GUYANA: PROSPECTS FOR A LEFTIST COALITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00573R001001250004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 1, 1985
• Content Type: SNIE

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Director of Secret
C
l
entra
Intelligence
Guyana: Prospects for
a Leftist Coalition
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Secret
SNIE 87.2-85
April 1985
Copy 3 8 4
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SECRET
S N I E 87.2-85
GUYANA: PROSPECTS FOR
A LEFTIST COALITION
Information available as of 3 April 1985 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate,
which was approved by the National Foreign
Intelligence Board on that date.
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SECRET
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ......................................................................................
1
KEY JUDGMENTS ..............................................................................
3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................
7
The Political Setting .........................................................................
7
The People's National Congress ...................................................
7
The Military ..................................................................................
7
Organized Labor ...........................................................................
7
The Opposition .............................................................................
8
The Economy ....................................................................................
9
Dismal Economic Performance ...................................................
9
High Social Costs ..........................................................................
9
Relations With Moscow and Its Allies .............................................
9
Pressure for a Coalition Government ..........................................
9
Soviet Interests ..............................................................................
10
Cuban Role ....................................................................................
10
Other Actors ..................................................................................
11
Possibility of a Burnham-Jagan Coalition .......................................
13
Risks of a Coalition Government .................................................
13
The Military Perspective ..............................................................
13
Economic Calculations .................................................................
13
Political Impact .............................................................................
14
Impact on Other Foreign Actors .................................................
14
Prospects for Guyana With or Without a Coalition ......................
15
Grim Economic Outlook ..............................................................
15
Impact on Soviet and Cuban Interests ........................................
16
Indicators .......................................................................................
16
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SCOPE NOTE
Guyana, a relatively small and sparsely populated country on the
northeast shoulder of South America, has faced a drastic downturn in its
economy over the last several years. President Burnham, unable to
attract much Western aid and investment, has turned increasingly
toward the Soviet Bloc and Cuba for economic support. He also is
exploring an alliance with his Marxist-Leninist political opposition as a
means of obtaining potentially greater Communist assistance.
This Estimate briefly examines the political and economic setting
in Guyana. It then looks at Burnham's relations with Moscow, Havana,
and other Communist and radical countries, and considers the prospects
for expanded relations over the next year or so. It also discusses the pros-
pects for a political coalition with the Communist opposition and the
potential internal and external impact. Finally, it examines the longer
term prospects for Guyana, with or without a coalition, and the impact
of either alternative on Soviet and Cuban interests.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Since the loss of Grenada in 1983, Moscow and Havana have
moved to enhance relations with Guyana as part of their strategy for re-
building their influence in the Caribbean. As a result, the Soviets and
Cubans have renewed their longstanding effort to encourage Guyana's
longtime dictator, Forbes Burnham, to invite the leader of Guyana's
Communist Party, Cheddi Jagan, into a coalition government. Mean-
while, Guyana's worsening economy has prompted Burnham to look to
the USSR, Cuba, and other Communist countries for aid. Burnham has
begun coalition negotiations with Jagan, apparently as a means of
gaining foreign economic support and defusing domestic political
tensions.
Moscow and Havana so far have shown little inclination to provide
significant economic or military aid to Guyana. Relations are neverthe-
less expanding, and more substantial aid might be in the offing should a
coalition agreement be reached. The Soviet presence, which has
remained stable at about 70 people since 1982, is likely to grow
For their part, the Cubans have
courted Burnham more actively in the past year than at any time since
establishing relations in 1972. The Cuban presence has grown to about
80 officials, mainly civilian advisers working on new agricultural or
medical projects. the Cubans reportedly have
provided small arms tote Burnham regime. However, we believe that
Burnham-distrustful of Soviet/Cuban motives and aware of US,
Venezuelan, and Brazilian sensitivities-would be unlikely to permit
the Soviets or Cubans to have a large military or civilian presence in
Guyana
Meanwhile, other Communist states are getting more heavily
involved in Guyana. North Korea now has some 200 people in Guyana,
primarily engaged in various economic development projects. East
Germany recently reached a barter agreement and may have provided
limited military assistance. In addition, Bulgaria may become involved
in a major hydroelectric project. As in Grenada, such activity may
enhance Communist influence while precluding the need for large-scale
Soviet involvement.
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Burnham would probably agree to a coalition government with the
Communist Party if he concluded it would be to his net political and
economic advantage. We believe he would agree to a coalition in the
hope of:
- Extracting enough economic, and possibly military, aid from
the Soviets and Cubans to improve the economy and shore up
support among his Afro-Guyanese backers.
- Undermining Jagan's political standing by having him share the
blame for continued economic hardship and any subsequent
repressive measures, such as strike breaking, that may become
necessary.
We believe Burnham would want a coalition before the end of
1985, when he must call elections. Although he is already holding talks
with the Communists, prospects for a coalition remain doubtful,
primarily because the two sides have not yet been able to agree on a
meaningful compromise. Still we do not rule out the possibility that a
coalition could emerge before the end of the year.
Even if a coalition materializes, Jagan's party,
its membership
heavily Indo-Guyanese, would have little chance of gaining real
influence. Burnham not only is unwilling to share power, but would also
probably bend to pressure from the almost exclusively Afro-Guyanese
military establishment to restrict the Indo-Guyanese role. The military,
which is the key to Burnham's continued supremacy, is also suspicious
of Moscow and Havana because of their long association with Jagan and
his followers. Thus, while the military would probably welcome Soviet
Bloc arms, it would probably oppose a large Soviet or Cuban presence.
we believe the military might
intervene to prevent or overthrow a coalition government if it believed
that the Soviet Bloc and Cuba were gaining too much influence or that
Jagan's supporters were achieving dominant positions. In this case, we
believe the military's goal probably would be limited to establishing a
new civilian government committed to protecting its interests and
containing the Soviet and Cuban role. Such a government would be
unlikely to dismantle the statist economic structure or abandon Third
World rhetoric, but it probably would be more friendly to the United
States and more pragmatic in trying to resolve Guyana's economic
difficulties.
A Burnham-Jagan coalition would probably facilitate Soviet and
Cuban efforts to influence Guyanese and other regional leftists. The
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USSR clearly values Guyana as a supporter of Soviet causes in
international forums and as a participant in Soviet front organizations
and peace groups. Havana probably hopes to expand use of Guyana as a
meetingplace for regional leftists, as the regional distribution center for
Cuban propaganda, and for intelligence collection in the eastern
Caribbean. Guyana's location offers many of the same geographic
advantages to Havana as Grenada did as a potential site for air facilities
between Cuba and Africa, and the Cubans may be interested in gaining
access rights. For his part, Burnham might agree to selective use of
Guyanese air facilities by the Cubans, the Soviets, or their allies in
return for economic inducements, should they be offered at some future
date
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DISCUSSION
The Political Setting
1. Except for Paraguay's President Stroessner and
Cuba's President Castro, President Forbes Burnham
has been in power longer than anyone in the Western
Hemisphere. Although he has retained the trappings
of a parliamentary democracy, Burnham has ruled as
a dictator during his 20 years as leader of Guyana.
Burnham is Afro-Guyanese, and his regime has result-
ed in black domination of the country's political,
military, and economic spheres, even though Guyana's
East Indian community is numerically larger.' The
Guyanese leader has entrenched his black followers in
every key institution, including labor and the military.
The nation's mounting economic troubles, however,
are beginning to weaken Burnham's traditional sup-
port mechanisms
The Military
3. The almost exclusively Afro-Guyanese security
forces-military and paramilitary-are the key ele-
ment in Burnham's power base. To facilitate control of
the military, Burnham has split the security forces into
four competing entities: the Guyanese Defense Force,
the Guyanese People's Militia, the Guyanese National
Service, and the Guyanese Police Force. In addition,
the Guyanese leader uses a variety of techniques to
ensure loyalty, including personally approving the
appointment of all senior officers. Officers of all
services are indoctrinated politically and, before pro-
motion to captain, must swear an oath of personal
loyalty to Burnham. Despite the country's staggering
economic problems, he also has attempted to make
certain that military pay and benefits are provided
efficiently. ~
The People's National Congress
2. Burnham is the creator and undisputed leader of
the People's National Congress (PNC), a socialist-
oriented party that draws its support primarily from
the largely urban Afro-Guyanese. The party has
served as Burnham's principal mechanism for generat-
ing political support, playing on perceptions of blacks
that he is the only alternative to their subjugation by
the Indo-Guyanese ethnic majority. The party struc-
ture parallels that of the government and, under
Burnham's direction, the PNC establishes policy lines
and monitors the government's implementation of
those policies. Burnham maintains his absolute power
over the party structure by frequent shifts in assign-
ments, thereby establishing a climate of uncertainty
and preventing potential rivals from establishing a
power base. Most of the so-called factions within the
PNC have been created by Burnham to keep his
subordinates off balance.
Guyana's population at about
700,000. Slightly over 50 percent are Indo-Guyanese of East Indian
origin, and some 43 percent are Afro-Guyanese or blacks. A
sprinkling of Chinese, Portuguese, British, and Amerindians make
up the remainder{
4. Nevertheless, mounting budget deficits forced
Burnham to slash last year's budget of the Guyanese
Defense Force (GDF). As a result of the cutback, real
wages for the military plummeted, and
there was rising discon-
tent among all ranks. Even Burnham loyalists in the
GDF openly criticized the President during the past
yea By mid-
1984, Burnham had turned to the police to staff his
personal bodyguard-an indication of his concern
Organized Labor
5. Organized labor, with the exception of the Indo-
Guyanese sugar workers, has traditionally been a
strong base of support for Burnham. Nevertheless, a
number of unions hitherto susceptible to PNC direc-
tion have taken an increasingly independent path
since the government broke a six-week strike by
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Guyana's Armed Forces
We estimate the strength of the Guyanese defense
establishment to be about 6,400. The defense establish-
ment consists of several forces, including the Guyanese
Defense Force (GDF), the Guyanese People's Militia
(GPM), the Guyanese National Service (GNS), and the
Guyanese Police Force. The government could almost
double the size of the Defense Force if it ordered a
general mobilization. The Army has one understrength
infantry brigade with 2,250 men and a second brigade
that is probably used solely as a training unit. The GDF
also comprises a small Navy and Air Corps, with a
combined strength of 500. Most of the senior officers in
the GDF were trained by the British, and are reported
to be highly competent and professional. Since the early
1970s, GDF officers have received training in Brazil,
Cuba, East Germany. North Korea, the United States,
Paramilitary forces include the People's Militia,
which serves as the principal reserve force and has an
active strength of 1,775, including a permanent staff of
some 400 men. The youth-oriented National Service has
an estimated permanent staff of 1,200 and trains up to
2,000 recruits a year. Since 1974 an estimated 11,000 to
15,000 have been trained. A third paramilitary organi-
zation, the Guyanese Police Force, has a strength of
about 2,500. One of its elements is the Tactical Services
Unit, a battalion-size riot squad similiar to a light
infantry battalion. In a general mobilization, these
paramilitary organizations would probably be incorpo-
rated into GDF line units
Most of the weapons in the GDF inventory were
supplied by Brazil, North Korea, Yugoslavia, and the
United Kingdom. More recently, Guyana has ap-
proached the USSR and several Soviet Bloc countries for
arms.
and opposition elements ousted the PNC from control
of the umbrella Trades Union Congress-the nation's
sole collective bargaining agency-for the first time in
20 years
The Opposition
6. Burnham continues to benefit from the long-
standing disunity and ineffectiveness of Guyana's po-
litical opposition. The Marxist-Leninist People's Pro-
gressive Party (PPP), headed by Cheddi Jagan and
made up almost entirely of Indo-Guyanese, is the
official opposition party, with 10 of the 72 seats in
parliament. Not generally perceived as a serious threat
to the ruling party, the PPP is useful to Burnham as
"proof" that Guyana tolerates a free opposition. The
PPP's political domination prior to Guyana's last free
election in 1964 was based on Jagan's immense popu-
larity with the Indo-Guyanese poor
many outside political observers believe
Jagan is no longer a serious political force. He report-
edly participated in the rigged 1980 election mainly to
earn the official title of "opposition leader," and he
cooperates with the regime as often as he criticizes it.
In recent years, he has spurned efforts of other
opposition groups to form a united front against
Burnham.
7. Another Marxist party, the Working People's
Alliance (WPA), founded in the late 1970s, appeals for
support across racial lines and publicly demands a true
democratic process, including free elections and hu-
man rights. Burnham regarded the WPA as a poten-
tially serious threat and took early steps to hamstring
it The
murder of its leader in 1980 is widely believed by
Guyanese to have been directed by Burnham, and
further harassment by the government has stunted the
party's growth and effectively inhibited remaining
The military is capable of border surveillance and
maintaining internal security, but could not hold out for
more than a few days against, for example, a full-scale
invasion by Venezuela. The GDF's greatest weaknesses
are its lack of air defense and its limited logistic
capability
bauxite workers, most of them Afro-Guyanese, in the
spring of 1983. The massive layoffs that followed, in
which many of the strikers lost their jobs, left a legacy
of bitterness. Erosion of Burnham's control over labor
was underscored last September, when independent
8. virtually the
only other currently active opposition groups are the
recently formed Democratic Labor Movement party
and the Guyana Council of Churches. Both are rela-
tively moderate in the Guyanese context and probably
favor better relations with the United States. Never-
theless, they suffer from inadequate resources and so
far have been unable to generate meaningful support.
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We believe that, if Burnham disappeared from the
political scene, none of these organizations would
garner much influence in the near term.
The Economy
Dismal Economic Performance
agreed-upon fiscal and monetary targets; the last
agreement, in 1982, came unglued after only three
months. Burnham's refusal to undertake extensive
economic restructuring, including a steep devaluation
of the currency and a revival of the private sector, has
been a major obstacle in obtaining a new IMF accord.
Burnham
9. Despite Guyana's wealth of resources and official
claims of recent progress, the country's economy is in
shambles. We believe that in 1984 output plummeted
about 10 percent to barely 60 percent of the peak 1976
level. This represents the steepest economic decline of
any Latin American country over the past eight years.
Output of the chief export commodities-bauxite,
alumina, sugar, and rice-has been hampered by
adverse world trends, pervasive corruption, misman-
agement, and labor disputes. Burnham has responded
to the downward trend not by encouraging private
enterprise, but by expanding the state's control of the
economy. The private sector's share of production is
now only about 15 percent. At the same time, the low
level of exports and a chronic inability to obtain
budgetary support from international financial institu-
tions have forced Guyana to implement stringent
import restrictions.
10. The unfavorable performance of Guyanese ex-
ports has crippled its ability to finance the imports on
which its economy depends. In the struggle to balance
its international accounts, Georgetown has slashed
imports, exhausted its foreign reserves, and built up
large payment arrears. External debt, which stood at
$694 million at the end of 1982, climbed to $1.3 billion
by December 1984.
11. Guyana's public finances have deteriorated in
tandem with the country's mounting foreign payments
problems. The economic slump and a flourishing black
market have greatly reduced government revenues. At
the same time, rising interest payments, growing losses
in unprofitable public corporations, large consumer
subsidies, and long-delayed wage hikes have swelled
government expenditures. Since foreign financing has
almost completely dried up in recent years, the deficit
has been financed by borrowing from the domestic
banking system and by printing money. As a result the
inflation rate is now some 30 percent annually, while
the unemployment rate exceeds 25 percent.
12. Despite Guyana's grave economic plight, Burn-
ham has been unwilling to take sufficient austerity
measures to regain funding from international lenders.
Past International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs
have foundered on Guyana's repeated failures to meet
believes implementation of these measures would di-
rectly threaten his Afro-Guyanese power base-whose
loyalty he has ensured with favors, privileges, and jobs
in the public sector. Moreover, any revival of the
private sector would disproportionately benefit the
commerce-oriented Indo-Guyanese community. C
13. Because the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB) has attached fewer strings to its loans than other
potential Western donors, it is Guyana's only remain-
ing source of sizable foreign funds and the only
international lender with which Guyana is current in
its obligations. the IDB
last June planned project aid to Guyana worth $30-40
million annually during 1984 and 1985. The IDB also
continued work on a $40 million irrigation project. F-
High Social Costs
14. The unraveling of the economy has drastically
reduced living standards, and, according to reporting
from a variety of sources, basic survival increasingly
consumes the attention of most Guyanese. Endemic
shortages of food, drugs, transportation, electricity,
and water worsened in 1984. The educational system,
once the region's best, has disintegrated. The Guya-
nese traditionally have looked to emigration, not polit-
ical action, as the solution to their misery. As a result,
we believe that Burnham is increasingly aware that,
unless he can improve the country's economic per-
formance, he risks losing support even among the
Afro-Guyanese, who have long been his principal
backers
15. Burnham's relations with Cuba and the USSR
traditionally have been characterized by mutual suspi-
cions and distrust. Despite his leftist policies, the
Cubans and the Soviets have long viewed the Guya-
nese leader as a corrupt opportunist, and Burnham is
well aware that both countries would prefer to see
their ideological kinsman, Cheddi Jagan, in power.
Moscow and Havana are resigned to the political
reality of Burnham's firm grip on power, however,
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and, have long
advocated that he include the PPP in a national front
government
16. Recent trends, however, have generated greater
interest on both sides in expanded ties and a corre-
sponding renewed effort toward a coalition govern-
ment in Guyana. Recognizing the dim prospects of
obtaining economic help from the West, Burnham by
1982 began to turn increasingly toward the USSR and
its allies. Since the loss of Grenada in 1983, Moscow
and Havana have moved to enhance existing relations
with Georgetown as part of their strategy to rebuild
their position in the Caribbean. Consequently, accord-
ing to a variety of sources, Cuba and the USSR during
1984 renewed their push for a coalition government.
17. In our view, Burnham also may be encouraging
coalition pressure with an eye toward its effect on both
the West and Moscow. He may hope that the prospect
of Jagan's Communists returning to power would
prompt the United States to try to avert such a
development by offering Burnham incentives-such
as softer IMF terms
such a role could adversely affect Soviet relations with
neighboring Brazil and Venezuela, as well as Argenti-
na and Peru-states with which the USSR has signifi-
cant economic ties. Still, the Soviets will continue to
probe for new opportunities to develop influence in
Guyana.
and the PNC.
19. The USSR clearly values Guyana as a supporter
of Soviet causes in international forums and as a
participant in Soviet front organizations and peace
groups. Moscow has exploited such local leftist atti-
tudes as exist to its advantage, but has taken a cautious
approach in expanding its relations with Georgetown.
The Soviet presence, which has remained stable since
1982, stands at about 70 people. The Soviets have an
ally in Jagan's pro-Moscow PPP, and they also have
several supporters within the Burnham government
20. Despite its interest in promoting a leftist coali-
tion government, Moscow so far has been unwilling to
provide any significant economic aid to Guyana. The
Soviets traditionally have considered Guyana a poor
investment and trade risk because of its weak cred-
itworthiness. Moscow and Georgetown have discussed
barter arrangements that would use Guyana's bauxite
as the key commodity, but the preference of both sides
for hard currency has been a major obstacle in
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For the same reason, he may hope that
Venezuela and Brazil would step up their limited
economic assistance, and that Venezuela would be
more accommodating in resolving its territorial dis-
pute with Guyana. As for the Soviets, Burnham may
hope that they would abandon their parsimony in the
expectation of making progress in uniting leftist forces
in the region
18. Soviet objectives in Guyana generally parallel
those for Latin America as a whole, that is, to neutral-
ize or supplant US influence and to promote leftist
change. At the same time, the USSR does not want its
support of leftist groups to jeopardize more important
state interests. For this reason, Moscow may be wary
of too extensive an involvement with Guyana, because
22. Keenly aware of their political isolation in the
Caribbean, the Cubans view Guyana-in the after-
math of Grenada-as the best available base of opera-
tions to try to restore their credibility with regional
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leftists and to regain influence. In the past year,
Havana has courted the Burnham regime more active-
ly than at any time since relations were established in
Moreover, Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca fol-
lowed up with a five-day visit to Guyana in November
to discuss bilateral relations. Despite these overtures,
we believe that Castro continues to distrust the oppor-
tunistic Burnham, while Burnham still harbors suspi-
cions about Cuban contacts with his domestic opposi-
tion.
23. The Cuban presence in Guyana has grown from
some 55 people in 1983 to about 80 officials, and
it is likely to expand in the near
the majority are civilian advisers involved in
medical or agricultural projects, including
sugar and tobacco cultivation dairy production, and
cattle raisin .
24. Castro is likely to continue pressing for a larger
Cuban role in Guyana, primarily because it provides
him with the best available access to Eastern Carib-
bean leftists. Following the pattern previously used in
Grenada, Havana probably hopes to expand use of
Guyana as a meetingplace for regional leftists, as the
regional distribution center for Cuban propaganda,
and for intelligence collection on the Eastern Carib-
25. Cuba's economic problems and its distrust of
Burnham probably will limit its willingness to provide
substantial economic and political aid to Guyana in
return for Burnham's agreement to form a coalition
government. Havana is more likely to continue to
offer only small amounts of aid, security force train-
ing, and scholarships. Castro may hope that this
assistance, combined with additional Soviet aid and
Burnham's domestic political considerations, will be
enough to persuade the Guyanese leader to link up
with Jagan. Once a coalition is in place, Cuba may be
willing to provide more substantial assistance. F___1
ed in Guyana by a trade office, and
artillery
with a variety of aid projects, including an irrigation
scheme, a hydroelectric project, a glass factory, and
several health projects. The large North Korean mis-
sion in Georgetown provides a convenient base for
anti-Seoul and anti-US diplomatic and propaganda
activities. In May 1984, P'yongyang sent 12 military
instructors to train Guyana Defense Force personnel to
operate recently purchased howitzers and air defense
Nort Korean technicians are in Guyana in connection
200,
Other Actors
26. In the past year, Guyana has strengthened
relations with other Communist states. North Korea,
which has carefully cultivated Burnham's favor since
the mid-1970s in line with its worldwide competition
with South Korea, stepped up its activities during
1984. The North Korean presence now numbers over
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North
P)to Maharuma Atlantic
Qo`e Ocean
ay 1 Matthews Ridge
airfield
~ndaN e , / GEORGETOWN
UIBO
Mararuni
Boundary representation Is
not necessarily authoritative.
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REGION t
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GDR provided two small patrol boats to the Maritime
Corps of the GDF
some Guyanese
officers are already worried about what they see as
increased North Korean, Cuban, and Soviet influence
in Guyana. We believe the largely British-trained
officer corps is basically pro-Western,
ing to fund some of the construction costs of a
hydropower station, but work has yet to begin. China
maintains a small diplomatic mission in Georgetown,
and a few Chinese technicians are
Ministry of Economic Development.
29. Libya's presence in Guyana has been reduced
recently. Tripoli closed its People's Bureau in George-
town in early 1985, and
~ibya still has an Islamic Cultural
Center in Guyana and participates in two joint agricul-
tural ventures with Guyana.
Possibility of a Burnham-Jagan Coalition
Risks of a Coalition Government
30. Before agreeing to a coalition government,
Burnham would weigh the risks and benefits carefully.
He is not inclined to share power, and would want to
ensure that he does not undermine his support among
his black constituency, especially the military. He also
would want to determine the economic rewards and
dangers before making a final decision. On balance,
we believe that, if Burnham concludes that a coalition
government is to his net political and economic advan-
tage, he would probably go forward with one, possibly
before the end of the year.
The Military Perspective
31. Because the military establishment remains the
main prop shoring up the Burnham regime, the
Guyanese leader almost certainly would take the
military's views into account in considering the forma-
tion of any coalition government. Military leaders
probably would strongly disapprove of any meaning-
ful government role for Jagan and his followers. Aside
from fears rooted in ethnic animosity, many military
leaders reportedly view Moscow and Havana with
suspicion because of their longstanding ties to Jagan.
The rank and file probably reflect the pro-Western
sympathies that prevail in the population at large.
Such popular commanders as the Chief of Staff, Brig.
Gen. Norman MacLean, and Desmond Roberts of the
Defense Secretariat are reported to be pro-Western.F
32. The officer corps-overwhelmingly Afro-Guya-
nese-owes its privileged position to Burnham and the
PNC. Burnham would have to assure the officer corps
that its interests would continue to be protected and
that the Indo-Guyanese would not achieve any posi-
tions of real power. While the military would be likely
to welcome Soviet Bloc arms and technical assistance,
the officer corps probably would oppose a large Cuban
or Soviet presence. They would fear Communist ties to
the PPP, as well as the danger of provoking US
intervention.
33. Should Burnham and Jagan agree to a coalition,
we believe the armed forces might intervene if they
believed that Jagan supporters were achieving domi-
nant positions or that the Soviet and Cuban roles were
becoming too influential
Economic Calculations
34. Burnham would also give strong consideration
to economic factors before making a final decision on
a coalition. He especially would weigh the benefits
and risks of Western versus Soviet Bloc aid. As matters
stand, an agreement with the IMF probably would
reopen other Western financing and produce faster
economic results than Soviet Bloc aid, but Burnham
sees an agreement as a threat to his power base. An
IMF program not only would impose austerity on his
black supporters but also could bring a revival of the
Indo-Guyanese-dominated private sector.
35. Should substantial Western aid, with or no
strings materialize, Burnham probably would be less
inclined to pursue a coalition. Perceiving that such aid
is unlikely, Burnham appears to have resigned himself
to living with a depressed economy indefinitely.
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36. The Soviet Union and Cuba may already have
agreed to provide increased economic and military aid
in return for Burnham's agreement to pursue a coali-
tion. While we have no direct evidence of such a deal,
we have noted increased, but so far limited, Commu-
nist aid activities over the past year.
37. Burnham also might want to bring Jagan into
the government in order to have his opponent share
the blame for continued economic hardship. For
example, Burnham might offer Jagan some trouble-
some ministry, such as labor or agriculture, for the
purpose of making him bear the onus of further
repressive measures, including strike breaking, that
may become necessary as the economy continues to
deteriorate. Using such tactics, Burnham would hope
to limit political damage to his own party and erode
Jagan's already faltering support among the Indo-
Guyanese.
Political Impact
38. Even if Burnham decides on a coalition govern-
ment, we see little chance for Jagan's party to gain
power. Burnham has made several pro-Moscow or pro-
Cuban appointments to high government and party
posts during the past year, aimed partly at diminishing
Jagan's value to Moscow by increasing his own. These
appointments include:
- Ranji Chandisingh as PNC General Secretary,
Deputy Prime Minister, and Vice President.
- Richard Van West-Charles as "Senior Minister"
of Health and Public Welfare.
- Halim Majeed as Deputy Political Adviser in the
Office of the President.
Like many other Indo-Guyanese elevated by Burn-
ham, Chandisingh and Majeed defected from the PPP.
None of these functionaries, however, has any substan-
tial base of independent support.
and, over time, their broader strategic interests might
be better served as well. Guyana would probably give
even stronger political support for Soviet-Cuban posi-
tions, serve as a model of unity for the region's
splintered leftist groups, and provide a more effective
focal point for support to radicals in the Eastern
Caribbean.
40. We judge that Burnham-shaken by the US
intervention in Grenada-would continue to monitor
Cuban and Soviet activities closely. Because of US,
Venezuelan, and Brazilian sensitivities, and Burnham's
underlying mistrust of Cuban and Soviet motives, he
would be unlikely to allow Havana or Moscow to have
a large military or civilian presence. A coalition
arrangement also might put Cuba and the USSR in a
better position to take advantage of the political
vacuum likely to occur with the eventual departure of
Burnham from power. Should such a departure occur
in the near term, however, we doubt that party and
government officials linked to Moscow and Havana
would have sufficient influence to be able to control
the outcome of a leadership struggle.
Impact on Other Foreign Actors
41. Since Venezuelan President Lusinchi took office
in February 1984, his government has sought to
improve relations with Guyana. These have long been
strained by a territorial dispute over Guyana's Esse-
quibo region. The Venezuelan Foreign Minister visited
Guyana in February 1985, and there are indications
that Venezuela may significantly reduce its territorial
demands. Strong nationalistic sentiments in both coun-
tries probably will hamper progress on this issue,
however, and we believe a near-term resolution is
unlikely. Nevertheless, economic relations may in-
crease over the next year as Caracas attempts to
expand its influence in Guyana.
aligned countries is growing
42. The Lusinchi government recently has ex-
pressed concern that the presence and influence in
Guyana of advisers from Cuba and other Soviet-
The formation of a Burn am-Jagan
39. We believe the formation of a Burnham-Jagan
coalition government would make it somewhat easier
for the USSR and Cuba to influence Guyanese affairs
coalition-as opposed to mere talk of future possibili-
ties-would be likely to deepen Venezuela's anxiety
about Communist political inroads because of Jagan's
ties to the Soviet Union. A governing role for Jagan
would, in our view, especially alarm the Venezuelan
military and the private sector.
43. Brazil's relatively recent interest in Guyana
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"soft underbelly" and echoed the military's longstand-
ing concern that a neighboring country might come
under Cuban influence or Communist rule. During
1982, the Brazilians followed up sending
their Foreign Minister to Georgetown and hosting
Burnham in Brasilia. The two countries signed agree-
ments to cooperate in energy, mining, agriculture, and
other areas. Brazil also authorized a $10 million arms
sale, although so far only a few small arms reportedly
have been delivered.
believe Brasilia may be willing to offer trade and aid
incentives to bolster Burnham and to diminish the
prospect of his turning to Jagan or Havana for support.
For their part, the Guyanese, who in the past generally
ignored Brazil, are now giving it extensive press
coverage. Following Brazil's recent presidential elec-
tion, Guyana sent a high-level delegation to the inau-
guration to discuss improved bilateral relations. This
suggests that Burnham may be looking toward Brasilia
as a source of more extensive economic support.
Prospects for Guyana With or Without
a Coalition
Grim Economic Outlook
45. Regardless of whether Burnham decides on a
coalition government or not, the outlook for Guyana's
economy is poor. The progressive deterioration of
capital stock, emigration of skilled labor, and declining
farmland fertility will make it especially difficult to
turn the economy around quickly. In addition, inter-
national market trends point to another bleak year for
Guyana's major foreign exchange earners. The deple-
tion of domestic rice stocks last year is likely to leave
little available for export this year, even if the rice
harvest is better than anticipated. Sugar production
will continue to suffer from prolonged shortages of
fertilizers. Foreign exchange constraints and lagging
world demand also point to continued problems in the
bauxite industry. Output and sales of refractory-grade
bauxite may improve, however, under a February
agreement with a US firm to provide $80 million in
new investment, as well as technical and marketing
assistance
46. At present, the prospects are dim that Guyana
will obtain an IMF agreement, and thereby regain
access to other Western concessional and commercial
lending. Guyana's Finance Minister, in his annual
budget presentation to Parliament, said that, even if a
strenuous effort were made, Guyana would be $9
million short of paying off its debt to the Fund in
1985.
47. In these circumstances, the hardships of the vast
majority of Guyanese are likely to deepen this year as
supplies of basic foods, particularly rice and milk, and
services continue to shrink. Moreover, Trinidad's
growing economic difficulties apparently are prompt-
ing it to reconsider its oil supply arrangement with
Guyana. Should Trinidad harden its credit terms,
Guyana's already inadequate fuel and electricity sup-
plies probably would be further reduced.
48. In our view, the likely response to the deepen-
ing misery of the ordinary Guyanese, whether black or
Indo-Guyanese, will continue to be emigration, not
rebellion. Nonetheless, there may be increasing labor
unrest, particularly if Burnham is unable to regain
control of the Trades Union Congress.
49. Even if Burnham decides against entering into a
coalition with Jagan to diffuse economic discontent,
we see little prospect of his removal from power
during the period of this Estimate. His sudden death,
either from natural causes or violence-always possi-
ble but not probable in the near term-would be
likely, in our view, to create a political vacuum. The
Constitution is deliberately vague on the issue of
formal succession and, for tactical reasons, Burnham
has refused to designate a political heir. Should a void
in the leadership occur, we would expect most of the
top military chiefs to favor a PNC faction headed by
Vice President Hamilton Green, or another relative
moderate, over leftist adviser McDavid.
50. We believe the military-in line with the
dictates of its British traditions-would return to its
constitutional role once a government pledged to
protect Afro-Guyanese and military interests had been
installed. Should the country's economic distress spark
civil unrest that threatened to become unmanageable,
however, the military might perceive that it could
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handle the situation better than a civilian government.
In addition, should the various military groups be
unable to agree on which of the competing PNC
factions to choose, the security forces might look to
their own ranks for a compromise candidate or a
popular military leader might try to seize power for
himself. None of these eventualities, however, would
be likely to benefit the PPP. The overwhelming
preponderance of Afro-Guyanese in the security forces
virtually guarantees that the result would be a regime
dedicated to Afro-Guyanese supremacy.
Impact on Soviet and Cuban Interests
51. Soviet and Cuban interests in Guyana will not
be substantially hurt even if a Burnham-Jagan coali-
tion does not occur in the near term. Both countries
are likely to continue to press for closer relations with
the Burnham government. Over the longer term, in
the absence of a coalition Havana and Moscow would
be forced to maintain somewhat more circumspect
contacts with Jagan's party, and their room to maneu-
ver Guyanese allies into influential positions in a post-
Burnham government might be reduced. We believe
the Soviets and Cubans, nonetheless, will continue to
look for opportunities to influence Guyanese affairs at
low costs and to develop Guyana as a center for
eastern Caribbean activities.
52. The loss of Grenada as a possible site for access
to air facilities probably has increased Soviet and
Cuban interest in Guyana, whose location offers many
of the same geographic advantages. Cuba briefly used
Guyana as a refueling point for flights to Angola in the
mid-1970s, and Georgetown is about
500
nautical
miles closer to Africa than Grenada.
We
have no
evidence that the Cubans or the Soviets have request-
ed access rights to Guyanese air facilities, but this is
almost certainly of interest to them. If Burnham were
approached on the subject, he might agree to selective
use of such facilities in return for economic induce-
ments.
Indicators
53. So far, neither the Soviets nor the Cubans have
taken steps indicating that they have assigned Guyana
a high priority.
The initiation of activities,
such as the following, would indicate a high probabili-
ty that such an increase had occurred:
- A significantly enhanced Soviet or Cuban politi-
cal or economic presence in Guyana.
- Initiation of a Soviet or Cuban military advisory
presence.
- Soviet or Cuban efforts to influence or control
Guyana's military or security forces.
- The commitment of Soviet or Cuban economic
or military aid on a large scale.
- Promulgation of bilateral agreements with Mos-
cow in a wide range of areas, such as science,
culture, ideology, and media.
- Significant Soviet or Cuban involvement in the
expansion of Guyanese airfield or port facilities
and utilization of such facilities to support
Havana's or Moscow's policy interests.
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