SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CONFLICT THROUGH THE MID-1990S

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 25, 1985
• Content Type: NIE

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N I E 11-3/8-84/85
SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CONFLICT
THROUGH THE MID-1990s
KEY JUDGMENTS
Information available as of 25 April 1985 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate, which
was approved by the National Foreign Intelli-
gence Board on that date.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Energy.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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SCOPE NOTE
This NIE 11-3/8 summarizes the latest developments and projects
future trends in Soviet weapons and supporting systems for strategic
nuclear conflict. The Estimate contains projections of the size and
composition of Soviet strategic forces under a variety of circumstances,
including the presence or absence of arms control constraints.
We focus on the USSR's strategy, plans, operations, and capabilities
for strategic nuclear conflict as we believe Soviet leaders perceive them.
We have emphasized Soviet views on the origin and nature of a US-
Soviet nuclear conflict and how the Soviets would plan to operate and
employ their forces during the various phases of such a war.
In evaluating their capabilities to accomplish strategic missions, the
Soviets differ from us in terms of the operational factors they consider,
the analytic techniques they use, and their criteria for success. In this
Estimate we have assessed trends in Soviet capabilities in terms familiar
to US policymakers and analysts, although these assessments do not
necessarily correspond to those the Soviets would make. We generally
do not know how the Soviets specifically would evaluate their capabili-
ties, and we have limited information pertaining to how they measure
their ability to accomplish strategic missions.
This Estimate is in three volumes in addition to separately issued
Key Judgments:
- Volume I contains:
- Summary of Soviet programs and capabilities believed to be of
greatest interest to policymakers and defense planners.
- Key Intelligence Gaps (Annex A).
- Bibliography (Annex B).
- Volume II contains:
- Key recent developments.
- Discussion of the Soviets' strategic doctrine and objectives,
including their views on the probable origin and nature of a
US-Soviet nuclear conflict.
- Descriptions of Soviet programs for the development and
deployment of strategic offensive and defensive forces and
supporting systems.
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- Projections of future Soviet strategic forces.
- Description of Soviet command, control, and communications
capabilities and discussion of the peacetime posture of Soviet
strategic forces.
- Discussion of Soviet concepts and plans for the operations of
strategic forces during the several phases of a global conflict.
- Trends in the USSR's capabilities to carry out some missions of
strategic forces in nuclear conflict.
- Volume III contains tables with detailed force projections and
weapon characteristics.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
By the mid-1990s, nearly all of the Soviets' currently deployed
intercontinental nuclear attack forces-land- and sea-based ballistic
missiles and heavy bombers-will be replaced by new and improved
systems. New mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and a
variety of cruise missiles are about to enter the force. The number of
deployed strategic force warheads will increase by a few thousand over
the next five years, with the potential for greater expansion in the 1990s.
We are concerned about the Soviets' longstanding commitment to
strategic defense, including an extensive program to protect their
leadership, their potential to deploy widespread defenses against ballis-
tic missiles, and their extensive efforts in directed-energy weapons
technologies, particularly high-energy lasers. Their vigorous effort in
strategic force research, development, and deployment is not new, but
is the result of an unswerving commitment for the past two decades to
build up and improve their strategic force capabilities
Strategic Offensive Forces
The most notable trend in offensive forces is the construction of
bases for mobile strategic missiles-SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic
missiles (IRBMs) and new ICBMs:
- During 1984, the Soviets embarked on an unprecedented
program for- constructing new SS-20 bases, starting more new
bases than in any previous year.
- The Soviets have made major strides in preparing for the
deployment of their two new mobile ICBMs-the road-mobile
SS-X-25 and the rail-mobile SS-X-24. Soviet commitment to
mobile ICBMs represents a major resource decision; such sys-
tems require substantially more support infrastructure than do
silo-based systems, and thus are much more costly to operate
and maintain
All elements of Soviet strategic offensive forces will be extensively
modernized by the mid-1990s. While the Soviets will continue to rely
on fixed, silo-based ICBMs, mobile ICBMs will be deployed in large
numbers (see figure 1), and major improvements will be made to the
sea-based and bomber forces. The major changes in the force will
include:
- An improved first-strike capability against hardened targets
through further improvements to the heavy ICBM force.
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Figure 1
Soviet Intercontinental Attack Forces,
Warhead Mix
- Significantly better survivability from improvements in the
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force-through
quieter submarines and longer range missiles-and deployment
of mobile ICBMs. Mobile ICBMs will also improve the Soviets'
capabilities to use reserve missiles for reload and refire.,
-A substantial increase in the number of deliverable warheads
for the bomber force as a result of the deployment of new
bombers with long-range, land-attack cruise missiles.
ICBMs
The ICBM force, as shown in figure 2, will have been almost
entirely replaced with new systems by the mid-1990s:
- The Soviets are preparing to deploy the SS-X-24 ICBM in silos
in 1986 and on rail-mobile launchers in 1987. We expect SS-X-24-
class ICBMs equipped with 10 multiple independently target-
able reentry vehicles (MIRVs) to replace the MIRVed SS-17 and
SS-19 silo-based ICBMs, which carry fewer warheads.
- The Soviets have started to retire older silo-based single-RV
SS-11s as they prepare to deploy the single-RV road-mobile
' For an alternative view of the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State,
see page 22F___-]
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Figure 2
Modernization of Soviet ICBMs
New heavy
ICBM
SS-X-25
(mobile)
SS-X-24
(mobile)
SS-X-24
(silo)
SS-X-25
(mobile)
New heavy
ICBM
SS-X-24
(mobile)
SS-X-24
(silo)
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SS-X-25. We expect the SS-X-25 to be operational by late 1985.
- We have evidence of at least three new ICBMs that we expect
will be flight-tested in the 1986-90 time period:
- A new silo-based heavy ICBM, to replace the SS-18, with
improved capabilities against hardened targets.
- A new version of the SS-X-24.
- A new version of the mobile SS-X-25, which may have a
three-RV payload option.
An extensive modernization program will result in replacement of
the entire MIRVed Soviet SLBM force and deployment of much better
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The major
changes, as shown in figure 3, will include:
- Deployment of D-IV and additional Typhoon SSBNs. These
boats have improvements that will contribute to their surviv-
ability, such as features that facilitate under-ice operations. In
addition, we are projecting a new class of SSBN to enter the
force in the early 1990s.
- Deployment of the new SS-NX-23 SLBM beginning in late 1985
or early 1986 on D-IVs and probably on D-IIIs. The increased
range of the SS-NX-23, relative to that of the SS-N-18 missile
currently on D-IIIs, will make SS-NX-23-equipped SSBNs more
survivable. They will be able to operate under the Arctic icecap
or closer to Soviet shores, where the Soviet Navy can better
protect them.
- A replacement for the SS-N-20 on Typhoon SSBNs will proba-
bly be flight-tested in late 1985 or 1986, and a missile in the
SS-NX-23 class will probably be tested later in the 1980s.
Heavy Bombers
The Soviet heavy bomber force is undergoing its first major
modernization since the 1960s; by the mid-1990s, as shown in figure 4
(page 8), most of the older bombers will have been replaced. The heavy
bomber force will have a greater role in intercontinental attack:
- The AS-15 air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) became opera-
tional on the Bear H in 1984. By using newly produced aircraft
of an old design, the Soviets were able to deploy ALCMs at least
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Figure 3
Modernization of Soviet SLBMs
Typhoon
Note: Color changes for D-III and Typhoon in the mid-1990s
indicate new missiles deployed in existing submarine classes.
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Figure 4
Modernization of Soviet Heavy Bombers
Heavy Bombers
Heavy Bomber Weapons
1985 Mid-1990s
Bison -~ Bear H Older Bears
Older
Bears
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four years earlier than if they had waited for the new Blackjack
bomber.
- We project Blackjack will be operational in 1988 or 1989,
carrying both ALCMs and bombs.
Growth of Intercontinental Attack Forces
The projected growth in the number of deployed warheads on
Soviet intercontinental attack forces, under various assumptions, is
shown in figure 5:
- The force currently consists of over 9,000 deployed warheads on
some 2,500 deployed ballistic missile launchers and heavy
bombers. Most warheads are in the ICBM force.
- Warheads are increasing: new Soviet Typhoon and D-IV sub-
marines, Bear H bombers, and SS-X-24 ICBMs will carry many
more warheads than the systems they are replacing.
- By 1990, if the Soviets continue to have about 2,500 missile
launchers and heavy bombers and remain within the quantita-
tive sublimits of SALT II, the deployed warheads will grow to
over 12,000.
- The 1983 Soviet proposal at the strategic arms reduction talks
(START) would also result in an expansion in warheads, al-
though about 1,000 fewer by 1990 than under SALT II limits.
- The effect of the 1983 US START proposal would be to reverse
this trend and, by the 1990s, lead to substantial reductions. We
note, however, that it is highly unlikely the Soviets would
modify their force along these lines; in particular, they almost
certainly would not drastically reduce the number of heavy
ICBMs, given the importance they attach to this system.
- While the Soviets would not necessarily expand their interconti-
nental attack forces beyond some 12,000 to 13,000 warheads in
the absence of arms control constraints, they clearly have the
capability for significant further expansion, to between 16,000
and 21,000 deployed warheads by the mid-1990s. The range
reflects our uncertainties about Soviet technological choices,
production capabilities, and the Soviets' own evaluation of their
military requirements. The lower figure represents a continua-
tion of recent trends in deployment rates; the upper figure is not
a maximum effort but would require a substantially greater
commitment of resources.
Estimates of the number of warheads on various Soviet ballistic
missiles are becoming more uncertain
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Figure 5
Growth in Number of Deployed Soviet Strategic Force Warheads
1990
Thousands of warheads
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1994
Thousands of warheads
SALT II
numerical
restraints
until mid-1990
Expansion beyond
arms control
Soviet
START
proposal
US START
proposal
SALT II
numerical
restraints
until mid-1990
Expansion beyond
arms control
Soviet
START
proposal
US START
proposal
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While there are differing views, we assess that
the Soviets have deployed, and will continue to deploy, some missiles
with more warheads than the maximum number flight-tested-the total
of reentry vehicles (RVs) actually released plus those simulated.
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The number of warheads could be significantly
underestimated under an arms control agreement that counted de-
ployed warheads by using the maximum number flight-tested on each
missile type. This problem is of current concern
t will be a problem for future MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs,
The Soviets will face important decisions in the next few years, as
they proceed with flight-testing for ballistic missiles scheduled for
deployment beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Specifically,
they will have to decide whether to test new ICBMs in such a way as to
conform, or appear close to conforming, with limitations on characteris-
tics and improvements from the unratified SALT II Treaty. They
appear to have technical options for some of their new systems that will
allow them to go either way.
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In late 1984 the Soviets began to deploy the AS-15 ALCM, the first
in a series of deployments of long-range, land-attack cruise missiles.
Over the next 10 years, we expect them to deploy large numbers of nu-
clear-armed ALCMs, sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), and ground-
launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). Estimated numbers are highly
uncertain, but we project an aggregate total of 2,000 to 3,000. The
deployment of cruise missiles provides the Soviets with new multidirec-
tional, low- and high-altitude capabilities against US targets.
The SS-20 force is expected to expand to 477 to 540 deployed
launchers by 1987, as a result of an extensive base construction program.
This total is somewhat lower than projected last year, because we did
not then anticipate the deactivation of SS-20 bases in the central USSR
to convert to SS-X-25 ICBM bases. A follow-on to the SS-20, probably
designed to improve lethality, began flight-testing in 1984.
Strategic Defensive Forces
The Soviets will significantly improve the capabilities of their
active and passive strategic defenses over the next 10 years, as a number
of new types of weapons are introduced and many of the older systems
retired. Significant developments in active strategic defenses include the
following:
- When completed by about 1987, the improved Moscow antibal-
listic missile (ABM) system will consist of 100 silo-based
and modified Galosh interceptors, providing an improved inter-
cept capability against small-scale attacks on key targets around
Moscow.
- By the end of the decade, when the new large phased-array
radar network is expected to be fully operational, the Soviets
will have a much improved capability for ballistic missile early
warning, attack assessment, and accurate target tracking. These
radars will be technically capable of providing battle manage-
ment support to a widespread ABM system, but there are
uncertainties and differences of view about whether the Soviets
would rely on these radars to support a widespread ABM
deployment.
- Deployment of new low-altitude-capable strategic air defense
systems will increase. (See figure 6.) The Soviets are continuing
to deploy the new SA-10 all-altitude surface-to-air missile
(SAM), are deploying new aircraft with much better capabilities
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Figure 6
Modernization of Soviet Strategic
Air Defense Forces
Strategic SAMs
Air Defense Interceptors
Military District 1985
Aviation New
Air Defense
District Aviation
a Represents uncertainty in our projections of modernization.
h New interceptors are: Foxhound, Fulcrum, Flanker, long-range
interceptor.
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against low-flying targets, and will deploy the Mainstay air-
borne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft in 1985.
The SA-X-12 system, to be deployed in the Soviet ground forces
in 1985-86, can engage conventional aircraft, cruise missiles,
and tactical ballistic missiles. We are uncertain about its
potential capabilities against strategic missiles. On the basis of a
number of assumptions
Ballistic Missile Defense
that it could have capabilities to intercept some types of US
strategic ballistic missile RVs. Its technical capabilities bring to
the forefront the problem that improving technology is blurring
the distinction between air defense and ABM systems. This
problem will be further complicated as newer, more complex
air defense missile systems are developed. F____1
men6
We are particularly concerned that the Soviets' continuing devel-
opment efforts give them the potential for widespread ABM deploy-
We judge they could undertake
rapidly-
api y paced ABM deployments to strengthen the defenses at Moscow
and cover key targets in the western USSR, and to extend protection to
key targets east of the Urals. Significant ABM forces could be deployed
by the late 1980s or early 1990s, assuming the Soviets have already
begun making some of the necessary preparations.
or alternative views of the likelihood that the Soviets wou
such deployments in the next few years, see volume I.
we conclude
Id
The Soviets still lack effective means to locate US SSBNs at sea. We
expect them to continue to pursue vigorously all antisubmarine warfare
(ASW) technologies as potential solutions to the problems of countering
US SSBNs and defending their own SSBNs against US attack subma-
rines. We are concerned about the energetic Soviet effort to develop a
capability to remotely sense submarine-generated effects from aircraft
or spacecraft
Although we continue to improve our understanding of the nature of
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the Soviets' overall effort
there remain important uncertainties about the full extent
and direction of their program.
We do not believe there is a realistic possibility that the Soviets will
be able to deploy in the 1990s a system that could reliably monitor US
SSBNs operating in the open ocean. There is a low-to-moderate
probability that the Soviets could deploy in the mid-1990s an ASW
remote detection system that would operate with some effectiveness if
enemy nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) approached ASW
barriers near Soviet SSBN bastions.
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Directed-Energy and Hypervelocity Kinetic-Energy Weapons
Directed-energy and kinetic-energy weapons potentially could be
developed for several strategic weapons applications-antisatellite
(ASAT), air defense, battlefield use, and, in the longer term, ballistic
missile defense (BMD). Because of the limited available evidence, there
are large uncertainties about the size and scope of the Soviets' research
efforts in key technologies, as well as about the status and goals of their
weapon development program
There is strong evidence of Soviet efforts to develop high-energy
laser weapons:
- On the basis of the high-energy laser efforts we have been able
to observe, we estimate a laser weapon program of this magni-
tude would cost roughly $1 billion per year if carried out in the
United States.
- Two facilities at the Saryshagan test range are assessed to have
high-energy lasers with the potential to function as ASAT
weapons.
- We are concerned about a large Soviet program to develop
ground-based laser weapons for terminal defense against reen-
try vehicles. There are major uncertainties, however, concern-
ing the feasibility and practicality of using ground-based lasers
for BMD and about when the Soviets might have such systems
operational. We expect them to test the feasibility of such a
system during the 1980s, probably using one of the high-energy
laser facilities at Saryshagan. An operational system could not be
deployed until many years later, probably not until after the
year 2000.
- The Soviets appear to be developing two high-energy laser
weapons with potential strategic air defense applications-
ground-based and naval point defense.
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- The Soviets are continuing to develop an airborne laser.
- Soviet research includes a project to develop high-energy laser
weapons for use in space. We estimate there is an even chance
that a prototype high-energy, space-based laser ASAT weapon
will be tested in low orbit in the early 1990s. Even if testing
were successful, such a system probably could not be operation-
al before the mid-1990s. An alternative view holds there is only
a low probability of such tests by the early 1990s.4
The Soviets are also conducting research under military sponsor-
ship for the purpose of acquiring the ability to develop particle beam
weapons (PBWs We
believe the Soviets will eventually attempt to build a space-based PBW,
but the technical requirements are so severe that we estimate there is a
low probability they will test a prototype before the year 2000.
ra io requency RF weapons to destroy the electronics of a target. The
Soviets are strong in the appropriate technologies, we
judge they are capable of developing a prototype RF weapon system.
Since 1981 the Soviets have been constructing a large facility on
top of a mountain near Dushanbe in the southernmost area of the USSR.
a directed-energy weapon function-
either a laser or a radiofrequency ASAT weapon-seems most consistent
with the available evidence. A somewhat less likely, but still plausible,
function is deep space surveillance and/or space object identification.
An alternative view holds that the evidence is insufficient to judge the
purpose of the Dushanbe facility.,
Resources for Projected Developments and
Arms Control Considerations
The Soviets are increasing their resource commitments to their
already formidable strategic forces research, development, and deploy-
ment programs. We estimate that total investment and operating
expenditures for projected Soviet strategic offensive forces (interconti-
nental attack and intermediate range) and strategic defensive forces
4 The holder of this view is the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of
State
6 The holders of this view are the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of
State, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army.F---]
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(assuming no widespread ABM deployments) will result in a growth in
total Soviet strategic force expenditures of between 5 and 7 percent a
year over the next five years. (The rate would be 7 to 10 percent if
widespread ABM defenses were deployed.) Strategic offensive and
defensive forces account for about one-fifth of total defense spending-
about one-tenth each
A growth rate of 5 to 7 percent a year for strategic programs,
combined with the projected growth rate for nonstrategic programs of
about 3 percent, would lead to a growth in total defense spending of be-
tween 3 and 4 percent per year-greater than the projected growth rate
of 2 percent for the GNP. Increasing the share of the GNP devoted to
defense will confront the Soviets with the difficult choice of reducing
the growth in investment, which is critical to modernizing the industrial
base, or curtailing growth in consumption, which is an important factor
in the Soviet drive to improve labor productivity.
Despite serious economic problems since the mid-1970s, Soviet
military procurement has been at high annual levels; in particular, the
Soviets have continued to procure large quantities of new strategic
weapons. Since the mid-1970s the Soviets fielded their MIRVed ICBM
force, and then improved it; deployed the MIRVed SLBM force on new
SSBNs; and deployed their mobile SS-20 force. In recent years the
Soviets have increased their resource commitments to emerging new
systems, particularly with respect to the deployment of costly mobile
missile systems.
While Soviet economic problems are severe, we see no signs that
the Soviets feel compelled to forgo important strategic programs or that
they will make substantial concessions in arms control in order to relieve
economic pressures. Soviet force decisions and arms control decisions
are likely to continue to be driven by calculations of political-strategic
benefits and the dynamism of weapons technology. We believe,
however, that, as a result of the stark economic realities, decisions
involving the rate of strategic force modernization probably will be
influenced by economic factors more now than in the past and some de-
ployment programs could be stretched out. Major new initiatives would
involve difficult trade-offs; in particular, if the Soviets decided to
expand their ABM defenses far beyond the 100-launcher treaty limit,
they might feel compelled to alter some of their other nonstrategic
military modernization efforts, or to stretch out the ABM deployments
somewhat. We judge, however, that strategic forces will continue to
command the highest resource priorities and therefore would be
affected less by economic problems than any other element of the
Soviet military
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There is an alternative view that Soviet willingness to pay the price
required for rapid deployment of an extensive nationwide ABM system
will depend on the military and political context. The holder of this
view believes historical evidence of the Soviets' ability to make large
sacrifices indicates that they would make the necessary resource
commitments to accomplish rapid deployments if deemed necessary.6
We believe the Soviets are determined to prevent any erosion of
the military gains the USSR has made over the past decade. They
recognize that new US strategic systems being deployed or under
development will increase the threat to the survivability of their silo-
based ICBM force, complicate their ASW efforts, and present their air
defense forces with increasingly complex problems. By their actions and
propaganda, the Soviets have demonstrated they are very concerned
about the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and its focus on
advanced technology. In their view, it could force them to redirect their
offensive ballistic missile development programs to reduce vulnerabili-
ties or could stimulate a costly, open-ended high-technology competi-
tion for which they probably are concerned that the United States can
outpace their own ongoing efforts. They are probably also concerned
that SDI will lead to a sustained US effort in strategic defenses-an area
in which the Soviets have enjoyed a virtual monopoly.
Soviet leaders view arms control policy as an important factor in
advancing their strategy of achieving strategic advantage. They have
been willing to negotiate restraints on force improvements and deploy-
ments when it serves their interests. Moscow has long believed that arms
control must first and foremost protect the capabilities of Soviet
military forces relative to their opponents. The Soviets seek to limit US
force modernization through both the arms control process and any
resulting agreements. A salient feature of Soviet arms control policy will
be its emphasis on trying to limit US ballistic missile defense and space
warfare capabilities. The Soviets will try to use arms control discussions
as a means of delaying or undercutting the US SDI program, but we do
not believe they will offer major concessions to halt the program as long
as it remains in the research stage and is strongly susceptible to
unilateral US restraint
Planning for Nuclear War
Soviet military planning is guided by fundamental Soviet wartime
objectives: to decisively defeat enemy conventional and nuclear forces,
occupy enemy territory in the theater, and defend the homeland
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against enemy attack. To meet these objectives, the Soviets train their
forces for a global nuclear conflict. This training has diversified in scope
and become increasingly complex in the operational factors with which
it deals
The Soviets apparently believe that a major nuclear conflict, if it
occurred, would be likely to arise out of a NATO-Warsaw Pact
conventional conflict preceded by a political crisis period that could last
several weeks or longer. They perceive a conventional phase as lasting
from a few days to as long as several weeks. The Soviets see little
likelihood that the United States would initiate a surprise nuclear attack
from a normal peacetime posture; we judge it is unlikely that the Soviets
would mount such an attack themselves. Key objectives of the Soviets in
the conventional phase would be to weaken the enemy's theater-based
and sea-based nuclear forces with attacks by conventional weapons,
while protecting their own nuclear forces. We estimate there is a high
likelihood that the Soviets would attempt to interfere with selected US
space systems that provide important wartime support, using both
destructive and nondestructive means. The Soviets believe elements of
their strategic forces would suffer losses during conventional conflict.
The Soviets are unlikely to initiate nuclear use in a theater conflict
unless they perceived that NATO was about to use nuclear weapons, be-
cause they would probably see it as being to their advantage instead to
keep the conflict at the conventional level. Moreover, the Soviets, in our
judgment, are unlikely to initiate nuclear conflict on a limited scale,
with small-scale use confined to the immediate combat zone, because
they would see the use of nuclear weapons on any scale as substantially
increasing the risks of escalation to strategic nuclear war. We believe,
however, that the likelihood of Soviet initiation of nuclear strikes would
increase if Soviet conventional forces were faced with a major defeat or
a NATO counteroffensive into Eastern Europe.
If nuclear weapons were used in a theater conflict, with attacks
confined to the theater area, the Soviets would have strong incentives to
try to keep the nuclear conflict from spreading to involve the Soviet and
US homelands. Thus, the Soviets might adopt a pragmatic approach and
attempt to:
- Accomplish their theater objectives without carrying out inter-
continental strikes.
- Create conditions that deter the United States from attacking
the Soviet homeland.
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- Prevent the United States from providing further support to the
theater campaign.
We cannot judge the likelihood that the Soviets would actually attempt
such a strategy. Evidence suggests they believe that it would be difficult
to cap a theater nuclear conflict and that attempting to do so
unsuccessfully could pose additional danger to the USSR. The Soviets
would probably see an initial localized use of nuclear weapons as still
leaving an opportunity to avoid large-scale nuclear war. However, once
large-scale use of nuclear weapons in the theater occurred, imminent
Soviet escalation to intercontinental nuclear war would be likely.
As the likelihood of large-scale nuclear conflict increased, Soviet
leaders would face the difficult decision of whether to seize the
initiative and strike, as would be consistent with their general military
doctrine, or to be more cautious in the hope of averting large-scale
nuclear strikes on the Soviet homeland. There are no easy prescriptions
for what the Soviets would actually do under a particular set of
circumstances, despite the apparent doctrinal imperative to mount
large-scale preemptive nuclear attacks:
- We believe they would launch a coordinated theater and
intercontinental strike in response to a large-scale theater
nuclear strike against the western USSR.
- If they acquired convincing evidence that a US intercontinental
strike were imminent, they would try to preempt. While we are
unable to judge what information would be sufficiently con-
vincing to cause Soviet leaders to order a large-scale preemptive
attack, we believe they would be more likely to act on the basis
of ambiguous indications and inconclusive evidence of US strike
intentions if a battlefield nuclear conflict were under way than
during a crisis or a conventional conflict.
- We believe the Soviets place considerable emphasis on assessing
their strategic offensive capabilities under conditions in which
the United States launched the initial major strike. These would
include scenarios in which they were able to launch varying
portions of their forces on tactical warning, as well as the most
stressful scenario-in which they failed to launch on tactical
warning and had to absorb a well-coordinated US counterforce
attack. For the Soviets, these scenarios would be the most
critical in an evaluation of their force requirements and capabil-
ities
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In intercontinental strikes the Soviets would seek to neutralize US
and Allied military operations and capabilities-to destroy US-based
nuclear forces, to disrupt and destroy the supporting infrastructure and
control systems for these forces as well as the National Command
Authority, and to attempt to isolate the United States from the theater
campaign by attacking its power projection capabilities. They probably
would also attempt to reduce US military power in the long term by at-
tacking other nonnuclear forces, US military-industrial capacity, and
governmental control facilities, although the extent of the attack on
these targets in the initial strikes could vary, depending on the
circumstances
The Soviets, following the initial large-scale nuclear strikes, plan to
reconstitute some surviving general purpose and strategic forces and to
occupy substantial areas of Western Europe, while neutralizing the
ability of US and Allied nuclear forces to interfere with these objectives.
The Soviets would clearly prefer to accomplish their objectives quickly,
but recognize that the later phases could be protracted, given the
difficulty and complexity of conducting operations following large-scale
nuclear strikes. They prepare for combat operations that could extend
weeks beyond an initial nuclear phase
As force modernization proceeds, the Soviets will continue to rely
primarily on silo-based ICBMs for use in initial strikes, while withhold-
ing many of their, SLBMs and presumably most of their dispersed
mobile ICBMs for subsequent strikes during later phases of nuclear
conflict. They also would attempt to reload and refire some ICBMs,
many SS-20s, and probably some SLBMs, using reserve missiles and
equipment.
Taking into account the problems the Soviets are likely to
face in a postattack environment and the apparently limited extent of
preparations they have undertaken to cope with these difficulties, we
estimate they probably would be able to reload and refire from silos
over a period of weeks or months only a small portion of the reserve
ICBMs they maintain in peacetime. The deployment of mobile ICBMs
will lead to improved capabilities for ICBM reload
There is an alternative view that the main text overstates the
difficulties the Soviets would have in reconstituting their current silo-
based ICBM force in nuclear conflict, given the extensive preparations
this view holds they have made, and that consequently they would be
able to refire a large portion of their reserve ICBMs.' According to
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another alternative view, the Soviets do not include ICBM, SLBM, and
SS-20 reload and refire in their war plans. However, the Soviets
probably would, in this view, attempt to reload a few launchers on a
contingency basis, if any reserve missiles not required to maintain the
online force were available. According to this view, a Soviet require-
ment for additional warheads would be better met by deployment of
additional missiles on launchers. Furthermore, in this view, it is by no
means clear that reload and refire operations during nuclear war would
be less problematic for mobile launchers than for silos.8
Capabilities of Strategic Forces
The Soviets have enough hard-target-capable ICBM reentry vehi-
cles today to attack all US missile silos and launch control centers and
will have larger numbers of hard-target-capable RVs in the future.
There are slightly differing views on the capabilities of the SS-18 to
damage US Minuteman silos, leading to a best estimate of the expected
damage to a silo from two Soviet warheads of about 70 percent, in one
view, to about 80 to 85 percent, in the other
The projected accuracy improvements for the
new heavy ICBM we expect the Soviets to deploy in the late 1980s
would result in a substantial increase in damage capability.
Soviet offensive forces will not be able to reliably target and
destroy patrolling US SSBNs, alert aircraft, aircraft in flight, or
dispersed land-mobile missiles, particularly those beyond the range of
tactical reconnaissance systems. We believe that, in a crisis or conflict,
the Soviets would credit undegraded US warning and control systems
with the ability to launch ICBMs on tactical warning.
Dispersed Soviet mobile missiles, many SSBNs patrolling in waters
near the USSR, and a large part of the silo-based ICBM force would sur-
vive an attack by current US forces. We judge that the Soviets can
launch ICBMs on tactical warning, assuming their warning and com-
mand and control systems were undegraded. However, with the
increasing vulnerability of Soviet ICBM silos during the period of this
Estimate if more accurate US missiles are deployed, the Soviets will be
faced with more difficult problems in assuring adequate retaliatory
capabilities in their critical planning scenario in which they are struck
first. We have seen no evidence of a program to significantly increase
the hardness of their missile silos, and our analysis suggests the Soviets
are unlikely to see much advantage in superhardening. The Soviets will
The holder of this view is the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of
State[____1
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increasingly depend on their mobile ICBM and SLBM forces for their
retaliatory capabilities
Current Soviet antisatellite capabilities are limited and fall short of
meeting the apparent Soviet requirement to be able to deny enemy use
of space in time of war. In addition to the dedicated nonnuclear orbital
interceptor, other systems-the nuclear Galosh ABM interceptor and
two ground-based high-energy lasers-have the potential to destroy or
interfere with some satellites in near-Earth orbit; these capabilities,
however, would not survive a nuclear attack. Electronic warfare
currently represents the only potential threat to satellites in higher
orbits
The Soviets, while well aware of their inability to prevent massive
damage to the USSR with their strategic defenses, even with the
improvements taking place in these forces, have a large program to
provide protection for their leadership. We judge that, with as little as a
few hours' warning, a- large percentage of the wartime management
structure would survive a large-scale US nuclear attack.
we estimate there are
ssibly as many as 1,500 relocation facilities
for leaders at the national and regional levels.
deep underground facilities for the top national
leadership at Sharapovo and Chekhov
he Soviets may believe t at
such deep underground structures would assure the survivability of the
top leadership-a key objective of their wartime management plans.
Any judgment about the overall effectiveness of the future Soviet
air defense system against an attack by bombers and cruise missiles is
subject to considerable uncertainty. Penetration of improved Soviet air
defenses by currently deployed bombers would be more difficult. These
defenses, however, would be considerably less effective against US
cruise missiles. Our judgment is that, against a combined attack of
penetrating bombers, short-range attack missiles (SRAMs), and cruise
missiles, Soviet air defenses during the next 10 years probably would not
be capable of inflicting sufficient losses to prevent large-scale damage to
the USSR. We judge, however, that the Soviets will be able to provide
an increasingly capable air defense for many key leadership, control,
and military and industrial installations essential to wartime operations.
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There is an alternative view that this Estimate substantially
understates the capability of the Soviet air defense system to defend key
target areas against low-altitude penetrators. The holder of this view
believes that the effectiveness in such areas would be significantly
higher against a combined attack of penetrating bombers, SRAMs, and
cruise missiles than the Estimate suggests.9
While significant improvements in the capabilities of both Soviet
and US strategic offensive forces will occur throughout the next 10
years, sizable forces on both sides would survive large-scale nuclear
strikes. We believe that the Soviets' confidence in their capabilities for
global conflict probably will be critically dependent on command and
control considerations-the need for continuity in their own command
and control capabilities, and their prospects for disrupting and destroy-
ing the ability of the United States and its Allies to command and to op-
erate their forces. Although US attacks could destroy many known fixed
command, control, and communications facilities, the Soviets have
many key hardened facilities and redundant means of communications,
hus, it seems highly
likely that the Soviets could maintain overall continuity of command
and control, although it would probably be degraded. The Soviets could
experience difficulty in maintaining endurance and effectiveness for
weeks of continuing operations, particularly if subjected to US strikes.
Soviet long-range reconnaissance capabilities could be particularly
affected.
We believe the Soviets would launch continuing attacks on US and
Allied strategic command, control, and communications to prevent or
impair the coordination of retaliatory strikes, thereby easing the burden
on Soviet strategic defenses, and impairing US and Allied abilities to
marshal military and civilian resources to reconstitute forces.
Concluding Observations
The evidence shows clearly that Soviet leaders are attempting to
prepare their military forces for the possibility that they will actually
have to fight a nuclear war and are training to be able to maintain con-
trol over increasingly complex conflict situations. They have seriously
addressed many of the problems of conducting military operations in a
nuclear war, thereby improving their ability to deal with the many
contingencies of such a conflict, and raising the probability of outcomes
favorable to the USSR. An alternative view notes that it should, at the
same time, be recognized that the Soviets have not resolved many of the
critical problems bearing on the conduct of nuclear war, such as the
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nature of initiation of conflict, escalation within the theater, and
protracted nuclear operations. According to this view, while they will
try to do the best they can, the Soviets recognize that nuclear war is so
destructive, and its course so uncertain, that they could not expect an
outcome that was "favorable" in any meaningful sense.10
The evidence that we have on how the Soviets would plan to
conduct a successful military campaign provides insight into how they
would seek to end a nuclear war on their terms-by neutralizing the
ability of US intercontinental and theater nuclear forces to interfere
with Soviet capabilities to prevail in a conflict in Eurasial
10 The holder of this view is the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of
State. F__1
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