SOUTH AFRICA'S CHANGING POLICY AGENDA: IMPLICATIONS FOR US-SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00573R000801070005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 1, 1985
• Content Type: SNIE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP87T00573R000801070005-3
Special National Intelligence Estimate
South Africa's Changing Policy
Agenda: Implications for
US-South African Relations
Key Judgments
WARNING: The material in this document is sensi-
tive. Distribution of this Estimate is strictly limited
to those officials who require access to the subject
matter for the performance of their duties
COPY 3 3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP87T00573R000801070005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP87T00573R000801070005-3
O
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
NFIBONLY- NFIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL...- This Information Has Been Authorized for
Release to ...
FGI- Foreign Government Information
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP87T00573R000801070005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP87T00573R000801070005-3
SNIE 73-85/L1
SOUTH AFRICA'S CHANGING POLICY
AGENDA: IMPLICATIONS FOR
US-SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS
KEY JUDGMENTS
The full text of this Estimate
is being published separately
with limited distribution.
WARNING: The material in this document is sensitive.
Distribution of this Estimate is strictly limited to those
officials who require access to the subject matter for the
performance of their duties
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP87T00573R000801070005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP87T00573R000801070005-3
0
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and
the Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
The Department of Commerce
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP87T00573R000801070005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP87T00573R000801070005-3
KEY JUDGMENTS
Changed perspectives and policies in Pretoria are likely to continue
straining US-South African bilateral relations. We believe this deterio-
ration will continue for the next several months as Washington and
Pretoria-both under increasing political pressure at home-react to
each other's statements and actions. There is a reasonable likelihood,
however, that after a few months renewed cooperation on matters of
shared interest will resume. Nevertheless, given South Africa's volatile
domestic and regional problems, any present judgment must be tenta-
tive, and we do not rule out a sharper deterioration that could last for a
longer period.
While the freedom of action of the Botha government to undertake
internal actions that would ease the strain in bilateral relations is
limited-given its preoccupation with restoring domestic order-it
could pursue certain actions that would have this effect. The most
fundamental of these would be to make substantial progress in resolving
the issue at the root of domestic disorder in South Africa: the exclusion
of blacks from national political life. One key development would be
winning the agreement of Zulu Chief Minister Buthelezi and other
major black leaders to participate in the government's reform process.
Approval of Buthelezi's plan for multiracial administration of Natal
Province would help, but Buthelezi and others have also made clear that
the government must give a statement of intent, recognize South
African citizenship for all blacks, and release the imprisoned African
National Congress (ANC) leader Nelson Mandela. New South African
Government actions and reforms that would essentially meet these
conditions would diminish opposition to the government and be a
positive stimulus to bilateral relations.
Pretoria's perceptions of US statements and actions are also
important to restoration of cooperative relations. The Botha administra-
tion appreciates that Washington condemns apartheid and desires
sociopolitical change in South Africa, but it is sensitive to US actions that
derive from that condemnation, such as possible new economic sanc-
tions. Successful efforts to block or diminish such proposed new
sanctions would alleviate South African concern. Continued efforts by
the United States to persuade the surrounding states that the presence of
ANC guerrillas fosters insecurity, and consequent aggressive behavior,
in Pretoria would speak to Pretoria's perception that Washington does
not understand its legitimate concerns. Renewed efforts to assist the
1
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP87T00573R000801070005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP87T00573R000801070005-3
0
Mozambique Government and encourage additional European support
would respond to frequent complaints by South Africa that the West
has not helped it to strengthen the Nkomati Accord as a key element in
regional stability. Similarly in Angola, any action by the United States
that would improve the prospects for Cuban troop withdrawal or an
accommodation between the ruling Popular Movement for the Libera-
tion of Angola (MPLA) and the insurgent National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA) would also be seen as underscoring
US appreciation of broad security concerns in southern Africa.
In the 1983-84 period, the South African Government pursued
policies that acknowledged the United States as an important interlocu-
tor in regional events. Examples include the Nkomati and Lusaka
agreements with Mozambique and Angola in 1984. Pretoria also
appeared to pay greater heed to US suggestions, criticisms, and quiet
pressures to speed domestic political and social reforms. The govern-
ment's willingness to undertake new initiatives was based in part on its
reading of the attitudes of the new US administration, the recognized
utility of US diplomacy in resolving persistent regional problems,
increasing concern over Soviet Bloc threats, and the belief that conser-
vative governments in Washington as well as London could offer a
unique opportunity to blunt South Africa's growing international
isolation.
Revised and changed South African perceptions of regional events
and domestic pressures have led Pretoria to policy adjustments in 1985.
Domestically, it has become preoccupied with the need to reassert order
over its black population and reassure its white electorate in the face of
black protests, riots, strikes, and general dissidence.
Regionally, the South African Government has lowered its expecta-
tions as to the usefulness of collaboration with US regional diplomatic
efforts, and it has moved to reassert its interests through unilateral
actions, including a return to overtly coercive actions such as the June
1985 raids into Botswana and Angola. Pretoria sees the Namibia/Angola
negotiations as at an impasse and is disappointed that the Lusaka
Agreement and the subsequent South African withdrawal from Angola
were not followed by any agreement by the MPLA to patrol the
Namibian-Angolan border to control incursions by the South-West
Africa People's Organization (SWAPO).
Foremost among Pretoria's responses are increased and heavyhand-
ed efforts to curb protest and intimidate dissenters, to strike at the ANC,
both internally and regionally, and to continue efforts to win over
leaders of black opinion in order to persuade them to begin consulta-
tions with the Botha government and participate in the government-
ordered political process. Relations with neighboring states as well as
2
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP87T00573R000801070005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP87T00573R000801070005-3
international relations have been subordinated to these domestic con-
cerns. Heightened white resentment of Western criticism and threats of
sanctions have reduced the Botha government's receptivity to US and
Western demarches and attempted interventions to change specific
South African domestic actions. While it still desires constructive
relations with Washington, Pretoria's expectations in terms of using the
United States to break out of isolation or to advance its regional security
interests have been diminished and may be further reduced if Washing-
ton should increase its criticism or even invoke sanctions.
During the next 12 months, several volatile factors could work to
further strain US-South African bilateral relations. These include:
- The South African Government's determination to regain con-
trol over the increasingly militant black population, leading to
use of repressive tactics that in turn would provoke new outcries
in the West and demands on Washington to take punitive
actions.
- A continuing South African recession that hits hardest at the
black population by raising unemployment and cutting govern-
ment services.
- Heightened concern in South Africa for its sovereignty, which
could cause greater scrutiny or interdiction of official and
private US efforts to fund and promote activities inside the
country. US programs that provide assistance to education,
human rights groups, and nonwhite trade unions could suffer.
- Continuing ANC and SWAPO programs of sabotage and terror-
ism that will generate demands among the government's most
important constituencies to strike back at home and in the
region.
At the same time, however, other factors will work to limit the
bilateral fallout and stabilize relations. These include:
- The Botha government's continuing recognition that it must
avoid total isolation from the West, a view shared by the
increasingly influential business community. Concern about the
psychological effect of Western sanctions and increased isolation
on white citizens also will temper South African reactions.
- The Botha government's continuing implementation of socio-
political reform and pursuit of dialogue with black opinion
leaders, including even discreet contacts with ANC President
Tambo. This will work to Pretoria's favor even if talks do not
bear immediate fruit.
3
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP87T00573R000801070005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP87T00573R000801070005-3
C n
-- US and Western dependence on South African minerals as well
as South Africa's need for Western markets, which will not
lessen in the next 12 months.
The concern shared by Pretoria and Washington about Soviet
Bloc activities in Africa and their common goals of circumscrib-
ing and rolling back Soviet advances.
- The increased diplomatic interaction and cooperative exchanges
with some African states, particularly the Frontline States,
which South Africa's diplomatic efforts have brought are gains
that the regime will be reluctant to forsake. They provide a
variety of opportunities for South Africa to exercise influence
and seek to achieve its regional and domestic goals through
behind-the-scenes exchanges with black African leaders.
Whether relations stabilize after some months or continue to
deteriorate, the current attenuation of US-South African relations
contains important implications for the United States. Over the next
several months:
Pretoria will become increasingly nonreceptive to US advice,
requests, pressures, and efforts to consult.
- There will be increasing domestic pressure on the Botha
government to retaliate against US criticism and possible sanc-
tions, but Pretoria will attempt to defuse such pressures pri-
marily by rhetoric. The harassment or interdiction of official US
programs such as scholarship, human rights, or trade union
financial aid programs cannot be ruled out.
- The momentum for voluntary disinvestment by US companies
in South Africa is likely to accelerate, reducing US leverage and
weakening a significant force for nonviolent reform in South
Africa.
- Continuing heavyhanded repression by South Africa of domes-
tic dissent and attacks on ANC facilities outside its borders will
create new pressures on Washington to "punish" South Africa.
At a minimum, new UN Security Council resolutions proposing
Chapter VII mandatory sanctions may be expected.
Any new restrictions on US nuclear technology transfer to South
Africa could derail discussions concerning further increase of
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) surveillance and
safeguarding of South African nuclear productions
4
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP87T00573R000801070005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP87T00573R000801070005-3
Secret
Secret
0
0
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP87T00573R000801070005-3