AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000301520001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 14, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
MASTER F11 E COPY
15Z
Africa Review
Secret
ALA AR 86-022
14 November 1986
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Africa Review F
]
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Mozambique-Malawi: Tense Neighbors
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Malawi's alleged support for Mozambican insurgents has led to a
deterioration in already-strained relations between Lilongwe and
Maputo.
South Africa: Black Labor Realignment
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A merger of two black labor federations is part of the increasing
politicization and consolidation of the black union movement
.
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Cabinet changes announced earlier this month are designed to
centralize executive power and streamline the government, but they
are unlikely to lead to significant changes in government policy.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Budget Patterns for 1986/87
local populations.
Budget austerity in most African countries reflects a trend toward
economic reform, but creates additional economic hardships for
Burkina: A Libyan Surrogate?
expressions of dislike for Libyan leader Qadhafi.
President Sankara apparently is allowing Libya to use Burkina as a
limited transit point for West African dissidents despite his private
Secret
ALA AR 86-022
14 November 1986
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Under moderate, pro-Western President Habyarimana, Rwanda is
one of Sub-Saharan Africa's most politically stable countries, but it
is vulnerable to Libyan meddling and periodic tensions with
neighboring countries.
Brief Africa: Insects Still Threaten Crops
Angola Chronology
Chronology of Islamic Activities in Liberia and Togo ~ 27
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Production Staff Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
Secret \ ii
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Secret
Africa Review
Mozambique-Malawi:
Tense Neighbors
Long-strained relations between Marxist
Mozambique and conservative Malawi, a close friend
of South Africa, have sharply deteriorated in recent
months. In early November, thousands of
Mozambicans stormed Malawi's High Commission in
Maputo to protest alleged South African involvement
in the plane crash that killed Mozambican President
Machel and Malawi's purported support for the South
African-backed Mozambique National Resistance
(RENAMO) insurgents. Meanwhile, South Africa
produced documents from the plane crash suggesting
that Machel had been plotting with Zimbabwean
leaders to overthrow Malawian President Banda.
Moderate Marxist ... Machel
loyalist ... was Foreign
Minister and Politburo
member ... ambitious,
popular, has strong party base
but lacks close ties to military
... unlikely to advocate
immediate negotiations with
In our view, Machel almost certainly was convinced
that Banda was assisting the rebels, and he probably
discussed with the Zimbabweans the possibility of
destabilizing the Banda government. Despite
Lilongwe's denials, evidence indicates that Malawian
authorities at a minimum have turned a blind eye
toward RENAMO activities in Malawi and Pretoria's
efforts to resupply the rebels from Malawian
territory. We believe that Mozambique's new leader,
President Chissano, will share his predecessor's
antipathy toward the Banda government and that
bilateral relations are unlikely to improve as long as
the insurgency persists and RENAMO operates in
areas of Mozambique close to the Malawian border.
Longstanding Animosity
Relations between Mozambique and Malawi have
been strained for years, with many of the points of
contention predating Mozambique's independence in
1975:
in 1961
Banda suggested to Tanzanian President Nyerere
that they partition Mozambique, which was then
under Portuguese control. Such an arrangement
would have given landlocked Malawi direct access
to the Indian Ocean but would have been
unsatisfactory to Mozambican nationalists.
? During the Mozambican independence struggle,
Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
(FRELIMO) soldiers who sought refuge in Malawi
often were arrested or turned over to Portuguese
authorities.
? After Mozambique's independence, the FRELIMO
regime was among the forefront of black African
governments denouncing Malawi's close ties to
South Africa.
More generally,) Ithe
conservative, pro-Western Banda has regarded the
FRELIMO government as Communist and
pro-Soviet, while Maputo has viewed him as
reactionary, soft on apartheid, and out of step with the
times.
Secret
ALA AR 86-022
14 November 1986
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1Ouelimane
Area of RENAMO
predominance
0 150 Kilometers
0 150 Miles
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Secret
Chronology of Relations, August 1986 to Present
21-22 August Frontline summit concludes that Malawi's
"military relationship with South Africa
constitutes a serious regional threat."
11 September Leaders of Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia,
and Zimbabwe meet in Malawi, where
Mache! accuses Banda of supporting Malawi.
Malawian authorities reportedly ask
RENAMO leaders to temporarily refrain
from meeting in Malawi.
19 September
23 September
26 September
Machel tours border provinces with Soviet
and Cuban advisers, denounces Malawi's
alleged territorial ambitions and support
for RENAMO.
RENAMO begins offensive in Malawian-
Mozambican border areas, resulting in the
flight of refugees and FRELIMO soldiers
into Malawi.
Malawian and Mozambican officials agree
to establish a joint security commission to
monitor activities in the border area.
1 October US Embassy in Lilongwe estimates over
70,000 Mozambicans have crossed into
Malawi to avoid border fighting.
Malawi begins repatriating 1,500 FRELIMO
troops.
Frontline meeting is held in Maputo. Mache!
charges that Lilongwe is supporting
RENAMO and colluding with Pretoria. He
proposes retaliatory measures.
Malawian envoy John Tembo returns home
after delivering personal messages from
Banda in Maputo and Lusaka.
19 October Mache! dies in a plane crash as he returns
from a visit to Zambia.
20 October Malawi High Commission and airline office
in Harare are stoned and firebombed amid
speculation that South Africa was responsible
for Machel's death.
Machel's funeral held in Maputo. Banda, an
octogenarian, does not attend but declares a
day of mourning in Malawi.
Mozambican mob ransacks Malawian
Embassy in Maputo.
South Africa publicly alleges that
Mozambican and Zimbabwean leaders had
plotted to overthrow Banda.
Maputo and Harare publicly deny plotting to
overthrow the Banda government.
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Recent Charges and Denials
In early November, two days after the ransacking of
the Malawian High Commission in Maputo, South
African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha announced
that documents taken from the plane in which Machel
died revealed that Mozambican and Zimbabwean
leaders in mid-October had plotted to overthrow
Banda. The Mozambicans and Zimbabweans,
according to the documents, planned to destroy
Malawi's bridges to neighboring Tanzania and
Zambia as a possible prelude to an invasion. The US
Embassy in Pretoria reports that the military aspects
of the plan were vague and, in any case, it was not to
have been carried out immediately. Maputo and
Harare subsequently dismissed the documents as a
South African fabrication designed to deflect public
attention from mounting suspicions of Pretoria's
involvement in the plane crash and its backing of
RENAMO insurgents trying to seize power in
Mozambique. Lilongwe, in an apparent effort to
lessen tensions, has reacted cautiously, noting it will
have to review the documents before officially
commenting.
In the months before his death, Machel had
frequently asserted that he had conclusive proof,
which he did not publicly reveal, of Malawi's support
for RENAMO. In a mid-September meeting in
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Secret
Blantyre, Malawi, Machel, along with Zambian
President Kaunda and Zimbabwean Prime Minister
Mugabe, "read the riot act" to Banda, according to
press and Embassy reports. On his return to
Mozambique, Machel publicly threatened to close his
country's borders with Malawi and to place missiles
along the frontier-presumably to interdict aircraft
carrying supplies bound for the insurgents-unless
Malawi cut its ties to RENAMO.
Machel chose to pressure Malawi, in our judgment,
primarily because he believed that Lilongwe's
increased support for RENAMO was enabling the
insurgents to make substantial battlefield gains,
particularly in Tete and Zambezia Provinces of
central Mozambique. In the past two months,
RENAMO insurgents have overrun virtually every
district bordering Malawi and have captured a
number of major towns along the frontier. The
offensive has left the Mozambican Armed Forces and
the 4,000 Zimbabwean troops supporting them in
Mozambique on the defensive, even during the dry
season, when government forces normally are
presumed to have the advantage.
In response, the Banda government repeatedly has
publicly and privately denied any official involvement
with RENAMO. It has suggested it would not be in
Malawi's interests to back the insurgents, since they
have severely disrupted major transport routes
through Mozambique and forced Malawi to care for
more than 70,000 refugees who have fled the fighting
in Mozambique.
In an apparent effort to demonstrate Malawian good
will, Banda in late September dispatched a high-level
delegation to Maputo headed by his closest adviser,
banking official John Tembo. As a result of the visit,
officials of the two countries agreed to establish a
joint commission to monitor security matters. In early
October, the Banda government also repatriated
1,500 Mozambican soldiers-together with their
weapons-who had taken sanctuary in Malawi during
the RENAMO offensive. Since then, however, a large
number of soldiers and growing numbers of refugees
again have crossed the border into Malawi to seek
food and to avoid the fighting,
. closed by guerrillas
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Despite Banda's conciliatory gestures, Machel hosted
a mid-October summit of Frontline leaders to discuss
the deteriorating security situation in Mozambique
and possible retaliatory measures against Malawi. On
the basis of press reports, we believe the Frontline
presidents for the most part accepted Machel's
allegations, although Kaunda and Mugabe later
announced individually that their governments would
not cut trade or other ties to Malawi. Meanwhile,
Mozambican
authorities agreed in principle to provide the Socialist
League of Malawi, a small dissident group seeking to
oust Banda, with bases in Mozambican provinces
bordering Malawi.
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The Question of Malawian Complicity
On the basis of Embassy reporting, we
believe the Banda government almost certainly is
supportive of and sympathetic to the aims of the
rebels. In our judgment, Lilongwe's longstanding
differences with Maputo, extensive ties to Pretoria,
and ideological affinity with the pro-Western
insurgency have led it at the very least to turn a blind
eye toward RENAMO activities and in some cases to
provide unofficial support to the insurgents
for example, that
individual Malawian officials, particularly in the
Army and the police force, are collaborating with
RENAMO and South African agents for personal,
ethnic, or monetary reasons. Moreover, we believe
that Banda may see the long-term benefits of a
RENAMO government in Maputo as outweighing
the temporary dislocations and public embarrassment
caused by supporting the rebels.
According to the
US Embassy in Lilongwe, however, RENAMO
personnel freely traverse the Malawian border, and E
insurgents use Malawian
territory as a nonhostile area in which they can
resupply, get medical attention, and take refuge. A
number of RENAMO officials, including some of the
group's external representatives, also have been issued
Malawian passports, according to the US Embassy in
Lilongwe
President for life ... rabidly
anti-Communist, anti-Soviet
... has seen Malawi become
African pariah in view of
diplomatic and economic ties to
South Africa . 8.
~.8 .
border. Nor do we believe that Mozambique could
impose an effective economic blockade without
Zambian and Zimbabwean cooperation.
insurgents will heed this advice.
For his part, Banda may attempt to improve his
standing among his neighbors by claiming to tighten
control over RENAMO activities in Malawi. We
believe, however, that such actions will be largely
temporary and symbolic. At the same time, Lilongwe
is likely to urge RENAMO and its South African
backers to pursue their insurgency inside
Mozambique and as far as possible from the
Malawian border and key Mozambican
transportation routes serving Malawi. Given that
RENAMO has scored the greatest successes and is
most popular in central Mozambique, which adjoins
Malawi, we believe there is little chance the
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Prospects
In our judgment, there is little likelihood of a
significant improvement in Mozambique's relations
with Malawi in the near to medium term. Moreover,
Maputo is likely to renew its public attacks on the
Banda government and once again consider
retaliatory measures if, as is probable, the rebels
make new gains during the rainy season, which is now
beginning and will end in March. Nonetheless, we do
not believe that Chissano, who will be preoccupied
with consolidating his power, will be able to follow
through on his predecessor's threat to fortify the
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South Africa: Black Labor
Realignment
The recent amalgamation of two black labor
federations and the dissolution of a once vibrant
multiracial labor group point to the continued
politicization and consolidation of the South African
black labor union movement. The merger of the
Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions (AZACTU)
and the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA),
to be known for now as the CUSA/AZACTU
Federation, will provide a new alternative for the non-
white unions formerly affiliated with the now defunct
Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA). The
new federation, however, is unlikely to present a
challenge to the giant Congress of South African
Trade Unions (COSATU), which was founded last
November and now claims a membership of 660,000.
Old-Style Group Falls Apart
Last month, the national executive of TUCSA,
founded in 1954 and once at the forefront of
organizing black unions, announced that the
federation will cease to exist as of 2 December.
Membership, which in 1983 had stood at over
500,000, had dropped by last August to about
150,000, according to the US Embassy, with over
100,000 leaving in 1986 alone. US Embassy reporting
ndicate that TUCSA's decline
stemmed in part from the fact that its generally
conservative political position and mostly white,
Afrikaner leadership had fallen out of step with the
increasingly radical black rank and file. Black union
leaders were particularly critical of TUCSA's refusal
to support May Day as a holiday, its opposition to the
Soweto Day "stayaway" in June, and its statement
that the state of emergency was "regrettable but
necessary." While TUCSA's leadership was
equivocating over the government's detention of
hundreds of union leaders in August, for example, its
largest black affiliate was calling for an end to the
state of emergency and the release of all political
Most of TUCSA's black unions have announced that
they will remain independent, but, in our judgment,
some are likely to affiliate later with either COSATU
or CUSA/AZACTU. Many of the white unions are
likely to join the all-white South African
Confederation of Labor.
Radicals Unite
The long-awaited CUSA/AZACTU merger marks
the formal culmination of a natural alliance between
the two major labor advocates of "black
consciousness," which holds that whites should be
excluded from antigovernment movements. COSATU
permits whites to hold important leadership positions,
and differences over white participation were largely
responsible for the failure of all the major labor
groups to unite when COSATU was formed last year.
Nevertheless, CUSA/AZACTU officials have
insisted that they will continue to work for a merger
with COSATU. The US Embassy reports that, aside
from the black consciousness issue, the two
federations' principles are compatible.
The new federation has 23 affiliated unions and
claims 248,000 members, although the actual number
probably is closer to 150,000, according to the US
Embassy. The Embassy further reports that both sides
benefit from the merger. CUSA gains members in
new industries representing a wider geographic area,
while AZACTU can now tap CUSA's skilled
leadership, including the highly regarded Phiroshaw
Camay, who will serve as the group's general
secretary.
The US Embassy reported that CUSA appears to
have pursued the merger primarily to strengthen its
position vis-a-vis COSATU, while AZACTU was
willing to federate largely on CUSA's terms in hopes
that greater numbers would provide increased
prisonsers, including Nelson Mandela.
Secret
ALA AR 86-022
14 November 1986
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Federation
Year
Founded
Membership a
Characteristics
Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSATU)
1985
660,000
Multiracial, but vast majority black ... favors socialism
... loosely allied with the antiapartheid United Demo-
cratic Front (UDF), but eschews formal political ties ...
outlook for membership growth appears very favorable.
Council of Unions of South Africa/
Azanian Congress of Trade Unions
(CUSA/AZACTU)
1986
248,000
Amalgam of two exclusively black federations ...
CUSA, founded in 1980, has concentrated on workplace
issues, mostly avoiding politics ... AZACTU, founded in
1984, politically allied to black consciousness movement
... prospects for some limited growth if new federation
produces economic gains for members.
South African Confederation of Labor
(SACLA)
1957
100,000
White ... has traditionally taken a hardline attitude
toward black workers and favored reserving certain jobs
for whites ... some softening in racial attitudes, howev-
er, probably because of white Mineworkers Union
(MWU) leaving SACLA ... growth outlook poor, but
may regain MWU or attract white unions from defunct
Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA).
a Estimates of membership are based largely on union claims and
may overstate actual paid membership for some federations.
influence. Although CUSA is the larger and more
pragmatic of the two groups, it has hardened its
position on sanctions and foreign disinvestment since
federation and reportedly has relinquished, at least for
now, its affiliation with the pro-Western International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions. AZACTU also
has withdrawn its nominal affiliation with the
National Forum, a black consciousness political
group. General Secretary Camay told the US
Embassy that the federation will avoid formal
political affiliation but that federation membership in
international labor organizations will be reconsidered
at a future date. Member unions remain free to
affiliate with any political group.
Outlook
In our judgment, the black labor movement will
continue to reflect major trends in black politics. As
such, we believe most workers will gravitate toward
COSATU-affiliated unions, which generally
sympathize with the ideology of the politically
dominant United Democratic Front. As a counter, we
expect CUSA/AZACTU to espouse more radical
rhetoric in the coming months in an attempt to satisfy
its increasingly politicized rank and file and to attract
new workers. At the same time, however,
CUSA/AZACTU also is likely to concentrate on
bread-and-butter issues and work toward an eventual
merger with COSATU.
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South Africa: Implications
of Cabinet Changes
Extensive Cabinet changes announced by President
Botha on 4 November portend little change in
government policy, but further centralize executive
power, streamline the government, and complicate
election prospects. The reorganization came after a
month of press speculation and affects only white
members of the multiracial, general affairs, or
national, Cabinet. Overall, the net result of the
changes was to reduce the number of full Cabinet
ministries by two, to 18, but to double the number of
deputy ministers to 20. Among the most significant
changes were the firing of unpopular Deputy Minister
of Information Louis Nel, and the semiretirement of
controversial Law and Order Minister Louis
Le Grange, who now moves to the largely ceremonial
post of speaker of Parliament. Botha also created a
new ministry for the state-run broadcasting
corporation that, together with the Information
Department, is now directly under his office.
Although economic portfolios previously spread
among five ministries have been consolidated into
two, the change is unlikely to affect policy.
In our judgment, the new Cabinet's composition
reinforces the centrist, moderately reformist image of
the ruling National Party and places more attractive
spokesmen in sensitive positions. For example,
Christoffel van der Merwe, Nel's replacement, is a
former academic, diplomat, and ruling party
information officer who is expected to be a more
appealing and articulate government spokesman than
the discredited Nel, according to press and Embassy
reports. Le Grange, criticized for his handling of the
police, is succeeded by his deputy, Adriaan Vlok, who
has won high marks even from some nonwhite
parliamentarians for being "approachable." Vlok now
also relinquishes his simultaneously held position as
Deputy Minister of Defense. Most of the 12 new
deputy ministers, all drawn from the ruling party's
parliamentary ranks, are considered to be verligte
(enlightened) supporters of political reform. None,
however, are at the liberal fringe of the National
Party spectrum, and all are known for their party
discipline and loyalty.
Domestic reaction to the Cabinet shuffle has been
generally positive but restrained. On the negative side,
some press and liberal opposition spokesmen have
expressed little optimism that the newcomers will
invigorate the Cabinet with bold new ideas for reform.
Others in the press have indicated concern with
Botha's "totalitarian" control over electronic media
and government information, while Botha's failure to
tap private-sector business expertise also has drawn
criticism.
The Cabinet changes create up to six new vacancies in
the Parliament. According to the Embassy, many
local observers now believe that Botha may choose to
forego an early general election next April in favor of
holding byelections, coupled with a referendum on
black political rights. Most of the byelections, which
almost certainly would be held much earlier than
April, would be for relatively safe ruling party seats in
Cape Province. In our judgment, however, the
Cabinet changes, although giving no clear signal of
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for a general election campaign. In a general election,
better control over the media and the replacement of
controversial Cabinet veterans by younger and
popular figures would be an asset for the National
Party. Moreover, several of the new deputy ministers
represent districts where their Cabinet status would
help turn back strong rightwing challenges.
Secret
ALA AR 86-022
14 November 1986
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Rising Political Leaders
Vlok, 49, held posts in the
Justice Department during the
1960s and also served as
assistant private secretary to
then Prime Minister John
Vorster. He left the Prime
Minister's office in 1970 to
pursue business interests. Wok
assumed the posts of Deputy
Minister of Defense and of Law
The new Minister of Law and Order continues his
rapid ascent within the National Party and, we
believe, is a darkhorse candidate to succeed President
P. W. Botha. Vlok has stated that the police should
serve as a shield between the South African people
and left- and right-wing extremists. In our opinion,
despite his reputation for being "gentle and too nice,"
Vlok will not hesitate to use the security forces
against black unrest. Vlok is viewed with suspicion by
many police officials who suspect that, as a former
military officer, he will favor the military over the
police.
Christoffel "Stoff el "van der Merwe
The new Deputy Minister of Information favors the
government's policies of controlled political change.
Van der Merwe, a National Party hardliner, supports
racially segregated living areas and schools and the
right to white self-determination. He also favors
detention without trial and a crackdown on dissident
labor and political organizations.
Van der Merwe, 49, was the National Party
spokesman prior to assuming his present post. Van
der Merwe entered parliament in 1981 after serving
as chairman of the political science department at
Rand Afrikaans University. He traveled to the United
States as an International Visitors Program grantee
in 1978, and he served as a foreign service officer
during the 1960s.
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Sub-Saharan Africa: Budget
Patterns for 1986/87
The budgets of Sub-Saharan African countries
indicate a general trend of austerity for fiscal year
1986/87. For most countries, planned government
expenditures have fallen, after accounting for
inflation. With few exceptions, anticipated tax
revenues have grown only modestly, or have fallen in
real terms, despite increased efforts at tax collection
and additional tax measures.
Although Sub-Saharan Africa's budget austerity
creates economic hardship for its people, the austerity
also reflects a general trend toward economic reform.
Nearly all the countries of the region have budget
deficits, but government officials are increasingly
planning to reduce the deficits relative to gross
domestic product (GDP), thus bringing them more in
line with available domestic resources. In the
meantime, the African governments will be relying
heavily on foreign loans and grants in 1986/87 to
The degree of budget austerity varies among the
African states. At one extreme, the better managed
countries, or those that have suffered less from
commodity price declines, have chosen to make
smaller economic sacrifices. Even so, their budgets
reflect a cautious approach, in our view.
Balanced or Surplus Budgets
At least two of the better performing African
countries plan to show a surplus or to balance their
budgets in the current fiscal year:
? Following record revenues in 1985/86 because of
sharply increased receipts from exported diamonds,
Botswana has presented a conservative 1986/87
budget with a surplus of $140 million. Revenues are
expected to rise 18 percent in nominal terms to $576
million; expenditures are programmed to grow by 17
percent to $436 million, according to press
reporting.
? Cameroon's 1986/87 budget is in balance at
$2.3 billion, according to press reporting. The
budget, however, is lower in real terms than that of
1985/86, having grown by 8 percent, compared with
a 15-percent inflation rate.
Budgets Consolidating Recent Economic Gains
After good economic performances last year, some
countries' 1986/87 budgets seek to consolidate the
gains and to promote future economic expansion. For
example, Ivory Coast has boosted its planned
investment spending for 1986, after cutting it by one-
third in 1985. In the wake of a 4-percent growth rate
last year, Kenya's planned expenditures are up 16
percent to $2.4 billion, compared with an expected
inflation rate of 10 percent. Revenues are projected to
grow by 25 percent to $1.8 billion. The planned deficit
of $655 million is slightly smaller than the actual
1985/86 deficit. The budget contains strong support
through duty concessions and new credit schemes for
agriculture and private-sector economic activity.
Budgets Driven by Economic Reform
The budgets of most other African countries are
providing a framework to accommodate and support
substantial economic reform. For example:
? The Gambia's budget incorporates IMF
(International Monetary Fund) conditions agreed to
in June in connection with a $15 million standby
arrangement. Revenues are projected to rise 22
percent, largely from improved collection methods
and the boost in local currency export taxes caused
by a 100-percent devaluation of the dalasi
subsequent to its February 1985 floating. Measures
to curb public spending include layoffs of some 750
permanent government employees and 340 daily-
paid workers. Nevertheless, recurrent spending is
projected to rise by 44 percent, contributing to an
overall deficit of some $23 million, about 18 percent
of GDP. The Gambian authorities expect to finance
the deficit from external grants and partly from a
$28-31 million World Bank structural adjustment
loan.
Secret
ALA AR 86-022
14 November 1986
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Selected African Countries: Government
Budget Profile a
M Expenditures
? Surplus/Deficit
L Values in national currencies have been converted to US $
at 1986 exchange rates.
b Nigerian expenditures include revenue allocations to states.
Budgeted.
d Estimated.
-1.0 1985/86 86/87 -5 1985d 86c
Billion US $ Billion US $
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? Malawi projects an overall budget deficit of
$44 million, after foreign grants of $29 million. The
deficit will be only 3.9 percent of GDP, however,
compared with 6.2 percent in the 1985/86 fiscal
year. Revenues are programmed to rise by 13
percent to $310 million, while spending growth will
be held to only 5 percent.
? Nigeria's 1986 budget, announced last December,
called for a 22-percent reduction in the overall
deficit to $2.6 billion, after the allocation of a share
of federally collected revenues to the states. The
subsequent collapse of oil prices and receipts has
caused a marked departure from the original
program, with the budget situation tighter than
before, in our view, particularly since the
announcement in June of a two-year economic
adjustment program.
? Sierra Leone's overall deficit is projected to fall to
$152 million in 1986/87, compared with $184
million in 1985/86. A major element in the deficit
reduction will be the abolition of gasoline subsidies
that accounted for 50 percent of last year's deficit.
? Tanzania's 1986/87 budget contains sufficient
economic reform measures to have facilitated a
$78 million IMF standby arrangement in August,
as well as continued donor support. The budget calls
for a 33-percent devaluation of the shilling and
generous producer price increases of 30 to 80
percent. However, the programmed overall deficit
will be $543 million, which, on the basis of
incomplete data, is substantially higher than that of
1985/86. Foreign grants and loans are expected to
provide $428 million toward financing the deficit.
Budgets Less Influenced by Economic Reform
In our judgment, the budgets of at least two countries
do not reflect significant economic reform this year:
? Uganda's 1986/87 budget calls for a deficit of
$250 million, more than three times the previous
record deficit of 1985/86. Planned spending is up by
119 percent, but below the expected inflation rate of
150 percent. Revenue increases are even smaller in
real terms, being scheduled to rise by 90 percent.
According to press reporting, Kampala intends to
finance thb deficit by borrowing internally and
through the sale of properties confiscated from
Asian residents. Foreign donors are reportedly
disappointed in Uganda's budget program and are
skeptical about the means of financing the deficit.
? Zimbabwe's budget expenditures are programmed
to rise by 22 percent to $2.4 billion, well above the
expected inflation rate of 15 percent, because of the
government's social programs, military
expenditures, debt service, and the costs of special
events like the Nonaligned Movement summit last
September. Revenues are projected to rise by 15
percent to $1.8 billion. According to press reports,
Harare faces limited prospects for revenue growth
because of already high tax levels and an expected
slowdown in economic growth to 3 to 4 percent this
year, after growing by 7 percent in 1985.
Impact of Commodity Prices
For a number of African countries, the actual budgets
will depart substantially from the programs, because
of the impact of declines in the prices of exported
primary commodities with accompanying falls in
government receipts. We believe that oil-exporting
countries will be particularly hard hit because of their
almost total dependence on oil receipts:
? Angola expects to lose roughly $1 billion, with a
50-percent drop in export earnings this year,
according to press reporting. As a result, the annual
budget drawn up last December has since been cut
in half.
? Nigeria's original 1986 budget was based on a $25
per barrel oil price. Oil prices presently average $14
per barrel after having slumped to $10 earlier.
Lagos's export earnings are expected to fall by 30
percent this year, according to press reporting.
? Congo and Gabon have announced cutbacks in
planned expenditures.
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Non-oil-exporting countries have been both gainers
and losers from commodity price movements:
? Kenya's 1986/87 budget reflects the double
windfall of lower oil import prices and higher coffee
export prices. Although coffee prices have declined
from their first-quarter 1986 peak, they remain
above last year's levels.
? According to press reporting, falling cotton prices
have created a shortfall in Togo's 1986 budget, after
an earlier projection of a surplus.
The Political Fallout
In our view, although African states face political
risks from budget austerity, and from economic
reform measures in general, we do not expect the
latest round of budget programs to trigger significant
new waves of unrest in the region.
In the past, there have been isolated protests against
budget measures in countries like Congo, Ivory Coast,
and Zaire, according to US Embassy reporting. Some
critics of Nigeria's reform measures fear a loss of
economic privileges, while socialist-oriented officials
in Zambia and Tanzania reportedly do not favor the
reduced role of government in economic activity
implicit in budget reform. Nonetheless, we believe
that African leaders will, for the most part, continue
to implement budget austerity and other economic
reforms, particularly because Western donors and
international financial institutions regard these
changes as requirements for the continued economic
assistance that will help the African states to
rehabilitate their economies.
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Burkina: A Libyan
Surrogate?
Burkina continues to serve at
least as a temporary conduit for Libyan-backed
dissidents in West Africa. Although we do not believe
that Sankara is a pawn of Libya, he lacks funds to
purchase arms from traditional suppliers and
probably believes he has no choice but to rely on
Libyan largess to rebuild Burkina's shattered
military, defeated by Mali last December. In
exchange for these arms, Sankara probably is
permitting Libya to use Burkina as a limited transit
point for dissidents.
Bilateral Relations'
Although Sankara privately has claimed to US
officials that relations with Tripoli are strained over
Qadhafi's broken promises of economic aid, press
reporting indicates that Burkina maintains regular,
high-level contact with Libya. In March, Pierre
Ouedraogo, head of the Committees for the Defense
of the Revolution,' represented Burkina at the
International Conference on Imperialism held in
Tripoli, and in April, Defense Minister Lingani visited
the Libyan capital to demonstrate "solidarity" with
Qadhafi following the US bombing of Tripoli. In
addition, Henri Zongo, the regime's third-ranking
official, paid a one-day visit in June, while President
Sankara stopped over in Tripoli last October to meet
with Qadhafi during a return flight from Moscow. In
August a 55-man Libyan delegation led by the
Information Minister visited Burkina for the
anniversary celebrating Sankara's seizure of power,
z The Committees are modeled on similar groups in Ethiopia, Cuba,
Libya, and Ghana. They are intended to build grassroots support
Sankara's obsession with alleged foreign threats
probably has encouraged him to bolster his military
ties to Tripoli. In July, Burkina told several Western
embassies that mercenaries undergoing training in
Zaire would attack Burkina from Malian territory.
Sankara also has expressed concern about Burkinan
dissidents residing in Ivory Coast. Unable to convince
France-Burkina's traditional arms supplier-to
provide relatively sophisticated weapons, Burkina
increasingly has relied on Libya. Since 1985, Libya
has donated small arms and ammunition, an unknown
number of antiaircraft weapons, and seven Marchiatti
SF-260 light attack aircraft, according to US
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suspect that in October Libya financed Burkina's
purchase of four Marchiatti 211 Is from the Italian
manufacturer.
For the near term, Sankara has little choice, in our
judgment, but to remain militarily dependent on
Tripoli. Burkina's SF-260s, for example, are flown
and maintained by Libya,according to US Embassy
reporting, although Burkinan pilots are undergoing
training in Algeria and Libya. Hostilities could flare
again between Mali and Burkina over the disputed
northern region, even though the International Court
of Justice's decision on the dispute is expected in
December. If fighting does begin again, Sankara will
almost certainly look to Libya for assistance, as he did
last December. F_ I
Subverting Its Neighbors?
The fact that regional dissidents occasionally pass
through Burkina has kept relations strained between
Sankara and some neighbors. According to the US
Embassy, Sankara has long suspected that more
moderate neighbors oppose his "revolution" and are
bent on subverting his regime. Ouagadougou claims,
nevertheless, that Mauritanian, Nigerian, and Ivorian
dissidents have been expelled when discovered in
Secret
ALA AR 86-022
14 November 1986
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Secret
Burkina, and Sankara continues to claim publicly that
his regime neither harbors nor trains these dissidents.
The weight of evidence, however, suggests that he
probably allows them to stay in the country so long as
their presence is not revealed. Although Burkina's
neighbors have yet to establish proof of Sankara's
.involvement, one Ivorian official claimed recently that
there is a growing consensus in West Africa that
Burkina is actively involved in regional subversive
activities.
The military base at Po-10 kilometers north of the
Ghanaian border-is under the command of Blaise
Compaore, and houses the battalion-strength
"Intervention Force, " the National Commando
Training Center, and an officers candidate school,
The US
Embassy reports that almost all of Burkina's major
weapons are stored at Po, out of the reach of
potential Ouagadougou-based coup plotters. Until
last November a small North Korean contingent
stationed at Po provided training in small unit tactics
and hand-to-hand combat.
To date, Burkina's neighors have limited their actions-
against suspected subversion supported by Burkina to
occasional public and private criticism. Both Togo
and Ivory Coast, however, could use their economic
leverage against Sankara if they become more
convinced that Burkina is a destabilizing force.
Landlocked Burkina relies on a railroad through Ivory
Coast and a highway through Togo for virtually all of
its imports and exports, according to US Embassy
reporting. Moreover, about one-third of Burkina's
labor force works in Ivory Coast, providing Burkina
with a safety valve for its growing population.
Abidjan's expulsion of migrant workers alone would
probably seriously threaten Sankara's regime. For the
moment, Ivorian President Houphouet-Boigny
believes that Sankara will "mature" and ultimately
realize the importance of good regional ties, according
to the Embassy.
Outlook
In our judgment, the strong-willed and independent-
minded Sankara is likely to stop short of becoming a
full-fledged ally of Libya. In particular, the Burkinan
the base, preventing them from confirming its
statements that no dissidents are trained there.
leader certainly will remain wary of Qadhafi's
intentions and disapppointed by what he sees as
Libya's inadequate economic aid. Although he
probably recognizes the political damage in being
branded a pawn of Libya, he is unlikely to sever ties to
Qadhafi. Sankara is susceptible to Tripoli's
blandishments and, for the near term, will remain
heavily dependent on Libyan military aid. As long as
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this military aid continues, Sankara will attempt
publicly to downplay his connections with Libya while
continuing to allow Burkina to be used as a transit
point. In addition, he is likely to ease the concern of
skeptical neighbors by relying on shuttle diplomacy by
his key ministers, and periodically expelling small
numbers of dissidents from neighboring countries to
demonstrate his good faith.
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Rwanda
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=1101, Projection
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AN
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Rwanda: Oasis of Stability
Moderate and pro-Western President Habyarimana's
leadership has made Rwanda one of Sub-Saharan
Africa's most politically stable countries.
Habyarimana's government has remained free of
significant corruption, effectively managed its scarce
economic resources, and promoted cooperation
between the two major ethnic groups, according to the
US Embassy. Over the longer term, however, Rwanda
must cope with a rapidly expanding population that is
likely to produce social dislocations and test the
President's leadership skills. Rwanda also will remain
vulnerable to Libyan meddling, and to periodic
tensions with neighboring Uganda and Burundi.
Domestic Politics
A survey of US Embassy reporting indicates that
47 year old Habyarimana, who as commander of the
Rwandan National Guard took power in a bloodless
coup in 1973, faces little domestic opposition. He is
founder of the sole party, the National Revolutionary
Movement for Development, and was reelected to a
five-year term as President in December 1983.
Habyarimana's only challenge came in 1980, when
his former security chief was arrested for coup
plotting, according to Embassy and
private sector.
Unlike neighboring Burundi, Rwanda thus far has
avoided major tribal violence, according to US
Embassy reporting. According to academic studies, a
revolt in 1959 by the majority Hutus-some 85
percent of the population-toppled the minority Tutsi
monarchy, and some 150,000 Tutsis who feared
persecution fled into neighboring Uganda and
Burundi. Apart from the 1980 coup plot, in which the
plotters reportedly planned to "eliminate" Tutsis from
national life, few communal problems have surfaced,
and the President, a Hutu, has consistently
emphasized reconciliation between the two groups,
according to Embassy reporting. The Embassy has
reported that although the Tutsis-14 percent of the
population-hold no key Cabinet or military
positions, they thrive as businessmen in Rwanda's
Religious Dissent
The US Embassy reports that one area of concern in
recent months has been the government's crackdown
on dissident religious denominations. Although 90
percent of the population is Catholic, and church-
state relations historically have been good, the
government reportedly fears that the proliferation of
small Christian sects may undermine its efforts to
create a Rwandan identity. Last October, some 300
members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, Abantu B'Mana
(Men of God), and Abarokore (God's Elect) received
sentences ranging from four to 12 years for belonging
to unauthorized religious organizations. According to
press reports, the members refused to sing the
national anthem and participate in Umuganda, a
system of community service which requires each
Rwandan to work one day a week without pay.
A Passive Military
purged following the 1980 plot-
has developed into one of the most professional and
apolitical in Africa. The Army is paid regularly, and
soldiers often work on civic action projects such as
road maintenance, tree planting, and the construction
of schools. The attache also has reported that both
junior and senior officers appear loyal to the regime.
The President, who is also the Minister of Defense,
has created a 1,500-man Gendarmerie to
counterbalance possible moves by the Army.
Ties to Libya
Relations between Tripoli and Kigali have been
strained since the late 1970s, according to a survey of
US Embassy and In 1978
Kigali dispatched some JUU Army commandos to
Libya for training, but they returned home the
following year, angered by Tripoli's efforts at
ideological indoctrination. During this period, Libyan
promises of military aid never materialized, and
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ALA AR 86-022
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Rwandans were annoyed, by Qadhafi's support for Idi
Amin in neighboring Uganda. In 1981 Rwanda sent
about 200 soldiers to Tripoli for training, but again
they were dissatisfed with living conditions and the
"racist" attitudes of the Libyans, and returned home
early,
Despite these tensions, Rwanda maintains polite ties
to Libya, in our judgment, hoping to avoid Libyan
meddling in the country. According to the US
Embassy, Libya has some investments in Rwanda,
including a tea plantation and part ownership of the
Meridien Hotel in the capital, but Kigali remains
angered by Libya's failure to provide greater aid and
its foot-dragging on planned projects. Although
Qadhafi visited Kigali in May 1985, Rwandan
officials claimed the visit was "imposed" on them, and
we agree with the US Embassy that the Libyan leader
failed to make inroads. Less than 1 percent of the
Rwandan population is Muslim, and it is unlikely the
Libyans will gain many supporters among the
generally conservative society. Nevertheless,
an unknown number of
dissident Rwandans currently are undergoing military
training in Libya.
Soviet Activities
US Embassy reporting indicates that the Soviet
Union maintains a low profile and has little influence
in Kigali. Although Rwandan authorities applauded
Moscow for airlifting 2,000 tons of wheat during a
food crisis in 1974-75, in recent years the USSR has
failed to provide significant economic aid. The
Embassy reports that Rwanda privately condemned
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and government
officials are wary of Moscow's intentions in central
Africa. The Soviet Union, however, remains the single
largest source of scholarships-about 60 a year-and
some Soviet teachers serve in Rwanda.
Relations With Uganda
Maintaining good relations with neighboring Uganda
has always been seen in Rwanda as critical to the
country's survival. Almost all of Rwanda's trade
transits Kenya and Uganda, and Rwanda is
vulnernable to Kampala's political instability. When
their common border was closed from February to
May 1979-as a result of fighting in Uganda-trade
was disrupted, causing serious shortages of petroleum
and basic commodities in Kigali, according to press
reports. Relations have periodically been strained by
refugee issues and, in October 1982, Rwanda closed
the border after 28,000 Ugandans who were fleeing
Obote's persecution entered the country, according to
open sources.
More recently, ties to the new Ugandan regime have
improved somewhat, but tensions persist. Shortly
after Museveni took power, Kigali feared that his
ethnic ties to the Tutsi would prompt him to support
efforts of the 110,000 Rwandan Tutsis living in
Uganda to stir up unrest in Rwanda. The US
Embassy reports that Museveni has backtracked on
his offer to grant the Rwandan exiles Ugandan
citizenship, however, and Kigali now fears that he
may forcibly repatriate them. Rwanda opposes
repatriation because of population pressures, but
Museveni publicly has rejected this argument,
according to the Embassy. Uganda's ties to Libya and
Rwandan smuggling of goods across the border also
remain bilateral irritants.
Cool Ties to Burundi
Relations with neighboring Burundi are strained as
well. According to the US Embassy, the two countries
have yet to settle their differences over Burundi's
occupation of the Rwandan Ambassador's residence
last February. Burundi claims that the house, near the
President's residence, was part of a security zone, and
negotiations have been frozen over the level of
compensation for the loss of property. The Embassy
also reports that Bujumbura is irritated by Kigali's
close ties to Belgium, their common former colonial
power, while Rwanda is concerned about Burundi's
warm relations with Moscow and Tripoli. Earlier this
year, a dispute erupted over Rwanda's refusal to allow
Burundian goods to transit its territory en route to
Museveni's forces, according to the Embassy.
Although some 240,000 Rwandan Tutsis reside in
Burundi, the Bagaza regime does not appear to have
encouraged them to engage in coup plotting.
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Social Problems
Rwanda's annual growth rate of 3.8 percent a year
makes overpopulation its most pressing problem,
according to US Embassy and open sources. The
population of 6.5 million is expected to double shortly
after the end of the century, and Rwanda already has
the highest population density in Africa-310 persons
per square kilometer. According to open sources,
Kigali has grown from 7,000 residents in 1962 to over
150,000, and is increasing by 9 percent a year. The
US Embassy reports that the government strongly
supports family planning and has initiated some birth
control policies, but these efforts are likely to have
little short-term impact.
The Habyarimana regime also will be hard pressed to
cope effectively with the spread of AIDS. An
estimated 15 percent of the population are carriers,
The
government, which has admitted publicly that the
disease exists and which sanctions research, does not
consider AIDS to be a health care priority, according
to the US Embassy.
The Economic Scene
US Embassy reporting indicates that, since 1983,
Habyarimana has pursed pragmatic economic
policies. The Embassy reports that the external debt
stands at a modest $230 million, the debt service ratio
last year was 6.8 percent, and inflation is running at a
rate of only 1.7 percent. The government has
encouraged the private sector and hopes to attract
greater foreign investment, according to the Embassy.
Moreover, the regime has strongly supported the
agricultural sector and regularly raised producer
prices. Last year, Rwanda had more than $100
million in foreign reserves-enough for six months'
worth of imports.
Over the longer term, economic prospects are more
problematic. Rwanda's dependence on a single
crop-coffee accounts for 70 percent of its export
revenue-makes the country vulnerable to the
fluctuating commodity market. Moreover, if current
trends continue, Rwanda will exhaust its arable land
by the year 2000, probably increasing malnutrition
and dependence on food imports, according to the US
Embassy. Rwanda lacks significant mineral deposits
and has no petroleum reserves. There also are limits to
foreign investment, given the high transportation costs
and an inadequate infrastructure, according to
Embassy and open source reporting.
Outlook
We agree with the US Embassy in Kigali that
Habyarimana faces few immediate political
challenges, particularly given the lack of organized
opposition in either his ruling party or the military.
His government, however, is likely to find it
increasingly difficult to cope with its burgeoning
population problem and to create jobs for school
graduates. Moreover, a sudden influx of Tutsi exiles
from Uganda could cause political tensions to rise.
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Africa
Brief
Africa Insects Still Threaten Crops
A $35 million multinational effort has prevented insects from destroying crops in
East, Central, and West Africa, according to press reporting. The UN Food and
Agriculture Organization estimates that in the Sahel region alone, extensive
insecticide spraying may have saved enough grain to feed 1.2 million people this
year. Only southern Africa currently faces a threat of insect damage. While
spraying efforts may have prevented a catastrophe this year, Africa is not yet free
of potential food shortages caused by its worst insect problem in 60 years. With
next year's rains, eggs laid this year by record-sized insect populations will hatch.
In addition, spraying in some West African countries was done improperly-
actually increasing the likelihood of insect problems in 1987. To reduce the danger
of food shortages next year and to avoid another costly rush to control insects,
donor nations should presently be allocating funds and pre-positioning resources
Secret
ALA AR 86-022
14 November 1986
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Angola Chronology I 25X1
for the first time.
UNITA claims that it destroyed seven Soviet-made tanks and BTR personnel
carriers in clashes with government forces by using specialized antitank weapons
between the countries, as well as peace in the rest of the world.
President dos Santos and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev exchange messages
on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship
and Cooperation between their countries. Both messages express the belief that the
treaty will serve the cause of the development and deepening of the existing links
announced. The accord defines cooperative projects for the 1986-90 period.
Signing of accord between Angola and CEMA providing for the organization of
multilateral cooperation and the creation of a joint cooperation commission is
government aircraft.
UNITA leader Savimbi, during visit to European Economic Community (EEC)
Parliament, publicly praises US aid to his movement, saying weapons provided
earlier this year by Washington have enabled UNITA to shoot down 29
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After Savimbi's appearance, EEC Parliament narrowly passes a resolution
branding UNITA "a terrorist organization." F__1 25X1
30 October UNITA claims to have raided the airport in the oil-rich Angolan Exclave of
Cabinda. The American oil company Chevron confirms an incident there.
Secret
ALA AR 86-022
14 November 1986
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000301520001-8