SOVIET MILITARY SUPPORT TO ANGOLA: INTENTIONS AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00573R000801010002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 1, 1985
• Content Type: SNIE

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Director ?)t "lop ,ecret
( cntra
inicIIigc,
Soviet Military Support
to Angola: nt ant ons
and Prospects
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cret
SNIE 71/11-85
SOVIET MILITARY SUPPORT
TO ANGOLA: INTENTIONS
AND PROSPECTS
Information available as of 24 October 1985 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board
on that date.
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Top Secret
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 7
The Soviets and Angola .................................................................... 7
Moscow's Longstanding Commitment ........................................ 7
1983-84-A Military Turning Point ............................................ 7
FAPLA's 1985 Offensive .................................................................. 8
The Soviet Role in the Offensive ..................................................... 10
Soviet Relations With the MPLA .................................................... 12
The South African Dimension ......................................................... 12
Outlook: Six to 12 Months ................................................................ 12
Hold, Consolidate, and Prepare for the Next Round ................ 12
The 1986 Offensive ...................................................................... 13
Implications of Future FAPLA Success ...................................... 13
Prospects for UNITA .................................................................... 13
Implications for the United States ................................................... 15
The 1985 Offensive ...................................................................... 15
Further FAPLA Gains .................................................................. 15
Future UNITA Gains ................................................................... 15
ANNEX: The Soviet Military Advisory Group in Angola ................. 17
in
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SCOPE NOTE
The recent offensive in Angola by the MPLA regime against the
UNITA insurgents attained some notable success. This Estimate will
examine whether the improvement in the MPLA military's perfor-
mance is attributable to increased Soviet material support and greater
involvement by Soviet military advisers. It will assess prospects for
combat over the next 12 months and examine likely outcomes and the
Soviet military role. The possibility of a Soviet-South African military
confrontation will be examined in these scenarios.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
We believe that the improved performance of the Angolan Army
against UNITA insurgents this year probably reflects in part an
increased Soviet role in the planning and direction of the recent
offensive as well as the effects of large amounts of Soviet arms delivered
since 1983. Although comprehensive evidence is lacking to substantiate
UNITA and South African allegations of this expanded role in the
recent offensive, we believe that this upgrade in Soviet military activity
is logical on the basis of the failure of the Angolan Armed Forces
(FAPLA) to perform credibly in offensives over the last nine years.
The probable increase in Soviet military involvement in the
Angolan war should be kept in perspective. We believe it represents:
- A logical expansion of the long-established advisory role played
by the 1,000 to 1,200 Soviet military advisers in Angola.
I'he increase probably
amounts to greater involvement of Soviet advisers in planning
operations as well as more demanding supervision of FAPLA-
executed combat and logistic operations.
- A sense of impatience with Cuban and MPLA surrogates and
clients, who for nine years have failed to inflict a serious reverse
on UNITA, which until recently had been increasingly success-
ful in the field.
- A Soviet judgment that the risks and costs of an increased role in
the planning and direction of the offensive were low.
- The determination of the present Soviet leadership to continue
to protect the Soviet investment in Angola's Marxist-Leninist
regime.
The enhanced Soviet role does not represent, in our view, a
takeover of the direction of the counterinsurgency effort, nor is it
intended to gain some short-term advantage in East-West negotiations.
We do not believe allegations of actual Soviet-particularly pilot-
participation in combat beyond a possible episodic occurrence
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During the recent offensive, the Angolan Army was able to
penetrate insurgent-held territory, overcome UNITA forces in battles,
and take positions defended by insurgents-goals it had largely failed to
achieve in previous offensives. The Angolan Army attacks were halted
by UNITA counterattacks and unprecedented South African airstrikes.
Angolan Army military gains, however, do not presage the demise of
UNITA-which is far from beaten-but they will improve the govern-
ment forces' morale and heighten Luanda's confidence that it can, over
the long run, handle the UNITA challenge.
Although the chances of a Soviet-South African confrontation rose
during the offensive, we do not believe the Soviets attempted to
interdict South African aircraft. The Soviets seem to have underestimat-
ed Pretoria's willingness to use its airpower to halt the Angolan advance.
They apparently chose not to challenge the South Africans, judging that
perhaps they did not have air supremacy.
FAPLA will probably use the next few months to consolidate its
gains, rest its troops, and prepare for next year's operations. The Soviets
will assist them in assessing the results of the recent offensive, imple-
menting necessary changes, and improving training and recruitment.
Moscow is also likely to replace weapons lost by Luanda, provide
additional arms aid, including air defense weapons intended to deter
South Africa from future activity over Angola, and may provide
additional advisers.
The political relations between Moscow and Luanda are not likely
to constrain current or projected Soviet military assistance. While
differences exist between the MPLA leadership and the USSR and
periodically flare up, we have not seen these differences affect the
military relationship. The MPLA is likely to continue to pursue the
military option against UNITA over the next 12 months, thereby
enhancing this relationship.
We believe the preferred Soviet counter to South African air
involvement will be a southward and eastward expansion of the
integrated air defense line running from Namibe to Menongue. This
combination of modern surface-to-air missiles, antiaircraft artillery,
radars, and airfields with high-performance fighters has already had a
deterrent effect on South African operations. As a result, we expect to
see continued improvements around Cuito Cuanavale in southeastern
Angola as this area is incorporated into the air defense network, perhaps
to include the permanent assignment of advanced fighter aircraft there.
We believe the extensive Soviet advisory involvement will continue
as Luanda renews its offensive against UNITA in the spring or summer
of 1986. Luanda may well again target Mavinga, and it may also
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attempt to retake UNITA-held areas of Moxico Province. Moscow,
which believes its essential interests are served by Luanda's continuing
military dependence on the USSR, will probably perceive no need to in-
tervene directly in the conflict and risk a wider war, as long as FAPLA
is doing reasonably well, and it may counsel the Angolans to forgo
operations near the Namibian border to avoid provoking South Africa.
If the government forces do directly threaten UNITA's survival,
the South Africans are likely to respond with airstrikes and possibly
commit some of their unconventional or reconnaissance forces. Angolan
pressure on Moscow for more direct assistance would be certain to
increase. We believe the USSR would prefer to avoid direct confronta-
tion with South Africa, but the Soviets would consider taking a more di-
rect role in operations if they believed the South Africans posed an
immediate threat to the viability of major FAPLA units. We believe the
Soviets would countenance use of Cuban-flown combat aircraft to
defend against expanded South African air operations. Beyond episodic
actions, however, we do not believe Moscow would allow Soviet pilots to
become regularly engaged in combat operations.
UNITA could abandon semiconventional warfare and rely more on
guerrilla tactics, as the South Africans are advising. Such actions could
at least reduce the effectiveness of FAPLA's next offensive and might
set the stage for a UNITA reversal of this year's losses. A more active
Cuban role in air and ground operations and increased Soviet advisory
involvement in coordinating counterinsurgency operations would be-
come more likely in this eventuality.
The Soviets will seek to gain propaganda advantage from Luanda's
military successes and will continue their efforts to discredit UNITA as
a puppet of South Africa and imperialism. Moscow is likely to seek to
isolate Angola from substantive discussions in East-West diplomacy,
repeating its assertion that the United States and the USSR have no vital
interests there and that southern African questions should not be
allowed to complicate more important issues in the bilateral
relationship.
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DISCUSSION
The Soviets and Angola
Moscow's Longstanding Commitment
1. Moscow has been the primary source of external
support for the Popular Movement for the Liberation
of Angola (MPLA) since the early 1960s, when it began
funneling arms to the MPLA for actions against the
Portuguese. Since Angolan independence in 1975, the
Soviet Bloc has supplied Angola with over $4 billion in
military aid, along with about 1,500 to 1,700 advisers
and 35,000 Cuban military personnel (see figure 1). In
addition, the Soviets have provided, by their own
standards, a high level of economic aid and have
extended extensive political support to the MPLA. In
return, Moscow has gained access to military facilities,
obtained a reliable supporter of Soviet positions in
international forums, and acquired a Third World
model of Soviet-style "socialist oriented" development.
Figure 1 Number
Angola: USSR and East European Advisers,
1976-85-
2,000
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2. This generally close relationship has not been
without strains. Issues such as the extent and quality of
Soviet development assistance, the terms of repayment
of Angolan financial obligations to the USSR, the need
to open Angola to greater Western aid and investment,
and the advisability of participating in US-brokered
regional negotiations have produced tensions. None-
theless, the MPLA's need for continued military sup-
port and Moscow's intention to play a role in southern
Africa have underpinned the relationship and prevent-
ed these tensions from developing into more serious
divisions
1983-84-A Military Turning Point
3. In spite of substantial Soviet Bloc aid since 1976,
including the assignment of Soviet military advisers
Angolan military forces
have not enjoyed great success in recent years. Begin-
ning in 1978, South African forces staged several
incursions into Angola against Southwest Africa Peo-
ple's Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas and held a
"buffer zone" of Angolan territory between 1981 and
1985. The Soviets responded by initiating a long-term
Yearend data.
b Spread reflects a degree of uncertainty in the exact number of advisers.
upgrading of Angola's air defenses and helping Luan-
da establish a defensive line along the southern rail-
way. At the same time, the Angolan Armed Forces
(FAPLA) still had serious difficulties in countering the
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
insurgency. In 1982 and 1983, UNITA, with South
African assistance, greatly expanded the territory it
dominated in southeastern Angola. In August 1983 it
captured the FAPLA garrison at Cangamba and ex-
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panded its guerrilla operations in the central and
northeastern regions of Angola. UNITA's gains and its
threats to carry the battle to urban areas shook the
MPLA government, which looked to the Soviets for
help. Angolan President dos Santos visited Moscow in
May 1983, and a high-level military delegation fol-
lowed in September. We believe that expanded Soviet
military aid was at the top of the agenda in both cases.
6. Through 1984, Soviet advisers in Angola assisted
in planning FAPLA operations but largely left the
execution to Angolan and Cuban officers. Cuban
troops were used primarily to man defense lines and
key base areas, freeing FAPLA troops for offensive
operations against UNITA. Additionally, the Cubans
helped the Angolans operate advanced Soviet-supplied
systems, such as fighter aircraft, attack helicopters,
4. The Soviets apparently agreed during these visits
to increase arms assistance to Luanda to reverse the
deteriorating situation on the ground. Military agree-
ments totaling more than $2 billion were signed in
early 1984 (see figure 2). Moscow's decision was
probably based on its evaluation of the growing
UNITA challenge and the threat that it posed to
longstanding Soviet objectives in Angola, which
include:
- Preserving the pro-Soviet character of the MPLA
regime.
- Preserving access to Angolan military facilities.
- Preventing any Namibian settlement that jeop-
ardizes the security of the MPLA regime in
Luanda and does not result in SWAPO's coming
to power in Namibia.
UNITA's threat to the MPLA also challenged Mos-
cow's credibility as a reliable supporter of its major
African clients, all of whom faced insurgent threats.
8. Soviet advisory assistance and increased Soviet,
East European, and Cuban military aid was not
sufficient to reverse MPLA fortunes during 1984, as
FAPLA again demonstrated that it could not on its
own make effective use of the massive aid provided by
the USSR and its allies. Two government offensives
attempted to dislodge UNITA from positions in the
eastern and southeastern parts of Angola but failed to
Soviet arms deliveries to Angola rose sharply in
late 1983 and continued at relatively high levels into
1984. Included in the Soviet-supplied equipment
were:
- Initial deliveries of MIG-23 and SU-22 fighter-
bombers, as well as additional MIG-21 fighters
and MI-25 attack helicopters.
- Substantial quantities of antiaircraft equipment,
for example, SA-2, SA-6, and SA-8 surface-to-air
missile systems.
- Large numbers of tanks, armored personnel car-
riers, and artillery pieces.
Moreover, Cuba added about 5,000 combat troops to
bring its complement of military personnel to about
35,000. A variety of reporting indicates that the
Angolans themselves undertook a series of steps to
improve command and control of their forces and
coordination of military and civilian resources in the
counterinsurgency effort as well as to expand the size
of the Army to 70,000 (see table).
achieve any meaningful gains.
FAPLA's 1985 Offensive
9. In the latest offensive, government forces dealt
UNITA its first significant reverse since the rebels
expanded their operations in 1982. Since July, FAPLA
has captured Cazombo and threatened Mavinga-300
kilometers northwest of UNITA's headquarters in
Jamba-although the drive was blunted in late Sep-
tember to early October by UNITA counterattacks
and unprecedented South African airstrikes (see figure
3). UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi told the press that his
forces were under severe pressure from the offensive
and noted the use of sophisticated weaponry by
FAPLA forces.
10. FAPLA's gains from this offensive do not pre-
sage the demise of UNITA or indicate that a military
solution to Angola's decadelong war is at hand. The
government's territorial gains are limited and far from
secure, and FAPLA still faces substantial logistic,
training, and operational problems. However, FAPLA
did show that it could penetrate UNITA-held terri-
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Figure 2
Angola: Soviet Bloc Military Agreements and Deliveries
Eastern Europe
PEMEMMR
1980
Soviet
77
? Eastern Europe
7
Soviet
81 82 83 84 Mid-85 0 1980 81 82 83 84 Mid-85
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Angola: Major Soviet Equipment Deliveries
3
MIG-2l
19
MIG-23
8
MIG-23
4
AN-26
70
MIG-21 (va
and trainer
riants
s)
4
MIG-2l
8
SU-22
6
AN-26
12
MI-24/25 Hind
12
MI-24/25
Hind
2
MI-17 Hip H
22
MI-8 Hip
2
MI-8
Ground Forces (armored
118
BTR-60P
18
T-34
6
T-34
vehicles/tanks)
15
BRDM-2
46
T-55
7
BTR-60
43
BTR-60P
15
BRDM-2
8
SA-9
4
SA-I3 LCHR
16
SA-6
76
Styx SS-N-2
8
SA-8
shipboard
15
SA-3
missiles
21
SA-2 LCHR
tory, meet and overcome UNITA forces in battle, and
take positions defended by the insurgents despite
sustaining heavy casualties. We believe that the results
of the 1985 offensive, after several years of reverses,
will improve FAPLA morale and heighten MPLA
confidence that it can, over the long run, handle the
UNITA challenge. FAPLA's improved performance is,
in our view, attributable to a number of factors,
including improved training, organization, and inte-
gration of Soviet-supplied arms; better use of tactical
airpower; and possible Cuban participation in combat.
The Soviet Role in the Offensive
11. We believe that the improved performance of
the Angolan Army against UNITA insurgents this year
probably reflects in part an increased Soviet role in the
planning and direction of the recent offensive as well
as the effects of large amounts of Soviet arms deliv-
ered since 1983. Although comprehensive evidence is
lacking to substantiate UNITA and South African
allegations of this expanded role in the recent offen-
sive, we believe that this upgrade in Soviet military
activity is logical on the basis of FAPLA failure to
perform credibly in past offensives over the last nine
years
12. The probable increase in Soviet military in-
volvement in the Angolan war should be kept in
perspective. We believe it represents:
- A logical expansion of the long-established advi-
sory role played by the 1,000 to 1,200 Soviet
military advisers in Angola.
They remain sensitive to risk of capture.
The increase probably amounts to greater in-
volvement of Soviet advisers in planning opera-
tions as well as more demanding supervision of
FAPLA-executed combat and logistic operations.
A sense of impatience with Cuban and MPLA
surrogates and clients, who for nine years have
failed to inflict a serious reverse on UNITA,
which until recently had been increasingly suc-
cessful in the field.
- A Soviet judgment that the risks and costs of an
increased role in the planning and direction of
the offensive were low.
- The determination of the present Soviet leader-
ship to continue to protect the Soviet investment
in Angola's Marxist-Leninist regime
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Figure 3
Recent Military Activity
Sg KINSHASA
airs
A. , la
Lobito
Benguela:
angamba
gue
iico ors Cuito
Ol Cuanavole
Cu\ n& Mavinga
Cubango
Ondangwa
Etosha F.
Pan F:
Angolan airbase 0 UNITA-held area
1 Contested area
South African -?-Selected province
airbase boundary
Angolan Government -Railroad
offensive
South African aircr'a
depart, 7 October
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South
Atlantic
Ocean
Zaire
Boundary reps entatron ie
not neoessanryseutnonttrve.
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13. The enhanced Soviet role does not represent a
takeover of the direction of the counterinsurgency
effort, nor is it intended to gain some short-term
advantage in East-West negotiations. We do not be-
lieve allegations of actual Soviet-particularly pilot-
participation in combat beyond a possible episodic
Soviet Relations With the MPLA
14. Moscow's political relations with the MPLA
regime have at times been troubled. The USSR was
particularly annoyed in 1984 when President dos
Santos pursued negotiations with the United States on
Cuban troop withdrawal without prior discussion with
Moscow. We believe that the Soviets may have
stepped up the pressure on dos Santos to resume close
consultations on the Cuban troop issue, but Moscow
did not interrupt its military assistance to the MPLA
during this period. The Soviets and MPLA apparently
agreed, during a subsequent trip to Moscow by dos
Santos in March 1985, not to make further concessions
on Cuban withdrawal. This suggests that Moscow
successfully brought dos Santos to appreciate the need
for closer consultation without having to resort to
altering the military relationship. The MPLA, presum-
ably with Moscow's blessing, suspended formal partici-
pation in the talks with Pretoria after the May South
African raid on Cabinda, and prospects for a quick
agreement on the Cuban troop issue waned.=
15. Although there may be differences between
Moscow and Luanda on Cuban troop withdrawal, the
two sides are agreed not to implement an agreement
that would jeopardize the stability of the MPLA
regime. There are those within the MPLA who take a
harder line in opposing Cuban withdrawal than Presi-
dent dos Santos's dominant group, and we believe dos
Santos will seek a consensus on the issue before making
further concessions. We do not envision new MPLA
policies in the next 12 months that would violate what
the Soviets perceive as fundamental interests. We
anticipate a strengthened MPLA commitment to the
armed struggle against both UNITA and South Africa,
which in the MPLA's view is not inconsistent with
participation in the Cuban withdrawal talks.
16.I I the Soviets
have been concerned with the possibility of South
African incursions into Angola since the late 1970s.
However, Soviet advisers appear to have underesti-
mated South Africa's willingness to use its airpower to
counter FAPLA's drive on Mavinga
While te
South African airstrikes raised the specter of a direct
confrontation between the Soviets and the South Afri-
cans, Moscow apparently was not inclined at this time
to take on South African aircraft, despite sufficient
opportunities. As far as we know, MIG-23 interceptors
based at Menongue did not challenge the South Afri-
can strikes. Moscow may have judged that its prospects
for successfully engaging South African Mirages in an
area outside effective ground-controlled intercept ra-
dar coverage were unfavorable.
17. The near-term possibility of Soviet-South Afri-
can conflict has dropped off substantially now that the
Angolan offensive has come to a halt and the South
Africans have moved most of their fighter aircraft
away from southern Angola. But the Soviets are
certain to factor South Africa's response to this year's
offensive into planning for future Angolan operations.
Outlook: Six to 12 Months
Hold, Consolidate, and Prepare for the Next Round
18. We believe that FAPLA is unlikely to press a
new attack during the rainy season (November-
March). As long as it is able to resupply and defend its
forward positions, FAPLA is likely to spend the next
few months consolidating its hold on Cazombo and
Cuito Cuanavale. Alternatively, if FAPLA considers
its forward position untenable, it may decide to pull
back to its main garrisons at Luena and Menongue. In
any event, FAPLA will probably use the next several
months to rest its troops, refurbish its equipment, and
prepare for new offensive operations next year. For its
part, UNITA can be expected to conduct harassment
operations and to prevent FAPLA from enhancing its
forward positions.
19. From Moscow's standpoint, either of the above
options serves to promote continued Angolan military
dependence on the USSR for equipment and advisory
support while limiting, for the moment, the possibility
of confrontation with South Africa. During the rainy
season the Soviets are certain to assist FAPLA in
assessing this year's offensive, implementing necessary
changes in logistics and tactics, and improving training
and recruitment. Moscow will replace weapons lost by
FAPLA, and may provide additional increments of
advisers and arms aid, particularly aircraft and heli-
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copters that have proved so useful in the recent
offensive. In addition, the Soviets will probably contin-
ue expanding and improving Angolan air defenses in a
bid to deter South Africa from future air operations
over Angolan territory. Soviet efforts will probably
focus on improving radar coverage of southern Angola
and continuing pilot training, and, possibly, will in-
clude the installation of a ground control intercept
network in the region
efforts in the Cazombo and Moxico regions, the imme-
diate threat to UNITA will be relatively limited, and
Pretoria is unlikely to commit its air assets to the
battle, especially in areas where a Soviet-supplied air
defense network is effective. If the government forces
move toward UNITA headquarters at Jamba, howev-
er, and defeat significant concentrations of UNITA
troops, South Africa is again likely to use its air assets
and increase material support to UNITA to reverse the
tide of the offensive, and may involve its battalion of
The 1986 Offensive
20. Its confidence buoyed by the results of this
year's operation, FAPLA probably believes that its
performance can be repeated, and we believe that the
Angolans are likely to renew offensive operations in
the spring or summer of 1986. They may move against
targets similar to those attacked this year, perhaps in
the direction of UNITA headquarters at Jamba. Alter-
natively, they might concentrate on other areas that
appear vulnerable where the chance of direct confron-
tation with South Africa appears lower. For example,
Luanda may try to retake more UNITA-controlled
areas in Moxico Province, a region brought largely
under UNITA control in late 1982 and early 1983.
21. The Soviets will continue to provide arms and
advisory support for Luanda. Direct Soviet advisory
involvement in planning and directing Angolan com-
bat operations is also likely to continue next year.
However, as long as strategic MPLA/Cuban posi-
tions-which may change during the course of the
war-are not in immediate danger of falling, Moscow
is unlikely to intervene more directly in the conflict
and risk a wider war. Indeed, the Soviets may counsel
the Angolan military to avoid action near the Namib-
ian border if they believe that it would provoke a
harsh military response from Pretoria
Implications of Future FAPLA Success
22. It is possible that the absorption of additional
Soviet-supplied weapons, further training on existing
systems, integration of the lessons learned in this year's
offensive, and continued Soviet advisory support will
enable FAPLA to score further gains next year, espe-
cially if UNITA chooses to engage FAPLA in relative-
ly large-scale conventional actions. The implications of
any such advances for expanded outside involvement
and escalation depend on the extent to which Pretoria
believes they threaten UNITA's viability as an effec-
tive fighting force and deems it necessary to expand its
own role in the conflict. If FAPLA concentrates its
black expatriates (the 32nd "Buffalo" Battalion).
23. Should the South Africans inflict serious dam-
age on FAPLA, Angolan pressure on the Soviets and
Cubans for expanded involvement in air-to-ground
and air-to-air operations would almost certainly grow.
We believe Moscow would prefer to avoid direct
confrontation with South African-piloted aircraft, giv-
en the limitations of Angola's radar net in the south-
eastern part of the country. However, we cannot rule
out a more direct Soviet combat role in air operations
if Moscow believes that South African activity poses a
direct threat to the viability of FAPLA as an effective
fighting force. If such a threat does not materialize,
the Soviets are not likely to expand their involvement
to include direct participation in combat actions,
except in isolated instances where leadership of Cu-
ban-FAPLA forces is desirable and risks are judged
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Prospects for UNITA
24. UNITA is unlikely to remain passive during the
current rainy season and may be able to inflict losses
on government forces in Cazombo and the southeast,
especially if it avoids further large-scale conventional
engagement with FAPLA formations. In addition,
UNITA could intensify its guerrilla activities through-
out northern and central Angola. UNITA leader Jonas
Savimbi could adopt strategic and tactical changes, 25X1
which we believe his South African supporters are
likely to urge on him, such as cutting back on semicon-
ventional operations-especially above the batallion
level-in favor of guerrilla tactics, hitting FAPLA
logistic lines, and giving ground rather than taking on
FAPLA in major pitched battles. UNITA may also
step up sabotage operations, probably with South
African help. Such actions could at least reduce the
effectiveness of FAPLA's next offensive and might set
the stage for a UNITA reversal of this year's losses,
especially if FAPLA's recently heightened morale
suffers.
25. If UNITA thwarts a FAPLA spring offensive in
southeastern Angola without direct South African sup-
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port, the prospects for a widening of the war would be
limited, as neither Moscow nor Pretoria would see a
direct threat to the side each is backing. In the less
likely event that UNITA not only blunts FAPLA
attacks but threatens key FAPLA base areas, we
believe the Soviets would propose a more active
Cuban role in air and ground operations and might
increase their own involvement in coordinating defen-
sive operations. We do not believe that other contin-
gencies that might provoke substantially increased
direct participation by the Soviets in air and ground
operations-large-scale South African offensive opera-
tions against FAPLA bases or a direct UNITA threat to
MPLA control of Luanda-are likely to occur in the
span of this Estimate.
Implications for the United States
The 1985 Offensive
26. The timing of this year's offensive was not, in
our judgment, directly connected to considerations of
East-West diplomacy. This year's action follows a
standing pattern of dry-season offensives, and plan-
ning for the operation appears to have begun at least
as early as last year.
a significant rise in Soviet risks or costs in the short
term, that would make the Soviets receptive to a
change in their policy of extensive military support to
the MPLA.
29. Reporting from several sources indicates that
Soviet officials have been more confident in recent
months that Luanda-now more militarily dependent
on the Soviets than ever-is not likely to pursue
seriously a negotiated agreement with South Africa
that could jeopardize Soviet interests in Angola. The
prospect of an MPLA regime more confident of its
ability to deal with UNITA, yet still dependent on the
USSR for military support, is probably sufficient to
limit Soviet concern on these questions. If Luanda
renews its participation in regional negotiations, Mos-
cow will repeat its warnings to Angola on the dangers
of any deal with South Africa and its alleged US
backers
30. The continued buildup of Soviet-supplied arms
in Angola will help further Moscow's long-term objec-
tive of ensuring a Soviet role in southern Africa. The
Angolan buildup, especially of air defense systems,
could also, over the long term, hamper South Africa's
capacity to carry out military operations against
27. The Soviets do stand to gain some "side bene-
fits" in the international arena. We would expect the
Soviets to use the next few months to play up the South
African involvement in the fighting as "proof" that
UNITA is no more than a South African puppet.
Perceived Angolan gains could contribute to outside
impressions of momentum for Moscow's policy in
Africa and improve Moscow's image as a reliable
backer of its clients. Also, Moscow and Luanda might
believe that UNITA's setbacks will make it appear less
attractive to some potential outside supporters. The
relative succes of this offensive will almost certainly
strengthen th7hand of those in the MPLA leadership
who oppose negotiations with UNITA. War strategy is
a major agenda item at the upcoming MPLA Congress
in December
SWAPO and on behalf of UNITA.
Further FAPLA Gains
31. Should FAPLA make substantial military prog-
ress next year, certainly UNITA and possibly South
Africa will call for Western help, calls that will
intensify if Soviet/Cuban-South African clashes are a
possibility. Zaire may attempt to exploit the Angolan
threat to obtain Western military aid.
might attempt to communicate with Pretoria.
32. For their part, the Soviets would probably
intensify their campaign to castigate UNITA as a "tool
of Pretoria," while drumming up Eastern Bloc and
nonaligned support for Luanda's campaign against
"South African-backed bandits" and warning against
any outside attempts to "interfere" in Angola. Private-
ly, Moscow would probably look to reassure Angola's
neighbors of Luanda's intentions, and reassert to the
West its claim that southern Africa should not be an
arena of East-West conflict. If the Soviets were genu-
inely concerned about the prospect of an undesired
escalation involving themselves and South Africa, they
Future UNITA Gains
33. Minor UNITA gains are not likely to have much
short-term impact on Soviet relations with Angola or
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its other client states. Luanda will have little alterna-
tive to continued military dependence on the USSR,
and Soviet relations with its other clients will not be
affected significantly by the military and political
exigencies in Angola.
34. Sustained improved UNITA performance might
lead Luanda to show more active interest in the US-
sponsored regional negotiating process if only as a
means to gain some diplomatic insurance against
expanded outside aid to UNITA. Intensified UNITA
pressure notwithstanding, however, it is unlikely that
during the span of this Estimate the Angolan leader-
ship will abandon its preference for a military solution
to the UNITA insurgency in favor of negotiations with
Savimbi, or be willing to forgo the protection of most
of the Cuban troops currently stationed in Angola.
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ANNEX
THE SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP IN ANGOLA
In-Country Responsibilities
1. Soviet advisory involvement in Angola is con-
trolled by the Military Advisory Group (MAG) in
Luanda, which includes, we believe, 1,000 to 1,200
Soviet personnel headed by a three-star general and at
least six other general officers. Soviet advisers
are assigned to virtually all
command and staff offices within the Angolan Minis-
try of Defense, to at least the five most threatened of
Angola's 10 military districts, and to Angolan brigades
and apparently some battalions.
at least eight to 10 Soviets have been
assigned ndividual Angolan brigades since at least
1984;
2. Soviet advisory responsibilities in 1985 cover the
full range of Angolan military activity: from recruit-
ment, training, and political indoctrination through
administrative and quartermaster functions and main-
tenance of sophisticated equipment to planning and
conducting combat operations. Day-to-day duties=
range from_meet-
ings with the Angolan Minister of Defense to the
detailing of Soviet mechanics to change a tire on an
Angolan armored personnel carrier. Although the So-
viets, in general, are careful to observe protocol in
dealing with Angolan officials, we believe apparent
frustration with Angolan inexperience has led the
Soviet advisers on occasion to intrude directly in what
would appear to be Angolan responsibilities.
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