AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000301430001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 27, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Africa Review
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ALA AR 86-013
27 June 1986
Copy 3 8 6
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Africa Review) 25X1
Chairman Mengistu is expanding his villagization program as
quickly as possible to gain greater control over the peasant
population and speed the collectivization of agriculture, but the
effort could fuel rural unrest and increase sympathy for insurgent
groups.
The Rawlings regime has lost support among radicals, some of
whom are trying to gain sufficient backing for a coup, as well as
moderates, who are weary of the economic austerity program and
Rawlings's anti-Western rhetoric. F
The antiwhite, anti-Communist Pan Africanist Congress's efforts to
move out from under the shadow of the rival African National
Congress are hampered by internal divisions and ineffective military
planning, but the Congress could launch a limited terrorist attack
inside South Africa.)
Briefs South Africa: Negative Immigration Trends
Tanzania-USSR: Military Relations
The Gambia: Scraping By F_~
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices
within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may
be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and
Latin American Analysis,
Secret
ALA LAR 86-013
27 June 1986
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Ethiopia: Villagization
Accelerates
The Mengistu regime is rapidly expanding its
ambitious villagization program despite severe logistic
problems, lack of skilled administrative personnel, and
potentially negative implications for human rights and
food production. Addis Ababa claims to have moved
over 2.8 million peasants so far in three key provinces,
and the US Embassy reports that the program is now
complete or under way in all provinces except war-
torn northern Ethiopia. With the smaller but more
controversial resettlement scheme in abeyance
because of Western human rights criticisms,
Chairman Mengistu appears determined to push
forward with villagization as quickly as possible in an
effort to gain greater control over the country's
peasant population and eventually speed the
collectivization of agriculture. While the program has
met with only limited resistance, we believe
Mengistu's commitment to making it countrywide
could fuel rural unrest and increase sympathy for
insurgencies, especially among the independent-
minded peasants in northern Ethiopia. F__1
Widening Scope of the Program
Villagization originated with the Land Reform
Proclamation of 1975, in which it was cited by the
new revolutionary government as a principal task of
the peasant associations under the mandate to
promote rural agricultural production.'
Implementation did not begin until 1979, however,
when party leaders in Harerge Province began
gathering scattered peasants into central villages to
Villagization, a relatively new feature of Mengistu's drive to
collectivize agriculture, forces peasants to destroy their traditional
homes scattered about the countryside and move to newly
constructed central villages in the same area.
limit their support for resistance groups and bandits.
The success of the Harerge initiative prompted
Mengistu to incorporate it into the regime's 10-year
development plan, announced last September. Since
last fall, the US Embassy reports that villagization
has been virtually completed in Harerge and Bale
Provinces and is far along in Shewa and Arsi.
Although the program differs in size and scope from
region to region and the government denies almost all
Western access to the villages, recent Embassy
reporting indicates that villages are springing up on a
smaller scale in Sidamo, Gamo Gofa, Kefa, Ilubabor,
Welega, and Gojam Provinces.F__1
According to the Embassy, the regime's villagization
efforts have been most intense in the densely
populated, primarily ethnic Oromo-inhabited
highlands of Harerge, Shewa, and Arsi Provinces.
These provinces comprise about one-third of the
country's 44 million people and account for 40 percent
of national crop production. As of April, Addis Ababa 25X1
claimed to have moved over 2.8 million people into
6,500 newly constructed villages in these three
provinces alone. poor
site selection for the new villages probably will cause
food shortages in many areas of the region this year.
In addition, some peasants reportedly have been
moved from highland areas with rich soil and
adequate rainfall to and lowlands where their
traditional crops will not grow. According to the US
Embassy in Mogadishu, villagization is the main
reason cited by about 40,000 mostly ethnic Oromo
peasants for leaving Harerge for refugee camps across
the border in northern Somalia. The US Embassy in
Addis Ababa reports that the government claims to
Secret
ALA LAR 86-013
27 June 1986
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The Role of Agriculture in the Revolution
Agriculture is Ethiopia's dominant economic sector.
Approximately 85 percent of the population-over 35
million persons-derive their living from farming or
agricultural pursuits, and most Ethiopians inhabit
land that is widely considered to have the best
agricultural potential in northeastern Africa.
According to the US Embassy, however, farm
production has been constrained over the years by
difficult climatic conditions, large variations in
geography, inadequate rainfall and irrigation, and
self-defeating government policies. Agricultural
technology for the most part has remained unchanged
since the Middle Ages. Moreover, as the poorest
nation in the world and the one fighting the
continent's longest running civil war, Ethiopia still
lacks the resources necessary to overcome its
agricultural backwardness.
Since assuming full power in 1977, Chairman
Mengistu has sought to restructure agriculture along
socialist lines with the ultimate goal of collectivizing
the entire peasant population. This transformation,
which has included the nationalization of all lands
and the establishment of cooperative peasant
associations, has proceeded slowly because the
practical need to raise productivity has often taken
priority over ideological considerations.
Consequently, the bulk of Ethiopian land is privately
cultivated, and the Embassy estimates that only 5
percent of the country's farms are collectives. Despite
the slow pace of the drive to socialize, Mengistu
remains committed to collectivization as a
'fundamental objective" of the Ethiopian revolution
and strongly believes it is the only way the nation can
overcome its agricultural plight. According to the US
Embassy, collective farms-officially called
'producers' cooperatives "-get priority for the
distribution of seeds, fertilizers, equipment, and
credit, and the regime's current 10-year plan aims to
place 53 percent of the country's farmers on
collectives by 1993. F_~
In our view, Mengistu has seized on Ethiopia's
drought and famine crisis to speed the
collectivization process. In October 1984 the regime
launched its controversial resettlement program,
which involves the relocation of peasants from
drought and insurgency-stricken northern Ethiopia to
newly established collective farms in the south and
southwest. About 600,000 peasants were relocated
several hundred miles-usually against their will-
before resettlement was put "under review" and
suspended late last year because of severe logistic
problems and Western primarily US-human
rights criticisms. Last September Mengistu
announced a larger relocation program known as
"villagization. " This program, which he vows will
"change the face of the countryside, "forces peasants
to destroy their widely scattered traditional homes
and move to newly constructed central villages
nearby. Addis Ababa claims both programs are
designed to help break the cycle of drought and
famine by providing better access to government-
supplied social services and infrastructure. On the
basis of a review of US Embassy reporting, however,
we believe both programs probably will disrupt
agricultural production and lead to even lower food
output. Nevertheless, in his recent May Day speech,
Mengistu reasserted his commitment to resettlement
and villagization and made it clear he intends to
pursue both vigorously.
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have learned from Harerge's experience with
villagization and is constructing higher quality
villages on better sites in Shewa Province, one of the
most fertile and prosperous areas of Ethiopia.
Problems in Implementation
According to the US Embassy, the villagization
program continues to be handicapped by logistic and
administrative problems and a lack of resources. In
our view, these drawbacks are unlikely to be
alleviated any time soon because the Mengistu regime
reportedly has not made budget allocations for the
necessary infrastructure and social and technical
services, and contributes only the minimum staff
personnel needed for planning and advice. Building
materials reportedly are particularly scarce, and
Ethiopian officials in charge of the program have
ordered that old, existing housing materials are to be
used as much as possible, with the cost for any new
materials to be borne by the peasants. The Embassy
reports, for example, that those peasants who are
required to put a tin roof on their new houses must
pay for the tin. Similarly, peasants in western Shewa
Province reportedly must pay a fee to the local
carpenters who help them build their homes.
The Embassy reports that the government has failed
to fulfill promises of improved social services-
including better education, health care, and water
supplies. Although the plans for the new villages
designate specific areas for schools, health clinics, and
recreational facilities, US Embassy officials who have
visited or observed villagization sites have seen no
visible improvements or evidence that the services are
under construction. Separate facilities for religious
activities, an important part of life among the rural
peasants, are not even planned. Ethiopian officials
have pledged that the services will be supplied as soon
as the resources are available, but the Embassy
reports that in most cases the new villages use existing
schools and health care facilities, most of which are
located several kilometers away. For its part, Addis
Ababa has acknowledged that "certain problems"
have developed but claims that these are caused by
"lack of support" from the peasants.
Although evidence is spotty, US Embassy reporting
also indicates that in some cases the time involved in
launching the villagization process has undercut rural
agricultural production. For example, in some areas
farmers reportedly have been required to spend at
least three out of every seven days tearing down their
old homes and putting up new ones, which has
detracted from their efforts to take advantage of the
good rains and prepare their lands for planting. While
the regime's policy is to stop work on villages when
time is needed for agriculture, local government
officials may choose not to observe this. As a result,
we judge that agricultural production will suffer while
the new villages are being established. Moreover, the
past performance of Ethiopia's collective farms
suggests to us that the eventual collectivization of the
new villages probably will cause agricultural
production to stagnate further.
The Leading Role of the Party
According to the US Embassy, the villagization
program is now under the overall control of the
Workers Party of Ethiopia. The party reportedly has
produced written guidelines for site selection, village
layout, and answers to most of the questions that arise
about the program. On the local level the party
implements the program through the peasant
association. Established and granted legal status by
government proclamation in 1975, peasant
associations are accountable to the regional
committees of the party and execute the villagization
program through sub-committees that are responsible
for site selection and surveying, materials
procurement, propaganda, security and defense, and
construction. Peasant associations-the rural
equivalent of the urban neighborhood associations
known as kebeles-act as the regime's political
watchdog in the countryside and handle all local
criminal, civil, military, and economic matters for the
government. While much of the work in the
villagization process falls to the peasants and the local
Ministry of Agriculture staff, the Embassy reports
that the program would not be possible without the
prominent role played by the peasant association.
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In our view, the key role played by the party and the
peasant associations in implementing villagization is
an important factor limiting potential peasant
resistance. The regime expects the peasant
association, which has sweeping judicial powers to
address violations of its regulations, to achieve full
participation, according to the Embassy,
plays a major role in "educating" and "motivating"
the peasants to participate. According to the
Embassy, the promise of government-furnished
infrastructure, essential social services-including
marketing and purchasing for products-and
membership in the peasant association gives the
farmer little real choice but to participate in the
program and move his individual dwelling. In view of
these factors and the long history of peasant-
especially ethnic Oromo-acceptance of Addis
Ababa's authoritarian rule, we agree with the US
Embassy assessment that the government and party
do not have to employ much physical force to gain
peasant compliance. F___]
Divided Donor Community
Villagization has not received the same publicity and
scrutiny as the resettlement program, but recent
Embassy reporting indicates that the Western aid
donors and diplomatic missions are increasingly
concerned about its hasty implementation and
political, ideological, and human rights implications.
While most of the donors reportedly recognize the
regime's collectivist goals and desire to gain better
control over the peasantry, they are split over the
long-term impact of villagization on agriculture.
Overall, however, the Embassy reports that, as with
the case of resettlement, most donor agencies and
countries believe that the best way to both monitor
and minimize potential human rights violations in the
program is to work with the Mengistu regime in
improving it. F__1
After a rare government-organized trip to six
villagization sites in western Shewa Province last
April, several representatives of the major Western
aid groups and diplomatic missions expressed
additional reservations about the program:
? The lack of social services in the villages and the
prospect that the program, if continued, will divert
scarce resources from productive farming to
unproductive housing construction.
? The inability of the farmers to protect their crops
now that they are living away from them.
? The potential for the spread of disease among people
and animals as they are gathered into the new
villages.
? The likelihood of short-term negative impact on
agricultural production.
? Problems with fire control and sanitation in the new
villages.
Despite these criticisms, we believe most of the donors
probably will provide limited assistance to
villagization while pressuring the regime to slow the
program and keep it open to outside observers. For its
part, Addis Ababa wants large EEC and World Bank
loans for peasant agriculture to finance the
construction of needed services in the new villages,
but the Embassy reports the regime has balked at
adopting the agricultural reforms insisted on by these
donors.
Outlook
In our view, the rapid growth of the villagization
program, despite the many obstacles it faces, reflects
Chairman Mengistu's staunch commitment to
expanding his political control over the rural
population and furthering his revolution. Because
villagization, along with resettlement, is part of his
two-pronged approach to collectivize agriculture, we
believe he will expand the program with or without
Western approval. Although full collectivization of
the new villages has not occurred and individual
family plots are still a part of each new housing site,
the Embassy reports that most peasants expect
collectivization to follow. From our perspective,
however, continuing logistic problems, lack of
resources and administrative personnel, and shortages
of infrastructure probably will slow the villagization
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process in some areas and may delay the regime's
plans to collectivize.
Over the longer term, we believe Mengistu's
determination to develop the program throughout the
country is likely to spur greater, and possibly more
violent, opposition among the peasantry. In its initial
phase, villagization has been concentrated primarily
in the ethnic Oromo heartland of southern and
eastern Ethiopia, and the Embassy reports that
nomads have been left completely out of the process.
Although Oromos comprise approximately 40 percent
of Ethiopia's population, they are generally viewed as
docile and have been dominated by the centrally
located Amhara and Tigreans for centuries. In our
view, this factor, coupled with subtle co-optation and
coercion by the peasant associations and the party,
probably accounts for the apparent lack of active
resistance among the villagized Oromo. In addition,
Embassy reporting indicates that in instances where
there has been violent opposition to villagization-for
example, in parts of Gojam Province-the
government has halted the process until local farmers
are deemed "psychologically ready." Nevertheless, we
judge villagization probably will meet more
determined peasant opposition if it is applied to the
independent-minded peasants of Amharic and
Tigrean stock in central and northern Ethiopia.
At a minimum, we believe government failure to
provide the promised social services to the new
villages could lead to widespread disaffection in the
villages and to significantly reduced agricultural
production. This in turn probably will result in
increased calls for aid to the United States and other
donors to relieve potentially major food shortages in
the Ethiopian countryside.
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on Rawlings
Jerry Rawlings, who seized power in December 1981
promising to represent the interests of the "common
man," faces increasing difficulties in balancing the
demands of moderate and radical factions who say he
no longer represents their respective concerns. In
recent months Rawlings's popularity has waned,
particularly among the middle class that has grown
weary of his three-year-old economic austerity
program. Other moderates are tired of his anti-
Western rhetoric, according to the US Embassy. For
their part, radicals accuse Rawlings of betraying the
regime's original "revolutionary" goals, and many are
working behind the scenes to gain control of key
institutions necessary to launch a successful coup,
Embassy sources indicate. F_~
For over three years Rawlings was able to chart a
populist course, carefully balancing the demands and
expectations of both moderates and radicals. A survey
of US Embassy and open-source reporting
demonstrates that in the foreign policy arena,
Rawlings generally pursued a leftist course, almost
always supporting Libya and the USSR in
international forums. On the other hand, his regime
implemented tough IMF-designed austerity measures,
encouraged foreign investment, and retained
moderate Army officers in key command positions.
Morever, Rawlings did not challenge tribal
influences-tribal chiefs still control land tenure-
and he forged close ties to the moderate, politically
Graduates for Action, two leftist groups composed
primarily of students and urban intellectuals that
helped Rawlings seize power in 1979 and again in
1981, accused him of aligning Ghana with the West,
called on workers to prepare for a "bitter and
protracted struggle," and compared Rawlings to pro-
Western Liberian Head of State Doe. Last
September, the 1,000-strong Kwame Nkrumah
Revolutionary Guards, a hardcore Marxist group that
also supported the 1981 coup, publicly called on
Rawlings to introduce "scientific socialism" and to
halt economic austerity measures, according to open
sources.F__1
powerful Ashanti chief.'
Pressures From the Left
Since last year, Rawlings has come under mounting
criticism from leftist political organizations for
allegedly betraying the original "revolutionary" goals
of his regime. Last year the US Embassy reported
that the New Democratic Movement and the Catholic
We agree with the US Embassy's assessment that
Marxist Provisional National Defense Council
(PNDC) member and security chief Kojo Tsikata is
building a separate power base that he hopes to use to
seize power.' Tsikata
' Although Ghana faces far fewer tribal tensions than most West
African countries, the Ashanti chief historically has been one of the
most influential and respected men in the country. Most key
government officials, including Rawlings, are from the coastal Ewe
tribe.)
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ALA LAR 86-013
27 June 1986
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Embassy. Wages have failed to keep pace with
inflation, and earlier this year the usually passive
trade unions staged some work stoppages and a series
of one-day strikes to demonstrate their unhappiness.
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The US Embassy reports that Tsikata is placing
handpicked loyalists-trained in Cuba, East
Germany, and Bulgaria in 1984 and 1985-in key
positions in the bureaucracy, militia, and internal
security apparatus. According to unconfirmed
Embassy and
which is responsible for Rawlings's safety.
Moderate elements in the military have yet to react
strongly to his maneuvering. A variety of US
Embassy reporting suggests, however, that many are
increasingly offended by the regime's anti-Western
rhetoric and close ties to Libya.
The Economic Scene
The tough IMF-supported adjustment program that
Accra implemented in 1983 has been relatively
successful. The package included several
devaluations, a reduction in the public-budget deficit,
reduced urban consumer subsidies, and the
reorganization of the most inefficient state
enterprises. Inflation, which reached 123 percent in
1983, now stands at about 12 percent. The US
Embassy reports that the once-empty markets in
Accra are now full of goods, Ghana is self-sufficient
in rice production, and hoarding and smuggling of
food and other basic goods have been sharply reduced.
The Embassy also reports that the regime has
centered its efforts on increasing agricultural and
commodity output with modest success. Cocoa
production-the mainstay of the economy, accounting
for about 60 percent of export earnings-is expected
to reach 212,000 metric tons this year. The Embassy
notes that this level, the highest in the last four years,
is largely the result of higher producer prices for
farmers. Moreover, economists report that the gross
domestic product grew by 7.6 percent last year and
should grow by more than 5 percent this year.
Despite these gains, Ghanaians-mainly the urban
middle class-are increasingly unhappy with the
austerity policies, and Rawlings finds it difficult to
convince the public that further belt-tightening
measures are necessary, according to the US
The US Embassy and Western economists report that
the regime must impose stiff austerity measures for
several more years, including further devaluations, if
the country is to attain sustained economic growth.
These observers also note that Ghana's debt service
ratio-some 67 percent of this year's export
earnings-will continue to rise until the early 1990s.
Institutionalizing the Revolution?
According to US Embassy and press reports,
Rawlings may "institutionalize" the largely ad hoc
political system later this year. He may feel that by
creating a single ruling party he will be in a better
position to control the various factions. Since 1984
Ghanaians have increasingly debated what form of
political system should be adopted. While some
moderate journalists have called for a return to a
multiparty democracy, Dan Annan, chairman of the
National Commission for Democracy-a committee
appointed by Rawlings two years ago to examine the
options--reportedly believes an "African democracy"
is the solution. We suspect that Rawlings, who rejects
both Western democracy and Marxist models, may
opt for a Tanzanian-style political system, which he
reportedly admires. According to unconfirmed press
reports, Rawlings plans to transform the June 4th
Movement, a student/worker group he created in
1980, into the sole and ruling political party. F__1
On the other hand, should Rawlings opt to transform
the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution
(CDRs) into the sole ruling political party-a move he
seems unlikely to make-it would facilitate the
radicals' control of the government. Established
shortly after he took power to channel citizen
concerns to the regime and to serve as a transmission
belt for the government, the CDRs largely serve as
the regime's "eyes and ears." According to the US
Embassy, Rawlings may believe that CDR
involvement in the political process would fulfill his
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Jerry Rawlings
Embassy reporting suggests he is weary of ruling ...
angry that corruption and graft have reappeared and
doubts the "moral fiber" of Ghanaians ... may not
recognize Tsikata's ambitions and independent
Kojo Tsikata
Embassy sources depict him as calculating, brillant
... this year he toured the country to develop a public
image ... admires Castro, Mengistu ... served as an
officer with the MPLA in Angola during the 1970s
... maintains contacts with several East Bloc
embassies.
Fui and Tsatsu Tsikata
Cousins of Kojo ... both are Marxists and lecturers
in law at University of Ghana, Legon ... reportedly
have good access to Rawlings but privately believe he
has betrayed the revolution ... neither has a public
role ... Tsatsu reportedly is one of the leading
behind-the-scenes ideologues. F_~
Arnold Quainoo
Army commander, PNDC member ... seeks control
of Force Reserve Unit, which may bring him into
conflict with regime radicals ... staunchly pro-
United States ... loyal to Rawlings ... no apparent
political ambitions ... a "soldier's soldier. " F__]
promise for "grassroots" participation in
decisionmaking. Athough Rawlings purged the CDRs
of leftists in December 1984,
Marxists are working behind the scenes
may have
infiltrated CDRs to reestablish their authority. F
Courage Quashigah
Commmands Force Reserve Unit, which is
responsible for Rawlings's protection ...
exceptionally ambitious, charismatic, self-assured
... key role in defeating 1983 and 1984 coup
attempts ... privately critical of Moscow but 25X6
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P. V. Obeng
Key PNDC moderate ... has not challenged
Tsikata's ambitions ... Embassy believes he is the
regime's "troubleshooter". . . generally runs
day-to-day operations of the PNDC ... may head a
caretaker government if Rawlings resigns.F_~
Alhaji Idrissu
PNDC member responsible for local government and
chieftancy matters ... a non-Marxist leftist ...
highly respected by Rawlings ... professional banker
and accountant ... has assumed a higher profile in
past year representing Ghana abroad. F__]
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David Klutse
Commands key 1st Brigade in Accra ... 48 years old 25X1
... trained in the United States in the 1970s ...
thought to be pro-Western ... apparently loyal to
Rawlings but has not revealed political intentions or
views on Force Reserve Unit and regime radicals.
Wither Rawlings?
We suspect Rawlings may be tired of trying to
maintain the balance between the factions within the
ruling PNDC. According to the US Embassy,
Rawlings may decide to step aside from day-to-day
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decisionmaking later this year and perhaps become
Ghana's titular head. Embassy sources indicate that
Rawlings is frustrated by the lack of "revolutionary
fabric" among the populace and publicly complains
that corruption and dishonesty are again seeping into
the government and society.
Should he retire, we believe the radicals would
probably consolidate their grip on the security
apparatus and the bureaucracy. A variety of US
Embassy and
lack the leadership skills and
the organizational backing necessary to balance the
factionalized political system successfully and to fend
off pressures from Tsikata and his allies. Moreover,
radicals dominate the PNDC bureaucracy-the
Secretariat-and could undermine the efforts of
moderates to introduce major reforms or to launch
Ghana on a more pro-Western foreign policy course.
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South Africa: The Pan
Africanist Congress
The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) has had little
success moving out from under the shadow of its
better known and militarily active rival, the African
National Congress (ANC). Although the PAC has
garnered external financial and military support from
diverse sources, including Zimbabwe, China, Libya,
Iran, and Yugoslavia, the group has yet to carry out
major military operations inside South Africa. In the
near term, we believe the group's actions will continue
to be hampered by internal divisions and ineffective
military planning. Nevertheless, the possibility that
the PAC could launch a limited terrorist attack,
particularly against a civilian target, cannot be ruled
out.F__~
Background
The PAC was established in 1959 by an antiwhite,
anti-Communist breakaway group within the ANC. It
broke with the ANC over objections to links to
leftwing Indian and white organizations and rejected
multiracial cooperation out of concern that this would
protect white interests. PAC members also rejected
the ANC's links to the South African Communist
Party and ties to the USSR. Johnson Mlambo, the
current PAC chairman, has carried on his
predecessors' task of building up the group's image
and securing financial assistance from various
sources.
Banned in 1960 along with the ANC following the
Sharpeville incident, the group formed an
underground military wing, Poqo (Pure), to conduct
terrorist activities in South Africa. PAC campaigns in
the early 1960s included sporadic attacks on
government facilities, white civilians, and black
government collaborators. In 1963 the PAC's external
headquarters in Lesotho was the staging ground for a
major offensive into South Africa. The attack was
preempted, however, and a subsequent South African
crackdown effectively halted activities inside South
Africa. In 1978 the PAC reportedly reemerged on the
South African scene when 18 alleged members were
arrested and accused of recruiting blacks in South
Africa. Political infighting and funding problems,
however, have plagued the group since its inception
and have severely hampered its ability to carry out
any effective military operations. F_~
Military Activity and Planning
The PAC clearly is eager to establish itself as a player
in the internal South African liberation struggle and
to gain ground against the ANC. In our judgment, the
PAC feels under considerable pressure to launch a
military campaign, partly out of fear of becoming
irrelevant to unrest in the black townships, violence
which neither insurgent group controls. While
complaints over lack of funds and equipment to
support a successful militar cam aign continue,
a new sense of
urgency fuels the PAC's military planning. Activities
under consideration reportedly include attacking
police stations in black townships, and rail lines, and
sparking violent demonstrations that would spill over
into white areas.)
Recently the group has floated numerous plans of
action, almost all of which appear to have been
postponed or scrapped. An attack on South African
security facilities in Natal Province and outside
Johannesburg originally scheduled for early April, for
example, has been postponed numerous times. 0
the arrests last
March in Botswana of insurgents with weapons, and
in May of a former PAC director of operations in
South Africa, probably have delayed operations until
at least mid-June.
I the PAC reportedly has withdrawn the cadre
in South Africa scheduled to carry out the operation
and is examining new targets in Cape and Transvaal
Secret
ALA LAR 86-013
27 June 1986
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2OA I
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Secret 25X1
External Support
Despite internal problems and a lack of military
activity that have disillusioned many PAC supporters,
the group continues to receive funds from a number of
African sources, including the OAU Liberation
Committee, Tanzania, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe.
Tanzania maintains military training facilities for its
guerrilla force, which has about 600 men, and PAC
headquarters is located in Dar es Salaam. Nigeria has
continued to supply an undetermined amount of
money and other aid, despite its apparent
disappointment with lack of PAC activity. The PAC
enjoys a special relationship with Zimbabwe and
Prime Minister Mugabe's ruling ZANU party.
The PAC continues to maintain a small presence in
both Botswana and Lesotho. Lesotho traditionally has
been a refuge for PAC cadre and a transit route into
South Africa, but, since the coup last January,
Maseru has evicted about 39
PAC members. Lesotho also has cracked down even
harder on South African insurgents since Pretoria's
coordinated raids on Botswana, Zimbabwe, and
Zambia last May, and
additional PAC members have been asked to leave.
Press reports indicate that the PAC decided to
withdraw voluntarily from Botswana last March, but
we believe a few PAC members remain
over the past
few years the PAC has tried to gain additional foreign
assistance, soliticing funds and military training from
Yugoslavia, North Korea, and China. About 50 PAC
guerrillas returned in March from six months of
military training in Yugoslavia,
and reportedly are in Tanzania
receiving further military instruction. The PAC also
reportedly is reestablishing ties to China, its oldest
major ally. Despite frustration with the group's
military inactivity, the Chinese reportedly offered to
train PAC cadres in China,
Senior PAC officials reportedly visited Beijing
in May to convince the Chinese that the group would
act on its long-promised military campaign
PAC attempts to
develop relations with Iran and Libya. PAC chairman
Johnson Mlambo visited Libya last year, and,
the group
received $25,000 from Tripoli to cover operating
expenses.
financial assistance,
64 PAC members completed a six-month military
training course in Libya in late April. Recent
Embassy reports from Maseru indicated that Libyan-
trained PAC guerrillas were in Lesotho preparing to
launch military activities against South Africa and
also against US facilities. In late April Mlambo also
headed a delegation to Iran seeking military and
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Outlook
In our judgment, the PAC is unlikely in the near term
to match the ANC's ability to operate in South 25X1
Africa. Despite some success in garnering support, we
see little likelihood that the PAC can overcome
longstanding internal problems to the point where it
can launch and sustain operations against targets such
as South African defense or police facilities, its
avowed primary targets. South Africa's recent
clampdown, marked by the declaration of a state of
emergency, and Pretoria's proven willingness to carry
out raids against insurgent groups in neighboring
countries will make it even more difficult for the PAC
to develop the network necessary for major military
operations inside South Africa.0
The fear of becoming irrelevant to internal
developments in South Africa and pressure from
external backers probably will continue to fuel a sense
of urgency within the PAC to launch a military
campaign. Therefore, the possibility of a terrorist
attack on a civilian target cannot be dismissed.
Pretoria cannot prevent all infiltration attempts, and
the group may have already successfully hidden
weapons inside South AfricaF_~
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Africa
Briefs
South Africa Negative Immigration Trends
Almost two years of unrest and political uncertainty appear to be influencing
South Africa's immigration-emigration trends.
more people left South Africa during the second half of 1985 than immigrated. In
all of 1985 the net gain of immigrants was only 5,883, compared with a gain of
20,243 in 1984. This trend appears to have accelerated in the first quarter of this
year, when emigration exceeded immigration by 1,726. The last time the
government reported net losses was in 1977 and 1978, also a period of political
uncertainty following the Soweto riots of 1976. Business leaders have expressed
concern about the number of highly skilled technical and managerial personnel
leaving South Africa, according to press reports. Although government data show
there was still a net gain of engineers during 1985, for example, 774 engineers
have left the country in the last two years, and the Engineering Society of South
Africa, basing its estimates on the number of inquiries about overseas positions,
expects a larger number to leave this year. F__1
SOUTH AFRICA
Immigration and Emigration Trends
1984 - 1985
3500 E
3000
2500
2000
1500
0
'V' CID Q1Z 12~CO Q Gh
0 OQ'O
4c Q 7 ~.2vU Q ,.~ 4, t0
4/ Q' Q t J J J (v G O 4/ Co 4/ Q Q a J J J Q V O 4i 0
7 QO020 k 'T AV 7 7'TCd 020N -Ze 7
Source: South Africa, Month/Year
Central Statistical Services.
Pretoria
Secret
ALA LAR 86-013
27 June 1986
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We expect that the overall negative migration trend, and particularly the
emigration of professional workers, will continue as long as South Africa is marked
by widespread unrest and high levels of violence. the
business community is uncertain about the government's ability to resolve racial
problems and revive a flagging economy, and that business confidence is at an
alltime low. High inflation-18.6 percent in April-and low levels of business
investment increasingly add to the incentives for highly skilled workers to seek
opportunities elsewhere, in our judgment. Although the number of workers leaving
is still relatively low, the emigration of professional workers, over time, will
compound South Africa's difficult economic situation by depriving Pretoria of
much needed technical expertise.F_~
Botswana Heightened Concerns About South Africa
The Government of Botswana appears increasingly apprehensive about what it
sees as deteriorating relations with South Africa. President Masire told the US
Embassy in Gaborone that he has information that Pretoria will respond to
international economic sanctions, which he sees as inevitable, by imposing a border
blockade on Botswana. Masire has asked the United States to intervene with
Pretoria to head off such action, while at the same time seeking help to shift the
country's trade routes to the north. About 25 percent of Botswana's exports depend
on South African rail and port facilities, and 80 to 90 percent of all imports,
including food and oil, come either through or from South Africa.
Gaborone also expects that South African security forces will carry out more
cross-border operations. It publicly blamed Pretoria for the 14 June attack on a
house in central Gaborone in which one Botswana citizen was killed and two
injured. The attack followed by less than a month Pretoria's coordinated raids on
alleged African National Congress (ANC) targets in Botswana, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe. Pretoria has denied involvement in the 14 June incident, implying that
it was a result of internal Botswana frictions. Although the woman killed in the
most recent attack had no known involvement with the ANC, the owner of the
house is the widow of a member of the armed wing of the ANC, who, the US
Embassy reports, maintains ties to other ANC members. Pretoria's recent
declaration of a state of emergency as well as its more activist regional policy
indicate, in our judgment, that Pretoria will not hesitate to strike hard against
ANC targets in Botswana and elsewhere, using whatever force it believes
necessary to try to quash unrest in South Africa.
Tanzania-USSR Military Relations
The chief of Tanzania's Defense Force will visit the Soviet Union in mid-July,
to discuss problems in the military relationship
between the two countries, but he is unlikely to request more equipment. Moscow
has planned an extensive round of tours and briefings for the Tanzanian
delegation, including meetings with Soviet Minister of Defense Sokolov and the
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Chief of Staff of the Soviet armed forces, In 25X1
our view, Moscow may be hoping to assuage Tanzanian disgruntlement-which
led former President Nyerere to reduce the number of Soviet military advisers
from 92 in 1984 to 74 in 1985 and cut off Soviet access to Tanzanian defense
headquarters. Prospects for improving strained relations are poor because the
Soviets are probably unprepared to increase their commitment beyond small
quantities of spare parts and perhaps short-term concessions on Dar es Salaam's
military debt. We believe Tanzania's discontent with the poor quality of Soviet
training was given fresh impetus by the crash of a MIG aircraft into Lake Victoria
in May that killed both the Tanzanian student pilot and a Soviet flight instructor.
The Tanzanian Army needs spare parts and repair services for a wide range of
Soviet-supplied equipment, however, and may renew efforts to obtain Chinese
military aid if Moscow will not agree to meet its needs. 25X1
The Gambia Scraping By
The Gambia's recent agreement with the IMF for short-term credit will
temporarily avert an economic crisis, although the austerity program carries large
political risks for President Jawara. Raising the tax on basic foods, such as rice,
and further layoffs will test popular support for government policies. The US
Embassy reports that Banjul had to promise increases in prices paid to peanut
growers and a rise in petroleum prices to the same levels as those in Senegal in an
effort to reduce the illegal flow of both commodities across the border. According
to press reports, the government will lay off 1,500 more civil servants, in addition
to the 3,000 fired last October in the first year of a four-year economic
improvement program.F_~
Economic pressures could precipitate domestic violence and prompt foreign
intervention by Senegal should another threat of a coup arise. The Embassy
reports that Libya may add to The Gambia's problem by sponsoring an attack
against a US or British installation-a move that would embarrass Jawara, focus
attention on the government's political vulnerabilities, and possibly speed up the
planned union with Senegal in a Senegambia federation. Moreover, we suspect
that Libya may try to take advantage of the frustrations generated by belt-
tightening measures to gain influence with the country's two opposition political
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Secret
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