed in a 23-to-1 vote the constitutionality of the US-Colombian extradi-
tion treaty-rejecting arguments that the treaty violated Colombia's national
sovereignty. The decision thwarted the Colombian Attorney General's efforts to
sabotage government drug control measures. Severo Escobar Ortega, another
major Colombian drug dealer wanted by the United States for extradition, was
later arrested on 23 February and is currently under detention in Bogota.
? Press reports of 8 January state that 939 persons have been accused of, narcotics
violations since the state of seige went into effect 1 May, many made possible by
the ability of military and police units to operate without following usual legal
procedures.
? Two officials of the Press and Public Relations, Office of the Presidency, were
arrested for possible negligence in allowing the Colombian diplomatic pouch to
be used for cocaine smuggling. Presidential press secretary Roman Medina
Bedoya was also charged in the case, and Colombian Vice-Foreign Minister
Laura Ochoa has also been touched by the scandal. The actions are apparently
intended as a warning from President Betancur to others contemplating similar
smuggling ventures.
? Colombian Attorney General Carlos Jimenez Gonzalez charged that Minister of
Justice Enrique Parejo violated five statutes in conjunction with his authoriza-
tion of the use of glyphosate against marijuana fields in Colombia's northern
growing region. On 22 January the Council of Ministers issued a statement
supporting the antinarcotics actions of the Minister of Justice and overruling the
Attorney General's efforts to block herbicidal eradication.
The Colombian Government also appears to be moving ahead in its efforts to
strengthen its drug control capabilities:
? Discussions are continuing on the establishment of a regional communications
network; preliminary groundwork has been accomplished and site surveys
conducted.
23 Secret
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? A cooperative project between the United States and Colombia to support a
national campaign for the prevention of drug addiction is ready for implementa-
tion. The program is designed to instill an awareness of drug abuse in the
Colombian population and reduce the demand for illicit drugs.
? The Ministry of Justice has proposed a law designed to help curb the widespread
use and trafficking of drugs. The antidrug proposal includes mandatory airing of
television and radio spots, rigorous education programs within the school
systems, establishment of public and private drug rehabilitation clinics, forma-
tion of local civic action committees to mount antidrug campaigns, and tougher
laws, sentences, and fines for drug offenders. The law failed to pass during the
regular fall 1984 session, but the US Embassy believes chances for passage in
the current legislative session are good.
? Work continues on the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control
(UNFDAC) pilot crop substitution project targeted for the Bolivar area of
Cauca. More than $500,000 is budgeted for prevention, treatment, and a mass
media campaign.
Traffickers' attempts to enlist the support of Colombia's terrorist groups apparent-
ly have failed. Former M-19 leader Ivan Marino Ospina admitted his statements
in Mexico, in which he wished the Colombian traffickers well in their attempts to
assassinate Americans in Colombia, were inopportune. Ospina was heavily
criticized by fellow M-19 members for his protrafficker sentiments and was
removed from his position as chief spokesman for the M-19. The new leadership
ostensibly is opposed to any alliance with traffickers. F__1
The seizure of the Avianca 747 aircraft on 15 February underscores the resilience
and strength of the Colombian drug trade. Although the toughest drug crackdown
in Colombian history is still under way, traffickers managed to collect and ship 1.1
metric tons of cocaine in 32 unmanifested boxes of flowers on 12 February. The
plane was released after the owners agreed to post bond and surrender the plane.
The Colombian Government and airline officials are exploring ways to prevent
future incidents, including more intensive preflight inspections.
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On 11 February, 16 campesinos were murdered in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley,
the target area for US-funded antinarcotics efforts. According to the US Embassy,
the killers were either insurgents or narcotics traffickers posing as insurgents.
Whichever group was responsible, the US Embassy believes that the action was
timed to convince visiting US and Peruvian officials that government intervention
in the area is futile. Narcotics traffickers murdered 19 Peruvians engaged in coca
eradication in this same region on 16 November, causing the program to be held
up more than two months. After the February killings, eradication operations were
temporarily suspended before starting up again at a much lower level.
Other drug-related developments in Peru for the period of 15 December 1984 to
1 March 1985 reflect the mercurial nature of the Peruvian situation. In December,
Lima took actions that sent a strong message to drug traffickers:
? Gen. Juan Balaguer, Director General of the Civil Guard, was removed from
office for corruption.
? Peruvian millionaire Carlos Langeberg Melendez was convicted on drug traf-
ficking charges and sentenced to 15 years in prison.
? Interdiction and eradication were resumed in the upper Huallaga Valley on a
limited scale but strained police-military relations continued to hamper drug
control efforts in the region, with each side accusing the other of drug-related
corruption.
? Plans were made for the drug abuse awareness program scheduled for early
March in Lima, and the US Embassy's drug education programs showed signs of
changing some Peruvian citizens' attitudes toward drug use.
Trends and events that may affect future Peruvian drug control efforts include the
presidential election scheduled for April, a growing sophistication in the Peruvian
drug industry, and the possibility of Sendero Luminoso (SL) involvement in drug
trafficking:
? A Garcia or Barrantes victory in the April election could have far-reaching
implications for drug control. Both candidates have indicated that they would
reshape Peru's drug control policy and concentrate more on crop substitution and
education and less on eradication.
? Peruvian drug traffickers are increasing their level 25X1
of sophistication by expanding coca cultivation and increasing smuggling
operations in Europe and the United States.
? SL leader Abimael Guzman has not ruled out future SL involvement by the
group in drug trafficking. Information to date, however, indicates SL linkages to
drug traffickers are infrequent and generally limited to extortion or protection
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The US Embassy in La Paz reported in early February that the Bolivian
Government has again sent US-trained police units into the key coca-producing
Chapare and Valle Alto regions to suppress narcotics activity.
The development coincides with press reports that some traffick-
ers who suspended operations in the area during a similar crackdown last August
have recently resumed their activities. The settling of the 16-day general strike by
the Bolivian Workers Central (COB), Bolivia's principal labor confederation, has
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left La Paz calm. With the easing of labor pressure, Siles has improved his chances
of completing his term, but continued economic deterioration and persistent coup
rumors compound the difficulties facing Bolivia's antinarcotics forces. While the
recent police actions represent a bow to US concerns, Siles is unlikely to risk
another expensive and unpopular antidrug campaign on a large scale before the 14
July elections.
In Ecuador, a series of US-funded coca eradication campaigns in the northern
border area near Colombia resulted in the destruction of 225 hectares of coca, 39
coca paste labs, and the arrest of 23 Colombian operators. The Colombian-bound
coca destroyed during this operation could have produced an estimated half ton of
cocaine HCL. DEA estimates that 2,000 to 5,000 hectares are under coca
cultivation causing official concern in Quito that Ecuador will become a major
growing and processing country; the government is seeking financial assistance
from the United States to conduct more eradication and interdiction programs.
Quito also plans to participate in a USAID program to strengthen the institutional
capability of both public- and private-sector entities to carry out a large-scale
public awareness campaign on the hazards of drug use. Although some resource
and personnel problems still exist, the administration has made substantial
progress since taking office in August in its goal to curb the growth of the
Ecuadorean drug trade.
Brazilian Federal Police (DPF) recently completed Operation Federico, a success-
ful series of US-sponsored coca eradication operations centered in the Upper
Amazon River Basin. The US Embassy in Brasilia estimates that approximately
840 tons of coca leaf were destroyed in the operation. Some of the coca fields
found were on Indian reservations legally immune from Brazilian federal authori-
ties. Others were difficult to detect because growers were cultivating the plants
under the jungle canopy. The DPF believes that Peruvian traffickers were
organizing the Indians to plant, cultivate, and harvest the coca, and were then
transporting the leaf out of the area by boat and aircraft. More eradication
operations are planned, and these probably will require an infusion of US funds,
technical assistance, and equipment.
The President of Brazil's Federal Drug Council (CONFEN), Arthur Castilho
Netto, reacted strongly to a US Congressional staff study published in February
that accused Brazil of devoting insufficient resources to controlling the production
of narcotics. The study, presented to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
recommended reducing or eliminating US imports of Brazilian sugar unless the
country demonstrated its seriousness in controlling narcotics production and
trafficking. Responding to press inquiries about the report, Netto defended
Brazil's control efforts and pointed to last year's Operation Ipadu, a costly coca
eradication effort in the Amazon. The Brazilian Government made additional
progress against narcotics trafficking in a series of simultaneous raids in six states
on 27 February. Although the decision to act and the subsequent press coverage
may have been influenced by the critical Congressional assessment, the raids were
preceded by some nine months of investigative efforts.
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narcotics control program substantially.
Media efforts in Argentina to sensitize the public to the nation's drug problems in-
creased noticeably. Comments by prominent government ministers indicate high-
level support for the current campaign. One popular magazine has focused on
widespread abuse by the young of legally available drugs-amphetamines and
various inhalants-as well as the increasing usage of marijuana. The stepped-up
media coverage directed at alerting and educating the public complements the
government's participation in the March Regional Narcotics Awareness Seminar
in Lima and First Lady Alfonsin's acceptance of the invitation to Mrs. Reagan's
April Conference on Drug Abuse in Washington. US Embassy officials note that
the sophisticated Argentine media industry has the potential to advance the
although no machinery was observed 25X1
with a complex irrigation system, and harvesting probably was mechanized,
Analysis I Ihas confirmed the sophistication 25X1
and size of the cannabis operation uncovered by Mexican authorities in November
1984 in the northern border state of Chihuahua. The large fields were watered
, the amount of marijuana cultivation was many times higher 25X1
than estimates provided by the Mexicans. The two areas measured totaled over
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Central America The US Embassy in Belize reported in late February that the recently elected
government of Prime Minister Esquivel has again postponed making a decision on
whether to resume aerial herbicide spraying of cannabis. Government leaders
evidently remain concerned about opposition to such action by the country's
politically influential farmers, who during the past few years have increasingly
turned to marijuana production to compensate for reduced earnings as a result of
the soft international market for sugar, Belize's principal legal cash crop. Protests
from marijuana farmers reportedly forced the previous government to suspend
aerial eradication in February 1984, after spray operations in October 1983
destroyed more than 80 percent of the fall cannabis crop. The ruling political party
also appears to be worried that approving the resumption of aerial spraying at this
time could hurt its chances in municipal elections scheduled for late March. The
US Embassy says the Prime Minister has told police authorities to work quietly
with US officials to conduct reconnaissance of cannabis growing areas and make
other preparations in anticipation of eventually resuming spraying. DEA officials
in Belize have reported that greater numbers of cannabis farmers have begun to
depart from their past adherence to rigid planting and harvesting timetables-
which had resulted in distinct spring and fall crops-in favor of staggered, year-
round cultivation. The Embassy believes that this development will make it more
difficult to determine how much is being produced nationwide and how much is
likely to be still under cultivation in April, the month in which farmers normally
would have completed the spring harvest and the earliest month that we expect any
aerial spraying of cannabis in Belize to resume. Recent Embassy
reporting suggest spraying will not resume until September at the earliest,
apparently to give Belize time to establish a national drug control coordination
bureau and to build public support.
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Caribbean Stung by hard evidence of drug trafficking, drug abuse, and rampant corruption
uncovered by a Royal Commission investigation, the Bahamian Government has
become more cooperative with the United States on drug enforcement issues:
? In November 1984, newly appointed Bahamian Foreign Minister Clement
Maynard proposed a joint US-Bahamian commission to improve coordination
among drug enforcement units.
? In January 1985, the US-sponsored radar facility at High Rock on Grand
Bahama Island was formally opened. The radar at this site is designed to detect
potential drug-carrying aircraft transiting Bahamian territory and in the area of
south Florida.
? Representatives of the US Departments of State and Justice in January held two
days of discussions with Bahamian officials on a draft Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty, which the US officials hoped would aid drug prosecutions. In contrast to
earlier negotiations, US representatives described the talks as fruitful.
The Royal Commission also blamed Bahamian banking practices for encouraging
money laundering and other criminal behavior, prompting the Bahamian Associa-
tion of International Banks and Trust Companies (AIBT) to institute a Central
Bank-approved "Code of Conduct." The code is designed to discourage criminal
use of the Bahamian banking system, and for the first time gives the AIBT the
power to punish violations by withholding or withdrawing an institution's member-
ship in the association. Although membership in the AIBT is not required for a
bank or trust company to operate in The Bahamas, the governor of the Bahamian
Central Bank is said to be considering making the code binding on all financial in-
stitutions regardless of membership. Moreover, the Chairman of the AIBT
pledged to enforce the code vigorously and has already suspended the membership
of a bank involved in laundering drug money. Unless membership in the AIBT is
mandatory, the new code is unlikely to reduce money laundering in The Bahamas.
Recent editorials in two of Jamaica's leading newspapers have condemned the
local marijuana trade and highlighted the seizures of marijuana by US Customs
aboard Jamaican Airlines. Growing awareness of the potential threat of the
marijuana trade to legitimate sectors of the economy is apparently behind the
change in attitude of the media. The more supportive attitude of the Jamaican
press should facilitate the government's attempts to take direct action against the
drug trade and reinforce a struggling public education campaign.
Cuban authorities may be facilitating
marijuana trafficking. A recently arrested pilot who had flown over
Cuba with loads of marijuana alleges that Cuban Air Force pilots frequently flew
close enough to his aircraft to visually inspect his cargo. The
was a Piper Aztec 23-250, and, according to DEA
it was possible that Cuban pilots could see the marijuana in the cargo
area. e 0 pilot claimed he was forced to dump his load of marijuana and
make an emergency landing in the same plane near Havana in December.0
Cuban airport personnel repaired and
refueled his aircraft, a claim confirmed by receipts found in the aircraft when he
was arrested on 24 December
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The Jamaican drug industry is becoming more closely involved with Colombian
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traffickers had begun to pay Jamaican farmers to stash and guard loads of cocaine
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The growing involvement of the
trade.
Colombian cocaine organizations is a source of concern to President Seaga and
was probably a factor in his recent series of actions against the Jamaican drug
aggravate the situation.
Colombians are also beginning to use Haiti as a transit area for marijuana and co-
caine, . In December 1984, the Haitian
Narcotics Bureau located a Colombian cocaine trafficker who had fled to Haiti to
avoid prosecution in Colombia and the United States. In February 1985, US
Embassy officials in Haiti learned that senior Haitian police officials now believe
that Colombians are using Haiti as a meeting place to arrange drug shipments.
Haiti has long been known to US drug enforcement authorities as a narcotics
transshipment point; the presence in Haiti of Colombian traffickers is likely to
to the United States
Trinidad and Tobago has become increasingly important as a supplier, transit
area, and market for illicit drugs, according to
The nation's petroleum-based economy has su ere trom declining oil prices,
encouraging some to turn to drugs to replace lost income. The climate favors the
cultivation of marijuana, and the islands have many secluded harbors for drug
transshipment. Drug abuse, a new phenomenon in Trinidad and Tobago, has also
increased dramatically over the past year. US and Colombian law enforcement
pressure on traditional routes north through the Caribbean has probably caused
the emergence of Trinidad and Tobago as a drug transit area. Sensing heightened
US surveillance of the Yucatan Channel and the Windward Passage, traffickers
have sought other routes to the United States, including shipping drugs east along
the north coast of Latin America and north through the Lesser Antilles. Trinidad
and Tobago is ideally. located for refueling and for storing drugs for later shipment
moving substantial quantities of drugs into the colony through China. The drugs
move overland or by sea from source countries in the Golden Triangle. Smugglers
use various methods of transport, including one-time couriers on regularly
scheduled flights and trains and larger drops by privately owned speed boats.
Although Chinese awareness of the problem has heightened over the past year and
cooperation with Hong Kong's customs and police department has increased, PRC
law enforcement agencies have inadequate resources to devote to narcotics
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The Burmese Communist Party BCP) has opened at least two opium treatment
centers, . Although the BCP prohibits opium use by
its troops and severely punishes violators, the number of opium addicts continues
to grow. The opening of the drug addiction centers is an indication that opium use
is affecting the performance of BCP units in the field.
Preliminary estimates by Thailand's Office of Narcotics Control Board (ONCB)
indicate that opium production will be lower this year despite a slight increase in
the total area planted to poppy. Information collected by the ONCB as of early
February indicates that the 1984-85 opium crop will total about 32 tons, a
decrease of 11 tons from last year. The lack of rain in December, essential during
the final stages of poppy growth, caused a decrease in yields in most areas.
Australian officials are calling for a national campaign against drug abuse. The
campaign will emphasize the danger of drugs and focus on the rehabilitation of
those with drug-related problems. The campaign is probably a followthrough on an
election year promise by Prime Minister Hawke to tighten and enforce existing
drug laws. The availability of drugs in Australia is rising rapidly as traffickers seek
new markets for large drug crop harvests in the Golden Triangle and Latin
Southwest Asia Recent investigations in Europe indicated that ethnic Tamils are broadening their
drug trafficking activities and may be using proceeds from the trade to support
their insurgency in Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan Tamils became involved in the
drug trade in the early 1980s as low-priced couriers smuggling heroin into Europe
for Pakistani and Indian trafficking organizations. An investigation last November
indicated that Tamil separatists are mounting a sophisticated effort to penetrate
the European heroin market. 16 Sri Lankans
were arrested in Naples in possession of 7 kilograms of pure heroin. The ring
reportedly had established its own laboratory for cutting the heroin to street-level
purities and was poised to begin retail distribution. The suspects confessed to
trafficking on behalf of the Tamil separatists. most of
the Tamils engaged in the European drug trade are members of PLOTE-the
largest and one of the most violent of Sri Lanka's five major separatist groups.
There is no evidence, however, that the Tamils have succeeded in capturing any of
the European drug market, and we doubt that repatriated drug earnings have
contributed significantly to the insurgency.
opium poppy cultivation in
Afghanistan and Pakistan is up-perhaps by 25 percent-over last year's levels.
the increases are largely a result of a marked rise in opi-
um prices. In Pakistan, the expansion reportedly is occurring outside of areas
where crop suppression programs are under way. Although some of the increase is
intended for drug markets in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and especially Iran-where
a large and growing addict population-more opium will
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Agency, where a three-year US-funded rural development project is coming to a
close. Before the project started, Malakand contained some of the densest poppy
cultivation in Pakistan. According to the Embassy, a key factor in the project's
success was the involvement of local officials in designing and implementing the
individual development schemes, a concept now being followed in similar poppy
suppression projects elsewhere in the North-West Frontier Province. The success
last year of the government's eradication teams, who were protected by hundreds
of armed troops, also helped dissuade opium growers from planting a 1985 crop.
The government still faces a difficult challenge in Malakand, however. With
development assistance ending and opium prices rising, growers may not feel
obliged to abide by the opium ban and may be strongly motivated to resume poppy
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Drug enforcement efforts in Pakistan could suffer a setback if the government, as
part of the process of returning the country to civilian rule, dissolves the martial
law courts and turns all narcotics cases over to the civilian courts. Although both
courts have handed out three-year rather than life sentences to drug traffickers,
the military tribunals have tried the cases faster and obtained a higher percentage
of convictions. The ]also believes that the transfer of cases will
lengthen the judicial backlog that already exists in the civil courts. Unless the
government acts to establish special narcotics courts and prosecutors, fewer drug
cases may come to trial; traffickers will use bribery and intimidation to attempt to
prevent their cases from appearing on the court's docket. F-7
Soviet and Afghan officials continue to make little effort to halt the opium trade
and may even be promoting drug production, trafficking, and use, despite
Moscow's expressed concern over drug use and trafficking by Soviet conscripts.
There have been some sporadic attempts to organize enforcement, and a year ago
rumors circulated in Kabul that the government was offering farmers 10 percent
more than the market price for opium
the Soviet-backed regime's lack of control over the rural areas and preoccupation
with fighting the mujahideen, Afghan officials are unlikely to move against opium
cultivation and trafficking any time soon. Soviet officials may crack down on drug
use if troop performance begins to decline significantly.
Iran's growing drug abuse problem, prevalent at all levels of society despite harsh
penalties, has for some time been openly acknowledged by domestic media and by
government officials in international forums.
the problem is now rampant in the military.
drug abuse is a
major problem at all airbases and is exacerbated by a shortage of medical
personnel to provide treatment. Steps taken by Tehran to deal with drug addicts
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at rehabilitation is intended at the facility.
reflect the severity of the drug abuse problem in Iranian society. During the last
quarter of 1984, Iranian media cited public officials on the recent creation of an
"addicts' island" for the exile of narcotics recidivists. Addicts who have been
apprehended and rehabilitated twice before are subject to incarceration on "Shirin
No Island"-as yet unlocated-said to be south of Busherhr. The island currently
has an alleged capacity for more than 15,000 inmates and can be expanded to ac-
commodate 30,000. To date, available media accounts indicate only a small
fraction of this capacity has been filled, and it is unclear whether any serious effort
Middle East Turkish authorities indicated to visiting State Department officials in January that
they fear the restoration of civilian rule, already established in half of Turkey's
provinces, may lead to weaker law enforcement. This could cause a resurgence of
the Turkish drug trade if traffickers take advantage of the confusion about
policing responsibilities among the Turkish National Police, the Jandarma, and
the military. The release of several thousand Turks, arrested for terrorism and
political crimes following the 1980 military coup, could also contribute to
increased trafficking. Many of these prisoners were drug traffickers, and it is likely
they will attempt to reestablish their former operations involving smuggling
narcotics from the Kurdish areas of eastern Turkey to Europe. The government is
probably better prepared to face this problem now than when it confronted a
similar situation in the mid-1970s. Authorities are taking active measures to
enlarge the Jandarma, which is responsible for narcotics enforcement in rural
areas, and are recruiting 5,000 additional police. The Turkish National Police,
responsible for narcotics control in the cities, is more professional than it was in
1980, according to the US Embassy, and is expected to become an even more ca-
pable antinarcotics organization over the next few years.
activity.
Several incidents in Western Europe over the past six months indicate increased
drug smuggling by African diplomatic personnel and their families:
? In November 1984, President Kaunda of Zambia dismissed a senior member of
the United National Independence Party's Central Committee following the
conviction in England of the committee member's wife on drug smuggling
charges.
? In mid-January 1985, French and Belgian police seized 34.5 kg of heroin from
suitcases consigned to the Ugandan Ambassador to Belgium. The suitcases
arrived in Brussels on a flight that originated in Karachi and passed through
Lagos and Paris.
? In late January, the son of Sierra Leone's President Stevens was arrested in
England with a large quantity of marijuana. British officials rejected the
smuggler's attempt to claim diplomatic immunity.
Except for a minor incident in late 1983, African diplomats and other official
African visitors to the United States have not been apprehended for smuggling
drugs. The reputation of the US Customs Service is a strong deterrent to such
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