NICARAGUA: SUPPORT FOR REGIONAL INSURGENCY AND SUBVERSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00573R000901150004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 1, 1985
• Content Type: SNIE

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Director of Central Intelligence
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Nicaragua: Support for
Regional Insurgency
and Subversion
Key Judgments
Secret
~~AS t " E BILE COPY "'UO NOT GIVE OUT
OA MARK ON
SNIE 83.3-2-85
March 1985
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
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PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
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ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL ...- This Information Has Been Authorized for
Release to ...
FGI- Foreign Government Information
STAT
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S N I E 83.3-2-85
NICARAGUA: SUPPORT FOR
REGIONAL INSURGENCY
AND SUBVERSION
KEY JUDGMENTS
The full text of this Estimate
is being published separately
with regular distribution.
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Secret
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence' Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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SCOPE NOTE
This NIE is a follow-on to SNIE 83.3-85, Nicaragua: Prospects for
Sandinista Consolidation, February 1985 and NIE 83.1-85, El
Salvador: The Outlook for the Duarte Government, March 1985
Those Estimates examined the future outlook for those countries in
detail, as well as the implications of continuing Sandinista support for
the Salvadoran insurgency. This Estimate provides additional informa-
tion on the extent of Nicaraguan support for regional insurgents and
subversive groups.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Nicaragua's support for insurgents in El Salvador and the rest of
Central America remains an integral part of Sandinista foreign policy.
Nicaragua also has established ties with other revolutionary groups
throughout the hemisphere, developing a more sophisticated network
and coordinating its activities more closely with Cuba.
Nicaraguan support remains a critical factor in sustaining the
Salvadoran insurgency. Nonetheless, there appears to have been some
reduction of materiel support over the past year, probably as the result
of several factors:
- Managua's growing problems with its own insurgency and
continued direct and indirect US pressure.
- The assessment by Castro and the Sandinistas that, in view of
President Duarte's election and the increasing capabilities of the
Salvadoran military, insurgent prospects for a near-term victory
have declined.
- The need for greater discretion created by the Manzanillo and
Contadora negotiations, which focused greater attention on
Managua's support for insurgents.
- Internal guerrilla logistic problems in El Salvador
Nevertheless, convincing evidence of continued shipments from
Nicaragua by sea, land, and air indicates that, while Managua may shift
its activities and deliveries to minimize its own vulnerability or husband
occasionally scarce resources, it has an abiding commitment to the
maintenance of the insurgency in El Salvador. Indeed, Managua's role
as a communications center and training hub for the Salvadorans has re-
mained constant during the last 12 months. We believe that, over the
long run, once the Sandinistas feel more secure, support for the
Salvadoran insurgents can be increased.
Nicaraguan activities elsewhere in the Central American region
provide other examples of training and arms support for radical groups,
generally typified by close cooperation with the Cubans. The establish-
ment of communications and broadcast sites in Nicaragua in 1983 and
1984 for Guatemalan guerrilla factions parallels early communications
support for the Salvadorans. In Honduras, the Sandinistas have used
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infiltration teams in an attempt to establish an insurgency and pressure
the Honduran Government. Nicaragua also has provided arms and
training to the orthodox Costa Rican Communist party
Nicaraguan training support of other radicals in Latin America has
expanded in the last year and, on the basis of reporting from a wide va-
riety of sources, appears to be closely coordinated with Cuban efforts.
Training courses in Cuba and Nicaragua are frequently complemen-
tary, and leftists from Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Colombia,
Ecuador, Chile, and the Dominican Republic have received instruction
in the two countries. Many of these contingents receive combat
experience in Nicaragua before returning to their home countries. The
cooperation extends to training by Cuban instructors of regional
insurgents at Nicaraguan facilities. Nicaragua also reportedly acts as an
arms conduit to several of the countries cited above.
In Costa Rica and Honduras, where support has been more
concerted, the Sandinistas probably hope to gain leverage against the
governments. In more distant countries, where opportunities for suc-
cessful revolution are less promising or where Nicaragua has little if any
real influence, the Sandinistas have nonetheless maintained contact and,
in certain cases, have actively supported radical leftists. In these areas,
Sandinista involvement has demonstrated revolutionary solidarity; Ma-
nagua also probably welcomes foreign radicals as a small but enthusias-
tic source of troops for their counterinsurgency effort
Intelligence gaps on Nicaraguan export activities are of concern to
the Intelligence Community
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