LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 26, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
Directorate of ~
Intelligence M
1
,, x
~~
:z~ ;;fig, ~ ~ t
t
{
,r,rry .._ R~-n av: ra s, Reza
t
I
5~ C .: 5.o Y
. ',.' ,.. K
4r
Ti, Yi Y ~'1 h.
.y ~ `~ '
T. F
~!C s~farzl~il ~.=~`1
Review
Latin America
ALA LAR 86-023
16 September 1986
?py 4 2 3
i~ Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
Secret
Latin America
Review0 25X1
7F CPntrmhPr , oA~ 25X1
Articles Nicaragua's National Assembly: Following the Sandinista Scripts 1
The Sandinistas are using the National Assembly-Nicaragua's
legislative body-as a rubberstamp for regime legislative initiatives
and to maintain a facade of political pluralism. The Assembly has
drafted a new constitution that provides a legal basis for the
consolidation of power by the ruling party. ~~
USSR-Mexico: Shevardnadze's Visit '7
but the trip has major diplomatic value in its own right.
The Soviet Foreign Minister's visit to Mexico in early October
apparently was initiated for the primary purpose of laying the
groundwork for a visit by General Secretary Gorbachev next year,
25X1
25X1
Cuba: Military Reservists To Fight CrimeO 13 25X1
The Castro regime reportedly is offering a number of material
incentives to military reservists to entice them to volunteer for one-
year tours of duty with the national police force. The recruitment
program appears to be a direct response to the dramatic increase in
crime in Cuba.l
Cuba: Bolstering the Mediate 15 25X1
Conjunctivitis Outbreak
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other o.~ces within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief;
Secret
ALA LAR 86-023
26 September 1986
~~X1
25X1
~~~ Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
Secret
25X1
Latin America
Review ~~
Nicaragua's National Assembly:
Following the Sandinista Script
The Sandinistas are using the National Assembly-
Nicaragua's legislative body-as a rubberstamp for
regime legislative initiatives and to maintain a facade
of political pluralism. The Assembly has drafted a
new constitution that, while honoring civil liberties in
the abstract, will provide a legal basis for the
restriction of opposition activities, increased state
intervention in the economy, and the consolidation of
power by the Sandinista National Liberation Front,
the ruling party. The regime tolerates only limited
opposition in the Assembly, and, despite growing
frustration with Sandinista steamroller tactics, the
nominally independent parties lack the leverage to
force fundamental changes. ~~
National Assembl President
The regime is in firm control of the Assembly. Moreover, President Ortega commands broad veto
Delegates from the ruling party hold a clear majority power over Assembly initiatives and can assume all
of the legislature's 96 seats and control major legislative functions during a recess or a state of
committees as well as the influential seven-member emergency.
directorate, according to press and US Embassy
reports. The Assembly president, Carlos Nunez, is a
member of the Sandinista National Directorate, the
key policymaking group in Nicaragua. Moreover, the
major democratic parties are excluded from the
Assembly because they boycotted elections in 1984.
The six non-Sandinista parties that participate hold a
total of only 35 seats and, in any event, are generally
docile, according to US Embassy reporting. ~~
As extra insurance, regime tacticians have rigged the
Assembly's rules of order in favor of the Sandinistas.
For example:
? A low quorum requirement-60 percent of the
delegates-has negated the possibility of a
stalemate caused by opposition walkouts.
Sandinista Priorities
The Sandinistas have used the Assembly, and
particularly the process of drafting a new constitution,
as part of their public diplomacy campaign.
25X1
25X1
Assembly members made highly publicized trips to
Western Europe, Latin America, and the Soviet Bloc
throughout 1985 to consult with constitutional
experts. The Sandinista-controlled press gave wide
coverage to Assembly-sponsored "open town
Secret
AL,4 LAR 86-013
16 September /986
II Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
 I. __ __ I i II I _.. _ _ I. I I I
meetings" held to canvas popular opinion.
Underscoring Sandinista recognition of the
importance of winning international applause, several
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
Secret
The National Assembly replaced the Council olState
in 1985 as Nicaragua's legislative body.
Representation in the Assembly is determined, in
part, by a complexjormula on the basis ojvotes
received in the 1984 elections; in addition, each party
participating in the election was allotted one seat.
Delegates serve six-year terms, and the next
legislative election is scheduled jor 1990.
Opposition parties in the Assembly, the so-called
legal opposition, are ideologically left ojcenter.
Several, including the Independent Liberal Party and
the Popular Social Christian Party, are democratic,
but the opposition also includes several lejtwing
extremist groups particularly the Popular Action
Movement-Marxist Leninist-that criticize the
regime jor moving too slowly toward Communism.
According to US Embassy o,~cials, most ojthese
parties are badly jactionalized, and the regime is able
to keep them divided:
Party
(Seats Held)
Sandinista National Delegates vote as bloc.
Liberation Front Speeches reportedly
(ti l J pre-approved by Assembly
President Nunez.
Democratic Conservative Despite collaborationist
Party credentials, highly critical
(14J 4f constitutional process.
Independent Liberal Most visible and critical
Party opposition party. Currently
under heavy pressure from
the regime.
Popular Social Left-of-center democratic party
Christian Party broadly supportive ojthe
(6J regime but critical q/'some
domestic policies.
Nicaraguan Socialist US Embassy says party
Party constantlyJluctuates between
(2J pro-Sandinista and marginally
anti-Sandinista positions.
Popular Action
Movement-Marxist
Leninist
(ZJ
Communist Party Sma/l, ultraleftist party.
cif Nicaragua
(Zl
meetings were held in the United States.
The Assembly provides the regime with the means to
demonstrate national consensus and further the
revolutionary process. The US Embassy reports that
key laws and decrees approved by the Assembly
coincide with the executive branch's desires. For
example, a controversial presidential decree
suspending civil and political rights last year was
ratified without modification. Press reports say that
20 of the 33 laws and decrees passed during the
Assembly's initial session last year were presidential
initiatives.0
The regime also uses the Assembly to enhance its
legitimacy, especially in international circles. The
Assembly hosts visits by parliamentary delegations
from around the world and provides Nicaragua with
entree into the International Parliamentary Union
and the Latin American Parliament. Last year,
Nunez used his participation at the Conference of the
Presidents of Spanish-speaking Parliaments to explain
Managua's Contadora and regional policies,
according to press reports. ~~
A Rigged Game: The New Constitution
Drafting a new constitution that will cement
Sandinista dominance has absorbed the Assembly's
attention for the past year, and completion by early
1987 is a key objective, according to US Embassy
reports. Although regime spokesmen repeatedly have
billed the constitution as Nicaragua's "Magna
Carta," early drafts point to a preponderance of
power in the hands of the President and a
continuation of the opposition's second-class status.
Echoing President Ortega's comment that the
that the constitution will be finished by year's end.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
Secret
The New Nicaraguan Constitution
The broad parameters ojthe constitution, scheduled
to be promulgated in early 1987, have become
increasingly clear in recent months. Preliminary
drq/Ps provide tremendous power to the President,
emasculate the National Assembly as a check on the
executive, provide for greater state control of the
economy, and, while paying lipservice to political
pluralism, clearly link Nicaragua's future to that of
the Sandinista National Liberation Front. Unless the
current round ojdebate in the Assembly leads to
significant changes, a development we consider
unlikely, important provisions will include:
Exists without ideological restrictions except for Provision is so broad that any political opposition
those that seek a return to the conditions under group advocating changes in the political system
former President Somoza or advocate a similar could be illegal.
system.
Mixed economy An economic model where diverse types of Allows broad limitations on private property and
property (state-owned, private, and mixed) must profits by assigning a public purpose to private
serve the nation's higher interest and meet the property.
needs of its inhabitants.
Direction for planning The direction of the economy is a duty of the Makes the state the manager of every aspect oj'the
of the economy state. national economy.
Political parties A!1 citizens shall have the right to organize Qualifies the right to organize by stipulating that the
political parties with the object 4/. among others, purpose of such parties must be to carry out a
aspiring to political power as long as those program that responds to the necessities of national
parties do not have as their goal a return to the development, as defined by the regime.
conditions under Somoza.
Responsibilities of
the National Assembly
Grant and cancel the legal personality of civil We believe these provisions will be abused to
and religious entities. suppress political parties and perhaps the Catholic
Church.
Appoints mayor of Managua. Assumes Cottfirms preeminence q/'President.
legislative power when Assembly in recess. Can
declare state of emergency. Directs public
administration.
Constitutional rG(orm The Assembly can reform the constitution at the Opposition parties highly critical of this provision,
request 4f the President, the president of the which ensures that only the Sandinistas will be able
Assembly, at least 35 representatives, or by a to make changes in the constitution.
petition with /0,000 signatures.
The Sandinistas have stacked the drafting process in
their favor. A variety of reporting from the US
Embassy indicates:
? The Sandinistas and their allies among the
opposition parties dominate the Assembly
commissions charged with drafting the constitution.
? The "open town meetings" sponsored by the
Assembly to foster "debate" on the constitution
were a triumph of rhetoric over substance;
comments and questions were subject to prior
review and participation was limited to regime
Even so, there are signs that the constitution has
caused concern among regime hardliners.
25X1
25X1
25X1
some idealogues believe the 25X1
document will cause the ruling party to lose control of
the revolution and provide an opening for the political
enemies of the Sandinistas to divide the country and
destabilize the government. 25X1
Sandinista 25X1
militants see the constitution as a departure from the
radical line of the revolution. Likewise, Interior
Minister Barge reportedly is pushing for a
constitutional provision to ban religious groups
- - --- - ------
II Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
Sandinista newspaper,
Barricada, portrays the
minority parties as supporters
4f US e.,B"orts to undermine the
constitution. n
involved in politics.
Borge believes the constitution should
Opposition Ups and Downs
Minority parties, despite Sandinista restraints, have
had some success in using the Assembly as a forum to
publicize regime shortcomings. Press and US
Embassy reporting indicates they strongly criticized
the military draft decree and a minimum wage law
last year. Short-lived walkouts frequently have
accompanied verbal blasts against the regime.
According to the Embassy, the Independent Liberal
Party has been in the forefront of opposition activity,
especially in recent months. Party chieftains, for
example, led the boycott of a special session called by
the Sandinistas in July to pass a resolution
condemning the vote by the US House of
Representatives to resume aid to the insurgents.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
 ~I_ L
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
Secret
More recently, frustration over the pro-Sandinista
bias of the constitution has spurred a new wave of
opposition activity. In early September, five of the
Assembly's six minority parties publicly demanded
that the regime hold a national dialogue including the
opposition parties not represented in the legislature,
halt work on the constitution during the talks, and
incorporate the results into the charter. The US
Embassy says this was the first time the regime's loyal
opposition-the Socialists and the Communists-
joined with the increasingly antagonistic Independent
Liberals and other opposition parties against a major
Sandinista goal.~~
Opposition unity, however, quickly crumbled under
Sandinista pressure. Following a conciliatory initial
response, including a promise of free access to the
media, the regime attacked the Independent Liberals
by claiming the party had close links to the
insurgents, according to Embassy and press reports..
Independent Liberal Vice President Bayardo Guzman
was temporarily detained by security forces. The
Sandinistas have turned protests into grist for their
propaganda mill by labeling the opposition groups
obstructionists and dupes of the US Government. We
agree with the Embassy's judgment that enough
opposition representatives will attend Assembly
debates on the constitution to preserve the image of
pluralism. ~~
What Lies Ahead
Largely because of its propaganda value, the
Assembly will continue to have a high profile on the
Nicaraguan political stage. We envisage membership
in the Assembly as an increasingly important avenue
for regime leaders to reward Sandinista loyalists. For
their part, opposition groups, plagued by ideological
and personal divisions, are unlikely to be able to exert
enough leverage on the Sandinistas to force
significant shifts in policy. Indeed, because of their
small size and lack of popular backing, they will
remain highly susceptible to Sandinista pressure.
From a broader perspective, internal Assembly
machinations might provide an indicator of future
Sandinista moves. A crackdown on opposition
delegates, for example, could presage tougher tactics
against the independent parties and other non-
Sandinista groups. In addition, monitoring the
affiliation of Assembly delegates with the different
Sandinista factions over time could provide insights
into shifts in the relative power of key leaders.
25X1
25X1
25X1
-~( Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
 - --~
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
Secret
USSR-Mexico:
Shevardnadze's Visit
The increased Soviet diplomatic activity in Mexico
over the past two years will accelerate with Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze's trip to Mexico City in early
October. His visit apparently was initiated by Moscow
for the primary purpose of laying the groundwork for
a visit by General Secretary Gorbachev to Mexico
next year. It has, however, a major diplomatic value
in its own right. Besides possibly leading to the
signing of cultural and diplomatic protocols,
Shevardnadze's visit is aimed at bolstering some
major Soviet objectives in bilateral relations with
Mexico, including:
? Stimulating Mexico to increase flagging diplomatic
support for Nicaragua and other regional
revolutionary movements.
? Encouraging Mexico's participation in the
international "peace" movement, especially the
Group of Six. One result of the visit could be a joint
statement endorsing peace and disarmament.
? Maintaining strong bilateral ties in hopes of
continuing a valuable indirect benefit-the use of
Mexico as a base for conducting intelligence
activities against the Western hemisphere, primarily
the United States. Shevardnadze may, for example,
press a longstanding Soviet request for a new
consulate on the US-Mexican border.
Although Moscow seeks progress in these areas, it
probably does not believe the visit will result in any
breakthroughs. Mexico's heavy economic dependence
on the United States is likely to limit Soviet ability to
influence Mexico's regional policy and discourage
Mexico from blatant anti-US behavior. Mexico
probably will also still balk at establishing a Soviet
consulate along the border.~~
Shevardnadze's Objectives
Shevardnadze's trip will be his only announced stop in
Latin America, and his delegation will be the highest
ranking Soviet group to visit Mexico since 1959. The
visit clearly signals the priority Moscow assigns to
strengthening the relationship and will follow an
increasingly well-worn path. Over the past four years,
the frequency of parliamentary delegation exchanges
has roughly tripled and has included visits by the
Soviet Ministers of Culture and Trade, ambassadors
at large, and other high-ranking officials. In January
and February 1986, the chief of the Foreign
Ministry's First Latin American Department made
two closely spaced visits, delivering a letter from
Gorbachev to Mexican President de la Madrid and,
according to press reports, discussing various
international issues, including the situation in Central
America. Moscow sent a Supreme Soviet delegation
in April to discuss Mexico's role as an organizer of the
Five Continent Peace Initiative-the Group of Six,
which includes Mexico, Tanzania, Argentina, Greece,
Sweden, and India-and followed that with a second
such delegation in July. While the principal rationale
for the trip probably is to firm up a Gorbachev visit
next year, we expect the Soviet Foreign Minister to
focus on several themes.
Support for Contadora. Support for Mexican
involvement in the Contadora process has been a
major theme in Moscow's propaganda, and we expect
Shevardnadze may work the subject into his public
and private discussions. The Soviets since 1983 have
been eager to have Mexico play a larger regional role
in Central America, hoping this would build up
regional pressure against the United States to force it
into a less "interventionist" stance in the area,
Moscow came to its
position of supporting the Contadora process
somewhat slowly. Despite the Mexican Ambassador's
repeated requests in 1983 and early 1984 for more
public Soviet support of the Contadora peace
initiative, the Soviets at first demurred. Moscow
declared that overt Soviet backing might sabotage
Contadora's legitimacy as a regional initiative,
Secret
ALA LAR 86-02.3
26 September 1986
-II~ Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
Secret
according to Embassy reporting. By mid-1984,
however, a visiting Soviet delegation issued a joint
communique with the Mexican Government generally
endorsing the Contadora process as a route to peace in
Central America. The delegation was featured
prominently in Pravda and Izvestiya, and Soviet
academic journals began to publish articles
supporting Contadora. As US criticism of Nicaragua
increased, the Soviet press increasingly praised
Mexico's role as a regional peacemaker while
disparaging what it termed US efforts to pressure
Mexico into distancing itself from the Sandinistas.
demonstrate its independence from the United States
and Moscow's desire to extend its influence in the
The upturn in Soviet enthusiasm for Mexican
involvement in regional affairs took place, however, at
a time when Mexico's support for it was waning. A
disintegrating economy increasingly dependent on US
financial support, and de la Madrid's more
conservative bent, caused Mexico to begin backing
away from its support of Nicaragua in 1982, and,
more recently, to cool toward, although not abandon,
Contadora as well.
Plugging Arms Control. Another standard line in
Soviet propaganda in Latin America~ne we expect
Shevardnadze to press-is the need for countries in
the region to be active in supporting arms control
issues. As a member of the Group of Six that is urging
the superpowers to pursue nuclear disarmament,
Mexico is likely to provide a receptive audience. Both
Soviet and Mexican media have devoted extensive
coverage to Mexico's participation in the Group's
disarmament initiative. Moscow has used the issue to
play to Mexico's aspirations as a Third World leader,
to tout its own nuclear test ban, and to portray the
United States as a nuclear superpower bent on
sustaining hegemony over the Western hemisphere.
Boosting Moscow at Washington's Expense. We
assume Shevardnadze will attempt to discredit the
United States by playing up what Moscow
characterizes as traditional Soviet-Mexican
affinities-a common revolutionary heritage and
mutual opposition to US "interventionist" policies.
Soviet-Mexican diplomatic relations were established
in 1924 in part because of Mexico's determination to
Western hemisphere. The same impulse, in our
judgment, continues at least partially to guide
Mexico's relations with the Soviet Union today;
asserted in 1983 that good relations with the USSR
serve to counterbalance US pressures. In reaction to a
perceived US press "attack" on Mexico's Central
American policy in early 1985,
however, de la Madrid denied a Soviet request for a
port visit by two Soviet warships, apparently to avoid
aggravating the United States.
Working the Mexican Media
In pushing these lines, Shevardnadze will be working
against a backdrop of stepped-up Soviet Bloc activity
in recent years to increase Moscow's influence on the
Mexican media and among Mexican elites in general.
International Department of the CPSU Central
Committee had formed a special task force on
Mexico-the largest working group in the
department's Latin American section-to devise
sophisticated campaigns on Central American issues.
The Soviet press corps in Mexico has nearly doubled
this year, increasing from eight to 15,
and Soviet influence on the
Mexican media is apparently extensive. Soviet wire
services routinely place about 10 articles a day in
Mexican newspapers, including the official
government paper, El National, and the most
influential daily, Excelsior. Both papers reach a wide
spectrum of Mexican elites.
25X1
25X1
25X1
9
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
 _JL _ i
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
Secret
The Soviets have also increased their efforts to
discredit the United States by playing up US-
Mexican discord in Soviet media, through placements
in Mexican media, and through diplomatic channels.
The Soviet Ambassador, who is widely quoted by the
Mexican press, has frequently criticized
Washington-in particular charging that it has used
the drug problem to interfere in Mexico's internal
political affairs. More recently, Soviet media have
portrayed the United States Senate hearings on
Mexico as an attempt to punish Mexico for its
independent foreign policy. According to the US
Embassy in Mexico City, the Soviets are also behind
recent stories in the Mexican press alleging that US
nuclear testing was responsible for the earthquakes
Mexico experienced in September 1985)
5X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
II Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
Q
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
Secret
Cuba: Military Reservists
To Fight Crime~~
The Castro regime reportedly is offering a number of
material incentives to military reservists to entice
them to volunteer for one-year tours of duty with the
national police force. The recruitment program
appears to be a direct response to the dramatic
increase in crime in Cuba that began in the mid-to-
late 1970s and so far has defied the regime's efforts to
reverse it. While the program may result in more
arrests-thus worsening conditions in Cuba's already
overcrowded prisons-it also may cause frictions with
professional police officers, who reportedly have a
much lower pay scale for the same duties. ~~
The Crime Trend
Crime has become so bad in recent years that even the
tightly controlled media are acknowledging it.
Moncada, the monthly journal of the Interior
Ministry, has carried a number of articles describing
criminal activities that seem to be particularly
audacious in a police state. Moncada's June issue, for
example, admitted that a 27-year-old supervisor in a
refrigeration plant had tunneled through the wall of a
bank in Matanzas last January and made off with
some $30,000 in Cuban currency. Other articles in
Moncada have chronicled robberies of supermarkets,
groceries, and cafeterias in Havana, the armed
robbery of a 75-year-old woman in her apartment in
the Vedado district of Havana, and a number of
similar street crimes.
The rise in crime was confirmed by a former high-
level Cuban official who defected last December. In
an article written by the defector for a Madrid
publication, he commented on "the sustained growth
of so-called common crime, which has reached quite
alarming levels." The foreign community in
Havana-diplomats and Western businessmen-
appears to be a special target of thieves and burglars,
presumably because consumer goods are more readily
available to this group. The robbers are apolitical;
they hit the residences of Western and Communist
officials alike.)
Red Berets
The Interior Ministry's National Revolutionary Police
(PNR) have been unable to stem the increase in crime,
which may have been one of the reasons for the
dismissal last December of Interior Minister Ramiro
Valdes. His replacement, Division Gen. Jose
Abrahantes, has added military reservists-dubbed
Red Berets-to the PNR to bolster its ranks)
(some 5,000
reservists are to be called up for police duty-half in
the Havana area and the rest scattered throughout the
island.)
participation was voluntary. Reservists who have been
vetted for political reliability are asked to volunteer
for one-year tours in the police force. As an
enticement, they reportedly are offered a monthly
salary of 250 pesos-substantially higher than the
150 to 175 pesos per month paid to a police officer-
and are promised access to special stores for
purchasing clothing at prices much lower than those
paid by the average Cuban. They also are given passes
entitling them to free public transportation. After
three months of special training, the volunteers join a
police unit and, if they so wish, can extend their
service following the one-year tour~~
Prospects
The granting of special privileges and extraordinary
financial benefits to military reservists who volunteer
for service with the police not only underscores the
seriousness with which the leadership views the crime
problem, but also contradicts the regime's current
political opposition to material incentives, which are
under heavy fire from the party's chief ideologue,
Fidel Castro. In effect, only the politically pure-
members in good standing in the party or its youth
Secret
ALA LAR 86-023
26 September 1986
25X1
225X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
~~ Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
 1. .~ L.~ II I _~ I ..I I I i i ~
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
Secret
arm-can become Red Berets, but ideologically
unacceptable material incentives are used to attract
and reward them.
Moreover, the disparity in pay scales is not likely to be
ignored by the professional police officers, and
resentment and suspicion are almost certain to
develop between the Red Berets and their PNR
counterparts. This does not auger well for the fight
against crime, especially with prospects so poor for an
upturn in the economy. The Red Beret program may
temporarily bring about an increase in arrests but is
not likely to have along-term impact on the upward
trend in crime.)
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
Secret
Latin America
Briefs
Cuba Bolstering the Media
Recent improvements to radio and television facilities in eastern Cuba will help the
Castro regime compete with foreign broadcasters for the Cuban audience and
enhance the potential for propaganda broadcasts to Haiti. On 17 September, the
Cuban Ministry of Communications announced that Guantanamo Province's
radiobroadcasting network, "CMKS-The Anti-Imperialist Trench," would
inaugurate a new mediumwave transmitter next month in Maisi on the eastern tip
of Cuba. The Ministry also said that the power of another transmitter in Baracoa
would be increased. Other plans call for the installation of five relay towers next
year that will improve television reception in the mountainous areas around the
city of Guantanamo. Guantanamo also will get two new radio transmitters to relay
broadcasts from national networks in Havana to eastern Cuba, while the provincial
radio network will open a relay transmitter in the town of San Antonio del Sur.
In its announcement, the ministry explained that the improvements were intended
to provide better reception in the densely populated mountainous region because
the geography makes it "extremely vulnerable to foreign station interference,
especially from the Caribbean." Havana's investment in developing these facilities,
essentially for entertainment purposes, during a period of economic stress suggests
the Castro regime is concerned that foreign broadcasts-including the radio and
television broadcasts from the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay-may be
having a negative political impact in a region historically known as the birthplace
of Cuba's revolutions. President Castro probably remembers that, in 1958, during
his guerrilla war against Batista, his 26 July Movement made propaganda
broadcasts from Venezuela to eastern Cuba on both shortwave and mediumwave
radios with great effect. He also may have in mind the use of the transmitters in
Maisi and Baracoa for broadcasting propaganda in Creole to Haiti, which is
located just across the Windward Passage.~~
Cogjunctivitis Outbreak 0 25X1
A recent outbreak of hemorrhagic conjunctivitis ' in Cuba raises the
possibility that Havana once again will blame the United States for its own public
health deficiencies. A Public Health Ministry announcement in early September
said "several cases" of the disease had been reported on the Isle of Youth as well
' This viral infection, which produces an inflammation of the membrane of the eye that subsides in
about a week, rarely causes complications but is highly contagious, especially in crowded conditions
Secret
ALA LAR 86-023
26 September 1986
I) Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
Secret
as in Havana and Las Tunas Provinces. Recent Ministry statistics, however, put
the total of documented cases at over 9,000, of which some two thirds were on the
Isle of Youth. ~~
The epidemic could cause Havana considerable international embarrassment. The
Isle of Youth has a population of about 85,000, of which 15,000 are high school
students from a dozen countries in Africa and Latin America. Some of the foreign
students almost certainly will contract the disease if they have not done so already.
The Castro regime's attempt to minimize the seriousness of the outbreak reflects
its concern over the possiblity that Third World countries may be discouraged
from taking part in the foreign scholarship program. To avert such consequences,
Havana may try to manufacture a scapegoat and blame the United States for
introducing the disease through bacteriological warfare.
Secret 16
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
 l~ _-- I' I I I I.-1 __ J I ~ i .
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000301650001-4