NARCOTICS REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00685R000100010001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Narcotics Review
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DI NR 86-004
August 1986
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Narcotics Review
1 Panama: Straddling the Fence on Drug Control
Panama's position as an international shipping center and its wide-open commer-
cial atmosphere-including a "free zone" and strict bank secrecy laws-make it a
prime target for narcotics traffickers. Panamanian authorities have stepped up
counternarcotics operations and are cooperating with the United States on
interdiction and drug crop eradication. There have been no moves, however, to
loosen up Panama's bank secrecy laws, which provide protection for the illicit
profits of international drug traffickers.
the program of its greatest defect, corruption.
The Mexican Government has failed to suppress the resurgence in the drug trade,
and drug production is outpacing the crop eradication program-the core of the
narcotics-control effort. Mexican officials have taken steps that should improve the
efficiency of the antidrug campaign, but more drastic measures are needed to rid
Mauritius: Drug Dealing on the Rise
Western markets.
Escalating domestic drug abuse and narcotics trafficking in Mauritius have
tarnished the image of Prime Minister Jugnauth's moderate government. Several
prominent politicians belonging to the three-party governing coalition, the Alli-
ance, have been arrested for drug smuggling. Mauritius' strategic location and
extensive airlinks to Africa and Europe and to heroin-producing countries in
Southwest Asia may increase its use as a transit point for drugs destined for
15 Sandia Arabia: Drugs and Security Worries
kingdom for weapons and other subversive materials.
Saudi Arabia's role as a consumer of and transit point for illicit narcotics has ex-
panded despite enforcement efforts, and Riyadh fears that established routes for
contraband narcotics may become increasingly attractive as conduits into the
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August 1986
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The Shan United Army (SUA) remains the dominant narcotics trafficking group
in the Golden Triangle but is under attack by a coalition of competing trafficking
groups. The conflict has altered trafficking patterns in the region and may cut the
SUA share of the heroin trade.
23 Worldwide Narcotics Highlights
A summary of key developments from 1 June to 1 August 1986
This review is published bimonthly by the Directorate of Intelligence and
examines international, regional, and functional issues related to the worldwide
drug problem. Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well
as other US Government agencies will be considered for publication. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Strategic Narcotics
Division
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Panama: Straddling the Fence
on Drug Control
Drug Trafficking Through Panama
Panama's strategic location on well-established trade
and travel routes between South American drug-
producing countries and the US market makes it a
prime target for exploitation by narcotics traffickers
and a natural transit point for US-bound cocaine and
marijuana. atin
American drug traffickers-principally Bolivians and
Colombians-use Panama both as a refueling point
for ships and aircraft carrying drugs to the United
States and as a transshipment area.
Panama's Colon Free Zone offers a number of unique
advantages to drug transshipment operations. Goods
can be imported, processed, and exported without any
duties, and ships undergo no rigorous customs
searches. Traffickers can easily take advantage of the
high degree of protection and freedom afforded to
legitimate business to move drugs through the Free
Zone:
? According to US Coast Guard sources, coastal
freighters probably involved in drug trafficking use
the Colon Free Zone as a staging area for operations
between Panama and the northern coast of
Colombia. Ships declare for Aruba but rendezvous
with Colombian mother ships off Barranquilla and
Cartagena to pick up marijuana and possibly
cocaine.
Colombian
traffickers were bringing cocaine and contraband
coffee into the Colon Free Zone for further
transshipment to the US Atlantic coast. Although
we have no hard evidence, we believe that major
Colombian traffickers have established warehouses
and ship repair facilities there.
Trafficking through Panama's airports and various
ports outside the Free Zone also is commonplace:
some major Colombian trafficking organizations are
shipping cocaine to their established networks in
Panama on coffee boats normally engaged in both
legitimate and contraband coffee trade. The coffee
boats offload the cocaine onto smaller vessels near
the US coast for onward shipment to the United
States.
? Vacamonte-a port on the Pacific coast 32 kms
west of Panama City-has been implicated by
as a possible center for offloading
and refueling operations. It has extensive
warehousing, transshipment, cold storage, and ship
repair facilities.
suited to drug trafficking activity.
? Some Panamanian officials are concerned that
Colombian drug traffickers are using the San Blas
region in northeastern Panama as a safehaven and
transit point. This area's location, sparse population,
and lack of firm government control make it ideally
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August 1986
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North
Pacific
Ocean
*PANAMA
Chiriqui Vacamonte! %alboa
Grande Panama
enonom? Archipielago
North
Atlantic
ocean
Aruba
(Neth )
de las Perlas'
(Pearl Islands)-,
--- Internal administrative
boundary
0 50 Kilometers
i
0 50 Mlles
Lb Palma
Garachin
North
Pacific
Ocean
Drugs and FDP Corruption specifically involved in antidrug operations are the
The FDP, headed by commander Manuel Noriega, and the
is a combination of military, police, and internal National Department of Investigations (DENI}-the
security forces and has the principal responsibility for latter primarily a civilian detective force headed by a
narcotics enforcement in Panama. Sectors of the FDP
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major in the G-2. The Narcotics Department in the
Ministry of Finance makes drug seizures at Panama's
major ports of entry and carries out related
investigations. This department is headed by a high-
level DENI inspector who reports to FDP commander
Noriega, giving him ultimate control over all antidrug
units in Panama.
The FDP is rife with cronyism. Members know that
loyalty to FDP commander Noriega, acceptance
without question of his involvement in shady
activities, and fitting into the "FDP Family" will earn
them respected positions even at the lowest ranks.
Eventually, they are
allowed to participate in corrupt activities that net a
small profit, such as issuing false passports and
transporting illegal immigrants. As they ascend to
higher levels in the FDP and as long as they maintain
a low public profile, personnel may be cut in on a
bigger piece of the action, becoming involved in
Some US Embassy officials believe the FDP was
responsible for the decapitation in September 1985 of
Hugo Spadafora, Vice Minister of Health in the late
1970s and a vocal opponent of General Noriega for
years. General Noriega frequently expressed his
strong dislike of Spadafora, who reportedly had
threatened to publicize details of Noriega's alleged
involvement in arms and drug trafficking as well as
other illegal activities.
activities such as facilitating drug and arms
transshipments and money laundering deals.
For several years, some State Department and other
US Government officials have suspected members of
the FDP of participating in narcotics trafficking for
personal gain.
Noriega has used his position and influence
laundering of narcodollars through Panama.
to enter licit business ventures and reportedly is one of
the richest men in Panama. We suspect, however, that
a significant portion of Noriega's wealth was derived
from illicit activities such as receiving payoffs for
allowing drug and arms transshipments and the
Caribbean. On the other hand,
participation in joint narcotics enforcement in the
General Noriega may now be attempting to improve
the FDP's image by ridding its ranks of those officers
publicly accused of corruption and by increasing FDP
shifting of FDP personnel,
drugs through Panama.
his recent appointment of FDP Maj. Pasqual
Gonzalez-one of the FDP's most corrupt members-
as Director of Civil Aeronautics, and efforts to
establish firmer FDP control over traditionally
civilian operations will facilitate the transshipment of
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Antitrafficking Measures
Government officials are making a visible effort to
combat drug trafficking, particularly through
Panama City's two airports and major ports
throughout the country:
eliminate marijuana cultivation in the Pearl Islands,
where in September 1985 the government began a
marijuana eradication program that destroyed an
estimated 210 hectares of the crop. A followup
spraying mission in mid-January destroyed an
additional 137 hectares, and 18 tons of harvested
marijuana were burned in the same operation.
According to the State Department, the two spray
campaigns destroyed virtually all of the marijuana
grown in Panama, and Panamanian officials
reportedly have pledged to continue efforts to limit its
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cultivation.
officials in 1985 confiscated 200 metric tons of
marijuana from ships with Panamanian registry. In
addition, cocaine refining chemicals-including
13,250 liters of ether and 5,400 liters of acetone-
were seized in the Colon Free Zone from mid-to-late
1985.
? Panamanian officials forced the shutdown of
INAIR-a commercial aviation company with
international flights-in mid-1984 after one of the
firm's planes was seized in Miami with nearly 2 tons
of cocaine. INAIR's president and principal
stockholder, Richard Bilonick, has long been
involved in drug and arms smuggling, according to
the US Embassy, and has been associated with at
least five other airlines. Bilonick, however, remains
free in Panama because Panamanian officials claim
they lack evidence to file drug trafficking charges
against him.
According to the US Department of Justice, "dozens"
of non-Panamanians have been deported from
Panama in recent years for drug-related offenses,
although there have been no formal extraditions of
drug traffickers from Panama. In 1985 alone, 66
foreign nationals were arrested in Panama on drug
charges.
Money Laundering-The Real Issue
The country's status as an international financial
center and its associated bank secrecy laws promote
drug money laundering operations by prohibiting the
release of information on funds in coded accounts.
This makes it impossible to trace the origin of profits
from suspected drug transactions. Use of the US
dollar as legal tender in Panama, liberal incorporation
laws, and few restrictions on money movements from
Panama probably provide the incentive for drug
traffickers to transfer illegal profits from the United
States to banks in Panama. In addition, social and
cultural ties between Panama and Colombia-and the
fact that Panama has the only Caribbean banking
system that uses Spanish as the official language-
attract Latin American traffickers to the country for
money laundering operations. At least 12
Panamanian banks are suspected of involvement in
money laundering, but Panamanian officials have
Marijuana Eradication
Marijuana has been cultivated on a small scale for
years, but Panama is not a significant producer.
Traditional growing areas are the Archipielago de las
Perlas (Pearl Islands), and, to a lesser extent, the area
around Garachine in Darien Province, and San Blas
Province in northeastern Panama. Panamanian
officials are working to
taken punitive action against only one.
The United States has been attempting since March
1984 to negotiate a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
(MLAT) with Panama, which would allow
investigation of coded dollar accounts. The proposed
MLAT stipulates, however, that authorities can
obtain information concerning a secret account only if
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individuals being investigated have violated Panama-
nian law. Significant progress on the treaty is unlikely
because even legitimate banking enterprises probably
will pull out of Panama if legislation allowing investi-
gation of secret accounts is enacted. Failure to estab-
lish such a treaty probably will result in an even larger
influx of narcodollars into Panama as traffickers
search for additional locations to launder their illegal
profits
Outlook
Panama is in a key position either to facilitate the
South American narcotics trade or to take measures
that could make trafficking more difficult. Panama is
likely to continue pursuing some measures-marijua-
na eradication and interdiction of drug-laden ships-
in an effort to demonstrate a greater commitment to
countering the narcotics trade and help to silence
charges of FDP involvement in drug smuggling. Gen-
eral Noriega may also hope these highly visible
activities will deter the United States from pressing
Panama to sign an MLAT, which-if effectively
enforced-could seriously damage Panama's legal
banking enterprises. Nevertheless, we believe General
Noriega will likely continue to allow FDP members to
receive drug-related payoffs as long as the operations
do not draw attention to the FDP and cause it to be
subjected to further criticism.
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Figure 1
Opium Poppy and Marijuana Cultivation
Confirmed opium poppy
Confirmed opium poppy
and marijuana
Suspected opium poppy
Suspected marijuana
Suspected opium poppy
and marijuana
State boundary
400 Kilometers
United States
Boundary representation is
not neonunarily authoritative
Gulf
of
Mexico
Yucatan
Peninsula
Mende,
Bahia de Yucatan/
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Drug Control
Current Status of the Drug Trade
Mexico has solidified its role as a major narcotics
production and trafficking center. Opium poppy an
marijuana cultivation continue to flourish, and
Mexico has become a more important transshipme
area for South American-produced cocaine and
marijuana from Belize and Guatemala.
Opium Poppy
Cultivation in Mexico's two major growing areas-
the northern tristate area of Sinaloa, Chihuahua, and
Durango and the southern area extending through the
States of Michoacan, Guerrero, and Oaxaca-has
expanded steadily since 1983 (figure 1)
cultivation in the region expanded to some 7,800
hectares in 1985, compared with about 5,580 hecta
in 1984, and 3,700 hectares in 1983. Opium
production could have reached 47 tons in 1985, a
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major increase over an estimated 30 tons in 1984 a
an estimated 17 tons in 1983.' Preliminary analysis
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indicates
that 1986 opium poppy cultivation remains at about
the same levels as 1985, with no significant change in
the area planted.
Heavy concentrations of opium poppy were observed
within a 160-kilometer radius east and north of the
city of Culiacan, Sinaloa State. We detected a greater
use of more sophisticated cultivation techniques-
such as irrigation and staggered planting-that are
likely to contribute to another robust opium crop in
1986
Our estimates are almost certainly conservative. In
the past, some poppy
also is grown in parts of the Yucatan Peninsula, Baja
California. and Jalisco State. ~
poppy fields are located in the States of
'On the basis of a yield of 8 kilograms per hectare, and assuming
ideal weather conditions and that the Mexicans eradicated no more
than 2,000 hectares per year.
Chiapas and Sonora. Veracruz State, on the east
coast, is fast developing into a major center of drug
activity
poppy and
marijuana cultivation are widespread, and traffickers
are buying ranchland to expand cultivation.
Information on the scale of cultivation in Veracruz is
incomplete, but ideal growing conditions and
increased trafficking suggest that illicit cultivation
could expand quickly.
According to DEA officials, virtually all of Mexico's
opium is processed into heroin for the US market. The
greater quantity of opium probably is causing
traffickers to search for new ways to market their
products. One particularly potent form of Mexican-
produced heroin called black tar is now available in 27
states in the United States.
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August 1986
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greater numbers
planting marijuana to secure additional income.
cultivation.
of farmers in the Yucatan Peninsula are planting
marijuana between rows of the region's more
traditional henequen fiber lant.
some farmers are forgoing the planting of
licit crops and are renting their fields for marijuana
Mexican traffickers are
overland shipment to Mexico.
Mexican traffickers stepped up purchases of large
amounts of marijuana in northwestern Belize for
March,
extending operations into Belize and Guatemala in a
move that demonstrates their growing potential for
developing cross-border trafficking infrastructures. In
other Mexican traffickers arranged
Marijuana
Marijuana cultivation is widespread and probably is
grown in every state.
farmers plant two crops each year. Cultivation
practices include both highly sophisticated
plantations-such as those found in Chihuahua in
November 1984-and the more common smaller
fields planted by individual farmers.
cultivation is widespread in the northern tristate
region of Sinaloa, Durango, and Chihuahua. On-site
surveys indicate some interplanting of marijuana and
opium poppy.
continue to surface. In December 1985
some 70 hectares were being cultivated
near the town of Ciudad Obregon in Sonora State.
marijuana is being
grown in at least three locations in the southern and
from the US Consulate in Guadalajara last May
indicates that farmers in the State of Zacatecas are
middlemen in Belize for further transshipment
to move large amounts of Guatemalan marijuana to
major Mexican
trafficking organizations, previously involved only in
marijuana and heroin, now routinely smuggle cocaine
to the United States. During the last two years, the
amount of cocaine seized in Mexico and in US border
states increased substantially.' During the first three
months of this year, US and Mexican officials have
the amount of cocaine seized along the
southwestern border last year represented only 5
percent of all US seizures, and Florida remains the
major point of entry for cocaine reaching the United
States. Nevertheless, we are confident that greater-
if still unknown-amounts of cocaine are being
transshipped through Mexico.
tatistics, Mexican officials seized 2,519 kg of
cocaine in 1985, a 467-percent increase over 1984. US authorities
in California, Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona seized 1,151 kg in
1985, a 364-percent increase over the 248 kg seized in these states
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Eradication Falling Behind drug control officials in
Mexico's drug crop eradication program is not Durango State routinely did not report the locations
holding the line against increasing drug production. of poppyfields and in some cases arranged for fields to
Cro estimates and reporting from the US Embassy be sprayed with water instead of herbicide. F
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ndicate that illict crop cultivation
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surged for the second straight year in 1985, and
another large harvest is expected this year. DEA
agents in the United States reported recently that
there is a glut of heroin on the southwestern US
market, providing further evidence of a resurgence in
poppy cultivation.
Mismanagement and laxity in aircraft maintenance
and flight training plague the eradication program.
Total flight time for the helicopters in the spray
campaign dropped below 1984 levels last year, despite
the addition of 12 aircraft. Damage to aircraft, mostly
due to pilot error, reached an alltime high in 1985.
The US Embassy reported that, even though some 30
of the 43 available helicopters could be outfitted with
aerial fumigation equipment, the Mexicans can
operate only 10 to 15 aircraft at any one time because
of a shortage of qualified pilots. Low salaries and
safer, higher paying opportunities in private aviation
are probably the major reasons for the government's
struggle to maintain an adequate force of spray pilots.
Countermeasures by growers also are undercutting
the effectiveness of the crop eradication program.
farmers continue to
plant small fields-averaging about 570 square
meters (.057 hectares}-in hard-to-reach mountainous
areas, making detection and eradication difficult.
Moreover, widespread use of irrigation offers growers
greater flexibility; more farmers can plant two crops
rather than one, poppy fields can be scattered over a
greater area, and sprinklers can be used to rinse off
the plant to minimize the effect of the herbicide.
in 1986 irrigated
fields are larger and contain denser stands of poppy
than the average field-conditions that could result in
higher yields per hectare.
77
to 70 percent of the state judicial
police in Sinaloa-Mexico's most important opium-
refining and -growing area and the site of over 75
percent of all reported eradication-are engaged in
the protection and expansion of the region's narcotics
trade. President de la Madrid recently forced three
senior officials in Sinaloa State to resign, apparently
because of their involvement with drug traffickers.
the Governor of
Sinaloa maintains extensive ties to the drug trade, and
opposition parties are sponsoring a national inquiry
into the Governor's allegedly corrupt activities.
We believe that the organization and operation of the
aerial spray campaign-which divides Mexico into 13
zones, each with a coordinator responsible for
overseeing aerial fumigation-makes it relatively easy
for traffickers to undermine spray operations. To
secure official complicity, traffickers need only to co-
opt the zone coordinator, the chief navigator, or the
chief pilot-who meet each morning to plan spray
missions in a particular zone. Zone coordinators in the
major growing areas are almost certainly offered 25X1
bribes and threatened if bribes are refused
in 1984 that Miguel Conde Comacho,
while serving as the zone coordinator in the key
northern poppy-growing area, zone 6, accepted bribes
to divert spray helicopters away from mature poppy
fields and. r that aircraft carried diluted
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1985 that the former eradication zone coordinator in
Durango, Hugo Quintanella, had been thoroughly
corrupted by the Herrera drug organization.
Quintanella routinely provided traffickers with
information on the timing and location of antidrug
operations. He also funneled bribery money to pilots
and navigators who in turn directed spray operations
away from opium poppy fields controlled by the
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Herrera network. The Quintanella-Herrera
connection continued to operate following
Quitanella's transfer to Merida, Yucatan State, in
January 1985.
We judge that higher salaries and more frequent
rotation of key drug-control officials could reduce the
susceptibility of these officials to corruption.
Moreover, more forceful action against corrupt
officials-such as prosecution rather than the
standard transfer-would demonstrate Mexico City's
determination to clean up the drug-control program
and could deter officials from establishing future links
to the drug trade
Prospects
We believe that eradication remains the most
effective way to reduce the quantity of Mexican-
produced drugs entering the United States, and-
the Mexicans have taken steps to improve
the operational efficiency of the aerial spray program:
? Three larger Bell helicopters will be integrated in
operations in hopes that their greater herbicidal
carrying capacity and extended range will result in
increased eradication.
? A fixed-wing Thrush aircraft will be incorporated
into the program to free more helicopters for
missions against hard-to-reach fields.
? To upgrade flight safety, pilots will be required to
undergo refresher training in aerial fumigation
techniques. Efforts are also being made to recruit
more pilots for the program.
? Surveillance missions are now being flown to
confirm eradication data reported by field
commanders. US State Department personnel also
are assisting Mexicans in analyzing film from aerial
surveys of poppy cultivation to provide information
on crop cultivation necessary for efficient planning
and execution of antidrug operations.
? In June, Mexican and US officials agreed to
conduct a 45-day intensive spraying campaign this
fall against poppy and marijuana cultivation in the
northern tristate growing area. The United States
will contribute six fixed-wing Thrush aircraft with
civilian pilots to the operation. Since large areas of
high-density illicit crop cultivation are located in
the north, this operation has the potential to make a
significant dent in the amount of narcotics
produced in Mexico this fall.
These measures almost certainly will add to progress
already achieved in 1986-the total area sprayed
during the first two months was up by 8 percent over
the same period in 1985. The gains, however, will be
short lived unless Mexico City makes a sustained
effort against corruption. The government,
preoccupied with state elections and the troubled
economy, and probably fearing a violent confrontation
with the traffickers, is unlikely to take strong action
against corruption any time soon.
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Mauritius: Drug Dealing
on the Rise
Escalating domestic drug abuse and narcotics
trafficking in Mauritius have tarnished the image of
Prime Minister Jugnauth's moderate government.
Several prominent politicians belonging to the three-
party governing coalition, the Alliance, have been
arrested for drug smuggling. US Embassy reporting
indicates that most drugs smuggled into Mauritius-
traditionally a small-scale cultivator of marijuana-
are consumed in the country.
the island could evolve into an
alternative transshipment point for illicit narcotics,
primarily from Southwest Asia, destined for mainland
African, European, and, to a lesser extent, North
American markets.
The Scope of the Domestic Problem
Accurate figures on local drug abuse are not
available, but the government estimates that there are
about 25,000 users in the population of 1 million, and
that drug addiction probably affects one out of every
eight teenagers. According to Embassy officials, drug
users often resort to petty theft and prostitution to
support their habit. The Embassy reports that the
hardships posed by the 20-percent unemployment
rate-almost 50 percent for males under the age of
25-has helped to make narcotics trafficking a big
business. A government study in 1985 identified over
100 sites where drugs are sold within the capital, and
local observers note that drug deals often are made
publicly.
smuggled in from abroad. Local authorities believe
that most of these narcotics are brought in from India,
Pakistan, and South Africa either on private yachts
and cruise ships or through the VIP lounge at the
country's single airport.
The government's inadequately trained and poorly
paid police forces thus far have been unable to clamp
down on the domestic drug trade. Drug enforcement
duties are divided between the Criminal Investigation
Unit of the police force and the Anti-Drug and
Smuggling Squad of the customs office. The Embassy
reports, however, that the policy of rotating
experienced enforcement officials every two years
contributes to low morale among officials who feel
overwhelmed by the extent of domestic trafficking.
The authorities also are hamstrung by scarce
resources and frugal budgetary allotments. The three
police patrol craft cannot adequately patrol the
approximately 100-mile-long coastline. The Embassy
reports that about 30 customs officials, with little or
no specialized drug enforcement training and no
trained dogs, process an average of 3,000 tourists at
the airport weekly. In addition, checks of private
yachts in the local harbor are rare. Despite
operational constraints, however, enforcement
officials have arrested more than 500 people and
confiscated close to $2 million in narcotics since the
beginning of this year, according to the Embassy.
Mauritians apparently use a variety of narcotic
substances. According to the Embassy, marijuana is
the most plentiful, inexpensive, and widely used
narcotic. Marijuana crops often are cultivated within
sugarcane fields and can easily escape police
detection.
domestic production may be falling short of local
demand. For example, local officials note that
marijuana currently is being imported from
Madagascar and India. Other substances, such as
opium, cocaine, heroin, and mandrax
(methaqualone}-a synthetic depressant-are
In late December
1985, four Alliance members of parliament were
arrested in Amsterdam for smuggling drugs. Three
were released for lack of evidence, but their
companion-who was carrying a suitcase full of
heroin-remains in detention. Last May, authorities
on the nearby French-administered island of Reunion
uncovered a drug-smuggling network between the
Secret
DI NR 86-004
August 1986
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Secret
Narcotics Trafficking Routes Through and to Mauritius
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
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Secret
islands that allegedly involves several prominent
Mauritians with political connections, according to
the arrested dealers. The Embassy reports that a
French commission is investigating the drug ring.
Moreover, some Alliance parliamentarians frequent
alleged trafficking centers or have contacts with
known drug dealers,
Alliance officials.
Political Fallout
The drug scandals pose a significant threat to the
Alliance's ability to hold on to power until the
scheduled end of its mandate in 1988.1 The fractious,
proleft Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM}-the
leading opposition party-sought to capitalize on
Jugnauth's wavering parliamentary support to call for
a vote of no confidence, which the government
defeated by a slim majority in May. Despite the
victory, Embassy reporting indicates that the
government's image is still being damaged by the
MMM's muckraking campaign. Moreover, we believe
that another government crisis could arise should
evidence come to light implicating other high-ranking
To minimize the damage, Jugnauth has toughened his
public stand on corruption and narcotics trafficking.
government is working with legislators to establish a
special court to deal with drug-related cases and has
proposed the death penalty for traffickers, a measure
that the Embassy reports is unlikely to pass.
trafficking, according to the Embassy.
The government is launching a multipronged
campaign with some assistance from the United
States to combat domestic drug abuse and narcotics
trafficking. The Prime Minister's wife and the
Foreign Minister have traveled to the United States to
participate in drug awareness conferences; they are
prominently involved in drug education programs and
in plans to establish drug treatment and rehabilitation
centers. The government has approached the United
States for help in training customs officials, setting up
a regional customs workshop, and identifying the
country of origin of confiscated narcotics. Authorities
have begun to crack down on corruption in drug
enforcement circles and recently arrested several
police and customs officials involved in drug
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Outlook
The narcotics issue will remain a touchy political
problem as long as the high unemployment rate
provides economic and psychological incentives
favoring drug abuse and trafficking. Jugnauth almost
certainly will face some difficult decisions when the
results of his drug commission and the French
investigative commission are made public. He may be
forced to call for early general elections-which he
could well lose-if the commissions expose corruption
and drug dealing at high levels of his government. If
only a few low-level officials are indicted, however, we
believe that Jugnauth probably will hold on to his
position as long as he takes decisive action, such as
purging the Alliance and prosecuting those involved.
Over the longer term, the inability of the authorities
to control the borders may encourage international
smugglers to use Mauritius as a regional
transshipment point for narcotics destined for other
markets. traffickers now are
directing some shipments ot eroin and mandrax
destined for South Africa through Mauritius because
of a crackdown on smuggling in traditional routes
through mainland southern African countries, such as
Zambia. In our view, the use of Mauritius as an
alternative regional transshipment point to Western
markets could expand further because of its location
and extensive airlinks to Africa and Europe and to
heroin-producing countries in Southwest Asia. On
balance, however, we believe that the government's
recent willingness to crack down on traffickers,
combined with efforts to seek foreign assistance for
border control, could help limit the flow of drugs
through Mauritius and reduce its potential as a
transshipment point.
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Saudi Arabia: Drugs and
Security Worries
Saudi Arabia's role as a consumer of and transit point
for illicit narcotics has expanded despite enforcement
efforts. Drug seizures have increased throughout the
kingdom, and there is evidence that narcotics abuse
now affects a growing number of Saudis. Riyadh fears
that established drug routes from Iran, Syria, and
Lebanon may become increasingly attractive as
conduits for weapons and other subversive materials
into the kingdom. The Saudi Government has
responded to the problem by seeking cooperative
antinarcotics agreements with its neighbors,
reassessing government security programs, and
requesting further technical support and training
from the United States. Increasingly, the Saudi
response to narcotics trafficking reflects Riyadh's
rising awareness that failure to limit the flow of
narcotics through the country is a weak link in its
national security program.
An Increasing Narcotics Challenge
Saudi Arabia's drug problem remains small in
comparison with other Middle Eastern states, but the
increase in the number and the size of recent drug
seizures and expanded interdiction efforts on the part
of the Saudi Government suggest the problem is
increasing. the
amount of heroin seized in the kingdom during March
1986 nearly equaled that seized in the previous two-
year period.
seizures of hashish, heroin, and-for the first time-
cocaine increased dramatically at Riyadh's
international airport last May
=traffickers apprehended in the kingdom are using
more sophisticated concealment techniques to bring
drugs through customs.
Rising narcotics seizures and a growing domestic
population of drug abusers have pushed Riyadh to
address more openly the problem of drug use among
Saudi Arabian Drug Seizures, 1978-84
1978 79 80 81 82 83 84
a Primarily hashish, but includes substantial
amounts of opium, heroin, and some cocaine.
h Includes captagon, amphetamines,
barbiturates, and other prescription drugs.
Saudi citizens, a step the government had strongly
rejected until recently. Until last year, Saudi officials
continued to tell US Embassy officials in Riyadh that
the only drug abuse in the kingdom was among guest
workers who brought drug habits with them from
their native South Asian countries, particularly
Pakistan and India.
leading hospitals.
last April Saudi Crown Prince `Abdallah said
that the problem of illicit drugs is much greater than
the government openly acknowledges and that he is
seeking to redirect the state security services to handle
the threat. Last spring, leading Saudi newspapers
began to run stories for the first time about the
successes of the canine contraband detector program
and the opening of drug detoxification facilities at
Secret
DI NR 86-004
August 1986
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Secret
We believe that the primary reason for the recent rise
in drug treatment facilities in the kingdom is the
increasing number of young Saudis exposed to drugs
in Europe and the United States who return to the
drug and weapons smugglers running contraband
into the kingdom,
? Riyadh banned the entry of foreign refrigerator
trucks in 1985, according to the US Embassy in
Jordan, charging that smugglers easily use false
bottoms and walls in the sealed vehicles to bring in
drugs and weapons.
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kingdom.
The Narcotics/Weapons Linkage
Smuggling of all types of contraband has been a
chronic problem for Riyadh, but the Saudi
Government appears more worried than ever that
subversive elements are able to use the same networks
to move weapons, explosives, and terrorist materials.
The country has long, unguarded borders, parts of
which are undefined or located in outlying desert
regions, that allow large amounts of contraband to
enter Saudi Arabia each year unobserved. Much of
this material, such as foreign currency, consumer
goods, and common drugs, is not related to security,
but over the last several years Saudi state security
services have become aware of an increasing volume
of contraband weapons and explosives entering or
transiting the kingdom:
? A large convoy of contraband weapons and other
goods moved through the empty wastes of the
Eastern Province toward an unknown destination in
mid-1983)
? Riyadh criticized the other members of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) in early 1984 for their
lax interdiction and security practices,
? Security officials in the United Arab Emirates
seized three shipments of contraband arms being
smuggled through Saudi Arabia to North Yemen in
1983,
? Riyadh demarched the Government of Jordan in
mid-1984 to demand that Amman investigate the
involvement of Jordanian officials with a ring of
Stepping Up Enforcement
Riyadh's response to rising narcotics and border
security problems has been to expand its interdiction
efforts, to seek Western expertise in improving
customs facilities, and to increase the penalties for the
smuggling or possession of contraband. King Fahd
has issued decrees against the abuse of specific drugs
and has changed the previous system of nominal fines
for abuse to mandatory three-year prison terms for
possession of illicit drugs,
Overall management of the national drug interdiction
effort is the responsibility of the Department of
Customs within the Ministry of Finance. This office
has received training and technical advice through its
liaison with the US Customs Service. According to
US Customs officials familiar with this program,
Riyadh has attempted to increase the effectiveness of
the customs program by:
? Creating watchlists of suspicious persons, flights
favored by smugglers, and cargoes likely to be
carrying contraband.
? Introducing a canine detector corps, capable of
identifying a wide range of contraband weapons and
narcotics.
? Putting increasing numbers of Saudi Government
officers in direct charge of program components.
Riyadh also is reordering government departments
involved with customs and security matters. Riyadh's
current desire to "Saudi-ize" the personnel of major
security and customs programs-replacing contract
labor with Saudi nationals-reflects this effort. The
General Director of the Department of Customs has
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The US-Saudi Arabian joint Canine Enforcement
Program is the keystone of an extensive customs
project aimed at increasing Riyadh's ability to inter-
dict contraband of all sorts. Established under the
auspices of the US-Saudi Arabian Joint Commission
on Economic Cooperation, the program trains dogs
and handlers to detect a wide range of weapons and
illicit drugs at all the major airports and most
ground entry points in the kingdom. Dogs and han-
dlers are put through extensive training in the United
States, and US officials continue to monitor the
May suggests Riyadh has not yet decided how to
handle potentially embarrassing revelations of official
collusion in narcotics trafficking. The report
concludes that perhaps one-fourth of the narcotics
traffickers moving drugs into and through the country
are Saudi nationals,
The report also notes that efforts to stiffen border
security do not affect the increasing number of
privately operated small planes flown by Saudis that
are probably also being used to bring in illegal
program in Saudi Arabia.
US officials say Riyadh was initially reticent about
assigning Saudi nationals to the program, claiming
no proper Arab would agree to work with a dog, an
animal traditionally considered unclean by orthodox
Muslims. Most of the initial candidates for the
program have been Malaysian contractors. But Saudi
nationals have taken the US training program and
returned to the kingdom where several of them
currently serve as adminstrators to the national
canine enforcement program.
increased the membership of the national Interagency
Cooperating Committee to include all five of the
major services involved in monitoring movement of
goods and people into and out of the country.
In our view, the initiative to enhance coordination
between security and customs services comes from
Minister of the Interior Prince Nayif. According to
US Embassy reports, he has made numerous
administrative changes to streamline the Saudi
bureaucracy and to overcome the widespread
reticence to share information and techniques.
Moreover, Prince Nayif has been active in promoting
the value of joint or regional customs training
Narcotics: A Growing Factor in Regional Relations
Riyadh has voiced its concerns about the growing
connection between narcotics and security issues in
several regional forums and seeks to increase the level
of coordination and cooperation among its neighbors.
As a member of the Arab League, the Organization
of the Islamic Conference, and the GCC, Saudi
Arabia has encouraged each group to review the
possibility of increased cooperation in antinarcotics
operations. According to US Embassy and press
accounts of these meetings, however, none of these
organizations has yet tabled a workable proposal for
multilateral antinarcotics cooperation.
Riyadh has initiated bilateral programs with some of
its immediate neighbors to gain greater control over
narcotics and illicit weapons smuggling.
he Saudi Ministry of Finance began
a program in late 1985 to create facilities for in-
country training in many of the contraband
interdiction techniques currently performed in Saudi
Arabia by foreign contractors. The long-range goal of
the program is to provide standardized customs
training to the member states of the GCC.
programs among the Persian Gulf countries.
We believe that Riyadh is not prepared to press
antinarcotic measures likely to discomfit members of
the administration. The decision to limit distribution
of a highly restricted customs report issued in late
Nonetheless, we believe Riyadh faces serious
constraints in encouraging neighboring states to
institute security measures equivalent to the Saudi
program.
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Secret
Outlook
Drug trafficking into Saudi Arabia and domestic drug
abuse are likely to rise over the next several years.
Even with the economic cutbacks that Riyadh faces
from falling oil prices, Saudi citizens will continue to
enjoy relatively high levels of disposable income, and
many Saudis will continue to study in the West where
they will pick up the taste for recreational drugs.
There is the possibility that affluent Saudis,
accustomed to trafficking small amounts of drugs for
their personal use, will smuggle large quantities of
illicit narcotics into the kingdom for resale to offset
reduced incomes.
Continued political, economic, and social tensions in
the Gulf and among Riyadh's neighbors to the north
and south are likely to lead to a rise in demand for
contraband arms in the region. The growing arms
market will provide an impetus for drug traffickers to
become involved in running weapons and other
subversive contraband. We believe that such
contraband will find a ready market inside Saudi
Arabia among radical Shias, disaffected youth, and
criminal elements, each with the potential to disrupt
Saudi Arabia's normally placid environment.
Riyadh will continue to strengthen its drug and
weapon interdiction programs. It will:
? Increase coordination among national security
agencies.
? Push joint antinarcotics initiatives in regional and
international forums.
? Increase criminal prosecution and punishments for
trafficking and drug abuse.
? Replace foreign contract labor with Saudi nationals
in key security positions.
We believe, however, that Riyadh's efforts to improve
antidrug and contraband interdiction programs will
fall short. The Saudi Government's
approach to regional cooperation has offended many
of the neighboring states whose support Riyadh will
need to initiate successful contraband interdiction
efforts. Domestic constraints also will limit the
success of Riyadh's antinarcotics efforts:
? The unwieldy Saudi bureaucracy, characterized by
a lack of cooperation among ministries, will be an
obstacle to effective antinarcotics enforcement
efforts.
? Riyadh has come to rely heavily on foreign expertise
and complex technical means to interdict illicit
drugs and weapons. The follow-on technology the
kingdom will need to ensure its goal of maximum
border security is likely to be prohibitively expensive
given falling oil revenues and competing high-
priority programs.
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Golden Triangle: Border Trafficking
Monopoly Under Fire
Introduction
The Shan United Army (SUA) remains in control of
the narcotics trade on the Thai-Burmese border but is
entangled in a conflict with a coalition of competing
trafficking groups that has the potential to cut its
market share of regional heroin production and is
already altering trafficking patterns in the Golden
Triangle. If the coalition succeeds in breaking the
SUA's monopoly, heroin exports from the Golden
Triangle will likely rise as these competitors enter the
market.
The Shan United Army's (SUA) drive to control the
heroin trade along the Thai-Burmese border began in
1982 after a series of Thai military operations drove
the SUA out of its strongholds in the northern border
area. SUA forces regrouped in Burma, and its leaders
opted to expand their control westward into areas
controlled by its chief rival, the 3rd Chinese Irregular
Force (CIF). Working with its ally the Tai
Revolutionary Army (TRA), the SUA achieved its
objective in September 1984 following a series of
assaults against CIF positions near Piang Luang that
resulted in the capture of the last of the CIF's border
Currently, fighting among the coalitions is at a
stalemate, mainly because CIF-WNA tactics have
negated superior SUA firepower. The SUA is
stronger man for man, more cohesive militarily, and
has better leadership. But CIF-WNA aggressive hit-
and-run tactics have kept the SUA offguard and on
the defensive
Earlier this year, the CIF-WNA used a lull in the
fighting to start its first large-scale refining operation
on the border since losing its Piang Luang outposts in
The BCP and SSA/N have
agreed to supply the refineries with raw narcotics.
The BCP has also dispatched several hundred troops
to the border to defend southbound caravans and
harass local SUA units. There have been several small
skirmishes between BCP and SUA troops in recent
refineries.
Forming Coalitions
Financially maimed by the defeat at Piang Luang,
CIF leaders set out immediately to build a coalition of
trafficking and insurgent groups strong enough to
dislodge the SUA and reopen its own trafficking
routes. The CIF solidified ties to the Wa National
Army (WNA), an ethnic group that has long opposed
the SUA, and recruited the Lahu National Army and
leading members of the National Democratic Front,
an umbrella organization of anti-Rangoon groups.
The Burmese Communist Party (BCP) has backed the
CIF-WNA campaign against the SUA for several
months but did not commit troops to the fighting until
April. BCP participation mainly has been limited to
logistic support, increased use of the Shan State
Army/North faction (SSA/N), a BCP ally, to harass
SUA caravans, and a steady stream of its own opium
Prospects for Peace
We judge it likely that fighting will continue for at
least several more months:
? The CIF-WNA alliance appears solid by Golden
Triangle standards and is unlikely to end its attacks
on the SUA any time soon. The CIF leadership
views the current conflict as essential in regaining
the group's share of the narcotics trade, and WNA
leaders want to reopen their opium and jade routes
to the border.
? Friction between the SUA and TRA leadership has
made this alliance more shaky, but the SUA could
probably hold its territory even if the TRA broke
away. TRA units are not directly responsible for
caravans to the CIF.
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DI NR 86-004
August 1986
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protecting coalition strongpoints, and a TRA
defection will not leave large gaps in the SUA's
defenses.
? Thai Army support has been crucial in allowing the
CIF-WNA to battle the SUA to a stalemate.
Embassy reporting indicates the Thai Army allows
the CIF easy access to Thai sources of weapons and
ammunition and has assisted WNA leaders in
planning operations against the SUA. We expect
this pro-CIF bias to continue as long as the SUA
remains dominant and the CIF does not regain its
former position as a major heroin producer.
? Both sides have been conserving their resources and
avoiding protracted setpiece battles. The coalitions
let months pass between engagements, using the
time to bolster their coalitions and fortify positions.
? A recent series of assassinations of SUA and CIF-
WNA officials has raised the level of tension in
border communities and is likely to prolong the
conflict. Following a failed attempt on the life of
CIF leader Gen. Li Wen-Huan in 1984, the CIF
assassinated a number of SUA brokers and
operatives. Both sides have now deployed hit teams
to eliminate key enemy personnel.
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Accommodation Likely
SUA reaction to establishment of the CIF refinery
complex at Ang Khan will indicate the longer term
course of the conflict. The refinery represents a major
step toward rebuilding the CIF cross-border
marketing chain. SUA
leaders have intensified efforts to attack caravans
supplying the refineries but have yet to attack the
complex. Attacking the complex would demonstrate
that SUA leaders still believe they can maintain their
monopoly over border trafficking. SUA inaction,
however, would indicate tacit acceptance of the CIF
network and signal a change to more competitive
border trafficking characteristic of the 1970s.
In our judgment, the SUA ultimately will seek some
sort of an accommodation-perhaps losing some
narcotics income while maintaining control over
pricing. Prolonged fighting has drained SUA
resources and increased costs of acquiring opium from
the northern Shan State and moving heroin to the
Thai market. The CIF-WNA alliance has shown
more staying power than SUA leaders expected, and
CIF strategy is one of patience, designed to prolong
the conflict and force such a favorable compromise. If
the CIF-WNA is able to intensify its military
pressure and retake some key border positions, the
SUA may be unable to prevent competitors from
resuming full-scale trafficking along the border.
Impact on the Heroin Trade
In our judgment, if the SUA is forced to open
trafficking routes to its competitors, regional heroin
availability will increase and wholesale prices in
Thailand will drop. The SUA has been using its
monopoly to hold back narcotics from the market to
drive up prices. With more groups operating on the
border, it will be forced to compete as a supplier to
Thai middlemen. Increased competition will reduce
the profitability of wholesale border trafficking and
probably push traffickers to increase their control
further along the marketing chain, where profits are
greater.
The BCP may be the big winner in the conflict. For
several years, the BCP has controlled much of the
opium moving to border refineries but has always
lacked the marketing infrastructure to become a
major force in the regional heroin market. During the
last two years, it has increased, its processing capacity
in the northern Shan State and has worked to expand
its marketing networks out of the Golden Triangle.
Fighting also has spurred the use of smuggling
routes-particularly through Burma and India-that
bypass the Thai-Burmese border. Increased use of
these routes will complicate interdiction efforts in the
region and contribute to the involvement of Indian
and Nepalese networks, which have better
connections in Great Britain, Canada, and the United
States than do ethnic Chinese.
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Powerful Colombian traffickers are continuing to foil US extradition
attempts. In July-four months after Mata Ballesteros escaped from a
Colombian prison and fled to Honduras-lawyers for Jorge Ochoa, the son
of one of Medellin's top cocaine traffickers, and his associate Gilberto
Rodriquez, persuaded a Spanish court to extradite their clients to
Colombia. Jailed in Spain since November 1984, both had been fighting
extradition to the United States where they are wanted on several drug
charges, including one alleging that Ochoa was involved in large cocaine
shipments through Nicaragua. Confident that he would receive only a
minor sentence, Ochoa may request to be tried on charges identical to those
pending against him in the United States. He could then rebut further
extradition attempts by claiming double jeopardy.
In Bolivia, Operation Blast Furnace kicked off on 18 July. The joint US-
Bolivian operation is designed to destroy cocaine-processing laboratories in
El Beni and Santa Cruz Departments. At the same time, Bolivian
antinarcotics police launched a simultaneous interdiction campaign in the
Yungas and Chapare regions aimed at restricting the flow of coca products
and arresting traffickers fleeing operations in El Beni. During the initial
three weeks of Operation Blast Furnace, results were mixed-six out of the
first 20 targets hit were abandoned cocaine-processing laboratories.
Although no appreciable quantities of cocaine were found, two locations
netted caches of cocaine-processing chemicals. Coordination, logistic, and
targeting problems that initially plagued the operation apparently have
been resolved, and this should lead to more frequent successes as the
operation progresses.
Continued violence in the Upper Huallaga Valley is slowing progress in
coca eradication and making it increasingly unlikely that Peru will reach
its target of destroying 6,000 hectares of coca this year. The government's
force of some 500 eradication workers destroyed less than 400 hectares of
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Secret
coca in June-considerably short of their 750-hectare goal-bringing this
year's total to 1,600 hectares. The government relocated most of the
eradication force away from the major growing areas around Uchiza after
a series of antigovernment demonstrations there in April. Eradication
forces, however, still are not safe. In July, 50 traffickers armed with
automatic weapons and handgrenades attacked a lightly defended
eradication team, killing six workers and one guard. All attackers escaped
unharmed, according to Embassy reports. The rate of eradication is not
likely to increase until the workers are given better protection and moved
back into the more densely cultivated areas. Key narcotics advisers have
recommended that these areas be declared police emergency zones.
President Garcia, more concerned with Peru's terrorist threat, has not yet
acted on this suggestion.
In late June Governor Franco Montoro issued a decree that created a State
Narcotics Council in Sao Paulo, Brazil. The council will be controlled by
the State Secretariat of Justice and will include officials from the Health,
Public Security, Social Welfare, and Education Secretariats, as well as
representatives from the scientific community and private sector. Speaking
at the signing ceremony, State Secretary of Health Joao Yunes described
the council's mandate as "education and prevention, not enforcement." In
other state jurisdictions, narcotics councils have proved to be effective
catalysts for joint actions by disparate groups sharing a concern about
increased drug trafficking and abuse in Brazil. In creating the council,
Montoro has given an important signal of government support to Sao
Paulo's private-sector activists who have mobilized on this issue during the
past two years. The Governor completely dismantled his predecessor's
antinarcotics organization, however, and his administration is due to leave
office in March 1987. Creating a council strong enough to avoid a similar
fate in the next nine months will be a daunting task
Civilian and law enforcement agencies in Argentina are alarmed at rising
rates of marijuana and cocaine consumption. As a result, the Argentine
National Commission on Drug Prevention has recently launched a "Master
Plan" to stem the spread of drug addiction in the schools. It includes
special courses for teachers, the preparation of education materials,
technical assistance, and two scholarships for selected teachers to obtain
specialized training abroad. The plan will require an estimated $2.3
million, which is to be obtained from private donations and the UN Fund
for Drug Abuse Control. The Argentines will contribute an equivalent
amount in materials, equipment, and administrative, technical, and
professional personnel. Meanwhile, governments in important provinces,
including Cordoba and Buenos Aires, have formed provincial antinarcotics
organizations to work with the National Commission in launching
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coordinated drug abuse programs, and the mayors of several suburban
areas-aided by civic and religious leaders-are dedicating considerable
time and effort to educational and prevention campaigns. A number of
programs already are being carried out by private and official institutions
such as the National Center for Drug Rehabilitation, private organizations
that conduct representative lecturing at schools, and parent's groups. The
Federal Police also are participating by sending specialized drug education
teams to elementary and high schools throughout the country.
Caribbean Drug-related violence is increasing throughout the Caribbean-a trend
that is likely to continue. In the Cayman Islands-free of homicides for
more than two decades until this year-the latest of five drug-related
killings took place late last month,
Trinidad and Tobago, police report that violent crime and weapons
violations are growing as drug trafficking increases. The surge in drug-
related violence accompanies an increase in the size and frequency of
narcotics shipments in the Caribbean. Traffickers and drug abusers now
have greater access than ever to weapons smuggled into Caribbean nations,
largely from the United States. Caribbean leaders are deeply concerned
over the wave of violence, but rampant corruption, weak legal systems, and
poorly trained police make a successful crackdown unlikely.
For the first time, Jamaican security officials have been able to target
major marijuana traffickers, largely untouched until recently. A late May
drug raid in St. Thomas Parish netted a leading area dealer, and even the
intervention of a Jamaican Cabinet minister often linked to drug
trafficking failed to secure the drug trader's release.
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Mexican traffickers in Sinaloa State-one of Mexico's most important
opium poppy and marijuana growing areas-are attempting to intimidate
US drug control officials. In late June,
likely to result in further attempts by traffickers to undermine US
investigative efforts, and armed confrontation cannot be ruled out.
At the
same time, two security guards assigned to the US Consulate in Mazatlan
resigned, apparently as a result of pressure from drug traffickers. Although
US officials continue to push for the arrest of Salcido under an outstanding
warrant, Mexican Federal Judicial Police (MFJP) personnel have been
unable to apprehend him. These intimidation tactics are almost certainly
designed to disrup investigations against Salcido. These measures
also may be part o a conscious effort by traffickers to dissuade officials
from more forceful antidrug action planned this fall. DEA's decision to
reopen the Mazatlan post with additional personnel on 1 September 1986 is
Central America Turf battles among narcotics traffickers in Belize have raised drug-related
violence there to an unprecedented high. In early May, US Embassy
officials indicated that drug wars between various syndicates in each of
Belize's five trafficking districts were imminent.
Belize in recent months.
resources to transport the harvested crop to US and Mexican buyers. These
established marijuana networks are ideally structured for trafficking
cocaine, and US Embassy officials believe these groups are
responsible for the reported increase in cocaine transshipment through
indicate this pattern may already be developing in the marijuana trade.
Four or five principal traffickers in each district control operations-
paying smaller growers to cultivate the crop and in some cases pooling
activities at a minimum. US Embassy,
activities-such as transporting drugs to buyers-to keep costs for such
competition among trafficking groups for control of drug operations in
Belize is likely to result in the firm establishment of a few well-integrated
and organized narcotics networks having control of overall trafficking
operations within well-defined territorial boundaries. At the same time, the
trafficking organizations probably will cooperate in certain less competitive
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The spread of marijuana cultivation in Thailand to several north central
provinces will put additional pressure on Thai enforcement resources and
signals that Thai traffickers are moving to counter expanded eradication
planned in the northeast.
a trafficking syndicate headed by a former member of parliament
from northeastern Thailand is already well entrenched in Sukhothai and
Lampang Provinces and sponsors cultivation of about 50 hectares of
marijuana, which would produce about 60 tons of marijuana. The
syndicate has secured high-level police protection and uses corrupt police to
force independent growers to sell their crop to the syndicate.
judge a piecemeal local approach is likely to fall prey to corruption, and
only a nationwide campaign designed to contain spreading cultivation can
keep the Thai marijuana trade from continuing its explosive growth.
Thai marijuana traffickers increasingly are turning to Laos to supplement
domestic production, sidestepping antimarijuana enforcement by Bangkok.
Marijuana production in Laos is expanding rapidly, largely through the
efforts of the government's Mountainous Area Development Company
(MADC), which promotes cultivation, serves as the principal buying agent
for the provinces, and coordinates sales to Thai buyers.
MADC may have close to 1,000 tons of
marijuana ready for export by December 1986,
The growing links between major Thai brokers and MADC
indicate that a significant share of future marijuana exports from Thailand
to the United States is likely to be Lao grown. Thai traffickers are drawn
to Lao supplies because there is no threat of eradication in Laos, and the
Thais can deal directly with the MADC rather than a large number of
individual growers. Intensified eradication planned by Bangkok for the
coming year will lead Thai traffickers into even greater dependence on Lao
supplies.
East Asia The first China/US bilateral narcotics conference held last month in
Beijing produced fruitful discussions on drug trafficking in the region,
Chinese views on multilateral drug initiatives, and plans for greater
cooperation. Chinese officials shared US concern that southern China is
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used as a route for Golden Triangle narcotics destined for Hong Kong and
other countries. The Chinese expressed general agreement with the
proposed United Nations Convention on Narcotics Trafficking and said
Beijing is adopting preventive measures to control the movement and
export and import of precursor chemicals. Regarding antidrug cooperation
with the United States, Chinese officials promised, and later provided,
greater access for Embassy and DEA officials to provincial officials in
Kunming-astride the main smuggling route-and expressed their desire
for greater exchange of intelligence on drug matters.
Despite appeals for clemency from Australia and the United Kingdom, in
July Malaysia executed two Australian men convicted of trafficking 179
grams of heroin. A 1983 amendment to Malaysia's drug-trafficking law
made the death penalty mandatory for possession of 15 grams or more of
heroin. Since the death penalty was first introduced in 1975, the Malaysian
Government has executed 38 people for drug trafficking, six of whom were
Singaporeans. Despite Australian Prime Minister Hawke's statement that
the executions were "barbaric," neither government expects that relations
will be adversely affected. The action-and its widespread media
coverage-will help publicize Malaysia's tough stand on drug abuse and
trafficking. Kuala Lumpur is also maintaining a high profile in the
international antidrug arena, fielding its Prime Minister as a candidate for
the Presidency of the 1987 UN Conference on Drug Abuse and
Trafficking, according to the US Mission in New York.
Southwest Asia Narcotics control officials in Pakistan in June apprehended an Army
major and accomplices attempting to smuggle approximately 200
kilograms of heroin from the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) to
Karachi by private vehicle, according to Embassy reporting. The seizure is
probably the largest single heroin "bust" in the country to date.
India has approved the establishment of a centralized Narcotics Control
Bureau (NCB) under the Ministry of Finance. B. V. Kumar-a rapidly
rising star known for aggressive revenue enforcement-has been confirmed
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as NCB director general,) Although details
of the new bureau have yet to be worked out, the organization undoubtedly
will bear Kumar's personal stamp. the government plans to
open NCB zone offices in Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, and Cochin,
primarily to crack down on heroin smuggling at major ports and airports.
The NCB has the potential to become more effective than the police or
customs because the bureau will have both an interagency coordinating
function and an exclusive focus on the drug problem.
Poppy cultivation and opium smuggling are under way in several remote,
mountainous districts in western Nepal.
probably in the larger towns of Nepal and in nearby India. Government
authorities make virtually no attempt at suppression throughout the region.
In fact, district and village level functionaries
support the opium trade as a generator of needed revenue. In addition,
local politicians of every stripe-including radical Communist dissidents-
encourage the drug trade either to finance their political activities or for
personal gain,
the Government of India
estimates that as much as 80 percent of the funding for the major Sri
Lankan Tamil insurgent groups comes from drug trafficking in South Asia
and Europe. The groups use Tamil expatriates in Europe, the Middle East,
South Asia, and North America to traffic narcotics into Western countries
and remit funds to buy arms and supplies. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) appears to be the militant group most heavily involved in
the drug trade. the LTTE's income
from drug trafficking runs into several million dollars each month. West
European governments are increasingly concerned about the "Tamil
connection." 600
Tamils were arrested abroad on drug trafficking charges in the past two
and a half years.
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despite a large seizure of South
American cocaine in July, the government has yet to initiate an effective
narcotics interdiction campaign. US Embassy officials report that more
pressing political and economic problems are hindering Cairo's antidrug
effort. Increased official support for the death penalty for convicted drug
traffickers and the appointment of a drug enforcement expert as governor
of Assiut-Egypt's major poppy growing and opium production region-
suggests, however, continued government resolve to fight the country's
growing drug problems.
Western Europe The French Government has named a no-nonsense policeman, Guy
Fougier, to head its interministerial mission responsible for coordinating
antidrug efforts and placed the mission under the Ministry of Justice. The
US Embassy suspects that these moves are not only a part of a general law-
and-order campaign by the Chirac government, but also an attempt to
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cooperate.
counter the growing drug problem in France and a sign that the
government intends to give the mission some muscle. The moves may also
indicate a policy shift away from prevention and rehabilitation to law
enforcement. A well-known law enforcement officer-who is not an expert
on narcotics problems-is unlikely to accept the mission's previous role as a
clearinghouse for information about the drug problem and more likely to
emphasize enforcement efforts. He may even be able to succeed where his
predecessors-who were magistrates-failed and get the Central Narcotics
Office of the National Police, the Paris Narcotics Squad, and Customs to
Nigerian traffickers are testing smuggling routes to the United States and
Europe through Ivory Coast and Liberia to avoid stepped-up security at
Murtala Muhammed airport in Lagos, US
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immediate threat to Ivorian law enforcement agencies. In a related
development, Nigerian and Ghanaian nationals are contracting with Ivory
Coast farmers to grow marijuana. West African traffickers are also
moving semirefined Bolivian cocaine from Brazil to Ghana for final
Embassy officials in Abidjan report that drug trafficking poses an
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