THE PHILIPPINE COMMUNIST INSURGENCY: ITS ACCELERATING GROWTH AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00573R000700920004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 1, 1985
• Content Type: SNIE

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Directorate of Secret
Central
Intelligence
A110 for East Asia
?
Room 7 E 62, CIA Hc s 25x1
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The Philippine Communist
Insurgency: Its Accelerating
Growth and Implications for
the United States
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Secret
SNIE 56-2-85
August 1985
Copy 285
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SNIE 56-2-85
THE PHILIPPINE COMMUNIST
INSURGENCY: ITS ACCELERATING
GROWTH AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE UNITED STATES
Information available as of 3 July 1985 was used
in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved by the National Foreign Intelligence
Board on 9 August, 1985.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE
1
KEY JUDGMENTS
3
DISCUSSION
7
Background to the Present Crisis
7
The CPP/NPA Organization
7
The Party
7
The United Front
11
The New People's Army
12
Communist Strategy and Tactics
13
Operation of a Guerrilla Front
14
CPP/NPA's Progress
14
External Support
14
Growing Popular Support for the Insurgency
23
Weaknesses of the NPA
25
The Government Response
25
Near-Term Prospects
26
Implications for US Interests
30
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SCOPE NOTE
The increasingly rapid growth of the Communist insurgency in the
Philippines and the absence thus far of any effective government effort
to counter the threat raise the prospects that a Communist government
could come to power in Manila. This Estimate examines the growth of
the New People's Army (NPA) and the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP), and assesses the near-term prospects (three to five
years) for the insurgency and the government's counterinsurgency
program. The implications for the United States of a Communist
takeover also are examined.
President Marcos, beset by an opposition effort to start impeach-
ment proceedings and growing public allegations of vast financial
investments overseas by the first family and its cronies, may advance
the time of a presidential election from 1987 to November 1985 by
resigning in September (45 to 60 days before the election). While such a
move would provide Marcos with some political advantages?catching
the opposition while still in a state of disarray and, assuming his
reelection, giving him a new mandate for six more years?it also could
exacerbate opposition dissatisfaction and provide the CPP/NPA with
ammunition to expand their grassroots support base in the country-
side?reinforcing the assessments in this Estimate.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The Communist-led insurgents in the Philippines are in an ideal
position to benefit from the malaise prevalent throughout their country:
? Popular support for the Marcos government is at an alltime low.
? The prospects for meaningful political reforms under this
regime are slight.
? Economic recovery will proceed only slowly.
? The military's response to the New People's Army (NPA) is for
the most part inept and often counterproductive.
It is unlikely that the military's performance will improve enough to
stem increased NPA activity in the near term.
The NPA is likely to continue to grow and will gradually increase
the size and frequency of military actions to include assaults against
better defended targets and expanded night operations.
We believe government forces may soon cede de facto control of
some lowland areas and rural highlands to the Communists in many
regions of the country.
The Communists continue to prepare to bring their revolution to
the streets of Manila. Such an event would further undermine the
Marcos government, though it would place the CPP/NPA apparatus in
Manila at considerable risk. The Communists, however, cannot hope to
achieve a military victory in the near future without substantially more
arms and ammunition than they now possess. Nevertheless, we judge
they will continue to rely primarily on internal sources for arms and
funding.
In sum, we believe that, if present trends continue, within the next
three to five years, the insurgents could stalemate the military in the
countryside and bring widespread urban terrorism to the streets of
Manila. We also believe, however, a major governmental crisis during
this period could give a coalition dominated by the Communists, or the
Communists themselves, an opportunity to seize power without first
achieving a decisive battlefield advantage.
Our bleak prognosis, however, could be altered by a number of
developments, chief among which would be the installation of an
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effective, reform-minded, non-Communist government in Manila.' This
could come about as the result of an orderly constitutional succession in
the event of Marcos's death, his forced removal from office by military
coup, or his defeat in the 1987 presidential election. Any new non-
Communist government would have an opportunity to remedy the
country's many ills; with an improved economy and a calmer political
environment, a reduction of the Communist appeal would be within
reach. At the same time, any successor government would face most of
the same formidable problems confronting Marcos?and without his
experience or other assets. Whether a new government could make
more headway against the insurgency or economic problems is an open
question.
A less likely development that could alter our bleak prognosis
would be for Marcos to recognize that reversing the current ominous
trends requires him to initiate sweeping, fundamental reforms,
including:
? Holding credible elections in 1986 and 1987.
? Depoliticizing the AFP.
? Implementing a coordinated counterinsurgency strategy and
pursuing it vigorously.
? Adopting programs that would stimulate economic recovery.
We are agreed, however, that the chances are extremely low for Marcos
undertaking any or all of these measures.
The current situation could give rise to some very serious problems
for the United States. We could see a prolonged period of -civil war,"
with the government increasingly hard pressed, serious terrorist and
insurgent attacks on US persons and installations, growing anti-Ameri-
canism, and a period of hard choices for the United States?including if
and when to abandon Marcos. Even if the Communists ruled out direct
attack on US citizens, increased violence would pose a substantial
danger to the almost 100,000 Americans in the islands and US economic
interests there. Under these circumstances, US efforts to prop up Marcos
probably would be counterproductive in that the United States would
be seen by most Filipinos as supporting an unpopular dictator. As long
as Marcos remains in power, we see little prospect for success against the
insurgents. At best, US aid might retard Communist expansion.
A takeover in the Philippines by Communists or by a government
heavily influenced by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)
would be viewed by countries in the region?particularly other ASEAN
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countries and China?as a setback of historic proportions, perhaps even
more devastating than our defeat in Vietnam. Besides the loss of US
bases, it could also mean a significant loss of US credibility and prestige.
Among other results likely to follow a CPP/NPA takeover are:
? US forward-basing strategy would suffer due to loss of the bases,
and US power-projection capability would be adversely
impacted.
? The Philippines might permit Soviets access to the military
facilities?at a price?thereby increasing Soviet influence in the
region and diminishing the United States'. This would pose a
significant strategic threat to US friends and allies in the region.
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DISCUSSION
Background to the Present Crisis
1. The current insurgency can be traced to 1968
when several young Communists, led by an ardent
Maoist, Jose Maria Sison, attempted to inculcate Mao's
ideology into the moribund pro-Soviet Communist
Party of the Philippines (PKP). Failing in this attempt,
they split with the PKP and formed a new Communist
Party, the pro-Beijing Communist Party of the Philip-
pines (CPP), with the aim of bringing armed revolu-
tion once more to the Philippines. They linked up with
the remnants of a small Huk guerrilla band, which
they renamed the New People's Army (NPA).
2. Sison's guerrillas Quickly sought to establish a
permanently liberated base in the Cagayan Valley of
northern Luzon, in imitation of Mao Zedong's experi-
ence at Yenan. But they were no match for the
Philippine armed forces, who mounted several cam-
paigns in the early 1970s, forcing the CPP/NPA to
abandon the fixed-base strategy. The Communists
then opened guerrilla fronts in several remote parts of
the countryside, emphasizing armed propaganda
teams rather than military activity. Throughout most
of the 1970s they remained an irritant in remote parts
of the countryside while the military's attention fo-
cused on the Muslim insurgency in Mindanao and the
Sulu archipalego islands
3. Communist expansion during the early 1970s was
slow. They experienced numerous setbacks and
learned by trial and error. By the 1980s, however, they
were well entrenched on all major islands and were
operating in nearly every province. Since the assassina-
tion of opposition leader Benigno Aquino in August
1983, CPP/NPA political and military action has
escalated rapidly. Taking advantage of widespread
popular disenchantment with the Marcos family and
other internal problems, the Communists have fo-
mented numerous antiregime rallies and strikes, re-
cruited several thousand new guerrillas, and stepped
up NPA military operations throughout the country-
side
4. These insurgents are markedly different from the
previous Communist insurgents, the Huks, who fought
the government from 1946 to 1954, and again in the
1960s. CPP/NPA leadership today includes young
intellectuals from all parts of the Philippines, not just
central Luzon; they rigorously pursue a Maoist strate-
gy emphasizing political organizing of the rural popu-
lation and protracted guerrilla warfare. By analyzing
the revolutions in Vietnam and Nicaragua, they have
learned the importance of manipulating international
public opinion to their benefit.
The CPP/NPA Organization
The Party
5. The Communist Party of the Philippines?which
we estimate
to be about 30,000 to 45,000 strong?is a
tightly knit organization led by dedicated revolution-
aries who are well trained and highly disciplined
t controls villages inhabited by at least 5
million people and is contesting government control of
villages inhabited by another 5.5 million. For the
purpose of this paper, we use the term Communist-
controlled village to mean areas where:
? A Communist -shadow government- has been
established.
? Communist peasant, women, and youth associa-
tions are functioning.
? Most of the population is sympathetic and gives
material support to the insurgents.
? At least 50 percent of the population can be
mobilized for protest actions.
? NPA militia units may be present.
6. As with all Communist parties, the CPP and its
military arm, the NPA, is under control of a small
dedicated Central Committee, that makes all impor-
tant decisions regarding ideology, strategy, and man-
agement of the party. Central Committee directives
are implemented by committees at the village level,
the NPA at each level is under the command of both
the local party committee and higher level NPA
commands, and united front activities are directed by
a similar interlocking command structure. This system
of command and control has provided both strong
central direction and local flexibility in implementing
orders from above.
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7. The CPP is organized along both territorial and
functional lines and, since 1984, by rural and urban
responsibilities as well Six regional
commissions, each headed by a Central Committee
member, were created in the 1980s to cope with the
geographic spread of the party and to ensure that all
subordinate committees operate in accordance with
the party line set by the Central Committee. Five
functional commissions oversee party activities in the
areas of foreign and domestic propaganda, military
affairs, mass movements, and united front activities.
The United Front
8. The National Democratic Front (NDF), the par-
ty's main united front organization, is in the forefront
of the CPP's overt effort to form a broad alliance of
Filipinos opposed to the Marcos government.
9. Its united front organizing skills have historically
been the weak link in the CPP/NPA insurgency. The
party's efforts to form a broad alliance of Filipinos
opposed to the Marcos government have suffered
setbacks repeatedly due to the capture of front mem-
bers and the dogmatic policies of party leaders. Party
leaders, realizing this weakness, are now concentrating
on united front activities to ensure a role for the party
in any successor government. The CPP/NPA has
begun to scatter party cells, infiltrating the leadership
of some organizations, forming new ones seemingly
independent of the party when necessary, and estab-
lishing alliances throughout Philippine society in sup-
port of the party's revolutionary objectives.
11. The party has also infiltrated organized labor
through the NDF and considers this sector one of its
best penetrated. Party influence in the Kilusang Mayo
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Uno?May First Movement?accounts for much of
the increasingly militant tone of union activity. The
labor movement in the Philippines is badly fragment-
ed, and Communist control is tenuous among many of
the leftist labor alliances. Despite this, party plans to
continue fomenting labor unrest make strike activity
likely to remain high in the months ahead.
The New People's Army
12. The NPA, fighting along as many as 60 fronts
nationwide, is characterized by strict discipline, opera-
tional security and effective command and control.'
we estimate the
NPA to have about 15,000 to 16,500 regulars orga-
nized in large units and as urban guerrilla units, and
15,000 to 20,000 part-time irregulars, organized as
village militia and local guerrilla units
Individual guerrillas may participate in
various organizations described below, depending on
circumstances
13. Regular Units?Regular Mobile Forces. The
Regular Mobile Forces are the best trained, equipped,
and organized guerrillas. These full-time forces are
responsible for most of the large-scale raids and am-
bushes. NPA regulars operate at three levels?district,
guerrilla front, and regional?under the direction of
their respective party committees.
14. Main Regional Guerrilla Units (MRGU) and
Secondary Regional Guerrilla Units (SRGU) of be-
tween 50 and 300 men each are equivalent to a regular
company of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
They normally confine their operations to the estab-
lished guerrilla fronts throughout the country. The
MRGU is a mobile force of about 100 to 300 guerrillas
that can link up any time with an SRGU or local
guerrilla unit, forming a combined force to conduct
guerrilla operations. Within the past two years, the
NPA has frequently combined such forces to success-
fully attack poorly defended government targets.
MRGUs in Mindanao can now field 200 to 300 men,
but units of this size are still in their formative stages
in most regions. Operations involving 100 to 200
guerrillas throu hout the rest of the country are not
unusual
15. Regular Units?Armed City Partisans. The
NPA uses classic urban guerrilla tactics to bring the
war to the cities. Four- to seven-member guerrilla
Reporting varies. The Philippine Government publicly reports
that there are no more than 45 fronts.
teams?called Sparrow Units?specialize in killing
police, other government employees, and informers
whom the party identifies in its propaganda as respon-
sible for abusing the people.
he NPA has been organizing for combat
in Manila since 1980 and now has about 300 to 600
people involved in these activities in the capital.
16. Irregular Units?People's Guerrillas. In mu-
nicipalities and villages where the party is contesting
control or is already firmly entrenched, local guerrilla
squads of 10 to 20 irregulars are formed by the NPA,
both to support regular insurgent military forces and
to operate independently. These local guerrilla squads
operate together with NPA regulars in or close to their
home villages, sometimes in coniuction with much
larger guerrilla units. They are usually poorly armed
and may play only a supporting, rather than a combat,
role in large NPA operations. By day, a guerrilla in
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such a unit works at his normal job; at night, or in
emergencies, he is available for assignment by his
party superiors.
17. Irregular Units?People's Militia. A militia
unit is the lowest echelon of party organization at the
village level. These units of about 15 to 20 persons
operate directly under the village committee rather
than the NPA. The militia are villagers, male and
female, who are covertly recruited and given the
critical responsibility for defense of villagers in CPP-
controlled areas against government reprisals and pro-
tection of resident or visiting cadre. A secret unit
within each village militia is responsible for enforce-
ment of party discipline, which includes assassinations.
Communist Strategy and Tactics
18. The CPP/NPA follows a political and guerrilla
strategy of protracted revolutionary guerrilla warfare,
following the teachings of Mao Zedong as modified by
party founder Jose Maria Sison. The strategy empha-
sizes the importance of painstakingly building a base
of support in the countryside among the peasant
population. Guerrilla warfare is seen as complement-
ing the political program in which party members and
front groups work to undermine the Marcos govern-
ment and legitimize their own organization
19. To broaden its popular appeal, the party in-
creasingly is citing Nicaragua as an example of a
revolution in which Marxist-Leninists, moderate oppo-
sition, and church workers successfully united to over-
throw a dictator. The CPP/NPA portrays the Sandinis-
ta regime as one where the Christian plea for social
justice has been realized without the repressive politi-
cal and social controls of other Communist countries.
This analogy has an appeal to some Filipino Catholics
who oppose the Marcos regime but have misgivings
about uniting with Communist revolutionaries.
20. Another aspect of CPP/NPA strategy, though
not well publicized, is the party's consolidation plan.
According to Sison, once the Communists come to
power, there will be a subsequent "socialist revolu-
tion" to consolidate Communism in Philippine society.
Although united front tactics and coalition govern-
ment proposals are articulated now, when the People's
Democratic Republic of the Philippines has been
established, the party alone will be responsible for
transforming the society into a "proletarian dictator-
ship." At that time, the "blood debt to the people"
owed by the landlord class and other "enemies of the
people- will be avenged
21. It is in the political sphere that the Communists
now see their most advantageous prospects. The CPP
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is maneuvering for a role in any government that
would be formed should Marcos die in office and is
actively promoting the concept of a coalition govern-
ment in which it would legally participate. In a switch
from its previous position of advocating a boycott of
elections, the CPP/NPA now intends to actively par-
ticipate in the 1986 nationwide local elections, sup-
porting candidates they have co-opted, while disrupt-
in the election process in areas where they are weak.
Operation of a Guerrilla Front
22. The CPP/NPA concentrates most military ac-
tion in rural areas. Guerrilla fronts, typically located in
mountainous terrain adjacent to a populated lowland,
consist of a series of zones or areas. A "red zone"
contains the guerrilla base and surrounding base area.
Guerrilla bases, although extensive in size, are not
fortified military encampments. Rather, the NPA
forces live in several established contiguous barrios?
usually 10 or more?which differ little from other
barrios. In some instances, these barrios are surround-
ed by a defensive perimeter of trenches and foxholes,
but in most cases the NPA has abandoned these bases
without serious losses as government forces prepared
to assault them (see figure 5)
23. Beyond this core is a "pink zone," the area
within the front where most political and military
activities to contest the government's control are con-
centrated. Urbanized areas within this zone, controlled
by the government and its forces, are usually classified
as "white areas.- The party is now stepping up efforts
to penetrate these cities and towns, organizing white
area committees and urban guerrilla units in most
fronts. Areas that lie outside the guerrilla fronts are
also labeled white areas, but, as the fronts expand,
party strategists expect these white areas to disappear.
24. NPA Regular Mobile Forces are housed and
trained in the guerrilla base area, which provides a
reliable operational center, secure sanctuary, and rear
area for the party's local political and military organi-
zations. NPA regulars operate throughout the guerrilla
front from these bases; large units attacking govern-
ment forces and small armed propaganda teams in-
creasing party influence in villages are scattered
throughout the front.
The CPP/NPA's Progress
25. Communist long-term efforts to politicize the
rural population against the government are increas-
ingly paying dividends. New guerrilla fronts are being
formed regularly, and the number of villages falling
under Communist control has expanded rapidly since
mid-1983 In southern Mindanao,
for example, where the CPP/NPA is very active,
current Constabulary estimates?which we believe
very conservative?indicate the Communists have
more than doubled the number of villages they control
since the Aquino assassination in 1983.
one-ttura ot tne
approximately 1,600 villages in the region?are now
under Communist control, and they are contesting
control of another third
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26. The level of insurgent activity has been increas-
ing steadily over the last decade, with the most
dramatic growth occurring since 1980. Last year, 75
percent of the more than 5,000 violent incidents were
initiated by the NPA Even discounting 25X1
the 1,300 ballot box snatchings that occurred during
elections in 1984, there were nine times more violent
incidents in 1984 than 10 years earlier and 50 percent
more than in 1983. 25X1
27. NPA units nationwide now routinely attack
government forces. These include 100- to 300-man
assaults on poorly defended armed forces garrisons
and economic and strategic targets. Despite recent
government sweep operations in Mindanao and north-
ern Luzon, the NPA?not the armed forces?still
initiates most of the military actions. Most CPP/NPA
front commands schedule at least one attack on gov-
ernment forces per month; in Mindanao, they plan
two per month. Raids, which net the guerrillas favor-
able publicity and firearms, increased by 53 percent in
the past year-216 were carried out in 1984. By
attacking weakly defended targets with large com-
bined guerrilla forces, the NPA is assured a tactical
and propaganda victory
28. Most guerrilla-initiated incidents are focused on
assassinations and assaults on individuals to acquire
weapons. Such incidents are now common nearly
everywhere. In 1984,
government and civilian casualties as a result of these
incidents totaled 2,600
killed and 1,400 wounded.
External Support
29. We do not believe the Communists currently
receive any sizable foreign financial assistance or arms
supplies. Beginning in the 1960s, Beijing provided
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Figure 5
A Typical Communist (CPP/NPA) Fronta
!,
\
0? I / \
,----'
? -...
Front area
I IGuerrilla base
Li Base area
Guerrilla zone
J Guerrilla front
Village (barangay)
? CPP/NPA controlled
Contested
O Uncontested
- Road
? Commonist Pery of the Philippines/
New Peopie's Amy
105514 0-03
t
?41
/
\ As
NO/
4
\
.
%,.. _
Vhite Zone
(government controlled)
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arms, training, and money, but Chinese assistance was
terminated in 1975. l'ilembers of the Central
Committee have admitted that
the party's most significant foreign financial support
has come from organizations of expatriate Filipinos in
the United States. There is evidence that 150 AK-47
rifles, purchased on the gray arms market, were
smuggled into Manila harbor in 1981
30
that the CPP lea ers ip was reassessing t e mi itary
struggle and had concluded that foreign arms pur-
chases would be necessary if the Communists were to
try to take advantage of the deteriorating domestic
situation by rapidly escalating guerrilla warfare. Many
CPP leaders, however, want to maintain an indepen-
dent and self-reliant foreign policy. Therefore, we
expect any attempt to purchase arms to be through a
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middleman, such as using the Moro National Libera-
tion Front as a go-between with Middle Eastern 25X1
countries.3 NDF cadre reportedly
have been dis-
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patched to Europe for this purpose
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s MNLF leader Nur Misuari, who is supported by Libya and
Syria, has been advocating a tactical alliance between his guerrillas
and the CPP/NPA for some time.
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. NDF contacts with the
Soviets were first reported in 1982. A -reconciliation"
between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and
the CPP/NPA is reportedly now being tested in joint
efforts in the labor sector between unions affiliated
with the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)
and the CPP/NPA's labor front, the Kilusang Mayo
Uno (KMU). If true, this supports President Marcos's
recent charge that the Soviet-controlled WFTU has
been funneling money to both WFTU-affiliated labor
unions in the Philippines and the KMU. Nevertheless,
we judge that for the next year or two the Communists
will continue to rely primarily on internal sources for
arms and funding.
Growing Popular Support for the Insurgency
32. The CPP/NPA's remarkable growth and the
danger this poses to stability cannot be attributed
solely to its own efforts or the appeal of Communist
ideology. We believe that, in areas controlled by the
party, some people cooperate voluntarily with the
CPP because of its seemingly honest approach to
correcting political and economic ills. The insurgent
threat would be far less serious, however, if fundamen-
tal political and economic problems did not exist?a
breakdown in the traditional political order, large-
scale poverty and economic troubles, and the perva-
sive perception of knilitary
maintaining the Marcos regime in power.
33. Political and economic power are monopolized
at the top by a small oligarchy, while at the bottom the
mass of Filipinos live in poverty without real input
into the political process. The trappings and symbols of
democracy exist, but they overlay a patron-client
system inherited from Spanish rule and earlier tribal
traditions. Until recently, the hierarchical network of
patrons, held together by personal loyalties and oper-
ating much like a political machine, provided essential
goods and services to the people in the countryside in
return for their support. Because much of the coun-
try's wealth depended on agricultural production,
power was distributed widely among regional barons
rather than concentrated in the hands of a few leaders
in Manila
34. After World War II, economic modernization,
the lure of the -good life" in Manila, land reform, and
other such factors began to undermine the influence of
the regional chieftains and concentrate power and
wealth more in the capital. President Marcos dramati-
cally accelerated this trend in the 1970s when he
imposed martial law, which enabled him to concen-
trate greater power in his own hands at the expense of
regional leaders. He now handpicks not only Cabinet
officers, but also mayors and other local officials?a
privilege traditionally reserved for the regional elite.
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In many areas this has created officials more depen-
dent on, and responsible to, President Marcos than to
the needs of their local constituencies.
35. Similarly, a few favored Marcos cronies have
been given?often by presidential decree?control of
large agricultural and industrial monopolies that domi-
nate the economy and seriously disrupt the operation
of a free market. These personal associates retain their
favored position by demonstrations of loyalty to the
President and financial support for his political ma-
chine?the KBL. Those who do not contribute time
and money risk expropriation of their business empires
and loss of political influence to others more willing to
cooperate. We believe that a recovery of the troubled
Philippine economy depends on the President's dis-
mantling of the crony system, but, in view of his
declining popular support, we are skeptical that he can
acce it the loss to his own power that this would entail.
36. Attempts to reduce the plight of the rural poor,
such as President Marcos's agrarian reform program?
which is limited to 14 percent of the country's farm-
land?have, in our view, increased poverty and wors-
ened income distribution: at least 20 million rural
Filipinos live in poverty?as defined by the World
Bank as an annual income of less than $160?and their
numbers are increasing; the landless poor account for
nearly 40 percent of households in rice- and sugar-
growing areas; and several million Filipinos live in
Manila's slums. The outlook for the next several years
is not encouraging. Even if President Marcos initiated
a sweeping economic reform program, we estimate
that the majority of rural Filipinos will still be living in
poverty in 1990
37. Overall, the Philippines faces a prolonged strug-
gle resuming even modest economic growth under the
burden of its $25 billion foreign debt. The recovery
will be especially sensitive to adverse developments in
the international economy and domestic political tur-
moil. Even if all goes well at home and abroad, the
debt crisis will continue to depress economic activity
through 1990, and the political costs of austerity for
the government will be substantial because of rising
unemployment and higher taxes. At the same time, we
anticipate a period of rapid growth in the working-age
population-3.3 percent annually?projected to be the
highest in Asia, which would ensure that the average
Filipino ex eriences little improvement in living stan-
dards
38. Most Filipinos blame official corruption for
much of their government's poor performance. They
point to the enormous personal wealth of President
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Marcos and his family, mostly accumulated while in
power, and note that they have invested large sums
outside the country. And although enriching one's self 25X1
while in office has been a generally accepted practice
in the Philippines, the extent of the President's inter-
vention on behalf of family and friends has exceeded
cultural norms. Stories of other officials both high and
low participating in illegal logging activities, misusing
public funds, operating protection rackets, and involv-
ing themselves in other corrupt practices have prolif-
erated and been exploited by the Communists. Wheth-
er all these tales are true or not?and we believe many
are?most Filipinos fully accept their validity and
have little faith in government institutions. 25X1
39. Abuses perpetrated by corrupt officers and
undisciplined personnel and a general breakdown of
peace and order have severely shaken respect for the
military and the police. Many Filipinos question the
government's ability to protect them from lawless 25X1
elements and to dispense justice equitably. Murder,
kidnapings, torture, and lesser abuses have become
commonplace occurrences in recent years. Many al-
most certainly have been committed by overzealous
officials in their pursuit of Communist insurgents, a
pattern that began while suppressing the Muslim
40. In any event, we believe real and perceived
abuses have been a major factor in many Filipinos'
choosing to join the insurgent ranks. This is especially
true of the growing number of Catholic clergy and
nuns who support the Communists. Some already play
important roles in the insurgent organization, such as
Conrado Balweg, a rebel priest, NPA commander,
and, now, popular Filipino folk hero. Priests and nuns
among the CPP/NPA have recently stepped up their
efforts to popularize the Nicaraguan experience, hop-
ing to convince their colleagues disenchanted with the
present government and its military abuses that coop-
eration with the insurgents will not adversely affect
the Church's interests.
41. Politicization of the AFP by President Marcos
has also contributed to the deterioration of the militar-
y's reputation. Until a few years ago, most Filipinos
viewed the AFP as a professional and competent force.
The military took pride in a record of protecting the
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nation's security, defending the constitution, and not
becoming involved in politics. After the imposition of
martial law in 1972, however, President Marcos began
blatantly to select officers for key assignments and
promotions based more on personal loyalty than mili-
tary competence. The morale of the officer corps
plummeted, and the perception that politics rules the
AFP has become the conventional wisdom for many
Filipinos.
Weaknesses of the NPA
42. The CPP/NPA is not without its problems. The
CPP/NPA's popular "Robin Hood" image has become
somewhat tarnished in some areas. The population in
Communist-controlled areas is discovering that the
Communists have no magic solutions for economic
realities and are much more thorough tax collectors
than the Philippine Government. Another result has
been popular resentment, as many learn that fear and
intimidation play a more important role once the
CPP/NPA assumes de facto control over an area and
democratic ideals?such as consent of the governed?
are swept aside. We anticipate that such disillusion-
ment will grow as the Communists attempt to expand
their mass base, making the CPP/NPA increasingly
vulnerable to a sophisticated, coordinated counterin-
surgency effort. Moreover, a dramatic increase in
urban violence, particularly in Manila, could be the
spark that ignites the middle class into action against
the dangers posed by the Communists.
43. Beyond this, the NPA lacks a reliable logistic
pipeline to support a guerrilla war. Other CPP/NPA
weaknesses include:
? No foreign sanctuary. The Philippines is geo-
graphically isolated. Neither Malaysia nor Indo-
nesia, the nearest countries, will permit Commu-
nist insurgent bases on their soil.
Penchant for paperwork. The Communists keep
detailed records and files that are regularly
discovered when cadres are captured at their
homes or safehouses. When compromised, such
information provides government security forces
with a better understanding of the insurgent
organization, membership, and plans.
? No charismatic leader. The CPP/NPA has no
one of the stature of Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh,
or Fidel Castro. The Central Committee and
senior cadres in prison are virtually unknown to
the public.
? Anti-American rhetoric. Party propaganda por-
trays the United States as an imperialist nation
and the sole prop supporting the Marcos govern-
ment. To some Filipinos, this propaganda rings
hollow.
? Non-Communist elements in the NPA. In the
attempt to stress nationalism over Communism,
the party appears to have accepted under its
banner many individuals who have a grudge
against the government but lack ideological com-
mitment to Communism. In Kalinga Apayao,
several hundred guerrillas belonging to an ethnic
minority recently defected from the NPA but
continue to war against the government.
? No combined-arms capability. The NPA has
demonstrated an ability to use small-unit guerril-
la tactics effectively but to date has not used
combined arms?the coordination of different
types of military units?in its operations. Should
the Communists decide to attack well-defended
military installations, they will find it necessary
to use direct and indirect fire from machineguns
and mortars to support their assault forces
The Government Response
44. The government has been slow to accept the
seriousness of the Communist threat and has still not
implemented or even agreed on a comprehensive
coordinated strategy for coping with the insurgency.
Even if it did, the armed forces suffer from deficien-
cies in leadership, discipline, training, weapons, equip-
ment, and logistic support and overall funding?so
serious that its capability over the long term to stem
the advance of Communist power is doubtful.
45. Recently many Cabinet officers and military
leaders have begun to take the Communist threat
seriously. Defense Minister Ponce Enrile, among oth-
ers, recognizes the danger posed by the insurgents and
advocates a coordinated governmentwide effort to
deal with the threat. Enrile
now speaks openly of the alarming
growth of the insurgency and complains bitterly about
government inaction, which he attributes almost solely
to President Marcos. Enrile earlier took the lead in
attempts to activate a centralized high-level counterin-
surgency program directed by the National Security
Council. President Marcos intervened personally to
squelch the idea and chastised his Defense Minister for
acting without authorization.
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46. Despite a recent public relations campaign by
the government, the President views the insurgency
problem in primarily military terms. He has said
economic programs and civic action must wait until
AFP clearing operations have eradicated the guerrilla
presence. Moreover, he has chosen to direct the entire
counterinsurgency effort personally, as he did against
the fledgling NPA in the early 1970s. He has stated
that he reviews all expenditures over $3,000, calls field
commanders, and approves the use of field artillery.
Although we doubt that he does this more than
occasionally, he does have the Regional Unified Com-
mand (RUC) Commander reporting directly to him,
thereby cutting out the Defense Minister and the
Chief of Staff, who complain that their broader
counterinsurgency proposals cannot be implemented
without the President's approval, which they cannot
get. Accordingly, we believe that President Marcos is
contributing to the insurgency problem and hindering
its solution
47. We believe the President's reluctance to dele-
gate authority and his failure to implement a coordi-
nated counterinsurgency program stem primarily
from a fear that it might undermine his own power.
He lacks confidence in the ability of many of those he
has surrounded himself with, and feels far more secure
relying on his own considerable talents than trusting
his survival to men chosen more for political reliabil-
ity. He may fear that the creation of a counterinsur-
gency czar might come back to haunt him as hap-
pened when President Quirino appointed Ramon
Magsaysay to take charge of eradicating the Huks in
the 1950s. Magsaysay turned his considerable power
and prestige, gained from the successful Huk Cam-
paign, against Quirino to become President himself.
48. Many hoped that the appointment of General
Ramos, a West Point graduate, as Acting Chief of Staff
would result in reform of the AFP, an end to military
abuses, and a more vigorous prosecution of the war
against the Communists. Indeed, he has made limited
progress in each of these categories. We are doubtful,
however, about his long-term capabilities, given the
poor showing of the PC during his tenure as its
commander.
49. Ramos admits that he has only been able to put
a dent in the problems of corruption and human rights
violations. Unless the President authorizes a thorough
housecleaning of the AFP?a development we consid-
er unlikely?Ramos's ability to initiate meaningful
military reforms is seriously circumscribed. Even if
the President decides not to reinstate General Ver as
Chief of Staff, assuming he is acquitted of responsibil-
ity for the assassination of Aquino, the prospects for his
agreeing to the removal of incompetent but otherwise
loyal officers are not good. Marcos may ask both Ver
and Ramos to step down and appoint another loyalist,
such as the Commander of the Army, General Ramas,
to the post. In any event, the twin problems of
politicization of the AFP and military abuses are
unlikely to be resolved soon.
50. General Ramos's attempts to improve the AFP's
military capability have proceeded slowly. Some im-
provement in the AFP's logistic system and its ability
to supply field units has been achieved with assistance
from the Joint US Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG).
Budget restraints, however, handicap the efforts. Seri-
ous shortfalls in almost all key items of military
supplies?particularly mobility assets and communica-
tions gear?exist, severely limiting the AFP's combat
capability. Retraining, another of General Ramos's
priorities, is also proving difficult because Marcos will
not authorize redeployment of units from around
Manila, and the money is not now available for a
major force expansion.
51. Elements of the AFP and PC charged with
carrying the war to the Communists still lack the
initiative. Regional combat force ratios in part help
explain this situation. The average regional ratio of
Philippine combat forces to armed insurgents is about
4:1. (See figure 11.) Only in Metro Manila
does the AFP have a decisive advantage (36:1). Else-
where, many regional commanders find themselves
confronted by an enemy force of virtually equal size.
In firefights the guerrillas often seem to have more
firepower and equal, if not greater, stocks of ammuni-
tion than government forces. And both sides rely
almost exclusively on movement by foot for tactical
mobility. In areas such as Samar and Negros, the AFP
is moving back from the highlands to protect the cities
and in many other areas are spending more time
defending bases than on the clearing operations called
for by President Marcos.
Near-Term Prospects
52. We believe the Communist insurgency has the
potential to grow more rapidly during the next three
years than at any time in the past. The Communist
Party is now in an ideal position to benefit from the
malaise prevalent throughout Philippine society: pop-
ular support for the Marcos government is at an all-
time low; the prospects for meaningful political re-
forms under this regime are slight; and economic
recovery will proceed only slowly. Accordingly, the
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Communists, promising real political, economic, and
social reform appear to many as the only credible
alternative
53. A third alternative to Marcos and the Commu-
nists is the moderate opposition. Unfortunately, the
moderate opposition is divided and lacks extensive
grassroots organization. There is, however, a differ-
ence of view on its near-term prospects. Some believe
that over the past two years the moderate opposition
has gained credibility and momentum and point to its
performance in the 1984 elections as evidence of
growing strength. Those who hold this view believe
that a government led by the moderate opposition
would be committed to reform and?if it came to
power in time?would have a chance to stabilize the
deteriorating internal situation. They also believe most
politically informed Filipinos are guardedly optimistic
that a government led by the moderate opposition
would be a step forward. Others believe that absent
some remedy of the fundamental weaknesses cited
above and the development of a cohesive program, the
moderate opposition will have difficulty further ex-
panding its credibility as an alternative to Marcos,
especially in rural areas where the insurgency is
strong. Those who hold this view believe the perfor-
mance of the moderate opposition in the 1984 election
is attributable more to anti-Marcos sentiment than as a
sign of support for the opposition as a credible alterna-
tive.
54. The military's response to the NPA is for the
most part inept and often counterproductive. Given
the Armed Forces' inadequate funding, poor logistics,
uncertain leadership, and the politicized nature of the
officer corps, it is unlikely that the military's perfor-
mance will improve enough to stem increased NPA
activity in the near term. If the elections planned for
1986 and 1987 are contentious, fraudulent, and vio-
lent, they will drive more people into the ranks of the
Communist Party. Although circumstances may
change, President Marcos intends to remain in office
beyond 1987 despite the deep-rooted and irreversible
public antipathy toward him.
55. The NPA is likely to continue to grow and will
gradually increase the size and frequency of military
actions, and improve its military tactics to include
assaults against better defended targets and expanded
night operations. We believe government forces may
soon be forced to cede de facto control of some
lowland areas and rural highlands to the Communists
in many regions of the country.
56. Without improved leadership, training, and lo-
gistic support, the government forces cannot protect
the population, economic, and strategic targets and
simultaneously pursue the enemy. The Communists,
however, cannot hope to achieve a military victory in
the near future without substantially more arms and
ammunition than they now possess. If the party does
arrange for weapons purchases abroad, they must also
arrange for clandestine arms deliveries to various
islands in the archipelago. We believe substantial
deliveries would be difficult to accomplish.
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Figure 11
Combat Force Ratio of AFP: NPA, by Region
; rm
Luzon
StrEit
a
Caga
Vail
II
Central
Luzon
an
Armed Forces of the
Philippines: New People's Army
I I
I I
Less than 3.0:1
3.0:1 to 6.0:1
6.0:1 to 18.0:1
1.118.0:1 and above
? Region boundary
0
0
150 Kilometers
AO Miles
National Capital
Region
el,
an
c?
Philippine
Sea
Leonel.
NIE,1 4
P h PPI
tern
as
Bacot
%. ?
Sulu Sea
Westerp
Mindasia
IX
Zambeang
Cen al
Mindanao
XII
Malaysia
Indonesia
Ce/ebes Sea
em
nao
Indonesia c)
705317 (A02387) 7-85
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57. Party efforts to join ranks with the MNLF
insurgents have not, and probably will not, succeed.
The MNLF is beset with defections, financial prob-
lems, and factionalism along ethnolinguistic lines. Nur
Misuari, leader of the largest and most radical group,
the Tausug Muslims, has advocated cooperation with
the CPP/NPA for some time, but he commands little
allegiance among Muslim guerrillas outside of Sulu.
Communist propaganda aimed at the Muslim commu-
nity has not been able to overcome longstanding
hatreds. Although Misuari may help arrange arms
purchases for the NPA, we believe there will be little
cooperation between the two insurgent groups in the
next three years. Moreover, as the NPA increases
activity in MNLF areas of operations in Mindanao and
presents a threat to established MNLF extortion activi-
ties, there will be even more friction and enmity
between rival insurgent groups.
59. In sum, we believe that, if the present trend
continues, within the next three to five years the
insurgents could stalemate the military in most of the
countryside and bring widespread urban terrorism to
the streets of Manila. Between now and the end of the
decade, we expect to see no improvement in the
current negative trends:
? Continued expansion of the areas under
CPP/NPA control.
? New military sophistication by the NPA, includ-
ing operations by larger formations of troops.
? Expanded political infiltration by the CPP.
We also believe, however, a major governmental crisis
during the next three to five years could give a
coalition government dominated by the Communists
or the Communists themselves an opportunity to seize
power without first achieving a decisive battlefield
advantage.
60. Our bleak prognosis, however, could be altered
by a number of developments, chief among which
would be the installation of an effective, reform-
minded, non-Communist government in Manila. This
could come about as the result of an orderly constitu-
tional succession in the event of Marcos's death, his
forced removal from office by military coup, or his
defeat in the 1987 presidential election. Any new non-
Communist government would have an opportunity to
remedy the country's many ills, and, with an im-
proved economy and a calmer political environment, a
reduction of the Communist appeal would be within
reach. At the same time, any successor government
would face most of the same formidable problems
confronting Marcos?and without his experience or
other assets. Whether a new government could make
more headway against the insur ency or economic
problems is an open question
61. Other developments that could alter our bleak
prognosis would:
? Require Marcos to undertake steps we believe
are unlikely:
- Credible 1986 and 1987 elections.
- A coordinated national counterinsurgency
strategy being adopted and vigorously
pursued.
- The AFP receiving adequate funding for
force expansion, counterinsurgency training,
additional mobility assets, and communica-
tions gear.
? Or require tactical mistakes by the Communists:
- The CPP/NPA experiencing unresolved lead-
ership struggles that sap the vitality of the
insurgency.
- Widespread repressive control measures and
heavy taxation undermining the insurgents'
support in the countryside.
- Excessive urban violence in Manila arousing
strong public criticism and renewed support
for the government.
- Losing their nationalist credentials and claim
of independence by relying heavily on out-
side powers for support.
- Miscalculating NPA strengths and AFP weak-
nesses by mounting a strategic offensive pre-
maturely.
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Implications for US Interests
62. The current situation could evolve into a pro-
longed period of "civil war," with the government
increasingly hard-pressed, serious terrorist and insur-
gent attacks on US persons and installations, growing
anti-Americanism, and a period of hard choices for the
United States?including if and when to abandon
Marcos. Even if the Communists ruled out direct
attack on US citizens, increased violence would pose a
substantial danger to the almost 100,000 Americans in
the islands and US economic interests there. Under
these circumstances US efforts to prop up Marcos
probably would be counterproductive in that the
United States would be seen by most Filipinos as
supporting an unpopular dictator. As long as Marcos
remains in power, we see little prospect for success
against the insurgents. At best US aid might retard
Communist expansion
63. A Communist takeover in the Philippines or a
government heavily influenced by the CPP would be
viewed by Asian countries?particularly the other
ASEAN countries and China?as a setback of historic
proportions, perhaps even more devastating than the
US defeat in Vietnam. Besides the loss of US bases, it
could also mean a significant loss of US credibility and
prestige. Among other results likely to follow a
CPP/NPA takeover are:
? US forward-basing strategy would suffer due to
loss of the bases, and US power-projection capa-
bility would be adversely impacted.
? The Philippines might permit Soviet access to the
military facilities?at a price?thereby increas-
ing Soviet influence in the region and diminish-
ing the United States'. This would pose a signifi-
cant strategic threat to US friends and allies in
the region
Threat to US Facilities and Personnel
We do not consider the principal threat to US bases
in the Philippines to be military. Rather, Communist
Party propaganda?citing the presence of US military
facilities on Philippine soil as the most visible manifes-
tation of America's imperialist intentions and an affront
to Philippine sovereignty?aims to make continued US
use of the bases politically untenable in the eyes of any
future government. The CPP, however, is not the only
source of the anti-US-bases movement. Respected non-
Communist, nationalist political leaders of the pre-
martial-law period have also called for removal of the
bases. To avoid charges of serving the interest of -US
imperialism,- any successor government may have to
demand either renegotiation of the bases agreement on
terms more favorable to the Philippines or the abroga-
tion of the agreement
A direct attack on one of the bases or ancillary
facilities is possible?and threats of military or terrorist
action have been received?but the NPA is much more
likely to selectively target US personnel or attempt to
place bombs in US installations. Direct assaults against
the bases by guerrilla units would, in the near future, be
counterproductive and costly. The NPA leadership is
aware of their limited firepower, lack of fire support,
and the difficulty of secretly massing troops for a
surprise attack in Central Luzon. Party leaders also
realize that such action would justify increased US
military actions. Limited weapons and ammunition-
stealing operations cannot be ruled out.
Assassination of Americans, on the other hand, could
easily be accomplished by trained NPA sparrow units.
Such attacks were planned by party leaders in 1977 and
1979 but were thwarted by US countermeasures. Some
of these party leaders are still in power. NPA leaders
have repeatedly said they will target US personnel if the
United States provides expanded counterinsurgency as-
sistance to Manila.
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