AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000301490001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 3, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence 4I t 'jam ,~ ~"
Africa Review
141
ALA AR 86-019
3 October 1986
394
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Africa Review
Articles The OAU: Sassou-Nguesso at the Helm
Under the leadership of Congolese President Sassou-Nguesso during
the next year, the OAU (Organization of African Unity) is likely to
concentrate more on the South African issue than on the economic
concerns focused on by his more moderate predecessor, Senegalese
President Diouf.l
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Ethiopia-Somalia: Solution to the Ogaden Issue Unlikely) 5 25X1
2bAl
Although further meetings probably will take place between
Ethiopian and Somali officials, progress toward resolving their
longstanding border dispute over the Ogaden region is unlikely.
Angola: Supplemental Sources of Military Aid 9 25X1
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Several recent arms deals that Luanda has negotiated with non-
Communist suppliers probably are intended to encourage limited
competition for the Soviet Bloc arms monopoly and to display an
image of nonalignment, but are unlikely to lessen Angola's military
dependence on Moscow
Liberia: Prospects for Matthews's Opposition Party I 11
Although the opposition United People's Party is preparing to
contest legislative byelections scheduled for December, and party
leader Baccus Matthews may accept a government post, he is likely
to seek to develop an independent base to mount a challenge against
President Doe
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Brief Mauritius-United States: Disappointment Over Textile Talks) 115 25X1
Chronology of Islamic Activities in Senegal
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis
Secret
ALA AR 86-019
3 October 1986
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Africa Review
Articles
The OAU: Sassou-Nguesso
at the Helm
Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso probably
will try to use his chairmanship of the OAU
(Organization of African Unity) to project himself as
an arbiter of African disputes and to ease some of the
organization's internal tensions, in our view. Sassou,
however, is a Marxist who is not as politically
acceptable to African moderates or as diplomatically
smooth as his predecesser, Senegalese President
Diouf. We believe that under Sassou's leadership the
OAU probably will become bogged down on the
South African issue and will devote less attention to
pressing economic concerns focused on by Diouf.
There is potential, however, for positive developments
during the next year, given Libya's increasing
isolation within the OAU and Sassou's efforts to
broker the Chadian conflict.
South Africa
The OAU summit in July, capitalizing on growing
international pressures for sanctions against South
Africa, reissued a call for sanctions and condemned
nations that maintain relations with Pretoria.
Delegates advocated tough measures but failed to
adopt mandatory economic sanctions and did not
criticize OAU members who retain substantial
economic ties to Pretoria. The United States and the
United Kingdom both came under fire for failing to
enact sanctions, and Washington was criticized for its
support of UNITA and its policies toward Namibia.
The summit surfaced several new proposals for the
treatment of South Africa, according to US Embassy
reporting:
? African leaders discussed denying air and sea
landing rights to traffic bound to or from South
Africa, and many states-some of which are used
by South Africa for these purposes-are currently
considering the feasibility of such denials.
Congolese President and Current OAU
Chairman Denis Sassou-Nguesso
About 42 years old ... President and Chairman of
Council of Ministers since 1979, and Minister of
Defense since 1977... has moderated his Marxist
views in recent years but remains an African
nationalist strongly committed to Third World
? The concept of an African defense force to train and
otherwise assist African National Congress
guerrillas was adopted, despite the difficulties posed
by ethnic and language diversities, logistic and
funding problems, and the vulnerability of the
Frontline States to South African retaliation.
Secret
ALA AR 86-019
3 October 1986
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? An ad hoc heads-of-state committee led by the
OAU chairman was created to keep the OAU
apprised of fast-moving events.
? The heads of state agreed to make antiapartheid
campaigns the theme for the 1986/87 school year in
Africa.
OAU leaders, with support from other Third World
statesmen, also managed to make South Africa the
prime issue of discussion at the recent Nonaligned
Movement meeting in Harare. Although most
Nonaligned Movement members have little interest in
the South African question, the choice of a Frontline
State leader, Zimbabwean Prime Minister Mugabe,
as chairman indicates that the organization will pay
increasing attention to South Africa in the next year.
Mugabe actively pushed for sanctions at the
Commonwealth meeting in early August, and the
Nonaligned summit echoed the OAU summit's calls.
We believe that Sassou will be responsive to OAU
member states' demands that South Africa remain
the organization's priority issue and will work toward
wider support for the OAU's position in other
multinational organizations. The OAU is likely to
intensify its posturing on sanctions-and criticism of
the United States and the United Kingdom, in
particular-while at the same time requesting
Western aid to alleviate the negative economic
repercussions of possible South African
countermeasures.
Chad
Sassou has been unsuccessful thus far in in his efforts
to broker the Chadian problem, but we believe he will
continue to try to bring about a settlement during his
tenure as OAU chairman. In our view, Sassou has a
realistic grasp of the Chadian situation and is aware
that rebel leader Goukouni is strongly influenced by
Tripoli. He probably also realizes that Libya must be
involved in a solution and thus may try to work
outside the OAU framework because the OAU does
not publicly acknowledge Libyan aggression in Chad.
Leader of Government of National Unity insurgency
with longstanding ties to Libya ... held succession of
positions in three Chadian coalition governments in
1979 and was President of Chad from 1979 to 1982
before being toppled by Habre .
Goukouni's failure to
standing among OAU members.
show up for OAU-sponsored talks in Brazzaville with
Chadian President Habre may have tarnished his
Habre found the OAU more favorably
disposed toward his government during the recent
summit than at any other time. Nevertheless, he is
critical of the extension of the OAU's mandate to
mediate Chadian national reconciliation and was
especially displeased with the summit's brief
consideration of an unpassed resolution that appeared
to call for the cessation of French military aid to
N'Djamena.
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President of civil-war-torn Chad since 1982.. .
served in Chadian provisional governments in 1978
and 1979 but withdrew from government to lead
opposition in 1980... strong-willed, competent
military leader but lacks across-the-board national
support despite his accommodation of many
opposition groups ... faces discontent in south and
isolated northern region ... reliant on French
military support to maintain position in northern
Chad against rebels ... has offered to meet and
reconcile with rebels ... implacably hostile toward
Libya ... educated in France ... in his early forties
... has great courage and physical endurance. =
Sassou to work toward an easing of tensions within
the OAU. While Sassou will have to deal with Libya's
efforts to draw the OAU into Tripoli's feud with the
United States, we believe that Qadhafi is beginning to
lose the substantial influence he has had over the
organization in the past several years. The
contradiction between the OAU's policy of refusing to
condemn a member state and Libya's often erratic
and disturbing conduct, however, will continue to
belie the private anti-Libyan sentiments of many
member states.
Since the US bombing raid in April on Tripoli and
Banghazi, Libya appears to be increasingly isolated
within the OAU For the
first time, Libyan-supported terrorism was mentioned
at the OAU-in a stinging verbal attack by Zaire in
the council of ministers' meeting preceeding the
summit in July-and criticism of Tripoli was greeted
with applause and jokes during the ministerial
meeting. Libya's statement at the same meeting
received no applause for the first time, according to
together for comprehensive negotiations.
The US Embassy in Brazzaville recently reported that
Sassou and other African heads of state have already
received letters from Habre asking that the OAU
conciliation committee discontinue its efforts. Habre's
apparent attempt to cease cooperation with the
OAU's mediation efforts will complicate Sassou's task
of finding a settlement. The OAU committee,
established in 1977, has yet to bring the two parties
Libya: Perennial OAU Troublemaker
Conflicts between OAU member states often have
been intensified by the radical policies of Libyan
strongman Qadhafi-as evidenced by Libyan
involvement in Chad-but recent events may allow
the US Embassy in Cairo.
Although Libya won approval for a resolution
condemning the April raid, a number of OAU-
members took advantage of new procedures and
issued written reservations. We believe that, although
the issue was old news by the time of the summit-
Qadhafi had failed in previous efforts to convene a
special ministerial meeting to condemn the United
States-Tripoli was able to push the resolution
through by capitalizing on the emotionally charged
atmosphere of the South African sanctions discussions
and condemnations of Western support for Pretoria.
We believe Qadhafi's derision of the Nonaligned
Movement at that organization's summit in Harare in
late August also has eroded his popularity with
African leaders. The Libyan leader's denunciation of
the Nonaligned Movement and the OAU as
ineffective and his public intention to establish his
own movement of progressive and anti-US countries
received wide press coverage. Reaction to his speech
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was almost uniformly negative, particularly among
the Frontline States who saw his words as an attempt
to shift the summit's attention away from the key
South African issue
Outlook
Sassou, pressured by the Frontline States and
bolstered by the OAU's success in making South
Africa the key issue at the Nonaligned summit, will
work to make South Africa an even more
internationally visible issue and will probably give less
attention to the Africa-wide economic issues that
preoccupied his predecessor. Vociferous name-calling
against the West is likely to persist under his
leadership, and calls for sanctions will not abate as
African nations consider their own-albeit limited-
options for action against Pretoria.
We believe, however, that the OAU's ineptitude and
political infighting will continue to hamper the
organization's effectiveness. At the same time,
conflict within the OAU may be softened by
Qadhafi's loss of influence and Sassou's growing
reputation-if he sincerely attempts to deal with the
intractable Chadian conflict-as a realistic mediator.
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Ethiopia-Somalia: Solution to the
Ogaden Issue Unlikely
Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu and Somali President
Siad met in Djibouti last January and agreed to seek a
political settlement to the longstanding Ogaden
dispute. Mogadishu's irredentist claim to the eastern
Ethiopian region has resulted in one major war,
several large-scale clashes, and countless border
incidents over the last 25 years. Ethiopian and Somali
delegations have met twice since January but have
been unable to agree on an agenda for the talks.
Although additional meetings probably will take place
over the next few months, we believe it unlikely that
the two sides will make any progress toward solving
the border problem.
Background
The Ogaden issue reflects the continuing clash of
ethnic, religious, and political views. In part, it is an
outgrowth of centuries of struggle between Ethiopia's
Christian highland population and the Muslim
lowlanders. Today it has evolved into a conflict in
which two nation-states lack the political will to reach
a peaceful solution to their differences. Ethiopia
stresses the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
principle of respect for each state's territorial integrity
and considers ethnicity a hindrance to nation
building, while Somalia, seeking to obtain Somali-
inhabited territory, emphasizes ethnic unity and
regards the Ogaden as an integral part of Somalia's
economic and social systems. Mogadishu consistently
appeals to the principle of self-determination, out of a
conviction that the inhabitants of the Ogaden region
would prefer political association with Somalia.[
The roots of the dispute date back to the late 19th-
century expansion of Ethiopia in the region, which up
to that time had rarely experienced Ethiopian
dominance. Ethiopia's expansion to approximately its
present eastern and southern boundaries received
international recognition in treaties that the
Ethiopians signed during the late 1890s and early
1900s with the United Kingdom, France, and Italy,
all of which held territory on the Somali coast.
Mogadishu has never accepted the legality of these
treaties and contends they were concluded by the
colonial powers without consulting the Somalis.
Mogadishu claims the agreements with Ethiopia
violated the colonial protectorate treaties signed in the
1880s by the colonial powers and Somali tribes.' [
In 1963, at the founding meeting of the OAU,
Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie strengthened his
hold on the Ogaden by using his stature as one of
Africa's elder statesmen to win the organization's
endorsement of existing national boundaries. This
move effectively negated Somalia's claim to the
Ogaden region, which Mogadishu had been actively 25X1
pursuing since gaining its independence in 1960.
Mogadishu, while signing the OAU charter, appended
a reservation to the portion dealing with the
recognition of existing borders, arguing that it did not
apply to the Ogaden because Ethiopia had colonized it
in much the same manner that European powers had
colonized other parts of Africa.
The revolutionary regime of Chairman Mengistu,
which came to power in 1977 following the overthrow
of Haile Selassie in 1974, has relentlessly asserted
Addis Ababa's claim to the Ogaden. Since repulsing
the Somali invasion in 1977 and 1978-with the help
of approximately 17,000 Cuban troops and a broad
array of Soviet weapons-Ethiopia has established
and maintained clear-cut military control in the
region.
Previous Negotiation Attempts
Various parties have attempted over the years to find
a diplomatic solution to the Ogaden issue. The United
Kingdom, which was the military administrator of the
' Portions of the border defined in the various treaties are vague and
contradictory. For example, the Ethiopian border with the former
Italian Somaliland has never been demarcated and remains a
provisional administrative line that was drawn in 1948 by the
United Kingdom[[
Secret
ALA AR 86-019
3 October 1986
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/ rDinle
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1 Boundary represontanon Is
not necessarily autnornatoe.
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Ogaden from 1941 until 1948, tried on several
occasions but was stymied by Haile Selassie's refusal
to make any concession on the border. The United
States also tried its hand in the 1940s, but the
acquisition of access rights to the Kagnew
communication complex in northern Ethiopia in 1953
resulted in Washington's supporting Addis Ababa on
the issue. In May 1973, the OAU created a Good
Offices Committee under the chairmanship of
Nigeria to mediate Ethiopian-Somali differences over
the Ogaden. The committee, however, reflected the
predisposition of the OAU itself by reaffirming the
inviolability of frontiers, in effect recognizing the
Ogaden as a part of Ethiopia. Finally, at a 1977
meeting in South Yemen, Cuban President Castro
failed in an effort to sell a Soviet proposal for creating
a federation of socialist states in the region, including
Ethiopia, Somalia, South Yemen, and Eritrea.
The Current Talks
We believe that the leaders of both countries, given
the changed political situations within their borders,
may now see it in their interests to maintain a
dialogue. Siad probably recognizes that the military
balance is clearly in Ethiopia's favor and that
Mogadishu is unable to challenge Addis Ababa's
dominance over the Ogaden. US Embassy and
indicates that most senior
Somali military leaders now realize that the West-
particularly the United States-will not provide
sufficient weapons to rebuild the military to its 1977
level. At the same time, many government officials
and military officers have grown weary of pursuing
the Ogaden cause because the insurgent group that
speaks for the Ogadeni-the Western Somali
Liberation Front-is reluctant to conduct military
operations. According to one US Embassy official, a
senior Somali general recently criticized several
Ogaden spokesmen for succumbing to the relatively
easy life of Mogadishu rather than undergoing the
rigors of guerrilla warfare in the harsh Ogaden. Some
Somali officials also may believe that Ethiopia's
intention to grant autonomy to its ethnic groups, as
stated in its draft constitution, can provide the basis
for a negotiated settlement.
The US Embassy reports that Siad also believes that
reconciliation talks will result in a reduction of
Ethiopian support to Somali dissidents based in
Ethiopia. While the two insurgent groups-the
Reverse Blank 7
Somali National Movement and the Somali
Democratic Salvation Front-pose little threat to the
Siad regime, their cross-border raids point out the
Army's weaknesses and exacerbate security problems,
especially in northern Somalia. Indeed, there is some
evidence that the talks have resulted in Addis Ababa's
ending its active support for the insurgents' raids,
although Ethiopia continues its logistic support to and
training of Somali dissidents.
For his part, Mengistu probably hopes to obtain
Somali recognition of the de facto frontier. A border
agreement would permit Mengistu to reduce his
military forces in the Ogaden and possibly to redeploy
troops to engage the more persistent and threatening
Eritrean and Tigrean insurgencies in northern
Ethiopia. At a minimum, he probably believes there is
little risk in meeting with the Somalis, especially
because he can increase the pressure on Mogadishu at
any time.
Since the Mengistu-Siad meeting last January, the
joint ad hoc committee has failed to establish an
agenda because the Somalis want to work on
confidence-building measures-such as prisoner
exchanges and the resumption of diplomatic
relations-while Ethiopia insists on tackling the
border issue first. Both sides have agreed to meet
again in Addis Ababa, although a date has not been
set.
Outlook
Talks between Ethiopia and Somalia probably will
continue but are unlikely to produce any meaningful
results over the near term. Siad cannot recognize the
border because of strong residual domestic opposition
to such a move, although most Somalis appear to
support a reduction in tension. Mengistu, for his part,
is unlikely to make any real concessions because the
Ethiopians hold the political and military advantages.
Sporadic meetings probably will continue to take
place over the next few months, and some minor
arrangements-such as a prisoner exchange-may
result. We believe the process will eventually draw to
a halt, however, and Addis Ababa, aware of its
superior military might, may decide that military
pressure is the best way to achieve its goals.
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Angola: Supplemental Sources
of Military Aid
Luanda has recently negotiated several arms deals
with non-Communist suppliers. While they probably
are intended to encourage limited competition for the
Communist Bloc arms monopoly and to display an
image of nonalignment, these transactions are not
likely to lessen Angola's military dependence on
Moscow.
Leading Non-Communist Suppliers
Brazil has become Angola's largest non-Communist
supplier of military equipment as part of Brasilia's
aggressive campaign to expand sales to Third World
markets. Earlier this year, an Angolan military and
economic delegation visited Brazil to sign credit
agreements with the Bank of Brazil and ENGESA,
the country's largest military manufacturer. Thus far,
Brazil's arms sales to Angola have consisted primarily
of military trucks and jeeps worth about $130 million,
More recently,
Luanda has purchased two maritime patrol aircraft
and is expressing interest in buying more
sophisticated items such as armored vehicles and
patrol boats.
In addition to providing military hardware, Brazil is
making inroads in advisory and technical fields.
ENGESA recently negotiated a $130 million contract
to take over Angola's central vehicle repair base near
Luanda, previously run by Soviet and Cuban
technicians. The repair facility reconditions the
Angolan military's trucks and heavy-lift and armored
vehicles, including those used predominantly by
Cuban troops.
ENGESA has recommended replacing all Soviet an
East European trucks with Brazilian-supplied engines
and developing domestic production facilities for
many spare parts.
In addition to Brazil, Luanda has signed deals with
several West European nations, keeping them in the
market, albeit as minor players. Purchases include
combat and patrol helicopters from France; large
quantities of small arms, aviation spare parts, and
ammunition from Portugal; transport aircraft from
Spain; and vehicles from West Germany and Sweden.
Angolan
officials have expressed an interest in finding Western
firms willing to sell military equipment to Angola as
military equipment provided by the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe is more expensive than comparable
Western equipment and, with declining oil revenues
and resulting hard currency shortages, equipment
costs are becoming an increasingly important factor.
Second, experience with Soviet Bloc equipment has
led to dissatisfaction among the Angolan military
with the quality of the hardware. The poor
performance of Soviet equipment in Libya against the
US military has further pointed out the relative
ineffectiveness- in Angolan eyes-of Soviet
hardware against modern Western forces.
Angola also resents its near-total dependence on the
Soviets, and Luanda is mindful of the potential for
political gain from improving its nonaligned
Secret
ALA AR 86-019
3 October 1986
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Outlook
Despite limited gains by non-Communist countries at
Moscow's expense, the Soviet Bloc will probably not
face any serious threat to its role as Angola's
predominant supplier of military equipment. Few
nations could provide the level and timeliness of
support offered by Moscow. Angola now receives a
full complement of advanced Soviet arms, including
MIG-23 fighters, MI-24 attack helicopters, and
various air defense and radar systems. During 1984
and 1985, the Soviet Union delivered some $1.4
billion in arms, and current projections suggest an
additional $500 million may be forthcoming by the
end of 1986. Since 1975, Soviet Bloc equipment has
been used to outfit some 60 Angolan brigades, as well
as the Cuban military contingent estimated at 36,000
men. Soviet, East European, and Cuban technical
advisers are present at almost all levels of the Angolan
military. Diversification from Soviet Bloc equipment
would impose extremely difficult financial, logistic,
and training problems.
Moscow values its arms-supply relationship with
Luanda, not only for ideological reasons, but also
because Angola is one of the few Third World Soviet
clients able to pay for at least a portion of its
purchases in hard currency. Although non-
Communist arms deals will probably continue at the
margins of the Angolan market, the Soviets are not
likely to tolerate serious challenges to this
relationship.
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Liberia: Prospects for
Matthews's Opposition
Party
President Doe's move to lift the ban on Liberia's
largest and most popular opposition party-the
United People's Party (UPP), led by Baccus
Matthews-on 23 September is probably part of his
effort to divide the opposition. Although the UPP is
not a legal party and cannot yet participate in
elections, we believe its registration is only a
formality. Although Matthews welcomes Doe's
conciliatory move, we believe he will work behind the
scenes to bolster his influence, while trying to control
a small radical faction of the UPP that favors a more
confrontational stance toward the regime. According
to US Embassy reporting, Matthews says he would
accept a government position if Doe made him an
offer. We believe, however, that he would use such a
post to develop an independent base that he could use
to mount a challenge against Doe.
Doe's Strategy
The lifting of the ban on the UPP is probably
designed by Doe to ease foreign and domestic
pressures to open the political system. According to
the US Embassy, Doe hopes the move will improve
Liberia's image in the United States and ensure badly
needed US financial aid. The Embassy also suspects
that Doe acted to demonstrate a conciliatory posture
and to undermine any attempts by the weak and
ineffective Grand Coalition of three opposition parties
to co-opt Matthews.
Nevertheless,) I Doe is
not convinced of Matthews's good faith and is waiting
for him to renounce his "socialist" past. Moreover,
some members of the ruling National Democratic
Party of Liberia remain highly suspicious of
Matthews and may attempt to get the President to
Doe's close advisers, Justice Minister Scott and
presidential aide Bai Gabali, also strongly opposed the
UPP's legalization and believe Matthews remains the
President's main antagonist. On the other hand,
Embassy reporting indicates that ruling party
chairman Kpoto argued that the UPP's legalization
was necessary to maintain Liberia's image as a
multiparty state.
The UPP's Ideological Leanings
Despite Doe's suspicions, and probably some public
wariness of its "socialist" leanings, US Embassy
reporting indicates that the UPP is a slighty left-of-
center party. It publicly rejects any formal ideology or
dogma, and Matthews considers himself a pragmatist.
The US Embassy reports that he supports free
enterprise-although in the past he charged that
foreign companies did not hire enough Liberians for
management positions-and failed to reinvest enough
of their profits into the country. An articulate
spokesman for city dwellers, Matthews believes that
Liberian governments must deliver greater benefits to
the poor, such as low-cost housing, education, and
medical care, but concedes that he must avoid
promising anything Liberia cannot afford, according
to the US Embassy. Although occasionally critical of
the United States and an advocate of a more
Secret
ALA AR 86-019
3 October 1986
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Chronology of Activities by Matthews and
the United People's Party (UPP)
The Political Alliance for
Liberia (PAL) is formed in New
York by Liberian students,
including Gabriel Baccus
Matthews.
Matthews returns to Monrovia
to register the PAL as an
opposition party.
PAL serves as the catalyst for
the "rice riots. " Matthews
organizes a demonstration in
Monrovia against a proposed
increase in the government-
controlled price of rice. After
Jittery security forces fire into
the demonstrators, the protest
degenerates into a weekend of
looting and violence. Some 300
are killed and 400 wounded.
Matthews voluntarily
surrenders, and he and 31
others are charged with
treason.
Matthews is freed under
general amnesty.
PAL registers as the People's
Progressive Party (PPP), which
Matthews claims is an
"African socialist" party. He
says he is prepared to serve as a
"loyal oppositionist" working
under the constitution.
Matthews calls on the
President and Vice President to
resign. In response, the Senate
and House vote to ban the PPP,
and Matthews is again charged
with treason.
Matthews joins the Doe
government as Foreign
Minister.
Matthews is dismissed for
"antigovernment " remarks.
8 July 1986
14 July 1986
22 July 1986
22 September 1986
Matthews is named Director
General of the Cabinet.
Matthews resigns in response to
Doe's ultimatum to officials to
step down if they plan to run
for office.
The PPP is renamed the United
People's Party.
The election commission
proscribes the UPP from
elections because of its role in
the 1979 rice riots.
Matthews is arrested and
briefly held for suspicion in an
assassination attempt on Doe.
Matthews goes to the United
States for medical treatment.
The UPP, following a seven-
month ban, announces the
resumption of public activities,
despite the continued ban on
politics.
UPP chairman Nelsen,
Secretary General Kawah, and
37 members are arrested for
holding a political rally. The
government charges them with
failure to obtain a permit.
Matthews returns from the
United States.
The UPP rejects a merger with
Grand Coalition parties.
Matthews pays a courtesy visit
on Doe.
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nonaligned foreign policy, Matthews admits that
Washington is important for Liberia's economic
survival.
Matthews's Maneuverings
In the near term, Matthews will probably work to
increase his party's popular support. Despite
clandestine efforts to rebuild and expand its
infrastructure, the UPP's membership is probably
below its strength of over 200,000 members prior to
Doe's coup in 1980. Last year the US Embassy
reported that the party probably had about 175,000
members and that the charismatic Matthews retained
the support of the urban poor, market women, and,
probably, a majority of students.
Matthews has several unname
sympathizers serving at the Executive Mansion, while
the government is convinced that he is popular among
some segments of the army,
As a result of the legalization, Matthews is likely to
reject offers to merge the UPP with the other
opposition parties, US Embassy reporting indicates.
According to the Embassy, he does not believe that
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf's Liberian Action Party is a
viable organization because of its internal frictions,
and thinks the leaders of the Grand Coalition are
interested only in maintaining their wealth and
influence. The Embassy also reports that Matthews is
critical of the Grand Coalition parties for not uniting
and coming to terms with Doe
Outlook
In our view, Doe almost certainly expects the UPP to
participate in byelections scheduled for December, to
take its legislative seats, and to become a "loyal"
opposition that does not openly challenge his policies.
He also probably believes that legalization of the UPP
will appease his critics in the United States and
undercut the influence of the other opposition parties.
Doe may even offer Matthews a Cabinet position and
attempt to make the UPP a coalition partner,
probably to ensure Matthews's loyalty and to make
the party share responsibility for Liberia's ills.
Reverse Blank 13
For his part, we believe that Matthews will move
cautiously in the coming months in order to avoid
giving the regime a pretext for banning his party
again. A review of US Embassy reporting indicates
that he is aware that he must win the support of key
army elements if he is to present the UPP as an
alternative to Doe. We believe Matthews would
probably use a position in the regime to ensure access
to government officials and military officers as part of
his effort to garner additional support.
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Africa
Brief
Mauritius-United States Disappointment Over Textile Talks
moderate Prime Minister Jugnauth is
reassessing relations with the United States after bilateral trade negotiations in
Port Louis last month resulted in unexpectedly low quotas for Mauritian textile
exports. The government in recent years has attempted to expand markets for the
growing textile industry in order to lessen dependence on the traditionally
predominant sugar sector and reduce the country's 20-percent unemployment rate.
US Embassy reporting indicates that the Prime Minister believed that Mauritius's
pro-US voting record in the United Nations-the highest among African states-
and his refusal to press a claim of sovereignty over UK-administered Diego
Garcia, where a US military facility is located, would result in more favorable
textile quotas.
Jugnauth was closely involved in the negotiations and almost certainly believes his
failure to obtain generous quotas could weaken his popular standing. He probably
will express his disappointment openly in order to deflect criticism by the proleft
opposition party, which for some time has challenged his acceptance of US access
to Diego Garcia. Over the longer term, however, we agree with the US Embassy
assessment that Jugnauth will continue to back US objectives in the region,
arguing that such support is in his country's long-term interest.
Reverse Blank 15
Secret
ALA AR 86-019
3 October 1986
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Chronology of Islamic Activities in Senegal' 25X1
1 January-31 August 1986
January The Muride Khalif General breaks ties to the Federation of Young Morides and
plans to sponsor three other youth groups with the intention of attracting a large
portion of the Federation's membership
Muridiya leaders plan to cut off funds for the movement and discredit its leaders.
27 February Seydi Moustapha Sy, the Tidjaniya's most active youth organizer, denounces
President Diouf and Senegal's religious leaders for their immorality and their
concentration on profanity and unreligious matters during public meetings and
conferences Sy has widely circulated a 25X1
cassette tape calling for the religious leaders to withhold their political support for
Diouf.during the presidential election in 1988 unless he transforms Senegal into an
Islamic republic. 25X1
took his nlace as the primary contact of the Iranian Government,
Latiffe Gueye, a prominent Senegalese Islamic fundamentalist and cofounder, 25X1
with Sidy Lamine Niasse, of the radical group Djamra, states bitterly that Niasse
Niasse, as editor in chief of the publication Wal f adjtrt, receives
monthly payments from Iran to promote Islam in Senegal. 0 25X1
The Islamic community in Senegal is the most highly organized Islamic grouping in West Africa and 25X1
accounts for 92 percent of Senegal's 6.8 million population. It is dominated by traditional Sufi
brotherhoods, the two largest of which are the Tidjani a with a membership of about 1.3 million, and
the Muridiya, with an estimated 1.5 million members. 25X1
Secret
ALA AR 86-019
3 October 1986
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isiamic tunaamentalists reach a truce with the Senegalese Government,
27 April
and to limit criticism of the government in their speeches. In exchange, Dakar
offered favors such as letters of introduction to heads of Islamic countries,
assistance in obtaining duty-free goods, and turning a "blind eye" to the Niasses'
acceptance of funds from foreign countries, such as Iran and Libya. 0 25X1
The Lebanese Shia Imam, based in Dakar, hosts a meeting of about 60 Lebanese 25X1
and Senegalese Islamic leaders to discuss what they perceive to be the anti-Islamic
attitudes s of Western nations, 25X1
this is the first time in recent memory that Senegalese Islamic leaders have
been invited to a meeting at the Lebanese Social Center. 25X1
An assailant attacks the Imam of Touba, brother of the Muride Khalif General,
The Muridiya leadership in Touba believes the
5 May
attack was in response to the Khalif General's support for the government's
President Diouf visits the Muride Khalif General in Touba, focusing on complaints
by the Muride Marabouts over the Khalif General's hoarding of government
subsidies, Diouf states that if the problem
continues he will consider distributing the subsidies to the Murides himself even
though this would be unsatisfactory to him as well as to the Khalif General.
21 May The leader of the opposition Party of Liberation of the People (PLP) states plans to
gain the political support of the major Islamic groups
His campaign will focus mainly on the government's inability to deal
effectively with domestic economic problems. The PLP leader is also pursuing the
backing of Moustafa Sy, religious leader of a Tidjani offshoot with about 100,000
members and considered to be a growing force in Senegal. The PLP leader claims
to have an excellent relationship with both the Tidjani and Muride Khalif
12 July
shrinking share of the Senegalese economy,
The Tidjani Khalif General tours northern Senegal, including Dakar, from 12 to
29 July, discussing with religious leaders the widespread unrest among the
Tidjaniya caused by the government's austerity measures and new agricultural
policy. Tidjani have voiced their growing concern that increased government
controls on customs and transport would cut further into their already rapidly
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13 July The Senegalese Armed Forces Minister calls on the Imam of Touba to discuss the
killing of a Senegalese soldier by followers of the Imam 25X1
The Imam declares that his followers are blameless because they were 25X1
acting in his defense. The Army Minister advises the Imam that the government
intends to investigate the killing and bring the responsible Murides to justice-25X1
The Army is pressuring the Ministry of Justice to prosecute those 25X1
Murides responsible for the killing
The Tidjani Khalif General tells approximately 6,000 followers that the
government's economic policies are dangerous to the health of Islam, and calls for
all Tidjani to unite and prevent the erosion of the brotherhood's power_25X1
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30 July The former Senegalese Ambassador to Egypt submits a request to the Senegalese
Government to register a political party called Islamic Obedience Party,
8 August The Tidjani Khalif General encourages the Muride Khalif General to distance
himself from Diouf and his policies Tidjani
members believe the Muride Khalif General is being used as an instrument of the
Senegalese authorities, particularly in the areas of commerce and agriculture, to
weaken the overall strength of Islamic groups in Senegal.
13 August The Tidjani Khalif General summons the director of the Senegalese Chemical
Industries Company to discuss the scheduled layoff on 30 August of approximately
150 of its 400 workers at the Darou and Mbao chemical plants
The Khalif General said that the workers should not lose
firing takes place.
their jobs because the reduction in factory sales is caused by the company's
mismanagement and is not the fault of the workers. The Darou plant employs
approximately 200 people, all Tidjani members. The Khalif General assured the
director that he would see to it that the director lost his position if the scheduled
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Secret
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