MANUSCRIPT: INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM-THE RUSSIAN BACKGROUND AND THE SOVIET LINKAGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00472R000100050052-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 15, 2008
• Sequence Number: 52
• Publication Date: May 18, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Manuscript: International Terrorism - The Russian Background and the
Soviet Linkage
FRO
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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
D/NIC
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FORM 61 O USE PREVIOUS
I-79 EDITIONS
18 May 1982
OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
INITIALS to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
LL
4ere I I A,ev
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INTETMATIONAL TERRORISM
The Russian Background
and the Soviet Linkage
by
Paul B. Henze
The author is currently a Fellow of
the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars
at the Smithsonian Institution, Washing-
ton, DC, 20560. -- This paper has been
prepared for presentation at the annual
meeting of the Canadian Political Science
Association in Ottawa, 9 June 1982. It
should not be reproduced or cited before
the date of this meeting.
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I
Among the more peculiar contradictions of our times is the persistent
and pervasive skepticism of people who otherwise pride themselves on
their critical faculties--especially journalists and academics-about the
likelihood that the Soviets might be playing an-important role in encoura-
ging and supporting international terrorism. A rich variety of rationali-
zations is repeatedly offered to dismiss'the possibility of Soviet involve-
ment or minimize it. Over and over again speculation and circumstantial
evidence of Soviet charitableness toward terrorism are met with the pro*est,
"But there is no proof." There is a disinclination to search for evidence,
or even to entertain hypotheses that a particular chain of subversive -and
violent. consequences could be the result of some degree of Soviet encourage-
ment and support, if not original initiative . The "Terrible Secret" syn-
drome seems to be in operation here.*1 Extreme formulations about terrorism
are dismissed as absurd, e.g.. "Assertions that most terrorists belong to a
worldwide network taking orders from some secret, high-ranking power center
are childishly far-fetched."*2 Probably true-but all too often then
there is a leap to the opposite-pole-because there is obviously no single
power center, it is claim that there can be none at all. Objectively both
hypotheses are untenable-and there is no evidence for either extreme view.
The subject needs to be approached with less emotional bias, a keener
sense of history and greater analytical rigor. What reason is there to
expect that a system which rests on the world's most extreme and sophisti-
cated security practices refined over a period of 65 years would permit
evidence of support of subversion and terrorism abroad even to be created
in a form which would constitute proof, let along become readily available
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abroad? The search for-documentary evidence, for a long, time to come,.
is unlikely to prove fruitful. It is, after all, not a new problem for
students of the Soviet Union and communist systems. Documentary evidence
on the most sensitive aspects of the workings of all totalitarian systems
eventually becomes available primarily as the result of accident or dis-
aster. There are lessons-from previous experience in dealing with the
most odious aspects of the Soviet system. The extraordinary gullibility
of some intellectuals in the 1920's and 1930's is well known.*3 The capa-
city to disbelieve was most strikingly demonstrated in connection with two
related phenomena: the great purges-and the GULAG system.
There was a remarkable degree of reluctance to recognize the scope and
depth of the purges of the 1930's, even in the face of publicity and
partial evidence at the time. The notion was nurtured that perhaps, after
all, most'of these people had actually been engaged in'treasonable plotting
with the Nazis or with exiles or other anti-Communist forces.*4 And the
concentration camps-perhaps they did exist, but weren't they intended
primarily for re-education, for reforming society?*5 The first compre-
hensive documentary study of them was too impressive to be dismissed
lightly*6, but it still met with skepticism. The chain of revelations
which Khrushchev set in motion three years after the death of Stalin finally
provided evidence which destroyed the cumulative body of apologetics and
rationalization that had been produced during the previous two decades
about the purges and the forced labor system. The monumental works of
Robert Conquest*7 ind.Alexander Solzhenitsyn*8 have exposed these appal-
ling features of the Soviet system in such detail that it is no longer
possible for an honest observer to ignore them.
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These past experiences should be taken into account when we examine the
possibility of Soviet sponsorship and support for various kinds of sub-
versive activity during the past two decades. Elementary prudence calls
for reserving judgment, however severe the lack of current hard evidence
maybe. The clean bill of health some current writers are so ready to
grant the Soviets may be badly compromised by the revelations of defectors
or even of future Soviet leaders who, like Thrushchev, may see it in their
interest to reveal some of their predecessors' misdeeds and excesses.
Let us go back a bit, however. No people should be held hostage to its
history, but history is relevant. To a degree far beyond an~,thing that
can be found in Western democratic tradition or experience, political in-
trigue, brutality, terrorism-"the habit of violence"*9--have been charac-
teristic features of the Russian political scene. While Western Europe
and the United States were evolving in the directiof more open, partici-
patory societies in the late 19th and early 20th centuries,.Russian evo-
lution was tragically in the direction of greater entanglement in terror
and intrigue on the part of both the state and its enemies.*10
Marx was not as opposed to terror as some authors have preferred to think.
In the wake of the events of 1848 he wrote:
"There is only-one way to shorten the murderous death agonies
of the old society, only one way to shorten the bloody birth
pangs of the new society.. only one means--revolutionary terrorism. "*1-1
The degree to which Marx and Engels approved'of terror in subsequent,years
will always be subject to debate, but at the very least it can be said that
Marxist ideas, as they became part of the ideological ferment which infected
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,
the Russian Empire during the second half of the 19th century, contributed
to formation of the view that violent change was going to be needed to
set Russia on a path toward change and progress. Bakunin, Kropotkin,
Nechaev, the People's Will, the Social Revolutionaries, -along with the
extraordinary double agent Azeff, are all part of a line of development
which culminated in Lenin, "the High Priest of Tenor."*12 This course
of development was not inevitable--the historical balance was tipped in
very delicate ways at crucial junctures during.the years before 1917-
but in the end Lenin and Bolshevism triumphed and this is the legacy
that is most relevant for the history of the Soviet Union and the prob-
lems it represents for the world today.
"The centrality of Lenin to modern terror is now beyond dispute...
Lenin believed capitalism to be violence; the revolutionary
use of violence was not more than a wholly proper counterviolence."*13
It is the same argument used by the Baader-Meinhof gang and the Italian
Red Brigades. Most of the philosophy of these and other modern terrorist
groups can be found in Nechaev's Catechism of a Revolutionary. Is it
merely accidental?
Lenin wrote in Iskra in 1901:
"In principle we have never rejected terror nor can we reject it.
Terror is one of those military means that can come in handy and be
even necessary at a certain moment of a battle, when the troops are
in a certain shape under certain circumstances..."*14
After seizing power in November 1917, Lenin rapidly applied these principles.
Terror became the main method by which the Bolsheviks consolidated their
hold on Russia and did in their rivals for power.*15 Class war meant then,
as it has meant ever since, resort to terror when it was'waged at full in-
.tensity:
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"The operative word in what Lenin called the class war was not
class but war. This. involved not merely an acceptance of
terror and a loving concern with the idea of its application.,
but also a pedantic elaboration of terroristic methods that
distinguished him from other socialist leaders."*16
The notion that it was Stalin who brutalized the Soviet system is an il-
lusion. Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago makes-clear that it was Lenin,
not Stalin, who got the system going.*17 The history of-Soviet Russia
falls into periods of terror, relieved by-periods of relative relaxation,.
with regional' variations. In the country as a whole, terror dominated
during collectivization and with only ,a brief period of relaxation inten-
sified again during the period of the great purges. Substantial internal
relaxation ,became necessary to enable the country to defeat the Nazi
invasion, but terror was reimposed even before the war's end when
several nationalities considered collaborators were uprooted and deported
to Central Asia and Siberia,*18 and continued through the dispatch to
forced labor camps of millions of returned prisoners of war, laborers
and alleged traitors (primarily Russians and other Slavs) and the purging
of the Baltic states and the Ukraine in the period 1945-50.
Since Stalin's death, terror as a tool of domestic management has been
applied in more differentiated, subtle and sophisticated ways, but it
has never been absent from the Soviet internal scene. Only through perio-
dic application of violence has the USSR been able to maintain control
over the captive peoples of Eastern Europe.
r None of this history proves, of course, that the Soviet Union has been
supporting international terrorism, but it has to be-accepted as an es-
sential part of any honest discussion of the subject. A system relying
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on deliberate and continual application of techniques of subversion
and violence to maintain itself in power over.its own population would
naturally resort to similar methods for protecting its interests and ex-
tending influence abroad. This becomes all the more likely because of
continued adherence to the concept of the universality of the Soviet
communist system and the desirability--indeed, historical inevitability-
of extending it to the entire world through revolutionary means. .
Covert activity abroad has been a feature of'the Soviet system from its
earliest days with varying patterns of collaboration, avoidance and
rivalry between party and intelligence instrumentalities. There-. is a
large memoir literature dealing with the period preceding WWII*19, expanded
enormously after 1946, and-several comprehensive studies of Soviet intelli-
gence and subversive operations*20 which take most of the defector memoirs
into account. This material leaves no doubt that the Soviet Union has de-
voted enormous resources to clandestine operations, expanded its capabili-
ties continually, extended its geographic range of operations and refined
its-techniques. There is no basis for an assumption, in global terms, that
the Soviets have ever downgraded the priority or restricted the momentum
clandestine operations in spite of periodic exposures and temporary set-
backs in several countries, some of which are well documented. The dominant
characteristic of these Soviet activities has always been persistence, per-
severance and effort in depth. Eastern European intelligence services which
were rapidly built up as the Russians consolidated control over these coun-
tries were already given important auxiliary tasks in the 1950's.
During the 1950's it was already apparent that operations conducted within
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the formal government structure enjoyed higher priority than those under-
taken through party channels. This trend has continued. It has made pos-
sible the support of non-communist, nationalist and even rightist groups.
Power considerations have-long since outdistanced ideology as a criterion
for judging the-worthiness of instrumentalities and individuals for support.
The Soviets have often displayed remarkable imaginativeness--and opportunism-
about manipulating and camouflaging raw power considerations under various
kinds of ideological cloaks which make them more respectable in the Third
World and among intellectuals everywhere.
Western reaction to the Korean invasion in 1950. was a shock from which
Stalin never recovered. Khrushchev, once he had gained a firm hold on
power, was daring about competing with the Free World for. influence on a
much more flexible basis but he suffered a severe setback when Kennedy
forced him to back down during the Cuban missile crisis. East-West compe-
tition during the past 20 years has been profoundly affected by decisions
the Soviets took in the period immediately following this 1962 humiliation.
These may well have been Khrushchev's decisions, even though he was unable
for long to maintain his hold on power.
The former Czech general, Jan jna who fled in 1968, maintains that the
Soviet Union had committed itself by 1964 to avast, long-range expansion
of covert operations in all major countries of the Free World and that
this plan included expansion of East European surrogate capabilities.*21
It also involved encouragement of Castro's ambitions to revolutionize Latin
America and the entire Third World. The Tricontinental structure--AALAPSO--
came into operation in 1966 and rapidly expanded as a propaganda and opera-
tional instrument for encouraging anti-Western revolutionary ferment where-
ver the ground looked even mildly fertile. ' Castro had no financial means
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of his own. Cuba was totally dependent then, as it has-been ever
'since, on Soviet funding and material-including arms--support for
.every major foreign operation it has undertaken.*22 Che Guevara
was prominent in this early phase, first in Africa, then in Bolivia,
where he met'his demise and in the process discredited romantic revo-
lutionary adventurism.*23
Lessons were learned from all these experiences. And more were learned
from the student and intellectual ferment which welled up throughout
the Free World in the late 1960's. There is evidence of direct Soviet
involvement in some of these activities*24 They encouraged and publi-
cized most of .them through overt and covert propaganda channels. A
wide variety of surrogate arrangements were used. Many countries proved
amenable to Soviet purposes: Syria, South Yemen, Iraq and Libya, all of
which were used, e.g., along with Cuba, for support of Eritreans and
other anti-Ethiopian activities in the late 1960's and early 1970's.
North Korea was especially useful in areas where the Russians were com-
peting with the still active Chinese Communists for influence on libera-
tion movements and guerrilla organizations. The Palestinians began to
be developed as a major operational force in the late 1960's, when they
were especially susceptible as a result of the Israeli victory in the
1967 war. By this time, the controled intelligence services of Eastern
Europe had reached a relatively high degree of effectiveness. The best
were the East Germans, Czechoslovaks, Bulgarians and Hungarians. The
Soviet capacity to exploit the Czechoslovak service seems to have in-
creased, rather than declined, in the wake of the invasion at the end
of the summer in 1968.
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It was at the turn of the decade that a shift from relatively diffuse
agitational and propaganda activity toward more tightly organized con-
spiratorial and violent operations occurred: terrorism in its more
dramatic and alarming forms. Cuba had encouraged hijackings of aircraft
from the US and Latin American in the late 1960's. Hijackings spread
in the 1970's. Palestinians had a natural affinity for risk-taking and
Qaddafy, very soon after he consolidated his hold on Libya, displayed
a strong desire to achieve impact in a much larger arena.
During the 1970's most of the long-standing clandestine broadcasting
operations which the Soviet Union had sponsored since the 1950s were
terminated. By the end of the decade, only those broadcasting to Turkey
(two stations) and Iran (one station in two languages) remained. (Both
played important roles in the political deterioration which affected both
countries in the late.1970's.) Meanwhile evidence of intensified Soviet
effort in the field of disinformation, subversive propaganda and forgery
began to accumulate. Some of this material was designed to serve specific
purposes. Most of it was aimed at undermining confidence in Western
governments and at disrupting US relationships with allied and friendly
governments.*25 In the broadest sense, its purpose was to foster aliena-
tion, suspicion and resentment in free world societies, fan tensions and
help build a climate where terrorism and violent destabilization would
seem credible and natural as manifestations of acute political dissatis-
faction.
During a period when US leadership wavered and.faltered, NATO was beset
by increasing strain, economic crisis spread following the.1973 Israeli-
Arab war and OPEC oil price increases, violence spread. This was a time
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when most democratic countries were coping with social and political
strains resulting from efforts to achieve more complete democracy, broader
social justice and rectification of economic, ethnic and regional imbalan-
ces. Some form of terrorism developed in most free democratic countries.
It reflected local causes in many specific instances and fed on indi-
genous grievances and frustrations. There nevertheless often seemed to
be insidious processes of exacerbation at work. Though generally left-
ist in ideological underpinnings and rationalizations and sometimes
declaredly fighting rightist groups and ideas, terrorists' ideological
motivations became more vague in direct proportion.to their propensity
for violence. The most dedicated terrorists seemed often to come from
the most affluent levels of society. Extreme nationalism was a factor
in some cases, but was often entirely absent. A curious form of abstract
internationalism, devoid of real humanitarianism and nihilistic t its
core, was the most characteristic motivation. More often, it seemed to
be mere lust for power, self-dramatizing adventurism.
What was most surprising.was that attitudes toward the Soviet Union were
seldom hostile, often equivocal, sometimes surprisingly indulgent in the
light of other goals the terrorists claimed to be pursuing. Such equivo-
cation and generosity was almost always reciprocated by the Soviets them-
selves. They showed remarkable understanding, sympathy and at times
open enthusiasm for disaffected "revolutionary" groups working to destroy
Western societies in spite of the fact that both sides knew that the
most benign actions of the same kind in :Ioscow or Minsk would provoke
immediate KGB repression.*26
As Claire Sterling notes, the terrorists
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have never tried to dismantle a society under Soviet spon-
sorship.. They haven't lifted a finger against some of the
most appalling tyrannies on record, either. Uganda-under
the maniac rule of Idi Amin did not make their list. (In
fact, Palestinians volunteered to act as his personal body-
guard.) Nor did the Central African Empire under the canni-
bal reign of Emperor Bokassa... Yet the nearly empty desert
sultanate of Oman has been high on their list and so has a
stretch of Saharan sand staked out by the Polisario guerril-
las, demanding statehood for a_population of eighty thousand...*27
To a remarkable extent, there is a common denominator in a very large
percentage of terrorist activity: it supports direct or indirect Sov-
iet political or ideological objectives. When Ethiopia was a western-
oriented country, dependent on the US for its principal military sup-
port and offering modest military facilities for US use, the Eritrean
insurgency was sustained by Communist and radical Arab countries, Libya
prominent among them. All of these countries have discovered that the
Eritrean insurgency is not a genuine "liberation" movement since the
USSR fully embraced the Ethiopian Revolution in 1976 and Eritreans now
depend on conservative Arabs for most of the support they receive.
Castro, who has no independent resources with which to support the Eri-
treans in any case, has shown some reserve :which by some has been in
terpreted as residual moral commitment, but may simply represent a con-
venient reinsurance policy against the possibility that the Soviet-Ethio-
pian alliance might turn sour and return to support of anti-Ethiopian
violence would again become desirable.*28
Increased emphasis on human rights in American foreign policy during
the 1970`s coincided with with steadily mounting terrorism--the very
antithesis of human rights. This was also a time of especially grue-
some manifestations of vengefulness toward dissidents and critics of
?,9
oppression in countries ruled by Communists."/Mounting, resentment of
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exploitation and repression in Communist-ruled countries, however,
did not result in outbreaks of comparable mass or individually-oriented
violence there, but instead in the evolution of more humane, construc-
tive and politically- sophisticated forms of resistance and pressure for
reform, of whidh the best known example is the massive country-wide
labor union, Solidarity, in Poland.
An enormous amount has been written about political dissent, violence
and terrorism in free societies during the past decade. It would be
impossible even to try to summarize all of it here. Let us take a
brief look at developments in two important :Mediterranean countries
as a means of gaining more understanding of the-problem and some in-
sight into the Soviet stance toward it: Italy and Turkey.*30
Italian President Pertini hit a tender Soviet nerve when, in an in-
terview over French television in January 1981, he voiced his sus-
picion that the Red Brigades were directed from abroad:
"I don't know, I only suspect it, and therefore I can only
express my suspicion. How is it that terrorism was unleashed
in Turkey, in a land that has a 1000-km. common border with
the Soviet Union? How is it that it is so strong in Italy,
which is a democratic bridge between Europe, Africa and the
Near East?"*31
A few days later the Soviet foreign-ministry summoned the Italian
ambassador and protested Pertini's remarks. Moscow's sensitivity
provoked an extensive debate in Italy. The confessions of captured
terrorists shed more light on the origins and support of extremism
in Italy as they became available in the press last year. Claire
Sterling analyzed some of this material in a chilling article in
the July 1981 Encounter in which she demonstrated that the Red Brig
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ades were far from an accidental development or merely the consequence
of the irrationality and contradictions of Italian society.*32
The intellectual formulations that produced them were provided by a
celebrated political science professor at the University of Padua,
Antonio Negri. Until his death in =larch 1972 while trying to blow
up an electric pylon, the famous leftist publisher Giangiacomo Feltri-
nelli provided a funding channel, protection and, along with Negri,
lenian aura of chic respectability to what was in effect a scheme not
only for destroying democracy in Italy, but also? Tying to ensure that
*33
only the most radical political alternative would follow./ The ter-
rorists aimed to undermine the moderate leadership of the Italian Com-
munist Party-at odds with Moscow ever since the Czechoslovak invasion
in 1968-and prevent the party from participating as a respectable poli-
tical force in an Italian government. This position would accord with
the position of the most conservative elements in the Soviet Communist
heirarchy.
The elaborate and highly professional structure which was created to
support the Red Brigades-the "Organization"-was brought into being
in Rome in September 1971 by a small group attending a congress of the
most doctrinaire leftist elements of the PCI. This was hardly contrary
to the desires of the USSR, then or later. All through the 1970's Red
Brigade members continued to'go to Czechoslovakia for training, as Fel-
trinelli had frequently done before his death.. Could anything of this
sort happening in Czechoslovakia after the Soviet invasion have been
contrary to Soviet desires? It would hardly have been the result of
Czechoslovak initiative... Red Brigade defectors have testified that
they received large quantities of weapons shipped* via Hungary and Austria
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from Czechoslovakia*34 while Czechoslovak diplomats were repeatedly
expelled from Italy for involvement in subversion throughout the 1970's.
It is remarkable that the Italian government gave little publicity to-
these expulsions and took no retaliatory mreasures against Czechoslo-
vakia. Indulgence did not pay. There is also evidence of many kinds
of links between Red Brigades and Palestinians, South Yemenis and
Libyans. Though the illusion was created that Italian terrorists
financed themselves with extortion and bank robberies, hard evidence
is lacking. The actual situation, if and when fuller data become av
ail-
able, may turn out to be similar tb that in Turkey-where vast sums'of
money were obviously provided from outside the country. There is some
evidence of encouragement of rightist terrorism in Italy as a foil-for
the left,.and with the aim of encouraging wider destabilization and
demoralization. The famous Bologna railway station bombing in August
1980 may fall into this category-its instigators have never been un-
covered.
While Turkey experienced a hiatus in terrorism and subversion during
the years which followed the 1971 military mini-intervention, and
violence did not again become a marked feature of the Turkish political
scene until the latter part of the 1970's, Italy endured a steady esca-
lation. By 1975 there were 702 terrorist incidents in the year. The
rate increased steadily until 1980: 1976 - 1198; 1977 - 2124; 1978 -
2365; 1979 - 2750.
Until 1977 the dfficial Italian Co=..unist position was that the flad
Brigades were merely an extension of neo-Fascist conspiracy. Party
spokesmen had.conceded the leftist nature of the Red Brigades*35
shortly before the shocking kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro in
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v
:?Iarch 1978. This act was directed not only against the Christian
Democrats but against the PCI itself--to prevent formation of a gov-
ernment with Communist backing. When Moro 's. body was found it had
been deposited half way between the headquarters of the PCI and the
Christian Democrats:*36 Within days the Soviet propaganda machine
began suggesting US links to Iloro's murder. Propaganda fabrications
were used to provide "substantiation" for new allegations. An article
in Problems of Peace and Socialism in December 1978 alleged that the
Red Brigades were manipulated through pro-Fascist organizations (a
position the PCI had now abandoned) organized by the CIA! The tech-
nique is .a familiar feature of Soviet practice. It was applied
shortly .after the May 1981 assassination attempt against the Pope
when the Soviets' Italian-language USSR Oggi featured a Novosti
article filled with insinuations that Mehmet Ali Agca had been acting
at the instigation of the US.*37
Red Brigades activity leveled off in 1980 but has by no means ceased..
The Italian security authorities have been gathering rich additional
information from a spate of prisoners and defectors. The full story
remains to be told.. Let us shift to Turkey.
Turkey is an easier case study than Italy because it experienced two
distinct waves of terrorism, both of which were brought to an end by
military intervention anda systematic round-up of terrorists'whose
interrogations produced an enormous amount of information on their
organization, motivation and sources of support.
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As in much of the Free World, student agitation and intellectual
ferment developed in Turkey in the late 1960's. Initially mild in
method, these movements soon fell under the influence of the extreme
left and became stridently anti-US and anti-NATO, attitudes which did
not correspond to any significant body of public opinion in the coun-
try.*38 Riots and disorders escalated into terrorism in 1969 with
the emergence of the "Turkish People's Liberation Army" and other.
extremist groups who found the means to carry out bombing attacks, as-
sassination attempts, kidnappings and hijackings during the next two
years. They were encouraged by two Soviet-sponsored clandestine
An episode involving the kidnapping of four US airmen precipitated. a
government crisis in March 1971 when military leaders suspended the
constitutional process, installed a civilian national-unity government
and proclaimed martial law. It took the better part of a year (and
several more spectacular terrorist incidents) before violence was halted.
Over 4000 terrorists and supporters had been arrested, interrogated and
tried and more than 2000 imprisoned by the summer of 1973. Extensive
evidence of external financial and arms support from Communist sources
was assembled, issued in a massive classified study and summarized in
a smaller White Book.*39 Elections in October 1973 resulted in forma-
tion of a weak coalition government early in 1974 with socialist-
leaning Bllent Ecevit as prime minister. One of his first initiatives
was to secure from parliament an amnesty releasing most of the terror-
ists who had been incarcerated during the previous three years.
Strong circumstantial evidence of Soviet and Soviet-surrogate support
for subversion in Turkey as well as a good deal of, specific evidence
of arms shipments and direct contacts between Communists and Turks
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came for all practical purposes to be forgotten or ignored during
the next three years when Turkey becane preoccupied with Cyprus,
strains with Greece and the US arms embargo and then fell into chronic
political and. economic crisis.*40 Ecevit's amnesty for terrorists had
been based on a widely field belief among Turkish intellectuals, which
remained current through the 1970's, that terrorism was the natural
result of sociological processes and political immaturity. Generosity
toward young people who had gone astray was thought likely to wean
them from violence. By 1976, however, some were found to be returning
to their old ways.
During the period 1977-80 Turkey experienced a second wave of subver-
sion and terrorism several times as destructive and with much more
far-reaching ramifications than the first. Terrorism by rightists
became a major feature of the situation.*41 Though US personnel and
installations were deliberately attacked, the main focus of the second
terrorist assault wave was Turkish society itself. By 1978 left-right
clashes were disrupting life in many parts of the co-ntry. High schools
and universities were crippled by clashes but their problems were over-
shadowed by the commotion and tension which infected religious sects,
labor unions, professional associations, tribal and ethnic factions
and the political parties themselves. Unemployed youth became a major
recruiting ground for terrorist organizers. By 1979 police and security
forces were frequent targets of violence. Terrorism became increasingly
irrational as the level of violence increased. "Liberated areas" cane
to be proclaimed in urban slum districts-and from somewhere funds
and arms had arrived to operate them. Terrorism contributed to economic
decline, but was not itself the result- of economic strain. Radical
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unions, who represented a very small part or the work force, called
-strikes-to disrupt production. After the economic stabilization pro-
gram which has already proved so successful was announced in January
1980, the level?of violence increased markedly. When killings reached
the level of 28 per day in the late summer of 1930, the military lead-
ership took control of the country. The need to prevent economic re-
form from being undermined by terrorism was an important considenation
in the military decision to take power.*42
Massive arrests of terrorists and surrender and confiscation of arms,
followed by interrogations and investigations which are not yet completed,
are producing the largest and most extensive body of data on country-
wide terrorism which has yet come to light anywhere. Sociology is in-
adequate as an explanation for what has been uncovered. It is clear
that Turkey was the target of one of the most intense and sophisticated
foreign-instigated destabilization operations the world has knout. More
than 800,000 hand weapons had been collected by the end of 1931, con-
servatively valued at $300 million--and almost all of foreign origin.
Vast quantities of ammunition, explosive material and-many other kinds
of ar*is--mines, grenades, mortars, rockets, bombs-have also been
gathered. 30,000 terrorists and supporters have been incarcerated and
are still in various stages of being dealt with; another 10-15,000 have
fled abroad.
These people were generously supplied with funds for travel, communi-
cations, propaganda, payments to agitators and, of course, their own
living expenses. The myth that terrorists of this kind live from bank
robberies, extortions and proceeds from sale of stolen goods has been
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discredited by what is known in Turkey. Security and police had kept
careful records of all 'such robberies and thefts. Extortion was rare.
Total funds terrorists could have netted in such fashion during the
years 1977-80 accounts for less than 2% of the total of $1 billion esti-
mated as required to finance terrorism during this time: for this en-
tailed not only all the costs already mentioned, but the cost of vast
amounts of arms and ammunition expended, the costs of transporting them
to Turkey and within the country.
The left and right, in spite of intense rivalry and destructive in-
fighting, have been found to have,drawn on similar-sometimes essentially
identical-sources of arms and funds. There are many other intriguing
facts of this situation on which I have written elsewhere at greater
length*43 and additional information continues to be published. in the
Turkish press almost daily. Everything, points to the Soviet Union as
the only plausible source of the funds and initiative that sustained
this massive effort to destroy democracy in Turkey, the country's economy
and Turks' confidence in themselves.
if
Before, in conclusion, I offer some general hypotheses about the
Soviet relationship to international terrorism-none of them provable
in an absolute sense, but all as worthy of consideration, I contend, s
the proposition that the Soviets do not support terrorism or are opposed
to it--let.me summarize the conclusions I have reached to date in a con-
tinuing investigation of the most spectacular and mysterious terrorist
action'of our era-Iehmet Ali Agca's attempt to assassinate what the
Economist called "The Ultimate Target", Pope John Paul II.
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When shots rang out in St. Peter's Square on the'sunny afternoon of
13 May 1981 and the Polish Pope collapsed in a pool of blood while
shocked bystanders helped police seize a young Turk, 'Iehmet Ali Agca,
there was a rush to judgment. Some journalists delivered themselves
of exactly the conclusion the sponsors of this act must have desired:
"Agca is a cold-eyed fanatic--a Turkish ultra-nationalist
and religious zealot who hates the West and Christianity
and sought the most effective way to attack them."
(Georgie Ann Geyer in the Washington Star, 15 May 1981)
"At the root of this terrorist attempt against the Pope is a
turbulent Islamic society, pregnant with nasty surprises.
The lesson is that those who.look to the Moslem world as
a.sure supplier of oil or a steady ally against Moscow do
so at their peril."
(Joe Kraft in the Washington Post, 19 May 1981)*44
The Palestinian apologist, Rev. Hilarion Capucci, had hurriedly called
a press conference in Rome on 15 May 1981 to deny any Palestinian sup-
port for Agca and the Christian Science ilonitor reported from Rome two
days later a theory that Qaddafy during his visit to Moscow the previous
month had offered to oblige the Russians in bringing Poland to heel by
arranging to have the Pope assassinated so that he could not carry out
his vow to return to his h omeland to support his countrymen if the
Russians invaded.
Nevertheless, on the basis of what evidence it is not clear, Joe Harsch
announced in the Christian Science Monitor on 2 June that there could be
"...no serious suggestion that the deed was motivated
from Moscow or the mavt trained by Moscow or its agents."
Hugh Sidey was much less sure. He came out with a chillingly realistic
but admittedly hypothetical account of Agca as the chosen instrument in
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a master plot of the KGB's Department of Wet Affairs: "Playing an.
Assassin Like a Fish"', Washington Star, 14 June 1981. It presents a
set of hypotheses which the passage of a year's time, the investigation,
interrogation and trial of Agca, the interrogation and trial of several
accomplices in Turkey, the work of journalists, academic researchers and
police and security authorities in several countries have done nothing
Agca,.though young (he only turned 24 this past January), was not without
a past. He had already assassinated a leading public figure in Turkey,
the highly respected editor of the liberal newspaper Milliyet, Abdi Ipeksi.
Ipeksi had been gunned down on his way home from work in February 1979
as the result of a carefully pre-meditated plot, which involved accom-
plices. Agca was not caught until 25 June 1979, when police apprehended
him in an Istanbul cafe and he quickly confessed to the Ipeksi murder but
revealed very little about the supporters behind him in the course of five
months of interrogation and trial before he escaped on 23 November 1979.
His escape was the result of a carefully organized operation which could
have taken place only as a result of organized effort and plentiful money.
He was driven out of prison in a soldier's uniform. He did not surface
again until the shots rang out in St. Peter's Square.
If the Agca story were simple and clear-cut it would be much easier to
write about than it is. I have been engaged in an intermittent effort
for a year to pull all the strands together and an, far from having the
task finished. `,rnat follows represents the conclusions of a 70-page
report which I completed in December 1931; this report, in turn, rested
on an earlier 30-page study I had finished in September 1981.*45 - In
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the course of these researches I have spent two periods in Turkey and
several days in Italy. I have had the co-operation of Turkish officials.
I have interviewed Agca's family and reviewed a large quantity of documen-
tation. I plan to continue this work later this year. What I set forth
below are the conclusions I reached last December. Though additional in-
formation has come to light since then, it does not alter these conclu-
sions in any significant way.
It is possible to say quite definitely what Agca is not-he is not
*a Muslim fanatic, or religious at all.
*demonstrably anti-Christian.
*an active rightist/nationalist in Turkish terms.
*stupid, ignorant, mentally unbalanced.
*a psychopath.
There is no evidence that Agca began his career as an assassin under
blackmail or some identifiable form of pressure.. that forced him to act
against his will. There is a great deal of evidence that demonstrates
that he possesses an unusually keen intelligence and alert mind. He had
a consistent record as an outstanding student at every level of his studies.
During his student years, Agca was a loner, serious, mildly introverted,
with some reputation for arrogance and cocksureness. He was ambitious
and worked hard from an early age to earn money to help his family and
himself.
It is difficult to get a clear picture of Agca's ideological orientation
and of influences that shaped his political attitudes. He appears to
have gone to considerable length (and perhaps even some physical risk)
to avoid engagement in student political turbulence in both high school
and university. On what this passionate above-politics attitude rested
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is not clear. It has not yet been possible to determine what books he
read during this time and what periodical publications influenced him
during his university period.
There are, nevertheless, intriguing indications of leftist orientation
in what we have of his writing: his note attacking the Pope's visit to
Turkey after his escape in 1979 and the note left in his hotel room when
he went off to shoot the Pope (claiming that he was acting to further free-
dom in Afghanistan and El Salvador); as well as in parts of his confession
written after his 1979 arrest.
There is no evidence of training with rightist or leftist groups in
Turkey itself. Agca acknowledged that he had had PLO training (presumably
in Lebanon) during his initial interrogation in Rome and then retracted
the admission after Rev. Capucci had denied it. As far as we know, he
has not acknowledged Libyan training. There is no confirmation of the
dramatic story that appeared in the Turkish press last fall of KGB training
in the USSR. If Turkish authorities have confirmation of training. in Bul-
garia, they have not yet released it.
There can be no doubt about organizational backing and generous supply
of funds. The assassination of Ipekri required careful '-planning and Agca
deposited what for his circumstances was a sizable sum in his mother's
bank account before he committed that crime. Everything we have learned and
deduced about the assassination attempt aginst the Pope demonstrates exten-
sive professional organizational support. Agca exchanged foreign funds in
Italy shortly before he attempted to kill the Pope and had cash totalling
nearly $20,000 on him when he was apprehended in St. Peter's Square.
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Agca appears to have been playing a leftist role, camouflaged as
a rightist and supported by mechanisms embedded in ;fart in Turkish
rightist organizations, both in the country and among Turks in ;er-
many. Agca's own motivation may not have been primarily political.
He may have been acting out of expectation of monetary gain and some
form of fame. His sponsors, detecting intense ambition and judging
i,t exploitable, may have capitalized on his megalomania to compromise
as well as inspire him, from one step to another, into a condition of
malleability. In the final analysis, there is no plausible motive
for Agca's attack on the Pope except an "Eastern" one. No country,
faction or group could expect to benefit from the elimination of John
Paul II in any clear-cut and obvious way--except the leaders in.the
Deeper examination of the Ipekci murder in Turkey makes it appear
less and less likely to have been instigated by the right. While
Soviet backing for it need not be postulated to explain it, neither
can it be ruled out. It had the effect of demoralizing the country
at a time when destabilization was already well advanced.
Would Agca have known that he was working for the Russians? It is
conceivable that his awareness of his ultimate backing may have been
very limited in the beginning. It is difficult to believe that he
could have maintained the illusion so completely as planning for the
attack on the Pope progressed-he was simply too intelligent--but it
is possible that lie had been flattered/deluded into believing that he
was serving some supra-national cause.
The attack on the Pope has been officially declared by the Italian
court which tried Agca to have been the result of an organization-backed.
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conspiracy. Whatever the specifics of this conspiracy, our best
source on them has to be Agca himself who, unlike Lee Harvey Oswald,
.is still alive and must be going through some process of reflection
and self-examination as he endures solitary confinement in a succession
of Italian high-security prisons.' It is possible, however, that even
Agca might not be able to shed full light on the background of the opera-
tion in which he was the key figure. If the KGB did mount it with the
approval of the highest authority in the Kremlin, we must expect a mis-
sion so important to have been carried out with the highest degree of
clandestine skill: compartmentation, decoy and ruse tactics, cut-out
and fail-safe support mechanisms. There is fair evidence that all of
these were indeed used. No one involved except "master control" would
have known the full plan.
But we should also not lose sight of the fact that Agca, after all,
bungled the job given him. He did not kill the Pope. His attempts to
confound his interrogators, though imaginative, have not really succeeded.
He has given away enough to make himself not credible in the role his
sponsors apparently envisioned for him if caught: a Turkish
fanatic who would be seen in himself as sufficient explanation. for the
foul deed that was to have been committed.or, perhaps, a mentally un-
balanced psychopath. Everything that has been learned about Agca belies
these notions. There is, furthermore, no basis for rancor against the
Pope in Turkey either as a Catholic Christian or as a Pole. Such con-
siderations have been absent from the concerns of Turkish rightists and
religious-conservatives. And, of course, Agca was not a religious con-
servative, never had any religious concerns, has. no record of any pre-
occupation that could in itself have led him to devote 18 months
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to mysterious travels through more thana dozen countries in preparation
for killing the leader of the Roman Catholic Church and the single man
who commands more respect in today's world than any other...
Moscow has been largely silent about Agca. From time to time odd
.tales that look like disinformation crop up. The 'Munich tabloid
Bildzeitung, e.g., came out with a story in October 1981 which tried
to depict Agca as a partner of German neo-Nazist he had allegedly spent
six months training with a group of them in Bavaria. It doesn't fit
anything else known about him. Allegations of Nazi links are a time-
worn KGB ploy.
There is much more to be learned about Agca. It is to be hoped that
further investigation in Italy, additional work by European security
services 'deeper investigations in.Turkey will all gradually fill in
the partial picture we now have.
In the final analysis, Agca cannot be understood in isolation from
the phenomenon of terrorism in Turkey.. The more we learn about it the
more likely it appears that was
*deliberately fomented and supported on a massive scale by
the Soviet , Union,. utilizing surrogates such as Bulgaria
and Syria as principal channels for arms, and that
*the Soviet modus operandi included multi-faceted infiltra-
tion and build-up of rightist groups to serve as a foil
for the left and accelerate tie destabilization process.
The pattern has parallels with what has been happening in Italy and else-
where in the Free World. Terrorism in Turkey merits greater study than
it has yet received and the material for such study is fortunately becom-
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ing available. The same is true of terrorism in Italy and a great
many other countries, including Germany, Spain and northern Ireland.
The initial question to be asked is, of course: Is all this violence
merely a manifestation of infection by a socio-political virus that is
or
naturally generated by democratic systems,/by'the ferment of moderniza-
tion, the ordeal of change and.adaptation? An easy yes is.not enough.
Who are the terrorists? What is their. organizational structure? What
common denominators are there from one country to another? Where does
the money really come from? What are their links abroad? Are surface
appearances substantiated by deeper probing? That is merely the first
phase. Then we have to ask: CIII BONO? Soviet charitableness toward
terrorism and violence'is sufficiently well demonstrated, and KGB in-
volvement has been frequently enough exposed, to justify more systema-
tic testing of the possibilities of Soviet support. It is like the
search for the cause of pernicious disease. We see the disease around
us. The results are apparent. There have to be causes and contributing
factors. Facile, comforting expla~tions of them will not enable us to
find a cure. All possible causes and . contributory-considerations ought
to be examined. What is wrong with putting the burden of proof on the
Soviets from time to time?
The Free World has been trying to come to terms with the Soviet Union
since World War II. The effort has not been notably successful. Ex-
perience has demonstrated that the challenge the Soviet Empire repre-
sents for the rest of the world is not effectively met if we permit
our approach to the problem to rest on illusions. One of the most com-
fortable ways to deal with a seemingly intractable problem is to pretend
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that it does-not exist. This phenomenon has been apparent in recent
months in the debate over mounting evidence of Soviet use of lethal
chemical and biological substances against Third World 'peoples resisting
Soviet-backed subjugation-the "Yellow Rain" controversy. The Wall
Street Journal's editorial of 30 December 1981, "Denial", defines the
issues sharply.
The mere possibility that Soviet leaders have been systematically abet-
ting terrorism as a means of undermining rapidly developing and advanced
societies carries too many implications for our own security and well
being to be dealt with lightly. The questions raised by the Agca case
dramatize the problem as nothing else could. His is the most mysterious
crime since Lee Harvey Oswald murdered John Kennedy. Oswald has never
been convincingly explained as anything other than a lone assassin.
Agca was no lone assassin. It is clear that an organization recruited
and supported h in in the effort to kill Karol Wojtyla, Pope John Paul II.
The who and the why of this case can tell us a great deal about the
nature of the world in which we live and the problems we must overcome
to ensure continuation of the way of life we prefer. We can fail to
pursue these issues only at our own peril.
Washington, DC - May 1982
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1 - The reference is to the reluctance on the part of the outer world,
including Jews themselves, to recognize the truth.of the Nazi holo-
caust. The phenomenon has been documented and analyzed in detail by
Walter Z. Laqueur in The Terrible Secret, New York/London, 1980, and
summarized in Encounter, "Hitler's Holocaust", July 1980.
2 - Political Terrorism, Facts on File, New York, 1975, p. 6.
3 - The best recent compilation of material recalling this tendency is
Paul Hollander's Political Pilgrims, New York/London, 1981. A selec-
tion of highlights appeared in Encounter, "Pilgrims on the Run", Octo-
ber 1981.
4 - For a striking example, see Frederick L. Schuman, then Woodrow Wilson
Professor of Government at Williams College, in Soviet Politics at
-Home and Abroad, New York, 1946, pp. 263ff.
5 - Schuman, 22,. cit., pp. 340-343.
6 - David J. Dallin and Boris I. Nicolaevsky, ForcedLabor in the Soviet
Union, New Haven, 1947.
7 - The Great Terror, Stalin's Purge of the Thirties, New York, 1968.
8 - The Gulag Archipelago, New York, 1973 and following.
9 - Crane Brinton as cited in Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer,
Political Terror in Communist Systems, Stanford, 1970,p. 23.
10 - See Tibor Szamuely, The Russian Tradition, London, 1974, esp. Chap-
ter 18, "Discipline and Terror-ism".
11 - Neue Rheinische Zeitung, 5 November 1848, as cited in Albert Parry,
Terrorism, from Robespierre to Arafat, New York, 1976, p. 71.
12 - Parry, 22..cit., pp. 131-145.
13 - Parry, 22. cit., p. 131.
14 - Parry, op. cit., p. 137.
15 - Parry, 22. cit., pp. 146-160.
16 - Bertram Wolfe, An Ideology in Power-Reflections on the Russian
Revolution, New York, 1969, p. 173.
17 - Parry, ~M. cit., p. 131.
18 - The. best account,which originated as samizdat..is Aleksandr M. Nekrich,
The Punished Peoples, New York,. 1973.
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19 - Outstanding examples include: Grigory S. Agabekov, OGPU, the Russian
Secret Terror, New York, 1931; W.G. Krivitsky, In Stalin's Secret Ser-
vice, New York, 1939; Jan Valtin, Out of the Night, New York, 1940.
20 - E.g. David J. Dallin, Soviet Espionage, New Haven, 1955; John Barron,
KGB, the.-Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents, New York, 1974.
21 - Claire Sterling, The Terror Network, New York, 1981, pp. 290-292.
22 - Cf. Sterling, op. cit, pp. 247-257.
23 - For a discussion of this aspect of the revolutionary mystique see
Melvin J. Lasky, Utopia and Revolution, Chicago/London, 1976, pp.
140-145.
24 - Much of it is included in Barron, op. Cit.
25 - These developments are dealt with in the works by Barron 'and Sterling
already cited and documented in detail in Soviet Covert Action (The
Forgery Offensive), a report of Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House
of Representatives, 96th Congress, 2d Session, US Government Printing
Office, Washington, 1980.
26 - See Herbert Romerstein, Soviet Support for International Terrorism,
Foundation for Democratic Education, Inc., Washington, DC, 1981.
27 - Sterling,. 92. cit., p. 17.
28- --.Ber.eket. Habte Selassie, Conflict and Intervention in the- ?corn of
Africa, Monthly Review Press, New York/London, 1980, himself a late
convert to the Eritrean cause, presents remarkable confirmation of
earlier Soviet. support for Eritrean insurgency in attacking the
Soviets for their "duplicity" in shifting to support of Hengistu.
29- See, e.g., Kyrill Panoff, "Murder on Waterloo Bridge--the Case of
Georgi Markov", Encounter, November 1979; also Pierre de Villemarest,
"Les Tueurs du K.G.B." in Historia, Paris, January 1982.
3rd- I have covered this material in greater detail, and provided much
more extensive references, in "Goal: Destabilization - Propaganda
Instability and Terrorism in Italy, Greece and Turkey", a monograph
issued by the European American Institute for Security Research,
Marina del Rey, California, 1982.
31 - Die Welt (Hamburg), 24 January1981.
32 - Claire Sterling, "Italian Terrorists - Life and Death in a Violent
Generation", Encounter, July 1981.
33 - Vittorfranco S. Pisano, "The Structure and Dynamics of Italian
Terrorism'", International Association of Chiefs of Police, Gaithers-
burg, Maryland, 1980; Vittorfranco S. Pisano, "The Red Brigades: A
Challenge to Italian Democracy", Institute for-the Study-of Con-
flict, London, July 1980.
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34 - Sterling, The Terror Network, pp. 289-91.
35 - Rinascita, 20 January 1978.
36 - Sterling, The Terrow Network, p. 212.
37 - New York Times, 27 August 1981: "US Protests Soviet Innuendo
on Shooting of Pope".
38 - The Communist Party, illegal in Turkey, has always existed only.
abroad as a small pro-Soviet exile group. Legal leftist parties
in Turkey, of which there have been many,.have never attracted sig-
nificant mass support. See George Harris, "The Left in Turkey" in
Problems of Communism, July-August 1980.
39 - Tilrkiye GerCekleri ve TerBrizm (Facts about Turkey and Terrorism),
Prime Ministry, Ankara, 1973.
40 - A thoughtful retrospective examination of the evidence was published
by Cuneyt Arcaylrek in Hilrriyet in September 1981, "Beyaz Kitap Her-
;;eyi Asikliyordu ama..." (The White Book Made Everything Clear but...)
41 - Extremist groups on the right (for which there is a potentially much
larger following in Turkey than there is for leftists) had hitherto
indulged in political agitation and propaganda-see Jacob M. Landau,
Radical Politics in Modern Turkey, Leiden, 1974, pp. 171-232--but only
occasionally in violence. The Facts on File world survey, Political
Terrorism, issued in 1975 considered only leftist terrorism in Turkey
worthy of note-pp. 271-274.
42'- Aydin Yalsin, "The Sources of Terrorism in Turli;ey",. Wall Street Journal,
22 June 1981; Paul B. Henze, "Turkey--Pulling Itself Together", Chris-
tian Science Monitor, 13 August 1931; Kenneth :Mackenzie, Turkey in
Transition, Ankara, 1981.
43 - Paul B. Henze, "The Long Effort to Destabilize Turkey", Wall Street
Journal, 7 October 1931; Paul B. Henze, "An Optimistic Turkey moves
Closer to Democracy", Christian Science :?Mnitor, 24 December 193.1;
Paul B. Henze, "Turkey, the Alliance and the :diddle East--Problems
and Opportunities. in Historical Perspective", Wilson Center Working
Paper ISS-36, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC, December 19^01.
44 - After visiting Turkey in February 1982 and reviewing evidence on
Agca with many Turks, Joe Kraft revised this view and, in a column
entitled "The Shooting of the Pope: A Byzantine Mystery", discussed
some of the evidence and circumstances that make Soviet sponsorship
conceivable; Washington Post, 23 February 1982.
45 - These studies, "Mehmet All Agca - Whose Agent?" and "From Malatya to
Rome - the Evolution of an Assassin", have not yet been published but
have been made available to US and Turkish government officials and
a few individual researchers working in this field. They will form
the basis,, along with additional information I am collecting, for pub-
lication during the coming year.
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