AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000301470001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 22, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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N13 T I VE OUT
OR MARK 01
Intelligence ryl e t d It at a N
Africa Review
22 August 1986
J97
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ALA AR 86-017
22 August 1986
??y 393
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Although the conflict in Mozambique is draining Zimbabwe's
scarce resources, eroding military morale, and endangering support
for Prime Minister Mugabe's government, Harare is likely to
maintain an extensive military commitment there.
The level of anti-US rhetoric at the Nonaligned Movement summit
in Harare probably will exceed that of previous summits.
Zimbabwean Prime Minister Mugabe's assumption of the group's
chairmanship is likely to accelerate Zimbabwe's advocacy of radical
positions on international issues.
Senegal: Dissatisfaction Among Islamic Brotherhoods I 11
to government policies that are hurting them economically.
Equatorial Guinea is permitting South Africans to enter the country
to complete two development projects, while the South Africans are
working on an airfield in southwestern Gabon.
President Vieira is facing mounting pressure from pro-Soviet
officials who believe he has moved the country too far toward the
West.
Secret
ALA AR 86-017
22 August 1986
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President Bagaza is obsessed with an alleged threat to his regime
from the influential Catholic Church, the country's sole dissenting
voice.
Briefs South Africa: KwaNdebele Refuses Independence
Africa: Insect Plagues Worsen
Chronology of Islamic Activities in Nigeria
23
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
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Africa Review
Zimbabwe: Mugabe's
Mozambican Adventure
Over the past year, the deteriorating security situation
in neighboring Mozambique and Zimbabwe's military
involvement there have dominated Harare's regional
foreign policy agenda. Prime Minister Mugabe has
become embroiled in a seemingly unending
commitment in a conflict that is siphoning off scarce
resources, eroding military morale and capabilities,
and threatening to undermine support for his regime.
Despite the Army's near unanimous desire to reduce
the size and extent of its role, political and economic
realities are likely to require Harare to maintain an
extensive-and open ended-military commitment in
Mozambique.
additional troops enabled Harare to begin
undertaking offensive operations against Mozambican
insurgents near the Beira corridor.
by late August 1985, 2bAl
La neany ip a the number of its troops to
more than 9,000 and was spearheading a joint
Mozambican-Zimbabwean offensive in the central
provinces. Following the end of the government
offensive late last year, Harare's forces continued to
conduct limited operations. Nevertheless, in late 25X1
February, Harare again reduced its troop presence
and, after a considerable debate among political and
military leaders, Army headquarters ordered a 25X1
cessation of all offensive
Military Intervention
Zimbabwean forces were first deployed to
Mozambique in late 1982 to protect the Beira
transportation corridor-running from the port city of
Beira to Mutare in eastern Zimbabwe-against
attacks by Mozambican insurgents and South African
commandos. In early 1984, Harare assigned a
motorized battalion to provide protection for truck
convoys traveling along the Tete corridor between
Zimbabwe and Malawi. Until mid-1985,
Zimbabwean forces in Mozambique-which never
exceeded 3,500-limited their activity to providing
security along these two transportation corridors.
Moreover, the Army apparently had reached a modus
vivendi with the guerrillas that kept interruptions on
the two routes down to a relatively low level
Concerned over a deteriorating security situation and
spurred on by appeals from Mozambican President
Machel for increased military assistance, Mugabe-
against the advice of several of his senior Army
commanders-in mid-1985 began to increase the
number of Zimbabwean troops in central
Mozambique. The introduction of several thousand
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Zimbabwean units remain 25X1
arrayed in defensive positions along the Beira
corridor.
Despite the Army's success at overrunning insurgent
camps and reasserting government control over large
areas of central Mozambique, Harare's efforts failed
to provide any long-term improvement in the overall
security situation. While Zimbabwe's tactical
successes did provide the Machel regime with a badly
needed boost in morale, the Army failed to inflict
heavy casualties on the guerrillas and only
temporarily disrupted insurgent activity. Moreover,
pacification of the central provinces was
an elusive objective,. given limited Zimbabwean
military resources, insurgent strategic flexibility and
the dismal performance of the Mozambican Army.
After their experience in 1985, we believe Harare's
military leaders will favor a strategy aimed at
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ALA AR 86-017
22 August 1986
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defending only that which is vital to Zimbabwean
interests-the Beira and Tete corridors-and
minimize personnel and equipment losses.
Mugabe's Objectives
In part, the decision to intervene appeared to be an
attempt by Mugabe to repay Machel for Mozambican
assistance to Zimbabwean guerrillas during the
Rhodesian civil war. More important, in our
judgment, the intervention stemmed from a growing
concern in Harare over the Mozambican insurgent
threat to Zimbabwe's vulnerable transportation and
supply lines through Mozambique. The US Embassy
reports that, prior to the troop increase last year, a
Zimbabwean official said his government was deeply
concerned about the severity of the problems facing
the Mozambican Government. Moreover, security
along the Beira corridor last May was deteriorating
and the Army was reporting increasing concentrations
of insurgents in the area,
Zimbabwe has attempted for several years-without
much success-to lessen its dependence on the South
African transportation network.
a government study in May 1985-
prior to the troop increase-concluded that
Zimbabwe was relying increasingly on the South
African transportation system to move exports and
imports, and only 16 percent of the country's surface
traffic was not subject to Pretoria's control. Recent
US Embassy reporting indicates that over 3 million
tons per year are carried by South African railroads
alone.
Harare's need to secure alternative transportation
routes has now become paramount in the midst of
Mugabe's campaign to garner support for
comprehensive economic sanctions against South
Africa and Pretoria's threat to counter with its own
sanctions against its neighbors. If South Africa were
to retaliate, Zimbabwe would be left with no
economically viable alternative except to make
extensive use of Mozambique's decaying and highly
vulnerable transportation network.' Following his
The Beira transportation corridor-consisting of a 25X1
rail line, paved two-lane road, and an oil pipeline-
extends from Mu tare, in eastern Zimbabwe, to the
Mozambican port of Beira, on the Indian Ocean. It is
the shortest and potentially cheapest outlet to the sea
for central Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana,
Zambia, and southern Malawi. For most of these
countries, the only feasible alternatives to the Beira
corridor are the longer, more costly, and politically
vulnerable routes through South Africa. Nonetheless,
the Beira route is underutilized because of poor
management, infrastructure deterioration, and
intermittent sabotage by Mozambican insurgents.
The Southern African Development Coordination
Conference, formed in the early 1980s by Angola,
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique,
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe to
coordinate economic development and lessen
dependence on South Africa, considers restoration
and expansion of the Beira corridor to be its most
urgent program. The group has secured initial
funding from countries and multilateral banks in the
West, Scandanavia, and the Middle East.
Representatives of the group predicted in mid-July
that completion of the ,first phase of a 10-year plan
will enable the Beira corridor to carry 50 percent of
the trade of the nine member countries that now
transits South Africa by the end of 1986. Officials of
the group estimate the initial cost of these
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improvements at between $265 and $421 million, and 25X1
US officials say the entire 10-year program will cost
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return from the mini-Commonwealth summit on
South African sanctions, Mugabe stressed the need
for securing and opening transportation routes
through Mozambique, according to the US Embassy.
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Zimbabwean Military in Mozambique
and difficult to reverse
Mozambican Morass
Harare, through a series of ad hoc political decisions
over several years, has steadily expanded its
commitment in Mozambique. Last summer's infusion
of over 6,000 additional troops and their active
participation in large-scale offensive operations,
however, marked a major escalation in Zimbabwean
involvement. We believe Harare has embarked on a
course of action that it will find increasingly costly
After devoting nearly four years, as well as extensive
manpower and material resources, to assist the
faltering Machel regime and secure vital
transportation and supply lines through Mozambique,
Harare has little to show for its effort. More
important, the Zimbabwean military is beset by a
growing host of problems:
? The Army in 1985 estimated the cost of
maintaining troops in Mozambique at about $15
million a month, and the 1986 defense budget
increased by 26 percent over last year.
? Late last fall, the US defense attache reported
equipment losses were draining Army resources at
an alarming rate.
? Although Harare's military has suffered relatively
light casualties, both the Army and Air Force have
lost skilled-and irreplaceable-field commanders.
? Harare is facing increasing morale problems among
troops deployed in Mozambique. Air Force pilots
have refused to fly supplies to forward Army
positions, marijuana usage is widespread, and many
Zimbabweans believe they are dying for a lost
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Army presence.
? There is a lack of cooperation and mistrust between
the Mozambican and the Zimbabwean Armies.
Moreover, the local
populace is increasingly hostile to the Zimbabwean
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Not only has Mugabe involved his military in an
unpopular and costly external conflict, but also the
Army is frustrated in fighting a guerrilla force that it
cannot defeat and is bogged down in a war it cannot
Desperately Seeking Solutions
Harare, aware of its limited ability to redress the
security situation, is attempting to find new methods
to help the Mozambican Government increase its
military and political effectiveness.
Harare's military to meet its commitment,
Mozambican Army weaknesses had to be corrected
immediately. The Mozambican military has been
repeatedly criticized by Harare for its inadequate
training, shortages of supplies, poor morale, and lack
of organization. In an effort to address some of these
shortcomings, Harare is sending several Army
training teams to Mozambique to teach basic
training, drill, and small unit tactics,
In addition, Zimbabwe's
Ambassador to Mozambique recently said that
Harare was preparing to increase logistic support to
the Mozambican Army, according to the US
Embassy.
Harare appears to be encouraging Maputo to take
steps to regain popular support it has lost to the
insurgents. To assist the regime, Zimbabwe
reportedly was considering supplying surplus food,
clothing, and consumer goods to the local population.
earlier this summer press reports indicated Mugabe
was encouraging Machel to renew talks with guerrilla
leaders.
Outlook
The Zimbabwean Army's presence in Mozambique
will continue to sap scarce financial resources, deplete
equipment stockpiles, and lay the foundation for
permanently politicizing the country's military
leadership. With little chance of victory on the
battlefield, Army officers and men are likely to
become increasingly angry at decisions that are slowly
but steadily destroying the military's capabilities.
Despite the growing unpopularity of the Zimbabwean
presence, no political or military leaders are yet
willing to challenge Mugabe directly.
As the movement to impose comprehensive sanctions
on South Africa gains momentum, Harare will
become more dependent on Mozambique for
alternative transportation routes. In the event of
South African countersanctions, Zimbabwe would be
forced-over the likely protest of the Army-to once
again increase its involvement in Mozambique.
Pretoria's military considers it essential to interdict or
reduce traffic through the Beira corridor in order for
countermeasures against Zimbabwe and other
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neighboring states to be effectiveF
In our judgment, Harare cannot
secure the Beira and Tete corridors if South Africa
resumes full support to the insurgents and directs
them to attack the route, or sends commandos to
sabotage key installations there.
The longer the Zimbabwean Army remains in
Mozambique, the greater the likelihood Harare will
turn to Moscow as a supplier of badly needed military
aid. Although Mugabe would be reluctant, in our
view, to enter into a major arms relationship with the
Soviets, a rapidly declining security situation in
Mozambique, continued poor relations between
Harare and the West, and hard-hitting South African
countersanctions may, in the long term, force him to
seek large-scale Soviet assistance.
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Zimbabwe: The Nonaligned
Summit
The harshly anti-US tone of the Nonaligned
Movement (NAM) ministerial meeting in New Delhi
last April suggests that the level of anti-US rhetoric
at the summit, scheduled for 26 August to 7
September in Harare, will probably exceed that of
previous summits. The Soviets almost certainly will
not be disappointed with NAM rhetoric on key issues
such as South Africa, disarmament, and LDC debt,
and are well placed in Zimbabwe to propagandize
debates and resolutions critical of the United States.
Prime Minister Mugabe's assumption of the NAM
chairmanship probably will accelerate Zimbabwean
acceptance and advocacy of radical positions on
international issues, and is likely to contribute to the
deterioration of US-Zimbabwean relations.
(2 to 3 percent), a large budget deficit (more than 10
percent of GDP), and inflation projected to reach 20
percent this year. To limit the strain, Zimbabwe has
accepted contributions from other countries. In our
view, Harare's ineptitude in negotiating deals with a
number of potential contributors has allowed more
committed radical members-most notably Cuba-to
provide desperately needed services and equipment for
the summit.
Cuba's past record in the NAM suggests that it will
exploit this position to good effect, although
Havana may be operating under
financial constraints. Mugabe is wary of Cuban
motives, but, we
believe that he overestimates his ability to keep
Background
Approximately 5,000 to 7,000 people, including 50 to
60 heads of state, will converge in Harare for the
NAM summit. Mugabe succeeds India's Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Harare was persuaded by
Havana last year to accept the NAM chairmanship,
giving Zimbabwe only 16 months to prepare for the
meeting. Mugabe probably believed the chairmanship
would enhance his credentials as a Third World
leader, establish Zimbabwe as a key country among
the Frontline States, and focus greater world
attention on southern Africa.
As host of the summit, Zimbabwe was responsible for
authoring a working document for the meeting that
was circulated in New York in early August. Mugabe
also will be the spokesperson for the NAM for the
next three years, and Zimbabwe's Permanent Mission
to the United Nations will head the Nonaligned
Coordinating Bureau in New York.
Hosting the Summit
Zimbabwe's financial difficulties in hosting the
conference make it vulnerable to pressure from
radical NAM members. The $40 million reportedly
budgeted for the summit represents a substantial
strain on an economy facing slow economic growth
radical members like Cuba in check.
Key Issues on the Agenda
A review of the summit draft communique, written by
the Zimbabwean UN Mission, and an analysis of the
results of the ministerial meeting in April indicate
that southern Africa, disarmament, and LDC
economic problems will get high priority at the
summit:
? Southern Africa. The heads of state will call for
complete eradication of apartheid and for
mandatory and comprehensive sanctions against
Pretoria. They may also call for a UN Security
Council meeting to focus on South Africa and
Namibia. The United States will be criticized for
aiding and abetting apartheid through its policy of
constructive engagement and condemned for
helping to build South Africa's nuclear capability,
abusing its veto power in the UN Security Council,
and giving aid to UNITA. There are indications
that some members may push the idea that the US
attack on Libya created the atmosphere for recent
South African attacks on Botswana, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe.
Secret
ALA AR 86-017
22 August 1986
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? Disarmament. The summit will endorse the arms-
control initiative of the Group of Six-Argentina,
Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden, and Tanzania-for
a US-Soviet test ban with the Group of Six
providing verification assistance. While the draft
communique does not contain language from the
New Delhi ministerial welcoming the "timely
program for disarmament put forward by the Soviet
Union," it does call for the United States to join the
Soviet nuclear test moratorium and urges
Washington to reconsider its decision on the SALT
accords.
economic conferences and organizations.
? LDC economic troubles. While the economic
portion of the draft communique is not yet
available, we believe reenergizing the Nonaligned
approach to global economic problems-
particularly LDC debt and the New International
Economic Order-will be an important agenda
item. While some NAM members oppose the
proposal because of fears it will split the Group of
77, India is seeking the establishment of a standing
committee on economic issues whose function would
be to create a NAM position vis-a-vis international
Two other agenda items, the Iran-Iraq war and
selection of a NAM chairman for 1989, promise to be
contentious issues:
? Iran-Iraq war. The NAM has been unable to
mediate between the two warring members, and,
after heated debate, probably will agree to only a
generic statement calling for the cessation of
hostilities.
? NAM chairman. Only two members, Nicaragua
and Indonesia, have formally announced candidacy,
although Peru is lobbying behind the scenes for
support. Most members believe it is Latin America's
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turn to assume the chairmanship, leaving Indonesia
at a disadvantage. Nicaragua, with Cuban support,
is lobbying hard and has sent envoys to several
countries and to the OAU summit held recently.
Despite Nicaragua's recent diplomatic efforts, we
believe Peru is a more likely choice. In our
judgment, should there be difficulty in reaching a
consensus for Peru, Yugoslavia could be a
compromise choice.
Soviet Exploitation of the Harare Meeting
The Soviets almost certainly will not be disappointed
with NAM rhetoric on southern Africa and
disarmament, as their views are similar to those of
many of the Nonaligned members. On topics that the
Soviets are vulnerable to criticism, such as
Afghanistan, Moscow has been maneuvering to press
its case. We believe, for example, that the Soviets
organized the recent visit of an Afghan delegation to
Zimbabwe. While the visit apparently did not result
in any diplomatic breakthrough or changes in
Zimbabwe's views, we expect that Moscow's allies-
for example, the Cubans and Nicaraguans-will be
able to block efforts to single out Moscow for
criticism on this and other issues.
In addition to the support that Moscow can expect
from its allies, the Soviet Union, in our view, is
positioned to influence and exploit the Harare summit
A review of Third World and Soviet press coverage on
the summit reflects a Moscow-orchestrated
disinformation campaign alleging US attempts to
sabotage the summit, US-South African military
cooperation, and US attempts to destroy NAM unity.
Soviet disinformation efforts, including media play
and probable involvement in disseminating anti-US
forgeries, are designed to reinforce and heighten
already strident anti-US sentiment within the NAM.
Moscow's tactic is likely to be successful because
moderate NAM members are unlikely to refute
allegations publicly during the summit for fear of
being labeled as US surrogates. Moreover, the Soviet
allegations reinforce existing African and Third
World perceptions on many key issues, most notably
alleged US cooperation with South Africa.
Uncontested, these allegations will circulate at the
meeting and may worsen anti-US name-calling in the
summit's proceedings and final communique. The
anti-US tone will probably carry forward into
proposed Third World resolutions during this fall's
UN General Assembly, where NAM members
consitute a majority.
Implications for the United States
In our judgment, Zimbabwe's anti-Western criticism
will probably become increasingly strident after
Mugabe assumes the chairmanship of the NAM and
draws closer to so-called Third World progressives,
thus placing an additional strain on already poor
relations between Washington and Harare. Although
Mugabe still appears to desire amicable relations with
the United States because of the importance of US
assistance-more than $360 million since 1980-to
Zimbabwe's economic success, Harare will continue
to guard jealously its own version of nonalignment.
Efforts by US officials to persuade Mugabe to adopt a
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more balanced approach are likely to be viewed as
unwarranted interference in the NAM's affairs and
largely disregarded.
Zimbabwe, as NAM chairman, is likely to find itself
increasingly at odds with US foreign policy goals in
Africa and the Third World. Mugabe will
undoubtedly step up his denunciation of US policies in
southern Africa, which he sees as tacit support for the
South African Government. He probably also will
become more vocal in his criticism of US policies in
Central America, and in Nicaragua in particular.
Moreover, as Zimbabwe's verbal attacks against the
United States and the West escalate and alienate
Western governments, Moscow's access is likely to
grow, providing new opportunities for Soviet meddling
in southern Africa.
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Senegal: Dissatisfaction Among
Islamic Brotherhoods
Growing tensions between the government of
President Diouf and the Islamic brotherhoods '
recently erupted in a clash between police and
members of the Mouride Brotherhood in their
religious capital city of Touba. The brotherhoods have
grown increasingly unhappy with government policies
that have hurt them economically, and have begun
voicing their opposition. Despite this, we believe the
government will continue to implement its economic
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Killing Highlights Problems
In July members of the Mouride Brotherhood killed a
man, later discovered to be a soldier, who they
believed was attacking their imam-the second most
important leader in the brotherhood
The Army is pressuring the Ministry
of Justice to prosecute those Mourides involved in the
killing,
The brotherhoods are also unhappy because they
believe their economic interests are being hurt by
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there is widespread dissatisfaction
among the Tidjani Brotherhood over the measures-
which include a tightening of domestic credit, more
vigorous collection of outstanding loans, and
' There are four brotherhoods in Senegal. The two most important
are the Tidjani and Mouride, which together claim the loyalty of
about 44 percent of the population.
agricultural reforms.' The Tidjaniya also are worried
that stricter government controls on customs and
transport will cut into their revenues
Moreover, last month the government
undertook a campaign of closing unauthorized stalls
in a Dakar market, many of which belonged to
Mouride businessmen
The brotherhoods recently have become more vocal in
their protests of government policies. In July the
Tidjani Khalif General-the organizational leader-
addressed a crowd of about 6,000 and called some of
Diouf's policies a threat to Islam in Senegal,
. He also called on
Senegalese Muslims to work together to prevent the
erosion of their power by government authorities,
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Despite these differences, both sides appear anxious to 25X1
avoid a more serious confrontation.
Diouf and the Mouride Khalif 25X1
General agreed that any problems between the
government and the brotherhood could be worked out
amicably. In late July the Tidjani Khalif General met
with the Ministers of Interior and Labor to try to ease
the negative effects of some government policies on
the brotherhood,
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ALA AR 86-017
22 August 1986
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Outlook
We believe the government will try to avert a
confrontation over the prosecution of the brotherhood
members involved in the Touba killing to avoid
provoking more open dissent from the brotherhoods.
some Mouride leaders are
concerned they would be forced to decide between
protecting those involved, or obeying Senegalese law
if the government decides to prosecute the case. We
believe the Mourides would try to protect their
members, but without appearing openly defiant of
Dakar, perhaps by sending those involved out of the
country.
In our judgment, Dakar will proceed with economic
reforms despite the objections of the brotherhoods, at
least in the near term. Diouf will probably continue to
rely on mutually profitable ties to keep brotherhood
opposition from getting out of hand. Nevertheless, in
our judgment, the brotherhoods will continue to
pressure the government to back off from the reforms,
and probably will become increasingly open in their
opposition.
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Equatorial Guinea-Gabon:
Increased South African
Presence
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Equatorial Guinea has permitted the South Africans
to enter the country to complete two development
projects
southeastern Gabon confirms South African
construction activity, A
more obvious South African presence in Equatorial
Guinea probably reflects President Obiang's
willingness to accept foreign assistance from any
donor, despite public rhetoric against Pretoria's
apartheid policies. President Bongo of Gabon
probably hopes to maintain a neutral position
regarding South Africa because of his country's
proximity to Angola and Cabinda, and his hopes of
eventually playing a role in negotiating a solution to
the Angola conflict.
Equatorial Guinea
In Equatorial Guinea, Pretoria has assisted livestock
development on Bioko Island, and constructed small
villas in Bata for central African chiefs of state who
will attend the Central African Economic and
Customs Union (UDEAC) conference in December.
According to the US Embassy, the South Africans are
well liked by the Equatorial Guineans and within
Malabo's small international community, and few
government officials bother to carry on the traditional
official pretense that the South Africans in the
country are Swiss, Dutch, or French. For at least two
years, the South African Government has attempted
to develop a livestock breeding project on Bioko Island
in the mountain agricultural region of Moka.
Although a South African veterinarian, mechanic,
doctor, and project leader have been involved in the
project since its inception, the US Embassy notes that
they recently have begun to appear frequently in
public places in the capital, Malabo. According to US
Embassy reporting, rumors abound regarding the
South Africans' intention to locate a VHF repeater on
Equatorial Guinea's highest peak to permit
communication around the island, and that other
According to the US Embassy, in late May President
Obiang was able to secure South African assistance to
resolve his housing shortage for heads of state 25X1
scheduled to attend the UDEAC conference, and 50
to 70 South African construction workers, mostly
blacks and Indians, came to Bata to build small villas
near the presidential palace. In July US Embassy
personnel witnessed the offloading of farm supplies
from a C-130-type South African Airways plane in
Malabo, while the Embassy reports six South African
engineers and construction experts were also expected
to arrive in July to supervise road construction.
the airfield at Leconi, in
southeastern Gabon, reveals a water tower unique to
South African military facilities. Construction
activity at the airfield, including a hangar and support
facilities, and lengthening of the runway to more than
2,000 meters-long enough to accommodate most
aircraft in the South African Air Force inventory.
The airfield is situated in a remote, sparsely populated
region-reportedly the ancestral homeland of
President Bongo-with no known economic potential
or security problems. It is located approximately 100
kilometers east of Franceville Airfield, where Gabon
has allowed South African commercial aircraft to
transit en route to Europe for many years.
Although Bongo has endorsed Western sanctions
against Pretoria, he clearly wants to remain
independent of any radical initiatives. At the recent
Organization of African Unity summit meeting in
Addis Ababa, Bongo downplayed the suggestion that
a pan-African military force be created to combat
apartheid, and opposed measures against the United
Kingdom for its opposition to sanctions on South
Africa, according to US Embassy reporting. We
believe both moves highlight Libreville's desire to
development assistance may be planned.
Secret
ALA AR 86-017
22 August 1986
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maintain smooth relations with South Africa, to play
a moderating role in African forums, and to remain a
viable broker for obtaining a solution to the Angolan
conflict.
Outlook and Regional Implications
Over the last several years, Malabo has repeatedly
demonstrated its determination to accept aid from
both East and West, discounting ideological
differences to secure credits, cash, and resident
advisers. Despite official denouncements of apartheid,
the same appears true for aid from South Africa.
Pretoria has expanded its role significantly at a time
when other bilateral donors are demurring from
supporting President Obiang's often grandiose
schemes for the UDEAC conference. Malabo has
supported US attempts in the United Nations to
delete name-calling from South African resolutions, a
move we believe was aimed at securing additional
South African assistance.
In Gabon, although information remains sketchy, the
proximity of the airstrip to Angola suggests that
South Africa may be developing it as a contingency
airfield to support UNITA operations in Cabinda and
other parts of Angola. Bongo may hope to gain
increased aid or a possible mediating role in the
Angola conflict in exchange. for allowing South
African access to Gabonese territory. As a result, we
expect he will continue to attempt to moderate
African initiatives against apartheid and to maintain
good relations with Pretoria.
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Guinea-Bissau: Vieira on
a Tightrope
the West.
President Vieira, who has moderated his radical
rhetoric in the past few years in an effort to secure
greater Western economic aid, faces mounting
pressure from regime hardliners who favor stronger
ties to Moscow. Moreover, the execution in July of
former Vice President Correia and five other coup
plotters is likely to fuel tribal animosities, US
Embassy reporting indicates. Although we have no
current evidence of coup plotting, Vieira may be
toppled if he loses the support of Defense Minister
Camara-widely regarded as the second most
powerful government figure, or if pro-Soviet officers
believe that he has moved the country too far toward
act on their behalf.
Pressures From Regime Hardliners
Vieira is increasingly concerned that pro-Soviet
officials, an ered by his overtures to the West, may
oust him. the
officials seek an expansion of the Soviet presence in
the country and are pressing him to allow the Soviets
naval access. Although we cannot easily estimate the
size of the pro-Soviet faction, US Embassy reporting
indicates many Bissauan officials, especially those
who participated in the independence struggle against
Portugal, still feel indebted to the Soviets for their
support. A review of US Embassy reporting indicates
that the two most prominent pro-Soviet officials are
Justice Minister Vasco Cabral and Minister of
Northern Region Mario Cabral. Vasco Cabral, who
frequently travels to Moscow and reportedly has links
to the Portugese Communist Party, has long argued
against the limited move toward the West. We note,
however, that neither man directly commands troops
and would have to rely on pro-Soviet Army officers to
Tribal Tensions
US Embassy reporting indicates that the execution in
July of Correia-a leader of the Balante tribe, which
makes up about one-third of the population and
dominates the Army rank and file-is likely to
further tribal divisions ' and erode Vieira's limited
popular support. The execution of Correia for his
involvement in a coup plot last November leaves the
Balante tribe without representation in either senior
civilian or military positions, and the Embassy reports
that, over the last few months, Balante farmers have
refused to sell their crops to the government. The
Embassy also observes that some Balante youths are
joining the Yanque-Yanque cult, which emphasizes
traditional animistic behavior and beliefs. Although it
is not a political movement, the government has
arrested some of its members, fearing that it will
become a tribally based, antiregime organization.
Continuing Economic Decline
Vieira has failed to halt Guinea-Bissau's economic
decline, despite limited austerity measures imposed
since 1983. According to the US Embassy and press
reports, economic problems include rice shortages, an
overvalued currency, a thriving black market, and a
mounting external foreign debt that now totals some 25X1
$190 million. Moreover, there is massive smuggling of
peanuts and rice-two key crops-into neighboring
Senegal, where higher prices are available. Although
Guinea-Bissau has potentially lucrative offshore oil,
the regime has failed to attract the foreign capital
necessary to exploit the deposits.
Bissau has failed to implement the reforms necessary
to secure an International Monetary Fund (IMF)
loan. According to the US Embassy , the 25X1
Vieira regime has paid only lipservice to the suggested
adjustments. Our Embassy speculates that the
government is unwilling or politically unable to
increase producer prices substantially, cut public 25X1
'According to US Embassy reporting, some 30 percent of Guinea-
Bissau's population is Balante; 20 percent, Fulani; 14 percent,
Mandingo; and 13 percent, Malinke. Vieira is a member of the
Papel tribe, which makes up about 7 percent of the population.
Secret
ALA AR 86-017
22 August 1986
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Vieira, 47, is regarded by US Embassy sources as the
genuine hero of the independence struggle from
Portugal, in which he personally commanded several
key military operations. As Prime Minister from
1978 until 1980, however, he failed to take hold of
the reins of government firmly, and frequently
disagreed with then President Luis Cabral. He
launched his coup in 1980 primarily because a newly
implemented constitution permitted Cape Verdeans
to have too much access to senior positions. US
Embassy sources report he is effective at playing
factions against one another. An. electrician by
trainin
Communist countries, receiving military training in
China in 1961, studying in Cuba from 1976 to 1977,
and visiting the Soviet Union on several occasions.
salaries, and devalue the currency. International
economists also note that Vieira increased the size of
the bureaucracy and raised government wages earlier
this year.
Courting the West
Guinea-Bissau's precarious economic situation has
prompted Vieira to court the West in an effort to
secure greater financial assistance. In the past two
years, he has visited Portugal, France, and
Luxembourg in search of increased aid, but appears to
have received only token responses. Paris-which
provided $4 million in economic aid last year-has
commercial investment in the country's bauxite and
phosphate industries, but is not expected to increase
its aid substantially. US Embassy reporting indicates
Vieira expects his country to enter the French franc
zone by 1990 and to replace the moribund peso with
the CFA franc.
In the past two years, Vieira has become increasingly
critical of the USSR. He publicly called for the
withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan, the
first time he has openly disapproved of Moscow's
behavior. According to US Embassy officials, the
government is increasingly frustrated with its fishing
agreement with Moscow that has so far proved
unprofitable. According to US Embassy estimates,
Guinea-Bissau receives less than 4 percent of the
valued catch, and Vieira laments his government's
inability to patrol Bissau's territorial waters.
Possible Soviet and Cuban Pressures
The Soviets and Cubans, who have considerable
influence in the 6,000-man armed forces, may try to
undermine Vieira's position should they conclude he
no longer serves their interests. The US Embassy
notes that every Army officer has been trained by
Cuba or the Soviet Union, and that Soviet advisers
are placed throughout the high command, while the
Cubans carefully monitor the enlisted ranks. We have
no precise figures on their presence, but the US
Embassy estimates some 250 to 350 Soviet civilian
and military advisers and about 140 Cuban military
and 100 civilian advisers are based in Bissau. Over the
past few years, the USSR has unsuccessfully asked
Vieira for access to naval facilities in Bissau,
according to US Embassy reporting, and we suspect
Moscow will urge pro-Soviet officials to intercede on
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Jfai Camara, the Second Vice President and Defense
Minister, is the second most powerful official in
Guinea-Bissau. Camara commanded the armored
battalion that seized the capital for Vieira during the
1980 coup, and he is said to command the full loyalty
of his troops. US Embassy sources report the 41-
year-old Camara is a "clever politician" who appears
to support Vieira's limited move toward the West
cautiously.
Camara dislikes the Soviets for denigrating
nationalism and refusing to provide food aid. Camara
is functionally illiterate, according to US Embassy
sources.
Will Vieira Survive?
Vieira is likely to come under fire in the coming
months from pro-Soviet ministers and Army officers
who believe they can capitalize on his isolation. He is
also likely to face pressures from disgruntled Balante
tribesmen, angered by their lack of representation in
the upper echelons of the government and armed
forces. Moreover, Vieira's failure to stem Guinea-
Bissau's economic decline is also likely to erode his
limited popular support.
We believe Vieira's fate will ultimately rest with two
key officials, Defense Minister Camara and Gen. Jose
Marques Vieira. Camara, who commands the loyalty
of the troops, probably could mount a successful coup
should he decide to do so. We have no information on
his current relationship with Vieira, but past US
Embassy reporting suggests he supports the
President's limited move toward the West. General
Vieira, Army Chief of Staff and a distant cousin of
the President, serves as acting commander of the key
mechanized brigade based near the capital. We have
no information on his loyalty to the President or his
ideological leanings.
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Burundi: Church-State
Frictions
President Bagaza's obsession with an alleged threat
from the influential Catholic Church to his 10-year-
old left-leaning Tutsi minority regime continues to
grow, according to US Embassy reporting. Some 69
percent of Burundi's 4.8 million people are Catholic,
and mainly members of the predominant Hutu tribe.
The church has emerged as the sole, if limited,
dissenting voice in Burundi, the Embassy observes.
Although the church is unlikely to challenge Bagaza
directly, it will probably continue to quietly press for
greater respect for human rights and draw attention
to the regime's harsh repression of alleged opposition.
President Bagaza and regime hardliners, such as
Interior Minister Kazatsa, believe the Catholic
Church may spark rebellion among the Hutu
population against his government.' According to US
Embassy reporting, Bagaza fears the church is raising
a new generation of Hutu political leaders, although
we have no evidence of such activity. A review of
Embassy reporting also indicates that Bagaza resents
the clergy's power base in the countryside, where it
provides essential social services, such as health clinics
and schools. The US Embassy reports that church
attendance has increased in the last few years,
probably in reaction to the government's anticleric
campaign.
Successive Burundi governments have accused the
church of meddling in politics and fueling tribal
animosities. According to academic studies, the
church-state dispute dates back to the first days of
independence, when missionaries publicly supported
the conservative Christian Democratic Party in
presidential elections. The party allegedly was
involved in the 1961 assassination in 1961 of Prince
Louis Rwagasore, the leader of UPRONA, which
'The Tutsis-some 15 percent of Burundi's population-have
dominated political power since independence. According to US
Embassy reporting, ethnic tensions permeate Burundi society, and
the Hutus, who make up some 85 percent of the population, have
only nominal representation in the government.
Fears church is competing for
mantle of leadership ... blames
Catholic missionaries for
spread of colonialism in
Africa ... reportedly has
refused to allow his children to
Jean Baptiste Bagaza
President ofBurundi
became Burundi's sole political party in 1966. During
the massacres in 1972-in which the ruling Tutsi
government killed as many as 100,000 Hutus-the
regime falsely accused the clergy of "stoking the
flames" of insurrection. Bujumbura banned open-air
prayer meetings in rural areas in 1979 for fear the
church was growing too powerful among the Hutus,
according to the US Embassy. According to open
sources, some 200 foreign missionaries were expelled
from Burundi between 1972 and 1982.
Bagaza stepped up harassment of the church in 1984.
According to the US Embassy and press reporting,
the government stationed police at Catholic churches
to record the names of people attending regular
morning masses, banned religious meetings outside
churches, prohibited worship between 0700 hours and
1700 hours on weekdays, removed all religious
symbols, such as crucifixes, from public display, and
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ALA AR 86-017
22 August 1986
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Catholicism is one of the rapidly growing religions on
the subcontinent, gaining more than 2 million
converts annually. Of Africa's 500 million people,
some 150 million are Muslim, while about 70 million
are Catholic, another 70 million belong to other
Christian denominations, and the remainder are
animists. Vatican officials call Africa a "key
battleground"for evangelism and estimate church
membership will grow to some 100 million by the
year 2000-18 percent of the continent's population,
compared with 1 percent in 1900. According to US
Embassy reporting, in many African states Catholic
missionaries run schools and health clinics in the
countryside, where government influence remains
marginal. The Pope-who has toured Africa three
times since 1979-so far has permitted the
"Africanization of Christianity, " which is a process
of incorporating traditional cultural values and tribal
practices into worship to gain adherents. The Pope
has expressed concern that "liberation theology"
could take root in Africa-as it has in Latin
America-and African Catholics could become
unwitting allies of Marxist revolutions,
banned radiobroadcasts of Sunday mass. Bagaza
claimed he had to take these actions because the. time
used for religious purposes would be better spent at
"nation building," according to the Embassy.
Sporadic crackdowns have continued since 1985.
According to US Embassy reporting, Bujumbura has
arbitrarily expelled foreign missionaries by not
renewing their resident permits and claiming that
they seek to impose "non-Burundian" ideas. Open-
source reporting indicates that some 140 of the
estimated 450 foreign missionaries in the country
were expelled'last year. Moreover, priests are
periodically arrested.and imprisoned for several
months,- probably in an attempt to intimidate them.
since June military
chaplains have been prohibited from holding services
at government installations.
A number of African regimes regard the Catholic
Church as a potential source of opposition, and some
have actively persecuted local Catholic officials. In
the early 1970s, Benin's President Kerekou
nationalized church schools, expelled missionaries,
and imprisoned a number of native priests in the
belief that they opposed his imposition of a Marxist
state. In Zimbabwe, Catholic Church leaders have
persistently criticized human rights abuses in
Matabeleland. In Zaire, President Mobutu has
occasionally lashed out at Catholic missionaries for
subversion, and, in 1981, a pastoral letter read at a
bishops' conference in Kinshasa denounced official
corruption and accused Mobutu of human rights
abuses. Perhaps the most extreme case of religious
persecution was in Equatorial Guinea under the
brutal Macias regime (1968-79). In 1978, the
Catholic Church was banned, Equatorial Guinea was
declared the .first atheist state in Africa, and the
President, who regarded the church as a dissident
power base, declared "There is no other God than
Macias. "
The Catholic Church, nevertheless, persists in
occasionally criticizing Bagaza's rule. Last August
the bishops issued a pastoral letter denouncing the
government's political and religious persecution.
in 1985 a dissident
church organization-the Marial Movement, founded
by Jesuit priest Gabriel Barakana, former rector of
the University of Burundi-published an
antigovernment tract. The government arrested its
leaders, and last December the 75-year-old Barakana
and four others were found guilty of subversion and
sentenced to five years in prison. Moreover,
last June a Catholic
organization-the Congregation of Brothers of Bene
Yozephu, which consists of about 300 friars-wrote a
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private letter to Bagaza deploring human rights
violations, economic decline, and the regime's efforts
to reduce the Catholic Church's influence.
The government also persecutes members of the
Seventh-Day Adventist Church. The refusal of church
members to perform work on Saturday, their sabbath,
led to the closure of their churches and loss of legal
status in 1985, according to US Embassy reporting.
The country's 55,000 Adventists-almost all of whom
are Hutus-have been regularly harassed by local
officials, and members occasionally have been
arrested and charged with spreading "tribal hatred."
The Embassy also reports that the group is regarded
by Marxist government officials as an "American"
church that is not loyal to Bagaza.
Outlook
The ruling Tutsi regime in Bujumbura almost
certainly will continue to selectively harass the
Catholic Church, and expel foreign missionaries it
regards as regime opponents. To weaken the influence
of the church and lessen its ability to oppose the
government, a review of US Embassy reporting
suggests that Bagaza may ultimately plan to establish
a "national".church along Communist lines, under
which the government would have direct control over
church property and funding. He probably would
implement such a policy gradually so as not to anger
key European donors-such as France and Belgium-
whose economic assistance he needs. For its part, the
Catholic bishops will probably continue passively to
resist Bagaza's efforts to intimidate them,
occasionally draw attention to his human rights
abuses, and perhaps seek the Pope's intervention.
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Africa
Briefs
South Africa KwaNdebele Refuses Independence
KwaNdebele's rejection this month of a plan that would have made it South
Africa's fifth nominally "independent" homeland deals a severe blow to the
government's independent homelands policy. KwaNdebele, with a population of
500,000, is the homeland for the Ndebele tribe, but is little more than a dormitory
for workers in the Pretoria-Johannesburg area, according to US Embassy and
press reporting. Pretoria had made the independence deal attractive by
transferring .land from the neighboring Lebowa homeland in January despite
President Botha's announcement in May that KwaNdebele would become
independent in December-a move the homeland's leaders had agreed to in
1984-sparked an outbreak of violence that to date has left more than 100 dead. A
two-week strike by civil servants, school boycotts, and violent clashes between pro-
and anti-independence forces led Pretoria to impose severe emergency restrictions
on the homeland in July. Residents claimed that pro-independence vigilantes-led
by KwaNdebele Minister of Internal Affairs Ntuli-had conducted a reign of
terror, burning houses and abducting political opponents, according to press
reports. Ntuli's assassination in late July sparked celebrations throughout the
Although Pretoria publicly announced that it will respect the KwaNdebele
government's decision, President Botha recently reaffirmed the South African
Government's intention to pursue its homelands policy, and again called on the
international community to recognize Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda, and
Ciskei-homelands that have already accepted "independence." Pretoria also may
Whatever Pretoria's decision, however, the failure of
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KwaNdebele's leaders-handpicked by Pretoria-to follow through with
independence is a serious embarrassment to the government, in our judgment. The
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government is likely to try to shift blame to "radical elements" that it claims are
behind the current round of nationwide violence, but other homeland leaders may
become even more reluctant to risk dealing with Pretoria out of fear of a stron
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ALA AR 86-017
22 August 1986
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monetary cost and most likely will exceed that of the famine.
The insect situation has worsened during the last 30 days, according to reporting
from US Embassies and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The
most critical areas are along the Sudan-Ethiopia border, the Mali-Mauritania
border, and throughout Chad and Senegal. Southern Africa's insect problems also
will increase during the region's rainy season of October-November. FAO's
inability to supervise African locust control as thoroughly as it has in the past has
contributed to the inadequacy of control efforts this year. We believe insects will
be a problem for at least 5 more years-even if control measures improve in 1987.
Food shortages will probably appear in late 1986 or early 1987, particularly in the
Sahel and the Horn, but aid delivery systems developed during the recent famine
should help limit starvation. The protracted nature of the plagues, their extent, and
the need for additional supplies to combat insects all will contribute to a final
Insect Plagues Worsen
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2 February
19 April
24 April
Chronology of Islamic Activities in NigeriaF____-] 25X1
1 January-31 July 1986
President Babangida inaugurates a panel of 20 representatives from both Muslim
and Christian society to examine the implications of Nigeria's controversial
membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), according to
US Embassy reports rumors that "recent crimes" in Niger State were committed
by the Islamic Maitatsine sect.
The Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs issues a communique after its meeting in
Kaduna criticizing the organizers of the all-Nigerian Conference on Foreign
Policy for failing to invite the council, but allowing the rival Christian Association
of Nigeria to attend. The council urges the Federal Military Government to
announce a final decision on Nigeria's membership in the OIC, and condemns the
United States for its bombing of Libya, according to US Embassy reporting
several students hospitalized, according to US Embassy reporting.
Kaduna Polytechnic campus closes for 10 days after a demonstration by militant
members of the Muslim Student Society protesting unspecified "unIslamic"
activities planned for the student spring festivals. One person reported dead and
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ALA AR 86-017
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leaving 15 people injured, according to US Embassy reporting.
Armed members of the Muslim Student Society demonstrate at Bayero University
and the University of Sokoto protesting "obscene and anti-Islamic activities,"
Nigerian pilgrims leaving from Lagos and Kano for Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to
make the hajj. Some 20,000 Nigerians are expected to make the pilgrimage,
.
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