SOVIET MILITARY SUPPORT TO ANGOLA: INTENTIONS AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00573R000801010001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1985
• Content Type: SNIE

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Special National Intelligence Estimate
Soviet Military Support
to Angola: Intentions
and Prospects
SNIE 71/I1-85/W/3
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SNIE 71/11-85/W/S
SOVIET MILITARY SUPPORT
TO ANGOLA: INTENTIONS
AND PROSPECTS
KEY JUDGMENTS
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KEY JUDGMENTS
We believe that the improved performance of the Angolan Army
against UNITA insurgents this year probably reflects in part an
increased Soviet role in the planning and direction of the recent
offensive as well as the effects of large amounts of Soviet arms delivered
since 1983. Although comprehensive evidence is lacking to substantiate
UNITA and South African allegations of this expanded role in the
recent offensive, we believe that this upgrade in Soviet military activity
is logical on the basis of the failure of the Angolan Armed Forces
(FAPLA) to perform credibly in offensives over the last 9 years.
The probable increase in Soviet military involvement in the
Angolan war should be kept in perspective. We believe it represents:
- A logical expansion of the long-established advisory role played
by the 1,000 to 1,200 Soviet military advisers in Angola.
[The increase probably
amounts to greater invo vement of Soviet advisers in planning
operations as well as more demanding supervision of FAPLA-
executed combat and logistic operations.
- A sense of impatience with Cuban and MPLA surrogates and
clients, who for 9 years have failed to inflict a serious reverse on
UNITA, which until recently had been increasingly successful
in the field.
- A Soviet judgment that the risks and costs of an increased role in
the planning and direction of the offensive were low.
- The determination of the present Soviet leadership to continue
to protect the Soviet investment in Angola's Marxist-Leninist
regime.
The enhanced Soviet role does not represent, in our view, a
takeover of the direction of the counterinsurgency effort, nor is it
intended to gain some short-term advantage in East-West negotiations.
We 'do not believe allegations of actual Soviet-particularly pilot-
participation in combat beyond a -possible episodic occurrence.)
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During the recent offensive, the Angolan Army was able to
penetrate insurgent-held territory, overcome UNITA forces in battles,
and take positions defended by insurgents-goals it had largely failed to
achieve in previous offensives. The Angolan Army attacks were halted
by UNITA counterattacks and unprecedented South African airstrikes.
Angolan Army military gains, however, do not presage the demise of
UNITA-which is far from beaten-but they will improve the govern-
ment forces' morale and heighten Luanda's confidence that it can, over
the long run, handle the UNITA challenge.
Although the chances of a Soviet-South African confrontation rose
during the offensive, we do not believe the Soviets attempted to
interdict South African aircraft. The Soviets seem to have underestimat-
ed Pretoria's willingness to use its airpower to halt the Angolan advance.
They apparently chose not to challenge the South Africans, judging that
perhaps they did not have air supremacy.
FAPLA will probably use the next few months to consolidate its
gains, rest its troops, and prepare for next year's operations. The Soviets
will assist them in assessing the results of the recent offensive, imple-
menting necessary changes, and improving training and recruitment.
Moscow is also likely to replace weapons lost by Luanda, provide
additional arms aid, including air defense weapons intended to deter
South Africa from future activity over Angola, and may provide
additional advisers. '
The political relations between Moscow and Luanda are not likely
to constrain current or projected Soviet military assistance. While
differences exist between the MPLA leadership and the USSR and
periodically flare up, we have not seen these differences affect the
military relationship. The MPLA is likely to continue to pursue the
military option against UNITA over the next 12 months, thereby
enhancing this relationship.
. We, believe the preferred Soviet counter to South African air
involvement will be a southward and eastward expansion of the
integrated air defense line running from Namibe to Menongue. This
combination of modern surface-to-air missiles, antiaircraft artillery,
radars, and airfields with high-performance fighters has already had a
deterrent effect on South African operations. As a result, we expect to
see continued improvements around Cuito Cuanavale in southeastern
Angola as this area is incorporated into the air defense network, perhaps
to include the permanent assignment of advanced fighter aircraft there.
We believe the extensive Soviet advisory involvement will continue
as Luanda renews its offensive against UNITA in the spring or summer
of 1986. Luanda may well again target Mavinga, and it may also
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attempt to retake UNITA-held areas of Moxico Province. Moscow,
which believes its essential interests are served by Luanda's continuing
military dependence on the USSR, will probably perceive no need to in-
tervene directly in the conflict and risk a wider war, as long as FAPLA
is doing reasonably well, and it may counsel the Angolans to forgo
operations near the Namibian border to avoid provoking South Africa.
If the government forces do directly threaten UNITA's survival,
the South Africans are likely to respond with airstrikes and possibly
commit some of their unconventional or reconnaissance forces. Angolan
pressure on Moscow for more direct assistance would be certain to
increase. We believe the USSR would prefer to avoid direct confronta-
tion with South Africa, but the Soviets would consider taking a more di-
rect role in operations if they believed the South Africans posed an
immediate threat to the viability of major FAPLA units. We believe the
Soviets would countenance use of Cuban-flown combat aircraft to
defend against expanded South African air operations. Beyond episodic
actions, however, we do not believe Moscow would allow Soviet pilots to
become regularly engaged in combat operations.
UNITA could abandon semiconventional warfare and rely more on
guerrilla tactics, as the South Africans are advising. Such actions could
at least reduce the effectiveness of FAPLA's next offensive and might
set the stage for a UNITA reversal of this year's losses. A more active
Cuban role in air and ground operations and increased Soviet advisory
involvement in coordinating counterinsurgency operations would be-
come more likely in this eventuality.
The Soviets will seek to gain propaganda advantage from Luanda's
military successes and will continue their efforts to discredit UNITA as
a puppet of South Africa and imperialism. Moscow is likely to seek to
isolate Angola from substantive discussions in East-West diplomacy,
repeating its assertion that the United States and the USSR have no vital
interests there and that southern African questions should not be
allowed to complicate more important issues in the bilateral
relationship.
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