THE CHANGING SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00495R000900940001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 5, 1984
• Content Type: NIE

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-~---~
Director of
Central
Intelligence
The Changing
Sino-Soviet Relationship
Too Secret
Top Secret
NIE 13 11-84 ~
5 April 1984
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Q
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NIE 13/11-84
THE CHANGING
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP
Information available as of 30 March 1984 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 11
The Wary Thaw ............................................................................... 11
The Soviet Perspective ..................................................................... 13
The Chinese Perspective .................................................................. 15
The Mayor Issues Precluding Sino-Soviet Improvement ................ 18
Afghanistan ................................................................................... 18
Indochina ....................................................................................... 18
The Augmenting of Soviet Military Power Adiacent to China. 19
The Central Role of the United States and Japan .......................... 23
The American Factor ................................................................... 23
The Japanese Factor ..................................................................... 24
Variables, Uncertainties, and Possible Alternative Outcomes....... 26
Variables and Uncertainties ......................................................... 26
Alternative Outcomes ................................................................... 29
ANNEX C: Sino-Soviet Chronology, 1949-84 .................................... 35
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SCOPE NOTE
For almost two years the USSR and China have been actively
probing the possibilities of improving their relations with one another-
at the very time that the Soviets have continued to develop and
modernize their already formidable strategic and conventional military
forces adiacent to China. These negotiating probes are not wholly new;
they have occurred before. But this time there has been some forward
movement, at least on secondary issues and political atmospherics. This
raises several questions for us:
- In what manner is the relationship between these two powers in
process of change?
- How do Soviet consultations with China fit into the USSR's
broad strategic-military objectives in East Asia?
- How far are present Sino-Soviet consultations going to carry
Moscow and Bening?
- In addition to probable trends, what alternative outcomes are
possible and what would be their likelihood?
- And what will be the significance of the Sino-Soviet future for
US interests?
This Estimate addresses these questions, examining both the con-
straints on and incentives for improvement in the Sino-Soviet relation-
ship. The Estimate also explores the possible effect of certain variables,
and proposes indicators by which to measure changes in the relation-
ship. Except where otherwise indicated, the period of the Estimate is
the next two to three years.
Because of the complexity of issues discussed in this Estimate, it is
being published in two versions: for broad readership, the complete text;
for senior readers, the Key Judgments.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The present consultations between the USSR and China are
unlikely to produce major concessions on the part of either, and the
many issues that divide them will largely continue. A change in their re-
lationship is nonetheless taking place. We believe this process will
continue during the period-the next two to three years-covered by
this Estimate.
As a result largely of Soviet initiative and of an increased Chinese
/ retains expansionist ambitions, and that Moscow's long-term
`~/ desire to expand Soviet presence and influence around China's
periphery is aimed directly at isolating China and diminishing
its influence in Asia.
responsiveness, Moscow and Bening have reached numerous agreements
over the past year or so on relatively minor economic and cultural
questions. But the change taking place in their relationship does not so
much involve their basic positions or any "moving closer" to one
another, as it does a moderating of the intensity of conflict. These two
powers will almost certainly remain suspicious, wary antagonists,
continuing to arm against each other and to criticize each other's aims
and conduct-but within a less hostile climate.
Many issues will continue to divide China and the USSR-and
will continue to prevent either from making major concessions to the
other. The principal such forces:
- On both sides, historical enmity, suspicions, ideological preten-
sions, and racist attitudes toward each other.
- The sensitivity of the Sino-Soviet issue in the inner politics of
both Bening and Moscow-with the consequent need for their
leaders not to become vulnerable to charges of betraying vital
national interests to the other power.
- Chinese concerns about Soviet power over the coming decades;
Soviet concerns about potential Chinese power over the coming
century.
- On the part of China, Beijing's continuing belief that the USSR
- The desire of China that the USSR make concessions on three
major issues: that is, that the USSR significantly reduce its
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military power (nuclear and nonnuclear) in the eastern USSR
and Mongolia, cease its support for Vietnam's occupation of
!/ Kampuchea, and withdraw its combat troops f rom Afghanistan.
- In the absence of any maior Soviet concessions on these
questions, Chinese reluctance to come to terms with Moscow on
the Sino-Soviet border dispute.
- Beijing's bitter experience with the high costs of close association
with Moscow: remembrance of unacceptable past Soviet efforts
to subvert the politics and armed forces of China and to
subordinate China's national interests to those of the Soviet
Union.
- The fact that China's boss, Deng Xiaoping, was himself one of
the foremost anti-Soviet officials indentif ied with the split of
these two Communist powers, a generation ago, into rival Third
Romes.
- On the part of the USSR, a bedrock, absolute refusal on the
part of Soviet leaders to halt Moscow's continuing buildup of
military power adjacent to China, or to give up or markedly
lessen the great military superiority the USSR enjoys over
China.
- Moscow's reluctance to yield the geopolitical advantages it
,currently derives from its ties with Vietnam, especially the
.% ~ forward deployment of ships and aircraft, and the barrier these
developments constitute to Chinese influence in Southeast Asia.
- The f act that the buildup of Soviet military power in Asia serves
,many strategic and political purposes beyond those relating
~ directly to China, and is but a portion of the Soviet global
strategic buildup.
- Soviet unwillingness to make the major concessions demanded
by Bening unless China significantly reduces its relationships
with the United States or moves to settle the border dispute.
At the same time, certain other forces will tend to support a
reduction of the intensity of Sino-Soviet hostility. The principal such
forces:
Overall, the numerous changes in time, situation, and personal-
ity that have occurred since the Sino-Soviet split of a generation
ago-which render extreme hostility between Moscow and
Bening somewhat of an outmoded phenomenon, the product of
certain circumstances of the time that now have less relevance.
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-The mere fact of reaching agreement on at least some (second-
ary) issues in itself creates an environment for momentum and
the possibility of further agreements.
- On the Soviet side, as Moscow's leaders perceive increasing
strategic challenge from more forceful US policies and future
US weapon systems and deployments, a strong wish on their
part to lessen the possibility that Sino-Soviet hostilities might
greatly complicate the USSR's basic security interests or its
overall strategic objectives.
- A basic desire to reduce the danger of a two-front war.
- A strong desire to prevent close cooperation between China and
the United States (and Japan), and to that end to take advantage
of known dissatisfactions on the part of Bening with its Ameri-
can connection.
- A desire to enhance the security of the USSR's eastern borders
by means additional to military power.
- Concern about what the long-term political implications would
be for China's economic modernization programs if outside
assistance to those programs were to come only from the United
States and the West.
- A sense in Moscow that the danger of Chinese adventurist
actions against the Soviet Union-one of the original reasons for
the beginnings of the Soviet military buildup, years ago, on the
Sino-Soviet border-has greatly diminished.
- The opportunity to take advantage of the more businesslike
attitudes and procedures that have come to mark Chinese
politics and society since the death of Mao Zedong, in the
process lessening some of the emotional content that Mao and
Nikita Khrushchev personally contributed to Sino-Soviet
estrangement.
- On the Chinese side, Deng Xiaoping and his associates have
determined that (a) China's greatest problems are those it faces
as a vast, poor LDC; (b) the process of national development in
China will be so difficult that it will need a prolonged period of
respite from outside pressures; (c) to these ends a reordering of
China's foreign policies is needed, one that reduces the level of
tension with the USSR; and (d) such a reordering would not
seriously risk jeopardizing the continuance either of strong US-
led opposition to Soviet expansion in the world, or of US and
Western willingness to continue cooperating economically with
China.
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Associated with those decisions, almost certainly low expecta-
tions on the part of Beijing's leaders that the United States
would come to Beijing's aid in the event of a Soviet attack on
China.
China's discovery during its invasion of Vietnam in 1979 that it
faced a formidable military antagonist on its southern border,
and Beijing's consequent desire to reduce the pressures on China
resulting from its two-front confrontation with the USSR and
Vietnam.
- Views on the part of China's leaders that a modest improvement
of relations with the USSR serves to increase Beijing's leverage
on Washington.
- A desire to diversify further the foreign sources of input into
China's modernization, and to take advantage of certain bene-
f its that would derive f rom expanded economic and technologi-
cal ties with the USSR.
- A view on the part of Deng and his fellow pragmatists that less
hostile relationships with the USSR will also signal that, in
accepting some US economic and military assistance, Bening
does not intend to embrace the United States too closely or
completely ref use all assistance from the USSR.
It should be stressed that present Sino-Soviet talks are taking
place against the background of a continuing substantial augmenta-
tion of Soviet military strength adjacent to China-which has contin-
ued during the Sino-Soviet consultations of the past two years. Roughly
one-fourth of all Soviet ground force personnel are now stationed
opposite China, together with more than 2,000 Soviet aircraft, over
100,000 air personnel, greatly enhanced naval strength, a rapidly
expanding SS-20 force, and considerable additional nuclear weapons
carriers in the form of Backfire and Badger bombers, SLBMs, and
ICBMs. The great majority of the USSR's nuclear weapons targeted
against East Asia will continue to be devoted to Chinese targets. And, a
principal net result of the buildup will be certain continuing marked
asymmetries in Soviet and Chinese military forces: the Chinese seriously
lagging, qualitatively, in modern arms; Soviet ground and air forces
generally positioned fairly close to China's borders, C ih n e forces
deployed deeply behind those borders.
Moscow's leaders see their military augmentation as insurance
against Chinese military provocations along the border, and against the
prospect of a significantly enhanced Chinese nuclear threat to the USSR
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over the long term. They almost certainly also consider that their forces
will continue to serve meanwhile as a deterrent to China from invading
Vietnam once again, or from otherwise effectively challenging Soviet
interests in Indochina. And, these forces will strengthen Moscow's
negotiating hand vis-a-vis the Chinese.
This ongoing Soviet augmentation will at the same time continue
to stem from many causes beyond those directly relating to China and
will continue to serve many broader Soviet interests. That is, the
augmentation of forces in the East also reflects the USSR's plans to
upgrade all of its forces, everywhere; its desire to strengthen its
capability to fight atwo-front war, in Europe and Asia; the felt need to
compensate for dependence on a very long, vulnerable railroad to
reinforce and resupply the isolated Soviet Far East; the traditional
Soviet practice of overinsuring, of massing more military strength than
outside observers might think necessary; the Soviet effort to use the
military buildup as an instrument for political intimidation and further
expansion of influence in East Asia; and a desire to reinforce Soviet se-
curity against the perspective of much-enhanced Western military
capabilities in the Pacific.
It should also be stressed that the Sino-Soviet future is not just a
bilateral matter, but will develop within the dynamic of triangular
relationships with the United States. This dynamic will be a crucially
important factor affecting the behavior of Moscow and Bening toward
the other. Each leadership will remain highly sensitive to its perceptions
of the US relationship with the rival Communist power, and especially
to any development that either power might consider to represent a
major discontinuity in US orientation or strategic priorities.
What developments appear most likely in the Sino-Soviet rela-
tionship over the next two years or so?
-Chances favor continuance of the process of markedly increas-
.- ing trade relations and reaching agreements on other secondary
issues of economic and technological ties, cultural interchanges,
and the like, amidst continuing reflections of a more business-
like, less intensely hostile overall atmosphere. This may proceed
to the point of including agreement on certain conf idence-
building measures ICBMs) such as mutual notification of troop
exercises.
- The~wo sides will upgrade the level of negotiating representa-
tion~. The Soviets will continue to press for broader ties with
Bening, in the belief that agreement on enough small steps will
lay a path for progress on major issues. The Soviets will also seek
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to institutionalize the negotiating process. The Chinese will
probably continue to draw the line well short of the most f ar-
reaching Soviet proposals in the absence of major Soviet military
concessions.
- While continuing to emphasize its maximum demands for large-
scale Soviet force reductions in the Soviet Far East, Bening
would welcome even small concessions from the Soviets in their
force deployments against China. The Chinese would particu-
larly welcome Soviet troop withdrawals from Mongolia.
- For their part, the Soviets will continue their force improve-
ments in the East. And, the Soviets will probably not make more
than token gestures to China over the next two to three years.
- Moscow will almost certainly continue to withhold major
concessions regarding its forces along China's border and in
Mongolia until Bening has made more fundamental concessions
than it has yet been willing to consider. There is nonetheless a
modest chance that the Soviets will make a token pullback of
perhaps a division or so from Mongolia during the next two to
three years. This would not constitute a material change of
much consequence, but could represent a symbolic concession
of some magnitude that might induce the Chinese to reciprocate
in some way-and thus perhaps encourage Moscow to make
further concessions.
- Even if there were a token Soviet military pullback from
Mongolia, however, we doubt that the Chinese would make
major concessions on the issues of greatest concern to Moscow-
particularly the border dispute-until Soviet force withdrawals
had gone well beyond the token stage.
- Nor is the USSR likely to give up its control over the regime in
Afghanistan, to abandon support for Vietnam's war effort in
Kampuchea, or to surrender its military privileges at Cam Ranh
Bay in Vietnam-where since late 1983 the Soviets have
deployed Badger bombers.
Contingent developments that could upset the above-estimated
course of Sino-Soviet relations:
- Major escalation of Vietnamese war efforts in Kampuchea or
along Thailand's borders.
- North Korean reversion to incendiary policies.
- Major Soviet efforts to destabilize Pakistan.
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-Vietnamese clashes with China, either along the border or in the
South China Sea.
- The adoption of major new policies on the part of post-Deng or
post-Chernenko leaderships.
- A Japanese move toward major rearmament.
Possible alternative outcomes:
- There is an off chance that during the period of this Estimate
the Sino-Soviet relationship could take on a much more hostile
character than the Estimate holds probable:
- This could occur because so many variables are present, many
of them not f ully within the control of the present leaderships
in either Moscow or Beijing: the advent of new policies on the
part of post-Deng or post-Chernenko leadership, initiatives
taken by other governments (in Korea or Vietnam, for exam-
ple), and so on.
- It does not follow that US interests would necessarily benefit
from the coming of a much more frigid Sino-Soviet relation-
ship. The effect on US interests would depend on the nature
and intensity of the estrangement between Moscow and
Beijing: up to a point, US interests would clearly benefit from
probable increases in Chinese cooperation against Soviet poli-
cies in the world, in Chinese receptiveness to US advice and
counsel, and-possibly-in willingness to permit expanded
levels of Western economic and technological presence within
China. But, if Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated to the point of
actual or threatened large-scale hostilities, US diplomatic and
security policymaking could be greatly complicated.
- Conversely, there is also an outside chance-though less likely
than the above-that the Sino-Soviet relationship could become
a much closer one during the period of this Estimate than we
now judge likely:
- This might come to pass if no great disruptive contingencies
should occur; if the Chinese should back away in practice-
though not in principle-from certain of their key "de-
mands"; if agreements reached on a number of secondary
issues should begin to create a somewhat greater momentum
toward Sino-Soviet rapprochement; or if for some reason
Beijing's leaders should come to depreciate the value of
China's relationships with the United States.
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-The coming of significantly closer relations between the USSR
and China could seriously harm US interests; the warmer the
Sino-Soviet relationship, the more damaging to US geopolitical
concerns, defense policies, targeting, and alliance systems, to
the role of Japan, and to numerous other key US interests.
- Although the possibility cannot be excluded that alternative
outcomes such as the above could occur in the Sino-Soviet
relationship, we stress that the most likely o_tcome, by far, is
that__which this NIE has postulate ?~amely, that the level o
hostility between Moscow and Beiiing will decrease, that some
additional agreements on secondary matters or possibly CBMs
will be reached, that at most the USSR may make a token
withdrawal of perhaps a division or so from Mongolia, and that
continuing basic differences between Moscow and Bening will
not permit any significantly greater degree of rapprochement
--..between .them to develop over the next two to three years.
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DISCUSSION
The Wary Thaw
1. Since the Intelligence Community last addressed
the subiect of Sino-Soviet relations,' the USSR and
China have begun to moderate the level of hostility
between them. Evidence indicates that theirs is still,
fundamentally, a hostile and distrustful relationship,
and that the most important of the factors that have
preserved this animosity for more than two decades
will probably remain substantially unchanged over the
next two to three years. Incremental improvements
have occurred in secondary aspects of the relationship,
and these will probably continue and grow in impor-
tance over time. These improvements will probably
continue to have only a modest effect on the central
issues that divide the two powers-barring certain
developments discussed below.
2. Over the last three years, and particularly since
the fall of 1982, important changes have occurred in
the atmosphere of bilateral Sino-Soviet dealings. Po-
lemics have been significantly reduced, particularly on
the Soviet side. Exchanges of technical, sports, and
cultural delegations have increased. Student exchanges
have also been reinstituted for the first time in many
years, although on a very small scale-and in no way
even faintly approaching China's present student ex-
changes with the West.2 Sino-Soviet dealings on river
navigation matters have become more cooperative,
Mutual trade was doubled in 1983, to a target figure of
some $800 million, the highest level since the early
1960s (see figure 1), and the 1984 trade protocol calls
for total trade to increase to some $1.2 billion.3 Also,
local trade crossing points have been opened in the
northeastern and northwestern sectors of the Sino-
Soviet border, for the first time since the early 1960s.
The Soviets have proposed and the Chinese have in
principle accepted Soviet assistance in the moderniza-
tion over the next few years of two to four of the
' NIE 11/13-80, Sino-Soviet Relations in the Early 1980s (s xa
nrc), 5 June 1980.
There were 100 Chinese students in the USSR in 1984, as
compared with some 14,000 in the West.
s The increased deliveries of timber, fertilizers, and ferrous and
nonferrous metals by the Soviet Union have accounted for much of
its increased exports, with sales of machinery and equipment
playing a less important role than in the past. The Chinese are
supplying the Soviets increased quantities of food products, textiles,
and other manufactured consumer goods.
Figure 1
Sino-Soviet Trade, 1950-84
I~~~~I~~~~I~~~~I~~~r~~~~l~~~~l~~~~
1950 55 60 65 70 75 gp a b
a Trade for 1983 estimated.
b Trade for 1984 projected according [o trade protocol of ]0 February.
Secret
302445 4-84
industrial plants built by the Chinese with Soviet help
in the 1950s. And two sets of semiannual consultations
at the deputy-foreign-minister level have been institut-
ed to maintain channels of contact on both contentious
and noncontentious issues. It is noteworthy that the
scope of many of these developments has tended to
broaden over time, implying that the process of
change has some momentum.
3. At the same time, an intense conflict of interest
in Asia persists between these two Communist powers.
This conflict has many sources, including racial antag-
onism, historical grievances, terr-itorial aspirations, the
difference in military potential, the heritage of past
border hostilities, the great contrast in population
density, Chinese memories of past Soviet heavyhand-
edness, ideological pretensions, and the rivalry for
political advantage in states around the periphery of
China and, more generally, in the Third World.
Fundamentally, the Soviet Union seeks to constrain
the growth of China's geopolitical weight in Asia, and
continues to regard Chinese ambitions as incompatible
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Objectives:
? Moscow's leaders hope that these consultations will
help ensure the security of the USSR's eastern
borders, undermine Sino-US and Sino-Japanese re-
lations-particularly with respect to any strategic
discussions, and moderate Chinese hostility.
? Beijing's leaders hope that the consultations will
help China to manage the Soviet threat, so that a
prolonged period of reduced tensions can facilitate
China's progress toward modernization.
? Reduce border tension and the risk of armed
clashes.
? Gain leverage in its respective dealings with the
United States.
? Increase trade; resume technical assistance.
? Increase cultural, educational, and other exchanges.
? Without having to make major concessions, gain
leverage for ultimate substantial gains at the other's
expense.
? Negotiate long-term trade agreement, agreements
on exchanges, etc.
? Achieve understanding on some bilateral security
issues.
??-Resume party-to-party relations if possible.
The Chinese tactic is to:
? Maintain a calculated distance from the USSR,
even while benefiting from various improvements
in relations.
? Focus from the outset on major strategic concerns,
even if there is no hope of agreement in the
foreseeable future.
? Identify areas of Soviet policy that can symbolize
the Soviet strategic threat in a way that will gain
support for China in the Third World, among Asian
countries, and in the West.
The Chinese therefore want to:
? Go slow on for a?rJ ents ut without block-
ing progress on practical issues.
The Soviet tactic is to:
? Dramatize small steps toward improved relations.
? Defer the more difficult strategic issues.
The Soviets therefore want to:
? Formalize improvements in relations in a joint
statement of principles.
with its own security and goals. The Chinese, for their
part, view their present dealings with Moscow against
the background of a long-term buildup of forces in the
Soviet Far East since the start of the Brezhnev regime,
and of an ongoing Soviet effort to corisolidate geopolit-
ical advances in Afghanistan and Indochina. The
Chinese interpret the Soviet buildup as intended to
intimidate China and Japan, to facilitate the Soviet
struggle to advance Soviet presence and influence
around China's periphery, to assist in the Soviet
worldwide geopolitical contest with the United States,
and to offset the growth of US military strength in the
western Pacific and the improvement of US military
cooperation with Japan. Thus, over the last few years
China has taken the position that Soviet force deploy-
ments along China's borders, Soviet moves in Indo-
china, and Soviet actions in Afghanistan are three key
issues where there must be some movement on Mos-
? Continue to focus attention on the "three obstacles"
to full normalization: the Soviet military presence
in Mongolia and on the Sino-Soviet border; the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; and Soviet aid to
the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea.
cow's part before substantial Sino-Soviet rapproche-
ment can take place.
4. In the last year, as bilateral contacts have ex-
panded, each side has received confirmation that it
should not anticipate early progress toward major
concessions. Beijing has found that the prospect of
increased trade and contacts has not caused the Soviet
Union to reduce its threat to Chinese security or to
alter those policies that undermine China's interests
around its periphery. Moscow has found that, in the
absence of what it considers radical and unpalatable
Soviet concessions to China, Beijing will not abandon
the use of important ties with the United States to
contest Soviet policy and to reinforce China's security.
Although both sides apparently regard the improve-
ments registered thus far as useful, almost certainly
neither state is reconciled to failure to move the other
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thus far on the issues of greater concern. Each may
retain residual hopes that the further development of
the process of amelioration will eventually bring it the
concessions it seeks, without surrendering the conces-
sions the opponent demands.
The Soviet Perspective
5. The attitude of Soviet leaders toward China is,
one of arm's-length encouragement. Moscow is clearly
gratified at the recent improvements in the bilateral
atmosphere and the trend toward expansion of Sino-
Soviet intercourse. The Soviets initiated this current
process in mid-1982 through a series, of public over-
tures, acting partly in response to Perception of a new
opening created by the emergence of heightened Sino-
US friction in 1981, as well as in response to setbacks
Soviet fortunes had experienced vis-a-vis the West-
the derailing of the SALT II agreement, NATO's two-
track decision on intermediate-range nuclear forces
(INF), and sharply adverse world reactions to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As in previous occa-
sions of Sino-Soviet diplomatic explorations, dating
back to 1970, the Soviets have consistently sought to
broaden the scope of bilateral dealings as far as the
Chinese will permit, seeking both to create the prereq-
uisites for the restoration of some Soviet influence in
China and to encourage Beijing to distance itself
further from the United States. Evidence indicates
that Soviet leaders thus hope to erode the Sino-US
relationship or at least reestablish a more balanced
Sino-Soviet-US triangular relationship, and to render
more remote the contingency of Soviet involvement in
a two-front war.
6. There is some indication that there have been
differing views within the Soviet foreign policy estab-
lishment in recent years, however, over the advisabil-
ity of initiating the kind of overtures Moscow began
making to Beijing in 1982-but it is not clear how
significant any such differences have been. Because all
the USSR's recent proposals to China are long-estab-
lished themes of Soviet policy that evade Beiiing's
requests for major military concessions, however, they
probably are not objects of major controversy in
Moscow. But, should the Soviet leadership ever come
to weigh seriously the advisability of some concessions
to China on Soviet troop dispositions, the degree of
controversy would probably rise sharply.
7. For the moment, we believe that there is proba-
bly considerable satisfaction in Moscow that the bilat-
eral movement seen so far is a useful Soviet achieve-
ment registered at little cost, the first fruit of more
than 20 years of sporadic efforts to secure Chinese
consent to some improvement in the relationship
without major Soviet concessions in advance. Soviet
leaders doubtless regard Chinese modification of pre-
vious attitudes as itself a unilateral tacit Chinese
concession.
8. Because no significant Soviet concessions are yet
involved, continuation of the strategy now being pur-
sued toward China to attempt to change Chinese
policy is generally approved in the Soviet leadership.
There appears to be solid support in the Soviet elite for
further efforts to expand trade and contacts along
present lines, along with renewed attempts to persuade
the Chinese to accept bilateral improvements in areas
where they remain recalcitrant, particularly their
consent to top-level meetings. The Soviets will surely
continue to press them hard for further substantive
and symbolic movement, across the spectrum of bilat-
eral relations, in order to bring the level of Sino-Soviet
dealings closer to that existing between the United
States and China. Moscow and Beijing have agreed to
double the level of their trade, and evidence indicates
that Moscow would like to be able to raise the turnover
still further. Acutely conscious of the acceleration of
Sino-American mutual ministerial visits in 1983 and
the scheduling of a new Presidential visit to China in
April 1984, the Soviets chafe at the restrictions Beijing
continues to impose on their own reciprocal diplomat-
ic exchanges with China, and seek to upgrade the level
of contact. The Soviets would probably like to secure a
restoration of bilateral party-to-party contacts severed
by Beijing in 1966-particularly since they constitute
an aspect of the relationship that the United States of
necessity could not match.
9. In .addition, there is likely to be wide support in
Soviet decisionmaking circles for concrete efforts to
appeal to Chinese concerns that seem to run counter to
US policy. One leading example is Chinese anxiety
about the possibility of a revival of Japanese milita-
rism. The Soviets have already made efforts to use this
issue (unsuccessfully to date) as a vehicle with which to
elicit Sino-Soviet political cooperation against the
United States, and they will almost certainly repeat
such efforts in the future.
10. At the same time, however, available evidence
indicates that Soviet leaders regard the progress
reached in Sino-Soviet talks to date as superficial. And,
although the Soviets welcome Chinese criticisms of the
United States and China's abandonment of calls for a
"world united front" against the Soviet Union, author-
itative Soviet spokesmen have made it clear that they
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see Chinese policy as still fundamentally hostile to
Soviet goals, and as aligned with the United States
against the USSR in most important respects.
11. Furthermore, the question of how to deal with
China is clearly a sensitive issue in Moscow. The
available evidence suggests that two currents of opin-
ion on this matter exist in the Soviet foreign policy
establishment. One, which appears to be much the
weaker of the two, seems to favor more active Soviet
steps to conciliate China, possibly including some
concessions regarding troop dispositions on the border.
(See figures 2 and 3 and the appended map.) Those
who lean to this position evidently argue that only
through such concessions can the Soviet Union extract
maior dividends from favorable tendencies in Beiiing.
Certain of the USSR's academic specialists on China
take such a position. These figures have drawn encour-
agement from the increased Chinese civility in bilater-
al dealings, from the disappearance of Chinese ideo-
logical charges against the Soviet Union, from the
similarities between the Chinese and Soviet social
systems and state structures, and~from the resentment
shown by some Chinese leaders over what they regard
as the subversive effect of Western influence. Such
trends, these figures argue, bode well for future trends
in Chinese foreign policy.
12. Such thought, however, appears to be considera-
bly outweighed by dominant forces in the Soviet
Figure 2
Soviet Peacetime Force Manning Opposite
China, 1965-83
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
Figure 3
Active Ground Forces Divisions Opposite
China, 1965-83
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
1965 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83
leadership that are strongly suspicious of Beijing's
intention, particularly while Deng Xiaoping remains
China's boss. These views seem particularly strong in
the Central Committee apparatus and among the
Soviet military. These harder-line figures probably
believe that recent Chinese conciliatory behavior to-
ward the USSR has been driven in large part by a
desire to exert pressure on the United States for
bilateral concessions within an overall framework of
continued opposition to Soviet policy by both powers.
Those Soviet officials are apparently vividly aware of
the extent to which the USSR's interests and ambitions
clash with China's in Asia, and of the fact that the
United States and China continue to work in parallel
to contest Soviet policies in Indochina and Afghani-
stan. They have remarked that recent Chinese invita-
tions to the US Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, and the President to visit China are further
confirmation of these attitudes. These Soviet skeptics
apparently interpret these Chinese invitations as evi-
dence of the strength of Beijing's long-term interest in
acquisition of American industrial technology relevant
to China's defense against the Soviet Union. They
almost certainly doubt that the Chinese can be in-
duced to abandon this relationship with the United
States merely as a result of improvements in China's
trade and contacts with the USSR, although they
apparently see no harm in attempting to do so.
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13. Although these tough attitudes do not exclude
all Soviet concessions to China during the period of
this Estimate, they suggest that any such concessions
are likely to be largely token or atmospheric in nature,
in the absence of major changes in the Chinese
position or a generational turnover in the Soviet
leadership that might bring a different set of attitudes
to the fore.' Representatives of all tendencies in
Moscow, however, doubtless hope that internal politi-
cal factors in China or the United States may eventual-
ly cause a multiplication of Sino-American frictions
that will in turn produce major changes in China's
posture toward both superpowers. And there clearly
appears to be general agreement in the Soviet leader-
ship that the USSR has a vested interest in limiting
Sino-US cooperation and, if possible, in encouraging a
deterioration of Washington-Beijing relations.
14. For the moment, the passing of Andropov and
the advent of Chernenko do provide Moscow with an
opportunity to make another effort to advance the
Sino-Soviet dialogue. There have already been a few
such signs from the Soviet side-for example, hints of
a more forthcoming stand on the question of China's
"socialist" nature. But Chernenko has bluntly reiterat-
ed Moscow's refusal to budge on the basic issues in
dispute: Afghanistan, Indochina, Soviet force strength
adiacent to China. The early emphasis of the new
Soviet leadership has been on continuity in policy, and
there has been no sign that Chernenko has made
improved relations with China a top priority. Further-
more, the continued prominence of Foreign Minister
Gromyko and Defense Minister Ustinov suggests that
Moscow will make few, if any, major departures on
foreign policy issues at the outset under Chernenko.
His leadership is likely to stick with the present course
of "small steps" toward a normalization of relations
with China.
The Chinese Perspective
15. Although the initiative for the recent bilateral
improvements has come from the Soviet Union, the
important shifts in policy required to allow any im-
provements to begin have come from China. As
already noted, most of those measures that have now
been put into effect had for many years been periodi-
^t~sed_by Moscow and re'ected by Beijing.
Indeed, a continuing centralsue for the future is that
many important proposals long on the Soviet list-
such as requests for summit meetings and restoration
of party contacts-still have not been accepted by
China.
' These matters are discussed in greater detail in the section
beginning at paragraph 27.
16. The degree of movement that has occurred in
Sino-Soviet bilateral relations has resulted in part from
gradual changes in the thinking of Chinese leaders
about how much improvement in these dealings is
compatible with China's defense of its geopolitical
interests against the Soviet Union. This evolution in
Chinese attitudes began in 1979, was halted by the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but has resumed again
since 1981. We believe that this pattern of sporadic
starting and stopping in Chinese policy toward deal-
ings with the Soviet Union has been influenced not
only by security and foreign policy considerations, but
also by the interplay of differing opinions within the
Chinese leadership. Such differences from time to
time seem to have affected Chinese tactics toward
both the Soviet Union and the United States.
17. The most recent modifications in Chinese calcu-
lations about the Soviet Union have emerged as part of
a broader pattern of changes in the Chinese posture
toward the world, carried out incrementally over the
last three years, aimed at cultivating a more independ-
ent image on the international scene. While retaining
a considerable degree of cooperation with Washington
against Moscow, Beijing has thus sought to blur the
impression created in the late 1970s of a China almost
totally identified with the United States in polar
opposition to the Soviet Union. To this end, China has
repudiated the notion of a strategic alliance with the
United States, has abandoned earlier calls fora "world
united front" against the Soviet Union, and has some-
what contracted the scope of its criticism of the USSR.
18. The Chinese have evidently decided to make
these changes in their general posture for a mixture of
reasons. Certain of these shifts were reflected in
China's exploratory talks with Moscow in 1979. Beijing
was later influenced to increase somewhat its distance
from America in 1981 and 1982 because the rise of
bilateral difficulties tended to strengthen longstanding
skepticism in Beijing about the willingness of the US
government and public to take risks for China in the
event of a Chinese crisis with the Soviet Union.
Beijing's leaders were apparently also interested in
using the process of Sino-Soviet amelioration as an
instrument of leverage on the United States, particu-
larly in the two most important areas of Sino-Ameri-
can friction: the US relationship with Taiwan, and US
olicy regarding the transfer of advanced industrial
echnology to China. Simultaneously, the Chinese
apparently hoped that the resulting shifts in relations
with the United States would create a more appropri-
? ate backdrop for Chinese efforts to elicit Soviet
concessions.
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19. Evidence indicates that Beiiing's leaders found
China's partial disassociation from the United States
convenient in other respects. It enabled China to
separate itself from identification with those US poli-
cies in the Third World that Beiiing disapproves. It
also made it somewhat easier for Beiiing to court
political actors hostile to the United States but impor-
tant for Chinese interests, and to strive to avoid
isolation from important sections of Western public
opinion opposed to certain specific American policies.
20. At the same time, however, China has been
reminded by Soviet intransigence that, whatever the
uncertainties in the Sino-US relationship, this relation-
ship provides China a welcome margin of security.
Because Beiiing has continued to perceive a Soviet
threat to Chinese security and undiminished Soviet
opposition to Chinese interests in Asia, it has also had
an ongoing reason to find a way to compromise
differences with Washington. China has therefore
sought not to eliminate its strategic cooperation with
the United States against the USSR, but rather to
redefine that cooperation in terms that preserve its
advantages for China while giving Bening greater
flexibility and leverage in dealing with both powers.
21. In both 1979 and 1982 China opened talks with
the USSR after a maior step in relations with the
United States had assured it that ties with Washington
had been consolidated-in 1979 the visit of then Vice
President Mondale, and in 1982 the conclusion of the
17 August communique on arms sales to Taiwan. It is
likely that the Chinese leaders felt that these actions,
which stabilized relations with the United States, were
important prerequisites for the talks that were opened
with the USSR shortly thereafter.
22. Despite the improvement that has taken place
in the atmosphere of Sino-US relations over the past
year, we believe that China will continue to disavow
any intention to loin Washington in a formal strategic
relationship. Also, the Chinese will continue to soft-
pedal attacks on Soviet policies in some areas of the
world, and will continue to criticize US policies on
occasion. And, additional new areas of Chinese dis-
agreement with the United States could emerge. But
Beiiing's leaders will also continue to hold on to the
relationship with the United States as important to
China's security and economic development, and as
the essential underpinning for their exploratory deal-
ings with Moscow.
23. The Chinese have a number of associated rea-
sons for lessening the level of tensions with the USSR:
- A desire to reduce tensions and relieve the
pressure on China resulting from its two-front
confrontation with the USSR and Vietnam.
- A desire to put pressure on Vietnam. Beiiing is
well aware of Hanoi's discomfiture over Sino-
Soviet contacts and negotiations, and of Viet-
nam's obvious anxiety at the possibility of Soviet
betrayal of Vietnam's interests to appease China.
However remote China's leaders consider the
likelihood of such a turn in Soviet policy, they
welcome the difficulties the issue has created for
Vietnam, and they doubtless hope fora conse-
quent exacerbation of Soviet-Vietnamese fric-
tions.
-The desire to build a calmer strategic environ-
ment that will provide a margin of safety for
Chinese economic priorities, for despite China's
military weaknesses its leaders are determined to
maintain a measured pace of military modern-
ization and to avoid hasty diversion of badly
needed resources from the civilian economy to
the military sector.
- A desire to further diversify the foreign sources
of input into China's modernization. Beiiing is
not likely to cease relying primarily upon the
capitalist industrialized world for such inputs,
despite Soviet hopes to change this priority. But
Deng and his associates have apparently come to
believe that expanded imports and a limited use
of expertise from the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe can play a useful supplementary role in
modernization. This view has apparently been
reinforced by the difficulties China has some-
times experienced in assimilating advanced
Western or Japanese technology. Evidence indi-
cates the Chinese have come to believe that some
less advanced but easier to assimilate Soviet
middle-level technology should be given a some-
what larger role in modernization, and particu-
larly in reequipping some of the industrial plants
built with Soviet help in the 1950s. Evidence also
indicates that Beiiing's leaders remember past
Soviet efforts to exploit Chinese economic
dependence for political purposes; they are high-
ly unlikely to allow themselves to be put in such
a position of dependence again. We believe that
with this consideration in mind they will place
sharp limits on the number and activities of
Soviet technical experts used in China to help in
plant modernization.
- A belief on the part of Beiiing's leaders that
China can make good use of expanded raw
material imports from the Soviet Union, and that
the USSR furnishes a convenient outlet for tex-
tiles and other Chinese light industrial products
that are surplus to Chinese export markets else-
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where. China's leaders also apparently find con-
venient the fact that barter trade with the Soviet
Union conserves hard currency.
- A Chinese desire to reestablish a political pres-
ence in the East European states and to expand
useful economic relations with them, a process
that will be furthered by a context of Chinese
improvements with Moscow.
- A Chinese hope-if not the expectation-that
Beijing may eventually obtain major concessions
from Moscow that would reduce Soviet geopoliti-
cal pressure around China's periphery.
24. Available evidence indicates that, after two
years of consultations with Moscow, China retains
little expectation of receiving meaningful concessions
regarding Indochina or Afghanistan for the foreseeable
future. On the other hand, Chinese behavior suggests
that some elements in Beijing's leadership may still
retain hopes that concessions can eventually be ob-
tained regarding the Soviet force posture to China's
north. Such Chinese views have apparently been
encouraged by hints advanced by the Soviet Union
implying the possibility of eventual unspecified con-
cessions regarding military deployments. The Chinese
may also harbor hopes of obtaining such gains because
they perceive the Soviet Union as heavily burdened by
its economic difficulties, its military commitments in
Afghanistan and Europe, and heightened Soviet com-
petition with the United States. Finally, the Chinese
may have been led to hope that the tougher US
posture toward Moscow in recent years would enhance
Beijing's leverage over the USSR, and therefore pro-
duce Soviet concessions.
25. Despite all their reasons to expand bilateral
dealings with the USSR, however, the Chinese have
powerful reasons to maintain limits on their dealings
with the USSR:
- Perhaps most important, the need to avoid creat-
ing the impression in the USSR that the Chinese
leadership is permanently reconciled to the status
quo in East Asia, and is willing to accept the
Soviet presence in Southeast Asia and a continu-
ing Soviet force buildup in East Asia as compati-
ble with good relations.
-Chinese care not to go so far in improving
relations with Moscow that this might jeopardize
the gains China receives from its existing rela-
tionships with the United States and other non-
communist states. China's leaders wish to be able
to imply to Moscow-as a prod for concessions
and a disincentive to more forceful policies
toward China-that they retain the option to
greatly strengthen security cooperation with the
United States; and they also strongly desire to
maintain US acquiescence in the flow of industri-
al technology to China from the United States,
Japan, and Western Europe, and to enlarge that
flow into more sophisticated and sensitive areas.
Evidence indicates that Chinese leaders also wish
to preserve the option to purchase some ad-
vanced weapons production technology from the
West, and particularly from the United States,
believing that the creation of expectations of far-
reaching changes in Sino-Soviet relations could
alarm the United States sufficiently to endanger
all these benefits.
- Beijing's wish not to be perceived by Third
World leaders as moving closer to the USSR.
Beiiing has found that Chinese actions viewed in
Asia as seeking to propitiate Moscow can evoke
negative reactions from certain states, notably
Japan and Thailand.
26. For all these reasons, we fudge that, in the
absence of major Soviet concessions, Beijing over the
next two to three years will probably continue to resist
Soviet pressure for bilateral improvements of a type
that would be likely to raise serious warning flags
elsewhere. Chinese response to Soviet overtures will
therefore continue to be differentiated: in some areas
Beijing will probably allow further progress, while in
others China is likely to continue to reject Soviet
requests:
- In the first area, Beijing will probably consent to
some reciprocal visits by important government
figures (without acknowledging their party sta-
tus), as well as to continued expansion of dealings
on those fronts where improvements have al-
ready begun in the last two years: notably,
student exchanges, and multiplication of eco-
nomic, sports, and cultural contacts; and trade
volume-where agreement may be reached on a
five-year trade pact.
- In the second area are those Soviet desires whose
satisfaction Beijing will probably regard as not
justified by Soviet conduct and as likely to be
overly provocative to the United States. For
example, in the absence of maior Soviet conces-
sions (which are themselves unlikely), Beijing will
probably not agree to the Soviet request, pressed
by Moscow since 1978, for a formal umbrella
document to establish the underpinning for a
new Sino-Soviet relationship. Beijing also is un-
likely to agree during the period of this Estimate
to reciprocal visits by top party leaders, and the
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chances are less than even that the Chinese will
consent to a restoration of party relations. Final-
ly, we do not believe that Beiiing will consent to
any overtures from Moscow for concrete Sino-
Soviet political cooperation against the United
States.
The Major Issues Precluding Sino-Soviet
Improvement
27. The three primary preconditions that Bening
has posed for a major improvement in the Sino-Soviet
relationship are that the USSR significantly reduce its
military power (nuclear and nonnuclear) adjacent to
China, cease its support for Vietnam's occupation of
Kampuchea, and withdraw its combat troops from
Afghanistan. These issues have different degrees of
importance to Moscow and Beijing; and it should be
noted that, if past Chinese negotiating patterns hold,
Beijing's "preconditions" often remain in a formal
sense but ultimately give way somewhat in fact. The
following are the three primary issues, in order of
increasing importance to the Sino-Soviet relationship.
Afghanistan
28. Evidence indicates that the Chinese regard the
issue of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan as the
least important of the three "obstacles." The Chinese
interpreted the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
December 1979 as alarming new evidence of Mos-
cow's willingness to use force to attain its goals, and as
a significant advance of the Soviet military presence in
Asia, creating a new potential for eventual further
advance of Soviet influence. In particular, China's
leaders are almost certainly concerned that success for
the USSR's "southward strategy" in Afghanistan could
endanger China's close ally Pakistan and the oil routes
of the Persian Gulf so important to the West. Beijing
also sees the Soviet assertion of hegemony in Afghani-
stan as, among other things, an extension of other
Soviet efforts to encircle China geopolitically, and as
part of an unending struggle to counteract China's
influence in Asia.
29. At the same time, however, the Chinese have
not seen the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan,
remote from China because of geography and terrain,
as adding significantly to the Soviet military threat to
China. Also because of Afghanistan's remoteness, Bei-
jing's sense of its vested interest in the political
orientation of this country has always been much
weaker than its view of its stake in Indochina. Finally,
Bejing has come to regard the extended punitive war
Moscow is waging in Afghanistan as a protracted
source of Soviet weakness-a point of political vulner-
ability, adrain on Soviet resources, and a possible
constraint on Soviet ability to take military initiatives
elsewhere. Beijing's leaders therefore see the present
situation as offering important compensation for Sovi-
et failure to withdraw, and do not seem to be greatly
concerned at the prospect of continued stalemate.
30. We fudge that the Soviets are unlikely to aban-
don efforts to consolidate control over Afghanistan.
The Soviet leaders are unlikely to modify their view of
the importance of maintaining a friendly regime in
power there that also serves as a bridge potentially
extending Soviet power and influence significantly
further in Southwest Asia. This view has probably
been reinforced by the Soviet commitment there to
preserve Soviet local domination. In any case, the
Soviet leaders almost certainly regard China's concerns
as secondary concerning Afghanistan. If more impor-
tant negative consequences of this policy are insuffi-
cient to modify Soviet behavior there, the Soviets will
certainly not do so to appease China.
31. Beijing's leaders take a far graver view of Soviet
actions in Indochina, which they regard as incompati-
ble with China's security. Since 1978, the Soviet Union
has provided economic, political, and military backing
for Vietnam's efforts to consolidate its domination
over the Indochinese peninsula and to exclude Chinese
influence from the region. The Soviet Union has also
served as a sizable deterrent to a major Chinese
intervention to halt Vietnam's conquest of Kampu-
chea. China has been compelled to rely instead on
supporting a Kampuchean insurgency that for five
years has denied final victory to Hanoi and Moscow.
This insurgency has been nourished in part by Chinese
weapons and supplies funneled through Thailand; as
well as by the diplomatic support of China, the
ASEAN countries, and the United States; and, indi-
rectly, by US security backing for Thailand against the
threat of Vietnamese reprisal. In return for the USSR's
commitments to Hanoi, Soviet influence has followed
in the wake of Vietnam into Kampuchea and Laos,
and the Soviet Union has obtained use of Cam Ranh
Bay to support growing air, naval, and intelligence
capabilities on China's southeastern flank.
32. Available evidence suggests that, while Mos-
cow's leaders do not regard the present Soviet position
in Indochina as comparable with Afghanistan in im-
portance, they surely regard it as an important geopo-
litical gain registered at the expense of both the United
States and China. They are well aware of Chinese
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concern over the two-front military confrontation
Beijing has been forced to accept since 1979, and they
doubtless consider that the Soviet deterrent factor has
humiliated Beijing by demonstrating Chinese inability
effectively to coerce Vietnam-in an area of tradition-
al Chinese pretensions to dominant influence. They
also probably regard their alliance with Vietnam as a
source of augmented Soviet pressure on China which
has already paid dividends in the new Chinese willing-
ness to accept Soviet proposals for modest bilateral
improvements. Over and above these considerations,
Soviet leaders almost certainly see their growing mili-
tary presence at Cam Ranh as a major advance that
enhances Soviet capabilities to conduct and support
naval and air operations in the South China Sea and
the Indian Ocean.
33. The Soviet relationship with Hanoi that yields
this Soviet military presence is not without frictions
and problems for both sides. Evidence clearly estab-
lishes that the Soviets are sensitive to the costs of
supporting Vietnam; and that the Vietnamese resent
Moscow's attempts to establish its own independent
ties with Hanoi's satellites, Laos and Kampuchea, and
fear that the USSR might someday betray the interests
of Vietnam in favor of its huge neighbor, China. The
demonstrated behavior of the USSR and Vietnam
makes it clear, however, [hat both parties consider
their relationship on balance to be a most beneficial
one.
34. Hence, we believe it unlikely that the Vietnam-
ese will change their course in Kampuchea in any
major way, or that significant change will take place in
the Moscow-Hanoi relationship over the next two to
three years, or indeed perhaps fora much longer
period. The Soviet leaders are well acquainted with
the intransigence of the Vietnamese leadership, and
almost certainly believe that only drastic Soviet pres-
sures on Hanoi might conceivably bring sufficient
Vietnamese concessions to satisfy Beijing, but that the
attempted use of such pressures would gravely endan-
ger the Soviet relationship with Vietnam, the Soviet
military presence in Cam Ranh, and indeed Soviet
objectives in Southeast Asia. To run political risks of
this magnitude concerning Vietnam, the Soviets would
want commensurate gains in advance from Beijing.
35. The Soviets are unwilling to risk losing the bird
in the hand-their present advantages in Indochina-
for the uncertainties of hypothetical Chinese grati-
tude. They therefore have consistently refused to
bargain with Beijing on the subject of Indochina
during their bilateral talks with the Chinese. They
have on occasion gone so far as to attempt to intimi-
date ASEAN states, on Vietnam's behalf, into aban-
doning opposition to the fait accompli in Kampuchea.
They have maintained intact their deployments along
China's northern borders, which constitute conspicu-
ous threats against the possibility of a new Chinese
military reaction to Vietnam's operations to China's
south. In sum, the inertia created by existing Soviet
geopolitical advantages is likely to continue to domi-
nate Soviet policy in Indochina, and to perpetuate
Chinese resentment.
36. Our confidence in this conclusion has been
further strengthened by the Soviet deployment in
1983 of nine TU-16 Bad-
gers-including some five configured as bombers or
air-to-surface missile carriers-to Cam Ranh. The
Badgers apparently will remain under Soviet control
and probably will maintain a continuous presence
there, rotating periodically back to the USSR and
being replaced by others. If the Badgers remain at
Cam Ranh, the Chinese may surmise that the Soviet
Union has extorted from Vietnam permission for this
deployment as partial compensation for the Sov~.et
refusal to betray Hanoi to conciliate Beijing. Chinese
leaders almost certainly interpret the advent of the
Badger bombers as fresh evidence that the Soviet
Union is likely to remain intransigent on the Indochina
issue.
The Augmenting of Soviet Military Power
Adjacent to China
37. In view of the poor prospects for Sino-Soviet
accommodation regarding Afghanistan or Indochina,
the third issue-the question of whether the Soviet
leaders will make major concessions regarding force
deployment policy in Asia-is likely to have a great
influence on the evolution of the Sino-Soviet relation-
ship over the next few years. We review in turn,
below, the evidence of existing trends in Soviet and
Chinese deployments, the possibilities and probabili-
ties of Soviet concessions, and the role of the Sino-
Soviet border dispute in Soviet thinking on these
matters..
38. Trends in Soviet Deplouments and Modern-
ization. The improvements noted in the Sino-Soviet
relationship have taken place in the face of a continu-
ing strengthening of the Soviet military position in the
eastern USSR and the Pacific. The pace of quantita-
tive buildup has tapered off from that of the late 1960s
and early 1970s; Moscow now seems intent on fulfill-
ing longstanding force modernization plans in the
area, upgrading the capabilities of deployed units, and
increasing logistic support. Nonetheless, one-fourth of
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all Soviet Ground Forces personnel-nearly 500,000
troops-is now stationed opposite China. Ground units
in the eastern USSR and Mongolia devoted to the anti-
China mission include 48 active divisions and an
independent army corps. These units are supported by
well over 2,000 aircraft and over 100,000 air person-
nel. During the past year, while Sino-Soviet consulta-
tions have been in progress, the Soviets have added
two motorized rifle divisions to their active forces,
converted a motorized rifle division into a tank divi-
sion, and formed afighter-bomber regiment facing the
Chinese. In addition, at least one air assault unit and
an additional artillery brigade are now being formed
along the border with China. Meanwhile, the Soviets
over the last year have also made costly investments in
military logistic capabilities in the Far East, and have
begun construction there for a new garrison, probably
intended to house part of another new division. We
think it likely the Soviets will also continue over the
next few years an ongoing construction program to
expand fortified zones in certain sectors of the Sino-
Soviet border.
39. The Soviets have also continued slowly to
strengthen their military position in Mongolia, despite
China's known sensitivity on this subject and repeated
Chinese demands for reduction of these deployments.
There the Soviets have constructed new SA-5 air
defense regimental complexes and radar stations, re-
placed older tanks with new T-72 models, and upgrad-
ed some of their artillery and armored personnel
carrier holdings. In result, the Soviet army in Mongo-
lia, which is in position to threaten the North China
plain and routes to Beijing, is the most combat-ready
force facing China and receives a relatively high
priority in the USSR's gradual modernization of Far
East equipment.
40. In addition, the weight of the Soviet strategic
nuclear threat directed against China is continuing to
grow even while the small-scale improvements in Sino-
Soviet relations proceed. The Soviets currently have
135 SS-20 launchers deployed at 15 bases in Siberia-
plus 90 additional SS-20 launchers in the central USSR
that could hit targets in western China-and are
constructing facilities at two more bases for 18 addi-
tional SS-20 launchers. It should be noted that the
present SS-20 force threatens China with more war-
heads than were on the older single-reentry-vehicle
missiles that were directed against targets in China
before deployment of the SS-20.
41. But the Chinese face not only the present SS-20
force and Soviet ICBMs, but a considerable array of
other Soviet nuclear weapon systems as well: over 200
Backfire and Badger bombers, shorter range ballistic
missiles, tactical aircraft, and two older Y-class ballistic
missile submarines in the Sea of Janan ~
we ju ge that the great majority o a
present oviet strategic targets in Asia are probably in
China, although the Soviet nuclear systems are flexible
and could be shifted to other targets. For their part,
however, Beijing's leaders are convinced that China
remains the primary target of these various deploy-
ments, despite considerable Soviet efforts in dealing
with Asian states to obfuscate the purpose of the
USSR's heavy SS-20 deployment in Asia.
42. The total number of aircraft assigned to Soviet
units in the Far East is expected to decline slightly
during the next few years. Nonetheless, technological
improvements in aircraft, avionics, and weapon sys-
tems will allow the Soviets to upgrade their ability to
perform their assigned missions while deploying fewer
aircraft to each regiment. In strategic aviation, the
initial deployment of the new Blackjack bomber in the
late 1980s will highlight developments. The Blackjack,
together with increased numbers of Bear H bombers,
creates a formidable standoff air-launched cruise mis-
sile capability east of the Urals. A third Backfire
regiment will further increase strategic strike options.
In the tactical air force, a key development will be the
deployment of lookdown/shootdown fighters: the Fox-
hound, Flanker, and Fulcrum. These aircraft will be
faster and more maneuverable, and will carry missiles
suited for both dogfighting and engagements beyond
visual range engagements. Ground attack aircraft are
expected to be equipped with new longer range
tactical air-to-surface missiles. This improved deep
strike capability .will be complemented by the intro-
duction of Frogfoot and additional helicopters dedi-
cated to supporting Soviet ground forces along the
Sino-Soviet border.
43. The Soviet Pacific Fleet has significantly in-
creased its size and capability over the past decade by
acquiring more modern submarines, surface combat-
ants, amphibious ships, and aircraft.s During the next
5 Since 1979 major improvements to Pacific Fleet Forces have
included frontline D-III SSBNs, V-III (nuclear) and K-class (nonnu-
clear) attack submarines, two Kiev-class carriers (CVHGs), a number
of Kresta and Kara cruisers (CGs) and Krivak frigates (FFGs), Ivan
Rogov amphibious ships (LPDs), Bear Flong-range antisumbarine
(ASW) aircraft, Helix ASW helicopters, and two regiments of
Backfire strike bombers. Additionally, aFitter Cfighter-bomber
regiment has been formed in the Pacific Fleet. Not least, the Soviet
Pacific Fleet has acquired the above-discussed naval and air
facilities at Cam Rahn, Vietnam.
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few years the new Kirov-class cruiser (CGN), Sovre-
mennyy- and Udaloy-class destroyers (DDGs), and S-
class attack submarines (SSNs) are expected to be
introduced into the Soviet Pacific Fleet. These units
will provide significantly improved weapons and sen-
sors for antisurface attack, air defense, and antisubma-
rine warfare. We believe the Soviet Pacific Fleet will
continue to be structured primarily to oppose US naval
forces although it will also devote attention and re-
sources to counter other potential threats such as those
from some Japanese or Chinese naval forces. While
the overall force level of the Soviet Pacific Fleet will
remain about the same, its capability will increase
with the introduction of new classes of submarines,
principal surface combatants, amphibious ships, and
shipboard aircraft.
44. Overall, given these trends in Soviet force
strength, the nature of the Sino-Soviet relationship
over the next few years will be strongly influenced by
the decisions the Soviet regime adopts regarding force
modernization and deployment policy in Asia. On
both the nuclear and the conventional sides, however,
the momentum of existing Soviet policy-the impetus
for further incremental growth rather than either
stagnation or reductions-is unlikely to be overcome.
45. Comparative Chinese Military Strength. The
Soviets confront (a) Chinese ground forces that are
much larger than Soviet Far East ground forces in
manpower, but much weaker in firepower, maneuver
capability, and air support; and (b) Chinese strategic
nuclear forces that are still fairly small in size and rely
upon concealment and mobility rather than numbers
for their deterrent effect. In the four Chinese military
regions bordering on the USSR and Mongolia, the
Chinese now deploy some 68 main-force combat
divisions, which are largely stationed a hundred miles
and more back from the border, defensively posi-
tioned to trade space for time in the event of a Soviet
attack and to guard against the possibility of converg-
ing Soviet assaults to overrun Beiiing or to cut off
Northeast China. In the last four years, the Chinese
have increased their tanks, armored personnel carriers,
and aircraft in the border regions by some 30 percent,
and they have formed new units and strengthened
their fortifications along probable invasion routes.
range ICBM. In addition,
CSS-4 (13,000- to 16,000-kilometer-range ICBM)
CSS-3s
CSS-4s may now be deployed. The deterrent
effect of these weapons, which can reach Moscow, is
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supplemented b the mobility of CSS-1 25X1
MRBMs and CSS-2 IRBMs, as well as 25X1
the availability of some 120 TU-16 intermediate-range
bombers, all of which can deliver nuclear weapons to
parts of Soviet Asia.fi In addition, the Chinese in recent
years have launched their first nuclear-powered ballis-
tic missile submarine, intended to carry the CSS-NX-3
SLBM (which is still undergoing flight tests). Deploy-
ment of this weapon system as an additional element
in the Chinese deterrent against the USSR is expected
between 1984 and 1987. Finally, the Chinese have also
shown considerable sensitivity about their potential
vulnerability to Soviet use of tactical nuclear weapons,
and have conducted and publicized exercises that
reckon with this contingency. The Chinese have no
deployed weapons comparable to Soviet tactical nucle-
ar weapons in flexibility and accuracy, and they
probably believe that the Soviets are more readily
inclined to use such weapons in the Far East than in
Europe. Overall, although the Chinese are making
important improvements in their deterrent and war-
fighting capabilities, they are not closing the gap in
relation to the growing and improving Soviet forces
that face them; on the contrary, they are continuing to
fall further behind.
47. The Future of SS-20s in Asia and in Europe.
We believe the Soviets will fill out the existing four SS-
20 divisions in Siberia to a total of six bases each by the
late 1980s. Because each SS-20 carries three reentry
vehicles, the advent of this IRBM capability in East
Asia has already significantly expanded nuclear capa-
bilities against China. With four divisions of six regi-
ments each, the Soviets would have 216 missiles with
648 warheads for an initial strike against Asian targets.
In addition, by the end of the decade the Soviets may
begin to deploy a new IRBM to replace the SS-20, and
may also deploy ground-launched cruise missiles in the
region.
48. SS-20 deployments reflect long-range Soviet
strategic plans. These are importantly influenced by
the visible trends in Chinese weapons development
and deployment policy, and by the prospects of
increased US military strength in the Far East in the
1980s. In both regards, the Soviets will almost certainly
take action in advance to guarantee undiminished
force advantages against worst-case eventualities.
49. The Andropov regime showed that, given 25X1
cient strategic political gains concerning Europe, it
might be willing to contemplate curtailment of ;t~
plans for a much greater SS-20 buildup; this25X1
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probably characterize the Chernenko regime's objec-
tives as well. During the INF negotiations, the Soviets
offered not to transfer SS-20s to Asia if an agreement
acceptable to the USSR materialized. They subse-
quently offered, if such an agreement were adopted,
to halt new SS-20 deployment in East Asia through
new construction so long as deployments in that region
aimed at Soviet territory did not subsequently in-
crease.' These proposals reflect the great importance
to the Soviet Union of an advantageous INF agree-
ment, and implied willingness at the time to trade off
planned enlargement of their existing nuclear advan-
tage in East Asia in order to prevent American
deployments in Europe. Secondarily, those Soviet of-
fers were also intended as gestures to Japan and China,
calculated to place the onus for any further Soviet SS-
20 buildup in Siberia on US deployment policy in East
Asia.
50. The future of the SS-20 program in Asia and the
ultimate size of the total Soviet nuclear threat against
China have thus been made partly dependent upon
the prospects for INF agreement in Europe. In the
wake of the beginning of Western intermediate-range
nuclear deployments in December 1983, and the
Soviet withdrawal-at least for the time being-from
INF negotiations, the Soviets are very unlikely soon to
halt SS-20 deployment in Siberia. In the continued
absence of an INF agreement, we believe that within
the next two to three years the Soviets will probably
not stop further SS-20 deployments in Asia merely to
conciliate Beijing and Tokyo.
51. We believe there is even less chance than this
that Moscow over this period will actually reduce its
SS-20 deployments as the Chinese have demanded,
either unilaterally or as the result of Sino-Soviet
bargaining. The Soviet leaders are likely to be skepti-
cal that an acceptable nuclear arms agreement can be
negotiated with Beijing in view of the enormous
asymmetries in the bilateral balance of forces.
52. The Issue of the Ground Force Posture Ad~a-
cent to China. In principle, the Chinese demand the
simple elimination of the Soviet capabilities that
threaten them: that is, a reduction of the Soviet force
structure in East Asia, back down to the level existing
almost two decades ago in Khrushchev's day. The
Chinese have privately indicated that they would be
' As was the case with their moratorium on deployments in
Europe, the Soviets would almost certainty interpret their condition-
al offer to halt SS-20 Asian deployments as a promise to top them off
at the level created by completion of all construction then in
progress.
satisfied with much less to start with, and some leaders
in Beijing may hope that a unilateral Soviet local
pullback of some forces may eventually be procured
that would start a process of Soviet reductions that
might later be expanded. A general Soviet pullback to
conciliate Beijing appears highly implausible-for sev-
eral reasons:
- Because of geography, Soviet forces in the east-
ernmost sector of the border; which must defend
large vulnerable cities and the Trans-Siberian
Railroad near the frontier, have no defense-in-
depth option and thus are necessarily deployed
much closer to the border than Chinese main-
force units. Consequently, any ostensibly mutual
pullback of Soviet and Chinese forces from the
border must in fact be essentially a unilateral
Soviet withdrawal unless it is limited to minus-
' cule border guard forces at the frontier itself.
This is likely to remain politically unacceptable
to any set of Soviet leaders.
- In the narrow Far East Military District salient
from Khabarovsk to Vladivostok, the most im-
portant part of the Soviet Far East and the most
heavily defended area of its size in the Soviet
Union, Soviet forces have little room to maneu-
ver or space for a pullback.
- There are some points on the border where a
pullback could be construed as compromising
Soviet border claims.
53. Furthermore, we believe that Moscow will not
agree even to selected pullbacks of selected units in
certain localities. The Soviets are highly reluctant to
agree to unilateral constraints on their troop disposi-
tions and more broadly perceive their overall relation-
ship with China as impelling them to continue
strengthening their force dispositions opposite China.
In recent years, the Soviets have followed a pattern of
activating at least one new division each year in the
Far East from existing mobilization bases that hold the
pre-positioned equipment for such divisions. We have
identified additional mobilization bases in the Far East
that we believe the Soviets intend to convert incre-
mentally into active divisions over the next few years,
with the additions entering active status at about the
same measured pace we have seen in the past. We see
little reason to believe that the Soviets have yet
decided to alter this long-term pattern of behavior.
54. This Soviet pattern of thinking has been most
clearly shown in the Soviet Union's refusal, in its talks
thus far with Beijing, to discuss changes in Soviet
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military deployments in Mongolia.e In principle, this is
the sector in which noticeable Soviet concessions could
be made to China without major impact upon the
Soviet Union's ability to defend itself against China. In
Mongolia alone, the Soviets have a large buffer against
China and could if necessary trade space for time. The
token withdrawal of perhaps a Soviet division or so
from Mongolia northward to the Soviet-Mongolian
border would not endanger any Soviet city, and would
not expose any Soviet territory to Chinese attack.
Additionally, over the past year and more, the Soviets
have significantly upgraded the equipment and capa-
bilities of Mongolia's own armed forces. Between 1980
and 1983 the Soviets provided the Mongolians with
enough additional equipment to upgrade their two
existing brigades to motorized rifle divisions and form
two additional MRDs, although all four are at low
strength.
55. It seems likely that the Soviet leaders intend to
withhold concessions. regarding their forces in Mongo-
lia until Beijing has made more fundamental conces-
sions than it has yet been willing to consider. We do
perceive a moderate chance, however, that within the
next two to three years the Soviet leaders will be
willing to offer China some token concession regarding
their force posture in Mongolia, in the hope of begin-
ning aprocess of mutual concessions that could even-
tually produce a breakthrough to maior Soviet goals. A
local pullback of perhaps one or so of the USSR's five
divisions now in Mongolia might be such a step. If the
Soviets did make such a withdrawal, this would consti-
tute asymbolic concession of some significance. It
would not be too meaningful in military terms, how-
ever, since such units could be reintroduced into
Mongolia at any time. If the Soviets did withdraw a
division or more, we judge that the Chinese would
welcome the move and would wish to respond in a
fashion likely to encourage more such Soviet gestures.
Beijing's response, at least initially, would also be
likely to be largely symbolic in nature.
56. In the meantime, in the absence of the kind of
large-scale withdrawals the Chinese are requesting at
the moment (for the total border area), it is probable
The Soviets state that they will not discuss their troops in
Mongolia because this is a matter concerning a "third country." The
Chinese almost certainly regard this as a hypocritical evasion of the
issue. The Soviet Union effectively controls the Mongolian regime,
and any Mongolian reservations about possible Soviet troop with-
drawals would be a relatively minor consideration for Moscow if the
Soviets felt some withdrawals to be otherwise desirable. We also
believe that the Soviet Union does not need five divisions in
Mongolia either to enforce the loyalty of the Tsedenbal regime or to
safeguard Mongolia against Chinese attack.
that the Soviet Union will continue to propose cosmet-
ic substitutes. Since the early 1970s, the Soviets have
unsuccessfully offered the Chinese proposals for a
nonaggression pact and for an agreement on no first
use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union in the last
year has evidently made a number of additional
suggestions for confidence-building measures ICBMs).
Although the Chinese will probably continue to regard
most such Soviet proposals as essentially evasions of
China's central concerns, they may no longer reject all
such suggestions out of hand. It is possible that China
will come to see agreement with the Soviet Union on
one or more selected CBMs, such as mutual notifica-
tion of troop exercises, as having a marginal usefulness
in helping to reduce tensions. Should any CBMs in fact
be agreed upon during the next two to three years, it
would probably not have an early impact upon the
hard issues separating China and the USSR regarding
the status of the border or the question of overall
Soviet force dispositions. Agreement even on such
superficial CBM measures, however, would give some
impetus to the process of improving Sino-Soviet
dealings.
The Central Role of the United States and Japan
The American Factor
57. The Sino-Soviet future will not be a bilateral
affair, but will develop as part of the broader dynamic
of Sino-Soviet-US triangular relations. And the evolu-
tion of the future relationships of the Soviet Union and
China with the United States, whether improvements
or setbacks, will continue to be one of the most
important factors affecting the behavior of Moscow
and Beijing toward each other. US policies toward the
USSR and China will of course not determine the
conduct of the two Communist powers toward each
other, but will certainly help condition that behavior,
and on the margin could conceivably be decisive.
58. Both Moscow and Beijing remain highly sensi-
tive to their perception of the US relationship with the
other. The Chinese have traditionally feared "super-
power collusion," while the Soviet leadership has for
many years been deeply concerned at the prospect of
Sino-US security collaboration at Soviet expense. Since
the first stages of Sino-American rapprochement in the
early 1970s, Soviet Politburo members have warned
US leaders against anti-Soviet cooperation with China,
and have occasionally sought to entice the United
States into commitments incompatible with good US
relations with Beijing. At the same time, the Soviets
have for years vainly sought to better their position in
the triangle by improving relations with Beijing, and
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to this end have repeatedly sought to reestablish
personal contacts with Chinese leaders.
59. Today, available evidence clearly indicates that
both Moscow and Beijing remain concerned at the
possibility of sudden changes that would heighten the
prospect of US collusion with the other. Beijing, while
reassured by the depth of Soviet-US differences, has
nevertheless retained residual concerns about the pos-
sibility of sudden deals between the two superpowers,
particularly at summit meetings, that might have
adverse implications for Chinese interests. Such Chi-
nese concerns remain especially strong regarding INF
issues. The dominant current of Soviet opinion, on the
other hand, has never ceased to believe that despite
Sino-US differences, the basic character of the rela-
tionship between Beijing and Washington remains one
of cooperation against Soviet policy. This view has
been strengthened by many of the events of 1983 and
1984 that signal a warming of Sino-US relations,
particularly the visits of the US Secretaries of Defense
and State and Premier Zhao Ziyang, and the scheduled
visits of President Reagan and Defense Minister Zhang
Aiping.
60. Chinese policy faces a dilemma on these scores.
On the one hand, Beijing has a need for a strong and
continuing relationship with the United States in order
to support Chinese economic and military develop-
ment and to assist China in resisting ongoing Soviet
geopolitical pressure in Asia. On the other hand, the
Chinese may sense that this association with the
United States, even if formally disavowed, remains a
factor that renders major Soviet concessions to Chi-
na-though not gestures-unlikely.
61. The present strained relationship between Mos-
cow and Washington also poses another dilemma of
sorts for Beijing. In general, it welcomes US toughness
toward Moscow, both because it desires that United
States inhibit Soviet expansionist impulses, and be-
cause it hopes that China will derive additional lever-
age over both Moscow and Washington as a result of
marked Soviet-US tensions. At the same time, the
Chinese have indicated that their own position could
be greatly endangered if these tensions were to esca-
late to produce a severe Soviet-US crisis. We fudge that
the Chinese leadership has no desire to become em-
broiled in such a crisis if it arose over issues remote
from direct Chinese security concerns, and that under
those difficult circumstances Beijing would endeavor
to maintain China's neutrality. Nevertheless, China's
leaders probably also recognize that if such a crisis
arose in an area more directly relevant to China's
security interests-such as the Indochina area or Paki-
stan-they would face more difficult risks and choices
in their posture toward the Soviet Union. More broad-
ly, the Chinese recognize that they have a vested
interest in the continued ability of the United States
and Western Europe to offset Soviet power, and that
Chinese vulnerability vis-a-vis the Soviet Union would
be enormously increased if that offset were greatly
weakened.
62. Over time, the Sino-Soviet relationship may
become more responsive to adverse changes in the US
relationship with either of the other two powers. Over
the last three years, bilateral difficulties with the
United States have already, to one degree or another,
influenced both Moscow and Beiiing to wish to be able
to improve relations with each other. In October 1982,
a month before his death, Brezhnev gave public
expression to this motive in an address to military
commanders, warning Soviet marshals that the aggra-
vation of Soviet relations with the United States had
given added importance to the possibility of improve-
ment with China. Meanwhile, the Chinese desire to
test Soviet willingness to make concessions had been
given impetus in 1982 by new frictions with the
United States over the question of the US relationship
with Taiwan.
63. The desire for moderating Sino-Soviet hostility
is not synonymous with the willingness of either of
these two Communist powers to make the concessions
necessary for far-reaching improvements in their rela-
tionship. The basic conflicts of interest are sufficiently
great to make it improbable that improvement in the
Sino-Soviet relationship will reach the point of a full
rapprochement with harmful implications for US in-
terests. Nevertheless, the readiness of the Soviet and
Chinese leaders to contemplate key concessions to
each other is a factor that is influenced by the state of
their relationship with the United States. Both the
USSR and China will probably endeavor to preserve
and improve the negotiating process and to deal with
issues on which agreement can be reached. At the
same time they will seek to use their improved
relationship to gain leverage in their dealings with the
United States. Nonetheless, a radical growth in ten-
sions between the United States and either the USSR
or China might provoke one of them to consider
making major concessions.
The Japanese Factor
64. A second very important external influence on
the direction that Sino-Soviet relations will take in the
next two to three years will be that of Japan. Japan's
present set of relationships with Washington, Beijing,
and Moscow exerts leverage on China, reinforcing the
considerations that pull Beijing toward the United
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States and that impose limits on Sino-Soviet concilia-
tion. A maior change in the Chinese attitude toward
Japan-though unlikely-could have serious effects on
the Sino-Soviet-US triangle.
65. The USSR's relations with Japan have worsened
over the past decade and are not likely to be reversed
during the period of this Estimate. The Soviets are
increasingly exercised at what they see to be growing
US-Japanese security cooperation, primarily because
of the expectation that this cooperation will augment
US capabilities against the Soviet Union in Northeast
Asia. The Soviets also appear to be concerned about
the long-term implications of the gradual but steady
buildup in Japanese conventional military forces.
Moreover, despite the fact that the Sino-US-Japanese
military cooperation the Soviet Union feared in the
late 1970s has failed to materialize in the 1980s, Soviet
military planners take aworst-case view of this possi-
bility and consider Japan as an enemy allied with the
United States and China.
66. For a number of years the USSR's tough, obtuse
efforts to intimidate the Japanese have greatly
strengthened anti-Soviet attitudes in Japan. The Soviet
leaders have not altered their adamant resection of
Tokyo's claim to the small islands that constitute the
Northern Territories, and they have continued the
militarization of these islands begun in 1978 and the
modernization of the weapons deployed there. Mos-
cow's propensity to continue strengthening its large
existing military advantages in the vicinity of Japan
has probably been given further impetus as a conse-
quence of the September 1983 overflight and downing
of the Korean Air Lines plane. Meanwhile, the growth
of Soviet SS-20 deployments in Asia has significantly
heightened Japanese anxiety. As noted earlier, during
1983 Japanese protests about these deployments were
theless, Moscow's leaders probably draw some encour-
agement from the recent Japanese national elections,
hoping that the results will undermine Premier Naka-
sone's efforts to strengthen Japan's military programs.
This will almost certainly serve to encourage Soviet
leaders to continue generally their previous policies
toward Japan, in the belief that political intimidation
combined with economic incentives will pay off for
Moscow over the long run in "softening up" attitudes
in Japan. Prospects for successful use of economic
inducements are not good: reduced Japanese demand
for natural resources combined with the cutoff in
official credits after the Afghanistan invasion suggest
that, with the possible exception of Sakhalin gas, large-
scale Siberian resource development proiects will not
be initiated any time soon. '
67. For its part, China's economic ties with Japan
are by far the most important it has with any country
in the capitalist industrialized world, and also dwarf
China's trade with the Soviet Union. This leading
Japanese role in assisting China's modernization is
therefore the second most important bulwark of Bei-
iing's relationship with the West, after its broader
connections with the United States. Because of the
strength of Japanese-American ties, the Sino-Japanese
relationship reinforces other Chinese incentives to
maintain China's US connections.
68. Although most aspects of the Sino-Japanese
relationship remain fairly healthy, in some areas the
relationship has somewhat cooled over the past two
years: China has become less outspoken in support of
the Japanese-American security relationship, and more
reserved about most issues relating to Japanese defense
efforts against the Soviet Union; and Bening has made
sporadic strident attacks on what the Chinese some-
times profess to see as a rising danger of Japanese
militarism. China still supports Japanese claims against
the Soviet Union concerning the Northern Territories,
though less vociferously, and, after years of concen-
trating almost exclusively on cultivation of the ruling
Japanese conservatives, Bening has reopened ties to the
Socialist opposition, as well as to local antinuclear
weapons movements.
69. The Chinese leaders are well aware of Japan's
military weakness, and probably do not see a grave or
imminent danger of Japanese militarism. And their
latent concerns on this matter, while real, are at
present far outweighed by their sense of the enormous
economic contribution China receives from its rela-
tionship with Japan. The Soviet Union ardently seeks 25X1
to reverse this Chinese sense of priorities, to alarm
China about Japan and the Japanese alliance with the
United States, and to use this alarm as a vehicle for
Sino-Soviet political cooperation against the United
States. The USSR has little hope of success in this effort
unless fairly radical changes occur on the Japanese
the present role Japan plays with respect to Sino-Soviet
relations.
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To Secret
Variables, Uncertainties, and Possible Alternative,
Outcomes
70. The central judgments of this Estimate have
been based on the belief that the broad structure of
world affairs will more or less continue. We believe it
likely that most aspects of this structure will continue
in general, though there is sufficient uncertainty to
warrant flagging the possibility-and the conse-
quences-of certain developments.
71. Stability o}' Chinese and American Policy-
making. As noted earlier, the Soviets appear to believe
that future changes in Chinese or US leaderships could
cause Beijing to incline toward a much more substan-
tial Sino-Soviet rapprochement than now seems proba-
ble. Soviet leaders are likely to hope that existing
disagreements within the Chinese elite will eventually
grow sufficiently important to bring about changed
priorities and foreign policies in Beijing. They proba-
bly base this hope not on evidence that this is likely to
happen, but primarily on the long record of Chinese
political leadership instability. Soviet leaders doubtless
harbor hopes that sentiment more favorable to the
USSR and more hostile to the United States may
emerge in leadership ranks of the Chinese armed
forces-the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The
Soviets appear to judge that some of the sharpest
criticisms of Deng Xiaoping's "American connection"
have issued from some old guard PLA circles, and they
make special efforts to appeal to this audience
Dissent in Beijing Regime
Available evidence is thin on the question of differ-
ences within China's leadership concerning optimum
policies toward the USSR and the United States. It has
long been clear that there is no coherent, recognizable
faction that is "pro-Soviet" as such. Certain Soviet
overtures and propaganda over the years have nonethe-
less played to such presumed sympathetic Chinese
leaders. And, in the last two years or so, some of these
leaders apparently have been sharply critical of what
they consider an unrewarding and unnecessarily pro-US
policy on the part of Beiiing. At a minimum the Soviets
have been playing to such figures.
72. Such hopes as exist among Soviet leaders that a
changed political scene in Beijing might lead to a less
cordial Chinese relationship with the United States are
doubtless buttressed by the fact of Deng Xiaoping's
advancing age-he will be 80 years old this year-and
of the advent of leaders who, unlike Deng, have not
been personally associated in the past with strongly
anti-Soviet attitudes. Even now within China there are
signs of resistance to Deng's initiatives, and indication
that there is some hesitance to accepting party Chair-
man Hu Yaobang as Deng's putative successor. Hence
there may be some expectation in Moscow that a
period of uncertainty and the absence of a strong
successor to Deng, at least initially, might strengthen
existing resistance within China's leadership to any
significant strategic or economic modernization coop-
eration with the United States. That such a succession
situation would necessarily redound to Moscow's bene-
fit is by no means certain, however, whatever the
Soviet expectation, inasmuch as new Chinese leaders
will seek to avoid having their political ambitions
damaged by becoming vulnerable to partisan domestic
charges that they are "soft" on China's enemy, the
USSR. Nevertheless, as they did when Mao died, the
Soviets can be expected to use such an occasion to
advance proposals for movement in the relationship.
73. Continuity of Present Chinese Policy in the
Border Dispute. The border issue has been intracta-
ble to date because the adamant negotiating position
of China has been interwoven with its much broader
political struggle against the Soviet Union, and because
Beiiing's leaders have maintained this position as an
instrument of political warfare against Moscow. It is
unlikely that Beijing will give up this position during
the next two to three years. Nevertheless, we believe
that, if China did yield on this question and began to
move toward a border settlement more acceptable to
the Soviets, the chance of reciprocal major Soviet
concessions over the long run would be enhanced,
Sino-Soviet relations would then enter a period of
much greater fluidity, and the possibilities for further
mutual concessions would grow.
74. Continuation of a Kampuchean Resistance
to Vietnam. Collapse of military resistance to Viet-
nam in Kampuchea would alter many of the terms of
the present political equation in East Asia. Under these
circumstances, the chances would grow that the pres-
ent ASEAN consensus regarding policy toward Indo-
china would dissipate, and that the United States
would come under considerable pressure from some
ASEAN states to ioin them in finding a formula with
which to come to terms with Vietnamese domination
of Indochina. Any such situation would conflict with
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i
1
The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute
Background
? Played down by both sides during alliance in the
1950s.
? Seen by the Chinese as a focal point of wrongs
perpetrated by the Russian Empire and the Soviet
Union against China. Now used by Chinese as
instrument of political warfare against Soviet
Union, to demonstrate the USSR's "great-power
hegemonist" tendencies and its refusal to admit
past injustices.
? Regarded by Soviets as a fundamental threat to the
security of their eastern border and the most
important single bilateral issue in contention with
the Chinese. The immediate precipitant of the
Soviet military buildup opposite China. Seen by
Soviets as both a false issue and potentially only the
first "bill" Chinese intend to present for return of
territory historically acquired at China's expense.
? Dispute centers on 19th-century treaties-worded
imprecisely for some sectors, and subject to differ-
ent interpretations-by which Russia acquired
some 1.5 million square kilometers of territory in
Central Asia and the Amur River Basin.
? Chinese have stated willingness to accept the
boundary laid down by the old treaties as long as
Moscow concedes they are "unjust," but demand
return of certain Soviet-occupied territories they
claim were not even granted by these treaties. The
areas in dispute include 20,000 square kilometers of
land in the Pamirs, some islands in the Amur and
Ussuri Rivers in the Far East, and several small
tracts depicted differently on each country's maps.
one of the important props of the present Sino-
American relationship, and could create the possibility
of further changes in the Chinese posture toward the
United States and the Soviet Union. It is unlikely that
Hanoi will in fact find it possible to put a fairly
complete end to Kampuchean resistance in the next
two to three years. But it is clear that the stability of
both the Sino-US relationship and the firmness of the
Chinese position vis-a-vis the USSR will to some
degree continue to be contingent upon the continua-
tion of the present military stalemate in Indochina and
the preservation of Sino-US cooperation against Soviet
policy in Indochina.
75. Stability of Politics and Policies in the USSR.
The initial statements and actions of the Chernenko
? Both sides tabled some concessions at intial round of
border talks in 1964, and Soviets eventually offered a
few more concessions at second round, which began in
October 1969 and continued intermittently over the
next nine years.
? Chinese demanded that Soviets admit certain areas are
in "dispute," recognize inequity of old treaties, agree to
an unconditional return of "illegally" occupied territory,
and withdraw their forces from all disputed areas
pending settlement of China's claims.
? Soviets refuse to admit old treaties are "unequal" or to
withdraw their forces from "disputed areas" (almost all
of which are now in their hands), but have expressed a
willingness to conduct a new survey of the boundary
lines, and continue to urge a resumption of border talks.
urrent Prospects
? Resumption of border talks unlikely at present, but the
two sides maintain regular contact on matters related to
dispute at Deputy Foreign Minister talks and, to a lesser
extent, through the Sino-Soviet Border River Navigation
Joint Commission.
? Situation along border remains quiet at the moment,
with both sides forgoing aggressive patrolling where
boundary is in dispute. Neither side, however, shows
signs of a willingness to yield on key points-most
notably, ownership of Heixiazi Island at the confluence
of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, adjoining the Soviet city
of Khabarovsk and the Trans-Siberian Railroad.
regime indicate a desire to project orderliness in the
succession and continuity in the USSR's dealings with
China. But Chernenko-at age 72, and not in the best
of health-could suddenly depart from the scene,
leaving his colleagues with a new succession problem
on their hands. There is no indication at this time that
any of the likely contenders-even the younger ones
such as Romanov or Gorbachev-are out of step with
the USSR's long-established China policy. If, however,
in the course of leadership turnover, a significant
segment of the leadership came to question the general
thrust of current policy, different ideas about Soviet
foreign relations might ultimately ensue. Relations
with China could be one of the major foreign policy
issues under review during this period, particularly if
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it involved a new set of leaders who had no role in the
bitter exchanges of the 1950s and 1960s. It is conceiv-
able that the situation could produce either a much
more conciliatory approach or a significant toughening
of the USSR's policy toward China. Sino-Soviet rela-
tions could, in fact, become very fluid if the Soviet
leadership turnover should coincide with the change-
over to a new leadership in China.
76. Preservation of Stability in the Korean Pen-
insula. Beijing's interest in maintaining good relations
with the United States conflicts to some degree with its
interest in preserving a close relationship with Pyong-
yang. Because of its geographic position, North Korea
has always been of great importance to China, and
over the last two years Beijing has taken vigorous
initiatives to strengthen this relationship and to pre-
serve the edge that Chinese influence has in Pyong-
yang over that of the USSR. In anticipation of the
coming political succession to Kim Il-song, the Chinese
have in fact reluctantly acknowledged the special
status of Kim's designated heir, his son Kim Chong-il.
77. Beijing, aware that its relationship with Wash-
ington could become hostage of North Korea's aspira-
tions to dominate the south, has indicated to both
Washington and Seoul its desire to maintain stability
in the Korean Peninsula. Since China cannot control
P'yongyang's actions, however, it faces a dilemma.
The North Korean regime, apparently concerned that
time is working to strengthen the relative economic
and international position of the Republic of Korea,
has taken an increasingly militant line over the past
year, one that includes maior terrorist initiatives
against South Korea's leaders and stability. Simulta-
neously, however, Pyongyang has initiated an opening
to the United States-via Beijing-to hold uncondi-
tional talks on a formal peace treaty, removal of US
troops, and confederation of the two Koreas; Beijing's
leaders support such talks but do not wish China to
become directly involved. China's support for this
proposal reflects its desire to reduce instability along
its borders, and to remain the prime ally/supporter of
North Korea. These contradictory policies on the part
of Pyongyang are not atypical of North Korea's
behavior. Thus, while progress toward a peaceful
solution is not expected soon, we may see-for a
while-some moderation in P'yongyang's pattern of
violence. Should North Korea revert to an incendiary
policy on the peninsula, this would complicate Beij-
ing's relationships with the United States and possibly
work to Moscow's advantage by heightening Soviet
opportunities to compete with China for influence in
Pyongyang. At the same time, however, Moscow
might perceive North Korean radicalism as risking a
possible confrontation between Soviet and US military
forces in the Korean area.
78. It is likely that no war will break out in Korea
during the period of this Estimate, and that both the
USSR and China will continue to insulate their rela-
tionships with Washington from P'yongyang's policy
toward the south. Nevertheless, the possibilities for
accident and miscalculation in the peninsula are con-
siderable and could grow, particularly in the event of
an upsurge in internal instability in South Korea.
79. Avoidance of New Sino-Soviet Conflict in
South and Southeast Asia. Any Sino-Soviet progress
toward greater rapprochement could be upset by
various possible crises to China's south:
- The emergence of new Chinese hostilities with
Vietnam on a serious scale, as a result of either
maior Vietnamese military conflict with Thai-
land, or of Vietnamese clashes with the Chinese
in the South China Sea. The latter possibility is
highlighted by the conflicting claims to oil explo-
ration rights in the Gulf of Tonkin, by recent
actions by the Chinese to strengthen their mili-
tary position in the Paracels, and by the growing
boldness and scope of Chinese naval and air
deployments in the area. Both the overall Soviet
relationship with Vietnam and the enhanced
Soviet military presence at Cam Ranh create the
possibility that such a Sino-Vietnamese clash
could spread to involve the Soviets.
- Substantial escalation of Vietnam's military ef-
forts in Kampuchea and along the borders of
Thailand. The many constraints on Hanoi's limit-
ed resources, concern over possible US and Chi-
nese reactions, and Soviet lack of enthusiasm-
make such actions by Vietnam improbable dur-
ing the period of this Estimate. There is nonethe-
less some possibility that a much greater Viet-
namese military involvement in Kampuchea
could arise from escalating border clashes with
Thailand. Should these occur, the resulting crisis
might well arrest or reverse any movement to-
ward greater Sino-Soviet rapprochement.
- A maior new effort by the USSR to advance its
geopolitical position in South or Southwest Asia,
particularly if done at the expense of Pakistan.
The- Chinese would of course be greatly dis-
turbed at any overt Soviet military threat to
Pakistan arising out of that country's role in
opposing Soviet efforts to subdue Afghanistan.
Beijing would be equally concerned, however,
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should the Soviet Union make significant prog-
ress in its efforts to destabilize Pakistan and/or
succeed in persuading India to loin in the effort.
The Soviets have worked hard to block any
improvement in India's relations with either
Bening or Islamabad. Although their efforts to
get the Indians to work iointly to undermine
Pakistan have not been particularly successful,
this might change if Pakistan exploded a nuclear
device or Prime Minister Gandhi became per-
suaded that manufacturing a "foreign threat" is
the only way to ensure her continued political
preeminence.
- A Soviet effort to change the status quo in
Pakistan and to secure a realignment of that
country away from its present orientation toward
China and the United States. Any such effort,
however indirect, would be regarded in Bening
as a serious new attack on Chinese interests. We
consider that there is sufficient fragility in the
present internal situation in Pakistan to make
such a Soviet venture a fair possibility during the
period of this Estimate, and that over the longer
term this possibility may grow. Hence the Soviets
may well face a choice between exploiting new
opportunities in Pakistan, or taking a more cau-
tious course out of regard for their relationship
with China. Should the Soviets opt for a much
more forward course toward Pakistan, the pres-
ent thaw in Moscow's relations with Bening
would be an early and definite casualty.
80. Soviet Involvement in Major New Crises
Elsewhere. Additional Soviet invasions or involve-
ment in maior hostilities in the Middle East or South-
west Asia would almost certainly reverse any move-
ment toward significant improvement in Sino-Soviet
relations. Such developments would cause Bening to
back away to dissociate itself from the Soviet action-
and reassess Chinese policy in the light of subsequent
developments concerning the crisis or crises, Soviet
moves, and US moves. Chinese reactions would proba-
bly be somewhat similar, at least initially, in the event
Soviet policy began moving toward some new version
of armed intervention in Eastern Europe, some repeat
of sorts of Budapest or Prague. Similar Chinese behav-
ior would also probably occur in the event the Soviets
got into open hostilities with Western forces, whether
in Europe or elsewhere-in such case the Chinese
would doubtless seek to stand clear of involvement,
and to fish to China's benefit in the troubled waters.
Moscow would be highly. unlikely to try to solve its
other maior problems, foreign or domestic, by going to
war against China; any Soviet leaders-Chernenko or
others-would almost certainly fear that although
their military forces could do China grievous harm,
resort to such action might well divert Soviet attention
from Moscow's principal antagonist, the United States,
while possibly bogging the USSR down in war with
China.
81. There is an off chance that during the period of
this Estimate the Sino-Soviet relationship could take on
a much more hostile character than this Estimate holds
probable:
- This could occur because so many variables are
present, many of them not fully within the
control of the present leaderships in either Mos-
cow or Beijing: the advent of new policies on the
part of post-Deng or post-Chernenko leaderships,
initiatives taken by other governments (for exam-
ple, in Korea or Vietnam), and so on.
- It does not follow that US interests would neces-
sarily benefit from the coming of a much more
frigid Sino-Soviet relationship. The effect on US
interests would depend on the nature and intensi-
ty of the estrangement between Moscow and
Bening: up to a point, US interests would clearly
benefit from probable increases in Chinese coop-
eration against Soviet policies in the world, in
Chinese receptiveness to US advice and counsel,
and-possibly-in willingness to permit expand-
ed levels of Western economic and technological
presence within China. But, if Sino-Soviet rela-
tions deteriorated to the point of actual or threat-
ened large-scale hostilities, US diplomatic and
security policymaking could be greatly compli-
cated.
' 82. Conversely, there is also an outside chance-
though less likely than the above-that the Sino-Soviet
relationship could become a much closer one during
the period of this Estimate than we now fudge likely:
- This might come to pass if no great disruptive
contingencies should occur; if the Chinese should
back away in practice-though not in princi-
ple-from certain of their key "demands"; if
agreements reached on a number of secondary
issues should begin to create a somewhat greater
momentum toward the Sino-Soviet rapproche-
ment; or if for some reason Beiiing's leaders
should come to depreciate the value of China's
relationships with the United States.
-The coming of significantly closer relations be-
tween the USSR and China could seriously harm
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US interests; the warmer the Sino-Soviet relation-
ship the more damaging to US geopolitical con-
cerns, defense policies, targeting, alliance sys-
tems, the role of Japan, and numerous other key
US interests.
83. Although the possibility cannot be excluded that
alternative outcomes such as the above could occur in
the Sino-Soviet relationship, we stress that the most
likely outcome, by far, is that which this NIE has
postulated: namely, that the level of hostility between
Moscow and Beijing will decrease, that some addition-
al agreements on secondary matters or possibly CBMs
will be reached, that at most the USSR may make a
token withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia, and
that continuing basic differences between Moscow and
Beijing will not permit any significantly greater degree
of rapprochement between them to develop over the
next two to three years.
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ANNEX C
SINO-SOVIET CHRONOLOGY, 1949-84
October 1949 Chinese Communist regime established in Beiiing.
Soviets negotiate Treaty of Friendship, Alliance,
and Mutual Assistance and other agreements with
the new regime. In one agreement, USSR promises
to surrender control of Chinese Eastern Railway
and evacuate Dairen (now Luda) and Port Arthur
(Lushun)-two ice-free naval ports on the Yellow
Sea-by the end of 1952.
June 1950 Start of Korean War.
September 1952 Deadline for Soviet evacuation of Dairen and Port
Arthur suspended because of the Korean War.
March 1953 Stalin dies.
October 1954 Post-Stalin Soviet leadership agrees to evacuate
Dairen and Port Arthur.
February 1956 Khrushchev, at 20th Soviet Party (CPSU) Congress,
delivers his "secret speech" criticizing Stalin, setting
in motion East European attempts to reduce Soviet
control.
April-December 1956 Chinese article in April implicitly corrects Soviet
"one-sided" appraisal of Stalin. Chinese applaud
Soviet promise to correct "errors" in intra-Bloc
relations but seek to define limits of tolerable
diversity within the Bloc.
October 1957 Secret agreement on "assistance to defense technol-
ogy" has USSR promising to help China develop
nuclear weapons.
November 1957 Mao, at Bloc conference in Moscow, publicly en-
dorses Soviets as Bloc leaders, but privately presses
Soviet for harder line on foreign policy.
April-May 1958 Soviets request (1) long-range submarine radio in
China and (2) joint fleet to be dominated by USSR
and to use Chinese ports. Chinese refuse.
August 1958 Chinese communes are formally unveiled, and Bei-
jing implies it has found shortcut-via "Great
Leap"-to full Communism.
August-September 1958 Chinese, during Taiwan Strait crisis, find Soviet
support to be too little and too late.
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January-February 1959 Khrushchev, at 21st CPSU Congress, indirectly
attacks principles of Chinese commune system.
CPSU declares that war can be eliminated while
capitalism remains.
June 1959 Soviets refuse to give "sample atomic bomb" to
Chinese, "tearing up" October 1957 military aid
agreement.
Spring-Summer 1959 Chinese Defense Minister Peng Dehuai returns
from visit to Moscow, challenges Mao's economic
and military policies with alleged Soviet encourage-
ment, and is purged.
Fall 1959 Khrushchev visits United States, and Soviet propa-
ganda takes moderate line toward US. Chinese
begin indirect criticism of Soviet detente line.
Spring 1960 Chinese launch massive press attack on Soviet line,
and Soviets organize unsuccessful counterattack at a
Bloc gathering at Bucharest.
June 1960 Soviets withdraw economic and technical advisers
from China, including those concerned with de-
fense effort.
October-November 1960 Soviets, at World Communist Conference in Mos-
cow, fail in all-out effort to force Chinese to
acknowledge CPSU's authority.
Fail 1961 Zhou Enlai walks out of 22nd CPSU Congress and
goes home early after public and private arguments
with Khrushchev.
Spring 1962 Unrest in Xinjiang Province among minority peo-
ples, allegedly encouraged by Soviets, leads to mass
flight into USSR. Central Asian borders reinforced
on both sides. Soviet consulates there closed by
Chinese.
Fall 1962 Soviet backdown over Cuban missile crisis brings
violent Chinese attacks on Soviet "Munich." Soviets
organize counterattacks at East European party
congresses.
Beijing publicly challenges Soviet right to Far East-
ern territories once belonging to China.
Chinese announce their "general line" for the
international Communist movement to replace So-
viet "general line." Sino-Soviet party talks in Mos-
cow fail. Polemics hit all-time high.
April-September 1964 First series of Sino-Soviet border negotiations.
October 1964 Khrushchev ousted from Soviet leadership. First
Chinese atomic explosion.
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1965
February 1965
July 1965
January 1966
March 1966
T966-67
March 1969
September 1969
October 1969
1972
November 1972
November 1974
Soviets begin force buildup opposite China.
Kosygin in Beijing, holds talks with Mao.
Brezhnev-Deng Xiaoping talks in Bucharest.
Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mu-
tual Assistance with Mongolia.
Chinese refuse invitation to 23rd CPSU Congress in
Moscow.
Cultural Revolution at its height in China.
Border clashes at several spots along Sino-Soviet
border, but especially on the Ussuri River in the Far
East.
Soviet war of nerves against China, with "threats"
that USSR might launch nuclear strikes against
China's nascent advanced weapons program.
.Kosygin-Zhou meeting at the airport in Beijing.
First round of new border talks (sessions held
intermittently through June 1978).
Soviets and Chinese feel each other out on negotia-
tions.
Sino-US "Ping-Pons diplomacy"; Dr. Kissinger vis-
its China.
US summit meetings in Beijing and Moscow pro-
duce Sino-US Shanghai Communique and US de-
tente with the USSR.
US-Soviet summit in Vladivostok; Chinese propose
Sino-Soviet nonaggression pact.
Mao dies. Soviet overture to post-Mao leadership
reiected.
Sino-Soviet agreement on navigation around Xeix-
iazi Island, opposite Khabarovsk on Ussuri River,
facilitates border river navigation talks, stalemated
since 1974.
Soviets propose joint statement on relations, reject-
ed by Chinese in March.
Brezhnev and Ustinov-visit forces in Far East. (New
stage in Soviet Far East buildup begins in 1978,
leading to new Far East theater command by end
of the year.)
Communist coup in Afghanistan.
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August 1978
November 1978
June 1979
September-November 1979
December 1979
January 1980
April 1980
February 1981
September 1981
Late 1981
March 1982
October 1982
November 1982
March 1983
September 1983
October 1983
Sino-Japanese treaty with "antihegemony" clause.
Soviets sign treaty with Vietnam, following further
rapid deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations.
Vietnam attacks and overruns Kampuchea; US and
China complete normalization of diplomatic rela-
tions; Deng visits US.
China invades Vietnam to "teach a lesson"; Viet-
namese occupation of Kampuchea unaffected. Sovi-
ets deploy two additional divisions into Mongolia
and begin to expand their military presence in
Vietnam.
Chinese announce intent to abrogate Sino-Soviet
treaty, but propose political talks.
Soviet-US summit in Vienna.
Sino-Soviet political talks in Moscow.
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Chinese postpone political talks indefinitely.
Sino-Soviet treaty expires.
Brezhnev, at 26th CPSU Congress, proposes confi-
dence-building measures ICBMs) for the Far East.
Soviets propose resumption of border talks; Chinese
silent.
USSR and China begin gradual expansion of con-
tacts-trade, academic and sports exchanges, etc.
Brezhnev speech in Tashkent expresses desire for
improved relations with China.
First round of Sino-Soviet consultations held in
Beijing.
Brezhnev dies; Foreign Ministers Gromyko and
Huang meet at funeral in Moscow; Andropov be-
comes General Secretary.
Second round of Sino-Soviet consultations held in
Moscow.
Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa in Beijing, opens a
second channel for talks on "international issues."
Third round of Sino-Soviet consultations held in
Beijing.
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Andropov dies. Chinese send Deputy Premier Wan
Li to attend funeral, where Wan holds talks with
Soviet First Deputy Premier Aliyev-highest level
Sino-Soviet discussions since Kosygin-Zhou meeting
in 1969.
March 1984 Fourth round of Sino-Soviet consultations held in
Moscow.
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Andropov dies. Chinese send Deputy Premier Wan
Li to attend funeral, where Wan holds talks with
Soviet First Deputy Premier Aliyev-highest level
Sino-Soviet discussions since Kosygin-Zhou meeting
in 1969.
March 1984 Fourth round of Sino-Soviet consultations held in
Moscow.
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1. This document was disseminated by the Directorate of Intelligence. Because of the
sensitive nature of some source material reflected herein, this copy is for the exclusive
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2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable
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4. The title of this document when used separately from the text is unclassified.
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/07 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900940001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/07 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900940001-8
Top Secret
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/07 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900940001-8