THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NUCLEAR WINTER

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• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Lqql
Uentral
Intelligence
The Soviet Approach
to Nuclear Winter
Secret
NI HA 84-10006
December 1984
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NI I I A 84-10006
THE SOVIET APPROACH
TO NUCLEAR WINTER
Information available as of 10 December 1984 was
used in the preparation of this Assessment.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... v
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 1
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 5
The Scientific Debate ........................................................................... 5
Background ................................................................................... 5
The Process .................................................................................... 5
Climate Changes ........................................................................... 6
Key Variables, Assumptions, and Uncertainties ......................... 7
Confidence in Findings ................................................................ 9
Soviet Views on Nuclear Winter ......................................................... 9
Leadership Perceptions ................................................................ 9
Current Soviet Research ............................................................... 10
Soviet Contributions ..................................................................... 12
Technology Transfer .................................................................... 16
Implications ........................................................................................... 16
Political Benefits ............................................................................ 16
Military Side Effects ..................................................................... 18
Outlook .................................................................................................. 18
The Base Case ............................................................................... 18
Potential Dilemmas ...................................................................... 19
Annex A: The Soviet Nuclear Winter Network ................................. 21
Annex B: Selected Chronology of Nuclear Winter Discussions in
International Forums .......................................................... 31
Annex C: Selected Bibliography .......................................................... 33
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SCOPE NOTE
This Assessment looks at Soviet research on Nuclear Winter to
determine what the Soviet leaders think of the hypothesis, the extent to
which they are exploiting the subject for propaganda purposes, and the
most likely implications from Moscow's perspective. It does not reach
judgments about the scientific validity of the Nuclear Winter hypothe-
sis. Most of the information on which this analysis is based is derived
from the international scientific and diplomatic communities. This
information is supplemented by foreign media reports. We also have
debriefed a Soviet scientist who recently defected from the USSR and
was knowledgeable of the capabilities of individuals and organizations
involved in Soviet research in this field. From these sources, we believe
that we have a relatively good understanding of Soviet Nuclear Winter
research. We also know what Soviet leaders say publicly about Nuclear
Winter. Their private, personal perceptions, however, are not known.
We identify some possible military and political dilemmas, should
Soviet leaders come to believe Nuclear Winter poses a serious danger,
and note some possible indicators of increasing concern over possible
adverse climatic consequences of nuclear war.
Note: This Assessment was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for
Strategic Programs. It was coordinated at the working level by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence component of the Department of Energy.F___]
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KEY JUDGMENTS
We do not anticipate any changes to Soviet nuclear weapons
policies or programs solely as a result of Nuclear Winter research.
Senior Soviet leaders are informed about Nuclear Winter. Reportedly,
Foreign Minister Gromyko has been briefed on the subject. But the
scientific evidence is not yet convincing, and, more important, Soviet
leaders do not see any apparent response in US strategic programs to
Nuclear Winter concerns. Lacking both of these conditions, we believe
Moscow will continue to maintain a strategic force posture that supports
their war-fighting strategy and depends primarily on missiles with large
throw weights and large numbers of warheads. Consequently, we
believe that there is little chance for major reductions in their nuclear
arsenal as a direct result of published or ongoing research on Nuclear
Winter.
We believe that there is a wide difference in what Soviet officials
say publicly about Nuclear Winter and what they believe privately. The
official Soviet party line is that Nuclear Winter is real and the effects
are certain and severe, but Soviet scientists have privately acknowl-
edged that substantial uncertainties remain. Despite these uncertainties,
Soviet Nuclear Winter research remains concentrated among a small
group of Computer Center scientists with little background in climatol-
ogy. The research program does not appear to be well coordinated
among other individuals and institutions in the Soviet Union that could
make important contributions. Nor do we have any evidence that the
research program is coordinated with the nuclear weapons design
organizations at this time.
Soviet Nuclear Winter research began in 1983, when a few
scientists moved quickly to conduct investigations and enter into the
growing debate on the subject. Their findings were widely reported as
independent confirmation of the hypothesis that nuclear war would
lead to widespread and devastating climatic changes. On closer exami-
nation, however, Soviet research on Nuclear Winter is not convincing.
Neither is it well documented. It is derived almost entirely from US
ideas, data, and models. Early US climate models were greatly simpli-
fied and run with input data that grossly exaggerated the effects of
smoke from burning cities, the key variable in the Nuclear Winter
equation. Not surprisingly, Soviet scientists have consistently reported
more severe climatic changes than are usually found in similar research
in the West. Furthermore, Soviet reporting tends to stretch conclusions
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well beyond what the research supports, often concluding that nu-
clear war of any dimension will signify either the disappearance of' the
human race or its degradation to a level lower than prehistoric." \Vhile
Soviet scientists privately acknowledge errors in their work that produce
more severe outcomes, they publicly continue to voice the party line.
Western scientists have been amazed at this kind of intellectual
dishonesty.
The location, nature. and findings of Soviet research suggest that
the primary interest in Nuclear Winter thus far is for external political
purposes. A large, well-coordinated propaganda campaign has been
organized with the international scientific community as the primary
target audience. The objective is to use these scientists to convince
\Vestern publics, and ultimately their political leaders, that arms
reductions are necessary-, that the US arsenal is already too large, and
that new weapons are not needed. The themes usually emphasized at
international scientific forums and widely reported in the media
include:
- Nuclear war
mankind.
would have disastrous consequences for all
- There is no effective defense against nuclear attack.
- There is increasing danger of nuclear war due to the "arms
race.
- l S actions are the main cause of the "arms race.
The efforts have met with some success. In certain cases, Soviet
scientists gain direct access to political leaders in the West. For example,
Vladimir Aleksandrov, the leading Soviet writer on Nuclear \Vinter, has
testified before the US Congress. In other cases, Soviet participation in
international organizations has served to keep the horrors of nuclear war
before the public. The UN World Health Organization, for example,
has placed the study of Nuclear \Vinter on its agenda.
In addition to the potential for political influence, Soviet participa-
tion in Nuclear Winter research also contributes to continued Soviet
access to US scientists, research, and computers. It also provides
opportunities for Soviet scientists to develop new modeling techniques
and improve global circulation models.
For all of these reasons, we expect Soviet research on Nuclear
vVinter will continue, but no substantial contributions are anticipated.
Experimental research on large-scale fires, which could provide useful
input data, has not been approved. Also, analysis will be limited by
Soviet computers that lack the capacity to use advanced climate models.
There will be continued Soviet interest in scientific exchanges with LAS
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scientists, but Soviet agreement to joint research is unlikely because
Moscow's public position is that the Nuclear Winter hypothesis has been
adequately proved. Furthermore, it is important to Moscow that Soviet
Nuclear Winter research be perceived as independent and original. In
any event, unclassified Soviet research probably will be carefully
circumscribed so that it does not cast any serious doubts on the Nuclear
Winter hypothesis.
Classified analysis of Nuclear Winter is likely to be undertaken
outside of the Computer Center. At a minimum, military planners
would want to know to what extent their strike plans and US retaliatory
strikes would cause adverse climatic conditions in the USSR. Another
major issue is the possibility of asymmetrical damage in which the
Soviet Union could experience somewhat more severe climatic conse-
quences from a nuclear war than the United States because prevailing
winds could move smoke from the United States and Europe to the
Soviet Union more quickly than smoke from the Soviet cities would
arrive over the United States.
Regardless of the climatic consequences of nuclear war, Nuclear
Winter research has pointed out some additional problems that may
have been insufficiently considered by Soviet military planners,
including:
- Persistent smoke and dust could obscure targets from overhead
reconnaissance and interfere with aircraft engines.
- Cold and darkness could further stress personnel operating
command and control systems.
- High-frequency communications links and satellite ground con-
trol stations could be affected by increased dust and water vapor
in the atmosphere.
The Nuclear Winter hypothesis could pose potential dilemmas for
the Soviet leadership and it could lead to contradictions between these
new considerations, on the one hand, and Soviet doctrine and weapons
employment policies on the other. Such contradictions would probably
cause Soviet officials to demand exceptionally high standards of scientif-
ic proof for the Nuclear Winter hypothesis, standards that probably
cannot be met.
Efforts to reduce the climatic consequences of nuclear war would
run counter to Soviet war-fighting strategy, which emphasizes preemp-
tion and massive strikes. Responses to this dilemma would be difficult
for Soviet strategic planners; they apparently are highly skeptical of
concepts of escalation control and small-scale strike options. Nuclear
Winter considerations also could result in more emphasis on convention-
al forces, biological weapons such as those achieved by genetic engineer-
ing, and directed-energy weapons.
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Should Soviet leaders become convinced that steps must be taken
to reduce the possibility of Nuclear Winter, these measures could affect
Soviet research and development programs. This could reinforce exist-
ing trends toward lower yields and better accuracy. Nonnuclear
warheads also could be considered for strategic targets. In addition,
targeting planners might consider target combustibility along with other
factors to reduce the amount of smoke and dust. Nuclear Winter
considerations also could complicate Soviet ballistic missile defense
(BNID) efforts. Should Moscow become concerned with using BMD both
to protect military capabilities and to prevent an attack from triggering
Nuclear Winter, then a much more extensive defense capability would
be required.
Finally, Nuclear Winter also could influence Soviet thinking about
civil defense. Because of the potential damage to food production,
Soviet civil defense officials could be forced to extend their planning
time frames for basic survival to about a year. Thus, substantial
increases in civil defense food stockpiles might be an early indicator
that Nuclear Winter was beginning to influence Soviet thinking at high
levels.
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DISCUSSION
Background
1. The concept of "Nuclear Winter" could funda-
mentally change the way xve think about nuclear war.
The term refers to the possibility of catastrophic
changes in climate due to nuclear war. This concept
was first raised in 1982 and, in 1983, caught the
attention of the scientific community with the publi-
cation of the "TTAPS" study. The study concluded
that nuclear war could trigger severe and widespread
changes in climate that could have devastating global
consequences. Other scientists have concluded that
these climatic changes could lead to the extinction of
human life on earth.F__1
2. Nuclear Winter studies raise the possibility that
the longer term, global-scale, aftereffects of nuclear
war may be even more serious than the immediate
effects. Previous studies were primarily concerned
with immediate effects, including blast, heat, and
short-term radiation. Studies of longer term effects
concentrated on fallout, residual radiation, and ozone
' 11 I' Turco, 1). 13 Toon, R. P. Ackerman, J. 13. Pollack, and Carl
Sagan. "Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of Multiple Nuclear
1':xplosions, Science, vol. 222, No. 4630 (23 December 1983). The
report is usually referred to as the "TTAPS" study, combining the
initials of their last names. A less technical article on the subject by
Carl Sagan appeared in Foreign Affairs, vol. 62, No. 2 (Winter
198384) and received widespread attention. The TTAPS study
grew out of analysis of (lust storms on Mars in connection with the
US Mariner space exploration project in the early 1970s. Mariner
data from Mars indicated that the widespread and persistent dust
storms absorbed considerable solar radiation and resulted in tem-
peratures much higher than normal at the polluted high altitudes
and much lower temperatures on the surfaces that were masked
from solar radiation. Similar changes on a much smaller scale have
been noted on earth as a result of major volcanic eruptions that
injected large quantities of ash particles into the atmosphere. In
1981, a group of American scientists decided to apply what had
been learned about the effects of large quantities of dust in the
atmosphere to the nuclear war context, in what eventually became
the T TAPS report A separate study in 1982 by Crutzen and Birks
pointed out the potential significance of smoke from burning cities
and forests in lowering surface temperatures after a nuclear attack.
With this discovery, smoke data were added to the TTAPS research.
I'reviiush it had not been assumed that smoke would rise to high
enough altitudes to cause significant, widespread climatic effects.
Paid Ehrlich, "The Biological Consequences of Nuclear War," in
The ('old and the Dark (1984), p.
depletion. But the climatic consequences of large
amounts of smoke and dust were overlooked until
recently; therefore the Nuclear Winter hypothesis has
attracted considerable interest. Many scientists, how-
ever, do not agree that the effects would be as severe
and widespread as indicated in early discussions, and
thus a scientific debate has opened. This debate
represents the latest in the long series of scientific
concerns about nuclear war.
The Nuclear Winter hypothesis essentially argues
that a nuclear war would produce large quantities of
smoke and dust that would absorb solar radiation,
causing:
- Cooling temperatures for several months or
longer.
- Circulation pattern changes that would bring
similar, but less severe, climatic changes to the
Southern Hemisphere.
3. Although smoke and dust were found to be the
major contributors to Nuclear Winter, the TTAPS
study considered four main physical effects of multi-
ple nuclear explosions: smoke in the troposphere, dust
in the stratosphere, fallout of radioactive debris, and
depletion of the ozone layer. A single, 1-megaton (Mt)
weapon detonated at ground level can generate
100,000 to 600,000 tons of fine dust that is propelled
into the upper troposphere and stratosphere. In the
TTAPS base-case scenario, about 960 million tons of
fine dust was produced, about 80 percent of which
reached the stratosphere. These particles would re-
main in the stratosphere for about a year, scattering
sunlight. Airbursts over cities would likely start mas-
sive fires that could generate large quantities of smoke.
Smoke particles could remain in the upper tropo-
sphere for weeks to months. In the TTAPS study, one
scenario involved a 1,000-weapon attack using 100-
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kiloton (kt) warheads against an urban area equivalent
to about 100 cities. This scenario produced an estimat-
ed 130 trillion tons of smoke in the troposphere. In
addition to dust and smoke, radioactive particles also
are produced and carried aloft in the fireball or the
updraft. Particles injected into the lower troposphere
settle back to earth or are rained out in a matter of
weeks. Those injected at higher altitudes, into the
stratosphere, remain there for about a wear, by which
time most of the fission products have decayed to safer
levels. The fourth effect, ozone depletion, results from
nitrogen oxides produced by high-yield explosions and
.incanted to about a 30-percent maximum reduction
in ozone in the 'I I'APS base case. This would produce
about a twofold increase in ultraviolet radiation in the
first sear following a nuclear exchange, according to
the '1" 1'APS analysis. Other effects, including the gen-
eration of toxic gases, dioxins, and other dangerous
products were noted but not evaluated.=-1
Climate Changes
-I. 't'hese physical effects could have a major impact
on the global climate, due primarily to absorption of
sunlight bw thick clouds of smoke from burning cities.
Local weather and precipitation could be seriously
disturbed for up to a bear. The severity of changes in
climate would vary from region to region and depend
on the season during which the attack occurred, but,
even in the most extreme case considered in the
'I"I'APS studs, the climatic changes did not suggest
that a long-terns ice age would he triggered by nuclear
war. "I'his is primarily because of the tremendous
quantities of ]teat stored in the oceans that would drive
the climate back to normal ranges within, at most, a
few wears. Nevertheless, the combination of darkness
and cooling for even one year could have disastrous
consequences.=
5. The normal temperature gradient could be radi-
cally changed by large quantities of smoke in the
troposphere and dust in the stratosphere (figure 1). At
the surface, when heated by the sun, the earth has an
average annual temperature of 13?C (56?F). Nuclear
effects (smoke and dust) in the atmosphere could
reduce surface tempcrattires to about well
below freezing, within 30 days of a nuclear attack. At
the saute time, temperature changes in the strato-
sphere could be even larger, possibly rising by as mach
as SO?C as the smoke particles absorb solar energy.
'I'he impact of such temperature changes could be
severe. An abrupt onset of cold maw be damaging or
fatal to plants, particularly if exposed during the
growing season. Crop harvests could be destroyed or
Figure 1
Nuclear Winter: Atmospheric Effects
Smoke r- Mist
Normal
temperature
severely reduced in much of' the Northern Hemi-
sphere. In addition, the superheating of the strato-
sphere could affect circulation patterns, bringing the
effects to the Southern Hemisphere rather quickly.
Plants in the tropics are even more susceptible to
damage from minor changes in climatic conditions.=
6. Furthermore, these conditions could persist for a
long period of time (figure 2). The TTAPS base-case
scenario produced subfreezing temperatures for about
three months, and about a year stias required before
temperatures began to return to normal levels. The
effects would be less severe in coastal areas, which are
warmed b~ the oceans. Even there, however, severe
storms would be common and in some areas further
inland, there could be continuous snowfall for months.
Water supplies could be frozen, and agriculture might
be impossible for up to a wear in many areas=
7. Darkness is the second major consequence of
injecting large quantities of smoke and dust in the
atmosphere. Virtually all life on earth depends oil
sunlight. If light levels were reduced bw 5 percent.
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Figure 2
Nuclear Winter: Range and Duration
of Temperature Chaugea
Surface land temperature
2(1?(.
Amhient temperature
I reeling point of water
(h( --------------
Ill?(,
IOl) 200
1in)e (days)
I 1 Al S h;nr r,n e, 000 Ill CgeiIn sec nano
Figure 3
Nuclear Winter Darknessa
Vertical optical depth h
100
0.01 J
Ii 111111_ 99
I month it
year
Percentage of sunlight
reaching ground
?I 1APS tease case. 5.(11)0-megaton scenario
h The logarithm of the traction of light that an atmosphere transmits The
normal, clear-sky optical depth is essential) ,ero; it light log is ahout II
An optical depth of I represents the transition between an atmosphere that
is essentially transparent and one that is opaque
most plants would be unable to maintain net growth.
In the TTAPS base case, smoke from urban fires and
forest fires reduced the amount of sunlight reaching
the earth's surface by over 95 percent for more than a
week in the northern midlatitudes (figure 3). It could
take a year or more for sunlight to reach normal levels
(figure 4). Widespread disruption of photosynthesis,
combined with radiation damage, severe cold, and
other effects, could pose a serious danger to plants and
ultimately to the animals and humans which depend
on them.)
Key Variables, Assumptions, and Uncertainties
8. Smoke is the key variable that determines the
extent to which climatic change would occur, over the
shorter term, while dust largely determines whether
the effect will be long lasting. In particular, the
amount of smoke produced, the altitude to which it
rose, and the duration that it persisted are crucial
factors in assessing resulting changes in the global
climate. For example, in the TTAPS base case, 225
million tons of smoke were injected into the atmos-
phere and accounted for tip to 90 percent of the
reductions in the solar energy reaching the earth's
surface and corresponding reductions in temperatures
that in some cases amounted to 30 degrees centigrade.
For such conditions to occur, however, there would
have to be large numbers of urban fires generating
intense heat that would carry some of the smoke into
the stratosphere, where it would persist for much
longer periods than commonly occurs at lower alti-
tudes. The fireball of large-yield weapons, in the
megaton range, also could inject smoke and dust into
the stratosphere. Thus, the main smoke parameters-
how much, how high, and how long-depend on
several important assumptions. For example, the
amount of smoke generated depends mainly upon the
kind of fuel, the amount of oxygen available, weather
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Figure 4
Nuclear Winter: Attenuation of Solar Energy
tinl,u cncret Iluv it the mind
fAA;ill, I''I IHid re 111,21c I
I .)U)
- I I VI'S 3,011)-megaton
countcrliorcc only
( oil) loll pollit
Iiir photol,cnthc,i,
conditions, and the rate of burn. The total injected
smoke in a nuclear war scenario ma~~ vary by a factor
of 10 or more.
9. Variations in the assumed properties of smoke
and dust generated by a nuclear war could change the
climatological results significantly. For example, rea-
sonable variations in estimates of (lust and smoke
particle parameters could vary the optical depth of
resulting (lust clouds from 0.02 to 3.0. Such a range in
opacity would result in conditions that range from
negligible haze to near-total darkness. Furthermore,
the "I'"I'APS study assumed instantaneous, uniform
injection of smoke, whereas actual smoke and dust
injections obviously would vary considerably from
place to place and over time, so there would be
corresponding variations in local temperatures. In
sonic cases, surface temperatures would be unaffected,
in others even a rise in temperatures is possible
10. 'I'he assumed nuclear war scenarios also signifi-
cantly affect research findings. The critical scenario
variable is the extent of urban-industrial targeting,
Figure 5
Nuclear Winter: Scenario Variations
Still ace land tCmpcratllrC
211(
\ntbicnt
111 ( tile
I I\I'S I00-111egaton ctch;ulge
on urban targets onlt
Ill) ?Il) 31111
I ime (davs)
although the number of weapons used, their yield,
height of burst, and timing also are important. The
TTAPS base-case scenario involved a total yield of
5,000 Mt from 10,400 weapons ranging from 0.1 to
10.0 Mt each. About 20 percent of the yield was
devoted to urban-industrial targets. This scenario is
similar to those used by other researchers. Several
other scenarios also were used in the TTAPS research
to test the sensitivity of the outcome to variations in
the postulated attacks. One of the major findings was
that even a relatively small nuclear exchange-100 Mt
on urban targets-could produce relatively large cli-
matic effects. This scenario, however, used different
smoke parameters from the base case. In a 3,000-Mt
counterforce exchange, where cities were avoided, the
climatic consequences were less severe (figure 5). (U)
11. Another uncertainty is the extent to which
smoke and dust will reach the Southern Hemisphere
and cause substantial cooling. Research using various
climate models suggests that typical circulation pat-
terns (Hadley (:ells) that would normally inhibit the
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transport of smoke and dust to the Southern Hemi-
sphere may be interrupted. This is due to warming of
the stratosphere that could reduce precipitation in the
tropical convergence zone that would be expected to
prevent the spread of aerosols to the Southern Hemi-
sphere. But the research is very preliminary at this
point. (u)
12. Combining the key assumptions about smoke,
dust, and scenarios in a useful manner presents a
difficult problem. In particular, translating the quanti-
ty of burnable fuels in cities and forests into appropri-
ate smoke clouds that can be used in global climate
models is the greatest source of uncertainty in Nuclear
Winter research. Until more accurate data can be
collected from actual large-scale fires, there will con-
tinue to be serious questions about the likelihood of
severe and persistent climatic changes following a
nuclear war.
Confidence in Findings
13. The Nuclear Winter hypothesis initially en-
joyed considerable support in the scientific communi-
ty. Farly independent research using more complex
climate models yielded similar results. Nevertheless,
Nuclear Winter research has not been without criti-
cism. For example, one argument challenges that
rainout would substantially reduce the amount of
smoke in the atmosphere within two weeks. Other
meteorological effects, such as local winds and cloud
caps, could further reduce the effects of smoke. Also,
variations in the season selected for analysis can
significantly affect the outcome. For example, some
research has indicated relatively minor temperature
declines might accompany a nuclear exchange occur-
ring in the winter. As a result of these factors and
uncertainties about the initial amount and properties
of smoke generated, average temperature changes
may he far less than those suggested in the TTAPS
study. Furthermore, the areas adversely affected may
be store restricted than suggested in the preliminary
findings. However, even if the early Nuclear Winter
research is in error by a factor of 10, the resulting
temperature changes may still produce significant
crop damage in certain areas."F____1
' F\ ('11 though local temperature changes may frequently be large
and rapid (in excess of 10?(: in a matter of hours or (lays), the global
climate, considered as a whole, is remarkably stable. For example,
average annual temperatures have varied by only 0.5?C over the
lust hundred tears. The stability of this huge, complex system is due
to oceans acting as large energy reservoirs and many other complex
interactive processes that store and redistribute solar energy. Be-
cause of the inherent stability of this system, it takes global-scale
14. Confidence in the Nuclear Winter hypothesis
probably will have to await actual measurement of
particles produced by large fires. This could involve
monitoring forest fires, experimental fires, or quick-
response measurement of actual large fires. Other
important areas of study include the dynamics of
smoke plumes, regional rather than global-scale me-
teorology, and calculations about the probability of
black smoke reaching high altitudes. Even when the
physical phenomenon are fairly well understood, how-
ever, there will continue to be substantial uncertainty
about the biological consequences of climate changes.
Leadership Perceptions
15. We do not know how seriously the Soviet
political and military leadership takes the Nuclear
Winter issue, although many senior Soviet officials
probably are aware of the hypothesis. For example,
Yevgeniy Velikhov, the main force behind Nuclear
Winter research in the USSR, has told
that he personally has
briefed Foreign Minister Gromyko, former Chief of
the General Staff Ogarkov, and Defense Minister
Ustinov on the subject of Nuclear Winter. However,
we have not yet noted any significant Soviet military
interest in Nuclear Winter.
16. If the Soviet leaders have been briefed on
Nuclear Winter, and we believe they have, then they
share essentially the same scientific basis for under-
standing the problem as do US leaders. Thus, at this
time, Soviet leaders are likely to believe that nuclear
war would cause varying degrees of increased cold and
darkness in some regions, but the effects would not
mean the end of life on earth. This view generally is
consistent with what they have been saying publicly for
over 20 years, that is, nuclear war would be a disaster of
events to cause changes, and even relatively small changes to global
averages can cause dramatic local consequences. For example, major
volcanic eruptions inject large quantities of dust and ash into the
atmosphere that spreads over much of the earth. The eruption of
Tambora in Indonesia in 1815 produced an estimated 200 million
tons of aerosol particles that subsequently caused about a PC
reduction in the average global temperature. Yet, this seemingly
small change produced "the year without a summer" in 1816.
Severe and persistent freezes caused widespread loss of life and crop
failure throughout the United States and Europe. Volcanic dust
particles, because of their large size, are relatively inefficient in
blocking sunlight. An injection of 200 million tons of smoke and dust
resulting from a nuclear war could have a more severe impact than
a 1?C temperature change.
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unprecedented proportions. From this perspective,
cold and darkness xvould further complicate the al-
readv difficult problem of survival in a nuclear war.1
17. We believe Soviet leaders will remain interested
in the subject because Nuclear Winter could have
profound implications, if, as suggested in the TTAPS
study, there is a "threshold" beyond which the use of
nuclear weapons xxottld be self-destructive. In such a
situation, a concept of deterrence that depended on
the credibility of launching a retaliatory strike xxith a
large number of nuclear weapons would be meaning-
less. The attractiveness of a disarming first strike also
would be reduced because, even if a first strike were
successful in totally destroying the retaliatory capabili-
lx of tit(, adversaries, it could exceed the "threshold,'
triggering Nuclear Winter, thus bringing about self-
destrnction. Furthermore, the nuclear inventories of
France, the united Kingdom, and China also could
independently represent a more significant minimum
deterrent capability. Despite these considerations, So-
viet scientists have not expressed an interest in the
ntilitar\ scenarios or the threshold concept, except to
comment in line with their propaganda that the
threshold is very loxx and even a limited nuclear war
probably would trigger Nuclear \V'interF
IS. the threshold that could trigger Nuclear \Vin-
ter is quite loxx according to the TTAPS study. Carl
Sagan has suggested that, depending on yields and
targeting, it may he somewhere between 500 and
2.000 nuclear warheads. Soviet scientists claim that
their calculations indicate that a 100- to 150-Mt war-
50 times less than the 'TTAPS base-case scenario-
' The use of the tens -threshold.. in connection vajth Suclear
titer has become coutnixersial, nuiinlx because it implies that
there is some simple measure of xcarheads ur xiclds that will trigger
adverse global climate consettaences.:A more proper use of the term
xvould he to indicate the puss of smoke injected into the atmosphere
that would create glohallx significant temperature decreases. Smoke
mass is a Iunction of the number of xveapons, their xield, and, most
important, the combnstihilil~ of urban areas targeted. Also the local
xveather, the season, and oilier variables can affect the extent of
climatic effects expected Iron a nuclear xvar Another problem with
the term threshold' arises in its use in a strict scientific sense as
designating a discrete point at xvhich a phenomenon occurs, such as
\vater boils at 100? (:, but not al 99?C its such use, Nudcar \b inter
xvould occur at a point xvhcre the addition of a single weapon xvould
cause globallt significant temperature drops More realisticallx
there is a continuum of worsening eff(-cts IL )
In joint sciculific exehanges_ Soviet scientists have urged West-
cni scientists to use extreme scenarios, on the order of 20,000 \lt. Bs
companson the I?tAPS base-case scenario xxas 5,0011 SIt A 10.000-
Sit scenario also was tested, but generally is considered to be
nurealisticallx
could cause a Nuclear Winter. Not all scientists agree,
however, that such a self-destructive threshold exists.
Nevertheless, such an idea has important implications
for perceptions of the East-West military balance.
From the Nuclear Winter viewpoint, a limited xvar in
Europe conceivably could exceed the threshold. Thus
perceptions of a low threshold could undermine the
credibility of NATO's flexible response police and
place additional importance on the conventional force
balance.
19. We believe that Soviet military planners are
interested in the possible dangers of Nuclear Winter.
At a minimum, they would avant to knoxv to what
extent their strike plans and US retaliatory strikes
would lead to adverse consequences in the USSR. To
answer this kind of question, the basic relationship
between nuclear weapons and Nuclear Winter will
need to be better understood. In particular, hoax do
variations in numbers, yields, and targets affect the
extent and severity of cold and darkness'?
20. The logical place for Soviet climate research is
the State Committee for Hydrometeorology and Envi-
ronmental Control (usually called HV dromet), the gov-
ernment organization generally responsible for climate
research and forecasting. Instead, Soviet research on
Nuclear Winter until recently has been concentrated
in the Academy of Sciences. Vladimir Aleksandrov,
46, is the leading Soviet scientist working on Nuclear
Winter and appears to head an ad hoc group of about
20 scientists. Aleksandrov's work in this field grew out
of Soviet interest in US high-speed computers. A
mathematician specializing in computer science, Alek-
sandrov was directed in 1976 to shift his research from
gas dynamics and plasma mechanics to climatology.
Ile was sent to the United States in 1978 to study
computer-based general weather circulation models
and develop a computer program compatible with
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relatively slow-speed Soviet computers. Ile returned to
the I sited States for further study and research in
1980 and 1982. During his visits he requested and was
granted access to a (;ray-1 computer at the National
(:enter for Atmospheric Research. His travel to the
t nited States has been under scientific exchange
agreements on climate research signed in 1972, well
before Nuclear Winter became an issue.
21. In 1983. Aleksandrov was directed to work on
Nuclear Winter, Probably by Yevgeniy Velikhov, a
nice president of the Academy of Sciences. Among his
several duties, Aelikhov is secretary of the Department
of Information Science, Computer Technology, and
Automation. This department, created in 1984, over-
sees the Computer Center where the main Nuclear
Winter research is conducted. Velikhov's interest in
Nuclear Winter stems from his participation in inter-
national scientific forums and his responsibilities as
director of the Soviet effort to develop supercom-
puters. He probably learned of Nuclear Winter at one
of the mnnerous international conferences lie attended
and recognized its potential to contribute both to
Soviet knowledge of computer science and to influ-
ence international public opinion on the nuclear "arms
race." Velikhov is politically influential and a prime
candidate to head the Soviet Academy of Sciences. He
is hcavil' involved in all areas of nuclear disarma-
ment, concentrating particularly on the issues of mili-
tarization of outer space and the L IS Strategic Defense
Initiative. Velikhov will continue to be the key person
in shaping Soviet Nuclear Winter research, and, under
his direction, it will continue to serve Soviet political
purposes.F__1
Key Promoter of Soviet
Nuclear Winter research
22. Velikhov took the lead on Nuclear Winter and
tasked the Computer Center, which quickly produced
the first Soviet research report on the subject. The
speed with which the report was produced is a highly
unusual accomplishment in Soviet science. In April
1983, the basic input information was probably ob-
tained at the TTAPS "Neer Review" in Boston. By
August, a report was completed, printed in English,
and delivered at the International Seminar on Nuclear
War held annually at Erice, Italy. Such work would
normally take years in the Soviet Union because of
inherent difficulties in the system-slow computers,
lack of computer paper, and so forth. In this case,
Velikhov was able to bring together the necessary
resources and get the job done. This was possible
mainly because Aleksandrov obtained two versions of
a general circulation model (U(NI) during his earlier
visits to the United States-something Hydromet had
been unable to do.
23. To date, Soviet Nuclear Winter research has
primarily involved a simplified GCM, derived f roni a
US model, and run on a 13ESNI-6 computer. In a 1983
preprint describing his work, Aleksandrov mentioned
a 40-hour modeling run on the BESM-6. This was for a
single calculation, one year into the future, on his
highly simplified model. lie also noted that similar
calculations using a Cray-1 computer would require
only about eight minutes. In addition to three BESM-
6's, a YeS-1060 computer has been installed at the
Academy's Moscow Computer Center, but operational
difficulties with the YeS-1060 have thus far prevented
successful use of a more advanced (;CM. Consequent-
ly, Aleksandrov and Stenchikov continue to rely on the
more simplified GCM using the BESM-6.
24. The Computer Center facilities impose severe
limitations on their abilities to do realistic Nuclear
Winter climate modeling. State-of-the-art calculations
require hours of time on Cray-class supercomputers.
During a single modeling run in the West, about 100
billion arithmetic operations are performed, at a typi-
cal computational rate of about 20 million floating-
point operations per second (\Iflop). The YeS-1060 is
capable of roughly 0.3 Mflop for high-precision scien-
tific modeling problems. Even the fastest Soviet scien-
tific computer, the El'brus-1, is still less than one-tenth
the effective speed of a (ray.
25. There has not been any significant Soviet re-
search on Nuclear Winter beyond the two reports by
Aleksandrov and Stenchikov delivered at Erice in 1983
and 1984 and frequently repeated elsewhere. Howev-
er, other Soviet studies related to nuclear effects have
recently been presented at international conferences
because they generally support the possibility of seri-
ous climatic changes due to multiple nuclear explo-
sions. For the most part, these additional reports
represent earlier research, completed before the idea
of Nuclear Winter became popular. These additional
reports also represent some internal competition
among various institutes in the USSR as they attempt
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to gain additional recognition. One report " by Hydro-
nut scientists concluded that gaseous byproducts of'
nuclear explosions, especially ozone in the troposphere
and nitrogen oxides in the stratosphere, would produce
loswer surface temperatures that would persist because
these pollutants swould remain in the atmosphere
much longer than smoke and dust. Another unpub-
lished Soviet report noted that the atmospheric injec-
tion of nitrogen oxides from nuclear testing during the
1950-6:3 time frame nut' base contributed to about a
0.3?(: drop in average temperature. Data from uncle-
,u testing in the early 1960s were scaled up to a
10,000-AIt nuclear exchange, and it was estimated that
there could be a corresponding 10?(: temperature
drop without considering the effects of, smoke and
dust.
26. We expect further bureaucratic competition
swithin the t SSR on Nuclear Winter research, rather
than a coordinated approach to improve understand-
ing of the phenomenon. Research funds and personal
prestige are at stake, including election to the Acade-
ntw of Sciences or a promotion from corresponding to
full membership. The main competition involves the
AcadentV of Sciences, Computer Center and Hydro-
ntct. '1 uriy Izrael , as director of IIv dromet_ may seek
a larger role in Nuclear Winter research, using scien-
tists swith more experience in climate research than
those found at the Computer Center. Izrael' heads
bilateral exchanges with the united States on environ-
mental science, including Nuclear Winter, and could
insert more of his scientists into the exchanges or
attempt to block Aleksandrov, or others front the
Computer Center, from future meetings. Among the
possible scientists to look for outside of the Computer
Center is Igor Karol, at the Main Geophysical Obser-
vatory of Ilydromet, who has clone climate research
that includes nuclear effects. Within the Academy of
Sciences but not yet associated with Aleksandrov's
group at the Computer Center, there are other scien-
tists who ntay become involved in Nuclear Winter
research. Gostinstex, with the Chemical Physics Insti-
tute, has been mentioned to possibly head up some fire
experiments in the l-SSR. But, if present relationships
continue, most of the research swill be conducted at the
Computer Center and it will not be well coordinated
xwitit other work in the USSR. Increasing involvement
of Ilydroniet would he an important indicator that
Nuclear Winter.
27. We have not identified any secret research on
Nuclear Winter in the USSR, but swe believe that
officials in the weapons development structure, at a
minimum, are following the Nuclear Winter research
being done bl the Academy of' Sciences. 'T'hese offi-
cials would most likely include planners in the 12th
Chief Directorate of the Ministry of Defense that
formulate requirements for nuclear weapons. In addi-
tion, sic would expect scientists at the two main
nuclear weapons design centers at Sarova and Kash
also to be closely following Nuclear Winter research.
These clesign centers fall under the management of the
Ministry of Medium Machine Building. To date, swe
have no evidence of contacts between these organiza-
tions and Soviet scientists involved in the unclassified
Nuclear Winter research. F--~
Soviet Contributions
28. Soviet Nuclear Winter research is derived al-
most entirely from I, S ideas, data, and models. Be-
cause of pressure to produce results quickly, and given
limited computer capabilities, Soviet research often is
inaccurate and does not significantly advance the
understanding of the Nuclear Winter phenomenon. 1-
29. To date, there have been W o main Soviet
contributions to Nuclear Winter research. In 1983, the
basic Nuclear Winter findings were tested using a
three-dimensional GCM for the first time, whereas the
original TTAPS study used a one-dimensional model.'
In 198-1, the effects of moving smoke were added to
the Soviet GCM, whereas previous research had treat-
ed smoke in a static, uniform manner. These contribu-
tions are considered modest conceptual advances from
the original TTAPS research. However, some interna-
tionally prominent scientists who have conducted re-
search on Nuclear \Winter have characterized the work
as weak, crude, and seriously flawed. Nevertheless, it
is currently the only national Nuclear Winter research
program outside the United States. Regardless of the
quality of the work, the 1, SSR has effectively joined
the scientific debate on Nuclear Winter
\lnu~spheric Composition and Thermal Regime Model
Changes After the Possible 'nuclear War," by Izracl', Karol, Kiselev,
and Rosunov of the Main Geophxsical Observatory, Goskorngidro-
niet, presented at t?rice, August 1984. =
"Ohs-national Fsidencc of the Impact of Nuclear Explosions in
the :Atmosphere," K. V. Kondrat'yev. presented ill bilateral meeting
with \nu?rican scientists in Moscow. August 1984.F--]
" The one dimension is altitude. The model used in the T TAPS
study considers a single point on the ground as representing the
average, year-round global temperature (WO. The temperature at
various levels of altitude above this point is then calculated for
various changes in solar radiation corresponding to scattering and
absorption of smoke arid dust A three-dimensional model includes
longitude and latitude as swell as altitude.
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30. Soviet Nuclear Winter research consistently
produces more severe results than similar research
done in the West. For example, the original TTAPS
study estiniated a temperature decline of up to 30?C
within a few weeks of a 5,000-Mt exchange. As would
be expected, subsequent two- and three-dimensional
studies that accounted for the moderating effects of
the oceans noted less severe temperature declines of
around 10?C. But Soviet research, using a three-
dimensional model, found a temperature drop of
about 40?C over the united States (figure 6). The
addition of moving smoke to the Soviet GCM (figure 7)
resulted in even more severe temperature drops than
noted in the earlier Soviet research. These findings
result from the unrealistically high input of smoke into
the GCM. Soviet scientists have privately admitted
their conceptual errors, but the results are nevertheless
widely reported in the West without reservation or
qualification.
31. Soviet scientists also tend to argue against fac-
tors that ssould moderate the effects of Nuclear
Winter. For example, rainout may remove substantial
quantities of smoke, but Soviet scientists argue that
heating of the atmosphere would decrease its relative
humidity and reduce turbulent convection that creates
precipitation. In addition to discounting moderating
effects, Soviet scientists note the relatively rapid move-
ment of smoke into the Southern Hemisphere, thus
bringing Nuclear Winter to Africa, Australia, and
South America.
32. Soviet reporting on Nuclear Winter research
often stretches conclusions well beyond what can be
supported by research, most likely to further their
propaganda effort. For example, the central conclu-
sion of the 1983 Aleksandrov-Stenchikov Report was
that a nuclear war would probably produce conditions
under which man would not be likely to survive. (See
inset.) Such conclusions have even been criticized
within the Soviet scientific community. Dr. Budyko,
with Hydromet, noted that small differences in pa-
rameters within various models can produce large
differences in outcomes. In particular, he has pointed
out that there has been too much duplication in
Nuclear Winter research. He and others have called
Soviet Scientists' Dramatic Portrayal of Nuclear Winter
. Our three-dimensional hydrodynamic model of
the climate shows that the Nuclear Winter will entail an
avalanche of pernicious consequences.... This will
generate severe storms along the coasts, causing enor-
mous amounts of snowfall on land. This alone will
evidently destroy life on the coastal zone. On the other
hand, the changes in the atmosphere will completely
change the hydrological cycle, and severe droughts will
break out over the night-enveloped, frost-bound conti-
nents. In other words, everything living which hadn't
been incinerated during the fires will freeze out. And if
it survives in conditions of low temperatures, it will
nevertheless die of thirst. But the earth's flora will not
endure.... The forests of all middle latitudes will
perish.... The planet's entire climatic system will pass
into a new state ... a new glacial period, possibly... .
The temperatures over Tibet and the Cordilleras will be
heated to such an extent that the giant masses of snow
and glaciers will melt and precipitate inconceivable
streams of water on the continents. It will be a deluge in
conditions of severe cold ... (Aleksandrov, 19 April
1984, on Moscow News in English)
... Irrespective of the season of the year, a protracted
Nuclear Winter will begin. In the hinterland of conti-
nents rainfalls will be almost zero, agricultural crops
will perish, and domestic animals, even if they survive
the cold, will die of thirst because fresh water for the
most part will only be available in a frozen state....
The tropical forests, which are the main bearers of
organic life on earth and the chief source of oxygen, will
be killed ... the biosphere will be left without its main
source of oxygen. The effects I mentioned will arise
practically in any nuclear war scenario. Even with an
explosion of 100 megatons. . . . Therefore a nuclear war
of any dimensions will signify either the disappearance
of the human race or its degradation to a level lower than
prehistoric. (Aleksandrov, 27 April 1984, in Soviet Pan-
orama, No. 84, Novosti Press Agency Bulletin)
... The impenetrable black cover would spread from
the northern hemisphere to the southern, and eventual-
ly enclose the entire planet. All sources of fresh water
would freeze over, all ecological balances would be
upset, and all harvests would fail. The total terrestrial
biota, that is, the total population of various species of
animals, plants, and microorganisms, would completely
perish.... Conclusions drawn from our calculations
indicated that if 100 to 150 megatons of nuclear fuel
(that is, 50 times less than in the Sagan scenario) were
used in a nuclear exchange, the major cities of Europe,
Asia, and North America would be destroyed, and the
Nuclear Winter would begin unabated.... But even
this would ... ensure the end of life on earth. (Moi-
seyev, 3 August 1984, article "Scientists Warn: The
World in the Aftermath of a Nuclear Strike: A Comput-
er-Generated Prognosis," Novosti and Sovetskaya
Kirgiziya)
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Figure 6
Sup iet Nuclear Winter Research:
Three-Dimensional Global-Circulation Model, 1983
903 L Temperature changes,day 243
Sourc International Seri nar on Nuclear War Err Italy 1984
'[r3&1? 1?-H4
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Figure 7
Soviet Nuclear Winter Research:
Three-Dimensional Global-Circulation Model, 1984
Temperature changes with moving smoke added to model, day 40
Source International Seminar on Nuclear War, Erice, Italy, 1984
rosr3.3:3 1 , H'I
for more independent research methods and more
complete documentation of studies prior to their pres-
entation at scientific meetings. Kirill Kondrat'yev, a
Soviet specialist in atmospheric particles, has suggested
that Aleksandrov and other "like-minded" scientists
had reached conclusions far beyond what was justified
by their limited work. Indeed, this frequently happens
at international conferences, when Soviet scientists
scan to stretch inferences. The tendency to overstate
Nuclear Winter conclusions, however, is not limited to
Soviet scientists
33. Soviet research on Nuclear Winter does not
stand up well to close examination. As noted, errone-
ous input data produced more severe climatic conse-
quences. Soviet research, for example, used smoke
parameters that were roughly equivalent to injecting
about 700 million tons of smoke in the atmosphere-
compared to 100-300 million tons estimated in the
Unclassified
TTAPS study-and even these figures may be too high
by a considerable margin. Although the Soviet scien-
tists initially claimed that they were using data consis-
tent with the TTAPS worst case scenario, they made
some erroneous assumptions. They essentially treated
dust and smoke equally, even though dust tends to
scatter sunlight whereas smoke is more absorbent.
Furthermore, they assumed that the combined smoke
and dust absorbed all the sunlight, rather than a more
reasonable estimate of 50 to 70 percent. Also, general
hemispheric circulation patterns appear to be mis-
placed in Soviet reports.
34. Such basic errors are surprising for scientists of
the caliber of Aleksandrov and Stenchikov.
does not believe the
simplistic assumptions necessarily incorporated into
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publicly continue to voice the party line that Nuclear
Winter is real and the effects are certain and severe.
Western scientists have been amazed at this kind of
intellectual dishonest) 0
35. fit addition to conceptual errors, Soviet research
findings in many cases are not logically sound. These
logical inconsistencies probably result from the limited
data points used in the greatly simplified GCyI, along
with the limited knosi ledge of climatology among
Soviet scientists at the Computer Centers
:36. Research findings are quickly reported and not
subjected to sensitivity tests. Soviet research on Nucle-
ar Winter has not been documented in sufficient detail
to understand clearly exactly what was done. Proposals
to compare directly Soviet and US (;('Ms by using the
same input data have not been favorably considered in
the USSR. While these and other shortcomings become
apparent to experts who take the time to inspect Soviet
findings and question the scientists, the average partic-
ipant at international conferences is only aware of the
results of the Soviet research. And, in each case, the
reported results amount to a severe Nuclear Winter E:
37 . While Soviet research has been cited as -inde-
pendent verification" of the Nuclear Winter hypothe-
sis, it falls far short of normal scientific standards for
Such claims. It represents more replication than verifi-
cation because it lacks original Soviet data or models.
When asked at scientific exchanges to provide data
from Soviet atmospheric nuclear testing prior to the
196:3 ban, Soviet scientists have not been able to
respond. Early interest by Soviet scientists in joint
experiments also apparently has been vetoed at higher
political levels in the Soviet Union. Using data and
models of US origin, it is not surprising that Soviet
findings are similar to early studies in the United
States...
Technology Transfer
:38. Soviet understanding of advanced computer
modeling techniques probably has benefited from
close cooperation with US scientists. For example,
\leksandrov has been able to use Cray computers in
the t uitccl States and has demonstrated considerable
skill in adapting complex models to a wide range of
computers. At the same time, Aleksandrov has ac-
quired advanced climatological models from the Unit-
ed States that could benefit Soviet theoretical science
? 9 few A1'eshrn scientists s+ ould disagree with these judgments
and contend that soviet Nuclear Winter research is original, inde-
pendent, and contributes to further understanding of the phenome-
non "t'hev would further disagree kith characterizing Soviet Nu-
and provide practical applications in a variet} of
important fields such as agriculture. Soviet intelligence
also could conceivably gain from contacts with US
scientists
39. At a minimum, frequent scientific exchanges
enable the Soviet leadership to keep informed on the
state of research in the West. In particular. we would
expect Moscow to be interested in the prospects for
asymmetrical damage-in which the USSR could in-
cur somewhat more severe Nuclear \Vinter effects
than the United States because the prevailing winds
would move the smoke from the United States and
Europe to the USSR more quickly than smoke from
Soviet cities would arrive over the United States. 'I'o
keep track of these and other developments, Soviet
scientists will want to stay in close touch with Western
scientists-1
Implications
Political Benefits
40. In addition to technology transfer, Moscow
derives several political benefits from a modest Nucle-
ar Winter research program. The Soviet image as a
responsible superpower is furthered by taking the
Nuclear Winter issue seriously at international forums.
Soviet officials have an informed position on Nuclear
Winter that is not based solely on research conducted
in the United States. Of course, it is no accident that
Soviet Nuclear Winter research generally confirms
longstanding Soviet pronouncements on the devastat-
ing nature of nuclear vvar.
41. Soviet interest in Nuc ear Winter research also
has the potential to influence arms reductions in the
United States. Soviet leaders understand the American
political process well, and by their active participation
in conferences on nuclear war and arms control, they
can support political forces that seek arms reductions
and disarmament. As noted, Soviet presentations out
Nuclear Winter consistently emphasize severe climatic
consequences, and are widely interpreted as independ-
ent verification of the T'1'APS study. Ongoing Soviet
Nuclear Winter research ensures continued Soviet
participation at international conferences (see figure
8).F---l
widespread Soviet use of
the Nuclear Winter theme abroad. The priinarl target
audience is the international scientific cornmunih,
because of its credibility and the "power of reason.
with the ultimate goal of influencing Western political
leaders. Direct face-to-face communication is empha-
sized because it is the most persuasive media. Thus, we
note extensive Soviet participation in international
scientific forums. These meetings also are widely
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publicized in the press, on radio, and on television.
The themes that are generally emphasized in the
Soviet media and often repeated in the West include:
-- Nuclear war would have disastrous consequences
for all mankind.
-- There is no effective defense against a nuclear
attack.
-- There is increasing danger of nuclear war due to
the "arms race."
- US actions are the main cause of the "arms race.
(o)
43. Nuclear Winter is appearing somewhat more
frequently in the Soviet media aimed at foreign
audiences. In the August to October 1984 time frame,
for example, Nuclear Winter was discussed on about a
Figure 8
Soviet Nuclear Winter Network
Main Institute of
GCop hysieiI Prohlcros of
()h,CI%jtor\ Mechanics
Committee of Soviet
scientists in Defense of
I'cacc and \gainst Nuclear
War
Institute of
Chemical
Phisic,
International
UN General
International
Seminar on
Assembly, World
Council of
N uclcar A5dl
Meteorological
Scientific Unions,
(I rice, Italy)
()rganiiation,
Scientific Committee
World Ilealth
on Problems of'
l )ream cation
the Environment
(SCOPE)
weekly basis in Soviet foreign broadcasts and press
releases. It also is appearing in a greater variety of
Soviet media, including poetry and an article in the
Soviet Literary Gazette. Much of the reporting is
repetitive, citing foreign news sources, particularly
from the United States and the United Kingdom. This
lends credibility to the Nuclear Winter hypothesis by
giving the impression of widespread, independent
verification. (c)
44. Nuclear Winter receives some attention in Sovi-
et domestic media, largely in the context of the
dangers of nuclear war. In such cases, the Soviet Union
is characterized as leading the crusade for peace and
disarmament. Contradictions between the Soviet con-
cern with Nuclear Winter and Moscow's opposition to
arms control agreements with deep cuts in strategic
forces are not discussed.)
Institute of Institute of Alain
Physical Atmospheric Ilvdrological
I'rohlems Physics Institute
International World After Etc.
Physicians for Nuclear War
the Prevention I onndation
of Nuclear War
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45. In addition to the public media, Soviet scientists
continually stress the responsibility of all scientists to
educate the public and the political leadership on the
dangers of nuclear Wear in general. In particular, they
argue that scientists should all work for peace by
calling for a halt to the "arms race" and opposing the
development of new weapons and the militarization of
outer space. Clearly, Soviet leaders want US leaders to
believe the Nuclear Winter hypothesis. On at least two
occasions Soviet scientists have met with US Congres-
sional leaders. On one of these occasions, Aleksandrov
appeared before a Congressional subcommittee. Such
access to the US political system is highly valuable to
\Ioscoss . ~~
.46. As part of this propaganda effort, ad hoc organi-
zations have been created to produce reports, grant
interviews, and sponsor exchanges (figure 8). For
esan)ple, in 1983 the Committee of Soviet Scientists
for Peace and Against Nuclear War was established
vv ill) A'elikhoy as Chairman. One of the purposes of
this organization is to:
")nohilize the scientists' efforts in the struggle for
preventing a nuclear holocaust, to draw a science-
based and credible picture of the dangers of con-
tinuing along the route of the 'arms race,' which will
lead mankind over the nuclear abyss, and to provide
broad sections of the public and those who directly
take political decisions with accurate scientific in-
formation." cc)
47. The propaganda effort is well coordinated. In
some cases, foreign attendees arrive at international
conferences to find that the Soviet organizers have
already prepared a draft final report, including a
statement on the adverse consequences of Nuclear
\\ inter. 'I'he subject has been raised in a variety of
influential networks, such as the international medical
profession. In this field, Soviet initiatives were in part
responsible for the World Health Organization's
adopting a resolution in May 1983 that "The role of
physicians and other health workers in the preserva-
tion and promotion of peace is the most significant
factor for the attainment of health for all." The World
Health Assembly endorsed the conclusion that "... it
is impossible to prepare health services to deal in any
systematic way with a catastrophe resulting from
nuclear warfare, and that nuclear weapons constitute
the greatest immediate threat to the health and wel-
fare of mankind." The Assembly recommended that
the \\ orld Ilealth Organization, in cooperation with
other United Nations agencies, '.continue the work of
collecting, analysing, and regularly publishing ac-
counts of activities and further studies on the effects of
nuclear war on health arid health services." Such
efforts have met with considerable success in making
the general public concerned about nuclear war. F--
Military Side Effects
48. Nuclear Winter research may raise some issues
that Soviet military planners would want to consider,
regardless of the climatic effects. For example, the
smoke and dust generated by multiple nuclear explo-
sions may obscure targets from overhead visual recon-
naissance and could interfere with ground-to-satellite
links. Reconnaissance may be precluded over large
areas for long periods. Infrared sensors also may be
degraded by the heat-absorbing aerosol particles. Ra-
dar imaging would be less affected except for a few
hours and in areas where ground bursts produce very
large quantities of dust. These considerations could
affect the development of Soviet imaging systems. For
example, we would expect added incentives to develop
radar imaging systems for satellites, aircraft, and
possibly the spaceplane.=
49. Command and control systems also might he
stressed by the effects of Nuclear Winter. High-
frequency communications links and satellite ground
control stations could be affected by increased dust
and water vapor in the atmosphere. In addition, dust
could interfere with aircraft engines, causing some
degradation to flight operations. Also, the personnel
that operate command and control systems may have
difficulty functioning well during prolonged periods
of cold and darkness. Thus Nuclear Winter concerns
could reinforce existing efforts to improve capabilities
for protracted war that include testing and training
with prolonged occupation of underground command
posts. F-~
The Base Case
50. We do riot anticipate any changes to Soviet
nuclear weapons policies or programs solely as a result
of Nuclear Winter research. The scientific evidence is
not yet convincing and, more important, Soviet leaders
do not see any apparent response in LS strategic
programs to Nuclear Winter concerns. Lacking both of
these conditions, we believe Moscow will continue to
maintain a strategic force posture that supports their
war-fighting strategy and depends primarily on mis-
siles with large throw weights and on large numbers of
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warheads. In addition, Soviet strategic planning will be
further complicated by the prospective modernization
of US, British, and French nuclear forces; NATO
deployments of cruise missiles and Pershings IIs; and
expanding Chinese strategic forces.
51. In any event, Soviet research on Nuclear Winter
will continue, thus guaranteeing Soviet participation in
the debate. But Soviet contributions are not likely to
be significant. Analysis will be limited by the inade-
quate Soviet computer capacity to handle advanced
climate modeling for at least the next several years.
The prospects for new or original Soviet data also are
poor. Individual Soviet scientists are interested in
experimental research, but higher level approval will
not be forthcoming, unless senior Soviet officials be-
come more seriously concerned about Nuclear Winter.
For present purposes, it appears that Soviet leaders are
content to rely on US data. This will involve continued
Soviet interest in scientific exchanges with the United
States. Joint experimental research could provide ac-
cess to US measurement technology, but there may
continue to be reluctance to approve such work at high
levels because the results could reduce the credibility
of earlier Soviet research and Soviet scientists might
eventually be put in an embarrassing position of
agreeing to the possibility of much less severe climatic
consegnences.F__1
issue introduced into a wide variety of forums, espe-
cially the various United Nations agencies. Further-
more, Soviet officials will attempt to raise concerns
about Nuclear Winter with members of the peace
movement in Europe. In addition to the Soviet media,
television documentaries on Nuclear Winter already
have been produced in the United Kingdom and
Japan. In the Third World, Soviet officials will exploit
Nuclear Winter because research suggests that the
consequences of nuclear war could extend to the
Southern Hemisphere. All of these efforts will be part
of a larger Soviet strategy to blame the United States
for the "arms race" and get other countries to bring
pressure on Washington to reduce the US strategic
arms inventory.F_~
54. We believe it is unlikely that Soviet positions on
arms control will change dramatically solely as a result
of Nuclear Winter research. Moscow will continue to
oppose substantial reductions in their medium and
heavy intercontinental ballistic missile force, other
major alterations of their force structure, or serious
limitations on their weapons modernization process.
Pressures to retain a force large enough to carry out
the major missions assigned to nuclear forces are likely
to outweigh Nuclear Winter concerns.F_~
52,. The public presentation of Soviet views on
Nuclear Winter has shifted from commentary on basic
research to publicizing the policy implications. Soviet
officials have noted that the main Nuclear Winter
questions have been sufficiently resolved and there is a
need to move on to dealing with the basic problem of
superpower relations. Such views have been expressed
by Moiseyev, Deputy Director of the Computer Cen-
ter and a key administrator in the chain between
Velikhov and Aleksandrov. Moiseyev wants to shift the
focus to the larger context of "man in the biosphere,"
the subject of a forthcoming book he hopes to publish
in the United States and the USSR. In linking the perils
of Nuclear Winter to other serious environmental
problems involving the superpowers, Moiseyev uses
the analogy of passengers riding together in a small
boat. In such a situation, any serious differences must
he resolved to "mutual satisfaction." We can expect to
see this theme associated with future Soviet reporting
on Nuclear \\'inter.l
5:3. Soviet scientists will seek to keep Nuclear Win-
ter in front of the public, particularly in the United
States and Western Europe. This will help keep
pressure on Western governments to reduce their
nuclear weapons inventories. We can expect to see the
55. The Nuclear Winter hypothesis is uncertain.
While the Soviets will continue to exploit it for
propaganda purposes, we believe that there is little
chance for fundamental changes in Soviet nuclear
weapons policies or major reductions in their nuclear
arsenal as a direct result of published or ongoing
research on this subject. If the Soviet leadership
eventually were to accept Nuclear Winter effects as
both credible and profound, it could lead to serious
contradictions between these new considerations, on
the one hand, and Soviet doctrine and weapons em-
ployment policies on the other. Such contradictions are
obvious to the Soviets and would probably cause Soviet
officials to demand exceptionally high standards of
scientific proof for the Nuclear Winter hypothesis,
standards that probably cannot be met.
56. The Soviets could be faced with several dilem-
mas if they had to reconcile the potential implications
of the Nuclear Winter hypothesis with important
tenets of their military doctrine. For example, Nuclear
Winter would call into question those aspects of Soviet
war-fighting strategy that emphasize preemptive, mas-
sive nuclear strikes, which, according to the hypothe-
sis, would literally be suicidal for the Soviets even if
US territory bore the brunt of the nuclear detonations.
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Responses to this dilemma would be difficult for
Soviet strategic planners: they apparently are highly,
skeptical of concepts of escalation control and small-
scale strike options. Ultimately, increasing doubts that
nuclear weapons would be used could undermine
Soviet beliefs in the political utility of nuclear weap-
ons. This, in turn, could result in more emphasis on
conventional forces, biological weapons such as those
achieved by genetic engineering, and directed-energy
weapons.
tracking, and intercept capabilities after the initial
strikes. Also, more advanced BMD technologies may
have to consider the effects of intercepts occurring in
the boost phase, exoatmospheric, or terminal phase of
missile flight in light of Nuclear Winter. Should
Moscow become concerned with using BMD both to
protect military capabilities and to prevent an attack
from triggering Nuclear Winter, then a much more
extensive defense capability would be required,
including:
57. Nuclear Winter considerations also could pose
dilemmas for Soviet research and development pro-
granis. In some respects, this could reinforce existing
trends toward development of lower yields and better
accuracy to reduce the climatic effects of strikes on
critical targets. Nonnuclear warheads also could be
considered for strategic targets. This might be espe-
cially attractive in the European Theater to reduce the
possibility that effects from burning cities would
extend to the USSR. In addition, targeting planners
might consider target combustibility along with yield,
height of bursts, timing, and other factors to reduce
the amount of smoke and (his
58. Nuclear Winter considerations also could corn-
plicate Soviet ballistic missile defense (BNID) planning.
Large quantities of smoke, dust, and particulate mat-
ter in the atmosphere could degrade target detection,
- Increased effectiveness to reduce leakage.
- Extended protection for urban areas, to reduce
smoke and particulate matter.
59. Nuclear Winter also could
thinking about civil defense. Soviet agriculture may be
more susceptible to damage than US crops because of'
weather patterns, greater geographical concentration,
and less diversity of Soviet crops. Because of the
potential damage to food production, Soviet civil
defense officials could be forced to extend their
planning time frames for basic survival to about a
year, rather than about 30 days when fallout would be
the major long-term consideration. Thus, substantial
increases in civil defense food stockpiles might be an
early indicator that Nuclear Winter was beginning to
influence Soviet thinking at high levels.
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Annex B
Selected Chronology of Nuclear Winter
Discussions in International Forums
April, Boston, TTAPS Peer Review. (Golitsyn)
17-19 May, Moscow, All-Union Conference of Scientists Against the Threat of
Nuclear War, the Committee of Soviet Scientists in the Defense of Peace and Against
Nuclear War established. (Velikhov, Golitsyn)
19-24 August, Erice, Italy, International Seminar on Nuclear War. (Velikhov,
Aleksandrov)
October, Moscow, US-USSR Committee for International Security and Arms
Control. (Velikhov, Skryabin, Blokhin, Bayer)
14-17 November, Second Vienna Dialogue for Disarmament and Detente,
sponsored by International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces and World Peace Council.
(Various Soviet scientists)
15-17 November, Stockholm, Sweden, Workshop on the Environmental Conse-
quences of Nuclear War, sponsored by Scientific Community on Problems of the
Environment (SCOPE), of International Council of Scientific Unions. (Various Soviet
scientists)
16 November, Washington-Moscow TV hookup, Conference on World After
Nuclear War. (Velikhov, Aleksandrov, Kondrat'yev)
23 November, Tbilisi, Georgia, USSR, Session of the Committee of Soviet
Scientists in the Defense of Peace and Against Nuclear War, representatives of the
Federation of American Scientists attend. (Velikhov, Golitsyn)
8 December, Washington, symposium of Soviet and American scientists, to discuss
the effects of nuclear war. (Velikhov, Aleksandrov)
January, Vatican meeting on the effects of nuclear explosions on the atmosphere,
held at the Pontifical Academy of Sciences. (Aleksandrov)
7 March, Tallinn, Estonia, USSR, meeting of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in
the Defense of Peace and Against Nuclear War. (Velikhov)
17 April, Ashkhabad, Turkmen Republic, USSR, meeting of the Committee of
Soviet Scientists in the Defense of Peace and Against Nuclear War. (Velikhov)
9 May, Washington, conference between delegates of Committee of Soviet
Scientists in the Defense of Peace and Against Nuclear War and representatives of the
Federation of American Scientists. (Velikhov)
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15 May, Leningrad, meeting of the Scientific Comniunity on Problems of the
Environment, International Council of' Scientific Unions. (Aleksandrov, Golitsyn,
KondratIycv)
June, Geneva. World Meteorological Organization, 36th seminar of Executive
Conunittec. (lzra(l )
-1-5 June, Helsinki. Finland, International Physicians for the Prevention of
Nuclear War. (Various Soviet scientists)
15 June, Leningrad, [N Regional Conference on World Disarmament. (Golitsyn)
19-21 August, Erice, Italy, International Seminar on Nuclear War. (Aleksandrov)
5 September, College Park, Maryland, Conference on Nuclear Deterrence.
(:Aleksandrov)
,5 Voucinber, Glasgow, Scotland, conference on the effects of a nuclear attack.
(Golitsyn)
18-20 \or'ember, Rellagio, Italy, International Conference on the Consequences
of Nuclear War. (Skryabin)
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Annex C
Selected Bibliography
Soviet Research on Nuclear Winter
Aleksandrov, V. V., Stenchikov, G. L., The Proceedings on Applied Mathemat-
ics. USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1983.
Aleksandrov, V. V., "Update on the Climatic Impacts of Nuclear Exchange,
Erice, Italy: International Seminar on Nuclear War, 1984.
Ginsberg, A. S., Golitsyn, G. S., Demchenko, P. F., "Development of Highly
Turbid Convective Boundary Layer," Moscow, Institute of Atmospheric Physics,
USSR Academy of Sciences, 1984.
Golitsyn, G. S., Ginsberg, A. S., "Possible Climatic Consequences of Nuclear
Conflict and Some Natural Analogs," Moscow, Committee of Soviet Scientists for
Peace Against the Nuclear Threat, 1984.
Izrael', Y. A., Karol, I. L., Kiselev, A. A., Rosanov, Y. V., "Atmospheric
Composition and Thermal Regime Model Charges After Possible Nuclear War,"
Moscow, Goskomgidromet, 1984.
Kondrat'yev, K. Y., "Observational Evidence of the Impact of Nuclear Explosions
on the Atmosphere and Climate," Moscow, Lake Study Institute, USSR Academy of
Sciences, 1984.
Western Research on Nuclear Winter
US National Academy of Sciences, The Effects on the Atmosphere of a Major
Nuclear Exchange. Washington: National Academy Press, 1985.
Ehrlich, Paul R.; Sagan, Carl; Kennedy, Donald; Roberts, Walter Orr, The Cold
and the Dark: The World After Nuclear War. New York: W. W. Norton, 1984.
Sagan, Carl, "Nuclear Winter and Climatic Catastrophe: Some Implications,"
Foreign Affairs, vol. 62 No. 2 (Winter 1983).
Crutzen, Paul J. and Birks, John W., "The Atmosphere After a Nuclear War:
Twilight at Noon," Ambio vol. II, No. 2-3 (1982).
Turco, R. P.; Toon, O. B.; Ackerman, T. P.; Pollack, J. B.; and Sagan, C., "Nuclear
Winter: Global Consequences of Multiple Nuclear Explosions," Science vol. 222, No.
4630 (23 December 1983).
"The Climatic Effects of Nuclear War," Scientific
American, vol. 251, No. 2 (August 1984), pp. 33-43.
MacCracken, Michael, "Nuclear War: Preliminary Estimates of the Climatic
Effects of a Nuclear Exchange," Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Report
No. 83-84.
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(:m ev . Schneider, and 'I'honipson, "Global AtuuospIwric Effects of \1assis e
Smoke Injections from a \uclear \\ ar. .A'ature (March 1984), pp. 21-25.
"Atmospheric. Calculatiolls Suggest Nuclear \\ inter. Physics Today (February
I9` 1), pp 17-20.
1:hrlich, Anne. 'Nuclear Winter. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (April 1984).
General Background on Nuclear Effects
t S Congress, Office of Technology Assessm(.nt. The l Jfecis of Nuclear War.
Washington: t S Government Printing Office, 1979.
t S I)epartnient of Defctsc. 711c Effects of Nuclear W eapon.s (Third F,ditiun),
\\ ashirrgton: 1_ S Gosernurent Printing Office. 1977.
t sited Nations Report of the Secretary General, Comprehensive Study on
.A'ru?lear Weopons, Nev fork: U\ Department of Political and Security Council
\ffairs, 1951.
t Cited Nations World Health Organization, FJjeets of nclcar War on IIealth
and Ilecdth Scrcices, Geneva: WHO, 198-1.
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