ROMANIA: THE OUTLOOK FOR CEAUSESCU

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00573R000300300002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 1, 1985
• Content Type: SNIE

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Romania: The Outlook
for Ceausescu
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SNIE 129-83
e wary 25X
COPY 19 7
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MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF
S N I E 12.7-83
ROMANIA: THE OUTLOOK
FOR CEAUSESCU
Information available as of 11 February 1985 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board
on 13 February 1985.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 5
Ceausescu Maintains Control ........................................................... 5
Domestic Measures ....................................................................... 5
Foreign Policy Maneuvers ........................................................... 6
Soviet Concerns ............................................................................. 6
Vulnerabilities ................................................................................... 7
The Economy ................................................................................ 7
Social Discontent ........................................................................... 8
Political Disaffection ..................................................................... 8
Outlook .............................................................................................. 9
The Threat to Ceausescu .................................................................. 10
Possible Indicators of Problems for Ceausescu ........................... 10
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SCOPE NOTE
0
SNIE 12.7-83 judged that President Ceausescu's position would
grow increasingly precarious over the next year as a result of the
continued deterioration of economic and social conditions but also
judged that Ceausescu's resources for defending his position gave him a
better than even chance of surviving the next 12 months. Ceausescu has
indeed maintained his hold on power, but lingering economic problems
mean that disaffection within the party, the government bureaucracy,
and the country remain the most serious threat to Ceausescu's reign.
This Memorandum to Holders examines Ceausescu's prospects for the
next two to three years. It also assesses the impact of the country's bleak
economic outlook on Bucharest's ability to follow policies that some-
times run counter to Soviet objectives
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KEY JUDGMENTS
a
President Ceausescu appears to be maintaining his strong grip over
Romania and chances are good that he will remain in power the next
two to three years at least. If he is challenged, it will probably be over
the country's serious economic problems.
Ceausescu has preserved his already strong position by further
consolidating his dominance of the party and government bureaucracy,
as demonstrated by his total mastery of the party congress in November
1984. His critics are off balance due to frequent cadre rotations and the
strong punitive action taken against the few who have openly disagreed
with him. Close relatives and cronies remain in control of those sectors
of the apparatus that are vital to protecting his position. Moreover,
Ceausescu's tightened internal security controls have intimidated the
population, which so far is unwilling to openly challenge the regime.
Despite his show of political strength, however, Ceausescu remains
vulnerable on several counts. He has still not solved, and indeed is
largely responsible for, Romania's serious economic problems. He has
steadfastly maintained a strategy of combating Romania's financial
difficulties by draconian measures that restrict imports, cut investments,
and squeeze the consumer. The resulting austerity has seriously weak-
ened the economy and could undermine its future growth potential.
The economy _at best will grow only slightly over the next few years. In
fact, the situation of the populace appears worse in the winter of 1984-
85 because of energy and food shortages and severe weather.
Without a common rallying point or a tradition of militancy or
solidarity, the Romanian populace probably will remain incapable of
united action. While the population generally is not resorting to open
protests over its difficult economic plight, chances for unrest are likely
to increase as economic problems multiply. Tensions within the Hun-
garian minority are escalating and could raise the level of discontent the
authorities face
The regime appears capable of keeping most protests under
control, but prolonged, large-scale unrest could seriously weaken
Ceausescu's grip on the bureaucracy. His problems might be aggravated
by morale problems in the military and security services. If their
effectiveness and reliability as Ceausescu's protector are reduced,
previously cowed subordinates might be emboldened to move against
him before he turns on them as scapegoats.
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As Romania's internal problems worsen, Ceausescu may be tempt-
ed to bring Romania closer to the USSR in an effort to obtain economic
help. Agreements "in principle" reportedly reached last summer to
increase substantially Soviet deliveries of oil and other key raw
materials in return for greater Romanian investment in the extraction of
these commodities suggest Ceausescu is already moving in this direc-
tion.
There is reason to question the strength and durability of this
trend. Negotiations on the economic agreements have bogged down on
the issue of Romanian obligations, and none of the major ones appear to
be final. Nor have political or military relations improved substantially.
The Romanians, in fact, defied the Soviets on several occasions during
1984, including their disregard of the Soviet-led boycott of the Olympic
Games and Ceausescu's visit to West Germany in October. His foot-
dragging in negotiating an extension of the Warsaw Pact treaty, which
expires this spring, also suggests he is not prepared to improve military
cooperation significantly
Although he may accommodate Soviet interests a bit more in order
to keep alive the chances for a beneficial economic deal, Ceausescu will
take care not to compromise Romania's relative independence in
foreign policy. To do so would endanger his sole remaining source of
domestic legitimacy and put him at the mercy of the Soviets, who
neither like nor trust him. Although the Soviets would like to entice
Ceausescu into more cooperative behavior, they probably are unwilling
to extend substantial aid or to favor him with increasingly scarce
resources without more substantial concessions than he appears pre-
pared to give
Ceausescu will also continue to pursue good relations with the
West, and particularly the United States, as he needs to counterbalance
Soviet pressure and influence. He may even make some slight accom-
modations to US interests in the foreign policy and human rights areas
in the hope of securing assistance for Romania's ailing economy. His
care not to overly antagonize the Soviets will inhibit significantly
greater independence in foreign policy, however, and he is likely to
regard US urgings to soften his internal rule as unacceptable interfer-
ence in Romania's internal affairs
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DISCUSSION
1. SNIE 12.7-83 judged that President Ceausescu's
position would grow increasingly precarious over the
next year as a consequence of the continued deteriora-
tion of economic and social conditions and increased
dissatisfaction throughout the party and governmental
bureaucracy. It also judged, however, that Ceausescu's
enormous resources for defending his position, includ-
ing his near-total domination of the party and govern-
ment and his control of the pervasive security appara-
tus, gave him a better than even chance of surviving
the next 12 months. The SNIE further judged that:
- The Soviets might try to use Ceausescu's difficul-
ties to gain more subservience from him, but
would probably not use their limited economic or
political leverage to try to topple Ceausescu or to
force a major change in his foreign policies.
- The USSR would, however, probably feel com-
pelled to take action, perhaps even an effort to
oust Ceausescu, if the collapse of Communist rule
in Romania appeared a real danger or if
Ceausescu or his successors turned Romania
sharply to the West and tried to withdraw from
the Warsaw Pact.
- US assistance and support would help Ceausescu
maintain his present position vis-a-vis the Soviets,
but the chances are slim that the United States
could induce behavior by Ceausescu or his suc-
cessors that is significantly more congenial to US
interests than at present.
- A post-Ceausescu leadership would probably not
make drastic changes in Romanian domestic or
foreign policies, although it might explore closer
relations with the USSR in the hope of getting
economic help.
2. These judgments generally remain valid today.
Ceausescu has survived the year without any apparent
difficulty. But although he seems to have strengthened
his control over the party and government and contin-
ues to stifle any opposition, the policies that he has
implemented over the last year have done little to
solve Romania's serious economic and social problems.
3. Ceausescu's mastery of the Communist party
congress in November 1984 confirmed that his grip on
power remains strong. Careful screening of all speak-
ers assured there would be no open criticism of
Ceausescu, such as occurred at the previous congress in
1979. Ceausescu and his policies received abundant
praise from all who took the podium, and all of his
closest supporters were "reelected" to their current
positions. His wife Elena received no new position, but
she continues to maintain her role as his closest
collaborator in the regime. Several relatives and cro-
nies were promoted, including his controversial son,
Nicu, and state security chief Tudor Postelnicu, who
gained candidate memberships on the policymaking
4. Ceausescu's critics within the bureaucracy have
been paralyzed by his apparent invincibility and by
fear of losing the perquisites of office-and possibly
their freedom. The example of onetime Ceausescu-
confidant and heir apparent Virgil Trofin, who-
expelled from the Central Committee in 1981 report-
edly for talking back to Ceausescu-died in obscurity
last year, probably deters many from openly criticiz-
ing Ceausescu's leadership. Periodic "rotations of ca-
dres" implemented again this year before and at the
congress have added to the insecurity of his subordi-
nates. i
5. By continuing to tighten security controls over
the populace, Ceausescu has intimidated dissenters in
and out of the government. Through a pervasive
informer network, the "Securitate" closely monitors
worker attitudes and has been able to identify poten-
tial troublemakers and move quickly against them.
Discouraged by the ease and firmness with which the
regime has squelched protests against its austere and
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repressive policies over the past three to four years, the
population appears resigned to substantial deprivation
and preoccupied with the day-to-day task of surviving.
Despite two successive harsh winters during which
severe food and energy shortages brought about a
further deterioration in already poor living and work-
ing conditions, popular expression of dissatisfaction
mainly took the form of grumbling, increased absen-
teeism, and declines in worker productivity, with
isolated work stoppages and demonstrations, rather
than the sporadic violence that took place the previous
three years.
6. Finally, Ceausescu may have benefited from
some apparent policy successes. First, Ceausescu's
defiance of the Soviet-led boycott of the Olympic
Games last summer and his visit to West Germany last
fall against Soviet wishes demonstrated that he is still
capable of bold diplomatic moves that appeal to the
population's nationalistic sentiments. Second, largely
as a result of austerity and sharp cuts in Western
imports, Romania has recorded a current account
surplus for the third consecutive year and thus further
reduced its hard currency debt. Although these
"successes" appear to be short term, illusory, and
unlikely to reap substantial and lasting material bene-
fits for Romania, they may have created a grudging
respect for Ceausescu's toughness and ability
Foreign Policy Maneuvers
7. With serious internal problems pressing him,
Ceausescu has trimmed his previous efforts to play the
role of world statesman. His most important new tack
in foreign policy has been to lessen political strains
with the USSR in the hope of acquiring economic aid
with as few "strings" as possible.
8. In an effort to alleviate Romania's shortages of
key raw materials and energy supplies, Ceausescu
negotiated preliminary arrangements with the USSR
last summer that, in the event they are fully carried
out, could bring the two countries closer together than
they have been at any time during Ceausescu's rule.
the USSR agreed in
principle to substantially increase sales of oil to Roma-
nia over the next several years, possibly quadrupling
current exports by 1990, and to sell it on easier terms.
The Soviets also reportedly agreed to increase long-
term deliveries of coal, iron ore, and natural gas in
return for additional Romanian investment in Soviet
extraction of those commodities.
Ceausescu Pledged an improvement
in political relations-by improving Moscow's current-
ly very limited access to senior Romanian party cadre
and allowing more frequent party-to-party exchange
visits-and an increase in military cooperation in the
Warsaw Pact and bilaterally.
9. There are indications that the warming trend
between the two countries may not be all that substan-
tial and durable. Details are yet to be worked out on
most of the economic agreements, and negotiations
appear bogged down on the question of Romanian
contributions. None of the major agreements are yet
final, as Romania seems either unwilling or unable to
meet Soviet demands. The political concessions report-
edly made by Ceausescu also appear ethereal. If party-
to-party contacts do increase, they will certainly be
under such tight restrictions and scrutiny as to prevent
significant new influence by the Soviets in Romania.
10. In addition, there is no evidence of significantly
greater military cooperation-either bilaterally or
within the Warsaw Pact-despite greater lipservice to
that end by Ceausescu. Ceausescu continues to limit
defense spending on military modernization. Indeed,
Bucharest appeared to slide backward in some respects
in 1984 as the result of several economy measures,
including the sale to Egypt of Romania's entire fleet of
homemade equivalents to Soviet T-55 tanks for hard
currency and a 50-percent cut in energy for military
usage. Ceausescu also shows no sign of altering Roman-
ia's prohibitions against holding joint military maneu-
vers on Romanian territory or participating in such
maneuvers abroad except at a staff level. He reported-
ly has tried to amend the Warsaw Pact treaty-which
expires this spring-to recognize this position.
Ceausescu reportedly has also balked at Soviet propos-
als for a 20- to 30-year extension period.
11. suggests that Ceausescu is not
ready to alter the independent aspects of his foreign
policy. Besides his decision to defy the Soviet-led
boycott of the Olympic Games last summer and his
visit to West Germany in October, Ceausescu has
continued from time to time to take a line on INF at
variance with that of the Soviets and,
has worked in recent months with East
Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria to urge a more
moderate stance by the Warsaw Pact in East-West
relations.
12. The USSR's priority interest is to maintain a
stable Communist regime in a Warsaw Pact country
with which it shares an 830-mile border. On this score,
Moscow apparently remains confident in Ceausescu's
controls, despite reported concerns about the negative
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opting assets in the leadership.
13. The Soviets, in addition, would like to rein in
Ceausescu's independent behavior, which at times is
troublesome for Soviet foreign policy. Moscow is also
unhappy about his reluctance to participate fully in
Warsaw Pact activities. The Soviets appear, however,
to lack sufficient political leverage or influence to
bring Ceausescu into line short of using-or threaten-
ing-military force. Soviet leader Chernenko's new
and relatively conciliatory approach to the Romanians
over the past year appears to reverse previous hard-
nosed efforts by Andropov to strengthen Soviet lever-
age over Ceausescu. The economic agreements
reached last summer have the potential-to the extent
they are implemented-to increase Romania's eco-
nomic dependency on the USSR. Moscow also hopes
that the political agreements, depending on how they
are carried out, could at least make Ceausescu less
abrasive. As more optimistic goals, the Soviets proba-
bly want increased influence over Bucharest's foreign
policy, better insights into the Romanian political
scene, and, possibly, some "inside" leverage by co-
and on popular attitudes.
impact of some of his policies on Romania's economy
key industrial imports (which have rebounded little debt obligations in 1985.
since being cut nearly in half during the 1981-82
record grain harvest, the economy appears to have o a probably would be willing to extend some
grown only slightly, if at all. Continued limitations on additional credit to help the Romanians cover their
The Economy
14. Despite his evident political strength, Ceausescu
still faces several serious problems. The most diffi-
cult-and dangerous-problem is the continued weak-
ness of the economy. Contrary to the regime's inflated
claims of a solid economic recovery last year, includ-
ing a 7-percent increase in industrial production and a
period), have caused significant dislocations in the 18. Another option would be to tighten the screws
industrial sector. Fuel shortages, which forced wide- further on the economy and try to cover current debt
spread factory closings, delays in raw material deliver- obligations out of the resulting hard currency earnings.
ies, and disruptions in public transportation during the Ceausescu reportedly has indicated he is ready to cut
first three months of last year, are even more severe Western imports this year by up to 30 percent, if
this winter. As a result, Bucharest announced new necessary. Such drastic new measures, however, would
measures in January mobilizing the population to help probably reduce Romania's export capability, further
increase energy production and to cut back on con- imperil future growth, and risk increased social unrest.
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15. There were also reports that fuel shortages 19. While neither course is very attractive, both
hampered grain harvest operations last fall. This, probably are preferable in Ceausescu's eyes to the
combined with evidence of severe weed infestations humiliation of another rescheduling. Ceausescu may
resulting from a lack of herbicides-due to import well choose a middle road-like accepting some small
restrictions-suggests that Ceausescu's claims of a and hopefully inconspicuous loans while undertaking
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bumper crop were exaggerated and that the harvest
actually fell below average for the second consecutive
year
16. Ceausescu's strategy-forcefully reiterated at
the congress-of combating Romania's financial prob-
lems by refusing new Western loans and, instead,
restricting imports from the West, cutting investment,
and suppressing living standards has weakened the
economy. It may even be inflicting long-term damage
on the economy's infrastructure that could undermine
future growth. The economy appears at best capable
of only slight growth over the next several years, and
its prospects could be even more bleak if there were
another disastrous harvest or another extremely harsh
winter.
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17. The next two or three years could be especially
dangerous because a new financial squeeze is likely.
The debt reschedulings of 1982 and 1983 have eased
debt repayment pressures for the past three years and
have allowed Romania to reduce its debt significantly
(from about $10 billion in 1981 to less than $8 billion
at the end of last year). But greater obligations during
1985-88 could bring about another crisis. Long- and
medium-term obligations, for instance, rise from $1.1
billion in 1984 to $1.4 billion in 1985. Short of
undergoing another rescheduling-something he and 25X1
presumably most of Romania's major creditors would
hope to avoid, Ceausescu could rescind his prohibition
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limited new austerity measures. This tack might help
Romania avoid a financial crisis in 1985, but the same
problem probably would return in 1986, and these
half measures would do little to improve Romania's
overall economic picture.
20. Living conditions, as a result of Ceausescu's
policies, have continued to deteriorate. Food shortages
worsened last winter, as local governments reportedly
cut rations of basic foodstuffs and even bread became
scarce in some parts of the country. Coercive measures
enacted in 1984 to force private farmers to increase
sales to the state did nothing to improve the very short
supply of farm produce and meat throughout the year.
Fuel shortages the last two winters, besides reducing
supplies for home heating, caused plant closings and
production bottlenecks. In turn, there were pay cuts
for many Romanian workers who were unable to meet
production quotas. While worker unhappiness has
mainly been manifested in grumbling, increased ab-
senteeism, and occasional antiregime leaflets and graf-
fiti, sporadic strikes have continued into 1985.
21. A number of other economic and social mea-
sures enacted by the regime last year have provoked
criticism. Parliament in June adopted Ceausescu's plan
for a bizarre "scientific diet" which recommends that
deprived Romanians eat fewer calories for health
reasons. Another program enacted in March 1984 to
increase the birth rate toughens measures to prevent
abortions and forbids the sale and distribution of
contraceptives. Teams of gynecologists in factories and
institutes examine female workers to assure that preg-
nancies are not terminated. In December, a national
literary journal boldly published poems critical of the
regime for using coercive methods "even before
birth." The responsible chief editor and the author lost
their jobs.
22. Restiveness among Romania's nearly 2 million
Hungarian minority appears to be on the increase.
Many ethnic Hungarians believe they are victims of
regime discrimination, especially in restricted employ-
ment and the lack of opportunities for education in
their mother tongue. They chafe at the growing
disparity between their lot and the comparatively
good situation of their conationals in Hungary. Con-
cern about antiregime sentiment in the Hungarian
community escalated following a powerful explosion
last June in a heavily ethnic-Hungarian city in Tran-
sylvania, which authorities suspect was set off by
23. Widespread criticism within the lower and
middle regime bureaucracy continues. Ceausescu's
handling of the economy, particularly his refusal to
alter his industrialization strategy or reduce central
control, is the main target. At the party congress last
November, Ceausescu defended his policy of heavy
state involvement in economic management and criti-
cized "all sorts of theories" favoring decentralization
economic reformists in Romania contends that mar-
ket-oriented reforms are imperative to prevent further
economic decline.
24. Dissatisfaction over Ceausescu's autocratic and
personalized ruling style was probably exacerbated by
the intensification of his personality cult and promo-
tion of several relatives-especially his playboy son-
25. We believe that Ceausescu is concerned about
the possibility of trouble in the ranks of the military-
security apparatus. A broad reshuffle of provincial
security chiefs and army field commanders last fall
ostensibly was to bring new blood into the upper ranks
of these services. It also may have reflected concern
about their to alt
Earlier in 1984 Ceausescu appeared to have
quieted grumbling in the military with pay raises,
promotions, and enhanced status, and he has always
pampered the security forces. It is possible that the
new personnel shifts-especially in the security appa-
ratus-reflect Ceausescu's irritation over the inability
to stop continuing low-level criticism of his rule and
antiregime activity by ethnic Hungarian nationalists.
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to come.
27. He appears to have little to fear from his cowed
and insecure subordinates. A master at behind-the-
scene maneuvering, Ceausescu has acquired enormous
personal power over decisionmaking and has rendered
the party and government apparatus incapable of
independent action. Family members or cronies who
control every sector vital to maintaining his control-
cadre selection, the military, the security forces-will
see his word as law. His frequent infusions of new
blood into party and government ranks through peri-
odic cadre rotations will keep potential rivals off
balance and assure the loyalty of the newcomers, who
owe their enhanced status and authority to him. To
this end, Ceausescu replaced nearly one-half of the
Central Committee at the party congress, reportedly
including a large portion of the "old guard," so his grip
on the party elite should continue strong for some time
is problems
Outlook
26. Ceausescu's firm control of the apparatus and
ruthlessness in suppressing dissent probably will enable
him to maintain his political dominance over at least
the next two to three years, which is the time frame of
this Estimate. But his tactic of increasing repressive
measures may not override discontent due to econom-
28. Ceausescu probably will stick to his tactics of
defusing popular discontent by occasionally channel-
ing scarce resources to relieve the most volatile ten-
sions, forcefully suppressing overt protests whenever
they occur, and maintaining tight controls over the
populace. Without a common rallying point or a
tradition of militancy or solidarity, the population
probably will remain incapable of united action and
demoralized by the seeming futility of challenging the
regime. Even so, Ceausescu's program could be tested
over the next few months, though we expect him to
come through the experience much as he has in the
past three years.
29. This year will be very difficult for most Roma-
nians. Food supplies remain short and could even
decline in the event of another mediocre grain harvest
and continued regime efforts to maximize food exports
to earn hard currency. Energy shortages, too, are likely
0
31. Despite his more accommodating stance, how-
ever, Ceausescu will take care not to compromise
Romania's relative independence. To do so would
forfeit his sole remaining source of domestic legitima-
cy and put him at the mercy of Moscow, which has
little reason to like or trust him. Ceausescu, therefore,
will continue to resist Soviet efforts to integrate Roma-
nia more fully into the Warsaw Pact and the Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance and will try to
strengthen ties with the West, the Third World, and
China as a buffer against Soviet pressure.
32. The Soviets, moreover, probably will not go
very far in their courtship of Ceausescu. Hard pressed
by their own economic problems, they would prefer
not to expend substantial resources to try to wring
greater obedience from Ceausescu, who appears un-
likely to give them what they want and whose trouble-
some behavior in any case has never directly threat-
ened their vital security interests. To give significant
aid to Ceausescu at this time, moreover, could cause
problems with the USSR's more strategically impor-
tant East European allies, who have had to accept
reductions in Soviet subsidies in recent years.
to continue as a result of the especially severe winter
and continued emphasis on exports of oil products.=
30. In the area of foreign relations, we believe
Ceausescu will continue to be somewhat more accom-
modating to Soviet interests as long as negotiations on
potentially beneficial economic deals are taking place.
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33. Ceausescu will continue to value good relations
with the West, and particularly the United States, as a
source of both prestige and support for his indepen-
dent-minded foreign policy. Worsening economic
problems at home could incline him from time to time
to try to accommodate US interests in the foreign
policy and human rights areas in the hope of obtaining
assistance. Ceausescu's willingness and ability to pur-
sue a foreign policy line more compatible with US
interests, however, will remain greatly limited by his
concern not to exceed what he perceives as the limits
of Soviet tolerance, and he will continue to reject most
US urgings to moderate his repressive internal policies
as unacceptable interference in Romania's internal
affairs.
34. We are unable to predict with confidence how
much more deprivation would lead the populace to
react violently. Despite lowered expectations and suc-
cessful regime intimidation, there presumably is a low
point that will induce the people to act against a
government that fails to provide basic needs. This
saturation point is not likely soon unless there is a
sudden worsening of living conditions. Similarly, seri-
ous ethnic unrest could make grievances over the
deteriorating economic situation harder to suppress.
35. Although the regime seems likely to control
social unrest, any prolonged, large-scale protests could
gradually weaken Ceausescu's grip on the party and
government bureaucracy. Morale problems in the
military-security apparatus could be aggravated, thus
blunting its effectiveness and lowering its reliability as
the main prop of Ceausescu's authority. Ceausescu's
aura of invincibility could weaken, and previously
cowed subordinates might be encouraged to move
against him-especially if they fear being sacrificed as
neither Mrs.
Ceausescu nor her son, Nicu, would be able to succeed
Ceausescu other than on an interim basis. Although
they have a number of allies in the top leadership,
their power is essentially derivative and they are
widely disliked. A post-Ceausescu leadership would
probably be collective in nature for at least a few
years, as no one but Ceausescu appears to have
sufficient stature to stand alone. Individuals from
Ceausescu's inner circle would probably dominate
such a leadership. Bobu, Postelnicu, Dascalescu, and
First Deputy Prime Minister Gheorghe Oprea espe-
cially stand out as likely to play a major role.
councils.
38. We believe that a post-Ceausescu leadership
would not stray far from the essence of current
Ceausescu policies. Ceausescu's top subordinates ap-
pear to believe in at least the major thrust of his
hardline domestic strategy and his independent- mind-
ed foreign policy and probably would consider any
sudden, major changes as potentially destabilizing.
They might step back somewhat from Ceausescu's
more onerous internal policies in an effort to gain the
population's confidence, however, and might pursue a
marginally less troublesome role in Warsaw Pact
Possible Indicators of Problems for Ceausescu
39.
Such a move, nonetheless, probably
would be made only after considerable pressure had
built up against him, possibly over a period of several
months to a year. The following indicators could
provide an early warning that Ceausescu is encounter-
ing problems of such magnitude that they could
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endanger his position and/or his relatively indepen-
dent foreign policy:
- Increased defensiveness in Ceausescu's policy
statements, which could reflect growing criti-
cism and debate within the leadership.
- Greater visibility by Ceausescu's subordinates,
which would be highly unusual given the usual
media focus on Ceausescu and his family, and
could reflect Ceausescu's desire to spread the
blame for unpopular decisions or signal a weak-
ening of his position in the leadership.
- Ceausescu's withdrawal from foreign activity or
from public view, which would be out of charac-
ter and might signal growing preoccupation with
internal problems.
- Significantly heightened security or an in-
creased Securitate role in the regime, which
could indicate concern about social unrest or
about a potential challenge to Ceausescu from
within the leadership.
- Sharp cuts in rations of food, energy supplies,
and other consumer goods.
- Increasing rapidity, scope, and severity of per-
sonnel changes, which could indicate an effort to
find scapegoats in order to assuage public discon-
tent or concern about possible conspiracies. Such
actions could actually prompt a challenge to
Ceausescu by subordinates fearful of losing their
own positions.
- A significant increase in cooperation with the
USSR or with the United States, which could
reflect a leadership struggle or Ceausescu's belief
that internal problems had worsened to the point
that there was no other way to save his regime.
- Widening social protests, especially by miners,
who touched off the rash of protests of 1980-81,
or by the Hungarian minority.
- Evidence of serious discontent within the mili-
tary and/or security forces, which are the main
props of Ceausescu's power.
- The demotion and/or criticism of Ceausescu's
highly placed relatives, especially his wife,
which would indicate he was losing control of the
political process.
- Increased Soviet warnings or threats directed
against Ceausescu, which could presage a major
hardening of Soviet policy toward Romania,
possibly to include an effort to topple him.
40. The appearance of these indicators would not
necessarily imply that Ceausescu was on his way out or
that Romania was about to come under Moscow's
thumb. It would, however, especially if several ap-
peared in a relatively short span of time, signal that
Ceausescu was experiencing unusual difficulty and
should alert the Intelligence Community to the need
for a heightened analytical and collection posture.
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