AFRICAN FAMINE: SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS, PROBLEMS, AND OPPORTUNITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00573R000700990003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 1, 1985
• Content Type: SNIE

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I)ire~ctor
('enrtral
Intelligence
African Famine:
~l~ort-Term Prospects,
Problems, and Opportunities
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Memorandum to Holders
tierrct
Secret
SN/E 70-84
November / 985
coP~ 4 4 0
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MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS
OF SNIE 70-84:
AFRICAN FAMINE:
SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS,
PROBLEMS, AND OPPORTUNITIES
Information availablg as of 31 October 1985 was used
in the preparation of this Memorandum, which was
approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board
on that date.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and
the Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 7
Constraints on Delivery of Emergency Assistance ......................... 7
Donor Country Constraints .......................................................... 7
Recipient Country Constraints .................................................... 8
Positive Factors Affecting Outlook .................................................. 10
Food Outlook-1986 ........................................................................ 10
Role of the Soviet Union .................................................................. 13
Implications for the United States and the West ........................... 13
ANNEX A: The Refugee Crisis ........................................................... 15
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SCOPE NOTE
A Special National Intelligence Estimate published in December
1984 (SNIE 70-84, African Famine: Short-Term Prospects, Problems,
and Opportunities) assessed the magnitude of the critical food situation
throughout Africa and analyzed pressures and demands arising f rom the
famine that were likely to face the United States and other Western do-
nor nations during 1985. This Memorandum to Holders focuses on the
results of the 1985 relief effort and the outlook for 1986, assessing the
likely changes in the food situation, the number of people at risk,
external assistance required, and the constraints to effectve_ Prin. A
number of key countries-Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Mali, and
Mozambique-receive particular attention.
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Figure 1
Countries of Sub-Saharan Africa With Food Emergencies
Oakar 1
mega
*Nouakchott
*Bamako
/Ouagad *gou
f Burkina
Niger
*Niamey
Cameroon
~ Yaounde
Brazzaville Zaire
Kinshasa
Namibia
I Windhoek
'" Botswana
Gaborone
' Zamb
i~ i~
~,~usaka*
$OUth Masegru~
Africa ` ~s
* Pretoria
Mbabane'*
Central Atrican
Republic
Narare j j
*Khartoum~ ~o
ti
Kam~ada ~en a
/,ly
Igah ~ ~ Nairobi
t;ujumb ra/~~ ~ ~~
3tirundl ~ j ~
%i~~0ar es Salaam S
,iTanzania ,+h
Addis Abaha
Ethiopia
Red
Sea
South
Atlantic
Ocean
ivory
rog~i~^;n Nigeria
Coast Ghana erte-Novo
enidia~ e~~,a ?Lagos
Soo Tome b ~
.v-..__ tirFl c lihro~illo
a Designated by UN Food and
Agriculture Organization
0 500 1000 Kilometers
0 500 1000 Miles
Indian
Ocean
eo~oeary rapreaemauon .a
noc naceaeaeir amnodlauva.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Despite the break in the drought this year, Africa will still need
substantial amounts of emergency assistance in 1986. The United
States will again be expected to provide the bulk of the relief aid. On
the eve of a cycle of African harvests, famine and related illnesses still
threaten as many as 24 million people in six of the seven countries
identified in SNIE 70-84 last December as seriously affected b;~ drought
and famine.' Although the at-risk population will decline-possibly as
much as 50 percent-as a result of good rains and expected improved
harvests in several countries, we believe that the affected population
will still require emergency relief and developmental. aid throughout
1986:
- Adequate rainfall in most countries of the Sahel and the Horn of
Africa this spring permitted planting, but low seed stocks, loss of
draft animals, dislocation, and the malnourished and weakened
condition of farmers reduced the acreage planted; below-
normal harvests still are expected in many countries.
- Where good harvests occur, such as in Sudan, there will be
pockets of severe hunger resulting from regional deficit rainfall,
shortage or absence of planting materials, limited cash income,
infrastructural defec s, and in some countries government poli-
cies that impede effective food distribution.
- African agriculture will continue to be affected by problems of
disease, pests, poor soil, ineffective farming techniques, and
misguided government policies that prevent adequate food
production even in nondrought years.
Relief efforts will continue to be impeded
- Inefficient or counterproductive host- og vernment._..policies..
Many African countries lack the trained personnel to manage
food relief efforts or suffer from pervasive public and private
corruption. Some governments place more importance on pla-
catin Pir iirhan eons itilP.p~i an on ee ing o ten remote
and politically less important rural populations.e
- Insurgencies and civil wars that prevent government and relief
agencies from reaching many of the drought-stricken areas.
' SNIE 70-84 estimated that 14-20 million people were at risk as a result of the African food crisis,
most of them in Ethiopia, Chad, b:ali, Niger, Kenya, S.ulan, and Mozambique. Subsequent information has
resulted in an increase in the estimate of the at-risk population0
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These insurgency problems are particularly acute in Ethiopia,
Sudan, Chad, Angola, Uganda, and Mozambique.
- Inadequate infrastructures and transportation networks. Poor
ground transportation and inefficient port operations persist in
several of the food-poor countries despite donor efforts to
provide trucks, repair roads and bridges, upgrade rail lines, and
enhance port equipment. Such improvements that have been
made are highly contingent on continued donor support. Expen-
sive airlift and airdrop operations were necessary to reach some
hard-hit areas this year, and may again be needed.
Inadequate coordination of the relief effort both at the interna-
tional level and within countries still plagues the efficient delivery of
relief goods. Although UN agencies and donor countries have achieved
a high degree of cooperation relative to similar emergencies in the past,
congestion and gaps in the internationally managed food and nonfood
supply lines still occur. Jurisdictional problems among UN~ncies-
such as disputes as to which agency will organize a trucking fleet in
Ethiopia-impede expeditious relief distribution within countries.
Charges of corruption and ineptitude have increased tensions
between donors and host governments. To alleviate misunderstandings,
and take advantage of expertise, the United States and other Western
donors have turned over some distribution and monitoring chores to
international and private voluntary organizations. Relations between
these entities and recipient governments are often better than those of
donor countries, but even these organizations are subject to significant
constraints, such as the inability to travel to impacted areas and monitor
deliveries.
Ethiopia continues to subordinate its humanitarian needs to its
political priorities, greatly complicating donors' relief efforts. Difficult
relations between Western donors and the Mengistu regime persist,
even after a year of intense relief efforts and the donation of nearly 1
million metric tons of food and millions of dollars of nonfood aid. The
regime is suspicious of Western donors, especially of the United States,
and has sought to gain control of the relief operation by limiting the
number of Western relief workers and denying them free passage to all
parts of the country. The regime's emphasis on the col e tivization of
agriculture and the institution of state farms has reduced sup~rt for
peasant armers and_has_impe~-fed efforts.to-develop f_ood_self=s.uf?icien-
_ cy. In the past year, Ethiopia's coercive_resettlement program received
higher priority for transportation and government food distribution
than did emergency feeding efforts for rural areas. Finally, the civil war
in the northern provinces has impeded implementation of donor
feeding programs for the north.
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Western donors work closely with the office of the UN Assistant
Secretary General in Addis Ababa to coordinate relief with the
government. There has been marginal improvement in some transporta-
tion and access problems and in putting a stop to earlier abuses, such as
the precipitate closing of feeding stations without regard for the welfare
of beneficiaries. However, in the face of regime f oot-dragging and
suspicion, the United States and other Western donors wi continue to
~ ~
have d'i icff ulty delivering humanitarian assistance in 1986.
The Soviet Union is unlikely to devote substantial resources to
famine relief in 1986. Moscow's tightfisted relief policy has not
changed appreciably during the past year. The Soviets insist they bear
no responsibility for food shortages that are the result of Western
exploitation. Negative publicity during the year, however, did spark
some response to the crisis in Ethiopia, where Moscow supplied some
transport assistance and small amounts of food. If the survival of a client
regime were endangered, Moscow would probably provide far more by
way of military and security aid than emergency food assistance, as has
been the case in Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique
The need of several African governments for continuing emergen-
cy food support will of course place continuing demands and pressures
on the United States. Implications of this shortfall include the following:
- African states will again expect-and will exert pressure on-
the United States to continue to provide the bulk of such
foodstuffs. In addition, African governments will ask the United
States and the West for increased and accelerated development
aid to address fundamental food production problems.
- The United States and other Western donors may have difficul-
ty mobilizing public opinion and legislative support for another
major feeding effort. Given the fact that the drought has broken
in large areas of Africa, Western public at ention may focus
more closely on A?zicai~go-uer-n~en.t rr.~alfgasance_aiad...n.on?ea-
sance as major causes for the continuing food shortfall.
- Despite US and Western pressures, African governments for the
most part will continue to resist structural reforms needed to
increase agricultural production. This will increase tensions in
bilateral relations. Those few governments that do undertake
reforms will expect significant rewards from the West in terms
of increased assistance.
- The African refugee problem has not significantly abated and is
likely to increase in 1986. This will cause new domestic tensions
in states hosting large refugee populations. New demands on the
United States and the West for increased refugee assistance can
be expected.
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Agricultural reform is the most important prerequisite for in-
creased food production over the long term. To feed their populations,
African governments need to raise farm prices and strengthen rnarket
mechanisms, improve water conservation schemes, increase availability
of farm inputs, and restructure economic priorities in favor of food
producers and away from urba~i populations. Western donors and
international organizations have been seeking such changes, but what
small progress has been achieved was overwhelmed by the food
emergency. Increased donor efforts to affect agricultural policy reform
are likely to be undermined in the next few years by continuing
emergency conditions. Unless progress is made, subsequent African food
emergencies will be even more devastating and require even larger
amounts of international assistance.
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DISCUSSION
1. On `the eve of a cycle of African harvests, famine
and related illnesses still threaten as many as 24
million people in six of the seven African countries
identified last December as seriously affected by
drought and famine in SNIE 70-84, African Famine:
Short-Term Prospects, Problems, and Opportunities.
Although the at-risk population will decline-possibly
as much as 50 percent-as a result of good rains and
expected improved harvests in several countries, we
believe that the affected population will still require
emergency relief and developmental aid throughout
1986.2 (See figure 1, page 2.) The affected populations
in Ethiopia and Sudan have grown in the last 10
months, with 8-9 million persons at risk in each
country. Fragile situations still exist in Niger, with 3.5
million persons at risk; in Mozambique, with 2 million;
and in Chad and Mali, with 1 million each.3 Only
Kenya, after a skillfully managed 18-month-long relief
program, has food supplies at normal levels and an
excellent crop forecast for this year
2. The need for foreign food donations will remain
high and could fluctuate significantly, depending on
rain patterns and actual harvests; 1.3-2.7 million met-
ric tons of food supplies will be required. Transport
bottlenecks, weak and inadequate government infra=
2 Estimates of the "at-risk" population are at best approximations.
The figures used here are estimated by the United Nations or by US
AID and are those most often used by international agencies and
large donor countries. The need to have some reasonable basis on
which to plan emergency relief forces the use of these estimates, but
they are only indicators of the magnitude of the crisis and are not
exact. Even in the best of circumstances, population figures are
notoriously inconsistent and incomplete. Adequate data collection
and processing do not exist in many countries, and they are often
deliberately_manip~lt~d_by local governments Eor political pur-
poses. The estimation of subgroups-that proportion at risk of
starvation-from a statistically imprecise national total population
number, especially in areas where government involvement is weak,
nonexistent, or where insurgencies are occurring, is particularly
difficult.
a In addition to the six countries mentioned above, in August
1985 the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) warned that
the following countries are also affected by abnormal food shortages
for which external assistance will be required: Angola, Botswana,
Burkina, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Mauritania, Senegal, and
Somalia. These food shortfalls reflect crop failures, interruption of
imports, disruption of distribution, and/or an increased demand
arising from population movements within the country or an influx
of refugees.
structures, and political turmoil resulting from guerril-
la insurgencies will continue to impede the flow of
food to remote areas.
3. Africa's food crisis endures despite the massive
international relief effort launched last_year. Over 75
percent of all donor cereal food aid pledges were
delivered to 19 Sub-Saharan nations by mid-1985.
Since the UN donors' conference last March, $1.5
billion has been raised or pledged by Western donors
for the African emergency, including 6.7 million tons
of food for emergency and developmental aid. Virtu-
ally all food aid is being provided by North America,
Western Europe, Australia, and Japan. The United
States is supplying approximately half, 3.1 million
tons, of which 60 percent is for emergency food
programs implemented directly with host-country
governments or through private voluntary and inter-
national organizations.~~ 25X1
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Constraints on Delivery of Emergency Assistance
Donor Country Constraints
4. Donor countries and agencies have confronted a
myriad of problems in delivering food supplies to 25X1
affected areas. Difficult relations with recipient coun-
tries have on occasion impeded the delivery of food
assistance. Relations between Ethiopia and Western
donors-particularly the United States-are often ad-
versarial, and US officials' insufficient access to Ethio-
pian authorities has at times affected the delivery of
US emergency assistance
5. Sudanese officials have been cooperative, but
conditions for donors are difficult. Sudan's coup in
April, coming in the critical pre-rainy-season period
when large food shipments were entering the country,
impeded donors' access to officials responsible for
famine relief and slowed food pre-positioning and
distribution to the west. The result is an inefficient and
uncoordinated partnership between Western donors
and the Sudanese transitional government.
6. Western assistance to some countries is also con-
strained by perceptions of malfeasance or nonfeasance
in the administration of assistance by t e rectptents.
Western publics and legislatures have more closely
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scrutinized the domestic policies of some recipient
governments, which have been accused of corruption
and human rights abuses. Such concerns, for example,
gave rise to the Solarz Amendment in the United
States requiring a Presidential determination that the
Mengistu regime was not practicing a deliberate policy
of starvation of portions of the population. In addition,
famine-hit countries are almost all among the least
developed countries and thus suffer from maior eco-
nomic problems aside from the food emergency,
which create difficulties-such as nonrepayment of
loans-with Western institutions and governments.
These problems have in some cases triggered donor
actions curtailing economic aid (such as the cutoff of
IMF standby loans to Sudan) or limiting bilateral
assistance (the Brooke Amendment).
7. After nearly a year of grappling with the crisis,
donors continue to face difficult coordination prob-
lems both outside the countries and within them.
International coordination is vested in UN agencies,
led by the UN Office of Emergency Operations for
Africa (OEOA), a new temporary office created by the
UN Secretary General to manage this crisis. While the
OEOA has been able to serve as a clearinghouse for
some donor problems, UN agencies involved in the
crisis are not subordinate to OEOA, creating 'urL isdic-
tional disputes. The results are both congestion and
gaps in the internationally managed food and nonfood
supply lines.
8. Although there has been skirmishing over juris-
diction, UN agencies and international and private
voluntary organizations have been valuable partners
for Western donors. They provide the means to give
aid without government-to-government agreements
that could founder on policy and ideological differ-
ences between donor and recipient countries. The
United States has found it effective, in some instances,
to funnel its assistance through organizations whose
relationship with the host government is often better
than that of the US Government. This has been done
in Mozambique through the UN World Food Pro-
gram, in Angola through the International Committee
of the Red Cross, and in Ethiopia, where the bulk of
US relief aid is channeled through some of the more
than 50 international and private voluntary organiza-
tions managing relief efforts there. Even these organi-
zations, however, are subiect to significant constraints,
such as the inability to travel to impacted areas and
monitor deliveries.)
9. Some major coordination problems have devel-
oped within the recipient countries, usually as a result
of bureaucratic inefficiencies there. Charges of cor-
~---~~
ruption and ineptitude cloud_ working relations be-
tween donors and governments and complicate the
relief effort. In Ethiopia, government intransigence is
blamed for delays in moving goods out of the ports
and warehouses. A plan for private voluntary organi-
zations and donor countries to provide a trucking fleet
managed by the UN to overcome serious transporta-
tion problems is the subiect of controversy between
various UN agencies, Addis Ababa, and donors-even
though all agree it is necessary to enlarge the truck
fleet and organize it for food deliveries. Nevertheless,
one of the early lessons donors recognized during this
crisis was the importance of keeping host-country top
management informed and involved in the execution
of relief programs. Despite less than optimal coordina-
tion, donors have insiste on host involvement and
helped upgrade crisis management techniques in order
to avert blatant tr ctinns and dPlavc.
10. During the next year, donor countries may face
an additional constraint if premature predictions that
the food emergency has ended take the edge off the
sense of urgency that has gripped the West. Although
emergency aid will still be needed in Sudan, Ethiopia,
Niger, Mozambique, Chad, Mali, and at least eight
other African countries, the drama of starving people
played out in the international media may be absent.
Appeals to the public and governments are likely to
receive a less enthusiastic response if it appears people
are recovering and conditions are conducive to suc-
cessful agricultural operations.
Recipient Country Constraints
I1. International relief efforts have been made
more difficult.hy~nditions within the host countries:
- The governments of famine-stricken areas are
often unable or unwilling to give relief efforts
priority over other domestic concerns or to
change government policies that impede food
deliveries. Many African regimes, for example,
depend upon the support of urban populations
for their political survival, and are sometimes less
interested in expediting shipments of food to
rural, politically less important areas.
- Insurgencies and civil wars in Sudan, Ethiopia,
Chad, Angola, Uganda, and Mozambique have
further hampered relief and rehabilitation ef-
forts, and there is little prospect for a reduction
in insurgent activity in these countries. Govern-
ments that lack control of these areas are unable
to distribute food to affected populations and
cannot guarantee the welfare of relief workers
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who travel to contested regions. In addition, some
African regimes want to manipulate relief efforts
to gain the support of previously hostile popula-
tion groups and thus restrict the insurgents' area
of operations. The insurgents themselves some-
times cut transportation lines to prevent govern-
ment reinforcements from reaching contested
areas, thereby also impeding the delivery of
needed supplies.
Infrastructural deficiencies and bureaucratic in-
efficiencies affect all the impacted countries.
Many African governments suffer from corrupt
or undermanned bureaucracies or inadequately
trained officials. Some landlocked countries have
to depend on their neighbors' ports for delivery
of goods, and their needs are sometimes assigned
a lower priority at already overextended port
facilities. Road and train networks are inade-
quate to support the increase necessary to distrib-
ute emergency food and developmental assis-
tance.
12. Transportation and logistic bottlenecks have
been maior constraints on the timely distribution of
food, particularly in landlocked Mali, Niger, and
Chad. Mali's forced dependence on distant ports in
Togo, Ivory Coast, and Senegal and its rudimentary
internal transportation system slowed food deliveries,
particularly in the drought-stricken northern and east-
rn regions. Administrative difficulties, due in large
art to the small cadre of Malian managers available
or relief activities, complicated donor efforts to pro-
ram food arrivals and distribution efficiently. In
iger, incompetence, corruption, and poor planning
lagued the food distribution system during the first
alf of 1985. As a result of donor pressure the
government has markedly improved the system, and,
although a smoother movement of food through ports
in Benin and Nigeria has brought more food into the
country, serious internal transport deficiencies and the
paucity of expert managers to oversee programs still
prevent quick distribution of goods. Transportation
problems were even more serious in Chad. Because of
bilateral tensions between Chad and Nigeria, Nigerian
ports were frequently denied to food shipments bound
for Chad, and donors were forced to use the port in
Cameroon. International donors had to upgrade the
port and railway, and build a bridge across the river
on the border between Cameroon and Chad. While
donor coordination with government officials has
worked well in Chad, the deteriorating security situa-
tion in the east and south threatens food supply lines.
While a year of donor effort has borne fruit in terms
of improved West African port performance, prob-
lems remain in ports of the Horn of Africa and
Mozambique0 25X1
13. Ethiopia. The competition between Ethiopia's
political priorities and its humanitarian needs has 1e25X1
to misunderstandinr~s and disputes between donor
and the Mengistu regime and to impediments an
delays in the delivery of emergency food. Addis Abab
has only grudgingly cooperated with do ~ despit
nearly total dependence on foreign assistance fo
famine relief. The Mengistu regime is suspicious of al
Western donors, especially the United States, and ha
sought to increase its control over international relie
efforts by limiting the number of Western relie
workers and denying them free passage to all parts of
the countr~ 25X1
14. In addition to Addis Ababa's mistrust of West-
ern donors, regime policies further undermine relief
programs and perpetuate conditions detrimental to the
at-risk population. Foremost among them are t 25X1
collectivization of agriculture and the allocation __
scarce resources to inefficient state farms and co11e25X1
fives, the coercive resettlement program that receives
higher priority than emergency feeding efforts, and
the focus on the civil war to the virtual exclusion of
relief efforts in the contested northern provinces.
During this crisis, Ethiopia has also used scarce foreign
exchange to buy grain for its key urban and military
constituencies and granted government rations to s~i-
diers and their families, while leaving the 25X1
stricken rural population to donors' programs.~25X1
15. The insurgency in Ethiopia's northern provinces
has often physically prevented the delivery of supplies
to the region and disrupted agricultural proiects. Et125X1
opian insurgent relief organizations-assisted by inter-
national relief organizations and with the acquiescence
of Sudan-have arranged for cross-border food ship-
ments from Sudan into the contested provinces. This
supply route, however, has proved inadequate to
provide for the great maiority of the population at
risk, and in any case has been interdicted by an
ongoing government offensive0 25X1
16. Sudan. The Nimeiri regime in Sudan was slow
to acknowledge publicly the growing food crisis, there-
by dangerously delaying the start of internatior25X1
assistance. After the April coup that ended that re-
gime, Sudan's new leadership publicly admitted the
severity of the drought and famine, but it was unable
to mobilize basic transport services or managerial
expertise to speed assistance. Food deliveries to the 2.5
million Sudanese in the remote hard-hit western re-
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gions have required extraordinary donor efforts, in-
cluding such expensive expedients as airlifts during
this summer's rainy season when rudimentary truck
routes and the single rail line were washed out before
sufficient food supplies could be pre-positioned.
17. Donors are still financing a truck fleet and
airlift to distribute food to western Sudan. The lack of
government control outside Khartoum, moreover, has
led to corruption and diversion of aid where local
officials have been given the responsibility for food
distribution. Bandits have preyed on relief convoys in
the west. In southern Sudan, the second most critical
area after the west, general lawlessness and the threat
posed by the insurgency remain major deterrents
restricting relief efforts. The insurgents in southern
Sudan have cut much of the region off from relief
supplies.
Positive Factors Affecting Outlook
18. In 1986, food assistance programs will be facili-
tated by certain positive factors that have developed
from the past year's donor efforts:
- Donor coordination has been worked out in
many countries.
- A network of experienced relief workers is al-
ready in place.
-Many potential transport bottlenecks have been
identified, some have been eased, and other
improvements are planned.
- There are increased donor efforts to develop
early warning indicators and improve reporting.
Food Outlook-1986
19. Good rains fell in the worst drought areas
throughout the rainy season and there is guarded
optimism for the fall harvest in most countries. Even
so, another 2.7 million metric tons of food assistance
could be required in 1986. If the harvests prove good
(see figure 2), this figure would of course be reduced.
Food aid is necessary both to carry the Africans
through the next few critical months to the harvest
and to cover the expected 1986 shortfalls in at least 14
countries (see table, page 12).
20. Political factors as well as agricultural condi-
tions will affect the 1986 outlook for most countries.
Adequate rainfall in Ethiopia and improved prospects
for agricultural production this fall are not expected to
decrease substantially the number of people at risk of
starvation. Millions of peasants will be unable to
capitalize on the better conditions because of a loss of
draft animals and seed stocks. Thousands more are still
displaced from their land or have returned too late to
plant a crop. Furthermore, Addis Ababa's agricultural
policies continue to favor collectivization and state
farms over the peasant freeholder, and the Mengistu
regime has refused for some time to negotiate policy
changes recommended by the World Bank and the
European Community. The intensity of the civil war
an~- d-tie -specter of increased fighting in the heavily
populated northern agricultural areas will also dimin-
ish prospects for agricultural recovery on the scale
needed to feed the population adequately. Emergency
food requirements will be less than the 1.3 million
metric tons needed this year, but are still expected to
reach 600,000 to 900,000 metric tons.
21. The Ethiopian food delivery system is plague
by bottlenecks that are likely to continue into 1986.
Regime promises to enhance port operations have no
materialized in a sustained way, and by late Septem-
ber food offtake at Aseb port was less than 1.500
metric tons a day an unacceptable drop~ron~-r=h
3rOQ9_mekri~tox~s a ~ay_ moved las~s,ummex. While
Addis Ababa has made substantial efforts recently to
provide more overland transportation for food deliver-
ies, its resources have fallen short, and the proposed
UN truck fleet has run into organizational difficulties.
Under these constraints, there could be as much as
153,000 metric tons of donated and commercial food
still in the port at the end of this year even if in-
country distribution is accelerated. Because of these
logistic difficulties, donor food deliveries to Aseb may
have to be cut back.
22. The instability of the regime in Sudan and the
impact of the country's profound economic problems
on its infrastructure inhibit the efficient delivery of
relief supplies even though the amount of food re-
quired in 1986 is projected to be considerably less than
it was this year-400,000 metric tons against approxi-
mately 1 million metric tons in 1985. It will be
difficult for the present regime, or any other govern-
ment likely to be in power, to concentrate resources on
famine relief and agricultural recovery.
23. Sudan was fortunate to have good rains in most
of the country for the first time since 1981, and
harvest prospects are good. As a consequence, the
thrust of relief programs will be considerably different
in 1986 from that in 1985. The problem will shift from
one of agrain-deficit country requiring imported
grains to that of a largely self-sufficient country whose
problems of distribution and rural poverty will result
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.Figure 2
Area of Drought in Sub-Saharan Africa
Bountlery representation is
not necesserlly aut~aritalivo.
Agricultural weather conditions during this year's
crop season have improved considerably in the severe
drought and famine-ravaged countries of Sub-Saharan
Africa. In contrast to last year, this year's precipitation
levels and temperatures have been favorable for crops
and grasslands in Mali, Niger, Chad, Ethiopia, and
Sudan.
Above-normal spring rainfall throughout most of the
Sahel and the Horn of Africa region produced sufficient
moisture for a successful spring planting season. Rainfall
amounts in many areas exceeded 100 percent of nor-
mal, benefiting grazing lands and replenishing irriga-
tion supplies. Although some local flooding was experi-
enced in Ethiopia, the precipitation was beneficial to
both crops and pasturelands. Late spring rains remained
adequate and near normal in most areas of Mali, Niger,
Chad, and Sudan. By midsummer, local flooding inter-
rupted transportation and caused some crop damage in
Sudan, Chad, and Mali, but overall crop yields were
probably improved.
Widespread rainfall continued over most of the Sahel
and the Horn region into early September, extending
the overall favorable outlook for a good harvest in early
winter. Heavy rain produced flooding conditions in
Sudan and Chad but improved dry areas in northern
Ethiopia.
The precipitation and crop year in Mozambique
differ from those of the Horn region and the Sahel.
Near-adequate rainfall and mild temperatures per-
tained throughout the growing season. During the
planting season of November-January, rains were heavy
in the northwest, totaling nearly 350 mm in December
and January-150 to 200 percent of normal-and
causing local flooding. Southern areas were mostly dry
during planting, but improved somewhat in January.
Heavy rains caused some flooding in the extreme south
in February. By the end of the rainy season in late
March, crop conditions were fair to good. The 1985
crop was reported to be near the average of the past few
years and significantly improved over last year.
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Emergency Food Delivered in 1985 to African Countries Facing
Abnormal Food Shortages and Projected Food Aid Needs in 1986 a
Country Population UN World Food Program n US AID 1
(thousands) 1985 Food Delivery Tally (metric to
986 Projections
ns)
Food Delivered Crop Total Gra
(metric tons) year Requirem
in Projected
ent Food Aid Needs
Angola 8,000 57,961
Apr-Mar 655,000
120,000
Botswana 221 42,180
Jul-Jun 221,000
50,000
Burkina 6,922 117,756
Nov-Oct 1,344,000
100,000
Cape Verde 300 63,055
Jan-Dec 79,700
~
Chad 4,300 190,358
Nov-Oct 630,000
60,000
Ethiopia 42,000 995,668
Jan-Dec 7,232,000
775,000
The Gambia 736 0
Nov-Oct 125,200
8,330
Countries that face food supply problems during current crop
years as designated in August 1985 by the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO).
n The World Food Program figures refer to food delivered during
the first nine months of the crop years in the individual countries.
The WFP Report is dated 1 August 1985. US AID information is
from field assessments of the developing food production situation
for the current crop year 1985/86, except where noted. AID
cautions that there are no "correct" estimates for African food
production, and that all estimates are subject to change. The date of
information is September 1985.
Estimates for Angola, Botswana, and Mozambique are from the
FAO.
in large pockets of malnutrition and poor health.
Current estimates put the at-risk population in 1986 at
2.5 million, down from this year's 8-9 million. Nearly
all of the population in need will be in the western
provinces, requiring the pre-positioning of grain in the
west between December and the beginning of the
rains in April. During the first half of the year,
intensive donor efforts to keep roads open, truck fleets
operating, and the single rail line to the west function-
ing met with only limited success. These same prob-
lems will confront donors next year. In addition, the
continued insurgency in the south will make adequate
food production there difficult and will seriously
impede if not preclude delivery of relief supplies.
a It is too early in the crop year to make projections, or, as in the case
of Mozambique, the information is not available.
e Exceptionally good weather from now until November-December
could reduce the need to 983,000 metric tons. Bad weather until the
harvest could raise it to 1,358,000 metric tons.
r Somalia is expecting to receive about 125,000 metric tons in
nonemergency food aid assistance.
e Although Sudan is estimating a sorghum crop of 4,280,000 metric
tons, there may be shortfalls due to poor internal distribution that
will create emergency food needs beyond aggregate availabilities.
24. In other severely affected countries, the rains
have also brought new optimism, but projected condi-
tions are unfavorable for complete recovery. The food
deficit in Mozambique's interior provinces is still
acute. Although rain has come to some parts of the
country, recovery has been impeded by the cumula-
tive effects of four years of drought, more than three
years of active insurgency, and widespread malnour-
ishment and illness. The affected population for 1986
is estimated at 2.5 million people, approximately the
same as this year. Conditions for 1986 in the Sahelian
countries are problematical. In the course of the 17-
year Sahelian drought, there have previously been as
many as three consecutive years of good rains, always
followed by several years of drought. The rains and
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anticipated good harvests this year, therefore, may
provide only a brief breathing spell for Niger, Chad,
and Mali.
25. Even if there are good harvests, the paucity of
trucks and inadequate roads in Sahelian countries will
impede the distribution of food from surplus to deficit
reas within the countries and the delivery of relief
supplies to at-risk populations. With the return of the
rains, many people who came to camps in urban areas
are beginning to return to their homes in remote
regions, although they will still be dependent on food
aid. Widespread rural poverty will also inhibit the
redistribution of surplus domestic food in the cash
economy. Donated trucks and upgraded roads and
bridges have eased the transportation problems some-
what, but there is little margin for error in the shaky
transportation system. Management bottlenecks or a
breakdown in the expanded distribution system could
send the people back to the camps.
Role of the Soviet Union
26. Moscow's approach to food problems in Africa
has not changed appreciably in recent months. The
Kremlin insists that the food emergency is the result of
Western exploitation for which the USSR bears no
responsibility, and the Soviets have provided little food
and agricultural assistance to African states. The Sovi-
ets did respond to the negative publicity they received
for their lack of response to the crisis in Ethiopia by
supplying transport assistance and limited amounts of
food, but aid levels remain well below those of the
West.
27. Constraints on Soviet food production, the
USSR's shortage of hard currency, and its insistence
that African famine is a Western problem make it
highly unlikely that Moscow will devote substantial
resources to famine relief. If the Soviets believe that
amine poses an immediate threat to the survival of a
lient regime, they might step up food and logistic
ssistance, but they would probably provide far more
by way of military and security aid to deal with any
political problems famine might create for the client
eadership. Moscow's tightfisted relief policy may lead
to a loss of prestige in the eyes of some African
governments, and Soviet clients under pressure might
be inclined to move toward the West. Any such moves,
however, will be limited because of the perception of
most client regimes that continued security ties to the
USSR are vital to their survival.
Implications for the United States and the West
28. The United States and other Western countries
will be asked for stepped-up development aid in the
coming year even as African countries continue to
demand and need emergency food assistance. The
cumulative effects of two years or more of malnutri-
tion, disease, lack of water, and human dislocation are
now being felt. Rehabilitation will require extensive
programs to restore health and control disease, replen-
ish water supplies, and restore land productivity.
Donor problems will become even more complex if
the continued provision of emergency food aid works
as a disincentive to increased local food production. If
food aid results in lower farm prices, for example,
farmers will have little incentive to produce beyond
the subsistence level, and the dependence on interna-
tional food aid could deepen.
29. It will be difficult for donors to determine when
crisis conditions no longer exist and normal needs
begin. Even under "normal" conditions, large propor-
tions of the populations in affected countries will be
malnourished, sick, and without land or employment
opportunities, and African governments will expect
aid to continue to combat these problems. The United
States and other donors could find themselves being
criticized for abandoning countries in need as emer-
gency programs wind down. Relations between Ethio-
pia and the United States will be particularly tense
during this period. The tenuous cooperation that was
built on humanitarian concerns during the emergency
will be threatened.
30. Drought has een on y one factor in the famine;
reform of Africa's national agricultural policies re-
mains the most important prerequisite for increased
food production over the long term.' Programs to
introduce new plant varieties, fertilizers, and pesti-
cides have been largely ineffective because of African
governments' failure or inability to support farmers.
Attempts by the United States and other Western
donors to encourage agricultural, economic, and politi-
cal reforms will be resisted by some African govern-
ments, who either view the reforms as politically risky
or reject them as inconsistent with their own governing
philosophies. Those African leaders willing to pursue
reform will demand significant amounts of aid from
the West. In any case, reforms of agricultural policies
will take years to bear fruit, and will not have an
impact on African food requirements in 1986.
' A more detailed account of the underlying causes of food
problems in Africa overall is found in the Interagency Intelligence
Assessment Food Problems in Sub-Saharan Africa: Prospects jor
1984 and Beyond, 22 Alareh 1984.
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Figure 3
Cross-Border Refugee Movement in the Horn of Africa
jJnrdan
Baphdad*
lraq
~icosia
Leban44
Beirutit
Suer
Canal
Central
Afriean
Republic
Victoria
rac`S
as,ooo~,
*Addis Abaha
await
Kuwait
Persian
_ GuH
'kRiyadh
Saudi
Arabia
~ Gull of
Arian Aden
fi a:^ Z i~ \t ii 4a /~"' 0 300 Kilometers
at aeoassarlly authoritative.
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Doha
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ANNEX A
The Refugee Crisis
Refugees are an integral part of the African crisis.
There are an estimated 3 million refugees contin-
entwide, with some groups having fled their home-
lands decades ago. Forced across international borders
by starvation and internal chaos in their home coun-
tries, these refugees burden the already depleted
physical and human resources of the host country, rob
the sending countries of vital workers, and raise
tensions between sending and receiving countries.
The most severely affected drought-stricken countries
have been particularly hard hit by refugee problems
over the past several years. In the Horn countries alone
there are approximately 1.7 million refugees, nearly half
a million of them Ethiopian famine victims now in
camps in Sudan, Somalia, and Diibouti. (See figure 3.)
Thousands of Chadian refugees have fled to neighboring
countries, approximately 40,000 to the Central African
Republic and an estimated 80,000 to 120,000 to western
Sudan. Chronic food shortages and persistent insurgent
activity have pushed thousands of refugees out of Mo-
zambique into all of its neighboring countries except
Tanzania. Nomads from Niger and Mali have crossed
southern borders into the coastal West African countries
and north to Algeria in greater numbers than ever
before. These movements follow age-old migratory paths
and, while Algeria offers some assistance to those in its
territory, little official"notice has been taken of increased
numbers in the coastal countries.
From the perspectives of the governments involved,
refugee problems have created or intensified both
domestic and international political strains. Domesti-
cally, the crisis has required governments, already
under considerable economic duress, to allocate signif-
icant resources to emergency programs for refugees.
For example, Sudan found it necessary to assign many
of its small cadre of. national development officials to
coordinate refugee relief in order to comply with
donors' requests to expand relief efforts to the 680,000
Ethiopian refugees and 120,000 Chadian refugees in
the country. In addition to human resources, maior
parts of Sudan's transportation system have also been
diverted from domestic operations to the handling of
relief goods. While Sudan and the other maior receiv-
ing countries have been hospitable to refugees so far,
their continued presence in growing numbers is begin-
ning to tax the good will of host governments, particu-
larly as the refugees exacerbate local famine condi-
tions and endemic tribal and ethnic tensions.
Beyond the domestic impact, government decisions
on refugee relief are taken in the context of increased
tensions with the sending countries. Nowhere is this
more evident than in the Horn. Ethiopia has historical-
ly been at odds with its neighbors and the exodus of
some 1 million Ethiopians over the past several
years-400,000 in this year alone-has worsened these
strains. Leaders in Sudan, Somalia, and Diibouti be-
lieve that the arrival of Ethiopian refugees-sparked
not only by drought but also by the civil war-is
intensifying their own internal problems and compli-
cating their relations with Ethiopia.
Over the near term refugee numbers are likely to
grow as a result of continuing serious food shortfalls,
intensifying insurgencies, and civil war. Asa conse-
quence, the international community, including the
United States, will be expected to increase aid levels to
provide primary care and protection to refugees.
Over the longer term, donors will expect both
sending and receiving countries to assume responsibil-
ity for planning comprehensive solutions for refu-
gees-either repatriation or permanent resettlement-
rather than depending solely on emergency aid. Either
option will be politically and economically difficult
and require international resource commitments over
many years.
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