THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGIONAL POWERS AND THE UNITED STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00495R000800770003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2009
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 1, 1985
• Content Type: NIE

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Central
Intelligence
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The Soviet Presence ino Afghanistan:
Implications for the Regional
Powers and the United States
National Intelligence Estimate
Secret
NIE 11137-85
April 1985
Copy 4 2 4
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N I E 11/37-85
THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGIONAL
POWERS AND THE UNITED STATES
Information available as of 26 March 1985 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved by the National Foreign Intelligence
Board on that date.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 11
Implications for Pakistan .................................................................. 11
Pakistani Perspectives ................................................................... 11
Soviet Objectives and Policy Toward Pakistan .......................... 11
Factors in Soviet Policy ................................................................ 11
Constraints on Soviet Policy ......................................................... 12
Major Variables in Pakistani Policy ............................................. 13
Pakistan's Vulnerability to Soviet Subversion ............................. 16
Implications for India ....................................................................... 16
Indian Perspectives ....................................................................... 16
Soviet Perspectives and Constraints in India .............................. 17
The Indian and Soviet Threats to Pakistan ................................. 17
An Indo-Pakistani War and Afghanistan ........................................ 18
Implications for Iran ......................................................................... 18
Iranian Perspectives ...................................................................... 18
Soviet Perspectives ........................................................ :............... 19
Soviet Constraints in Iran ............................................................. 19
Afghanistan in Soviet-Iranian Relations ...................................... 19
Implications for the Arab World ..................................................... 20
Implications for China ..................................................................... 20
Implications of Soviet Victory in Afghanistan ................................ 21
Afghanistan as a Forward Base ................................................... 21
Threat to Iran and the Persian Gulf Countries .......................... 22
Threat to Pakistan ......................................................................... 22
Threat to India .............................................................................. 23
Implications for the United States ................................................... 23
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.SCOPE NOTE
This Estimate assesses the implications of a continued Soviet
military- presence in Afghanistan through 1990 for the regional pow-
ers-Pakistan, India, Iran, and the Arab world-and for the United
States. It addresses the implications of the Soviet invasion in terms of the
following questions:
- How has the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan influenced the
regional powers' strategic perspectives and. threat assessments?
- What impact has the Soviet presence in Afghanistan had on
regional rivalries, especially that between India and Pakistan?
- What options do the Soviets have to manipulate the policies and
internal politics of the regional states, and what are Moscow's
prospects for success?
- How would ' domestic instability or changes in government of
the regional states affect their policies toward Afghanistan and
the Soviets?
- How are US interests affected by the policies of the regional
powers, and by Soviet attempts to manipulate the domestic
politics and conflicts of these regional powers?
The Estimate examines Moscow's policy options in Afghanistan
only as far as they affect regional actors and is not intended to be pre-
dictive of all aspects of Soviet regional policies through 1990 or beyond.
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Afghanistan's Regional Position
500 Kilometers
5 0Miles
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative -
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KEY JUDGMENTS
After nearly 150 years of intermittent competition between Russia
and Western powers in Central Asia and Afghanistan, the Soviet Union
now occupies Afghanistan with a large army, is strategically positioned
between Iran and Pakistan, is the only great power on the ground
militarily in the region, and is 300 miles away from the Indian Ocean.'
Moscow's efforts to consolidate Soviet control over Afghanistan will
increase the potential for regional instability and conflict during the
next five years. The Soviets will continue their efforts to move events in
the region in their favor and will increase the pressure on regional actors
through military and political means as well as intimidation and
subversion.
Should the Soviets consolidate their control over Afghanistan, they
will enhance their strategic and regional position and place themselves
in a stronger position for pursuing other regional objectives at the
expense of US interests: Even if Moscow would only gain modest
strategic military advantages during the next five years, military or
political success toward consolidating their position would place the
Soviets in a better position to intimidate Afghanistan's neighbors and to
meddle in their affairs. All the regional powers-including India and
the Persian Gulf countries-would have to take into consideration the
proximity of Soviet power and Moscow's demonstrated willingness to
use force to achieve Soviet objectives.
Regional Reaction to Invasion
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has created a new strategic
situation that has already had a major.impact on regional politics and on
the strategic interests of powers outside Southwest Asia:
- The invasion sparked an Afghan insurgency that has grown in
size and effectiveness and which prevents the Soviets from
consolidating their control.
- Pakistan, as a result of providing vital sanctuary and support for
the Afghan insurgents and supporting US objectives in the
region, is now in confrontation with the Soviets.
' The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, is in agreement with this
Estimate but believes it important to point out that the Soviet efforts to consolidate control in Afganistan
will be very difficult during the five-year period of the Estimate and will most likely have negative effects
on the Soviet Union's position throughout the region and its ability to enhance its strategic position.
Much of this is spelled out in the remainder of the Key Judgments.
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- The Soviet threat to Pakistan from Afghanistan provided strong
impetus to the resurrection of US-Pakistani security ties that
now include closer strategic cooperation and significant US
military assistance..
- US military aid for Pakistan has in turn increased India's
suspicions of both US and Pakistani intentions, has contributed
to greater Indo-Pakistani tensions, and has led to a closer-
though still limited-convergence of some Indian and Soviet
interests in weakening Pakistan.
The invasion set back Soviet efforts to improve relations with
the Arab states of the Persian Gulf region and with China. Saudi
Arabia and China both provide aid to the Afghan insurgents
through Pakistan, and. the Saudis have increased their assistance
to Islamabad.
The very process by which Moscow attempts to further consolidate its
power in Afghanistan will have ongoing strategic impact on the region.
Prospects and Implications of Soviet Consolidation
There is a range of opinion within the Intelligence Community
about whether the Soviet Union will be able to consolidate its position in
Afghanistan beyond the period of this Estimate. If the Soviet Union can
further consolidate its position, Moscow's prospects for achieving long-
term strategic objectives in the region would increase:
- Firmly establishing Afghanistan within Moscow's "empire"
would demonstrate the Soviets' resolve and increase fears
among regional states about Soviet expansionism.
- Moscow would be in a stronger geographic position to further
expand its political influence in the region, in some cases at the
expense of US influence.
Within the time frame of this Estimate, the USSR will steadily
improve its military infrastructure in Afghanistan to support its regional
defense requirements and ability to project power. Major improvements
in 'air and logistic facilities and the deployment of additional forces
would be essential for the Soviets to undertake and sustain large-scale
operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan or Iran.
Over the next five years, the Soviets' improvements in the logistic
infrastructure in Afghanistan will improve their capabilities against the
resistance and could also support Soviet military operations against Iran
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and Pakistan. Over the longer term the military significance of
Afghanistan as a forward base will grow. However:
- The difficult terrain, rudimentary transportation network, and
poor logistic facilities in Afghanistan, together with the range
limitations of tactical aircraft currently in the Soviet inventory,
limit the strategic military advantages that the Soviets would
derive from victory in Afghanistan in the near term.
- Logistic and terrain difficulties would also limit the use of
Afghanistan as a forward base for a land invasion of Pakistan
and, to a lesser extent, Iran.
- However, beginning in the late 1980s, expected improvements
in Soviet I tactical aviation-including an air-refueling capabili-
ty-would allow aircraft launched from Afghanistan to support
Soviet military operations in the Persian Gulf region, improving
existing capabilities.
Military and Diplomatic Costs to Moscow
So far, however, the invasion has resulted in significant military
and' diplomatic costs for Moscow that offset potential strategic gains.
They regional reaction to the Soviet invasion and subsequent occupation
of Afghanistan has been uniformly negative. This has given the United
States an opportunity to make some concrete, though still modest, gains
in its relations with several of these states. Continued US interest and
commitment, appropriate to the variety of states in question, is
perceived by the regional states as critical to their continued opposition
to the Soviets in Afghanistan.
To date, Moscow's invasion has incurred the following military and
diplomatic costs:
- Five years after the invasion, the Soviets and their puppet regime
in Kabul still do not control most of Afghanistan, and their combat
losses-while still relatively small-are increasing.
- The invasion helped provoke an enhanced US commitment to
regional security, complicated Indo-Soviet relations, and has rekin-
dled suspicions about Soviet ambitions in the Arab world.
- US military planning and force structuring for contingencies in the
Persian Gulf have been given increased impetus by the invasion.
Projected Soviet Policy in Afghanistan
The judgments in this Estimate are based on our belief that, during
the next five years, the Soviets will neither withdraw from Afghanistan,'
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nor succeed in reducing significantly the level of Afghan resistance. The
USSR may marginally improve its political military position in Afghani-
stan and will take whatever steps are necessary to avoid a severe
deterioration of its military position in Afghanistan. .
Specifically, we believe that:
- The Soviets will not withdraw from Afghanistan because such a
move would represent a clear failure of Soviet policy and force
of arms both at home and abroad.
- The Soviets will not be willing to make the type of concessions
that would permit a political compromise acceptable to the
Afghan resistance.
- The Afghan resistance will increase its effectiveness against the
Soviets as it becomes better armed and trained.
- Unless the Soviets are faced with a serious deterioration in their
military position, we still expect them to make continued
incremental increases-of perhaps 10,000 men per year-in
their troop strength. Should resistance capabilities improve
significantly and the Soviets face a deteriorating military situa-
tion, however, they could consider even larger increases in troop
strength and stepped-up pressure against Pakistan.
- Nevertheless, we do not believe the Soviets will opt for a
massive reinforcement of the approximately 115,000 men now
in Afghanistan because of the likely diplomatic, economic, and
military costs. To use military force alone to crush the resistance
would, in our judgment, require 400,000 to 500,000 troops.
Pakistan
The Soviets will concentrate on political and military efforts to stop
the flow of men and supplies across Afghanistan's borders with Pakistan.
To accomplish these objectives, the Soviets probably will:
- Increase cross-border air and artillery strikes into Pakistan and
probably support limited ground incursions in an attempt to
undermine the Pakistani public's support for the Afghan resist-
ance and confidence in President Zia.
- Step up subversion to weaken the Zia regime and try to help a
pliable civilian government-which would be more accommo-
dating to Moscow's interests-come to power in Islamabad.
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- Seek ways to reinvigorate Baluchi, Pushtun, and Sindhi separat-
ist tendencies in order to threaten the unity of Pakistan.
- Foster tensions between India and Pakistan.
Soviet policy choices will be affected by Moscow's view of
Pakistan's political stability and weaknesses, US-Pakistani ties, Indo-
Soviet relations, and its own limited resources in Pakistan:
- Moscow would view Zia as more vulnerable to pressure if he
were to become seriously weakened politically.
- The Soviets would be wary that too tough a policy could
strengthen Zia, as well as US-Pakistani security ties, and possibly
lead to a confrontation with the United States.
- Further, Moscow would not want its actions against Pakistan to
result in major strains in its relations with India, and especially
not in closer Indian ties to the United States.
Pakistan's resistance to greater Soviet pressure will depend princi-
pally on its perceptions of US support:
- Zia's Afghan policies are predicated-on tying the Soviets down
in Afghanistan in the interests of Pakistan's own security. His
willingness to run the risks of increased tensions with the USSR
reflect in part his hope that the United States will reciprocate
with a full commitment to his regime-against India as well as
against the Soviets.
- The Pakistanis will continue to press for additional arms and
would expect more direct US military help-including logistic
support and possibly a show of force-if the Soviets conduct
cross-border operations.
As long as Zia remains in power and so long as he feels he can rely
on US support, Pakistan is unlikely to alter its policy on Afghanistan or
reduce its ties to the United States. However, a major internal crisis or
an erosion of public support for the Afghan cause might compel
Islamabad to alter its policies even if it had US backing:
- Another military regime might be more likely than Zia to adopt
a conciliatory policy toward Moscow and Kabul.
- A leftist civilian government-which is least likely to come to
power in the next five years-would be most willing to reach
agreement with Moscow and Kabul.
Moscow's efforts to bully Pakistan into changing. its tough policy on
Afghanistan have so far been counterproductive and are likely to face
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continuing difficulties. The threat to Pakistan from an alien and "anti-
Islamic" Soviet force in Afghanistan has worked to:
- Strengthen national unity by rallying Pakistanis to a government
confronting a foreign force-the threat serves to help Zia retain
control.
- Strengthen Pakistan's security and economic. relationships. with
the United States, China, and the conservative Persian Gulf
Arabs, with visible benefits of economic assistance and improve-
ment in Pakistan's armed forces.
- Complicate Soviet-directed subversive efforts.
- Defuse the Pushtunistan separatist issue.
- Encourage Pakistan to seek better relations with India.
A Pakistani. accommodation with Moscow would have major
strategic implications for the United States:
- The Afghan resistance would be 'severely weakened without
Pakistan as a sanctuary and supply base.
- A much wider expansion of Soviet control over Afghanistan
would be virtually assured, although some level of resistance
would continue.
- Pakistan would become less supportive overall of US strategic
interests.
India
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi would like both the USSR and the
United States to end their involvement in South Asia. At least over the
near term, however, the consequences of the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan-notably US security assistance to Pakistan-may serve as
a basis for the de facto convergence of some Indian and Soviet
objectives. India and the Soviet Union both want, for different reasons:
- Weakening of Pakistani security ties to the United States.
- Establishment of a more pliant government in Pakistan.
- An end to the Afghan insurgency.
The Soviets have tried to heighten India's suspicions about Paki-
stan's intentions and its security relationship with the United States in
order to foster Indo-Pakistani tensions and heighten New Delhi's
dependence on Moscow. In the Soviet view, conflict between India and
Pakistan would work toward solving Moscow's Afghan problem and
would give Moscow opportunities to strengthen its position in South
Asia.
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The Soviets would almost certainly condone even an Indian
preemptive strike against Pakistan's nuclear facilities in the belief that it
served Moscow's interests by weakening Pakistan. However, a pre-
emptive Indian attack on Pakistani nuclear facilities is unlikely in the
near term.
Even without Soviet encouragement, India's suspicions of Pakistan
and the United States and its dependence on Soviet arms will persist and
could even increase as a result of closer US-Pakistani security coopera-
tion. Some in New Delhi believe this cooperation has already acquired a
dynamic independent of Afghanistan. Nonetheless, India is likely to
become increasingly concerned about long-range Soviet intentions in
the region, and could find itself moving toward confrontation with the
Soviets if Pakistan were effectively neutralized:
- New Delhi regards Pakistan as a strategic buffer against the
USSR and would oppose Moscow's efforts to dominate Pakistan.
- New Delhi and Moscow could find themselves supporting rival
factions within Pakistan.
- The Indians would seek to significantly reduce their depen-
dence on Moscow and reorder their strategic relationship with
the USSR, the United States, and China if they perceived Soviet
ambitions as - extending , beyond Afghanistan toward the
subcontinent.
Iran
Soviet relations with Iran probably will be more determined by
bilateral issues other than Afghanistan. Nonetheless:
- Soviet pressure on Iran probably will intensify if Tehran
increases its support for the Afghan resistance. Greater Soviet
pressure would be unlikely, however, to cause Tehran to change
its Afghan policies.
- Iran might increase its aid to the insurgents once its war with
Iraq is over, but Iran's support is not nearly as crucial to the re-
sistance as Pakistan's.
Should Pakistan cease support to the Mujahedin, Iranian support
would become critical to the survival of the insurgency but
would not begin to replace current supply levels through
Pakistan.
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Arab States
Soviet success in controlling Afghanistan would heighten Arab
concerns about Moscow's intentions in the Middle East. However, the
potential for US-Arab strategic cooperation-and Arab views of Soviet
policies-will be influenced much more by Arab-Israeli and Gulf war
issues than by the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf states will continue to back Pakistan in its support for the Afghan
resistance.
China
Beijing views the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as an ominous
extension of Moscow's military assertiveness that threatens China's
broader strategic interests. China will continue to support Islamabad's
role in aiding the insurgents, but has limited potential for helping
Pakistan in the face of greater Soviet pressure. The Chinese, however,
would not want Pakistani policy to result in successful Soviet efforts to
neutralize Pakistan because Islamabad's role as Beijing's key South
Asian ally is even more important to China than its role in opposing the
Soviets in Afghanistan.
Implications for the United States
Pakistan is likely to continue to oppose the Soviet military presence
in Afghanistan as long as it perceives it has continued strong US support.
Even Iran, which may feel compelled to move to improve its relations
with the Soviets, will continue to support the withdrawal of Soviet
troops from its neighbor. For the new Indian leadership, however, the
US-Pakistani security relationship will hamper any reassessment by
India of its public position on Afghanistan.
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DISCUSSION
Implications for Pakistan
Pakistani Perspectives
1. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December
1979 increased Pakistan's sense of vulnerability and
led it to reassess its security policy and foreign rela-
tions. Islamabad could no longer regard Afghanistan as
a weak, nonthreatening buffer state between the USSR
and South Asia.
2. The Soviets have publicly and privately warned
Islamabad that continued support for the insurgents
and increasing ties to the United States-particularly
in regional security matters-potentially threaten
Pakistan's security and survival. The Pakistanis fear
that, if the Soviets consolidate their control over
Afghanistan, they eventually will attempt to split
Baluchistan from Pakistan or even. to collaborate with
India in a coordinated' invasion to destroy Pakistan as
an independent state. However, a number of Paki-
stanis have come to recognize that India would itself
be threatened by Pakistan's collapse while the Soviets
remain in Afghanistan.
3. Pakistan's policy since 1980 has attempted to
balance its opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghan-
istan with the need to avoid a military confrontation
with the Soviets. This policy is predicated on the belief
that the Soviets will not withdraw from Afghanistan
and that US support for Pakistan-principally in the
supply of modern weapons-is essential to Pakistan's
security and survival. Support for the Afghan resist-
ance has allowed Islamabad to develop closer: ties to
the United States, thereby strengthening its defenses
while simultaneously keeping the Soviets from consoli-
dating their hold on Afghanistan.
4. At the same time, however, Pakistan has tried to
remain circumspect in its support for the resistance-
Islamabad publicly denies it provides a, weapons con-
duit for the. insurgents-and has maintained a diplo-
matic dialogue with Moscow on Afghanistan. Paki-
stan's participation in the UN-sponsored indirect. talks
on Afghanistan is intended.to keep the door open for a
negotiated settlement and to reduce the pressure from
Moscow while gaining time to improve its military
capability.
5. Islamabad has warned both Moscow and Kabul
that it will defend Pakistan's border, but the Pakistanis
have so far demonstrated a determination to avoid a
border conflict with Soviet forces that could escalate
into a larger confrontation. They'have not responded
with force to the'Soviet/Afghan'air or ground incur-
sions, which so far have been confined to the frontier
region where an effective Pakistani military response
is most difficult. Islamabad implicitly has'conceded it
cannot defend the border region, and the Army and
Air Force are held as a reserve force to deter-and, if
need be, to combat-deeper penetrations.
Soviet Objectives and Policy Toward Pakistan
6. The war in Afghanistan is currently the principal
determinant in Soviet policy toward Pakistan. It is
clear from the Soviets' public and private statements
that they regard Pakistan's support for the insurgents
as a major reason for their failure to control
Afghanistan. 0
7. For the period of this Estimate, Moscow's major
policy aims in Pakistan will remain:
To end Islamabad's support for the Afghan resist-
ance-support that is crucial to denying the
Soviets control of Afghanistan.
- To gain Pakistani recognition of the Kabul re-
gime, which would help legitimize the Soviet
presence in Afghanistan.
- To limit regional security cooperation between
Pakistan and the United States.
- To see a pro-Soviet, or at least anti-US, govern-
ment come to power in Islamabad.
Factors in Soviet Policy
8. Any policy decision by Moscow to escalate mili-
tary pressure on Pakistan will be based on several
factors: the situation in Afghanistan, Moscow's rela-
tions with the United States and its calculations re-
garding political stability in Pakistan, Islamabad's
relations with the United States and India, and the
likely US and Indian reactions.
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9. Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Soviets are
likely to further increase military pressure on Islam-
abad as they attribute major improvements in insur-
gent capabilities to US (and Chinese) assistance fun-
neled through Pakistan. A significant increase in Soviet
casualties and equipment losses-particularly air-
craft-would provide a strong incentive for Moscow to
attack insurgent camps, logistic bases, and supply lines
in Pakistan.
10. A Pakistani accommodation with Moscow-
although unlikely in the near term-would be a severe
blow to the Afghan resistance and would give the
Marxist regime in Kabul a legitimacy it otherwise
could not attain. It would also deny the resistance
secure sanctuaries and supply bases in Pakistan and
erode the international consensus against the invasion.
Islamabad probably would tighten regulations to re-
strict the Afghans' freedom of movement in the
frontier regions and would severely curtail the activi-
ties of Afghan political exiles in Pakistan.
11. However, the withdrawal of Pakistan's backing
would not end the resistance in Afghanistan and would
leave a large refugee presence in Pakistan. Even
without Pakistan's support, many insurgent groups
would continue to fight the Soviets and to use Paki-
stani territory to move arms and supplies into Afghani-
stan. The Pakistanis could seriously impair the Af-
ghans' ability to move across the border but could not
seal the frontier.
12. Pakistani Politics. The degree of political sta-
bility in Pakistan will be a major consideration in a
Soviet decision to increase military pressure on the
country. The Soviets probably will not view President
Zia as vulnerable to increased pressure unless he
becomes seriously weakened politically. In the event
of a major internal crisis in Pakistan, however, the
Soviets would have to be careful to avoid such overt
threats to Pakistan's security that they allowed Zia-or
another military government-to redefine the crisis as
an issue of Pakistan's survival as an independent
country. Zia adroitly used the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan to renew military ties to the United States,
and the implicit Soviet threat to Pakistan has given
him considerable latitude in dealing with domestic
problems and the political opposition.
13. Moscow probably calculates that Zia's removal
from power would result in a less confrontational
approach to Afghanistan by a successor government. If
Zia were replaced by another military officer in a time
of great political instability in Pakistan, the Soviets
may believe that the new leader would seek an
accommodation with Moscow and Kabul in order to
reduce the pressure from Afghanistan while he con-
centrated on consolidating the new regime.
14. The Soviets would consider a civilian govern-
ment dominated by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP)
as potentially the most sympathetic to their interests in
Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region. The Soviets
would be less optimistic about the prospects for recon-
ciliation with a civilian government led by a coalition
of moderate and conservative parties, but might view
such a government as more vulnerable to intimidation
than a military regime.
15. Pakistan's Relations With the United States
and India. An equally important consideration in
Soviet policy would be Pakistan's relations with the
United States and India:
- Even if Zia faced no important internal crisis, the
Soviets might view his regime as vulnerable to
increased pressure-including large-scale cross-
border operations-if there were major strains in
US-Pakistani relations.
- The Soviets might try to exploit tensions between
India and Pakistan to pressure Islamabad, al-
though we believe Indo-Soviet collusion is not
likely.'
16. Moscow's Concerns About Indian Reactions.
India's importance to Soviet interests probably con-
strains Moscow's policy toward Pakistan. Moscow
views India as strategically more important than Paki-
stan, and the Soviets would not want their actions
against Pakistan to result in major strains with India
and especially not in closer Indian ties to the United
States. Nonetheless, the Soviets might conclude that
the potential for altering Islamabad's policies by cross-
border attacks was worth the risk of strains in relations
with India-particularly if the military situation in
Afghanistan got worse.
Constraints on Soviet Policy
17. Military. At present, the Soviets' capabilities for
pressuring Pakistan militarily are limited by the size of
their forces, the effectiveness of the Mujahedin, the
difficult terrain, and the relatively undeveloped mili-
tary infrastructure in Afghanistan (see inset on Soviet
military threat to Pakistan and Iran). The Soviets
currently could increase military pressure on Pakistan
with more frequent and severe airstrikes and artillery
' Paragraphs 44-48 assess prospects for Soviet-Indian collusion
against Pakistan.
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Soviet Military Threat to Pakistan and Iran
The Soviets at present have the capability to conduct
limited cross-border raids into Pakistan and Iran, but so
far have not made the logistic and infrastructure im-
provements that would be necessary to turn Afghani-
stan. into a forward base for major operations against
either country:
- Soviet forces in Afghanistan are tied down fighting
the insurgents, and their supply lines and many
installations remain vulnerable to insurgent at-
tacks. Supply problems probably would multiply
if the Soviets were to greatly increase the traffic
along narrow and insecure supply lines to support
a force in Afghanistan attacking. into Iran or
Pakistan.
- The Soviets have had difficulty supporting the
units already in Afghanistan, and a large increase
in troops or aircraft without an accompanying
expansion of support. facilities would only aggra-
vate their present logistic problems. The Soviets'
ability to maintain and repair. equipment in
Afghanistan is poor,-particularly for aircraft.
- The Soviets could mount airstrikes or cross-border
raids into Pakistan or Iran without strengthening
their forces in Afghanistan and with no warning
indicators for the United States.
Improvements being made to the military infrastruc-
ture in Afghanistan are aimed at supporting operations
against the resistance, but also indicate that the Soviets
are establishing a permanent military presence. Since
the invasion, the Soviets have:
- Built additional helicopter, transport, and fighter
parking hardstands and improved runways at
Afghan airbases.
- Constructed new barracks at military garrisons.
- Increased fuel and munitions storage capacities at
ground and air force bases and built a petroleum
products pipeline from Termez in the USSR to
Bagram, and another from Towragundi to Shin-
dand Airbase south of Herat.
- Improved maintenance facilities at many military
installations.
- Expanded the Afghan transshipment points at
Khairabad and Towraghoudi on the Soviet border.
Some of this construction has been completed and
improvements continue to be made.
areas in Pakistan, but would not greatly reduce insur-
gent infiltration or activities in Afghanistan.
18. We believe the Soviets initially would limit
their attacks to insurgent camps and supply bases close
to the border and would try to avoid clashes with the
Pakistani Army that could trigger a larger conflict and
provoke sharp international censure. An escalation of
military pressure against Pakistan probably would be
probing and gradual, with Moscow continually assess-
ing Islamabad's reactions and those of Pakistan's al-
lies-principally the United States-and the internal
political strength of the Pakistani regime. Moscow
would not greatly escalate military tensions with Paki-
stan if it believed there were a serious risk of a military
confrontation with the United States. A Soviet percep-
tion of weakness or indecision in Islamabad, or in the
US commitment to Pakistan, would be likely to cause
Moscow to conclude that further escalation would
have little additional risk. As the Soviets improve their
logistic base in Afghanistan, they will have more
options for increasing military pressure.
19. Pakistan would have difficulty combating Soviet
airstrikes, hot pursuit, or quick heliborne assault raids
in the frontier region and could not resist large-scale
Soviet cross-border operations without significant US
support:
- The Pakistanis have little capability to detect air
violations along much of the border with Afghan-
istan, and their air defenses are still poorly
integrated.
- Pakistani forces opposite Afghanistan are weak in
mobility and firepower, but the rugged terrain
and poor roads there favor the defenders.
20. Political and Economic. Soviet efforts to influ-
ence Pakistani policy with economic or political blan-
dishments have failed because Moscow has little eco-
nomic and no political leverage in Pakistan. Soviet
economic inducements or political assurances that
Kabul would accept the disputed Durand Line as the
recognized international border has not caused Islam-
abad to alter its policies. Indeed, any Pakistani govern-
ment probably would exploit Soviet promises of new
aid to obtain additional financial or economic assist-
ance from Islamabad's traditional sources of aid-
including Saudi Arabia, China, and the United
States-but would run the risk of alienating them if it
cut a deal with Moscow or Kabul.
fire across the border, or with quick heliborne assault
raids into Pakistan's border regions. Airstrikes and
cross-border raids could temporarily disrupt the secu-
rity and stability of insurgent supply lines and staging
Major Variables in Pakistani Policy
21. An escalation of Soviet and Afghan military
pressure along the border would present Islamabad
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with hard choices on how and where to respond,
especially if the Soviets began a concerted effort to
attack refugee camps or insurgent bases and supply
routes in Pakistan on a regular basis. A decision by any
government not to defend Pakistani territory along the
border against a ground attack would have severe
political consequences by undermining both public
and military confidence.
22. Some influential Pakistanis both in and outside
government-including some in the Army-believe
that Zia's policies risk greater Soviet pressures and
ultimately threaten Pakistan's security. They advocate
a political accommodation with Moscow and Kabul
that recognizes the irreversibility of Soviet gains in
Afghanistan and allows for the repatriation of nearly 3
million Afghan refugees before they become a major
threat to economic and social stability in Pakistan.
Islamabad, in their view, could not count on US
support, would be unable to withstand escalating
Soviet pressure-particularly if tensions with India
were high-and eventually would have to bow to
Soviet demands. Many advocates of a more concilia-
tory policy argue that delaying the inevitable would
only reduce Islamabad's bargaining leverage and
weaken Pakistan against its principal adversary-
India.
23. Many Pakistanis disapprove of the. close mili-
tary relations that Zia has forged with the United
States, and US-Pakistani relations could become a very
contentious issue if Soviet pressure increases-particu-
larly if US support is less than expected. However,
Pakistanis arguing for a more conciliatory policy on
Afghanistan do not now have the influence or power
base to press Zia to reconsider his policy.
24. US-Pakistani Relations. US willingness to meet
Pakistan's perceived security needs will reinforce Is-
lamabad's policy of supporting the Afghan insurgents.
In the event of intensified Soviet military pressure,
Islamabad-as it has in the past-is likely to press the
United States for new arms deals and accelerated
delivery of advanced weapons. Islamabad would ex-
pect more direct US military help-including logistic
support and possibly a show of force-if the Soviets
mounted large-scale operations deep into Pakistani
territory.
25. US failure to strengthen Pakistan's military
capability in the event of intensified Soviet pressure
along the border would undermine the foundation of
Zia's policy and cause him to reassess relations with the
United States-including support for US strategic in-
terests elsewhere in the region.
26. The Refugee Problem. Increased socioeconom-
ic tensions caused by a long-term Afghan refugee
presence in Pakistan, and a worsening economy, al-
most certainly would result in greater politicization of
the refugee problem, particularly if the refugees lost
hope of ever returning to Afghanistan. Many Paki-
stanis are worried that the 3 million refugees could
become a major security problem, and that the Soviets
could exploit tensions between the refugees and local
population to destabilize Pakistan. If this should
happen, any government in Islamabad-including
Zia's-would be under greater pressure to reach an
agreement with Moscow and Kabul that would facili-
tate the repatriation of the Afghan refugees. However,
an attempt to repatriate the refugees against their will
or to prevent insurgent movement across the border
almost certainly would increase tensions. Moves by
Pakistan to seal the border would produce immediate
conflict with the well-armed Afghan Mujahedin and
with its own Pushtuns and Baluchis, who would resent
the Pakistani Army's required presence in traditional
tribal areas where Islamabad's writ has never been
strong.
27. Relations With India. Increased tensions with
India could provide a strong incentive for any Paki-
stani government to try to reduce the potential for
confrontation with the Soviets over Afghanistan. Paki-
stanis believe that New Delhi, at a minimum, wants a
weak and subservient Pakistan and that many Indians
still are not reconciled to Pakistan's independence.
From Pakistan's viewpoint, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, coupled with Moscow's already close ties
to New Delhi, raised a threat of Soviet and Indian
collaboration to weaken and neutralize Pakistan.'
Many Pakistanis are concerned that India might try to
take advantage of tensions along the Pakistani-Afghan
border to intimidate Pakistan or that India might
launch a preemptive strike against Pakistani nuclear
facilities.
28; Domestic Politics. President Zia stands a fair
chance of remaining in power for the rest of the
decade. Zia emerged politically strengthened after
National Assembly elections in February. His deft
handling of the Sind crisis in 1983 and his success in
the recent elections have exposed the division and
uncertainty of the opposition, strengthened Army
support for his rule, and enabled him to set the tone of
political debate in Pakistan.
'Paragraphs 44-48 assess prospects for Soviet-Indian collusion
against Pakistan.
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Afghanistan and Pakistan
1
Jalalibhd
,Quetta
Pakistan
Baluchistan
Iran Province
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Afghanistan
I Area of numero \.
/Afghan refuge camps
lndinn\claim
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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29. There are, however, potentially explosive eco-
nomic, political, and regional factors that could quick-
ly undermine Zia's regime-and which could be ex-.
ploited by the Soviets and India to hasten his removal:
- Despite Zia's skillful management of elections,
mismanagement of further transition to civilian
rule could result in a backlash against Zia within
his most important constituencies in Punjab
Province and the Army.
-A decline in the economy or a rapid drop in
foreign remittances would lead to growing oppo-
sition by important interest groups and the pub-
lic generally, particularly if internal competition
for resources increased.
- Failure to address, political and economic griev-
ances in Sind and Baluchistan Provinces could
lead to serious ethnic violence with nationwide
implications, including the prospect of militant
regional separatism.
- The growing number of Afghan refugees in
Pakistan could aggravate all of these factors if
they become a political constituency in their own
right.
Pakistan's Vulnerability to Soviet Subversion
30. The Soviets have little capability by themselves
to destabilize Pakistan, but would quickly move to
take advantage of domestic unrest to weaken Islam-
abad. There are many allegations, . but our limited
information shows little hard evidence of Soviet sub-
version in Pakistan. At present, Soviet media manipu-
lation and covert activities appear aimed less at sub-
verting Zia than at cultivating political leftists in the
PPP and other parties for the longer term. The left is
badly divided; however, and never has enjoyed much
support in Pakistan.
31. Serious separatist movements have flourished in
Baluchistan, Sind, and the North-West Frontier Prov-
ince (NWFP) in the past, and ethnic unrest in these
provinces can also provide the Soviets opportunities
for covert manipulation to try to undermine the
Pakistani Government.'
32. Baluchistan. The Soviets probably have the
best long-term opportunities to exploit-and help pro-
voke-antigovernment sentiment in Baluchistan.
Afghanistan
provides the Soviets with a contiguous base and long
border for infiltrating aid to Pakistani Baluchi
nationalists.
33. The North-West Frontier Province. Soviet
prospects for destabilizing the NWFP have declined
substantially since the invasion of Afghanistan. The
Pushtun majority in the NWFP adamantly opposed
the invasion because most of the Afghan refugees from
the fighting are also Pushtun, and there now is little
support in the province for an'independent or autono-
mous Pushtunistan-a movement that has received
Afghan backing in the past. Zia has strengthened his
support in the NWFP by his firm backing of the
Afghan resistance and allowing Pushtuns more posi-
tions of authority in the .provincial government.
34. Sind. The most serious threat to Pakistan's
internal stability in the next five to 10 years is likely to
be in Sind Province, but India has much greater
capability than the Soviets to affect developments
there. The deep resentment of Punjabi domination
and significant antigovernment opposition in Sind
present both Moscow and New Delhi with opportuni-
ties for subversion in Pakistan. The provincewide
disturbances in autumn 1983 were the most serious
challenge to Zia's rule to date; there was some evi-
dence of Indian involvement, and the Pakistanis claim
even the Soviets were involved. One ominous develop-
ment in the Sind crisis was the growing support among
militants for an independent Sindhudesh. Although
Zia successfully contained the unrest and even
strengthened his political position nationally, his meas-
ures have increased Sindhi disaffection.
Implications for India
Indian Perspectives
35. So far, India has not regarded the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan as a direct threat to its security.
The invasion, however, is seen in New Delhi as posing
an indirect threat to Indian interests and policy in
South Asia and the Indian Ocean because:
- It brought the superpower competition to a
region where India aspires to unchallenged polit-
ical and military dominance.
- In New Delhi's view, the renewal of military ties
between Pakistan and the United States and the
permanent US naval presence in the Indian
Ocean are a direct result of the war in Afghani-
stan and a major setback to India's goal of
regional hegemony.
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- The Indians believe Islamabad wants.modern US
weapons to strengthen its military potential
against India; they argue that no feasible supply
of arms can enable Pakistan to withstand a major
attack from Soviet-occupied Afghanistan; and
they see the new sophisticated arms as again
emboldening Pakistan's military leaders to attack
India.
36. The Soviet invasion also puts India in an awk-
ward position in its relations with both Moscow and
the Nonaligned Movement. New Delhi is reluctant to
openly oppose the Soviets on Afghanistan because of
India's dependence on Soviet arms supplies and strong
political and economic links to Moscow. These would
be critical in the event of another war with Pakistan-
a historical adversary now being rearmed with modern
US weapons. On the other hand, most members of the
Nonaligned Movement have condemned the Soviet
invasion and the Indians are sensitive about the harm
to India's nonaligned image in seeming to condone the
Soviet presence in Afghanistan.
37. Indian policy assumes the Soviets will not leave
Afghanistan except on their own terms, and it aims at
minimizing the adverse, strategic consequences to
India's interests. New Delhi recognizes the Kabul
regime and provides limited economic aid, arguing
that its relationship with Afghanistan provides a poten-
tial alternative to Kabul's exclusive dependence on the
USSR.
38. Many Indian officials believe that a Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan would come about only
if the United States and Pakistan recognized Moscow's
interests in Afghanistan, ended their support for the
resistance, and acquiesced in a pro-Soviet government
in Kabul. Some Indian officials are concerned that the
alternative to a Soviet-backed government in Kabul
would be a fundamentalist Muslim regime-a devel-
opment they especially fear because of their own large
Muslim minority.
39. New Delhi also is attempting to neutralize the
revived US-Pakistani relationship. Many Indians are
concerned that the United States will eventually ob-
tain military bases or access rights to bases in Pakistan
as the price for its arms, thereby increasing super-
power tensions in the region. Indian opposition to US
policies in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region
probably will increase if the United States tries to
significantly strengthen its ties and military assistance
to Pakistan, and as New Delhi tries to expand its
influence in the region.
40. Even without Indira Gandhi and with improved
Indo-US ties, India's Soviet Afghanistan policies are
not likely to change substantially in the years ahead
unless the Indians believe the Soviets aim at expansion
beyond Afghanistan. India will continue to rely on
Moscow for arms and perhaps for diplomatic support.
It will continue to avoid confrontation with the Soviets
over policies that do not immediately conflict with
Indian interests. Rajiv Gandhi has publicly stated his
opposition to both the Soviet presence in Afghanistan
and the US aid to Afghan insurgents that "gives the
excuse for the Soviet troops to be there." A national
consensus in India on the need to protect both the
Soviet arms supply relationship and Moscow's diplo-
matic support constrains major changes in policy and
moderates New Delhi's criticism of Soviet policy.
41. However, the possibility that India's new Prime
Minister may be willing to review his country's policy
cannot be ruled out. Rajiv Gandhi may not have his
mother's deep-seated distrust of Western "imperial-
ism," he is looking to improve relations with both
Pakistan and the United States, and he may be more
questioning about the motives and policies of the
USSR. Moreover, Soviet influence could decline. The
Soviets' worries over Gandhi's intentions have been
sharply exacerbated by the recent sensational Indian
espionage scandal.
Soviet Perspectives and Constraints in India
42. Moscow views its relations with New Delhi as
having great strategic importance in advancing Soviet
interests in the region and within the Nonaligned
Movement. India's opposition to US interests and
policies in the region-particularly to the US naval
presence in the Indian Ocean-parallels Soviet inter-
ests, and the Soviet media routinely parrot Indian
media criticisms of the United States.
43. India's commitment to nonalignment and sensi-
tivity about being perceived as a tacit Soviet ally will
limit Moscow's efforts to secure close military coopera-
tion with New Delhi. Even if the Soviets stepped up
pressure for access to Indian naval bases and other
military cooperation-should the United States gain
base rights in Pakistan-New Delhi would remain
reluctant to agree to such concessions.
44. India and the USSR both would like to see
Pakistan's role in the region diminished, if not neutral-
ized, but from different perspectives. Both New Delhi
and Moscow view the policies of Islamabad' as a major
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obstacle to their objectives in the region. Both wish to
keep Pakistan militarily weak and to prevent US-
Pakistani cooperation in regional security matters.
However, Moscow's principal concern is Islamabad's
support to the Afghan resistance; New Delhi is most
worried that the renewed US-Pakistani military supply
relationship could eventually threaten India's regional
dominance. New Delhi is concerned over any super-
power presence-US or, to a lesser degree, Soviet-in
what it considers its own region of influence.
45. India would welcome the withdrawal of Paki-
stani support to the Afghan resistance and an end to
the insurgency because it would weaken the rationale
for US-Pakistani cooperation. However, Indian leaders
may believe that, even with the end of the resistance,
US-Pakistani ties may not be altered. They may hold
that the United States wants the Pakistanis to play a
major role in ensuring security in the Persian Gulf and
is angling for base rights in Pakistan. However, New
Delhi probably also hopes that, without Afghanistan,
the US-Pakistani relationship could founder over
nuclear nonproliferation issues.
46. Both India and the Soviet Union believe that a
civilian government in Pakistan-preferably one led
by the PPP-could be more accommodating to their
respective interests. Both Moscow and New Delhi have
sought to gain influence with the Pakistani political
opposition and to exploit antigovernment movements.
Even though India faces some of the same constraints
as the Soviets in trying to instigate domestic unrest in
Pakistan, the Indians probably would be better able
than the Soviets to take advantage of homegrown
internal crises in Pakistan because of their closer ties to
elements of the riven opposition, and Moscow proba-
bly believes it would gain from Indian efforts to
subvert the Zia regime. Both India and Pakistan have
long been prone to meddling in each other's affairs,
but India does not want Pakistan to collapse.
47. Despite this convergence of interests, the pros-
pects for direct Indian and Soviet collaboration to
subvert the Pakistani Government are slight. The
Indians want to limit superpower involvement in the
region and would view significant Soviet influence in
an opposition movement or government in Pakistan as
a threat to India's own security. Moreover, under Rajiv
Gandhi there appears to be new interest in India in
improving relations with Pakistan.
48. New Delhi would be even less likely to conspire
with Moscow to mount a coordinated attack on Paki-
stan and would oppose the dismemberment of Paki-
stan. We believe the Indians would consider a frag-
mented Pakistan more destabilizing and a greater
threat to regional peace than a united Pakistan. India
almost certainly could not effectively control either
Punjab or Sind in a dismembered Pakistan and would
fear that the likely political instability in the rump
states would spread across the border into India. New
Delhi already fears the potential impact that radical
Islamic fundamentalism could have on India's signifi-
cant Muslim population and would be concerned that
a Khomeini-style Islam would prevail in the former
Pakistan as a substitute for the dismembered state.
An Indo-Pakistani War and Afghanistan
49. There is no indication that either India or
Pakistan is currently contemplating hostilities. A war
between the two states, however, could provide the
Soviets a new opportunity to strengthen their position
in the region. A certain Pakistani defeat in an Indo-
Pakistani war would result in a new government in
Islamabad and a neutralized Pakistan powerless and
disinclined to oppose either Soviet or Indian strategic
ambitions. A defeated Pakistan probably would end its
support for the Afghan resistance-enabling the Sovi-
ets to consolidate their hold on Afghanistan-and
would downgrade its relations with the United States.
50. The Soviets probably would gain increased
stature in New Delhi by supporting India in a war
with Pakistan. The Soviets might also try to act as a
mediator to end the fighting, however, and save
Pakistan from a major defeat, as they did in the 1965
Indo-Pakistani war. A role as mediator could enhance
Moscow's international prestige, increase its influence
in both New Delhi and Islamabad, and undermine US
diplomatic efforts in the region.
51. The Soviets would almost certainly condone
even an Indian preemptive strike against Pakistan's
nuclear facilities in the belief that it served Moscow's
interests by weakening Pakistan. However, a preemp-
tive Indian attack on Pakistan's nuclear facilities is
unlikely in the near term.
Implications for Iran
Iranian Perspectives
52. Tehran initially viewed the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan as having ominous implications for Iran's
security-more for what the invasion implied of Mos-
.cow's willingness to use military force against its
neighbors to establish a client regime than for any new
military advantage in the east that the invasion gave
Moscow.
53. The clerical regime in Iran adamantly opposes
Communist ideology, believes the Soviets wish to
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destroy the Islamic revolution, and is angered by
Moscow's military and political support of Iraq. Many
of the more radical clerics may argue for better
relations with Moscow, but they are not sympathetic to
Soviet aims and would strongly oppose Soviet policies
that harm Iran's interests or are seen as anti-Islamic.
High-ranking Iranian clerics-including Ayatollah
Montazeri, Khomeini's heir apparent-as well as the
Revolutionary Guard have supported Shia insurgent
groups in Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion, but
Moscow's support for Baghdad in the Iran-Iraq war
apparently is a far more contentious issue between the
two countries.
Soviet Perspectives
54. Moscow considers Iran the most important geo-
political prize in Southwest Asia and viewed the Shah's
fall in February 1979-and the US ouster-as a major
strategic gain. The Soviets expended considerable ef-
fort after the Shah was overthrown to court the new
Iranian leaders, even directing Tudeh-the Iranian
Communist party-to support the Islamic regime. The
invasion of Afghanistan, however, severely set back
whatever prospects existed for improved relations, and
the Soviet tilt toward Iraq, Tehran's crackdown on
Tudeh, and its expulsion of some Soviet officials from
Iran further strained relations.
Soviet Constraints in Iran
55. The Soviets' presence in Afghanistan has in-
creased their leverage against Iran. Nonetheless, even
if the Soviets significantly improved the infrastructure
in Afghanistan and increased the size of their forces in
the western provinces, the principal Soviet military
threat to Iran would still, be from the northwest.
-56. The Soviets' potential for subversion in Iran is
only marginally enhanced by their presence in Af-
ghanistan, although they may be infiltrating agents
and arms into eastern Iran from Afghanistan. In any
case, Moscow's influence with opposition parties and
political factions and ability to exploit political, eco-
nomic, or ethnic grievances in Iran have declined
sharply as Soviet-Iranian relations have worsened.
Tehran's intensive counterintelligence efforts will be
able to constrain Soviet covert activities only as long as
the clerics' grip on power is sure.
57. Soviet efforts to use Afghanistan as a base for
covert activity against Iranian Baluchistan would have
little success. in undermining the Clerical regime in
Tehran, or creating the conditions for the. expansion of
Moscow's influence toward the Persian Gulf. The
apparent lack of Soviet activity in Baluchistan suggests
that for now Moscow sees little fertile ground for pro-
Soviet subversion.
Afghanistan in Soviet-Iranian Relations
58. Tehran's support for the Afghan resistance has
been continuous but selective. The Khomeini regime
has provided limited military aid and guerrilla train-
ing to pro-Iranian Shia insurgent groups in western
and especially central Afghanistan. Unlike Pakistan,
Iran refuses to participate officially in the UN-spon-
sored indirect talks on Afghanistan until Soviet troops
are withdrawn and the resistance is represented at the
negotiations. Iran is kept informed on the talks by both
the United Nations and the Pakistanis. Tehran has
indicated it would not block a settlement to which
Pakistan could agree. Nonetheless, Afghanistan is a
traditional Iranian sphere of influence, and Tehran
views the resistance as both a target and a means for
exporting its revolution. When the war with Iraq ends,
the Iranians may increase further their support of
Afghan Shia insurgent groups, hoping eventually to
dominate the resistance and set up an Islamic regime
in Afghanistan.
59. Afghanistan is not the principal. factor affecting
Soviet-Iranian ties, but has become an increasing
irritant as the relationship has deteriorated. As long as
Moscow thought there was potential for better rela-
tions, there was little direct Soviet pressure or criticism
of Tehran's support for the Afghan resistance. The
Soviets became more strident about Afghanistan after
concluding in 1982 that there was little hope for
improved ties to Iran and they decided to tilt toward
Iraq. In the last year, the Soviets have become more
vocal in their denunciation of Iran's aid to the insur-
gents and in their media have linked Tehran's support
with that of the United States and Pakistan.
60. Soviet military capabilities to affect Iranian
policy toward Afghanistan are limited. If Iranian aid
to the resistance increased greatly, the Soviets proba-
bly would feel less constrained about mounting cross-
border operations against Iran than they would about
action against Pakistan, because Tehran is diplomati-
cally isolated. Iran, preoccupied by its war with Iraq,
has few forces opposite Afghanistan and could not
respond quickly enough to limited Soviet attacks along
most of its eastern border.
61. The Soviets and Afghans probably will increase
their covert activities in eastern Iran, . however, to
weaken the resistance groups and erode Iranian sup-
port for them. The Soviets are. likely to attempt to
foment tensions between Afghan Sunni refugees and
Iranian Shias in eastern Iran in hopes of encouraging
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tighter Iranian control over the refugees and the
imposition of severe restrictions on cross-border move-
ments by the Afghan insurgents. The Soviets may also
promote clandestine attacks against targets in Iran that
can be blamed on Afghan insurgents.
Implications for the Arab World
62. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan resulted in
some significant setbacks for Moscow's policy in the
Middle East. The Persian Gulf states have opposed the
Soviet presence in Afghanistan, however, and have
contributed financially to the Mujahedin cause. Most
Arab states-particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt-
condemned the invasion as an attack on an Islamic
country and claim that Moscow's continuing occupa-
tion of Afghanistan is a major impediment to Soviet
efforts to improve relations. The example of Afghani-
stan was one of several factors that encouraged Saudi
Arabia and some of the smaller Arab countries on the
Persian Gulf to quietly support a regional US military
presence "over the horizon." Their willingness to
cooperate with the United States depends, however, on
their perception of more immediate threats-primari-
ly from Iran-and may well recede if Persian Gulf
tensions subside.
63. Of the Arab countries, Saudi Arabia and Oman
are the most concerned about the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan because of their sense of vulnerability,
geographic proximity, and deep ideological antipathy
to Communism. Both viewed the invasion as part of a
long-term Soviet effort to encircle the Persian Gulf in
order to threaten the West's strategic oil supplies, with
Saudi Arabia as the main target.
64. Most of the Arab countries outside the Persian
Gulf region do not feel threatened by the Soviet
presence in Afghanistan. Their attitudes toward the
invasion reflect their East-West biases and the degree
of their dependence on Soviet support-principally
military aid.
65. Pakistan benefits directly from Saudi Arabia's
strong opposition to the invasion of Afghanistan.
Riyadh provides Islamabad with important economic
assistance and financial support to help pay for Paki-
stani arms purchases from the United States, in part
because Pakistan is an Islamic state that directly
confronts the Soviets in Afghanistan and which pro-
vides support and sanctuary for the Afghans. Paki-
stan's security also is important to Saudi Arabia be-
cause of Islamabad's sizable commitment of military
personnel to the Kingdom's defense, as well as to the
smaller Arab Gulf states.
66. A major shift in Pakistani policy or Soviet
domination of Pakistan would alter the regional bal-
ance and leave the Persian Gulf states-including
Saudi Arabia-more vulnerable and insecure. Saudi
Arabia would regard intensified Soviet pressure on
Pakistan with great concern and would watch the US
response closely. Riyadh probably would increase its
own aid to Islamabad and urge greater US support for
Pakistan's security-including new arms supplies-to
help the Pakistanis withstand greater Soviet pressure.
Failure by the United States to support Pakistan would
shake the Saudis' confidence in the credibility of US
commitments to Persian Gulf security-particularly if
it resulted in a military defeat for Pakistan or a radical
change in government.
Implications for China
67. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan does not
directly threaten China because the mountainous Chi-
nese-Afghan border is small and largely inaccessible.
Nonetheless, Beijing views the Soviet invasion as an
ominous extension of Moscow's military assertiveness
near China's borders that threatens China's broader
strategic interests:
- The Chinese believe that the occupation of Af-
ghanistan is part of Moscow's strategy to expand
its power to the Persian Gulf in order to be in a
position to interdict Western and Japanese oil
supplies, thereby potentially weakening Western
opposition to the USSR.
- The Chinese are particularly concerned about
the direct threat from Afghanistan to Pakistan-
a key ally-which they regard as a vital strategic
buffer to further Soviet expansion and as a
counterweight to India in South Asia.
68. The Chinese play an important role in opposing
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. China provides
military assistance through Pakistan to the Afghan
resistance-which it regards as essential to prevent
Soviet control of Afghanistan-and has supported
international moves to pressure the Soviets to with-
draw their forces. Beijing also has made Soviet with-
drawal from Afghanistan one of the major require-
ments for a rapprochement with Moscow. Soviet
concessions on issues of greater strategic concern to
Beijing-such as a reduction in forces along the Chi-
nese border or an end to Moscow's support for Viet-
nam in Kampuchea-might cause the Chinese to
reduce their public and covert support for the Afghan
insurgents, but such an improvement in Sino-Soviet
relations is unlikely in the time frame of this Estimate.
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69. Despite Pakistan's importance to China's strate-
gic interests, Chinese support for Islamabad in the
event of intensified Soviet military pressure or an
attack on Pakistan would be limited to strong diplo-
matic support, accelerated arms deliveries, and possi-
bly some token participation by Chinese troops in
Pakistani military exercises near the Chinese border.
The Chinese are unlikely to commit troops to Paki-
stan's defense because of the significant military threat
on the Sino-Soviet border. Beijing's principal aim
would be to prevent a Pakistani accommodation to
broader Soviet strategic objectives in the region.
70. China's military options to support Pakistan in a
confrontation with the Soviets are, in any case, ex-
tremely limited. The Chinese have no major military
units near Pakistan and would require several weeks to
move units to the Pakistani border. Instead, the Chi-
nese would expect the United States to provide a firm
commitment to defend Pakistan, in a confrontation
with the Soviets (or India), as well as modern arms, and
probably would seek close private consultations on
how to respond to a direct military threat to Pakistan.
Beijing in the. past has indicated it would consider
deploying troops to protect its strategic supply lines
between China and Pakistan.
71. China views the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
as an ominous extension of Moscow's military asser-
tiveness that threatens Beijing's broader strategic inter-
ests. China will continue to support Islamabad's role in
aiding the insurgents, but has limited. potential for
helping Pakistan in the face of greater Soviet pressure.
The Chinese, however, would not want Pakistani
policy to result in successful Soviet efforts to neutralize
Pakistan because Islamabad's role as Beijing's key
South Asian ally is even more important to China than
its role in opposing the Soviets in Afghanistan.
Implications of Soviet Victory in Afghanistan
72. Should the Soviets consolidate their control
over Afghanistan, they will enhance their strategic and
regional position and place themselves in a stronger
position for pursuing other regional objectives at the
expense of US interests. Even if Moscow would only
gain modest strategic military advantages during the
next five years, military or political success toward
consolidating their position would place the Soviets in
a better position to intimidate Afghanistan's neighbors
and to meddle in their affairs. All the regional pow-
ers-including India and the Persian Gulf countries-
would have to take into consideration the proximity of
Soviet power and Moscow's demonstrated willingness
to use force to achieve Soviet objectives.
Afghanistan as a Forward Base
73. The Soviets' capability to use Afghanistan as a
forward base for strategic power projection elsewhere
in the region will require major improvements in air,
logistic, and transportation facilities. Such improve-
ments and the deployment of additional forces will be
essential for the Soviets to undertake and sustain large-
scale operations into Pakistan or Iran. The Afghan
Army's current capabilities are extremely limited;
major force improvements and training would be
required, therefore, to support any large-scale (com-
bined) operation outside Afghanistan. Consolidation of
Soviet control could allow Moscow to use Afghanistan
as a strategic base, but, even if the resistance does
continue at its present level, the Soviets could build the
bases for projecting military power-should they de-
cide to pay the price. The insurgents could harass these
efforts but could not keep the Soviets from improving
the military infrastructure or deploying additional
forces into Afghanistan.
74. The current limitations of critical transportation
junctures along the Soviet-Afghan border and the in-
country road network would restrict major force and
logistic movements through Afghanistan. In particular,
the absence of any rail network in Afghanistan would
require. the Soviets to offload all equipment and
supplies at transloading points for subsequent move-
ment into Afghanistan by either road or air. Mountain-
ous terrain in the north and east and vast, harsh deserts
in the south and west would pose great difficulties for
the Soviets in building up their logistic infrastructure
and expanding the transportation network in Afghani-
stan. Such improvements and increased security of in-
country supply lines would be required to support any
multidivision operations from Afghanistan.
75. Limited improvements in air defenses that the
Soviets have already made in Afghanistan strengthen
their military position in the country, enhance the
security of the southern USSR, and indicate that
Moscow is integrating Afghanistan into the Soviet air
defense network. The deployment in 1982 and 1983 of
long-range radars extended Soviet high-altitude air
surveillance coverage all around Afghanistan's borders
well into Pakistan and Iran, but have more limited
capabilities to detect low-flying aircraft.
76. The construction of a major new airbase. in the
southwest-significantly closer to the Persian Gulf-
would be a significant indication 'of a Soviet intention
to use Afghanistan as a forward base for power
projection. Building any airbase in the southwest,
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however, would be a major undertaking because of the
inaccessibility of the region:
- We judge the Soviets would need three to five
years to construct an airbase in the southwest
capable of handling heavy bombers and all of the
infrastructure linking the region to the main
highway and military bases in Afghanistan.
- An airbase capable of supporting tactical aircraft
would require up to 18 months to construct. Any
effort by the Soviets would be complicated to
some extent by insurgent activity, but they would
be able to secure the facility under construction
in that terrain.
77. A major new airbase in southwestern Afghani-
stan, however, would only marginally enhance Soviet
military capabilities against the Persian Gulf in the
short term. The comparatively short combat mission
radius of present Soviet fighters and fighter-bombers
would limit the ability of Soviet tactical air forces to
attack targets in the Persian Gulf or Strait of Hormuz
even from a base in southwestern Afghanistan. Soviet
medium and heavy bombers-including Backfires and
Badgers-do not require airbases in Afghanistan to
attack targets in the Persian Gulf because they can fly
missions from secure airbases in the southern USSR.
78. Expected improvements in Soviet tactical avia-
tion by the late 1980s would make an airbase in
southwestern Afghanistan more valuable. By then, we
expect that the Soviets will have begun deploying new,
longer range fighters and fighter-bombers that may be
capable of aerial refueling. We also expect them to
begin production of a new aerial tanker by the late
1980s. If the Soviets used air-refuelable tactical air-
craft together with aerial tankers from airbases in
Afghanistan, they could strike targets throughout the
Persian Gulf region.
79. We do not believe the Soviets would mount a
major ground force campaign against Iran and the
Gulf from Afghanistan; Soviet forces from Afghani-
stan, however, would support any such Soviet opera-
tions. The advantage that Afghanistan provides by
being closer to the Persian Gulf would be significantly
offset by the logistic difficulties the Soviets would face
in mounting and sustaining a large-scale ground force
operation from Afghanistan. In addition, the Soviets
probably would view any operation launched from
Afghanistan as particularly vulnerable to counterat-
tacks by US naval aircraft in the Arabian Sea. We
believe that preparations for an offensive from Af-
ghanistan toward the Strait of Hormuz or the Gulf of
Oman would require about six weeks-including mov-
ing forces into attack positions in Afghanistan-de-
pending on how much the Soviets improve the logistic
infrastructure in the southwest. The Soviets could
better support a major campaign through eastern Iran
toward the Persian Gulf or the Gulf of Oman from the
Turkestan Military District, where they would have
the benefit of a larger and more well-developed
infrastructure and secure supply lines.
80. Soviet victory in Afghanistan would heighten
Saudi concern and might encourage Riyadh to support
a greater US military presence in the region-especial-
ly if the Soviets began constructing new military bases
such as airfields that could be used for power projec-
tion into the Persian Gulf.
81. Major Soviet advances toward consolidation in
Afghanistan would probably cause any Pakistani gov-
ernment to review its program of resistance and to
consider a political accommodation with Moscow and
Kabul:
- In the absence of major domestic turmoil, Zia or
a like-minded successor would probably be driv-
en closer to the United States-assuming contin-
ued strong US support.
- Even under Zia, however, a Pakistan beset by
domestic turmoil might move to cut off aid to the
resistance and to seek accommodation with Mos-
cow and Kabul.
82. Over the next five years, Moscow almost cer-
tainly would not regard the potential strategic gains of
an invasion of Pakistan to be worth the political and
military costs and most likely would opt instead for
subversion and intimidation-including limited mili-
tary action-to neutralize Pakistan:
- An invasion of Pakistan-even if limited to
seizing Pakistani territory bordering Afghani-
stan-would be a high-risk option for Moscow
because of the US commitment to regional
security.
- An offensive aimed at the Arabian Sea or the
Indus River would be even more provocative and
would bring the Soviets into conflict with India,
their most important client state in the region.
- The Soviets would have to anticipate that an
invasion of Pakistan would provoke increased
military cooperation between the United States
and the Persian Gulf Arab states and an en-
hanced US military presence in the region.
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- The size of the forces and the logistic effort that
would be required for an invasion of, Pakistan
would severely limit Soviet options 'and capabili-
ties for any subsequent intervention in Iran-a
much more?important strategic prize. -
83. While India would like to see the conflict in
Afghanistan terminated, it would not wish to see a
Soviet victory that would turn Afghanistan into a
Mongolian-style Soviet client state with either perma-
nent Soviet troops or an effective Marxist-led indige-
nous armed forces. India would like Pakistani-and
American-acquiescence in the Kabul regime in the
hope that it would become more nationalist and less
dependent on Moscow. India would welcome the
withdrawal of Soviet troops as easing East-West ten-
sions in the region. However, New Delhi might not see
such a development as necessarily resulting in a
diminution of US-Pakistani security ties.
84. Efforts by the Soviets to use Afghanistan to
extend their influence into Pakistan almost certainly
would draw New Delhi into opposition to Moscow.
India is likely to become increasingly concerned about
long-range Soviet intentions in the region and could
find itself moving toward confrontation with the
Soviets if Pakistan were effectively neutralized. India
regards Pakistan as a strategic buffer against the
Soviets and would view Soviet domination of Pakistan
as a serious threat to its security. If the Zia regime
were to fall, the Indians might try to prevent Soviet
attempts to dominate Pakistan by supporting rival
Pakistani political factions. Soviet military moves
against an already neutralized Pakistan could even
result in military confrontation with India. If Pakistan
was disintegrating, New Delhi would probably move
forces into Pakistan's Punjab and Sind Provinces to
protect its strategic buffer zone.
Implications for the United States
85. A Pakistani accommodation with Moscow
would cripple the Afghan resistance, facilitate Soviet
efforts to consolidate control in Afghanistan, and
remove an important tacit regional ally of the United
States-as well as a major force for moderation and
opposition to Soviet strategic ambitions in Southwest
Asia. Pakistan's willingness to resist intensified Soviet
pressure will depend largely on its perceptions of the
US commitment to its security-principally in meet-
ing its perceived defense needs. Failure to meet
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Pakistani . expectations of US. support-especially if
tensions with India were high-would undermine the
premises of Zia's policies toward Afghanistan and the,
United States: and could cause Islamabad to come.to
terms with Moscow and Kabul and to distance itself
from US regional policies. .
86. US security assistance to Pakistan-besides
helping to reinforce present Pakistani policy-compli-
cates Soviet planning for even limited operations
across the Afghan border. We believe that continued
US security assistance to Pakistan could deter Moscow
or Kabul from major cross-border operations or would
cause the Soviets to make extensive preparations-
including increasing the size of their forces-that
would provide more warning of an impending attack.
87. In the absence of a direct Soviet or Indian
military threat, Islamabad most likely will remain
unreceptive to US proposals for closer military cooper-
ation-such as pre-positioning supplies, regular US
access to Pakistani bases, or joint training exercises-
because of domestic, Islamic, and Nonaligned con-
cerns. Any Pakistani government will have to deal
with strong latent anti-US sentiment and lingering
doubts-based on historical precedent-about the reli-
ability of the US commitment to Pakistan.
88. Most Pakistanis are convinced that a nuclear
capability represents in the long run Pakistan's only
credible deterrent to Indian aggression. Accordingly,
Pakistan cannot realistically be expected to terminate
its program to develop the technology necessary to
provide it with a nuclear weapons option.
89. Continued US security assistance to Pakistan
will remain an obstacle to closer Indo-US ties. Indian
perceptions that the United States was attempting to
co-opt Pakistan into regional security cooperation and
was willing to tolerate Pakistan's development of a
nuclear weapon in order to keep Islamabad as a
strategic partner would reinforce New Delhi's view.
90. New Delhi, in time, may be willing to play a
role in trying to prod Moscow into withdrawing from
Afghanistan-particularly if the Indians come to view
Soviet policies in the region as threatening their
security interests. India's ambivalence toward the
United States, however, probably would set limits on
bilateral cooperation even if New Delhi perceived a
greater Soviet threat. The Indians value US trade, aid,
and technology, and view good relations with Wash-
ington as expanding their foreign policy options by
diluting India's identification with Soviet policies and
underlining its Nonaligned credentials.
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91. Soviet success in controlling Afghanistan
would heighten Arab. concerns about Moscow's in-
tentions in the Middle East. However, the potential
for US-Arab strategic cooperation-and Arab views
of Soviet policies-will be influenced much more by,
Arab-Israeli and Gulf war issues than by the, Soviet
presence in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf
states will continue to back Pakistan in its support
for the Afghan resistance.
92. The US military presence and commitment
to Persian Gulf security probably work to
deter Moscow from military operations in the
region.
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