CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00434R000200150042-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: April 11, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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11 April 1985
FB 85-10016
MIDDLE EAST-9
Czy ci C 5 l S
Current Directions in Iranian Foreign Policy
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This analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in
foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without
coordination with other U.S. Government components.
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Current Directions in Iranian Foreign Policy
Summary
Over the past several months Tehran has pursued a highly active foreign
policy intended to overcome Iran's international isolation and expand ties
particularly with Third World countries. Based on its frequently expressed
"neither East nor West" principle of seeking economic and political independ-
ence from the superpowers, Iran has increased its trade ties with African and
Asian nations and attempted to spread its political influence in Third World
countries by propagating the ideas of its Islamic revolution as a model. An ad-
ditional objective, gaining support for its side in the Gulf war, has had only
limited success. While Iran has stressed the importance of "exporting its
revolution," its leaders consistently reject charges that this involves terrorist
methods.
Conflicting priorities are inherent in these policies that seek to expand trade
and diplomatic ties while pursuing a proselytizing mission to spread the
Islamic revolution. Accordingly, Tehran's heightened diplomatic activity has
been accompanied by a public debate over the nature of Iran's relations with
the outside world. The debate has continued despite a landmark speech by
Ayatollah Khomeyni in October 1984 underwriting the stepped-up diplomatic
efforts. A bill passed by the Iranian parliament in February, charging the
Foreign Ministry with expanding Iran's diplomatic relations but also investing
it with a revolutionary mission, seems designed to strike a compromise
between the contending viewpoints.
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Current Directions in Iranian Foreign Policy
Tehran in recent months has begun to pursue a more outgoing foreign policy
in an apparent attempt to overcome the isolation in which Iran has existed
since its 1979 Islamic revolution. "At present, we have an active foreign
policy," Prime Minister Mir Husayn Musavi said in an interview published in
the Tehran daily Ettela'at on 17 December 1984. "We have tried to expand
our relations with the outside world, and in this area we give priority to Third
World countries."
One of the more visible indications of this intensified effort has been the
readiness of top Iranian officials in recent months to make frequent trips
abroad for bilateral meetings and to receive delega-
tions from other nations on a regular basis. Prime
Minister Musavi's 23-25 January visit to Nicaragua
was one of the more noticeable manifestations of
Iran's current diplomatic activities.' Iranian officials
have also made visits to India and other nonaligned
nations, East Europe, and Japan. In recent months
Iran has hosted diplomatic and trade delegations
from such countries as China, Yugoslavia, North and
South Korea, and numerous countries in Africa and
other parts of the Third World.
Iran's endeavor to develop its diplomatic relations has become a generally
accepted government policy at least since Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni
declared his support for expanding relations with foreign governments in a
28 October 1984 address to Iranian diplomats gathered in Tehran. "Wherever
you ambassadors and charges d'affaires are, you must try to strengthen your
ties," he said, declaring lack of ties with other governments to be contrary to
Islamic precepts. In a 21 February 1985 speech reported by the Tehran daily
Keyhan, President `Ali Khamene'i reaffirmed Khomeyni's stand as official
government policy. "The open-door policy, which was emphatically recom-
mended by the imam [Khomeyni] a few months ago and was also explained in
detail by political circles, is the firm policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran,"
he stated.
The Iranian Foreign Ministry, however, has advocated increased diplomatic
ties for more than two years. In February 1983 the ministry established an in-
stitute for training new personnel to serve in its missions abroad, particularly
' Musavi's visit is discussed in the FBIS Trends of 30 January 1985, pages 9-11.
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in Third World countries. In a 19 February 1985 address reported by the
Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), Supreme Court Chief Justice
`Abdolkarim Musavi-Ardebili told the institute's first group of graduates that
Iran is "bent on building an active presence in the world and it needs educated
and committed people to act as envoys abroad. We do not want to be isolated."
The principal actors in extending Iran's diplomatic contacts have been Foreign
Minister `Ali Akbar Velayati, Prime Minister Musavi, and President
Khamene'i. Majlis Speaker `Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, an often outspo-
ken commentator on international issues, rarely makes trips abroad, though he
may meet with high-ranking foreign delegations visiting Tehran. Ayatollah
Khomeyni confirmed the roles of the principal players in his 28 October 1984
address: "When the president of the republic visits several countries, and so do
the prime minister and Dr. Velayati-as it is right that they should-then ev-
eryone understands that Iran has relations with the world."
Third World Orientation
Iran's diplomatic activity has focused on Third World countries, reflecting a
desire to achieve political and economic independence from the superpowers.
This orientation also reflects Tehran's ideological mission of presenting its
revolution as a model for peoples of the Third World, particularly in Islamic
nations, and its desire to rally support for its side in the Gulf war. One
measure of this Third World emphasis-a fundamental change from the
predominantly westward orientation of Iran under the shah-was provided in
an 8 January Tehran radio interview with a deputy of the Iranian Foreign
Ministry. "In order to establish and expand political, economic, and educa-
tional relations with Third World countries," he stated, "the Foreign Ministry
during the past two years has opened 15 new embassies in various countries in
Asia and Africa and two embassies in Central and South America."
Iran declares the fundamental principle of its foreign policy to be "neither
East nor West"-a formula signifying rejection of alignment with either of
the superpowers but generally an open-door policy toward the rest of the
world. Speaking to Iranian diplomats at a 23 October 1984 gathering in
Tehran, Foreign Minister Velayati explained that such a policy "keeps us
resistant against foreign influence" without resulting in "seclusion or isolation
from today's world."
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In practice, this policy of nonalign-
ment is unevenly applied, since the
United States is reviled uncompro-
misingly on a daily basis and rela-
tions with most West European
countries are generally poor. Trade
ties with East European countries,
by contrast, have been expanding
rapidly.
Iran's desire to improve ties with
Moscow is reflected in Rafsanjani's
statement, reported by IRNA on
7 February 1985, that "we are
inclined to have good relations with
the Soviets." Though decidedly
better than with the United States,
Iran's relations with the Soviet
Union are clouded by Tehran's sup-
port for the Muslim rebels of
Afghanistan and its demands for a Soviet troop withdrawal there, as well as by
Moscow's complaints over issues such as Iranian suppression of the Tudeh
communist party. Velayati declared in an interview published in the 13 March
Rotterdam paper NRC Handelsblad that "good-neighborly relations do not
mean we will set aside our principles with regard to the Afghanistan
question."
To some extent Iran's increasing ties with the Third World have been driven
by its poor relations with the West and perceptions of Western hostility to its
purposes. According to IRNA, Prime Minister Musavi reminded the Iranian
ambassadors gathered in Tehran on 23 October 1984 that "if we forget the
deep-rooted animosity of the West and industrialized world against the
Islamic revolution for a minute, then we will lose our path." He concluded:
"Iran attaches particular significance to the establishment of extensive
political relations with the Third World and especially African countries."
These perceptions of Western hostility translate directly in Iranian public
statements into claims of a special affinity with Third World countries that
Tehran believes endure similar exploitation by the West. President Khamene'i
stressed this theme, for example, in a Friday prayers sermon on 1 February:
"We feel sympathetic toward and accept as one of us any nation in the world
which is suffering under the scourge of global arrogance." Such sympathies
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have been expressed particularly in the course of efforts to strengthen relations
with African nations. Speaking to a special envoy from Benin on 22 December
1984, for example, Khamene'i said that "the two nations of Iran and Benin
have suffered from similar pains, and this is sufficient for us to solve your
problems."
Building on these themes, Iran ideologically justifies its preference for
expanding Third World relations as a means to counter what it views as
economic exploitation by Western nations. A 27 February 1985 Tehran radio
commentary explained: "Now that we wish to establish relations with the
world and establish trade exchanges, would it not be better for us to come clos-
er to our neighbors, to the Afro-Asian countries? Why should the superpowers
take our oil and why should our money be poured into the banks of the world's
guzzlers?"
As a part of this policy, Iranian officials have promoted the idea of creating a
Third World force economically independent of the superpowers. As reported
by Tehran radio on 13 December 1984, Minister of Heavy Industries Behzad
Nabavi told the Turkish minister of communications, for example, that "if we
Muslim countries can develop our industries through our own efforts to such a
point that they become strong enough to withstand the onslaught of Western
industries, we would be doing something effective."
While pursuing this objective, Tehran has at the same time displayed an
awareness of the shortcomings of focusing single-mindedly on the Third
World. In a 2 December 1984 interview pub-
lished in the Tehran daily Keyhan, Foreign
Minister Velayati, while noting that "increased
economic exchanges with a country enhances
our political ties," pointed to the practical limi-
tations of such a trade policy. He explained that
despite ideological considerations, it is some-
times justifiable to import goods from Western
industrialized nations when it appears that
Third World countries are unable to produce
goods of comparable quality or at competitive
prices. Velayati argued that "public funds used
to purchase needed material for the country ...
Foreign Minister Velayati should not be spent on low-quality goods." "We
must be careful that due to political consider-
ations our warehouses do not become full of worthless goods," he said.
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A generally unfulfilled political objective of Iran's Third World diplomacy has
been to gain support for its side in the Gulf war. Although Tehran has
generally succeeded in retaining Syrian and Libyan support, it has had little
success elsewhere in the Arab world or in the Third World at large.' Benin and
North Korea are unusual in having expressed such support, but otherwise
Iran's statements on its position-that Iraq was the initial aggressor, for
example-have not been met with statements of sympathy.
Relations With Islamic Countries
Speaking at a seminar of Iran's ambassadors to Arab and African countries on
20 February, Velayati, according to IRNA, "stressed the role of Islam in
linking Arab and Islamic countries" and in making them the most natural part
of the Third World for Iran to expand its economic and political ties. This fre-
quently expressed policy of the Foreign Ministry conflicts, however, with the
revolutionary outlook of other Iranian leaders who have sharply criticized
relations with some Islamic governments.
For example, in a 9 February address to foreign guests in Qom reported by
IRNA, Ayatollah Hoseyn Ali Montazeri, Khomeyni's probable successor as
supreme political-religious authority, criticized the heads of unspecified
Islamic countries "for having become overly subservient to the major powers
of the West and the East" and for contributing to keeping President Saddam
Husayn in power in Baghdad. He also warned that Muslims have the strength
to liberate such Islamic countries and to "dump their leaders on the rubbish
heap of history," and he added that the United States could no more help
them than it was able to rescue the shah.
President Khamene'i has leveled even more direct criticism at governments in
Islamic Asia and Africa, whose peoples he described in a Friday prayers
sermon on 9 February as being "the dupes and playthings of the deviations
and love of comfort of their governments." He promised support for Islamic
revolutionary movements in those countries, though his remarks suggested
defensiveness over the possibility that such support might be considered
meddling. "Our constitution has warned us against interfering in the affairs of
other countries, but supporting the movements of those nations suffering under
the jackboots of world colonialism-this we do not consider interference," he
2 President Khamene'i's September 1984 tour of Arab capitals, which yielded mixed results
in securing support against Iraq, is discussed in the FBIS Trends of 19 September 1984,
pages 3-6.
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stated. Khamene'i has presented Iran's current diplomatic efforts as a useful
means to this end. On 19 February he told a group of Iranian ambassadors to
Arab and African countries that countering the "region's reactionaries ... can
be achieved by expanding relations with the countries of the world."
Export of Revolution
Iranian leaders view the export of Islamic revolution modeled on their own ex-
perience as a fundamental mission. In a speech on the subject on 30 October
1984, Rafsanjani said that "no one can conceal or intend to conceal the export
of the Islamic revolution." He made clear, however, that the idea of such ex-
port was "to convey the message of the revolution, which is the message of
Islam." More recently, Foreign Minister Velayati, as reported by Tehran
radio on 4 March, explained at a seminar of cultural attaches that a central
objective of Iran's foreign policy is the export of the Islamic revolution, which
he defined as "acquainting the people of the world with the values and
concepts of the Islamic revolution."
The Tehran leadership maintains that the image of Iran and its revolution
abroad is distorted by the hostile propaganda of nations that fear the spread of
Islamic revolution. Iranian leaders often com-
plain that their revolution is characterized as a
dangerous threat that Iran intends to export by
terrorism and force rather than as a movement of
potentially great popular appeal. Rafsanjani told
a gathering of Iranian diplomats on 26 February
that "the principal task of the Islamic govern-
ment and its ambassadors and Foreign Ministry
envoys abroad is to wipe out misconceptions and
~~ f ~~
w wrongful attitudes created in the minds of the
world's people by oppressive governments dis-
valuing religion and dismissing its potential for
mobilizing the masses."
Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani
Iranian leaders express confidence that the revo-
lution will be an inspiration to others, particularly in Islamic lands, if its image
is properly presented. Declaring that "we are the trailblazers of an Islamic
movement," Rafsanjani stated on 15 February that "our Islamic revolution is
not an ordinary movement limited by our borders." Khamene'i declared on
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9 February that Iranians must nurture such movements: "The seed of this rev-
olution has not only been sown in Iran but in all Islamic lands, and the Islamic
revolution must be properly cultivated so that it can flourish in all Muslim
lands."
Iranian leaders have been publicly vague about the specific nature of their
support for other Islamic movements. Perhaps the most explicit comment in
this regard was made by Rafsanjani in an address reported in the 23 January
Tehran daily Keyhan. Observing that "any revolution that takes place in the
world relies on and places its hope in the Islamic Republic of Iran," he
declared that "today we support the Muslim people of Lebanon, Afghanistan,
the Sahara, Eritrea, and others, and our boys are fighting today against Israel
in Lebanon."
Iran has declared its support for Muslim movements in Lebanon, both Shiite
and Sunni.' It claims that Iran's Islamic revolution has been a source of
inspiration for popular resistance against Israel, and it credits Muslim rather
than national resistance with the current withdrawal of the Israeli forces from
South Lebanon. Rafsanjani said on 9 February that what was happening there
was taking place "with inspiration from us" and called Lebanon "a sign of
Iran's victory beyond its own borders." Ayatollah Montazeri on 18 February
declared his support for the establishment of an Islamic government in
Lebanon.
Reflecting an awareness of the concern expressed by other nations that Iran
contemplates more forceful means to achieve its goals, Rafsanjani on
31 October 1984 rejected the idea that revolution would be imposed on others,
saying "the principle of `no duress in religion' is accepted by all Muslims as an
immutable principle. But within this framework we have always declared that
we do not wish to keep our ideas to ourselves."
Iranian leaders have repeatedly rejected foreign allegations that the export of
revolution involves terrorist methods. In a 3 February 1985 address on the
"Ten Days of Dawn" anniversary of the Islamic revolution, for example,
Ayatollah Khomeyni responded to such charges, saying "they are lying."
"Iran is against all such acts," he said, adding that "we have no need to resort
to terrorism." Khomeyni countercharged that "actually those who oppose us
are committing terrorism," calling the United States a "country that has set
the whole world ablaze."
' For more on this topic see FBIS Analysis Note FB M 85-10010 of 20 March 1985, "Iranian
Support for Muslims of Lebanon."
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The Tehran leadership has carefully avoided portraying its revolution as
relevant only to the Shiite sect of Islam and has sought to avoid sectarian is-
sues in its relations with other Islamic countries. In a 14 December 1984
speech to clergymen broadcast by Tehran radio, Rafsanjani warned of Muslim
discord and stressed that "differences between Muslims can be easily
eliminated." He claimed that such discord is encouraged by the "imperialists"
to prevent the spread of the Islamic revolution: "The Persian Gulf-this
jugular of the world economy-is in the hands of followers of Islam but the
enemy tries to capitalize on every pretext to create differences between
Muslims."
In recent months Iran has portrayed its revolution as a model for Christian na-
tions as well. On 2 February, for example, Prime Minister Musavi said he had
learned during his January visit to Nicaragua that "Iran's Islamic and
revolutionary movement has even shaken the world of Christianity," adding
that "the principal essence of the Islamic revolution was the merger of religion
and politics."
Debate Over Diplomatic Ties
The question of whether to establish or maintain diplomatic relations with
foreign governments-as opposed to Tehran's traditional stress on revolution-
ary ties with foreign "peoples"-has been the subject of a prolonged domestic
debate that may have been resolved only recently with the passage of a Majlis
bill defining the role of the Foreign Ministry.
Khomeyni in his speech to Iran's diplomatic corps on 28 October last year re-
jected the view that ties should be made only with peoples rather than
governments. He said that certain unnamed foreign policy critics "are up to
more mischief, asking why we should have relations with other governments,"
and called this a "fresh and very dangerous plot." Recalling how in the early
days of Islam the prophet Mohammad had "sent ambassadors to all parts of
the world to establish proper relations," he said it is "inadmissible to common
sense and to humanity that we should have no relations with other govern-
ments" and added: "My advice to you is to strengthen relations wherever and
in whatever country you are." According to IRNA, Ayatollah Montazeri the
next day "reaffirmed" Khomeyni's stand that "Iranian diplomats abroad
should strengthen their contacts with governments."
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Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani, however, in a speech reported by Tehran radio on
31 October, reconstructed Khomeyni's remarks in an apparent attempt to
rescue the position Khomeyni had denounced. In statements "aimed at
clarifying the remarks of the imam," he said that the issues Khomeyni raised
"should be commented on by those who have a greater understanding of his
statements." Claiming that the "spirit of the issue" was really the export of
the principles of the Islamic revolution, he said: "Our adversaries are the
bullying governments. We have no quarrel with the wronged governments. We
speak to and with the peoples and we raise issues with them."
A front-page editorial in the Tehran daily Jomhuri Eslami on 5 December
1984 gave further voice to opponents of diplomatic contacts by complaining
that Iranian foreign policy's "basic goal, which is relations with nations, is
overshadowed by what is only a means toward that-that is, relations with
governments." Former Prime Minister Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, now head of
an important association of clerics, attempted to lay the issue to rest a few
days later in his sermon as temporary Friday prayers leader, in which he
reaffirmed Khomeyni's remarks. As reported by Ettela'at on 9 December
1984, he said that the business of the Foreign Ministry is to have relations
with governments and not just with other peoples. "The imam commanded
that we must not be isolated," he recalled, "and we must do nothing that
would make us isolated in the world."
In an interview published in the Tehran daily Ettela'at on 17 December 1984,
Prime Minister Musavi tried to reconcile Iran's formal diplomatic contacts
with the position of those critics who maintain that many governments,
particularly in the Islamic world, do not represent their people and that
therefore having relations with such governments conflicts with the principles
of the Islamic revolution and lessens its popular appeal to other nations.
Recognizing that only "a very small number of the governments of the world
are in harmony with their people," he stressed that "the important point is
that in these relations we must not become involved in a lack of homogeneity"
between governments and people. He described relations with governments as
a means to achieving the long-range goal of spreading the message of the
revolution.
Ministry Role Redefined
In an apparent effort to resolve some of these foreign policy issues, the Majlis
on 14 February 1985 passed a bill specifying the duties of the Foreign
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Ministry, in the process curtailing the ministry's role in policymaking. As
reported in the 16 February Ettela'at and other Tehran dailies, Article One
states that "the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for carrying out the
foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran"-in effect emphasizing the
ministry's role as executor of policies set by the leadership and the Majlis. As
reported by Keyhan and Jomhuri Eslami on 16 February, Foreign Minister
Velayati unsuccessfully argued for an amendment that would have enabled
the "government" to determine the general framework of foreign policy, based
on the constitution and the guidance of the leadership. The bill strengthens the
power of the Majlis and its speaker, Rafsanjani, and suggests that Majlis
debates may make it even more difficult to identify a clear direction in foreign
policy.
With respect to the debate over the object of Iran's foreign policy, however,
the language of the bill clearly charges the ministry with dealing with other
governments. Article Two, for example, lists its duties as "studying, establish-
ing, adjusting, preserving, and expanding the political relations of the Islamic
Republic of Iran with other governments and international organizations." At
the same time, Article Four gives the Foreign Ministry a revolutionary
mission, apparently seeking to accommodate both those who wish to maintain
proper international relations and those who want to officially make the
ministry a means for coordinating the support of revolutionary movements in
other nations:
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should support the struggles of oppressed
people, especially Muslims, for their rights against the oppressors in all
parts of the world, without interfering in the affairs of other nations, based
on the goals and foreign policy of the country and in coordination with other
related organizations.
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