FOOD PROBLEMS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: PROSPECTS FOR 1984 AND BEYOND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00413R000100050001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 22, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
22 March 1984
FOOD PROBLEMS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
PRO FOR 1984 AND E D
This Interagency Intelligence Assessment was requested by the National
Security Council. It was prepared under the auspices of the National
Intelligence Officer for Africa. The Assessment was coordinated at the
working level within the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Army,
and the Department of Commerce.
NIC M 84-10005
Copy of
SECRET
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Table of Contents
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Page
KEY JUDGMENTS ..........................................................ii
DISCUSSION
PART I: AN OVERVIEW
Introduction: The Present Food Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa ......... 1
Long Term Trends Underlying the Present Crisis
Declining Per Capita Food Productivity .........................3
Growing Dependence on Food Imports .............................4
Balance of Payments Difficulties ...............................
Reliance on International Food Aid .............................6
Causes of Food Problems in Sub-Saharan Africa--An Overview
Natural Causes of Food Problems
Adverse Weather and Climatic Conditions ...................8
Other Environmental Difficulties ......................... 10
Population Trends ........................................ 10
Public Policy Causes of Food Problems
Pricing and Marketing Policies ........................... 15
Transportation Inadequacies .... .......................17
State Investments in Food Production ..................... 1
Misuse and Corruption of the Food System ................. 18
Implications for the United States ................................. 20
PART II: CASE STUDIES OF FOOD PROBLEMS IN SPECIFIC COUNTRIES
The Sahel ..................................................... 21
West Africa
Ghana .................................................... 23
Nigeria .................................................. 24
East Africa
Ethiopia ................................................. 26
Kenya .................................................... 2
Tanzania ................................................. 30
Southern Africa
Mozambique ...............................................
South Africa ............................................. 34
Zimbabwe ................................................. 37
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Food has once again become one of Sub-Saharan Africa's most pressing
problems, as at least 24 countries there are now in need of emergency food
aid. While food crises have occurred in Africa several times during the last
15 years, the pervasiveness of current food problems makes the present
situation more serious than previous emergencies have been. Drought and other
extreme weather conditions, political turmoil resulting from guerrilla
insurgencies, and the consequent displacement of some 4 million people have
exacerbated existing food problems and explain the severity of the present
situation.
Underlying these phenomena, however, are more profound, chronic problems.
Most Sub-Saharan African countries have long faced declining per capita food
production caused by rapid population growth rates and stagnating crop yields
as crowding makes traditional shifting cultivation methods less effective.
Some of Africa's food problems are due to basic and long-standing constraints
of water resources, climate, soil, crop disease, and pestilence. Many others
are the direct result of mismanagement, corruption, and specific policies
followed by African governments that have reduced incentives for domestic food
production and impeded the distribution of both local and imported food
supplies. The net sum is that Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region in the
world where per capita food production has declined over the past 20 years.
Government pricing policies common to most African states have
discouraged domestic production of staple foods by keeping official prices low
in order to subsidize urban consumers. These policies have accelerated
migration to African cities, causing rural labor shortages and adding to urban
food demand. In addition, the marketing and distribution of foodstuffs,
agricultural materials, farm equipment, and advanced agricultural technologies
are usually handled by government-run corporations, whose performance has been
marked by widespread mismanagement, shortages of technical and administrative
expertise, insufficient financing, and corruption. Moreover, as a matter of
policy, some governments may be withholding food from certain elements of the
population. These problems are further compounded h adequate and
frequently deteriorating transportation systems.
To close the widening gap between domestic food production and the food
demands of a growing population, most African governments have turned
increasingly to imported food to satisfy normal demand as well as emergency
needs. Food imports have risen steadily over the last two decades, and paying
for those imports--even for those offered on a concessional basis--has proven
difficult because of insufficient foreign exchange reserves. The low reserves
reflect deterioration of the agricultural export sector, recent declines in
many primary commodity prices, and residual effects of the international
recession. Moreover, the burden of rising food imports, exacerbated by the
costs of domestic drought relief programs, has strained the resources of a
number of countries and threatened their ability to comply with existing IMF
assistance programs.
The outlook for resolving these food problems in the immediate future is
not good. The required policy changes--such as those associated with IMF and
other debt rescheduling programs--appear risky to many fragile regimes. They
are afraid to boost farmers' price incentives since this would inevitably mean
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are afraid to boost farmers' price incentives since this would inevitably mean
either impossible increases in government food subsidies or food price
increases unacceptable to city dwellers. These could cost the governments
their political support and even trigger civil disorders. Currency
devaluations could produce the same effects. Governments are also reluctant
to dismantle the parastatal organizations that control food purchasing and
distributio they provide an important source of employment and
patronage. 25X1
Although food related civil unrest could provide opportunities for
exploitation by the Soviet Union and Libya, popular dissatisfaction undermines
both pro-Western regimes as well as regimes friendly to the Soviets. Neither
the Soviets nor the Libyans are lik ovide Sub-Saharan African
countries with necessary food aid. Y t~ or 25X1
Over the long term, hopes for increasing the productivity of African
agriculture rest not only on changes in pricing, marketing, and distribution
policies, but also on the use of improved agricultural technologies to
overcome basic deficiences and on the reduction of high population growth
rates. More consistent and widespread application of known "technical
packages" of seed types, fertilizers, and cultivation methods would improve
yields. However, most African governments have not established the kinds of
agricultural extension services necessary to bring these innovations to
farmers in the field. In addition, high-yielding grains suitable for the Sub-
Saharan climate and resistant to tropical pestilence, as well as methods to
control economically devastating problems such as rinderpest and the cassava
mealie bug, must still be developed before Africa can experience the
agricultural revolution that has transformed food productivity in other parts
of the developing world. Research in several areas appears promising, but
useable results are still years away and will likely require the investment of
technical, financial, and managerial resources beyond the means of even the
most prosperous Sub-Saharan African countries.
Because of the persistent nature of many of these obstacles, it is
unlikely that the problem of food production in Sub-Saharan Africa can be
significantly alleviated in this century. Policy reform is absolutely
essential even before longer-term technological advances can make a
difference, and is crucial to near-term improvements in agricultural
productivity. Unless African governments can be persuaded to make these
politically risky policy changes now, and can be convinced that failure to
make these changes entails even greater risks, requests for food relief will
probably come from throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, as many governments attempt
to use aid to postpone hard domestic political decisions.
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PRIMARY CAUSES OF FOOD PROBLEMS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Paucity of Agri- Agricultural Warfare/
cultural Resources** Policies Drought Refugees
*Angola x x
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Cape Verde x x
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Cent'l Af Rep x x
*Ethiopia x x x
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Guinea x
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Guinea-Bissau x
Ivory Coast x
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Lesotho x x
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Madagascar x
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Mozambique x x x
Niger x x
* Countries on UN/FAO's 1984 emergency food list
**Limited water resources and other especially harsh agricultural conditions
prevail normally.
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Paucity of Agri- Agricultural Warfare/
cultural Resources** Policies Drought Refugees
Nigeria x x
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Senegal x x
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Togo x
Uganda x x
*Upper Volta x x
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zaire x
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Zambia x x
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Zimbabwe x x
* Countries on UN/FAO's 1984 emergency food list
** Limited water resources and other especially harsh agricultural conditions
prevail normally.
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Figure 1
AFRICA: Drought and Countries Receiving Food Aid
? Country affected by drought
Country on UN/FAO' emergency
food aid list
Boundary repro son tat!on is
not neceaaar~iy aumontat e
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DISCUSSION
PART I: AN OVERVIEW
Introduction: The Present Food Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa
1. Twenty-four Sub-Saharan African countries, according to the United
Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization, are in immediate need of emergency
food aid.* While food emergencies have occurred periodically in Sub-Saharan
Africa during the last 15 years, the pervasiveness of current food problems
makes the present situation more serious than previous food crises have
been. Unlike earlier emergencies, which were always confined to specific
regions or countries, this time countries throughout the African continent are
affected. Estimates place the number of people suffering from various degrees
of food deficiencies as high as 150 million, or nearly half the continent's
population. While that figure--along with most other data on the food
situation in Sub-Saharan Africa--is impossible to verify, it does indicate the
extent of food problems in the region.
Difficulties in Estimating Food Deficiencies
The calculations involved in estimating food deficiencies--
placing figures on the quantity of available food and comparing it to
the population's nutritional requirements--are prone to errors that
tend to overstate the extent of food deficiencies.
FOOD SUPPLIES: Food supplies available for human consumption are
calculated by summing production, trade, and stock changes, and then
substracting those supplies lost in storage or used for seed and
animal feed. The quantity of available food tends to be
underestimated because farmers--especially those engaged in
subsistence farming as are the majority in Africa--understate their
production in order to retain more of it for their own use or private
sale. Reliable statistics are virtually impossible to collect
because communication systems are poor, much food does not pass
through marketing channels where it can be monitored, and mix-planted
fields are prevalent and make broad estimates difficult. In most
parts of the developing world, the accuracy of statistics on food
availabilities has been improving but, in much of Sub-Saharan Africa,
reporting systems have deteriorated over the past 20 years.
---------------
* This list now includes Angola, Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, The Central
African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Lesotho, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal,
Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Upper Volta, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
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NUTRITIONAL REQUIREMENTS: Establishing minimal or desirable levels
of food intake remains an imprecise science, although techniques used
today yield results that appear more realistic--and significantly
lower--than those used in the past. Undernourishment refers to a
caloric intake insufficient to maintain activities without losing
weight. Malnourishment describes a deficiency in protective
nutrients--protein, vitamins, and minerals.
..............................................................................
2. Drought and other extreme weather conditions, political turmoil
resulting from guerrilla insurgencies, and the consequent displacement of some
4 million people are among the causes of the current food emergency.
Underlying these phenomena, however, are more profound, chronic problems.
Most Sub-Saharan African countries have long faced declining per capita food
production, concomitant growing dependence on imported food (despite reduced
export earnings), and increasing reliance on international food aid. Sub-
Saharan Africa is the only region of the developing world where per capita
food production has declined over the past 20 years. Many of the food
problems are the direct result of mismanagement, corruption, and specific
policies followed by African governments. This paper examines the longer-term
trends that underlie the present food crisis, and analyzes both the natural
and public policy causes of food problems in Sub-Saharan Africa.
COUNTRIES WITH LONG-STANDING FOOD PROBLEMS
NOTE: This chart lists countries by their average daily per capita caloric intake
as a percentage of nutritional requirements as measured in 1976-78.
Less than 70%
70%-79%
80%-89%
90%-99% 1
00% an
d over
*Ango 1 a
*Botswana
*Ghana
*Benin
Burund
i
*Ethiopia
*Cape Verde
*Guinea
*Cent'l Af. Rep.
Camero
on
*Chad
Niger
Congo
*Gambia *
Zimbab
we
*Mali
Nigeria
Kenya
*Guinea-Bissau
*Mozambique
Rwanda
*Lesotho
Ivory Coast
*Somalia
*Tanzania
Liberia
Madagascar
*Upper Volta
Uganda
Malawi
*Senegal
Zaire
Namibia
Sierra Leone
*Swaziland
*Togo
*Zambia
*Countries on the UN/FAO's 1984 emergency food aid list
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Long-Term Trends Underlying the Present Food Crisis
Declining Per Capita Food Productivity
3. The growth rate of food production in Sub-Saharan Africa, already the
lowest of any region in the developing world, has slipped steadily over the
past 20 years. The average annual rate of increase in food production in the
1970s was 1.5 percent--down from about 2 percent during the preceding decade
and less than half the rate for all developing countries, according to the
World Bank. Per capita food production has dropped even more precipitously as
the result of an accelerating population growth rate. By 1982, overall per
capita food production in the region had fallen 20 percent below the 1961-65
average level, and this figure masks substantially greater declines during the
past decade in several countries.
PER CAPITA FOOD PRODUCTION (1980-82)
Index 1969-71 = 100)
Countries Falling Behind
Countries Keeping Pace
Countries Increasing
Production
80
81-95
95-100
101-105
106-110
110
*Ango I a
*Benin
Burundi
Kenya
Rwanda
Ivory Coast
*Ethiopia
*Ghana
*Mali
*Mozambique
*Senegal
*Togo
*Uganda
Madagascar
Niger
Nigeria
Sierra Leone
Sudan
*Tanzania
*Upper Volta
Zaire
*Zambia
*Zimbabwe
Cameroon
*Guinea
Malawi
Liberia
South Africa
* Countries on UN/FAO's 1984 emergency food aid list
NOTE: The use of 1969-71 as a base period does not imply that food supplies
were fully adequate during those years.
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Figure 2
Indexes of Per Capita Food Production for
Selected Regions, 1972-81
- Latin America South Asia
- Developed World - Sub-Saharan A(ricaa
I I 1_ _ t I L _1-_~ J
80 1972 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81
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Growing Dependence on Food Imports
4. During the 1960s, when African cities began to grow rapidly and world
grain prices were low, governments found that the food needs of urban
populations could be satisfied more easily with imported grains than with
locally produced food. Total grain imports--most coming from the United States
and the European Community--exceeded 8.6 million tons in 1981, compared with
1.2 million tons in the early 1960s. If production and consumption trends from
the 1970s continue, annual requirements for imported food will reach 10 to 12
million tons by 1990, accord e USDA, FAO, and International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI).
Dependence on Imported Food (1979-81)
Greater than 50%-69%
70%
*Cape Verde
Congo
Gabon
Mauritius
*Sao Tome/
Principe
30%-49% 10%-29% Less than 10%
*Botswana *Angola
*Somalia *Gambia
Zaire *Mozambique
*Senegal
*Swaziland
*Tanzania
*Togo
*Zambia
Liberia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Sierra Leone
*Benin Burundi
Cameroon *Ethiopia
*Cent'l Afr Rep. Kenya
*Ghana Madagascar
*Guinea Mali
*Guinea-Bissau Uganda
Ivory Coast *Upper Volta
*Lesotho *Zimbabwe
* Countries on UN/FAO's 1984 emergency food aid list
NOTE: These figures were calculated by subtracting the percentage of grain
self-sufficiency (=(grain production)/(grain production + net grain imports) x
100) from 100.
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V. a W
Balance of Payments Difficulties
5. Paying for imported food has become a significant burden for the
majority of African governments. According to FAO, Africa's annual food import
bill averaged $2.5 billion in 1977-79--the last period for which data are
available--compared with $274 million per year in 1961-63. The cost of food
imports for 1982 are estimated at over $5 billion. These costs are being
incurred during a period when the price of importing oil is also high and the
export earnings of many Sub-Saharan African states have been depressed beca"f
production problems and residual effects of the international recession.
6. Because of shortages in foreign exchange earnings, many African
countries have been forced to borrow heavily from international financial
institutions. Although much of the financing has been granted on a
concessional basis, debt servicing has consumed a large and increasing share of
many countries' foreign exchange earnings. Several Sub-Saharan countries have
not maintained the capital stock in their export sectors and therefore have
experienced declining output from these sectors. Even if major investment
programs were established immediately in these countries, the payback from
these programs is many years away (for example, rubber plantations in Liberia
and the clove groves in Madagascar). It is this long payback period that
resulted in the postponement of such programs since more immediate needs
consumed all the funds available. Domestic export sectors must be revitalized
before these countries will have the foreign exchange to pay for imported goods
and technology.
DEBT SERVICING RATIOS FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA--1982
60 and over Guinea-Bissau
Madagascar
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
40-59 Ivory Coast
Malawi
Niger
*Tanzania
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
20-39 Burundi *Gambia *Mauritaria Uganda
Cameroon *Guinea *Senegal Zaire
Congo Kenya Sierra Leone Zambia
*Mali Sudan Zimbabwe
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Less than *Benin Djibouti Mauritius *Togo
20 *Botswana *Ethiopia Nigeria *Upper Volta
*Cent'l Af. Rep. Gabon Rwanda
*Chad *Ghana *Somalia
Comoros *Lesotho *Swaziland
-----------------
* Countries on UN/FAO's 1984 emergency food aid list
NOTE: Figures are debt service as a percent of exports of goods and services.
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Reliance on international Food Aid
7. As a result of their increasingly precarious financial positions, most
African nations are compelled to rely on Western donors for food aid in the
form of concessional sales or grants to meet normal import requirements as well
as emergency needs. Over 40 African nations relied on food aid for about ten
percent of their total imported food needs, and received an estimated
$500 million worth of food aid from Western donors in 1981 alone. The United
States was the largest single supplier of this assistance, with over 60 percent
of the total. according to the US Agency for International Development
(AID).*
DEPENDENCE ON FOOD AID FOR GRAIN IMPORTS (1981)
0% *Botswana Ivory Coast Nigeria
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1%-19% *Benin *Gambia *Swaziland
Cameroon Madagascar *Togo
*Cent'l Afr. Rep. Malawi Zaire
Congo Niger
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
20%-39% Burundi *Lesotho *Zambia
*Ghana Liberia
*Guinea *Mali
Kenya *Senegal
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
40% and Cape Verde Rwanda *Upper Volta
over *Ethiopia *Somalia *Zimbabwe
*Guinea-Bissau *Tanzania
* Countries on UN/FAO's 1984 emergency food aid ist
NOTE: Food aid (grain) is expressed as a percent of grain imports.
* Communist countries are not an important source of food aid to Africa.
China was the main donor over the last decade, although its aid dropped
virtually to naught in 1981-82, and Beijing tends to distribute its
assistance quite widely. The Soviet Union and Eastern European countries
provided less than $10 million in food aid to Sub-Saharan Africa in 1981,
and their assistance has traditionally gone to states with whom they have
enjoyed close relations such as Madagascar, Mozambique, Mali, Somalia
(before Siad's break with Moscow in 1977), Ethiopia, and Guinea (before
Toure's decision in the late 1970s to develop closer ties with the West).
China and the Soviet Union have chosen not to make food assistance a more
important element in their aid programs in Africa.
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KILOGRAMS OF FOOD AID PER CAPITA 1978-79
CHANGES IN FOOD AID 1977/78--1981182
(thousand tons, grain equivalent)
OVER 40
*Cape Verde
77/78
81/82
UNDER 40
*Guinea-Bissau
Burundi 16
9
*Sao Tome & Principe
AID HAS
Congo 4
1
Seychelles
DECLINED
*Ghana 73
43
*Lesotho 38
34
UNDER 30
*Gambia
*Lesotho
*Togo 8
5
*Mauritania
*Botswana 9
10
*Senegal
Cameroon 8
11
*Somalia
*Chad 23
29
AID HAS
*Ethiopia 163
190
UNDER 20
*Botswana
INCREASED
*Guinea 28
39
Comoros
UP TO 50%
Malawi 2
2
Djibouti
*Mozambique 125
135
Mauritius
Rwanda 10
13
*Mozambique
*Senegal 60
83
*Swaziland 1
1
UNDER 10
*Angola
*Benin
Zaire 76
98
Burundi
*Benin 5
8
Cameroon
*Cape Verde 31
54
*Cent' l Af Rep
AID HAS
*Cent'l Af Rep 1
2
*Chad
INCREASED
Comoros 5
8
Congo
50%-100%
*Guinea-Bissau 17
30
Eq Guinea
*Upper Volta 49
81
*Ethiopia
Gabon
Zambia 50
100
*Ghana
Djibouti 5
11
*Guinea
*Gambia 7
11
Kenya
AID HAS
*Mali 22
60
Liberia
INCREASED
*Mauritania 31
86
Madagascar
100%-200%
*SaoTome&Princ. 1
3
Malawi
*Somalia 87
186
*Mali
Sudan 91
194
Niger
Nigeria
*Angola 11 73
Rwanda
Kenya 9 27
Sierra Leone
Liberia 1 42
Sudan AID HAS
Madagascar 9 87
*Swaziland INCREASED
Mauritius 6 45
*Tanzania 200 + %
Niger 23 71
*Togo
Sierra Leone 6 30
Uganda
*Tanzania
5
4 304
Zaire
*Zambia
* Countries on UN/FAO's 1984 emergency food aid list
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Causes of Food Problems in Sub-Saharan Africa--An Overview
Natural Causes of Food Problems
8. Adverse Weather and Climatic Conditions: Although some areas have
escaped its full effects, most of Sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing the worst
drought of this century. The dry period actually started approximately 15
years ago when precipitation began a gradual decline after several years of
averaging 15 percent above the long term-mean in southern Africa and 35 to
40 percent above that mean along the Saharan fringe. Drought had spread
throughout the Sub-Saharan region by 1968, and for the following six years
precipitation ranged 15 to 40 percent below normal. During the worst years of
this period--1972 and 1973--the shortfalls exceeded 50 percent of normal in
the northern Sahel and 30 to 35 percent in the more humid southern area.
Rainfall over the continent increased considerably during 1974 and 1975
leading to speculation that the drought had ended but, in reality,
precipitation was still 25 percent below the mean in Sub-Saharan areas north
of the Equator and 10 percent below the mean in the south. The shortfalls in
1976-77 and 1982-83 matched or exceeded the severe drought years of the early
1970s.
9. When the current African drought will end is impossible to predict.
Most meteorologists believe that they understand the general conditions that
lead to drought formation, but the quantitative detail necessary to predict
its onset and duration are not known. Because drought has recurred in Africa,
numerous analyses of the climate have been undertaken to identify cyclical
events that could lead to drought prediction. Some of these so-called time
series investigations have revealed a possible cyclical pattern, but the
weather and climate data are incomplete. Moreover, population changes,
industrial development, agricultural expansion, and other manmade changes in
the environment will significantly influence future climate in ways the
historical data cannot reflect.
The Drought, South Africa, and Regional Food Trade
One of the most significant consequences of drought in South
Africa has been its effect on regional food supplies. South Africa
is by far the dominant corn (maize) producer and exporter in the
region, with Zimbabwe a distant runner-up. Until last year, large
surpluses had been available for annual export. Corn is exported at
competitive world prices that are often below those charged to
domestic consumers. As a result, South Africa has been successful in
contracting deliveries worldwide as well as in black Africa. A total
of about 4.3 million tons were exported from the 1982 crop, comp25X1
with 5.4 million tons from 1981 and 3.2 million tons from 1980.
estimates that about one-third of these sales were to 25X1
black Africa. 25X1
Such sales enhance regional economic dependence on South
Africa. Pretoria occasionally stresses the nation's role as a food
supplier and hints at food as a potential weapon. Our evidence,
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however, indicates that South Africa has not explicitly used the
threat of withholding food as a foreign policy weapon, even though a
survey of white South Africans in late 1982 revealed that 72 percent
favored banning foo to neighboring countries that support or
harbor terrorists.
Because of drought last year, Pretoria was forced to cancel
major export contracts for deliveries of corn and wheat outside
Africa. Moreover, it suspended sales to traditional customers such
as Zambia and Zaire. South Africa has continued to supply corn at
market rates to Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, all of which it
treats as part of its domestic market for corn. Nevertheless,
peasant families without cash for purchases n hurt and forced
to rely on aid programs in their countries.
Because of the intensified drought in 1984, South Africa is
projecting corn imports of well over 4 million tons between now and
April 1985--double the level of imports last year--which will strain
the offloading capacity of the country's ports and rail lines. As a
result, South African will have little margin to handle imports of
corn for Zambia, Zaire, and Zimbabwe, all of which have become
increasingly dependent on South African ports as facilities in
Mozambique and Tanzania have deteriorated. Import requirements for
Zimbabwe alone probably will absorb any excess South African port
capacity, while Mozambique's ports will be hard-pressed merely to
handle that country's own exceptional relief deliveries this year.
Most countries in the region are net food importers even under
normal conditions. As a result, formal efforts to promote regional
cooperation for long-term food security independent of South Africa
are being made by the nine-nation Southern African Development
Coordination Conference. These efforts--in which Zimbabwe's role
will be crucial--are barely in the planning stage, however, and will
require greater technical, financial, and administrative resources
than are likely to be available in the foreseeable future.
Consequently, regional dependence on imp7rted food--including from
South Africa--is unlikely to diminish.
10. While much of Africa has suffered from drought for the past three
years, the continent has suffered from other climatic extremes that have also
impeded food production. The cyclone that tore into Mozambique, Swaziland,
and parts of South Africa late in January 1984 is but the latest such
episode. Floods have also periodically devastated parts of central Africa,
and West Africa's export and food crops have been damaged by brushfires fanned
by the Harmattan desert winds.
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Figure 3
Percipitation Trend in Sahel, 1950-83
1 L-1 I I I I_ I I I I ----I I I I I I I I I I -L_1-t-
1960 1970 1980
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Figure 4
AFRICA: Average Annual Precipitation
(NOTE: One inch is equal to
approximately 25 millimeters)
o iooo
Kilometers
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DROUGHT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (1983)
Drought Affected Countries
*Botswana Namibia
*Cape Verde *Nigeria
Cameroon *Senegal
*Chad South Africa
*Cent'l Af. Rep. *Swaziland
*Ethiopia *Togo
*Gambia *Zambia
*Ghana *Zimbabwe
Ivory Coast
*Lesotho
*Mali
*Mauritaria
*Mozambique
Countries with Normal Precipitation
*Ango I a
Benin
Burundi
Comoros
Congo
Djibouti
Equatorial Guinea
Gabon
*Guinea
*Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mauritius
Niger
Rwanda
*Sao Tome/Principe
Sierra Leone
*Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Uganda
*Upper Volta
Zaire
*Countries on UN/FAO's 1984 emergency food aid list
11. Other Environmental Difficulties: Extreme weather is not the only
problem facing African agriculture. Crop diseases, poor soil, infestations of
locusts, army worms, and other pests also reduce crop yields. Widespread
trypanosomiasis caused by tsetse flies limits livestock raising and the use of
draft animals. Technical solutions to some of these problems are known, but
most countries lack the resources and agricultural extention services
necessary to transmit technological advances to the field.
12. More extensive technical, financial, and managerial resources will
likely be required before Africa can experience a true agricultural revolution
like the ones that transformed food productivity in Asia, India, and Mexico.
High-yielding grains suitable for the Sub-Saharan climate and resistant to
tropical pestilence have not yet been developed. The International Institute
for Tropical Agriculture in Nigeria has recently released a high-yielding
cassava that is resistant to major African pests. Some other areas of
research--most notably that concentrating on sorghum--appear promising, but
useable results are still several years away. However, more widespread
application of existing "technical packages" of seed types, fertilizers, and
cultivation methods could substantially improve yields. The problem again is
access to these technologies. Most food production is carried out on small
plots by farmers who have little access to modern agricultural advances,
improved farm machinery, irrigation systems, or extension services. In
Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, farmers make a significant contribution to
food production.
13. Population Trends: Africa's rapid population growth over the past 20
years has been the primary factor behind the enormous increase in food demand
yet the population density for the continent as a whole is very low, and rural
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labor shortages abound. Demographers believe that Africa's growth rate will
stay high because Africans traditionally have placed high value on large
families and the desired number of children per family ranges from seven to
10. Governments of 22 countries with growth rates ranging from 2.5 to 3.7
percent see their population growth as being satisfactory or too low.
Moreover, politicians are reluctant to promote family planning policies that
could upset tribal balances. Some leaders--President Mai of Kenya and former
Presidents Ahidjo of Cameroon and Senghor of Senegal--have warned of potential
demographic problems, but this awareness has not filtered down to lower levels
of their bureaucracies. UN demographers therefore project that Africa's
population growth rate will rise from 3 percent to a high of 3.1 percent in
1990 before beginning to decline. Seventeen countries, mostly in East and
West Africa, have growth rates well over 3 percent, and Kenya's growth rate of
4.1 percent is now one of the highest in the world. The UN estimates that the
area's on of 330 million in 1980 will grow to 612 million by the year
2000.
14. Africa's growing urban population is a particular source of stress on
African food supplies. Although today Africa is one of the least urbanized
regions of the world--22 percent of its people lived in cities in 1980--its
annual urban growth rate from natural increase and rural-urban migration is
nearly 6 percent. In 1980, Sub-Saharan Africa had 11 cities of more than 1
million, and if present trends continue for the next 20 years, the region will
have 41 such cities--12 of them in Nigeria. UN demographers project that.3fi
percent of the population will live in urban areas by the year 2000.
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URBAN POPULATION TRENDS
Annual average Urban Growth Rates
(1970-80)
Less than *Benin
4% Burundi
Congo
*Senegal
4%-4.9% *Central Af. Rep.
Nigeria
*Upper Volta
Population in Urban Areas
(1980)
More than Cameroon Liberia
30% *Cent'l Af. Rep. *Somalia
Congo Zaire
*Ghana *Zambia
Ivory Coast *Zimbabwe
5%-5.9% *Angola Rwanda
*Ghana Sierra Leone
*Guinea *Togo
Liberia
Madagascar
*Mali
6%-6.9% *Chad Sudan
*Ethiopia Zaire
Kenya *Zimbabwe
Malawi
*Mozambique
7%-7.9% Cameroon
*Mauritania
Uganda
More than Ivory Coast
8% *Tanzania
25%-30% *Senegal
Sudan
20%-24% *Angola
*Mali
Mauritania
Niger
Sierre Leone
10%-19% *Benin Madagascar
*Chad Niger
*Ethiopia
*Guinea
Kenya
Less than Burundi *Upper Volta
10% Malawi
*Mozambique
Rwanda
Uganda
*Countries on UN/FAO's 1984 emergency food aid list
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15. The growing urbanization of the African population and food subsidies
have created demands for food that are difficult to supply from local pro-
duction even under the best of circumstances. Urban incomes are generally
higher than rural incomes, and academic studies suggest that as their incomes
rise, people purchase greater quantities of food and diversify their diets.
Moreover, the taste preferences of Africans change when they move to cities
because of the higher status associated with certain foods and the easier
preparation and storage of some nontraditional foods. As a result, urban
Africans have turned away from local grains, roots, and tubers in favor of
such foods as higher quality imported rice and Western-style bread made of
wheat flour at recent subsidized prices. In the case of wheat, a crop that is
not suited for production in much of Africa, demand has been fueled at least
in part,hvthP availability of imported wheat for purchase on concessional
terms.
16. Food problems have been further complicated by the vast numbers of
Africans who have fled their traditional areas since the mid-1970's and placed
severe strains on the resources of the regions that receive them. The
problems of refugees and displaced persons are particularly acute in the Horn
and East-Central Africa and are increasing in Southern Africa because internal
political conflicts and inadequate transportation s stems have added to the
difficulties in distributing food equitably.
Refugees and Displaced Persons
The most serious refugee problems are in the Horn of Africa
where Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti shelter over one million persons
who have fled their homelands. Sudan faces the worst situation with
more than 600,000 refugees from Ethiopia, Uganda, Zaire, and Chad.
The influx has been steady as an estimated 35.000 Ethiopians have
entered eastern Sudan since August 1983.
in Khartoum, the daily flow of 350 to 450 new arrivals dropped to 200
per week in late February.
The Government of Sudan, along with the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international private
volunteer organizations, is attempting to resolve its refugee
problems through a variety of programs of self-help, assimilation,
resettlement, and limited repatriation. Sudanese officials are
fearful, however, that potentially violent backlashes could erupt
among the local inhabitants. Living standards are rapidly declining
as drought conditions persist in the east and refugees draw on the
available food, shelter, and services. Private volunteers report
that Sudanese security forces are holding thousands of Ethiopians at
the border in an effort to stem the tide. Government officials and
the UNHCR have developed plans to provide limited assistance for
Ethiopia's drought victims, but the refugees will be discouraged from
becoming permanent residents of Sudan.
Somalia continues to shelter approximately half a million
Ethiopian Somalis who entered the country during the 1977-78 Ogaden
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War. International assistance has eased the government's burden of
accommodating the refugees while providing for the needs of the local
population. This delicate balance could be threatened, however, by
an increasingly severe drought. Contrary to recent reports of masses
of refugees returning to Ethiopia, relatively few are known to have
done so. Most of those who have departed Somalia are nomads
following their normal seasonal livestock movement patterns.
The Ethiopians who entered Djibouti because of the Ogaden War
boosted the country's population by more than 10 percent, creating
severe stress for a state with inadequate resources for its own
inhabitants. A repatriation agreement signed by the governments of
Djibouti, Ethiopia, and the UNHCR has made it possible for about a
quarter of the refugees to return to Ethiopia. That project was
halted in late January 1984, however, because of rebel attacks on the
Addis Ababa-Djibouti railroad (the major return route), and because
of Ethiopi ' ility to provide adequate accommodations for the
returnees.
Ethiopia has generated more refugees than any other country in
Africa. Since the exodus began in 1974, the war with Somalia, on-
going fighting with insurgents, and drought have forced well over one
million Ethiopians to leave their country. Another half million
potential refugees massed along the border with Sudan are counted
among the three million internally displaced Ethiopians.
International and private organizations report that available food is
difficult to distribute among these people because of continuing
fighting, poor roads, lack of vehicles, and adverse seasonal weather
conditions.
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REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Principal Generating and Asylum Countries 1983*
Generating Countries Asylum Countries by Region
Ethiopia 1,000,000 Horn of Africa
Uganda 287,000 Sudan 650,000
Angola 273,000 Somalia 400,000
Burundi 160,000 Djibouti 27,000
Mozambique 120,000 Ethiopia 25,000
Rwanda 102,000
Namibia 74,000
Zaire 51,000
Displaced Persons in Country
Ethiopia 3,UOU'um
Angola 160,000
Chad 70,000
Uganda 40,000
East Central
Zaire
Tanzania
Uganda
Burundi
Rwanda
Kenya
395,000
170,000
116,000
58,000
45,000
6,000
Niger 11,000
Cameroon 10,000
Congo 10,000
Senegal 5,200
Liberia 4,000
Southern
Zim abwe
Angola
Zambia
Lesotho
Botswana
120,000
110,000
89,000
12,000
6,500
(C)
----------------
*These figures are rough approximations based on asylum country estimates as
reported to the UNHCR and US embassies. "Displaced persons in country" refers
to people who have been forced from their home areas but who remain in their
countries of origin.
Public Policy Causes of Food Problems
17. Pricing and Marketing Policies: While adverse weather explains the
sharp drops in food production over the last couple of years, pricing and
marketing policies common to most African governments primarily account for
most of the longer-run decline. Post-independence African leaders tended to
view the agricultural sector as a source of surplus revenue to finance what
they perceived as more important industrial development. Consequently, most
African governments devoted few resources to the production of food for
consumption, preferring to focus their agricultural development programs on
export crops which are a major source of foreign exchange.
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18. The governments' food pricing and marketing policies have reflected
these priorities. In most African countries, official producer and consumer
prices on major staples, crop procurement, and food marketing are regulated
through government-controlled boards known as parastatals. However, the
operations of the parastatals have been hampered from the start by government
decisions to keep producer prices on food crops low in order to subsidize food
for the politically volatile urban consumers. Farmers have little incentive
to expand their production as the prices offered se government boards
often do not even cover their production costs.
19. Low official producer prices and higher consumer demand have encouraged
the development of private marketing structures operating parallel to official
marketing channels in much of Africa. The World Bank estimates that private
traders, who often offer producer prices two to three times as high as
official prices, control over half the marketed production of cereals
throughout the region, although their presence varies considerably among
20. Since 1980, several countries have raised producer prices of staple
foods above world market levels in order to encourage production. Maize
farmers in Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe responded to price increases
with substantial increases in production. Zimbabwe's 1981 maize crop was
nearly double the previous year's production because farmers reacted
positively to record-high preplanting prices and benefitted from good weather
as well. Other efforts to stimulate production have been less successful
because the attractiveness of higher producer prices was undercut by still
higher production costs, lack of necessary materials, bad weather, or domestic
inflation. In Zambia, where a 15-percent price increase for maize in 1981
brought about a boost in the acreage planted, USDA analysts warned that price
incentives would likely be dampened by shortages of agricultural materials and
equipment, transportation problems, and unavailability of credit. Until the
present drought, wheat growers in Zimbabwe were being paid more than twice the
world market price but did not expand plantings because of the high cost of
irrigation. Rising labor costs may be cutting into the incentive of recent
price increases for rice growers in West Africa, according to USDA analyses.
Nigeria increased official producer prices on staple foods substantially in
1980, with rice prices rising 24 percent, maize 38 percent, sorghum 73
percent--all well above world market prices. Prices have not risen
significantly since then, however, while the cost of living has more than
doubled. Similar situations have occurred in Tanzania and Senegal.
21. Some governments are trying to stimulate production by liberalizing
marketing practices and giving freer rein to these private traders. Senegal
has abolished the official cereals marketing board and eliminated government
procurement of cereals. In response to IMF insistence on grain marketing
liberalization as a precondition for a standby accord, Mali has relinquished
its monopoly control on sorghum and millet. Somalia abolished several
parastatals in 1981 and turned their functions over to the private sector.
Zambia has reduced the role of its agricultural marketing board, allowing
cooperatives in some provinces to become the official maize buyers. These
kinds of reforms offer some hope of progress in the longer-run, but their
immediate impact has been offset by the effects of the drought.
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22. Transportation Inadequacies: An inadequate system of transportation and
storage facilities further hinders the marketing and distribution of
foodstuffs and agricultural materials within many African countries. US
agricultural attache reporting has noted, for example, that the major obstacle
to improving Zaire's agricultural sector is the country's rapidly
deteriorating road system which prevents many farmers from getting their
produce to market centers. Improving roads in Zaire, as in other African
countries, is made more difficult by high construction and maintenance
costs. In addition, austerity measures introduced in conjunction with debt
rescheduling have compounded the immediate transportation prob b ising
the domestic costs of imported trucks, spare parts, and fuel. 25X1
Kilometers of Roads per Square Kilometer of Total Land
less than 1 *Ethiopia *Mauritania Niger Sudan
1-4 *Benin Congo Madagascar Uganda
*Botswana Gabon *Mali *Zambia
*Chad *Gambia *Mozambique
*Cent'l Af. Rep. *Guinea *Tanzania
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5-9 *Angola *Guinea-Bissau Liberia *Upper Volta
Cameroon Kenya *Senegal Zaire
10-14 *Ghana *Lesotho Nigeria *Togo
Ivory Coast Malawi Sierra Leone
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
15-19 *Swaziland
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
20 and over Burundi Rwanda *Zimbabwe
*Countries on UN/FAO's 1984 emergency food aid list
NOTE: Figures include all roads and take no account of the great variation in
quality of roads. Data for countries not listed was unavailable.
23. State Investments in Food Production: What little government
investment in food pro uction occurred during the 1960s and 1970s, the World
Bank reports, tended to subsidize large-scale, government-operated
agricultural projects in the hope of overcoming the stagnation associated with
traditional agricultural methods. The heavy mechanization involved in these
schemes also seemed to promise a solution to the seasonal labor shortages
arising from the accelerated rural-urban migration. While typically consuming
a large proportion of the public investment in agriculture, these projects
generally account for only a small proportion of total food production. Their
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disappointing performance is attributed to poor administration, overstaffing,
and a failure to maintain equipment and infrastructure. Rice production in
Mozambique's state farms, for example, has declined since the farms were
established in the late 1970s because of frequent equipment breakdowns and
workers have few incentives to improve production. Ethiopia's state farms
have suffered from mismanagement by military officers who lack agricultural
expertise, and Congolese authorities publicly admit that their state farms are
plagued by chronic equipment problems.
Constrasting Public Policies in Tanzania and Kenya
The dramatic impact of government policies is demonstrated in
Kenya and neighboring Tanzania. The two countries have similar
agricultural resources, traditions, and population growth rates.
While its policies have not always been ideal, Kenya has offered its
farmers price incentives and an effective market-oriented
infrastructure in most recent years. As a result, food production
has risen and, in several recent years, Kenya has exported food
surpluses. The drought cut last year's co n crop 15 percent but
produced no real food shortages. 1 -- ~
In contrast, Tanzania uprooted its scattered farmers and
concentrated them in Ujamaa villages-where they were supposed to
receive water projects, machinery, and extension and social
services. When the government proved unable to provide the services,
the result was a sharp drop in farm output and an increase in soil
degradation. Production of export crops plummeted as villages
increasingly retreated into subsistence production. The resulting
foreign exchange crisis is now so severe that Tanzania cannot import
food or fertilizer--nor transport either through its countryside.
24. Misuse and Corruption of the Food System: The development of large
institutional structures responsible for the production, procurement,
distribution, and pricing of food has created abundant opportunities for
various forms of corruption. Government regulation of crop purchases,
transport, and storage, for instance allows functionaries to exact bribes in
return for services rendered. corruption in
Senegal's now-defunct grain-marketing board extended from weighers and
truckers t senior official
mar a ing o icia s in anzania w no
con ro access to re a ive y s arce subsidized food curry favor by selling in
bulk to influential customers who resell the commodities to consumers at
higher prices.
25. The allocation of agricultural materials, equipment, and farm credit
often becomes a source of graft for parastatal officials and a means of
distributing political patronage in rural areas. Academic studies claim that
farm loans made through the Tanzania Rural Development Bank in the 1970's were
sometimes used to build peasant support for local politicians. The Nigerian
press has frequently charged that agricultural loans are not allocated on the
basis of need and that the money often is not invested in farming. According
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to academic observers, the Senegalese Government co-opted rural leaders in the
197by giving them access to subsidized agricultural production material.
26. Food imports also are avenues for graft. The Nigerian press has
reported extensively on irregularities in the issuance of rice import
licenses, and in 1981 the National Assembly published a list of former
President Shagari's supporters and cronies who received licenses. 25X1
widespread rumors that the head of Zaire's largest commercial 25X1
bakery was using payoffs in late 1982 to circumvent stiff government
restrictions on imported wheat flour. 25X1
27. Opposition groups are increasingly tempted to point to abuses in food
distribution as evidence of government indifference to constituents'
welfare. For example, the late Liberian President Tolbert and his family were
popularly believed to be among the prime potential beneficiaries of the
proposed rice price increases that led to anti-government rioting in Monrovia
in 1979. Governments, too, use allegations of curruption to discredit
opponents. In 1980, the Zairian Government attempted to damage the reputation
of one of President b ritic by accusing him of diverting rice for his
own financial gain 25X1
28. There are problems as well with deliveries of food financied by various
aid programs, although the extent of these problems is difficult to
establish. A former director of UN World Food Program projects in west and
central Africa reported that in the late 1970s local project managers
frequently diverted or illegally sold donated food.
Kinshasa have noted numerous instances in recent years of diversion of US
Public Law (PL) 480 rice aid by fun at all levels of government for
illegal resale at inflated prices.
.............................................................................
Political Impact of Food Shortages
reports document numerous instances of unrest
related to food problems in Sub-Saharan Africa in recent years.
- In April 1979, Liberian dissidents exploited public opposition
to government plans to raise the price of rice--an urban dietary
staple by organizing an antiregime demonstration. The
demonstration escalated into two days of rioting and looting,
leaving scores dead, before being suppressed by the army.
- Shortages of staple foods and high food prices during the
preharvest "lean season" in Ghana were factors in antigovernment
student demonstrations and labor strikes in 1977 and 1978.
- Efforts by Guinean police to confiscate illegally marketed food
in 1977 led to demonstrations by market women, resulting in
several deaths. Two years earlier, an acute food shortage in the
country's second-largest city helped trigger a military protest
against President Toure's economic policies.
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- Public unhappiness with a six-month rice shortage in Sierra
Leone in 1979 led to violence at government-controlled rice
distribution centers in Freetown. In 1981, President Stevens
declared a state of emergency in response to a general strike
called by trade unions seeking economic reforms, including
reduced food prices.
- Workers at Zambia's economically strategic copper mines went on
strike three times in 1981. Grievances included discontent over
high food prices.
- Several thousand people protesting shortages of food and other
commodities rioted in cities in northern Madagascar in March
1982. Rioters attacked government and military bases,
and several civilians were killed.
Implications for the United States
29. Few African countries will escape increasing food problems in the next
decade, and requests from Sub-Saharan African countries for emergency food aid
are likely to grow even after the present drought subsides. Unless African
governments can be persuaded to make politically risky policy changes--or can
be convinced that failure to make those changes entails even greater risks--
requests for food relief will probably come from throughout Africa, as many
governments attempt to use aid to postpone hard domestic political
decisions.
30. Urban Africans, increasingly beset by rising prices and declining
living standards, will be especially hard hit and may be less inclined to
tolerate food problems in the future. Even if violence does not erupt, a
serious food shortage could become a rallying point for political opposition
to government authorities. Although food related unrest could provide
opportunities for exploitation by the Soviet Union and Libya, popular
dissatisfaction undermines both pro-Western regimes as well as regimes
friendly to the Soviets. The West has been able to provide food aid in
significant amounts. Neither the Soviets nor the Libyans are 1
provide Sub-Saharan African countries with necessary food aid.
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PART II: CASE STUDIES OF FOOD PROBLEMS IN SPECIFIC COUNTRIES
The Sahel*
31. Current Conditions: Few parts of the Sahel escaped the poor and
erratic rainfall of 1983, although it is impossible to determine precisely how
many of the Sahel's estimated 33 million people have been affected by the
drought. Grain production per capita is continuing to decline, cattle herds
in some countries are dying from lack of pasture, irrigation capacities are
seriously diminished, and seven of the eight Sahelian countries are
experiencing a combined food shortage estimated at 1.4 million tons by the US
Department of Agriculture.** None of the Sahelian countries can afford to
make up these shortfalls with commercial purchases as world prices for
imported corn and sorghum have risen almost 50 percent while prices for
Sahelian exports have fallen. Pledges of food aid by the Sahel's traditional
Western donors have left a gap of between 500 (USDA figures) and 800 thousand
(FAO figures) tons of grains,*** and food aid shipments are needed before the
onset of t season in May if they are to reach those most seriously
affected.
32. Even when sufficient food supplies are available, political turmoil
often disrupts its distribution. Transportation of food to Chad through
Nigeria, for example, was blocked for weeks following the New Year's coup in
Lagos and subsequent closure of borders. Continued fighting in Chad still
prevents the distribution of food aid, with the result that only half that
country's estimated needs are met.
33. Outlook: The consequences of the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s
will persist well beyond the immediate food emergencies, and it is highly
unlikely that the Sahel will become self-sufficient in food production at any
time in the future. Part of the blame can be attributed to government
policies, most notably the general unwillingness to risk urban discontent by
allowing controlled food prices to rise in hope of boosting local producer
incentives. The inefficiencies of the parastatal corporations in importing
seeds and fertilizers and in marketing grains has further compounded the
* The Sahel is a geographic belt that extends along the southern edge of the
Sahara from Chad to the Atlantic Ocean. In this paper, we define the Sahel as
including Cape Verde, Chad, The Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and
Upper Volta.
** Niger's comparatively favorable statistics disguise drought-related
problems--traders in neighboring Nigeria have been smuggling food and
livestock into Niger, where they can obtain higher prices in hard currency
francs while the future value of the Nigerian naira remains uncertain.
*** Data for the region are notoriously unreliable, and estimates should be
viewed only as suggestive. The UN Food and Agricultural Organization, for
example, tends to report food needs that higher than those estimated by
the US Department of Agriculture.
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34. Governments that have shown the political will to tackle the
economy's structural problems have often found their efforts frustrated. In
an attempt to stimulate domestic production, Senegal increased consumer rice
prices 30 percent in 1981, increased producer prices for some cereals above
world market prices, and abolished its poorly managed cereals marketing
board. Yet rainfall in northern Senegal in 1983 was only 30 percent of
normal, the worst since 1972, and Dakar has been forced to turn to the United
States and other donors to fill its food aid need of 300,000 tons. Upper
Volta also reduced consumer subsidies only to find that the early end to the
1983 rainy season resulted in 15 to 40 percent losses in key cereal-producing
areas.
35. The Sahel's desperate economic condition has made it one of the
largest per capita recipients of foreign assistance in the world. Since the
drought of the 1970s, roughly $7.5 billion has been poured into the region.
While 65 percent of aid to the Sahel is in the form of grants, nongrant aid
accounts for two-thirds of the Sahel's foreign debt. Servicing such debts
further weakens the countries' foreign exchange positions and strengthens
government appeals her forms of food aid as thinly disguised balance of
payments support.
36. Despite efforts by both the Sahel and its donors to coordinate aid
programs, increasing evidence from the World Bank and other sources indicates
that much international aid--which dropped by 20 percent in 1982/83 crop year
--is not effective. Sahelian nations lack the skilled manpower and economic
institutions needed to support the high recurring costs of aid projects. As a
result, projects often are abandoned after expensive startup costs. Efforts
to overhaul Sahelian food production are further hampered by unpredictable and
uneven rainfall, poor soils, primitive agricultural methods, weak extension
and marketing services, high transportation costs, the growing preference of
urban dwellers for imported wheat and rice, and government policies that
traditionally have encouraged farmers to grow export crops such as cotton and
peanuts.
37. The economic and food outlook for the Sahel remains bleak. The
after effects of the world recession, severe drought, high energy costs, and
growing debt service burdens are straining already fragile economies to the
breaking point. The region is more dependent than ever on international
financial institutions and Western aid donors, and several years of normal
rainfall will be required to rehabilitate agriculture. Moreover, the economic
and budgetary problems of France, the region's principal benefactor and former
colonizer, limit Paris' ability to bail out Sahelian governments. As a
result, Sahelian leaders are likely to turn increasingly to d States
with requests for additional financial and food assistance.
38. Economic hardships and food shortages will contribute to
dissatisfaction with Sahelian regimes as entrenched elites, and the older
generation of leaders is increasingly faulted for corruption and blamed for
deteriorating living standards. Growing frustration will increase the
potential for civil disorders and coups as demands for radical change gain
ground among lower military ranks, underprivileged urban dwellers, and
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students unable to find jobs. This situation provides opportunities for
Libyan and Soviet meddling.
West Africa
39. Current Conditions: Ghana's food production--already in decline for
several years--has been devastated by the current drought and the Rawlings
government has declared a food emergency. Per capita food production is only
56 percent of 1971 levels. The US Department of Agriculture estimates that
grain production may have reached only 500 thousand tons for 1983, down from a
baseline of 625 thousand tons in 1979-82. Meanwhile. o ulation growth has
increased consumption needs to 800 thousand tons.
40. Because of foreign exchange shortages, Ghana will find it difficult
to import commercially its remaining consumption needs. Although the world
market price of Ghana's major export crop--cocoa--rose in 1983, production has
declined substantially in the last few years and has suffered long-term damage
from inept government purchasing policies and drought-induced brush fires. The
cocoa harvest of 1982/83 was the smallest in 40 years. The government is
encouraging new cocoa plantings to restore the country's output, but farmers
prefer to grow food crops for home consumption and local sale because they
currently obtain better prices on the local markets. Much of Ghana's scarce
foreign exchange goes to purchasing oil on the spot market, and prolonged
drought has drastically cut hard currency earnings from sales of Volta Dam
electricity to neighboring Togo and Benin.
41. The critical shortage of foreign exchange will permit Ghana to
import commercially only 80 thousand tons of food this year. As of mid-
January, known food aid pledges from primarily Western donors totaled 119
thousand tons, leaving a shortfall of 100 thousand tons.* Ghana's chronic
food shortages will become critical during the early harvest which begins in
June, and some starvation and urban unrest are growing possibilities. Poorer
urban consumers are un ay higher prices-induced by IMF programs--for
locally produced food.
42. Transport difficulties are a major obstacle to the delivery of the
emergency relief. Although major aid donors agreed last December to increase
their assistance, Ghana does not have the foreign exchange to pay for tires,
spare parts, and fuel for trucks to carry,food to stricken areas, which are
cut off from urban centers by poor roads.
* International assistance included $5.9 million from the World Food Program,
$25 million in food and drugs through the UNDRO, and $40 million from the
World Bank to support cocoa and palm oil producton and improve the transport
sector.
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43. The number of Ghanaians affected by the food crisis is difficult to
estimate because of uncertainties in arriving at a total population figure for
the country. The drought in the northern subsistence agricultural regions is
most severe, yet the region had to absorb more than 1 million Ghanaian workers
expelled by Nigeria early last year. The Catholic Relief Services reports
that 50 to 58 percent of the 250,000 Ghanaian children it regularly surveys
are undernourished. Of these, 10 to 15 percent suffer from a severe caloric
decency, which could translate into 2,500 deaths per month from starvation.
44. In hopes of obtaining greater Western food and financial aid,
Ghana's leaders have quieted their anti-Western rhetoric, which had become so
heated in early 1983 that the United States froze its assistance projects.
The United States has recently allocated 16.7 thousand tons of supplemental
aid and 33.6 thousand tons of emergency food aid. The regime is responding to
Western economic counsel and has embarked on an ambitious econo rm
program that has qualified Ghana for an IMF standby agreement.
45. Outlook: A turnaround in Ghana's food situation is unlikely anytime
soon. Increased consumption of seed stocks, together with livestock losses,
militate against increased food production in the foreseeable future. No
immediate relief is in sight apart from Western donor food aid because
benefits from the IMF-mandated economic reform program will not be apparent
for at least another year and rains are not due until mid-year. Some
Ghanaians could soon start dying from food shortages.
46. Economic decline, drought, and management failures have greatly
increased the potential for political instability within Ghana. Fissures
within the regime and armed forces pose the most immediate danger to the
survival of the Rawlings regime, but civil unrest over food shortages could
also become a threat. While the last demonstrations over shortages of staples
and high food prices occurred in 1977 and 1978, Rawlings' turning to the West
and IMF for help risks a backlash from disgruntled ultra-leftist factions
eager to restore Ghana's revolutionary purity. This could cause Rawlings to
back off his economic reforms or lead to his overthrow in a radical-led coup
that likely could result in closer Ghanaian ties with Libya, Cuba, and the
IIS SB. Such ties would not likely resolve any of Ghana's economic problems.
Nigeria
47. Current Conditions: Nigeria's northern tier of states--the
country's most productive agricultural region--is suffering from serious
drought conditions which have resulted in severe shortages of potable water
for both human and livestock consumption and greatly reduced irrigation
capacity. Food production in these areas has been seriously curtailed in
comparison with the usually good performance of 1982. Overall grain output is
down 30 percent from 1982 levels, and this may mark a resumption of long-term
pattern of declining production. The sorghum crop--one of the principal
staples--registered an overall drop of nearly 40 percent. The other key
staples, yams and cassava, are estimated to be down 10 and 15 percent,
respectively. The remainder of the country has average to slightly below
average crop conditions.
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48. Even though severe food deficits this year are expected only in the
far north, some 20 million people will be directly affected as will several
million city dwellers dependent on northern food production. Nigeria's
overall food import bill will increase significantly because an additional 2
to 2.5 million tons of food grains are required. Stocks
because of drought-reduced harvests prior to 1982.
of grain are low
ion. drvnpcc s
increased the susceptibility of cattle to disease.
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disease is largely responsible for th
of
S
5 percent of the 25X1
national
cattle herd over the past 18 months. "
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49. Outlook: Nigeria's current food shortfall, although exacerbated by
the drou ht is primarily the result of years of neglect. Even before the
drough agricultural production was 20 percent
lower than in 1975. In the years since the 1967-70 civil war, successive
Nigerian governments--including the recently deposed Shagari administration--
have paid lip service to initiating a "Green Revolution" in Nigeria, but they
have made little real effort to stimulate the agricultural sector. Although
government-controlled producer prices have been raised from time to time--and
agricultural production would probably have increased in 1983 were it not for
drought--farm incomes have not risen nearly enough to induce industrious
younger families to take up farming instead of seeking higher paying jobs in
the cities. Moreover, for those who stayed in the fields, investment credit
has been hard to obtain and the distribution of fertilizers and other inputs
has been poor because of internal transportation problems. These distribution
problems, along with black marketeering of food, will likely hamper the
effective allocation of imports purchased to offset the effects of drought.
50. Nigeria's prospects for avoiding food deficits in the future are
poor, despite a relatively favorable agricultural resource base. Like its
predecessors, the new Buhari government is unlikely to make effective
investments in the agricultural sector. Moreover, Nigeria's severe financial
crisis will limit any government development efforts over the next few
years.
51. Nigeria does not currently receive any food aid and none is
anticipated from Western governments in the immediate future.
the Buhari regime is aware that adequate food
supplies, especially in urban areas, could be crucial to maintaining political
stability, and will take steps to prevent critical shortages. Because of its
already precarious financial position, Lagos can be expected to look to the
West--particularly the United States--for commercial credits to fund its
import requirements. Indeed, without foreign credits, Nigeria may not have
enough foreign exchange this year to cover both its import needs--including
food--and debt servicing costs. Unless the world oil market rebounds
substantially over the next year, Nigeria's foreign exchange picture is not
likely to improve dramatically over the near term even if the country carries
through with debt-rescheduling plans and secures an IMF loan agreement.
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East Africa
Ethiopia
52. Current Conditions: Despite reports of a better harvest this year,
Ethiopia's domestic food position remains precarious. Although Addis Ababa is
unwilling to release crop production figures, impressionistic evidence from
foreign diplomats, international organizations, and private voluntary
organizations indicates that good rains have led to increased output this year
in the traditionally strongest producing regions of central Ethiopia. In
addition, some 200,000 metric tons in carry-over stocks from last year's
harvest are reportedly being held by the state marketing board, and about
30,000 metric tons of donated grain are bPina stored by the government's
Refugee Rehabilitation Commission (RRC).
53. Nonetheless, harvests are poor again in several areas of the country
and food shortages persist. In the strife-torn northern provinces of Eritrea
and Tigray, and parts of Welo and Gondar, crops have been hit yet again by
drought and civil war. Moreover, two consecutive years of little or no rain
and overgrazing of pastoral lands by nomads have limited food production in
southern Sidamo. As a result, some 3 to 4 million people in these areas--or
about 10 percent of Ethiopia's population--continue to face food shortages,
according to the Ethiopian government, and a large proportion--perhaps two-
thirds, according to official estimates--are inaccessible because of bad
security conditions and poor transportation.* The situation is further
complicated by sizable refugee movements, both within country and cross-
border.
54. Although donors have been responding to Ethiopia's food problems
with substantial shipments of food aid, severe distribution and security
problems have sharply limited the effectiveness of this assistance. Once food
aid is unloaded at Ethiopia's two ports, Massawa--recently the major receiving
point--or Assab, transshipment to inland distribution centers is often
delayed. The official agencies responsible for disbursing food aid lack the
trucks, funds, spare parts, tires, mechanics, managerial expertise, and--some
donors suspect--the commitment to transport food inland effectively.
indicated that of 120 trucks,
only 10 percent were being utilized for relief efforts. One-third were
inoperable, another third lacked proper documentation to move from one area to
another, and the rest were involved in commercial transportation. As a
result, private contractors are being used to fill some of the gap. Moreover,
bad roads exacerbate the situation.
55. The deteriorating security situation in the northern provinces is
compounding these problems. The road from Massawa to Asmara, the central
distribution point in Eritrea province, often requires convoys,
as do all roads north, south, and west out of Asmara.
Major arteries in Gondar, Welo, and Tigray also are unsafe without convoys,
* We have no independent confirmation of any of these figures.
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and food distribution in Tigray is limited to population centers along the
main road.
56. The reports of good harvests, the near closing of Assab port to food
aid shipments, and the RRC's seeming inability to move grain have led some
donors to question both Ethiopia's need for more food aid and the government's
commitment to distribute shipments quickly and efficiently. Indeed, the
general consensus among donars is that there is sufficient food in government
controlled areas of the country and in the donor pipeline to satisfy the
country's total needs for the remainder of 1984. In addition,
several donors are annoyed by heavy fees for unloading,
storage, fumigation, and transport services, and the government's
unwillingness to account for its use of subsidies donated to help alleviate
the transportation problems. As a result, the British, Dutch, French, West
German, and Canadian representatives recently agreed to hold off on further
food aid until Addis Ababa organizes its relief program more effectively. If
donors become convinced later in the year that Ethiopia needs more food,
however, the flows probably will begin again. Moreover, private voluntary
organizations, such as Catholic Relief Services, and international
organizations, such as the World Food Program, are continuing their relief
efforts.
57. Outlook: Ethiopia will likely suffer from insufficient food
production for the foreseeable future. Agricultural output will be limited by
government efforts to collectivize the agricultural sector and active
insurgencies that hamper food growing, harvesting, and distribution activities
in the northern provinces. Moreover, severe soil erosion and depletion impair
the prospects for a long-term recovery and periodic drought will likely create
short-term food crises.
58. Farmers resist the establishment of state farms and peasant
collectives. This situation is exacerbated by a lack of trained managers to
oversee operations and Addis Ababa's consequent use of military officers--who
are reluctant to identify themselves with rural interests and have no
agricultural training --to administer farm policy. As a result, state and
collective farms, despite being lavished with machinery, fertilizer, seed, and
technology. generally have lower productivity than the average peasant
holding.
59. Although there are some signs that the government has begun to show
some flexibility toward the small individual farmer, Addis Ababa is not likely
to provide enough incentives to increase production substantially.
Stimulating food production would require some combination of greatly
increased credit to the private farmer, sharply higher producer prices,
enlarged access to agricultural inputs, improved technology, or expanded
individual holdings. This would force the Ethiopian Government to reevaluate
its ideologically inspired goals of collectivization and would necessitate
greater investment in agriculture, probably at the expense of the military.
Such decisions would be all the more difficult because the government stands
little chance any time soon of spurring enough growth and diversification in
the economy to improve its tight financial position. Moreover, the budgetary
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drain of the government's military campaigns limits the financia
technical support Addis Ababa is able to offer to agriculture.
60. Ethiopia will continue to need imported food, even in years of
favorable weather, because the government's agricultural policies will
continue to limit food production. Moreover, Ethiopia will probably not be
able to afford commercial imports and will remain dependent on food aid.
Western governments, private voluntary organizations, and multilateral
institutions will continue to be the most important donors because the Soviets
and their allies are not likely to furnish substantial amounts of food
assistance. Even if food problems lead to increased domestic discontent,
active opposition to the remould be quickly squelched by the government's
harsh security apparatus.
Kenya
61. Current Conditions: Despite some pockets of drought in the normally
arid and semi-arid parts of the country, there are no reports of serious food
shortages in Kenya. Some malnutrition exists in Kenya, but by African
standards it is not severe. Major causes of malnourishment include lack of
potable water, poor sanitation, poor ation of mothers, and high population
densities of infants and children.
62. Although some bad weather has cut Kenya's overall grain production
moderately this crop ear, iimports are expected to remain at a fairly low
leve Despite a 15-percent drop from last
year's bumper harvest, a 1963/64 maize crop--estimated at about 2.1 million
metric tons--is expected to cover domestic requirements as domestic stocks
probably will cover any shortfall. Moreover, high stocks of rice (composed
primarily of imports from previous years) will more than make up for
production that is stagnating at about 20,000 to 27,000 metric tons
annually. Indeed, overstocking is considered such a serious problem that the
government apparently is thinking of exporting rice.
63. Wheat imports, however, are expected to increase this year because
heavy rains during the harvest ruined almost 20 percent of the crop and pushed
production to about the 1981/82 level of 210,000 metric tons estimated by
USDA. Although much of the 100,000 to 130,000 metric tons of expected wheat
purchases will come, at concessional terms, from the United States and the EC,
some commercial imports. Ironically, wheat
imports are necessary in par ecause rising incomes have enabled Kenyans to
shift some of their consumption away from corn toward more expensive wheat.
64. Sharply higher producer prices and generally favorable weather
conditions have led to increased food output since 1981, but several
constraints to improved production and distribution still exist. Productivity
suffers from shortages of needed fuels, agricultural spare parts, seeds, and
fertilizers caused by Kenya's foreign exchange crunch and inefficient internal
distribution network. Credit shortages have persisted as the government
struggles to cover large budget deficits and absorbs much of the available
credit itself. Producer payments have been delayed under the bureaucratic
parastatal system. This problem has at times been exacerbated by the
government's efforts to postpone expenditures and reduce budget deficits in
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accordance with IMF guidelines. The lack of adequate storage facilities and
restrictive grain marketing procedures--which the government shows no signs of
relaxing--have hampered food distribution efforts, while lack of coordination
within the government has resulted in export commitments that ofiten to
take domestic consumption and stock requirements into account.
65. Outlook: Despite this year's fairly comfortable showing, Kenya
faces the long-run challenge of trying to match food production with one of
the world's highest population growth rates (over 4 percent annually).
Because little undeveloped high-quality land remains, agricultural production
is expanding onto marginal lands that are more susceptible to drought.
Moreover, deforestation and resultant soil erosion are increasingly serious
problems. However, the adoption of existing corn hybrids and improved
cultivation techniques is far from complete, which offers some hope for higher
yields.
66. The widespread Kenyan preference for large families makes population
growth an intractable problem. Rural women, who are responsible for
cultivation as well as household chores, need children to help with heavy
workloads. Many Kenyans believe that having a large number of children
increases the chance that one will succeed and bring economic benefits to the
entire group. Moreover, a tribe's political power is related to tribal size,
and any program to control fertility is likely to be perceived by Kenyans as
an effort to weaken their particular group. Kenyan officials are beginning to
devote increased attention to developing a family planning program, but it
will take many years at best, before population growth can be reduced
significantly.
67. The government apparently has recognized the potential for future
food shortages and, pushed by donor countries and multilateral organizations,
has started to move toward providing incentives to rectify the problem. In an
attempt to reduce subsidies and restrain domestic demand for food, Nairobi
recently raised consumer prices for rice and increases for corn and wheat
products may also be in the works. Producer prices also are being raised
again, by 10 to 140 percent for the 1984/85 marketing year. Continuing budget
problems, however, may well constrain the government's ability to make
promised payments to farmers. Research efforts to imDrove production,
especially on marginal land, are being intensified.
68. Nonetheless, poor communication, lack of technical expertise, and a
disinterest in long-term planning will interfere with the government's policy
responses to Kenya's food challenge. In addition, Nairobi does not possess an
adequate early-warning crop forecast system, and appears unable to collect,
analyze, and release the im ortant crop information necessary for successful
planning exercises.
69. The need for food imports is likely to fluctuate in the near term,
primarily in response to weather conditions. During years in which
significant shortfalls occur, however, the government is likely to view food
imports as critical, in large part to satisfy politically important urban
consumers. Over the longer term, food deficits will be likely because of the
rising demand from the burgeoning population. As a result, Kenya will be
increasingly dependent on imported food and may periodically require food
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70. Current Conditions: Tanzania's agricultural production has been
devastated by government policies in the last decade. Production of export
crops has fallen about 40 percent, and the quality of those crops has
deteriorated sharply. Food production does not come close to meeting
requirements even in years with good weather. The government marketing
agencies have offered poor prices, and sometimes have failed to pay farmers at
all. Black market prices often double or triple official food prices, while
government roadblocks have attempted to seize any food moving to market
through unofficial channels. Severe malnutrition affects about 5 to 10
percent of the population, according to village surveys. Only massive amounts
of foreign aid and food imports have prevented desperate hunger.
71. The Nyerere government attempted to finance industrialization by
taxing away a presumed agricultural surplus. In addition, most of the farmers
were moved from their existing locations and collected in large Ujamaa
villages--by force when necessary. The new villages were intended to
facilitate farm modernization, but the government was unable to provide the
projected services and equipment. Most of Tanzania's food production today
comes form the individual garden plots of the Ujamaa villagers. Despite
normal rainfall throughout most of the country, food production during the
1983/84 crop year is expected to meet only about 85 percent of Tanzania's food
needs.
72. Because of foreign exchange difficulties, Dar es Salaam will
probably depend on donor food aid to cover about 90 percent of the shortfall
in production. According to a recent USDA estimate, the Tanzanian government
so far in fiscal year 1984 is slated to receive about 234,000 metric tons of
food aid (maize, wheat, and rice). Most of Tanzania's food assistance comes
from OECD donor countries, particularly Australia, the EC, and Japan. A
shortage of,about 16,000 tons still exists, according to recent USDA
estimates.
73. Emergency food distribution is not a major problem in Tanzania at
present. Roads are passable and neither internal political or military
struggles nor overwhelming problems of corruption impede delivery of emergency
food supplies. Recurring gasoline shortages, however, will probably continue
to cause transport bottlenecks. Tanzania's internal food distribution
problems are largely caused by inappropriate government pr' in Policies and
mismanagement by the major crop-purchasing authorities.
74. Outlook: Low agricultural production in the last several years is
no reflection of Tanzania's agricultural potential. Population density is
only 35 persons per square kilometer of cultivable land and, even though much
of Tanzania receives unpredictable rainfall, there are areas of underuti
fertile soil on which a variety of export and food crops could grow.
75. Dar es Salaam's prospects for avoiding food shortages in the future
depend greatly on the government's ability to provide incentives to farmers to
increase commercial food production. Several recent measures taken include
the payment of higher prices to farmers and the reestablishment of private
cooperatives to take over some of the responsibilities of inefficient national
marketing organizations. In addition, the government expects to improve
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internal food distribution by lifting the ban on movement of grain across
district lines by local traders. Meanwhile, to boost field crop and livestock
production, President Nyerere this near doubled agriculture's share of the
country's development budget.
76. These reforms alone, however, are unlikely to improve performance
significantly. Distribution of agricultural equipment and fertilizers is
still handled by incompetent government-run boards; potential foreign
investors remain skeptical of investments in Tanzanian agriculture; increasing
producer prices for maize while keeping ceilings on consumer prices will
merely increase budget deficits; and farmers will probably continue to sell
their products on the more lucrative black market.
77. Tanzania's severe financial strains play a major role in dampening
growth in the agricultural sector. Foreign currency is so scarce in Tanzania
that even though almost 50 percent of the country's export earnings are
allocated for purchases of farm machines and equipment, severe shortages still
persist. In addition, Dar es Salaam's difficulties in obtaining imported oil
and gasoline products at harvest time frequently cause harvesting and delivery
of crops to grind to a halt. Moreover, because of a lack of imported
insecticides. borer worms annually destroy a large portion of Tanzania's grain
crops.
78. Government efforts to increase foreign exchange revenues available
for food imports by boosting and diversifying the output of cash crops are
likely to achieve only limited success. Dar es Salaam's continuing emphasis
on mechanization in a country where 85 percent of the key export crops--
coffee, cotton, tobacco, sisal, cashews, and cloves--are produced on plots of
10 hectares is unlikely to prove feasible and is seriously constrained by the
inability to import machinery and equipment. Further, institutional hurdles
inhibit farmers' bility to obtain credit. Durc ase seeds and other inputs,
and market crops. the scarcity of qualified
personnel in both research an extension services suggests that effective
research will require outside technical assistance for at least 10 years.
79. Dar es Salaam's inability to meet all of its food needs through
local production and imports is likely to cause Tanzania to turn to the United
States and other Western donors for additional food assistance in the future--
even in years of normal rainfall, such as 1984 appears to be. This dependence
on OECD-member food support--as well as other official aid programs--will
probably allow the West limited success in pressing Tanzania to make needed
reforms. Nyerere's presidency is becoming increasingly threatened as
Tanzanians in growing numbers blame him personally for the deteriorating
economic situation. As long as Nyerere is president, however, it is unlikely
that Tanzania will move far from his commitment to a largely government-run
economy.
Southern Africa
Mozambique
80. Current Conditions: Before typhoon Domoina and subsequent
torrential rains struck southern Mozambique in late January/early February,
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causing an unprecedented natural disaster, Mozambique was experiencing its
third season of severe drought. According to the FAO, Mozambique is among the
worst-hit of African countries with emergency food shortages. Drought in the
previous two growing seasons (from November to April)--including an almost
complete failure of the March 1983 crop--has already affected about 4 m'l
people, and domestic food stocks had become depleted by last November.
81. About 1.8 million people--primarily in the major southern food
producing regions of Gaza and Inhambane Provinces--are dependent on emergency
food relief. Sofala, Manica, and Maputo Provinces also have been seriously
affected. In addition, the food and health situation is also serious in the
cities, where food is ratinnf1 by the inefficient, government-controlled
distribution system.
82. According tol (reports, 100,000 people may have died
in 1982-83 because of drought. Severe malnutrition is prevalent throughout
the southern region and deaths, especially of children, continue daily. About
70 percent of the national cattle herd is located in the south where up to
15,000 head may be dying each month. Poor animal condition has sharply
curtailed cattle sales, exacerbating already serious nutritional
deficiencies.
83. Flooding from the typhoon further devastated cattle herds and
destroyed what would have been the first harvest in three years of corn, rice,
and sorghum--the main food crops--for over 350,000 people living mostly on
private and family farms in the south. The typhoon destroyed dams and pumping
stations vital to the limited irrigation system as well as washed out roads
and bridges, thereby impeding relief efforts. Moreover, the storm winds did
extensive damage to citrus, coconut, and cashew crops in Inhambane province.
The recovery of such tree crops will take years which, in the case of
export crop such as cashews, will reduce foreign exchange earnings.
84. Chronic shortages of foreign exchange--exacerbated by drought and
storm damage--preclude commercial purchases of seeds and foodgrains and
underscore dependence on aid. Effects of the typhoon probably have boosted
Mozambique's food aid requirement for the period through April 1985 from about
500,000 tons to as much as 700,000 tons, including nearly 200,000 tons needed
by April 1984. In 1984, the United States has committed more emergency food
aid to Mozambique than has any other donor nation and more than it has
committed to any other African country.
85. In addition to immediate food assistance, according to the FAO,
there is a pressing need for seeds and other inputs for the next planting
seasons: corn seeds and fertilizer by October, and vegetable seeds by April
for the off-season planting and by November for the main crop. Domestic seed
stocks have been depleted as a result of multiple replantings caused by fickle
weather over the past two years. After the typhoon it was too late for
replanting of major grain crops even if seed had been available, because the
rainy season ends in February.
86. Although the Machel regime appears committed to meeting the food
emergency, its resources for management and logistical support for famine
relief are almost nonexistent, thereby limiting
the effectiveness of international aid efforts. Mozambican ports will be
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unable to handle an influx of food shipments unless arrivals are scheduled
carefully. Although Mozambique has for the first time arranged for the
participation of private international relief organizations, few vehicles are
available to bring food to rural villages and distribution centers where and
when it is needed. Moreover, susceptibility to attack by insurgents of the
South African-backed National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO) has
necessitated the protection of supply convoys by troops and armored
vehicles. Even then they are tempting targets, especially since the
guerrillas have specifically targetted government food stocks in order to
support themselves, and acquire food for distribution to peasants to win their
support. (S)
87. Outlook: Mozambique suffers almost continuously from drought in
some areas and floods in others. Nonetheless, although severe weather
conditions account for the currently acute food crisis, Mozambique's food
problems also are chronic because of deeper causes--the effects of eight years
of government mismanagement and policy failure, and a growing insurgency.
88. For the 80 to 90 percent of Mozambique's population engaged in
family subsistence farming, the government has continued its policy of
"socialization of the countryside" which encourages the formation of communal
villages and agricultural cooperatives. Last year, partly in an effort to
control urban crime, Maputo announced "Operation Production", a plan for the
forced resettlement of the urban unemployed to rural communal villages,
especially in the north. Most such villages, however, have been created to
house refugees from RENAMO attacks and drought rather than to improve farm
output. Moreover, because of declines in production and in world prices for
sugar and cashews, the government lacks the resources to support these
villages with needed inputs for successful agricultural production, and
cooperative farms have taken a backseat to sf arms in the allocation of
what few resources have been available.
89. The large, state farms, which the regime created as its most
important agricultural objective, have been a failure. Even in the period
from 1979 to 1981, immediately before the onset of sustained drought,
Mozambique was importing over 30 percent of its foodgrain requirement. State
farms have come under strong fire from some in the leadership for their
mismanagement and failure to meet production targets. As a result, the fourth
congress of the ruling FRELIMO party, held in early 1983, supported a shift
toward more pragmatic policies and away from antipathy toward private
enterprise. efforts to revitalize the
private commercial and agricultural sectors have been stymied so far by major
obstacles. especially the insurgency problem, and little progress has been
made.
90. In addition to the effects of natural disasters and policy failure,
the Mozambican economy and the food relief effort have been seriously damaged
by the RENAMO insurgency which operates in nine of the country's 10
provinces. Guerrilla attacks have disrupted the country's rail and road
transport, agricultural production and marketing, and its economic links with
neighboring Zimbabwe. The attacks have left the transport infrastructure in
almost total disarray, and travel in most of the country is difficult and
dangerous.
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91. Poor transport, weak marketing, and insurgent activity have reduced
the normal food surplus in the north, and
guerrilla attacks have transformed the once food abundant central provinces--a
traditional insurgent stronghold--into deficit regions. Moreover, Maputo has
been unable to move small northern grain surpluses to deficit areas in the
south because of poor transport facilities. Ground transport has been so
disrupted that the government has had to resort to distributing food aid by
sea to small coastal ports where many refugees from the interior have gathered
after abandoning their farms because of insurgent attacks, drought, and the
recent flooding. In addition, since mid-1983, well over 100,000 other
Mozambicans have fled to Zimbabwe seeking food and relief from effects of the
insurgency. The number of such refugees is reportedly growing daily.
92. Better weather for the 1984/85 growing season could improve
agricultural output significantly, but not enough to eliminate completely
Mozambique's food deficit and its dependence on international food aid.
Several successive good harvests may be necessary before seed stocks can be
rebuilt.
93. Prospects are dim in the near to medium term for overall
agricultural recovery because economic mismanagement, the lingering as well as
recurring effects of weather damage, and the likely disruptive impact of
RENAMO--despite the recently concluded security agreement with South Africa--
are all obstacles that the regime has shown itself unable to overcome.
Moreover, Maputo's efforts to attract Western assistance to halt agricultural
decline are unlikelv to enjoy much success as long as the RENAMO insurgency
remains active.
94. Current Conditions: The return of good and widespread rains in late
1983 appeared to signal the end of what had become South Africa's worst
drought of the century, and marked a promising beginning to the 1983/84 crop
year. By late January, however, a recurrence of midseason drought began to
wither crops in the principal corn areas in the Transvaal and the Orange Free
State. Official projections of the corn harvest that begins in April have
been revised progressively downward in recent weeks as rains have failed
during key stages of crop development. Estimates that had been as high as 9.5
million tons in early January have now dropped as low as 2.7 million tons,
marking an agricultural disaster of unprecendented proportions. Substantial
imports of corn--perhaps exceeding 4 million tons--will be necessary as South
African enters the current harvest without carry-over stocks from last year.
Moreover, imports at this level will clog South African ports and inhibit its
ability to transship food destined for other countries in the region, most of
which are heavily dependent on South African transportation facilities.
95. The recent recurrence of drought marks South Africa's third
successive year of failing rains and declining agricultural output since the
record corn harvest in 1981 of 14.6 million tons. Moderate drought conditions
reduced the output of corn--the dietary staple of South Africa's 22 million
blacks--to 8.4 million tons in 1982. This was still well above the roughly
7.3 million tons usually needed for a stic consumption, about 50
percent of which is for animal feed.
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96. Drought worsened dramatically in 1982/83, however, depressing the
corn harvest to the lowest level since 1973. At about 4 million tons, the
crop was well below domestic requirements. Over 1 million tons of reserve
stocks were depleted and about 2.3 million tons of corn had to be imported--
the first time in 31 years that South Africa was a net importer of corn.
Wheat, which relies on irrigation, was also hard-hit as dams and boreholes
dried up, leading to the first major wheat imports in a decade. Oilseed
crops--peanuts, sunflowerseed, and cottonseed--failed badly and would have
caused a serious protein shortfall except for substantial imports. The
drought was blamed for over half of the more than 3-percent decline in real
GDP experienced by South Africa.
97. Despite a second successive year of food deficit, South Africa has
had sufficient foreign exchange for commercial imports to ensure that no
aggregate food shortage occurs. South Africa's blacks, however, bear a
disproportionate share of the localized food shortages that do occur.
Moreover, tight food supplies aggravated double digit inflation last year and
are likely to do the same this year. Even though blacks are able to purchase
corn meal and bread at subsidized prices, those prices have risen recently and
blacks spend a higher proportion of their incomes on food.
98. Conditions in South Africa's black homelands--squalid and poverty-
sticken regions under the best of conditions--are deteriorating further from
drought. peasant subsistence crops failed last
year and livestock losses were massive--probably over 700,000 head. In
addition to the immediate consequences of drought, the long-term effects may
be even more serious. The substantial loss of animals has a double effect in
the homelands where cattle are used not only for food but a source of farm
power. Recovery of livestock herds and grazing land will take years.
99. Drought has also deprived many rural blacks of their usual source of
cash income from casual labor on white farms, and caused malnutrition and
disease to rise sharply. The forced return of millions of urban blacks to
their homelands in recent years--exacerbated by a recession-induced increase
in unemployment--has further curtailed cash remittances that many homeland
residents rely upon for the purchase of food and other necessities, as well as
causing overcrowding on the land. The full extent of drought-induced
malnutrition is not known, however, as there are no reliable countrywide
statistics. The government is perceived, probably correctly, as being in-
sensitive to the food situation in the black homelands. No official data are
kept on food production in the homelands, and there _or__ehe - xtent of food
shortfall in subsistence agriculture is not known.
100. Although the government imported food last year to bridge the gap
in commercial production, no such effort was made to make up the shortfall in
subsistence output. Since most observers in South Africa estimate that one-
third of the homeland population of 12 million feeds itself with subsistence
crops, it is possible that up to 4 million blacks have been without their
normal source of nutrition since last year's crops failed. Pretoria provided
over $18 million last year in emergency relief funds to nonindependent
homelands, but most of the aid was used for water projects rather than food
relief. Some aid was also given to so-called independent homelands, such as
Ciskei. The major food relief effort, however, has been mounted by a variety
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of domestic and international private voluntary organizations whose work is
continuing.
101. Outlook: South Africa's high levels of corn output before 1983
have been the result of favorable weather and government agricultural policies
that combine price incentives and subsidized inputs for domestic production
and subsidies for exports. These policies reflect the political importance of
the conservative white farmers who grow the corn, but also have been part of a
deliberate attempt to sustain, for security reasons, a white presence in
economicall mar inal farming areas bordered by South Africa's black
neighbors.
102. Drought has called some of these policies into question. Even
though commercial farmers in South Africa are resilient and able to take
advantage of improved weather to sharply increase output, a recovery of
production and export capacity faces other key obstacles:
-- Following the disastrous harvest in 1983, South Africa's white
commercial farmers were left with a daunting debt burden--well
over $1 billion, according to press reports--that caused the
government to intervene with a variety of assistance measures.
These included stretching of loan repayments and the extension of
substantial new credit at subsidized rates. Many farms have,
nevertheless, gone out of business, and the return of drought
this year is prompting official concern about the long-term
impact on white farming in the main growing areas.
-- Drought has reduced surface and ground water levels so severely
that irrigation capacity is likely to take at least another
season to recover, assuming reasonable rainfall.
-- Even South Africa has barely been able to expand production to
keep pace with rapid population growth. Per capita food
production increased by only 2 percent for the whole of the
1970s, according to the FAO.
103. Because of the severity of drought this year, South Africa's
commercial farmers face an unprecedented financial squeeze that many will be
unable to survive. The government will be forced to import record amounts of
corn, and perhaps wheat--much of both from the United States--and will be
hard-pressed to minimize the wider damage that is inevitable as the effects of
agricultural collapse ripple through the economy. There is little that
Pretoria will be able to do, except to hope for the return o rains
again in October and November for the next planting season.
104. Crop failure this year also means no South African corn exports to
other African states.* Moreover, any future surplus over domestic consumption
needs, perhaps up 2 million tons, probably would be retained in any event in
an effort to rebuild domestic reserve stocks. Even after exportable surpluses
become available, few countries in the region will be able to pay for
*See the boxed insert following paragraph 9.
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commercial im orts and South Africa will not likely provide food aid on a
grant basis.
105. South Africa's black homelands will be another claimant on tight
food supplies. Even if drought subsides, pockets of hunger and malnutrition
will persist there, and conditions will not improve much without a sustained
recovery in the South African economy. There is severe overcrowding on the
little land that is suitable for cultivation in the homelands, and the
residents--mostly women, children, and the elderly--will continue to depend
heavily on remittances from men working in white South Africa.
Zimbabwe
106. Current Conditions: Zimbabwe is among the countries hardest hit by
drought in the region this year. Three successive years of drought--with a
countrywide incidence this year and last year--have sharply reduced the output
of corn (the dietary staple), depleted carry-over stocks, killed over 300,000
cattle, destroyed grass cover on grazing land, and seriously lowered surface
and ground water levels. As a result, food shortages emerged in several areas
last year, forcing the government to begin an emergency food and drought
relief program--supplied out of domestic grain stocks--for about 1 million
people. The number dependent on such relief alread approaches 3 million.
Domestic corn stocks will run out in April. The relief program has thus far
cost Harare $118 million, much of which has had to be taken from the
government's development programs. Demands for relief have become so great
that rationing of corn was introduced in October 1983 for the first time.
107. Crop failures have been most severe in the normally food self-
sufficient areas of the country, including the commercial growing areas of the
north. Unirrigated peasant crops are the most susceptible to damage. About
80 percent of Zimbabwe's normal corn output of about 2.5 million tons is
usually produced by white commercial farmers, with the rest coming from black
subsistence farmers who retain most of their crop for their own consumption.
Both types of producers have been responsive to strong price incentives
provided by the government-controlled grain marketing board to induce market
deliveries. Moreover, Harare has taken steps over the last two years to
remove or in some cases eliminate altogether subsidies on domestic food
consumption in order to rationalize production and consumption decisions.
This year the government has announced early delivery incentive payments for
corn in an effort to accelerate the harvest as stocks run out in April, but
such incentives have no effect on production levels.
108. The effects of drought, however, have overwhelmed these price
incentives. The farmers' cash crunch--already severe last year--is likely to
require liberalization of credit policy and rescheduling of debts. Drought
conditions have been most prolonged and severe in the normally low rainfall,
livestock raising areas in the south and west, including all of dissident-
plagued Matabeleland. Peasant farmers are losing thousands of cattle each
month, depriving them of an important source of power as well as income, while
white commercial ranchers also face losses because of insufficient water and
feedstock. In addition to drought and financial problems, white farmers in
Matabeleland--the backbone of commercial livestock production--face repeated
armed attacks at the hands of antigovernment dissidents that the authorities
have been unable to control. As a result, many farms have been abandoned and
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others are less than fully operational because they are run by absentee owners
who have moved away for safety. Additionally, there are indications that the
government has withheld food aid t~ beland as part of its program to
suppress dissident activity.
109. Meanwhile, Mozambicans seeking refuge from the insurgency and
dought in their own country are placing additional strains on Zimbabwean food
supplies. There are currently between gn nnn and 180,000 Mozambicans in 25X1
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dramatically i n recen months an is expected to grow. 25X1
110. Outlook: Despite record plantings last November in response to the
government's guaranteed minimum preplanting producer prices, prospects for the
harvest in April are extremely poor. The rains--which came late for planting
--began to fail again in January and overall have been less than half of
normal. The most optimistic of recent official projections call for a wheat
crop about half its normal level and a total corn crop--including subsistence
production--of one million tons. Athough this matches last year's crop, 1
million tons of carryover stocks were available then. No more than about
650,000 tons of corn are expected to be delivered to market this year, with
the rest retained on-farm. Market demand, however, is normally about 1.2
million tons and will be higher this year because of the government's food
relief program. Thus, Zimbabwe faces a shortfall that will almost certainly
exceed 550,000 tons and may reach 750,000 tons between now and the harvest in
April 1985. This year's corn crop is likely to be used up by October. 25X1
111. Until last year, Zimbabwe had large surpluses of commercial corn
available for export. This has enabled it to sell corn to 12 black African
countries, with substantial amounts going to Zambia and Zaire. Export sales
totaled 238,000 tons in 1981 and 348,000 tons in 1982, according to official
statistics. Although production last year was below domestic demand, some
exports were possible because of 1 million tons of carry-over stocks from
1982. Zimbabwe provided over 159,000 tons of corn to its neighbors in 1983,
including grants of 25,000 tons each to Tanzania and Mozambique. This year,
however, no exports will be possible, but significant amounts of Zimbabwean
corn are reportedly being smuggled into Mozambique. 25X1
112. For the next year at least, Zimbabwe will be critically dependent
on Western and multilateral food aid. The greatest need will begin to be felt
by October as domestic stocks from this year's expected poor harvest are
exhausted. Harare i like1 to look to the United States as a principal donor
of food assistance. 25X1
113. Even if adequate rains occur for the next planting season beginning
in November 1984, other factors will affect the extent of recovery in food
production and export capacity. Zimbabwe's large commercial farms are capable
of a rapid recovery but will require relief from their credit squeeze and debt
burden. In addition, shortages of foreign exchange will inhibit the purchase
of imported inputs such as fertilizer and machinery. Harare probably will
also want to rebuild food reserves before undertaking exports. Zimbabwe's
export potential is, in any event, dwarfed by that of South Africa and
insufficient by itself to satisfy the level of regional food requirements that
is likely to prevail even if the drought ends.
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