NORTH KOREAN EXERCISE ACTIVITY: BEFORE AND SINCE 1980

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP87T00495R001001010024-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
11
Document Creation Date: 
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 17, 2010
Sequence Number: 
24
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 1, 1984
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP87T00495R001001010024-2.pdf158.03 KB
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,._ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001001010024-2 1. SECRET DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 25X1 F,14. olu 7A North Korean Exercise Activity: Before and Since 1980 (U) OCTOBER 1984 COPY NO. 22 9 NOFORN NOCONTRACT 25X1 THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001001010024-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001001010024-2 Dissemination Control Markings NOFORN Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals ORCON Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator NFIBONLY NFIB Departments, Agencies, and Components Only NOCONTRACT Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants PROPIN Caution-Proprietary Information Involved WNINTEL Warning Notice?Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved REL This information has been Authorized for Release to ... Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001001010024-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001001010024-2 W SECRET SPOKE 11. \*) Classified By: Multiple Sources Declassify on: OADR North Korean Exercise Activity: Before and Since 1980 (U) Information Cutoff Date: 12 September 1984 Not Releasable to Contractors/Consultants This is a Department Of Defense Intelligence Document prepared by the Eastern Division, Directorate for Research, Defense Intelligence Agency Product Manager: Korea Branch Military Capabilities Section NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS SECRET SPOKE ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001001010024-2 25X1 25X1 Declassified M Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001001010024-2 SECRET SPOKE 11. PREFACE demonstrated a distinct change in activity since 1980. (S/RELROK) The North Korean People's Army trains, exerrisen haw. 25X1 then concludes with an assessment 25X1 of the current status of North Korean military training exercises. (U) The product manager would like to acknowledge the extensive support and inputs by the following analysts: 25X1 (U) This document contains both Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) and collateral information. Individual portions are marked to indicate specifically individual classifications and control markings applicable to their content, including WNINTEL when appropriate for collateral-level portions. (U) Each classified title and heading in this report has been properly marked; all those unmarked are unclassified. (U) Questions and comments concerning this publication should be referred in writing to the Defense Intelligence Agency (ATTN: DB-2), Washington, D.C. 20301-6111. Requests for additional copies should be forwarded through command approval channels, as appropriate, to DIA (ATTN: RTS-2A), using DD Form 1142, Interagency Document Request, in accordance with DIA Manual 59-3, DIA Reference Library. III (Reverse Blank) SECRET SPOKE Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001001010024-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001001010024-2 SECRET SPOKE CONTENTS Page SUMMARY vii 1. BACKGROUND 1 2. 1 25X1 3. 2 4. CONCLUSIONS 4 (Reverse Blank) SECRET SPOKE Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001001010024-2 Declassified M Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001001010024-2 lir SECRET SPOKE w I. SUMMARY Nationwide exercises have not occurred since December 1983, but they are likely to resume after the ongoing ground force reor anization and redeployment has been completed, probably during the winter of vii (Reverse Blank) SECRET SPOKE Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001001010024-2 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified M Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001001010024-2 W SECRET SPOKE 1. BACKGROUND (S/RELROK) The regular North Korean military forces are known collectively as the North Korean People's Army (NKPA). The NKPA is the fourth largest Communist armed force and the sixth largest armed force in the world. The NKPA's army, navy, and air force components have equal status. The North Korean Army (NKA), is the largest of the country's three Services and comprises about 90 percent of the personnel). Currently, it is composed of at least 12 corps: 8 with geographic responsibilities, 3 with functional responsibilities, and 1 that controls selected special purpose units nationwide. Its mission is to maintain the territorial integrity of the country and assist in internal security, civic action, and agricultural programs. Most important is the NKA's role of providing 25X1 'North Korean military training exercises have traditionally focused on developing and maintainin NKA combat readiness. The 25X1 25X1 scope of training, however, 2. NORTH KOREA TRAINING EXERCISES (1960-79) (S/RELROK) regional and progressed in a relatively predictable manner toward more complex, larger exercises throughout the training year. Usually from late spring through the summer, the ground forces engaged in small-unit combat training while air regiments emphasized basic flight proficiency. Most naval units were involved with routine sea and coastal patrolling operations as well as low intensity gunnery and air defense tactics. (S/RELROK) From autumn through early winter, training and maneuvers gradually increased in tempo with army units conducting combined-arms exercises at regional training areas. For the most part, unit sizes were limited to battalions of infantry, armor, or artillery. On occasion, elements of a regiment or brigade were observed in the field. Air and naval forces as well as air and army units, were reportedly on maneuvers in contiguous areas and possibly engaged in coordinated exercises. From mid-winter through early spring, all Services of the NKPA were invariably active, curtailing or ceasing training only on national holidays. 1 SECRET SPOKE Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001001010024-2 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001001010024-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001001010024-2 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified M Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001001010024-2 w SECRET SPOKE W 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 (S/RELROK) Neither the winter traini nor those ri 3 SECRET SPOKE d during were assesse as Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001001010024-2 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001001010024-2 SECRET SPOKE nationwide exercises. The most likely reason why the North Koreans may have decided against conducting nationwide exercises for these periods is the current reorganization and redeployment of at least part of the NKA. Other possible reasons include: An attempt by Pyongyang to cool down tensions on the peninsula as a result of adverse international publicity caused by the Rangoon bombing incident. -- An attempt to eliminate the shortcomings noted during the three previous nationwide exercises. An attempt to prevent exacerbating an already difficult national economic situation by calling up reserves from a dwindling manpower pool, directing limited transportion resources to support non- productive military activities, creating additional fuel shortages, and disrupting industrial production schedules. a 225X1 25X1 25X1 4 SECRET SPOKE Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001001010024-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001001010024-2 SECRET THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001001010024-2