DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF NIE 11-12-83, VOLUMES I AND II

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00495R000600540002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 3, 1984
• Content Type: NIE

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
3 April 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Contributors and Drafters of NIE 11-12-83
Associate National Intelligence Officer for
Science & Technology
SUBJECT : Declassification Review of NIE 11-12-83,
Volumes I and II
1. The DCI has requested that we review the first two volumes of
NIE 11-12-83 to determine if they may be revised for dissemination as
unclassified documents without emasculating them entirely.
2. I have reviewed both documents and found that the same
declassification issues arise in both. I have decided to test the waters with
Volume I on the theory that it, as the summary document, is the most easily
declassified without removing its substance and will serve as a model for
santizing Volume II. Accordingly, a copy of Volume I has been marked (with
brackets) to indicate those statements which seem to me to he most in need of
restatment or removal for declassification (attached).
3. Please review the attached Volume and indicate what must be deleted
from or rewritten for the unclassified version. Please provide unclassified
restatements wherever they are needed. Your reply is requested by
COB 4 May 1984.
cc: NIO/S&T
NIO/SP
D/SWR
D/SOVA
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NIE 11-12-83
14 December 1983
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Director of
Central
Intelligence
Prospects for Soviet
Military Technology and
Research and Development
Secret
NOFORN-NOCONTRACT
National Intelligence Estimate
Volume I-Summary and Key Judgments
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N I E 11-12-83
PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET
MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
VOLUME I-SUMMARY
AND KEY JUDGMENTS
Information available as of 14 December 1983 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation. of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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PREFACE
. This Estimate supersedes NIE 11-12-80. We have incorporated
new information and refined or changed many of our previous
judgments. We have a better understanding today than we had in 1980
of the scale of the Soviet commitment to military R&D, and of the sig-
nificant role the Soviets have assigned to the acquisition of Western
technology in their weapons development process.
Our principal focus in this Estimate is to identify and assess those
technologies that are key to future Soviet military capabilities and to as-
sess the likely impact of those technologies on Soviet military systems of
the 1990s. To support the needs of the office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering, we have made comparisons of
the relative standing of those technologies in the United States and the
Soviet Union.
There are some gaps in our information and uncertainties in our
analysis that impede our understanding of several important issues. We
have an incomplete understanding of the relative standings. now and of
the rates of change in Soviet and Western technologies, of the interplay
between technologies and systems performance, and of the full impact
of technology transfer on Soviet science and technology.
Our understanding of specific Soviet technologies is not uniform.
While we have been able to monitor Soviet progress fairly closely in
some technologies, such as microelectronics, others have proved more
elusive
Our findings and analyses for this Estimate are in four volumes:
? Volume I : Summary and Key Judgments
? Volume II : The Estimate
? Volume III : Summary of Annexes and Future Military
System Projections
? Volume IV : The Annexes
-Annex A : Soviet Military and Civilian R&D Processes
-Annex B : Soviet Military R&D Resources and Trends
-Annex C : Key Soviet Military Technologies
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SUMMARY
Soviet political leaders recognize the role that technology plays in
determining the extent of the USSR's military capabilities-their
principal foreign policy. asset. They are seeking to attain military-
technical superiority over the West, and have given this goal a very high
priority for at least the past two decades.
Progress to Date
The Soviets' resource commitment to military research and
development is enormous by any measure. We estimate that, despite
serious problems in the civilian economy, Soviet military R&D outlays
have been about double those of the United States in recent years, and
today amount to a significantly larger share of gross national product
than in the United States. Leadership support for military R&D remains
strong, facilities are still expanding, and the R&D program effort seems
not to have been affected by economic difficulties in the civilian sector.
If conditions worsen in the civilian economic sector, pressures against
military outlays will surely grow, but the Soviets will almost certainly
maintain their high level of commitment to weapons research and
development. Also, requirements for R&D are increasing as the com-
plexity of military threats facing the Soviets becomes greater.
The Soviets have narrowed the US lead in nearly all key
technologies. In general, their technology available for application to
future military systems' is now about five years behind the West-
roughly comparable to that of the West in the mid-to-late 1970s. [The
relative Soviet position in the key military technologies ranges from
world leadership in a few fields-but significant f ields,f ssuch as chemical
warfare and some areas of directed-energy researches to as much as 15
years behind the United States in. some vitally important areas of
computing]
Western technology has helped the Soviets considerably. They
subsidize their military R&D programs through significant open and
clandestine acquisitions of Western technology, most of which is of US
origin. Their well-organized national program for acquiring and assimi-
' In this Estimate, projections about the availability of technologies mean that a particular technology
would be ready to be incorporated in a weapons development program. Weapon system development times
vary widely, but typically an additional five to 12 years is usually required before deployment is possible.
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lating Western technology has been a major factor in the advances they
have made since the early 1970s in significant areas, including micro-
electronics and computers, that are essential to the development of
modern military systems. Their strategy of large-scale Western technol-
ogy acquisition and use derives from their historic realization that it is
to their benefit to take advantage of the advanced technology efforts of
the West. Incorporating Western technology into their military pro-
grams, rather than relying on Soviet indigenous capabilities, yields a
significant savings in program costs, thereby freeing indigenous R&D
resources for efforts in other areas, and takes less development time,
thereby producing more capable military systems at an earlier date.
The Soviets' weapons acquisition process helps them to overcome
technological weaknesses and economic constraints. Relative to their
US counterparts, Soviet military planners are better able to marshal,
focus, and sustain the commitment and resources for developing
weapon systems. Politburo-level weapons decisions carry force of law in
the economy, and are the rough equivalent in US practice of combining
a Defense Department program approval, a Presidential decision
authorizing top priority, and multiyear Congressional funding. Strict
schedules are enforced, resulting in essentially a technology freeze once
a decision to develop a weapon is made. This reduces technological risk
and affords a high probability of development success. The weapons
decisionmaking process offsets inadequate performance and the po-
tential for technological stagnation in deployed weapons by an almost
routine approval of follow-on improvement programs. The Soviets
field new or significantly modernized weapons on the average of every
five to 10 years in each system area.
he USSR currently leads the United States in several key
technologies, L including chemical warfare agents and some aspects of
millimeter-wave radar and sensor technology] These strengths, in
conjunction with our limited understanding of some Soviet efforts, give
the USSR a potential for deploying military systems we do not fully un-
derstand, and hence the potential for future military advantages. Such
systems could prove extremely difficult to detect and to counter in
combat. [Soviet advanced research is also strong in directed-energy
technologies, including that for development of high-energy laser
weapons for possible application to space-, air-, ground-, and sea-based
systems
Soviet weaknesses are significant. The rate of return to the Soviets
on decades of high-priority R&D investments-measured in economic
terms-has been low relative to that in the West. While the payoff in
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military output in absolute terms-numbers of new weapon systems,
improved effectiveness, and the growth in overall military capabili-
ties-has been quite good, on balance, productivity in the Soviet R&D
sector, both civilian and military, has been notably. poor. We expect this
inefficiency to continue. The Soviet system does not-and probably will
not-effectively stimulate advances in multidisciplinary efforts such as
microelectronics and computers. While the Soviets have made impor-
tant gains in recent years, serious shortcomings persist in some key areas
of military technology, including the design, manufacture, and quality
control of microelectronics. Moreover, in computer technologies, the
Soviets will continue to lag the United States by five to 15 years; this lag
will continue to hamper many programs, including those for ballistic
missile defense, antisubmarine warfare, aircraft, and command and
control systems. [They also face major limitations in signal-processing
technology and in automated production technologies and precision test
equipment] In addition, their practice of heavily adopting Western
ideas and designs will continue to reinforce their position of technologi-
cal inferiority to and dependence on the West.
However, the Soviets' persistent modernization efforts help them to
compensate for these weaknesses. For example, they have been able to
move computer technology into deployed systems on the average of six
years faster than the United States, enabling them to offset partially the
US technological lead in computers. Similarly, frequent modernization
of fielded weapon systems also helps the Soviets to offset the attendant
technological lags that result from their reliance on Western technology
for their military systems.
Prospects for Soviet Technologies
We think the prospects are, in general, low for an unanticipated
major technological advance in the Soviet Union during the next 10
years that could lead to a 'revolutionary new capability posing a
significant new threat to the West. For those' technologies where we
have an adequate understanding of Soviet achievements to date, the
Soviets lag the United States in several areas critical to the achievement
of military advantage. Moreover, about nine to 12 years are required to
transform a major technological advance into a new operational
weapon. The Soviets almost certainly will not be able to incorporate into
systems deployed through 1995 advances much beyond their present
technology levels.
We do not completely discount the prospects for technological
surprise through 1995, particularly in several areas where the Soviet
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efforts are already strong
E:::::::[nonacoustic antisubmarine warfare, chemical weapons, direct-
ed energy, and optical processing are our greatest concern because of
the strength and persistence of Soviet R&D in these area The growth
and. maturity of the Soviets' R&D sector, in conjunction with the scale
of their military programs, could. result in some unexpected advances
either in the speed with which they are able to develop and field new
weapon systems with higher levels of performance, or in the, novel
design of some of their systems.
For the 1990s the Soviets will be working from a strong and
sizable base of military technologies, but the pace of their advances
will be uneven:
- Developments in information acquisition technology will prob-
ably accelerate and be stronger before the end of the 1980s.[The
Soviets will increasingly emphasize advanced radar and electro-
optical sensors in an effort to counter US Stealth technology]
- Soviet information-processing technologies, particularly micro-
electronics and computers, are not likely to keep up with
Western developments; howeverf we expect the Soviets to adapt
large-scale integrated circuitry for military applications by the
end of the 1980s] 1
- We. expect Soviet weapons delivery technologies, particularly in
missile guidance and propulsion, to advance steadily and contin-
ue to provide a strong base for both tactical and strategic
weapons development.
The Soviets' most si nificant advances may occur in the area of
lethality/damage.LTheir extensive efforts in chemical warfare
and directed-energy technologies could result in some major
advance] They are likely to keep up their large investment in
conventional explosives technologies in order to maintain the
excellent technological capabilities they now have.
Soviet prospects for gaining on the West in some military
technologies, and keeping pace in others, will in large measure depend
upon continued success in acquiring Western technology. Soviet
dependence is. especially important in computers, microelectronics, and
automated production technologies.
Military Implications of Soviet Technologies
The decade of the 1990s will pose some new, major technological
challenges to Soviet military planners. Western defense programs,
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particularly US strategic force modernization, will. lead to costly and
technologically demanding Soviet efforts. The USSR's weapons develop
ment programs will continue to be vigorous. .
The weapon systems that the Soviets will deploy through the mid-
1990s will be based largely on the technology levels achieved-or
obtained from the West-in the 1975-85 time frame. (We estimate that
the Soviets currently have under development 1between 150 and 200-1
new and major modernized weapon systems and support systems. We
believe that the number of systems in development in, the 1990s is
unlikely to decline
In strategic offensive systems, Soviet emphasis will be on greater
survivability through deployment of mobile systems, as well as im-,
proved accuracy. The development of mobile land-based missile sys-
tems will serve to offset the increasing vulnerability of fixed interconti-
nental ballistic missiles to programed US strategic weapons.
In strategic defense technologies, the Soviets must make signifi-
cant advances in several critical technology areas well beyond those now
available for military applications. [They will probably continue to lag
behind the changing threat posed by programed US bombers and cruise
missiles (particularly those employing Stealtand by US ballistic missile
submar neD They will nevertheless make major improvements in their
defensive systems.
In directed-energy technologies, we expect development and
prototype testing of several types of Soviet laser weapons. [Laser
technologies are already available for development of ground-based
weapons capable of damaging satellite sensors and antisensor weapons
for use in air defense
Technology for the development of destructive
laser air defense weapons is expected to be available within the next
several years. [The Soviets, are likely to be able to test a prototype space-
based laser weapon for antisatellite application,by the early 1990]But
the technology for space-based laser weapons for ballistic missile
defense is not yet sufficient to support development of a -prototype
weapon. Operational laser systems for destruction of ballistic missiles or
their reentry vehicles, if they prove feasible, probably could not be
fielded until after the turn of the century.
Command, control, and communications'systems, although effec-
tive, will continue to be limited by deficiencies in computer technology
and computer networking. We expect a-number of advanced electronic
warfare systems in the 1990s, including highly capable jamming. sys-
tems. In addition, Re expect improvements in Soviet technical intelli-
gence collection capabilities,[ncluding the deployment in the late 1980s
of a network of space-based near-real-time reconnaissance systems. ,
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Advanced technologies will allow the Soviets to improve many
aspects of their naval forces. The deployment of a new class of aircraft
carrier with accompanying combat and surveillance aircraft. will sup-
port their efforts to expand their areas of sea control and sea denial. In
antisubmarine warfare, they will remain unable to systematically detect
and track Western ballistic missile submarines in broad ocean areas, but
[hey may achieve improved capabilities against enemy attack subma-
rines attempting to penetrate bastions for Soviet ballistic missile
submarine
Soviet ground forces and particularly supporting air and air
defense forces will incorporate some weapons with advanced technol-
ogies. Western advances in. armor protection and antiarmor weapons
will reduce some of the present Soviet numerical advantages in the
land-warfare area, and we expect the Soviets to have difficulties
countering these advances. Eve anticipate advanced electro-optical and
infrared sensors and imaging radars to be based on aircraft, remotely pi-
loted vehicles, and drones.llntroduction of small, guided, fire-and-forget
weapons on helicopters is expected by the mid-1990)
The Soviets have committed substantial R&D resources to support
their space 'programs, with large increases in the early 1980s for the mil-
itary manned space program and communications systems. [he devel-
opment of new systems,including the shuttle, space plane; heavy-lift
launch vehicles, and near-real-time imagery relay systems will offer the
Soviets new military opportunities in spac]
Soviet military research and development organizations have
probably become more capable in developing high-technology weapon
systems than Soviet industry has become in producing them. A
combination of factors-more multipurpose weapons, higher costs,
problems in production engineering and quality control, and more
difficult and costly maintenance requirements-is likely to cause the
Soviets to produce, in some areas, new and more technically advanced
systems in smaller quantities than they have in the past. Thus, they are
tending to rely somewhat more, on technology, and somewhat less on
quantity, to achieve their future military goals.
We believe that the Soviets will experience difficulties in-manu-
facturing many of the sophisticated weapons projected for the 1990s.
Qhe Soviets are currently experiencing production rate limitations and.
technical problems that are disrupting the manufacture of several
advanced systems t ncluding the T-72 tank, the MIG-31 aircraft, the
Backfire bomber, and the Typhoon ballistic missile submarine The
Soviets may partially overcome such difficulties through their present
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efforts to expand their electronics-related industry, to press for advances
in precision machining and other fabrication technologies, and to
maintain their aggressive exploitation of Western technology.
Can the Soviets Catch Up in Military Technologies?
If the United States sustains a strong program of military
research and development, we believe that the Soviet Union will not
be able to match or overtake the United States in overall military
technologies by the' 1990s. In addition to the institutional impediments
inherent in their system, the Soviets must also contend with uncertain-
ties about their future successes in technology acquisitions. Nonetheless,
we expect continued advancements in all Soviet military technologies,
and that the present overall gap between the United States and the
USSR of about five years will be further narrowed. The size of this gap,
however, will depend also on US progress in military technologies. A
larger number of the Soviet military technologies will be lagging by no
more than two to three years-small enough to make the levels of
technology nearly 'comparable for those military systems incorporating
such technologies that will be introduced in the late 1990s and beyond.
Moreover, the Soviet systems development process incorporates technol-
ogy advances more frequently into deployed systems than does the US
process.
The current and prospective upswing in US military R&D
commitments, if sustained, will pose a major challenge to Soviet
military R&D and make it more difficult for the USSR to close
existing technology gaps.Cn certain areas of prospective US concentra-
ch as directed-energy technologies applicable to ballistic missile
tionIS,
defense, existing Soviet strengths could be overshadowed In these and
other areas, however, Soviet military R&D will continue for some years
to benefit from the increases in investment-and the larger total
investment relative to that of the United States-that have character-
ized the past decade.
We caution, however, that there are numerous uncertainties
associated with our assessments of the overall relative standing of US
and Soviet military technologies by the 1990s. Our uncertainties stem
from an incomplete understanding of the relative standings now and of ,
the rates of change in Soviet and Western technologies, and from the
difficulty in forecasting the contribution of , technology transfer. In
addition, while we assume a strong US commitment to military R&D,
systematic comparisons of the future states of US and Soviet technologi-
cal capabilities must also account for actual advances in US technol-
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ogies-which we have not studied here, and which have yet to be
realized, but which could significantly influence any projections.
We project that the Soviets will remain generally behind the West.
However, their major commitment to technological advances will
persevere into the next decade, their S & T and economic reform efforts
may yield incremental but useful payoffs, and their military R&D will
continue in any case to benefit for years to come from past investments.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
How will the Soviet commitment to military R&D
be characterized over the next 10 years?
he Soviet weapons acquisitions program in the
next decade will be characterized by a continued
persistence of effort and large resource allocations to
military research and development.ee figure I 13
The motivation behind this program is to achieve
military capabilities that are at least equal, if not
superior, to those of the USSR's potential adversaries.
These elements will sustain the current momentum of
military technological progress into the 1990s.
Despite serious problems in the civilian economy,
the Soviet leadership continues to favor the military
with generous funding and priority access to resources
and foreign technology.ilitary research and devel-
opment now account for approximately half the
USSR's total R&D spending and manpower
scope
and magnitude of these programs, the Soviets' willing-
ness to exact sacrifices from the civilian sector, their
indigenous technological capabilities, and especially
their extensive exploitation of Western technology will
largely compensate for systemic inefficiencies, and
permit them to narrow the US lead in military
technologies and to develop increasingly complex
weapon systems.
How does present Soviet military technology
generally compare with that of the West?
The current level of Soviet military technology
available for application to military systems generally
is roughly comparable to that of the West in the mid-
to-late 1970s. The Soviets have clearly made progress
in recent years. In microelectronics, for example, the
Soviets probably lagged the West by 10 to 12 years in
the mid-1970s. Today, we judge this lag to be much
smaller, perhaps only three to five years.[The relative
Soviet position in the key technologies of military
significance ranges from world leadership in a few
significant fields, such as chemical warfare technol-
ogies and some areas of directed-energy research, to as
much as 15 years behind the United States in some
vitally important areas of computin.Table I-1 (on
pages 12 and 13) illustrates the relative standing of the
USSR and the United States in the major technology
fields that we believe will significantly influence
future military capabilitie3s
How important is Western technology to Soviet
military R&D?
Competition with and acquisition of Western tech-
nology has been essential to many of the Soviets'
military gains. They have successfully pursued some
independent R&D paths such as in storable liquid
missile fuels and some nuclear weapon design but in
most areas have followed Western technological direc-
tions. In the overall technological competition, the
United States sets the pace. The Soviets regard West-
ern system characteristics as yardsticks against which
their own technical capabilities are judged.
The Soviets' well-organized national program for
the overt and clandestine acquisition and assimilation
of Western-primarily US-derived-technology has
been a major factor in the technological advances they
have made since the early 1970s. Through technology
transfer, the Soviets have significantly strengthened
their technology capabilities in many areas, including
microelectronics and computers, that are, basic to the
development of many modern military systems. Their
strategy of large-scale Western technology acquisition
and use derives from their historic realization that it is
to their benefit to take advantage of the advanced
technology efforts of the West. Incorporating Western
technology into their military programs, rather than
relying wholly on Soviet indigenous capabilities, yields
a significant savings in program costs, thereby freeing
indigenous R&D resources for other military areas,
and reduces development time, thereby producing
more capable military systems at an earlier date.
The Soviet Military-Industrial Commission (VPK)
co lects and prioritizes requirements for Western tech-
nology from the defense-industrial ministri The
Soviet intelligence services and their East European
surrogates are the primary collectors of Western classi-
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Figure I-1
Soviet and US Outlays for Military R&D
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As Percent of Total Military Spending, 1965-81b
USSR 25
US
i
_- . L-_I-1Ji L_J~L-1 --L-1-L-L-L_I I I I I I I i I i I i --L1-L --J
1965 66 .68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 1965 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80
As Percent of Total Military Spending, 1981b
"The most recent data for the USSR are for 1981. The 1982, 1983, and 1984
US data are from Department of Defense projections based on
total obligational authority.
b Percentages for the USSR are derived from data in 1970 rubles; those for the
United States come from data in 1981 dollars.
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fied and export-controlled technology, as well as open-
ly available technology. We believe that the majority
of their significant military-related acquisitions . are
composed of export-controlled technologies and equip-
ment, and technical literature in the public domain.
The materials that can be acquired from the West are
in turn fed to the requesting ministries, whereupon the
VPK begins a followup program of monitoring their
assimilation
Soviet technology acquisition efforts have not been
directed only at the United States but have been
conducted on a global basis. The USSR has turned
increasingly to other world technology leaders such as
Japan. Technology acquired from the Japanese in
critical areas such as microelectronics and computers
could give the Soviets the potential to make important
gains on the United States in military applications of
these technologies, through their more frequent mod-
ernization programs.
Despite some dramatic gains from technology ac-
quisitions, Soviet dependence. on the West entails a
risk that Western technology may be curtailed, and
ensures a continued lag in many key technologies. The
Soviets appear to recognize the disadvantages of this
dependence and wish to reduce it, but they have not
slowed their attempts to acquire embargoed Western
technology. Their efforts continue to be comprehen-
sive and to have a high priority. We believe that Soviet
prospects for gaining on the West on a broad front in
military technology will in large measure depend on
continued success in acquiring Western technology.
There will almost certainly be a continued depend-
ence on Western technology for direction and leader-
ship in many areas.
In what areas of key military technology is the
Soviet Union either superior to the United States
or particularly strong?
1The USSR currently is judged to be superior to the
United States in several key technologies, including
chemical warfare (CW) agents and some aspects of
millimeter-wave (MMW) technology,. These strengths,
give
the Soviets the potential for future weapons programs
that could result in deployment of systems we do not
understand or recognize, and hence result in military
advantages:
Eechnological strengths in several other areas-such
as conventional explosives, ramjet engines, titanium
alloy fabrication, and liquid-metal-cooled nuclear pro-
pulsion system--reflect design choices different from
those of the United Stateeand, although providing
some unique weapons capabilities, do not necessarily
provide clear-cut military advantages.
[A- dvanced research in directed-energy technol-
ogies-laser, radiofrequency (RF), and particle
beam-is also a strength of the Soviets
--Chey have a priority program to develop high-
energy laser (HEL) weapons. They are continu-
ing to expand their test range facilities for HELs
and are further expanding a facility we believe is
intended for the design and fabrication of proto-
type laser weapons
They are continuing extensive efforts, begun
more than 20 years ago, aimed at developing
high-power microwave and millimeter-wave
sources applicable' to the development of RF
weapons
We are uncertain about what progress the Soviets
are making in particle beam technologies; their
programs appear to be in an earlier phase and on
a much smaller scale than those applicable to
laser weapons. They appear to be conducting
laboratory research applicable to space-based
beam weapons, but we do not believe that they
have built the accelerator they would need for
feasibility testing of either neutral (for space) or
charged (for atmospheric) particle beam propa-
gation]
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Technology
Area
Relative! Standings of the. USSR and-the United States in
Major Technology Areas
Key: 0 Technologies in research and exploratory development.
X Technologies available for application.
4-
Relative direction of future position where determination can be made.
US US, USSR USSR
Ahead Equal Ahead
Information acquisition/
denial technologies
? Sensors and sensing systems
- Electro-optical (EO).and in- 0-1 X- *
frared (IR)
Soviets lag in fabrication of Soviets have conducted research on
large arrays more detector materials
? Nonelectronic counter-
measures b
Information processing/
transmission technologies
? Microelectronics
? Computing
- Hardware
- Software
? Signal processing
? Command and control
- Communications
- Automated control
? Guidance and navigation
?. Power sources
Soviets rely heavily on Western
sonobuoy technologies. They
lack broad area capability
US advances in very-high-speed
and very-large-scale integrated
circuitry will sustain lead
US has greater experience and
readily available production
equipment
US is advancing rapidly in digi-
tal technologies and device
development
Soviets ahead in MMW component
technology. US ahead in use of digi-
tal techniques
Soviet active sonars compare
favorably
Soviet military use of analog, hy-
brid, or optical technologies may
partially offset some present
limitations
Reflects US lead in semiconduc- . Soviets lead in antenna hardening
tor technologies
US networking experience is Soviets have developed extensive re-
strong search basis for algorithm
development
Soviets had late start in compos- Some Soviet polymers equal to US.
ites research; are limited by pro- Large scientific base for ceramics
duction capability research
US strong in some technologies,
Soviets strong in others
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Table I-1 (Continued)
Relative Standings'of the USSR and the United States in
Major Technology Areas
Key: 0 Technologies in research and exploratory development.
X Technologies available for application.
Relative direction of future position where determination can be made.
Technology
US
US, USSR
USSR
-
Area
Ahead
Equal
Ahead
Comments
Caveats
Lethality/Damage Technologies
? Directed energy
- Lasers
- RF weapon technologies
- Particle beam weapons
(PBW)
? Nuclear technologies
? Conventional explosives
OX
X
Neither country has developed
the technology sufficiently for
military applications
0 Extensive Soviet research effort US ahead in insensitive explosives
OX
Environment technologies
? Life sciences
? Ocean sciences
OX
O-4.
X
? Space technologies r
OX
Production Technologies
? Metalworking
OX
with lead in enhanced blast
munitions
Strong, persistent Soviet effort US may be ahead in detector tech-
nologies and equal in prophylaxis
? Computer-aided design/ OX Soviet microprocessor technol.
manufacturing (CAD/ ogy limits numerically con-
CAM) and automated trolled machine development
assembly
b Radar cross section (RCS) reduction and aerosol technologies emphasized in this comparison.
Comparison based on metallic, polymeric, ceramic, and composite materials,
d Comparison based on rocket, air-breathing, naval nuclear, and a few ground propulsion technologies.
Comparison based on nuclear warhead and isotope separation technologies.
tComparison based only on space structures, space power sources, life support, and boosters.
Note: ? The entries in this table are intended to convey the general pattern of accomplishments in each of the key technologies. Each entry represents a highly
aggregated position comprising many detailed aspects-some of which have been objectively analyzed and others inferred-of the complex
technologies represented. In the cases of the footnoted technologies, the table entry is weighted on the basis of those specified subtechnologies that are
discussed in greater detail in annex C, "Key Soviet Military Technologies."
? US experts were consulted in assessing the US and Soviet states of the art in microelectronics, computing, guidance and navigation, and lasers. The
assessments of the relative positions in the remaining technologies reflect the views of Intelligence Community analysts.
? These technology areas are not all equally important-some, such as microelectronics, are more pervasive than others and will affect the prospects of
many future weapon systems.
? Technology comparisons do not necessarily equate to military capabilities. A lag in a technological field does not mean that military systems using
that technology are inadequate for their intended mission. The assessments do not reflect Soviet judgments as to the adequacy or inadequacy of the re-
sulting weapon system.
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Are there characteristics peculiar to the Soviet
weapons acquisition process that ease the devel-
opment of modern weapon systems?
Because of structural differences in the two socie-
ties, Soviet military planners are generally better able
to marshal and sustain the commitment and resources
for military R&D than are their counterparts in the
United States. While the Soviet and US design cycles
are similar in some respects-both are able to move
promising ideas through a bureaucratic maze of devel-
opment requirements into weapons production-the
differences are also significant. The following aspects
of the Soviets' weapons acquisition process, all of
-which stem chiefly from their political and economic
systems, help to explain how they overcome important
weaknesses and field modern weapon systems:
-CA-major weapons program in the Soviet Union is
authorized by a Politburo-level (Defense Council)
decision that has no direct counterpart in terms
of authority in the United States'The decision is,
in effect, the equivalent of combining a Depart-
ment of Defense approval of a program, a
Presidential decision authorizing top priority,
and multiyear funding of the program by
Congress.
Under a Politburo decision, any state asset-that
is, any individual or organization in the USSR
regardless of formal affiliation-can legally be
assigned a role in a weapons program)The Soviet
leaders are thus assured that the best resources
can be made available to the program.
The Soviet emphasis on strict adherence to
schedules results in what amounts to a freeze of
most critical technologies once a decision to
proceed with the development phase of a weap-
ons program has been made, thus assuring a high
probability of development success. The leader-
ship offsets the inherent potential for obsoles-
cence in Soviet weapon systems that could result
from this practice by an almost routine approval
of follow-on improvement programs.
- Because all aspects of Soviet weapons programs,
including their very existence, are closely held
state secrets, the regime prevents internal public
debate and delays and hinders Western knowl-
edge of the programs.
- The Soviet leaders, when making weapons devel-
opment decisions, give only general consideration
to expenditure estimates. They are more con-
cerned about the integrated military require-
ments for weapon systems and the capability, in
terms of men and material, to successfully carry
them out.
- The Soviet system fosters continuity in the key
organizations and personnel that conduct weap-
ons development. In contrast to weapons acquisi-
tion in the United States, where weapons, pro-
gram managers and other key personnel are
often in flux, individuals and organizations as-
signed to a program in the USSR normally stay
with that program from inception to completion.
Additionally, the organizations responsible for
the initial version of a weapon usually retain
'responsibility for all follow-on versions.
What are the Soviet capabilities for quickly
incorporating new technology into weapon sys-
tem designs?
The Soviets can incorporate new technology in their
weapon system development process in one of three
basic time frames:
-New or major modernized weapon systems that
incorporate advanced technology in a number of
subsystems generally require nine to 12 years
from program authorization to initial operational
capability)
Modernized weapon systems that incorporate
one or a small number of new major subsystems
(for example, missile guidance, avionics) general-
ly require five or more years
-Upgraded weapon systems already in production
(or already in the field) are achieved by improv-
ing one or a small number of subsystems (for
example, sensors, reentry vehicles, artillery
tubes); these generally require less than five
years)
The Soviets' practice of fielding new or modernized
weapons on the average of every five to 10 years in
each system area has contributed significantly to
maintaining a high level of technology in deployed
weapon For example because of their persistent
modernization efforts hey have been able to move
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computer technology into deployed systems on the
average of six years faster than the United State
enabling them partially to offset the US technological
lead in computers. Similarly, frequent modernization
of fielded weapon systems. also helps the Soviets to
compensate for the attendant technological lags that
result from their reliance on Western technology for
their military systems.
-Cn production technologies and test equipment,
persisting inadequacies will continue to limit the
quality and effectiveness of metallurgical proc-
esses, and generally hamper the reliability and
availability,of deployed military systems)
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Soviet
Approach to Military R&D
Are there significant weaknesses in Soviet tech-
nological or R&D management that impede mili-
tary progress?
In spite of decades of high priority R&D invest-
ments, the return rate on these investments in the
USSR, measured in economic terms, has been low
relative to that in the West. While the payoff in
military output in absolute terms-numbers of new
weapon systems, improved effectiveness, and the
growth in overall military capabilities-has been quite
good, on balance, productivity in the Soviet R&D
sector, both civilian. and military, has been notably
poor. We expect this inefficiency to continue. In
general, the Soviet system does not-and we judge will
not-effectively stimulate and coordinate indigenous,
innovative advances in basic multidisciplinary techno-
logical programs such as computers or microelectron-
ics. The Soviets' practice of heavily adopting Western
ideas and designs illustrates, and tends to reinforce,
their position of technological inferiority to and de-
pendence on the West. While they have made impor-
tant gains in recent years, serious shortcomings persist
in some key areas of military technology:
-ET-he Soviets remain weak in the design, manufac-
ture, and testing of microelectronics; this will
continue to impair the quality and limit the
applications of microelectronic devices in many
types of military systems
-In computer technologies, the Soviets lag the
United States by five to 15 years in various areas
and may be falling further behind. This lag will
hamper Soviet development programs in antibal-
listic missile (ABM), antisubmarine warfare
(ASW), and command and control system
Limitations in signal-processing technology will
seriously impede Soviet capabilities to defend
against US Stealth technology:
Strong central management and high priority accorded
the military in the USSR can expedite weapon development; if
this leads to, uneconomic diversion of resources, away, from
basic science and civilian basic industry, however, it can hurt
A conservative approach to design, combined with early
major technology freeze, increases the probability that Soviet
developers will meet program obligations; this approach has
two disadvantages-discouragement of innovation and en-
couragement of development of single-mission systems-both
of which can drive up the overall cost of meeting military
mission objectives.
Maintaining stable design organizations and teams,
shielded from significant program competition and relying on
the same subcontractors for long periods, promotes continuity
and minimizes startup problems; but such a policy can lead to
stagnation, and extended commitment to suboptimal technical
approaches.
Extreme secrecy helps to deny the West the leadtime
necessary for timely response to Soviet programs; it also works
to impair the free flow of information-and thereby innova-
tion-within the Soviet R&D community.
Aggressive exploitation of Western technology can dra-
matically expedite technology advance and economize on
resources. It can, however, lead to dependence or at least lags
in certain areas, and it can render the Soviets vulnerable to
Western countermeasures.
Greater weapon system complexity could also.pose
increasingly difficult management problems for the
Soviets; the often overlapping demands on key subsys-
tem organizations, such as those involved in the devel-
opment and production of microelectronics, may tax
their resources beyond their capabilities to deliver on
schedule in future years.
What are the prospects for a major technological
advance that would give the Soviets weapon
systems that would provide an important military
advantage over the United States?
In general, we judge as. low the prospects for an
unanticipated major technological advance in the
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Soviet Union during the next 10, years that could lead
to a revolutionary new capability posing a significant
new threat to the West. We base this judgment-for
those technologies where we have an adequate under-
standing of Soviet achievements to date-on Fhe lag in
Soviet technology behind that of the United States in
areas most critical to the achievement of military
advantage, and on the time-on the order of nine to
12 yearsI required to transform a major technological
advance into a new operational weapon3The Soviets
almost certainly will not be able to incorporate into
systems deployed through 1995 technological advances
much beyond the technology levels they have already
achieved, or the technology now available to the
United States. We cannot judge the potential for a
major advance after 1995.
There are important gaps in our understanding of
Soviet progress in several areas of technology and their
currently achieved technology levels, where major
In addition, while we believe the Soviets lag the
West in microelectronics, developments in this field
are so rapidly paced and their applications so broad
that we cannot foresee all possible military implica-
tions of advances in this technology area.
The Soviets' practices in technology application
have become more aggressive and more responsive as
their military technologies and R&D organizations
have matured. While the Soviets have not been profi-
cient as technological innovators, their substantial en-
gineering capabilities have in the past used lower
levels of technology to develop weapons designs
which, in conjunction with high production rates,'have
resulted in weapon system effectiveness comparable to
or exceeding some modern Western weapons. Thus,
military advances could also occur through innovative
applications of existing technologies. Such advances
would depend more on present Soviet engineering
strengths than on an unexpected technological break-
through in an area of advanced research.
Finally, the growth and maturity of .the Soviets'
R&D sector, and the persistence of their military
programs, could result in some unexpected advances
either in the speed with which they are able to
develop and field new weapon. systems with higher
levels of performance, or in the novel design of some
of their systems.
How will the Soviets counter. military technology
advances in the West?
In several important areas, Soviet weapons require-
ments, and hence system performance in the 1990s,
will be greatly influenced by the introduction of
advanced- military technologies by the United States
and its allies. The US force modernization program,
for example, will lead to costly and technologically
demanding efforts by the Soviets to attempt to counter
these major improvements, particularly in their defen-
sive systems.
For defensive missions, the Soviets must make major
improvements in several critical areas well beyond
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those now available for military applications. [For*
detection of US ballistic missile submarines and de-
fense against Stealth penetrators, the Soviets also must
contend .with the limits imposed on the detection
process by the physical environment. We doubt the
Soviets will have the capability to deploy effective
defenses against planned US ballistic missile subma-
rines or Stealth penetrators, even by the mid-1990s. 1
Further, Western advances in armor protection and
antiarmor weapons threaten to reverse some of the
Soviets' technical advantages in the land-warfare area.
The Soviets will need to develop new antiarmor
weapons because many of their current weapons
cannot defeat the M1 tank's special armor. Also,
greatly improved warheads for US antitank weapons
should be- able to penetrate the armor of Soviet T-64
and T-72 main battle tank The development of new
tank armor and antitank weapons to counter these
new, more powerful US weapons will place severe
requirements on the Soviets, especially in the area of
materials technology.
What new military systems, including those that
will require new advanced technology, are likely
to appear in the 1990s? Are there other systems
for which we believe the Soviets lack the needed
technology, which are therefore not likely to
appear, in the 1990s, but which could, have major
significance if the Soviets were able to produce
them?
come of the advanced systems that we project the
Soviets will deploy in the 1990s are shown in table I -2J
These systems will generally provide them with new
capabilities that either fill existing needs or offer new
opportunities.Clso shown'in table 1-2 are systems that
we believe are not likely to reach initial operational
capability (IOC) in the 19901; theses judgments are
based. on our forecast of the technology that will be
available to the Soviets. If these systems should be
deployed in the 1990s or even later, however, they
would give the Soviets important military advantages
in the absence of appropriate Western responses.
The technology for nearly all of the systems that we
expect the Soviets to deploy through the mid-1990s is
probably now available to them, although we do not
.have evidence, in some cases, of what specific level of
technology they have achieved. For some systems to
appear by the late 1990s, the Soviets will require
important technological improvements that we-believe
they have not yet achieved.
A key trend in the USSR's strategic offensive
systems will be greater mobility and accuracy. The
development of mobile systems will serve to offset the
increasing vulnerability of fixed intercontinental bal-
listic missiles (ICBMs) to programed US strategic deliv-
ery systems. he Soviets have long perceived the
benefits of such mobility and have had developmental
efforts under way in small, solid-propellant. ICBMs, for.
example, for over 20 years. Soviet technologies 'in
propulsion, materials, and terminal guidance are cur-
rently sufficient to support the development of land-
mobile ICBMs with hard-target kill capability. These
technologies are also adequate for development and
deployment of improved submarine-launched ballistic
missile (SLBM) systems, some of which, in the late
1980s or early 1990s, could be capable of attacking
hard targets by using accuracy MaRVs (maneuverable
reentry vehicles). In addition, the Soviets, could diver-
sify their offensive forces further-by developing new
aerodynamic systems, perhaps including some with
reduced observable)
Soviet strategic air defense technologies will very
likely continue to lag behind the changing threat, if US
penetrating aircraft and cruise missile programs result
in deployments.Elhe Soviets will be severely chal-
lenged in their capability to deal- effectively with
large-scale low-altitude attacks by cruise missiles,
short-range attack missiles, and. penetrating aircraft
with low radar cross sections, and especially attacks b
bombers and cruise missiles using Stealth technology:
--lhe Soviets are probably making. an effort to
develop the capability to destroy cruise missile
carriers before they launch their missiles. They are
about to deploy an airborne warning and control
system (AWACS) aircraft for long-range search
and surveillance; and, may be developing long-
range, long-endurance interceptors- to counter
standoff cruise missile delivery vehicles: Further
developments, such asa spaceborne: air vehicle
detection system, will. require Soviet advances.
beyond currently achieved levels in several tech-
nologies-signal processing, radiofrequency and
electro-optical sensors, and computers]
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Table 1-2
Major New Soviet Systems for the 1990s
(Likely Systems and Those Unlikely But Significant)
Systems With
Moderate-to-High Systems Not Expected
Likelihood of To Reach IOC in 1990s,
Initial Opera- But That-Would Be Sig-,
tional Capability (IOC) nificant If They
System Area in the 1990s a b Did b
Strategic offensive systems - Accuracy MaRV (maneuverable
reentry vehicle).
- Reduced-observable aircraft and
cruise missiles
Strategic defense systems - Space-based system for detection
of bombers and airborne cruise
missile carriers c
- Spaceborne laser antisatellite
(ASAT) system
- Ground-based radiofrequency
ASAT weapon
- Anti-cruise-missile missile
- Satellite-for detecting launches
of submarine-launched ballistic
missiles
- Long-range interceptor
General purpose naval - Carrier-based airborne-early-
systems warning aircraft
- Naval conventional-takeoff-and-
landing aircraft
- Shipborne high-energy laser for
ship'defense
- Ground- or space-based laser .
ballistic missile defense system
- Orbital particle beam ASAT
weapon
- Orbital radiofrequency ASAT
weapon
- Stealth countermeasures systems
- Space-based nonacoustic sub-
marine detection system d
General purpose ground - Ground-mobile high-energy
forces systems laser for battlefield air defense
- Fire-and-forget heliborne anti-
tank missile
- New chemical warfare agents
- Advanced (possibly turretless)
tank
- New attack helicopter
- Wide-band intercept and jam-
ming systems
Command, control; commu- - Automated intelligence integra- - Radar imaging satellite
nications, and intelligence tion-and-dissemination system
systems
a Assumes that development will,be fully successful and that Soviets will choose to deploy the systems. Not
all Soviet developments lead to deployment.
b Italic type indicates programs identified as requiring significant advances in technology before system
development can begin.
c This system could not appear until the late 1990s at the earliest.
d Low probability for a system capable of detecting ballistic missile submarines in the open ocean; low-to-
moderate probability for detection.of attack submarines trying to penetrate bastion areas for Soviet ballistic
missile submarines. An airborne, system for the detection of attack submarines is somewhat more likely.
Secret Noforn
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Available technology will permit the Soviets to
evelop new low-altitude air surveillance and
tracking systems, multimission fighters with mul-
tiple target engagement capability, surface-to-air
missile (SAM) systems with phased-array radar
using pulse-Doppler techniques, and anti-cruise-
missile missiles
n the late 1980s and 1990s, Western Stealth
cruise missiles and aircraft will severely stress the
Soviets' defenses. We do not believe that they
have the technology available to develop systems
to effectively counter Stealth in the 1990]
he progress made by the Soviets in directed-
energy technologies has permitted systems develop-
ment and prototype testing of some types of directed-
energy weaponsjThe Soviet state of the art is not
sufficient, however, to proceed with development of
some other types of directed-energy weapons:
--FThe technology for ground-based laser weapons
capable of in-band damage of satellite sensors has
been available for at least a decade; the lase
technology for a short-range space-based anti-
satellite (ASAT) weapon is probably now avail-
able. For tactical use, including air defense, the
Soviets have had the technology for antisensor
weapons for at least 10 years; technology for
destructive air defense weapons is expected to be
available within the next several years. The
technology for longer range space-based ASAT
weapons is also likely to be available within the
next several years, to support prototype tests in
space by the early 1990s. The technology for
ballistic missile defense (BMD) weapons is not yet
sufficient to support development, of a prototype
weapon. Ground-based and space-based BMD
systems are likely to require another 10 years or
more of technology development, and operation-
al systems for destruction of ballistic missiles or
their reentry vehicles probably could not be
fielded until after the turn of the century
he Soviets now have the technology capable of
supporting development of a prototype RF
weapon for soft kill of electronics or for anti-
personnel. applications out to a distance of about
1 kilometer
- The technology to support development of
destructive particle beam weapons, if feasi-
ble, is not expected to be available for a
prototype test before the mid-to-late 1990s.
he real-time performance of command, control,
communications, and intelligence systems, includ-
ing space-based systems, will continue to be limited
by deficiencies in computer technology and comput-
er networking. The Soviet lag in computer technol-
ogy is greatest in software and peripherals, where
the USSR is respectively 10 and 15 years behind the
Wes]Still, we expect the Soviets to deploy, in the
late 1980s, a network of space-based near-real-time
reconnaissance systems, and an automated intelli-
gence integration and dissemination system could be
available in the late 1990s.
In naval technologies, the USSR will concentrate
on those applicable to development of systems for
protection of its nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarine (SSBN) forces and for detection of oppos-
ing submarines. CThe Soviets will achieve some suc-
cess in protecting their own submarines by selection
of operational areas and improved tactics, by em-
ploying multiple layers of ASW forces and-on the
basis of technology now available-by increased
SSBN quieting and by improvements in short-range
detection systemmThe Soviets will remain unable to
systematically detect and track Western SSBNs in
broad ocean areas. They may be able to deploy
spaceborne nonacoustic systems in the mid-1990s
with limited capabilities to detect enemy attack
submarines attempting to penetrate bastions for
Soviet ballistic missile submarines. An airborne sys-
tem could be available by the early 1990 We
expect that current technology will enable the Sovi-
ets to be able to deploy conventional-takeoff-and-
landing aircraft and airborne early warning aircraft
in the early 1990s on attack carriers.They may
deploy a first-generation shipborne high-energy la-
ser for ship defense in the late 198093
Soviet ground forces and supporting air and air
defense forces will also require some systems incor-
porating advanced technologies to meet their mis-
sion objectives in the 1980s and early 1990s:
- In tactical reconnaissance, high-quality near-
real-time intelligence and targeting data will be
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required to support strikes by aircraft and short-
range ballistic missiles against dispersed and
mobile targets. We expect development of ad-
vanced electro-optical and infrared sensors and
imaging radars to be based on aircraft, remotely
piloted vehicles, and drones, together with sup-
porting ground-based processing and dissemina-
tion systemOFhe technology is now available for
development of these systems; come programs,
including one for a hi h-altitude reconnaissance
aircraft are now well
under wa It is doubtful, however, that the
Soviets will be able to produce the necessary
systems in the quantities required for effective
tactical application before the mid-1990s.
--EThe introduction of small, guided, heliborne fire-
and-forget weapons by the Soviets will require
the development and introduction of advanced
sensors, signal-processing techniques, and micro-
electronics and computing technologie:s]We ex-
pect the technologies to be available within the
next few years to support initial deployments of
such weapons in the mid-1990s.
- Soviet armor technology will need to make sig-
nificant strides to counter Western antiarmor
improvements. We expect the Soviets to have
difficulties achieving these improvements rapid-
ly.cone approach, based on existing technology,
could be the development of a turretless tank for
initial deployment in the early 1990s. Such a
tank would offer a reduced silhouette and in-
creased armor protection
- Soviet tactical air and air defense systems, using
available technology, will probably emphasize
improved survivability and operational efficien-
cy. Soviet tactical fighters will be multimission
and will probably resemble their current West-
ern counterparts. &e expect an emphasis on
increased maneuverability with external ord-
nance in higher g-load conditions and an im-
proved capability for out-of-plane attack[A
mobile ground-based high-energy laser weapon,
which is now undergoing testing, could be de-
ployed beginning in the late. 1980s. It could be
capable of structural damage at short range. (1 to
2 km) under optimal conditions, and sensor
damage out to a range of about 10 kjThere is a
moderate likelihood that an advanced system
with higher power levels will be deployed in the
late 1990sj
Given their maturing technology base, are the
Soviets more likely to take technological risks' in
the weapons development program?
In their R&D practices, the Soviets will probably
continue to restrict technological risk to the applied
research phase prior to making a commitment for
weapon system development. They will continue to
reduce, risk in actual weapons development by stress-
ing the use of proven technologies and evolutionary
improvements in system quality, with the intent of
assuring a high probability that weapon systems will
be delivered on time and achieve the desired per-
formance levels. In addition, the continued infusion of
technology from the West will serve to lower the
technological risk in applied research, thereby helping
the Soviets to build weapon systems with better per-
formance capabilities sooner, and with fewer R&D
resources, than would otherwise be possible.
Military requirements, together with the availability
of new technologies, are the dominant factors in Soviet
decisions to develop new military systems. Also, the
satisfaction of future military objectives is a driving
force behind Soviet military research. Although ad-
vanced technologies are often required' for a new
system, they are matured through separate technology
development programs and, in almost all cases, must
be available before the decision is made to include that
technology in a weapon system development program.
Will the Soviets continue to develop a large
number of military systems as they have in the
past?
We believe that the Soviets will continue to main-
tain a high level of military systems development into
the 1990s.
E e estimate that, as of 1983, the Soviets have under
development between 150 and 200 new and major
moderriizea weapon systems and support systems,
including military space systems. Over the past' two
decades, we estimate that 150 to 200 major weapon
systems have been in development at any one timm
We believe that the number of systems that will be in
development in the 1990s is unlikely to decline.
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Leadership support for military research and develop-
ment remains strong, facilities are still expanding, and
the R&D program effort seems not to have been
affected by economic difficulties in the civilian sector.
Also, requirements for R&D are increasing as the
complexity of military problems facing the Soviets
becomes greater. -
The Soviets are increasing . combat potential by
exploiting advanced technology. In certain areas, this
will lead to a smaller number of systems but a higher
percentage of multimission systems than has been
Soviet practice. We expect, for example, that tactical
aircraft will be able to carry and employ. larger' mixes
of high-technology weapons in the 1990s. In other
areas, large numbers of many different types of
systems will be developed for some established mis-
sions (such as the current trend for general purpose
submarines) and to meet new requirements (such as
for long-range land-attack cruise missiles and for
directed-energy weapons). The Soviets will tend to
maximize the development potential of their new
weapons by continuing to design them to accommo-
date future modular upgrades after they are deployed.
However, Soviet military R&D organizations have
probably become more capable in developing high-
technology weapon systems than Soviet industry has
become in producing them. A combination of fac-
tors-more multipurpose weapons, higher costs, great-
er quality control problems, and more difficult and
costly maintenance requirements-is likelyto cause
the Soviets to produce new, more technologically
advanced systems in smaller quantities than they have
in the past. Thus, they are tending to rely somewhat
more on technology, and somewhat less on quantity, to
achieve their future military goals.
What problems will the Soviets have in producing
the sophisticated weapons that we project for
development?
We believe that the Soviets will experience difficul-
ties in manufacturing many of the sophisticated weap-
ons projected for the 1990s.Che Soviets are experienc-
ing production rate limitations and technical problems
that are disrupting the manufacture of advanced
systems-including the T-72 tank, the MIG-31 air-
craft, the Backfire bomber, and the Typhoon SSBNN
Current evidence of expansion in electronics-related
industry, projected advances in precision machining
and other fabrication technologies, and continued
aggressive exploitation. of Western technology suggest
that some of their present difficulties are likely to be at
least partially overcomef-But some major deficiencies
are expected to continue in the availability and quality
of test equipment and instrumentation, in their logis-
tics base, and in technical training of maintenance
personnel]
Will the Soviets face resource constraints in
producing and supporting these complex new
systems for the 1990s?.
Although we do not foresee a major diversion of
resources away from military R&D, growing demands
in the civilian sector will intensify the competition for
resources if economic problems worsen in the late
1980s. Since the late 1970s, the annual rate of Soviet
economic growth has been declining because of in-
creasing resource scarcities, industrial and transporta-
tion bottlenecks, and persistent inefficiencies within
the economy.
Manpower constraints, both in numbers and quality,
might have an adverse impact on the ability of the
defense industries to produce advanced weapons. In-
creases in productivity from more automated equip-
ment have the potential to offset shortages of skilled
labor in the industrial sector. n- the armed forces,
however, the relative decline in manpower quality,
brought about by a growing number of less educated
non-Russian-speaking Central Asians, may adversely
affect operation and maintenance of complex weapon
systems]
What are the Soviets doing to ensure a strong
technology base for the 1990s?
In the past few years the party Central Committee
and the Council of Ministers have initiated programs
to improve the bureaucratic and economic aspects of
the USSR's science and technology effort. A strong
leadership commitment to this S&T policy is'likely to
strengthen the overall Soviet technology base necessary
for satisfying both the needs of the civilian economy
and the requirements for some of the high technology
for weapon systems projected in this Estimate. This
new policy has a stated near-term emphasis on
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strengthening technology applicable to the civilian
sector by relying on the defense sector to contribute
expertise, technology, and limited resources. We be-
lieve that dramatic-and needed-advances in "civil-
ian" technologies would require a substantial diversion
of resources from military' R&D, which we do not
foresee. If the Soviets are successful in enhancing S&T
through long-range programs, the future military
benefits could be significant, particularly in those
technologies that are common to both sectors, includ-
ing computers, microelectronics, fiber optics, powder
metallurgy and composite materials, and industrial
lasers and robots.
Can the Soviets catch up with-even surpass-
the West in overall military technology?
While the Soviets appear fully committed to achiev-
ing military-technical superiority, and have devoted
significant resources toward this stated goal, we doubt
that they currently possess the necessary capabilities to
match or overtake the United States in overall military
technologies by the 1990s. In addition to the impedi-
ments within.the Soviet R&D system, they must also
contend with uncertainties about their future successes
in technology acquisitions, and with the current and
prospective upswing in US military R&D efforts.
These efforts, if sustained, will pose a major challenge
to the Soviets and make it more difficult for them to
close existing gaps[n certain areas of prospective US
concentration, such as directed-energy technologies
applicable to ballistic missile defense, existing Soviet
strengths could be overshadowed:. In these and other
areas, however, Soviet military R&D will continue for
some years to benefit from the increases in invest-
ment-and the larger total investment relative to that
of the United States-that have characterized the past
decade.
We also caution that there are considerable uncer-
tainties associated with our assessments of the overall
relative standing of US and Soviet military technol-
ogies by the 1990s. Our uncertainties stem from an
incomplete understanding of the relative standings
now and of the rate of change in Soviet technology,
and from the difficulty in forecasting the contribution
of technology transfer. In addition, while we assume a
strong US commitment to military R&D, systematic
comparisons of the future states of US and Soviet
technological capabilities must also take account of
actual advances in US technologies-which we have
not studied here, and which have yet to be realized,
but which could significantly influence any pro-
jections.
While we project that the Soviets will remain
generally behind the West, we also caution that their
major commitment to advances will probably not
dissipate, that their military R&D will continue in any
case to benefit for years to come. from past invest-
ments, and that their S&T and economic reform
efforts may yield incremental but useful payoffs. We
expect continued advancements in all Soviet military
technologies, and that the overall gap between the US
and Soviet technology bases will be further narrowed.
As a result, a larger number of the Soviet military
technologies will be lagging by no more than two to
three years, and the gap would be small enough to
make the level of technology introduced into many
military systems deployed in the late 1990s and be-
yond nearly comparable.
In general, what are the prospects for Soviet
military technologies by the end of the 1980s?
We expect the Soviets to make continued progress in
raising the levels of those technologies that are key to
their advanced weapons development programs:
- At present the Soviets are strong across a broad
front of military technologies; with the introduc-
tion of advanced microelectronics into military
systems trailing similar technologies in the West
by only about three to five years. At the same
time the Soviets have achieved superior techno-
logical capabilities in several important areas that
could provide the USSR and its allies with some
military advantages in the 1990s.
- Support of military R&D and defense production
by Soviet science also limproved noticeably
over the last 10 years. Lble strength of Soviet
efforts in. several important areas-millimeter
wave, electro-optics, directed energy, acoustic
and nonacoustic ASW, and space-are directly
attributable to large and extensive scientific re-
search programs]
Progress in military technologies will vary by tech-
nology area:
- Soviet development of information acquisition
technology will probably accelerate and be
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stronger before the end of the 1980s. For exam-
ple,ie Soviets will need to emphasize advanced
radar and electro-optics sensors, in an effort to
counter US Stealth technology. (A key to their
success in countering Stealth is whether they can
develop better signal processing, a capability that
depends on improving their ability to produce
high-quality microelectronics and optical compo-
nents or possibly making major advances in the
linking of their analog, optical, and digital proc-
essing capabilities.]
- Soviet information-processing technologies, par-
ticularly microelectronics and computers, are not
likely to keep up with Western developments;
however[we expect the Soviets by the end of the
1980s will make innovative use of their micro-
electronics in designing large-scale integrated
(LSI) circuitry for military application Further,
we believe Soviet use of digital signal processing
based on microelectronics will be widespread for
both ground-based and airborne weapon systems
by the late 1980s. By the late 1990s they may
introduce very-large-scale-integrated (VLSI) cir-
cuitry into military systems.
- We expect Soviet weapons delivery technologies,
particularly missile guidance and propulsion
technologies, to advance steadily and continue to
provide a strong base for both tactical and
strategic weapons development.
- Possibly the most significant advances in the
Soviet military technologies will occur in the
lethality/damage technology area. The Soviets
are likely to keep up their large investment in
conventional explosives technologies in order to
maintain the excellent technological capabilities
they now have. GVe are uncertain about what
their vigorous chemical warfare R&D effort will
produce in the next five to 10 years because of
the lead they have now opened over the West. As
Soviet research in directed energy, particularly
laser and RF weapon technology, begins to yield
results, the effects of even limited test success
could stimulate even more R&D]
- Apart from some areas such as chemical and
biological R&D, life sciences technologies in the
USSR are generally less sophisticated and less
well developed than those in the United States.
Overall, genetic engineering techniques, for ex-
ample, are somewhat less advanced than those of
the United States and applications development
efforts are smaller. We are concerned, however,
about the potential that genetic engineering has
for the development of biological warfare agents
or toxins. Soviet research, development, and eval-
uation efforts involving human factors appear to
be concentrating on improving weapon system
performance through the optimal use of humans
as controllers and decisionmakers. We also expect
that the Soviet chemical warfare effort will
continue, with emphasis on better protective suits
and improved ability to detect CW agents, as
well as more effective agents for offense.
- The Soviet ocean science research program-the
largest in the world-continues to expand, with
new advanced ships, instrumentation, and ocean-
ographic satellites. One particular area of Soviet
ocean sciences interest is the Arctic, where Soviet
submarine under-ice expeditions and transfers
have been conducted since 1961[Oceanographic
scientific research expeditions, which also began
then, are probably related to the development of
submarine navigation procedures, to ASW opera-
tions and tactics, and to establishing the Soviet
Navy's capability to operate its most modern
submarines in its contiguous Arctic havens shield-
ed from US acoustic surveillance systems]
- The Soviets have committed substantial R&D
resources to support their space programs, programs, with
large increases in the early 1980s for their mili-
tary manned space program and communica-
tions systems. The wide range of new space
systems now in development stands in contrast to
the 1970s, when most developments were for
improved, rather than new, systems. Military
systems and missions receive first priority, in-
cluding a Soviet space shuttle, space plane,
heavy-lift launch vehicle, and near-real-time im-
agery-relay. systems. New capabilities will result,
including those for quick-reaction military mis-
sions such as reconnaissance
- The Soviets are gradually improving their pro-
duction technology, with a trend toward greater
industrial automation. The principal improve-
ment from automated production will be in-
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creased efficiency, and perhaps some alleviation
of expected manpower shortages, especially of
skilled labor. But Soviet industrial automation is
not expected to result in the production of
substantially larger numbers of weapon systems
than are now being produced. Rather it is likely
to be used to aid the production of more complex
weapon systems by producing parts of higher
reliability that are manufactured to more strin-
gent tolerances and industry standards.
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