AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000301400001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 16, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Africa Review
Directorate of
Intelligence
MASTER FILE COPY
E-3 140T GIVE BUT
on
MAII'K ON
Secret
ALA AR 86-010
16 May 1986
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Secret
Africa Review
Articles Somalia: Siad Moves Against Islamic Fundamentalism
Recent arrests of northern religious leaders reflect President Siad's
increasing concern over the potential spread of Islamic
fundamentalism among military personnel and urban youth.
Soviet academic and propaganda writings on the racial disturbances
in South Africa convey an impression of confidence that
developments there are working in the USSR's favor to produce, in
the long run, a pro-Soviet or Soviet-influenced regime in Pretoria.
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South Africa: New Labor Federation Flexes Muscles I 7
The Congress of South African Trade Unions, which claims to
represent more than half of all unionized black workers in South
Africa, intends to use its economic leverage to achieve broader social
and political gains for blacks. It nevertheless is likely to proceed
cautiously on the political front to avoid incurring Pretoria's wrath.
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South Africa: Hard Times for Progressives I 19
The Progressive Federal Party has long laid claim to being the party
of racial reform, but the ruling National Party's more moderate
image of late has undercut support for the Progressives. The
resignation of its popular Afrikaner leader earlier this year has
magnified the party's problems.
Angola's Cabinda Province-Vital and VulnerableF___-] 21
An attack last March by UNITA guerrillas on Chevron-Gulf's main
oil installation suggests that Cabinda-a valuable source of
economic wealth for Angola-could become a growing security
problem for Luanda.
Secret
ALA AR 86-010
16 May 1986
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Secret
Comoros-Fr
itivitie
s Over Mayotte
President Abdalla
island of Mayotte
between Comoros
remain unresolve
themselves are di
h's efforts
under Com
and Franc
d for some t
vided on wh
to integrate the French-administered
oran sovereignty has soured relations
e. The status of Mayotte is likely to
ime, in part because the French
ether to integrate the island into the
French Republic.
South Africa-Gabon-An
gola: The L
econi Airfield Puzzle
31
South Africa: Navy Laun
ches New
Ships
31
Seychelles: Enhancing R
egional Ties
32
Africa: IMF Trust Fund
32
Angola Chronology
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices
within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may
be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and
Latin American Analysis,
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Secret
Africa Review
Articles
Somalia: Siad Moves Against
Islamic Fundamentalism
President Siad cracked down last month on Islamic
leaders protesting tight government control over
religious teachings, arresting some 20 northern
shaykhs as well as two of Mogadishu's most important
religious figures. Siad has kept a tight rein on Islamic
activities since taking power in 1969, and the arrests
reflect his increasing concern over the potential
spread of Islamic fundamentalism among military
personnel and urban youth. Although
fundamentalism itself is unlikely to threaten Siad's
hold on power, it could further undermine a regime
already weakened by political, military, and economic
ills. In addition, Siad's crackdown may complicate
relations with Saudi Arabia, a major aid donor and
patron of Islam in Somalia.
Somalia's Islamic Legacy
Approximately 99 percent of Somalis are Sunni
Muslims, and the country's constitution establishes
Islam as the state religion. In the past, Islam has been
an important unifying factor for the Somali people
and contributed to the development of national
identity. For example, the Somali national hero is
Mohamed Hassan Abdullah, the "mad mullah" who
led a 20-year holy war against the British colonial
administration earlier in this century. Nevertheless,
the country's nomadic tribal history and customs have
limited the role of religious traditions in day-to-day
life. According to academic sources, Somali tribes
have long put a premium on the role and duties of the
tribal warrior-leader, in effect giving religious leaders
a less valued position in society. In addition,
traditional Somali tribal rituals often conflict with
strict Muslim observance, and today many Somalis do
not submit to the full rigors of Islam.
The coup in 1969 that brought General Siad Barre to
power further restricted Islam's influence. Although
the regime condemned atheism and insisted that
"scientific socialism" was consistent with Islam, Siad
moved quickly to reinforce the separation of religious
and secular authority. He criticized the Nasserite
concept of Islamic socialism as a "tool" of
neocolonialism and capitalism and sternly warned
religious leaders not to meddle in politics.
Government-sponsored seminars and training sessions
for religious leaders were instituted to ensure that
only Islamic doctrine consistent with the regime's
ideology was taught.
Siad's efforts initially produced little more than
grumbling in the religious community, and, according
to academic studies, significant religious opposition to
his rule did not appear until January 1975 when he
announced a new family law that granted equal rights
to women. Most Somali religious figures interpreted
this as an attempt to undermine the very foundation
of Islam, and 23 shaykhs publicly protested the new
law. Siad's security forces immediately arrested the
protesters, however, and 10 shaykhs were later
executed for violating state security and acting on
behalf of "foreign powers." According to the US
Embassy, this effectively ended religious opposition to
Siad for several years. Since then, he has kept a tight
grip on all Islamic activities and quickly arrested
anyone suspected of undermining his policies.
Government Reaction to Religious Revival
According to the Embassy, a group of younger
shaykhs-some of whom received their religious
training in Iraq and Saudi Arabia-have mounted a
fresh challenge to government control over religious
Secret
ALA AR 86-010
16 May 1986
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Secret
activities. These shaykhs reportedly preach worried that these officers might become sympathetic
puritanical Islamic beliefs and are less inclined than to the cause of fundamentalist Islamic leaders
the older generation of leaders to go along with opposed to the Siad regime.
government directives on politically acceptable
interpretations of the Koran. The Embassy reports
that senior government officials are concerned that
the increasingly independent spirit of these leaders
will appeal to youths in urban areas, many of whom
are unemployed and disaffected. As a preventive
measure, Somali security forces reportedly were
ordered several months ago to increase their
surveillance of religious leaders and all those who
preach that Somalia should become more Islamic.
security officials are investigating possible links
between the recently arrested Islamic leaders and
domestic opponents of the Siad regime, including the
40 military officers arrested for coup plotting in early
April.
Government suspicions of growing religious unrest
were confirmed in mid-April when demonstrations
protesting Siad's control over sermons and teachings
took place in several cities.
Siad responded by arresting s amic
leaders in two northern cities and Mogadishu and
expelling an Egyptian religious teacher. In the capital,
two of the city's most important Islamic leaders
reportedly were arrested, even though they were not
involved in the demonstrations. In our view, Siad
probably was concerned that they might denounce his
moves and call for additional protests and possibly
violence. Indeed
the presidential bodyguard was bolstered after the
crackdown in the event of a violent backlash.
that the government
also fears that fundamentalism will spread to the
already disgruntled military-the regime's key pillar
of support. The regime recently warned Somali
military personnel about the evils of religious
fanaticism and called on officers to be especially
watchful of militant Islamic groups such as the
Muslim Brotherhood. The government issued a
circular in late 1985 to all military commands
underscoring the need for prior government approval
of all religious preaching, services, and instruction in
the armed forces.
that these efforts may have been counterproductive,
as some military officers have expressed anger over
stricter government control of their religious
practices. Senior Somali officers reportedly are
The Saudi Factor
According to the US Embassy, Riyadh has strongly
promoted Islam in Somalia by financing the
construction of mosques, setting up Koranic schools,
and bringing young Somalis to Saudi Arabia for
religious training. At the same time, the Saudis have
attempted to use their considerable economic
influence as a major trading partner and aid donor to
persuade Siad to relax government strictures on Islam
and establish sharia law. Siad has adroitly avoided
making any major concessions to the Saudis and at
the same time has managed to keep their economic
assistance flowing, but in recent months Riyadh has
increased its public and private criticisms of his
religious policies.
Outlook
We believe Islamic fundamentalism, even though
rising, poses no immediate threat to Siad's grip on
power. Tribalism continues to hold sway in Somali
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society, and there is no evidence to suggest that
religious fervor can transcend this deep-seated trait,
particularly in the military. In addition, Siad's
demonstrated willingness to move quickly-and often
preemptively-against suspicious religious leaders
probably will deter any significant growth of
fundamentalism in the near term.
Fundamentalism could, however, appeal to sectors of
Somali society where the importance of clan ties is not
as pronounced-for example, among the unemployed
or educated youth in urban areas. Moreover, tribal
fissures in the government and military run deep, and
religious unrest could spark additional antagonisms or
further inflame old ones. Although Siad wishes to
avoid jeopardizing crucial Saudi economic aid, his
track record suggests that he will not hesitate to deal
harshly with any threats to his rule.
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Soviet Views on South Africa
and the ANC
Soviet) I writings on the
racial disturbances in South Africa convey an
impression of confidence that developments there are
working in the USSR's favor to produce, in the long
run, a pro-Soviet or Soviet-influenced regime in
Pretoria. The Soviets aim these writings at external
audiences, but they also frequently use them to
communicate positions to domestic elites and foreign
policy allies, and as instruments in internal policy
debates. As such, the writings can provide useful
insights into Soviet views and potential policies on key
issues. The articles suggest that the following factors
are behind Moscow's confidence:
Short-Term Reservations
Soviet commentary is not specific about the time
frame in which a favorable revolutionary situation is
to emerge in South Africa, but a variety of articles
indicates Moscow recognizes several factors that limit
its ability to play a substantial role in South Africa at
present or in the next few years:
? The Soviets claim that the role of the Soviet-backed
African National Congress (ANC), described as the
only group among opposition forces in South Africa
with nationwide legitimacy, is growing. An article in
the November 1985 issue of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs journal International Affairs claimed that
the recent crisis has "enhanced the authority and
influence of the vanguard of the liberation
movement, the ANC."
? Fragmentation of the proapartheid consensus of
South African whites is now under way, according to
other writings. An article last September in the
foreign relations journal New Times provided the
most extensive discussion of this theme to date,
stating that differences between the ruling elite and
whites on both the right and the left are intensifying.
constructive engagement."
? The Soviets see the international environment,
especially the climate of political and public opinion
in Western states, as gradually moving in a direction
favoring extensive change in South Africa. For
example, an International Affairs article last
October noted that "even some NATO countries"
had taken diplomatic and economic measures to
show their unhappiness with Pretoria's policies, and
that a "certain section of the US ruling elite is
beginning to recognize the hopelessness of
? Most of the members of the South African
Communist Party (SACP) and ANC operate out of
neighboring countries, where they are vulnerable to
harsh South African reprisals against both their own
operations and those of the host countries. A TASS
article last December stated that "the racists are
mounting terror in all directions" by striking at the
ANC in neighboring states.
? The Soviets view revolutionary trends in South
Africa as immature. Antigovernment forces are
considered fragmented, and their leadership weak
and unlikely to be loyal to Soviet-approved positions.
Izvestiya political observer Alexander Bovin wrote in
November that ethnic- and religious-based
contradictions were weakening revolutionary
pressures and "easing the regime's position."
? Numerous Pravda articles and Radio Moscow
broadcasts still describe Western support for South
Africa as significant, particularly when Pretoria can
portray itself as engaged in an East-West struggle.
? The Soviets believe that events in South Africa will
eventually work in their favor, but that "the next
phase" of revolutionary development could take as
Secret
ALA AR 86-010
16 May 1986
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long as 10 to 15 years to unfold, depending on the
commitment of Western investors and South
African whites to preserving the status quo.
? The Kremlin views the ANC as the agent of change
in South Africa most likely to result in a black
government favorable to its interests. The Soviets,
however, are somewhat suspicious of the ANC's
ideological reliability, and are concerned that
nationalist elements in the ANC could be co-opted
by Pretoria into some kind of reform program.
Outlook
Moscow is likely to continue using its mix of low-risk
policies-supplying arms to the ANC, backing the
group's claim to a place on the international stage,
castigating alleged Western backing of Pretoria, and
supporting African and Nonaligned calls for
sanctions-to extract maximum propaganda benefit,
drive a wedge between Western and Third World
states, and promote Soviet influence in the ANC.
Moscow probably believes that, over the longer run,
the ANC's access to external organizational,
financial, and military resources should enable the
group at the very least to "play the spoiler," blocking
any settlement that it believes unfavorable, or to take
advantage of a breakdown of white control to take
power in its own right. The USSR presumably is
counting on its control of South African Communist
Party elements within the ANC, and on its role as the
group's military and financial backer to ensure
continued Soviet influence within the ANC.
Indicators of a Policy Shift
Some or all of the following points are likely
indicators of a Soviet decision that the situation in
South Africa is ripe for more direct exploitation,
probably in the form of stepped-up military and
political action by the ANC:
? Statements in articles to the effect that "a new phase
of the revolution" is under way. Soviet
commentators now argue that "the struggle is
intensifying," but do not accept the contention of
some SACP members that the time has come to
launch a campaign of broad resistance to the
government and to create alternative organs of
power-"soviets"-under the leadership of the
ANC and SACP.
? A reduction in the number of groups Soviet
commentators consider "progressive forces." Soviet
observers currently concede a progressive role for a
wide variety of groups. Rejection of such a role for
these broadly based groups would probably be
accompanied by backing for future ANC claims of
exclusive leadership of the national liberation
movement.
? Soviet diplomatic pressure on African and other
Third World governments to recognize the ANC as
the sole legitimate antiapartheid force in South
Africa. Such pressure was applied on behalf of the
MPLA in Angola in 1975 and 1976.
? Substantially increased Soviet Bloc weapons supply
to the ANC.
? Direct warnings to the United States and other
Western countries on the risks of any intervention on
behalf of Pretoria.
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South Africa: New Labor
Federation Flexes Muscles
The formation late last year of a labor federation that
claims to represent over half of all unionized black
workers is the most significant labor development
since Pretoria legally recognized black unions in 1979.
The Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSATU) combines the "bread-and-butter"
pragmatism of mainstream black unions with the
greater political activism of unions belonging to the
antiapartheid coalition United Democratic Front
(UDF). Thus far, COSATU's leaders have indicated
clearly that they want to use the federation's
economic leverage to achieve broader social and
political gains for blacks. At the same time, however,
they are likely to continue to proceed cautiously on
the political front to avoid incurring Pretoria's wrath.
On the basis of the membership claims of its
constituent unions, we estimate that COSATU now
represents over one-third of all unionized workers.
Press reports cite COSATU officials claim 460,000
dues-paying members and an additional 200,000 who
have signed up but not yet paid dues. The
federation-the vast majority of whose members are
black-draws together 33 unions, including those
previously affiliated with the Federation of South
African Trade Unions (FOSATU), 17 unions
belonging to the UDF, seven previously unaffiliated
unions, and the National Union of Mineworkers
(NUM), which had belonged to the rival Council of
Unions of South Africa (CUSA). COSATU is the
largest labor federation in South Africa, exceeding
the multiracial, but white-led, Trade Union Council
of South Africa (TUCSA) by at least 150,000 paid-up
members (see table 1).
An Uneasy Alliance
The black labor union movement historically has been
riven by ideological and tactical splits. Vigorous
debates have occurred over whether unions should
exclude whites or be multiracial, over the extent to
which they should concentrate on narrow workplace
issues or tackle broader political concerns of blacks,
over relations with international labor organizations,
and over whether labor unions should be organized by
industry or region. Although we believe the formation
of COSATU-after four years of talks between
various unions-represents an initial step toward
unity, divisions, both inside and outside the new
federation, persist.'
Racial Organization. Like other black umbrella
groups, COSATU's leaders face the split between
advocates of "black consciousness"-those favoring
the exclusion of whites from antigovernment
movements-and supporters of a nonracial approach.
Labor reporting indicates that this rift is largely
responsible for the labor movement's inability to unite
all of the major independent nonwhite labor unions.
The black consciousness-oriented federations refused
to join mainly out of fear that whites-who had
played a low-key, but important, role in guiding
FOSATU-gradually would dominate the new
federation.
Despite the commitment to the principle of
nonracialism, the black consciousness tradition
remains strong and is represented by the two largest
COSATU unions, the NUM and the Commercial
Catering and Allied Workers Union of South Africa,
both of which have roots in the black consciousness
movement. In addition, many of the 17 unions
affiliated with the UDF, a nominally nonracial group,
have expressed black consciousness principles.
judgment, moreover, the presence of the powerful
black-led NUM is likely to limit the influence of
white officials in COSATU.
Secret
ALA AR 86-010
16 May 1986
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Table 1
South African Labor Federations
Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSA TU). Multiracial, but vast majority black.
Favors socialism. Loosely allied with the anti-
apartheid UDF, but eschews formal political ties.
Goal is to establish one union per major industrial
grouping. Outlook for membership growth ap-
pears very favorable.
Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA).
Multiracial, but blacks in "parallel" unions orga-
nized by white unions. TUCSA was once in
forefront of efforts to organize blacks, but now
seen as anachronism by many blacks. Political
attitudes range from moderate to conservative.
Generally procapitalism and against foreign dis-
investment. Has suffered numerous recent defec-
tions. Prospects for membership growth appear
poor.
Year
Founded
Leadership
Paid
Membership a
1985
Jay Naidoo (Indian), General Secretary
Elijah Barayi (black), President
450;000
1954
Fred Roux (white), Acting General Secretary
Robbie Botha (white) President
300,000
Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA). Non- 1980 Phiroshaw Camay (Indian), General Secretary 150,000
white. Loosely allied to black consciousness move- James Mndaweni (black), President
ment, but also works with UDF. Has concentrat-
ed on workplace issues and generally avoided
direct involvement in politics. Largest union,
NUM, recently disaffiliated to join COSATU.
Prospects for membership growth appear good,
but only in industries where CUSA is better
established than COSATU.
South African Confederation of Labor (SACLA). 1957 Wessel Bornman (white), General Secretary 100,000
White. Has traditionally taken a hardline attitude Arthur Nievwondt (white), President
toward black workers and favored reserving cer-
tain jobs for whites. Recently lost best known
affiliate, the white Mineworkers Union (MWU),
probably reflecting softening in racial attitudes of
other SACLA unions. The MWU has quit and
rejoined in the past. SACLA growth outlook is
poor and depends on either reattracting the
MWU or moderating image enough to draw
white unions from TUCSA.
Azanian Congress of Trade Unions (AZACTU). 1984 Pandelani Nefolovhodwe (black), General 65,000
Nonwhite. Allied to black consciousness move- Secretary
ment, particularly National Forum and Azanian
Peoples' Organization. More political than
CUSA. Growth prospects appear poor, unless it
can attract membership from CUSA.
a Estimates of dues-paying membership are based largely on union
claims, and may overstate actual paid membership for some
federations.
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South Africa: Estimated Black Union Membership
1982 Total: 500,000
TUCSA
21% _i
FOSATU
21%
UNAMUATED
40%
1986 Total: 1,000,000
TUCSA
F-8%
CUSA
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Portrait of the Black Consciousness Labor
Federations
After their refusal to sign on to the agreement that
led to the formation of COSA TU last year, the two
black consciousness-oriented labor federations met to
discuss cooperative action. Representatives of the
Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) and the
Azanian Congress of Trade Unions (AZACTU) last
November agreed in principle on their own united
black union movement and endorsed features that
contrasted sharply with the COSA TU approach.
These included:
? A belief in exclusively nonwhite leadership both of
the federations and of individual unions.
? Acceptance of whites as union members but only at
the grassroots level-whites can move to leadership
positions by working their way up from the shop
floor and being elected.
? Recognition that individual unions within the
federations have their own interests that called for
independent actions.
? Rejection of affiliation with any political
organizations.
? Endorsement of union involvement in community
activities that may not be related directly to labor
issues.
The Council of South African Unions (CUSA)
Formed after a dispute with FOSA TU over the role
of white officials, CUSA is a loose federation much
less centralized than either COSA TU or its
forerunner FOSATU. Its of liates have considerable
discretion in formulating their positions on important
issues. For example, the group's leadership has
provided information on the advantages and
disadvantages of government registration, but has left
the decision on whether to register with the
government to each union. CUSA participates in both
the UDF and the black consciousness National
Forum without formal membership in either. Unlike
COSA TU, however, CUSA has affiliated with the
pro-West International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (ICFTU) and takes advantage of ICFTU's
funding and training programs.
Despite the loss of the National Union of
Mineworkers-CUSA's largest union-to COSATU,
CUSA is an important force in the black trade union
movement, especially in the Transvaal. Its unions are
active in crucial industries including construction,
food and beverage, chemicals, and transport. CUSA
unions, like those which belonged to FOSATU, are
known for their strong shop floor organization and
negotiating skills,
Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions (AZACTU)
A formal affiliate of the black consciousness-oriented
political coalition, the National Forum, AZACTU is
more militantly political than CUSA. Its 10 small
unions mostly are outgrowths of labor clinics held by
the Azanian Peoples' Organization (AZAPO) in the
late 1970s. AZACTU unions tend to be less
democratic and more elitist than their CUSA
counterparts.
We believe AZACTU will remain a small and
relatively unimportant factor in the black labor
movement. Its unions in the future probably will tend
to look to CUSA professionals for tactical guidance.
Press reports frequently speculate on a formal
CUSA-AZACTU merger, and, should this occur, we
expect the more pragmatic CUSA leadership to
dominate.
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CUSA to enter COSATU are likely to grow if
COSATU can demonstrate that white officials play a
subordinate role within its leadership.
Although still in an embryonic state, COSA TU
eventually plans to have a complex network of
national, regional, and local committees. Among the
most important bodies in this network are the
national congress, central executive committee, and
regional congresses:
- The national congress is to meet every two years
and elect five officers. Each affiliated union will
send one delegate per 500 members.
- These five officers, along with two representatives
for each union with under 15,000 members and
four representatives for those with over 15,000,
constitute the central executive committee, which
is to meet every three months to make important
policy decisions on behalf of the national congress.
- Regional congresses will be established to act as
administrative bodies and to elect regional
officers.
Day-to-day operation of COSA TU is the
responsibility of the general secretary and assistant
general secretary.
=policy decisions are formulated by consensus of
the national office bearers with considerable input
from Cyril Ramaphosa, leader of the powerful
National Union of Mineworkers.
Nevertheless,
we believe the federation's multiracialism
reflects the sympathies of most black workers and is
likely to win further support. COSATU executives,
for example, are working hard to lure unions away
from CUSA, and we expect that CUSA's strength is
likely to be weakened as it becomes clear that black
labor power is concentrated in COSATU hands.
CUSA's general secretary has indicated publicly that
CUSA may yet join COSATU. Pressures within
Economics Versus Politics. COSATU also attempts
to bridge two other strands in black labor: the worker-
orientation of the old FOSATU unions-which put
primary emphasis in the short-term on bread-and-
butter issues-and the more activist stance of unions
affiliated with the UDF. When the ANC urged more
political activism during its meeting with COSATU
in Lusaka in March 1986, COSATU officials insisted
that they would concentrate only on worker issues but
would define them broadly enough to include pass
laws, job reservation, and education. In practice, this
compromise has meant that COSATU leaders have
given at least nominal support for UDF-led consumer
boycotts and foreign disinvestment, while, at the same
time, focusing most of their energies on attracting
unions and building membership
International Labor Connections. 25X1
divisions over whether COSATU 25X1
should affiliate with international labor federations
has cost it outside educational and financial
assistance. COSATU, for example, has refused to
affiliate with or accept funds directly from the pro-
25X1
Western International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (ICFTU), and ICFTU affiliates have been 25X1
unwilling to provide funds to COSATU on a bilateral
A COSATU delegation visited Western Europe in
March 1986 in an effort to gain funds directly from
national labor movements.
most of the labor groups resisted, and suggested
that the federation work through the existing ICFTU
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Table 2
COSATU: Ten Major Member Unions
Union/ Characteristics Leadership Membership a
Signed Up/(Paid-Up)
Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU). Former R. Crompton (white), General Secretary 20,700 (20,700)
FOSATU affiliate. CWIU was at the center of two C. Makgaleng (black), President
highly visible labor issues. 5,000 members were
dismissed from the coal-to-oil company during the
massive work stayaway in Transvaal Province in
November 1984, but most eventually were rehired.
Death from head injuries of CWIU executive member
Andries Raditsela shortly after his release from
detention last year triggered widespread protest.
Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union of Emma Mashinini (black), General Secretary 50,300 (50,300)
Formerly unaffiliated, but M. Ledwaba (black), President
.
South Africa (CCA WUSA)
loosely associated with CUSA. Has largely female
membership. Mashinini, probably top female labor
leader, plans to retire soon. CCAWUSA is one of a few
COSATU unions with large Colored and Indian
membership. Has grown rapidly in recent years, called
frequent strikes, and won some maternity benefits for
members. Ledwaba is second vice president of
COSATU.
Food and Canning Workers Union (FCWU). Previously
unaffiliated, member of SACTU in 1950s. Current
FCWU resulted in 1985 from merger between Colored
FCWU, and parallel African FCWU with Sweet Food
and Allied Workers Union.
General and Allied Workers Union (GAWU). UDF
affiliate. One of the most militant UDF unions; is
pushin COSATU to more actively support UDF and
ANC
Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU). Former
FOSATU affiliate. Pushing for industrywide bargaining
to establish base wages and benefits, plus plant-level
bargaining. Has been leader in use of protests,
stayaways, consumer boycotts, and similar tactics in
support of industrial disputes. Hit by breakaway in 1984
when former General Secretary was expelled for alleged
"financial mismanagement." Detention of MAWU
official Moses Mayekiso earlier this year attracted
international attention.
National Automobile and Allied Workers Union
(NAAWU). Former FOSATU affiliate. Has suffered
badly from impact of recession on membership and
ability to win higher wages. Union currently is involved
in merger talks with MAWU and independent Motor
Industry Combined Workers Union.
National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). Former CUSA
affiliate. Has grown dramatically since founding in 1982
to become largest union in South Africa. General
Secretary Ramaphosa is one of best known and most
influential black labor leaders. COSATU President
Barayi is NUM vice president.
Jan Theron (white), General Secretary
Irwin Pereira (white), President
26,500 (26,500)
Monde Mditshwa (black), General Secretary
Samson Ndou (black), President
34,000 (19,100)
Thembi Nabe (black), General Secretary
Jeffrey Vilane (black), President
42,500 (36,800)
Fred Sauls (Colored), General Secretary
J. Harris (Colored), President
20,300 (20,300)
Cyril Ramaphosa (black), General Secretary
James Motlatsi (black), President
250,000 (120,000)
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Table 2
COSATU: Ten Major Member Unions (continued)
National Union of Textile Workers (NUTW). Former
FOSATU affiliate. Union is strong in Natal. Has links
with unions in Europe, and is member of the
International Textile, Garment, and Leather Workers
Federation.
South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU). UDF
affiliate. SAAWU is an Eastern Cape-based general
workers union with a long history of political activism.
Leadership split occurred in 1984 as a result of alleged
financial irregularities. Has had numerous officials
detained, or otherwise harassed, by South African
Government and by officials of nominally independent
Ciskei. Four SAAWU officials, including Gqweta, still
are on trial for treason, charges having been dropped
early this year against their 12 codefendents.
Sweet Food and Allied Workers Union (SFAWU).
Former FOSATU affiliate. Organized successful
consumer boycott of company that fired 400 SFAWU
workers in 1984. Currently in merger talks with FCWU.
Former General Secretary Jay Naidoo is now COSATU
general secretary, while Dlamini is COSATU first vice
president.
Membership a
Signed Up/(Paid-Up)
John Copelyn (white), General Secretary
23,200 (23,200)
Nelson Mthombeni (white), President
Bonile Tuluma (black), Acting General Secretary
27,000 (25,000)
Thozamile Gqweta, President
a Membership figures reflect union claims and may be inflated for
some unions.
committee that coordinates aid to South African labor despite their agreement in principle to do so, UDF-
groups. Officials later asked the International Labor affiliated unions not tied to specific industries will be
Organization to act as a financial clearinghouse for reluctant to merge with existing industrial unions.
money from other groups, but it did offer its normal
funds for training and travel.
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COSATU's Political Stance
We believe that COSATU is struggling to determine 25X1
its role in black politics. At the group's inaugural
rally, president Elijah Barayi made several highly
charged political statements, including exhortations to
blacks to burn pass books and refuse to pay taxes and
rents. black political 25X1
activists-including those in the UDF-believe that
COSATU can become an important force in fighting
for black rule. Nevertheless, the federation's leaders,
on balance, have proceeded cautiously on their
Industrial Unionism. COSATU has committed itself
to merging its varied industrially or regionally based
constituent unions into one union for each of 12
industrial groups, and merger talks reportedly are
now under way among several member unions.
Although efforts to create a new 100,000-member
metal and automobile industries union appear most
promising, in our judgment, longstanding differences
between existing unions may complicate and perhaps
delay the merger. More generally, we anticipate that,
political agenda.
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COSATU rhetoric follows closely that of the UDF,
including socialist principles-such as the need to
restructure society, worker control of wealth, and
nationalization of South Africa's mines and
industries-and calls for equal education and political
rights. The federation's stand on negotiations with
Pretoria also closely parallels that of the UDF,
demanding.the release of all political prisoners, return
of exiles, and unbanning of all political groups before
negotiations can begin.
OSATU leaders disagree over the
proper relationship between the federation and the
ANC and UDF. Assistant General Secretary
Mafumadi and leaders of at least two major affiliates
are pressing for more active support for these groups.
They are opposed by several smaller unions who have
strongly criticized COSATU leaders for being
subservient to the ANC
I These small unions reportedly have charged
that the ANC is not committed to organized labor,
citing the ANC's failure to consult with labor leaders
before meeting with South African businessmen in
Lusaka last September.
We expect that the federation will continue its policy
of retaining formal independence from all political
groups but agreeing to talk with any group that
advocates black liberation. COSATU leaders, for
example, have met with ANC representatives outside
South Africa on at least two occasions.
although
there was broad agreement between the two groups on
the long-term goals of establishing majority rule and
redistributing wealth in South Africa, COSATU
leaders made it clear that their first priority is to build
a strong labor organization by concentrating on
we believe COSATU leaders believe they possess a
stronger internal organization than the ANC and
UDF, and that they have better near-term prospects
for success. These leaders probably also believe there
is more to be lost than gained by developing a direct
association with either group, and that open
collaboration risks a strong response by Pretoria.
Nevertheless, we expect that COSATU will continue
to recognize the ANC as the major spokesman for
black political aspirations, given its symbolic
importance to blacks and the affinity that many
COSATU leaders have for it.
COSATU and the Zulus. COSATU's support for
foreign disinvestment and denunciation of black
homelands and homeland leaders has put it in direct
confrontation with KwaZulu Chief Minister Gatsha
Buthelezi. Press reporting indicates that COSATU
denuciations of the proposed KwaZulu-Natal joint
administration as another mechanism of apartheid
rule have further enraged Buthelezi.
We believe these factors encouraged Chief Buthelezi
to launch his own, Inkatha-backed labor union, the
United Workers' Union of South Africa, which was
formally inaugurated on 1 May at a rally in Durban.
Buthelezi has stated publicly that he believes that
COSATU is anti-Inkatha and a front for the ANC,
and the Inkatha Central Committee has urged all
Inkatha members who are also members of COSATU
to report any anti-Inkatha talk from COSATU
executives. COSATU leaders have responded by
charging that the Inkatha union will be a
"sweetheart" or employer-supported union.
and suggest no firmly established position.
Buthelezi clearly believes worker concern over
possible loss of jobs as a result of foreign
disinvestment will gain support for his union, but it
may be that the politicization of black workers has
reached a stage where some are willing to put
liberation before employment. The extent of rank-
and-file support for COSATU's advocacy of socialism
and foreign disinvestment is unclear, in our judgment.
Public opinion surveys among blacks are ambiguous
e
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Secret
Biographies
Jay Naidoo
Political activist Jay Naidoo, an Indian and a veteran
trade union official, has served as general secretary
of COSA TU since the federation was inaugurated
last year. His election may reflect the organization's
desire to project a nonracial image. An outspoken
critic of Pretoria, Naidoo believes that traditional
labor issues cannot be separated from general
political concerns. He supports many of the goals of
the outlawed African National Congress and has met
several times with external ANC officials since he
assumed his post.
Naidoo began his political activities in the mid-1970s
at the University of Durban, where he was a member
of the now-banned South African Students'
Organization. Before joining COSA TU he served as
general secretary of the Sweet Food and Allied
Workers' Union. His recent election to the executive
committee of the National Union of Mineworkers
(COSATU's largest affiliate) was probably directly
related to the prestige he has gained in his COSA TU
post. Naidoo is in his early thirties.
Sydney Mafumadi
Assistant general secretary Sydney Mafumadi is
COSATU's most militant senior official, in our view.
Mafumadi, who is also publicity secretary of the
Transvaal branch of the antiapartheid United
Democratic Front, wants COSA TU to give greater
public support to both the UDF and the outlawed
African National Congress, according to press
reports. US diplomats say that 25X1
he dislikes the United States and that he has urged
other senior COSA TU officials to limit the
federation's relations with the International Congress 25X1
of Free Trade Unions and other pro-Western
organized labor groups. He has told US officials that
he believes that traditional labor issues are closely
tied to political and social concerns.
Mafumadi was expelled from high school in the mid-
1970s because of his involvement in antigovernment 25X1
political activities. Before he joined COSA TU, he
served as general secretary of the UDF-affiliated
General and Allied Workers' Union. He is in his late
twenties.)
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Elijah Barayi
Elijah Barayi has served as COSA TU president since
the federation's founding. Poorly educated and
previously a minor figure in the labor movement, we
believe he owes his election to the presidency to his
close ties to Cyril Ramaphosa, the most influential
black labor leader in the country and head of the
National Union of Mineworkers, COSATU's largest
ciliate. Barayi exercises limited authority in his
largely ceremonial post, but he has emerged as a
prominent spokesman for black labor, lambasting
Pretoria's policies and calling on workers and
students to unite to topple the white minority regime.
Barayi, about 55, was a member of the ANC from the
late 1940s until the organization was banned in 1960.
Barayi, who also serves as vice president of the NUM,
has worked in the mining industry since 1964 and is
currently a personnel assistant at Rand Mines.
In any event, we expect that tribal and regional
loyalties will dominate ideological concerns in Natal
Province, Buthelezi's stronghold. The rivalry-
probably marked by occasional violent clashes-will
create problems for COSATU in Natal. Although
thousands of COSATU members also belong to
Inkatha, according to press reports, Buthelezi appears
intent on using his political resources to boost his
union. Moreover, given that COSATU's major area
Chris Dlamini
Chris Dlamini, one of the country's most important
black labor leaders, has served as COSATU'sfrst
vice president since the founding of the federation.
Described by US diplomats as a "diamond in the
rough, " Dlamini emerged from relative obscurity in
late 1984, when, as president of the now-defunct
Federation of South African Trade Unions, he led a
highly successful work stayaway in Transvaal
Province. Like many COSATU officials, he does not
distinguish between traditional labor concerns and
political and social issues.
In addition to his COSATUpost, Dlamini is
president of the 19,600-strong Sweet Food and Allied
Workers Union and works full-time at a Kellogg
International cereal plant. Dlamini, who was
president of FOSATUfrom 1982 until 1985, is about
39 years old.
of strength is South Africa's industrial and mining
heartland in Transvaal Province, the Inkatha-backed
group probably is better placed to establish a firm
toehold in Natal's sugar- and tourism-based economy.
Nationally, Inkatha is less likely to have success
against COSATU. Even if it joins forces with
TUCSA-a white-led federation favoring capitalism
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with US officials.
we believe that rank- 25X1
Alec Erwin
Alec Erwin, COSATU's director of education is white
and has long been involved in organizing black labor.
He and other white officials in COSA TU, however,
maintain low profiles because of black racial
sensitivities. Despite his liberal reputation and strong
support for COSATU's political platform, Erwin is a
traditional trade unionist who would prefer that the
federation concentrate on bread-and-butter issues,
say US diplomats. Erwin, who is critical of US
regional policy, is reserved in his infrequent meetings
Erwin, a former college economics lecturer, studied
at the University of Natal and at York University in
the United Kingdom. He has been associated with
black labor organizations since the mid-1970s,
occupying positions in a Durban-based labor council
and in the National Union of Textile Workers. Before
joining COSATU, Erwin was with the Federation of
South African Trade Unions, an umbrella
organization that was disbanded after the formation
of COSATU. Erwin, 38, served as FOSATU's general
secretary (1979-82) and director of education (1982-
Outlook for Political Activism
So long as the unrest in black townships persists, we
expect COSATU's leadership will experience growing
pressure to take a more active political stance. Failure
to do so risks being branded by political activists as
"collaborating" with the government or as irrelevant
to the broader aspirations of blacks. Moreover,F_
and-file members of some constituent unions are
pressing union leaders to speak out on political issues.
Finally, many COSATU officials appear motivated
by personal conviction to move the new federation
firmly into the political fray.
We believe, however, that COSATU will continue to
move with caution. Its leaders appear to recognize the
tendency for black labor unions to become bogged
down in political activism after an initial period of
success in organizing workers. Historical documents
report that black unions have found it difficult to
translate their economic leverage into political gain
and have the tendency to become divided over tactical
and ideological differences when faced with
government repression. For its part, Pretoria already
has shown a willingness to thwart COSATU by
denying passports for officials on at least two
occasions. Although we believe the government
recognizes that COSATU provides tangible evidence
of the significance of the 1979 labor reforms and
would prefer to avoid taking direct action against the
federation, Pretoria clearly is willing to do so if it feels
threatened by growing labor activism.
While seeking to avoid provoking an open conflict
with the government, we believe that COSATU
leaders will continue to try to tie economic actions to
larger political goals. As such, we expect more actions
similar to the work stayaway which demanded a 1
May holiday-a clear political goal-but which also
was directly related to the workplace. COSATU also
has joined the call for a 16 June stayaway in
85).
black industrial workers or miners.
and opposing foreign disinvestment-we do not
believe that Buthelezi's union could seriously
challenge COSATU over the near term in organizing
commemoration of the 1976 Soweto riots. The extent
of worker participation in the 16 June stayaway may
provide clearer signals of the willingness and ability of
COSATU to move toward pursuing a broader
political agenda.
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South Africa:
Hard Times for Progressives
The Progressive Federal Party (PFP), South Africa's
official white opposition group, long has laid claim to
being the party of racial reform.
efforts by the ruling National
Party (NP) to portray a more moderate image of
commitment to change has undercut support for the
PFP. The resignation early this year of the PFP's
popular Afrikaner leader has magnified the problems
of the party, which probably will lose its status as the
official opposition when the next general election is
held, no later than 1989.
Recent Challenges
Since its founding in 1977, the PFP consistently has
advocated sweeping reforms designed to draw South
African blacks into government. Although opposing
"one man, one vote," the PFP has called for a federal
structure of self-governing states, with a federal
parliament-based on proportional party
representation-elected through universal franchise.
Whites would be protected by a minority veto. In
addition, the PFP has argued for a single South
African citizenship, the removal of all racially
discriminatory laws, passage of a bill protecting
individual and minority rights, and a general bill of
rights. In the short term, its platform advocates the
scrapping or amending of laws segregating residential
areas, an end to the government's suppression of
extraparliamentary opposition groups and military
conscription, and a dramatic increase in spending for
education and social services. The PFP also has called
for the release of Nelson Mandela, the jailed African
National Congress leader
however,= the PFP's
claim tote reformist mantle among white political
parties has been undercut as the NP has accepted the
need for significant changes. In recent years, the NP
has implemented or adopted as its own, numerous
planks of the PFP's platform. Most recently, the NP
announced plans to scrap more than 30 laws
restricting the movement of blacks, including the
25X1
The Progressive Federal Party emerged as the 25X1
official opposition party in 1977, winning 17 seats in
Parliament compared with the majority NP's 134
seats. The party won 26 seats in 1981. Public support . ,
for the PFP has fluctuated close to 20 percent in
recent years, according to opinion surveys. In
October, 19.8 percent of white South Africans
supported the PFP, up from 17.8 percent early in 25X1
1985 and down from a high of 20.2 percent in mid-
The PFP-now with 25 seats-is the largest
opposition party in Parliament. Public opinion
surveys reveal, however, that rightwing party gains in
popular support have far outstripped advances made
by the PFP. The rightwing Conservative Party in
particular has made strong gains against the
National Party in Orange Free State Province,
according to opinion surveys, and the
ultraconservative Herstigte Nasionale Party won. its
first seat in Parliament in a Transvaal Province
constituency last year.
PFP supporters are among the most liberal whites in
South Africa. According to a poll late last year, 95
percent of PFP supporters believe power-sharing with
blacks is inevitable, compared to 70 percent of NP
supporters. The same survey showed that 93 percent
of PFP supporters-compared with 55.4 percent of
NP supporters-believe Pretoria's pace of reform is 25X1
too slow. Only 30 percent of PFP supporters believe
there has been a "departure "from apartheid in 25X1
South Africa, compared to 76 percent of NP
supporters. 25X1
hated "pass book" system that required blacks to
carry documents certifying their right to be in areas
reserved for whites.
Secret
ALA AR 86-010
16 May 1986
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The PFP has attempted to counter the NP reforms by
stressing that fundamental differences between the
two parties remain. Former party leader Frederik Van
Zyl Slabbert noted in public statements last year that,
unlike the NP, the PFP believes all groups-rather
than whites alone-should decide on a new
constitution through negotiation and compromise. In
addition, the PFP advocates have emphasized than
they back a pluralist system based on voluntary party
association rather than the NP scenario, which still
calls for future political arrangements based on racial
or ethnic group membership. Moreover, the PFP has
emphasized that its calls for equal citizenship rights
for all blacks in South Africa and its strong criticism
of repressive security laws also continue to distinguish
it from the NP.
Despite these efforts, analysis of polls and voting
returns suggests that the PFP is having a difficult
time holding its supporters in line. Many traditional
PFP backers, for example, voted for the 1982
referendum that created white, Colored, and Indian
chambers in Parliament even though the PFP
leadership urged a no vote because of the exclusion of
blacks. More ominously for the PFP, recent polls
suggest that, although a majority of whites believe the
NP is moving too slowly to implement reforms, they
see the NP, rather than the PFP, as the most viable
party to pursue reform.
Problems with Leadership and Direction
The PFP's problems have been compounded, in our
judgment, by the resignation of its popular Afrikaner
leader Slabbert
Slabbert's resignation has rekindled the debate over
whether the PFP should seek to gain credibility
among blacks by remaining an outspoken critic of NP
policies or concentrate on maximizing support among
whites. Slabbert-
a strong proponent of seeking wider support among
whites-had been able to moderate conflict between
these factions. Once outside the party, Slabbert has
reversed course somewhat and now advocates
extraparliamentary politics, calling for Pretoria to
negotiate with "legitimate" black leaders, including
the outlawed African National Congress. Last month
he spoke at a rally called to promote increased white
participation in the multiracial, antiapartheid United
Democratic Front (UDF).
Slabbert's replacement, Colin Eglin-an English
speaker-was party leader before Slabbert and,
is viewed by
many party supporters as an uninspiring choice ill
suited to reinvigorate the party. Nevertheless, the US
Embassy reports that his role in suggesting that the
party investigate the Langa shootings last year and in
the establishment of commissions to monitor unrest in
the western Cape has won him some credit among
party insiders. Eglin has indicated that he wants the
party to pursue negotiations with black leaders and
involve nonwhites more directly in the party by
wooing Coloreds and Indians in Parliament, and
blacks outside Parliament.
Eglin and the "old
guard" are likely to face an increasingly serious
challenge from a new generation of PFP supporters.
Three so-called young lions recently were elected to
high visibility positions in the PFP leadership as some
prominent moderates in the party were excluded from
the new executive. Press reports have speculated that
these new party leaders eventually will be able to oust
Eglin.
Outlook
In our judgment, the PFP will have difficulty holding
onto the "liberal" end of the white political spectrum.
The NP's success in portraying itself as the party with
the ability to implement-rather than merely
propose-reforms probably will drive the Progressives
to the left, perhaps turning more to
extraparliamentary activities such as monitoring
unrest, investigating security force abuses, and
attempting to serve as a bridge between white
politicians and black political activists. In this role,
the PFP will continue to act as a counterweight to the
growing conservative voices in the white community
by raising its views in Parliament and trying to press
the NP to institute further reforms. If rightwing
influence increases dramatically, which now seems
likely, we believe the PFP may form an electoral pact
or coalition with reformists in the NP, particularly if
more conservative NP members bolt the party and
join forces with the conservative parties.
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Angola's Cabinda Province-
Vital and Vulnerable
The oil-rich exclave of Cabinda is an indispensable,
but potentially vulnerable, source of economic wealth
for the Angolan Government. Cabinda accounts for
almost 70 percent of Angola's total oil production-its
primary source of foreign exchange. An attack last
March by guerrillas of the National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) on Chevron-
Gulf's main oil installation suggests that Cabinda
could become a growing security problem for Luanda.
The exclave is also an operating ground for the small
and largely inactive Front for the Liberation of the
Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC), a guerrilla group
committed to the independence of Cabinda. Sporadic
UNITA and FLEC operations against the oil
facilities have forced the Angolans to divert military
resources
so far have prevented any interruption of oil
production
Physical Description and Demography
Cabinda is a small coastal province of 7,270 square
kilometers, approximately the size of Delaware.
Barely above sea level, Cabinda is located north of the
Zaire River estuary and is separated from Angola
proper by a 60-kilometer-wide strip of Zaire. Cabinda
shares its northern boundary with Congo. Except for
the rain forest in the northeast, a convenient shelter
for FLEC insurgents, most of the exclave is an
extension of Angola's coastal plain.
Most of Cabinda's population of 133,000 belongs to
the Bakongo ethnic group and speaks a dialect of the
Bantu language that is common to southern Africa.
Cabindans have more in common with their neighbors
than with the ethnic groups in Angola proper. Five
different subtribes comprise the Bakongo within
Cabinda: the Vili tribe, which is found along the coast
as far north as Gabon; the Yombe, which extends into
Congo; and the Sundi, Kikongo, and Oyo, which
reach into Zaire. The Yombe inhabit the rain forest of
Mayombe and are isolated from the other Cabindan
tribes. Most of the southern Kikongo and Oyo peoples
migrated to the port of Cabinda and actively sought
Cabinda has traditionally been a contested area.
Until the 15th century, the area was inhabited by
three African kingdoms-the Kongo, Ngoye, and
Loango-that spread well beyond Cabinda's present
border. In 1482, lured by the lucrative slave trade,
the Portuguese arrived in the port of Tchiowa, later
known as Cabinda, and were subsequently joined by
the French and the British. In 1783, the French
occupied the port but were constantly challenged by
the Dutch and the British. At the end of the 19th
century, the Portuguese established a firm foothold
in Cabinda when it signed treaties with each of the
three kingdoms granting Lisbon exclusive trading 25X1
rights in exchange for protection against Belgium's
expanding colonial empire in present-day Zaire. 25X1
Under agreements among European colonial powers
reached at the 1884-85 Conference of Berlin, Cabinda
became a Portuguese protectorate administered
directly from Lisbon, and Angola became a
Portuguese colony. In 1956, Portugal began
governing both Cabinda and Angola from Luanda,
and two years later, incorporated the two regions for
administrative convenience. When the Alvor
Agreement was signed that led to independence for
Angola in November 1975, Cabinda was declared "an
inalienable part of Angola" and became a province. 25X1
assimilation into the modern sector. The Cabindans
are considered fine craftsmen and fishermen, and
generally have a higher standard of living than most
Africans in Angola.
Economic Significance
In 1985, the oil produced by the Cabinda-Gulf
Company accounted for 70 percent of Angola's total
petroleum output.' Other important minerals include
'The Cabinda-Gulf Company is jointly owned by SONANGOL,
Angola's energy agency (51 percent) and Chevron-Gulf (49
percent). This company handles Cabinda's entire oil output.
Secret
ALA AR 86-010
16 May 1986
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Secret
undeveloped deposits of manganese, potassium, and
phosphates. Forests cover two-thirds of the territory
and are Angola's largest source of wood. A new
company was established with Cuban assistance in
1983 to exploit Cabinda's timber resources. The
timber center of Buco Zau is located in the Mayombe
jungle, an area especially vulnerable to FLEC
guerrilla operations. Cabinda's main crops include
palm oil, bananas, coffee, and cocoa
Oil. When the Angolan civil war erupted in 1975, oil
production continued normally until December of that
year; Gulf then announced that, at the request of the
US Department of State, operations would be
suspended and its personnel withdrawn. Production
was taken over by the Soviet Union until April 1976,
when Gulf resumed its operations in Cabinda at the
request of the MPLA government
The Cabinda-Gulf facilities are an enticing target for
insurgent sabotage. The largest onshore facility,
located in,Malongo, has been the target of isolated,
small-scale attacks by UNITA and FLEC.forces. To
date, however, neither group appears to have the
necessary logistic capabilities to carry out an attack
that'would disrupt, oil production. The government
increased security measures at the oil facilities, first
in 1981 in response to a UNITA attack, and, again in
1985, as a resul of an abortive South African
commando raid.
there are 1,300 Cuban combat troops. and over 2,000
Angolan troops in Cabinda.
The Cabindan Independence Movement
The Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of
Cabinda is an umbrella group that was founded in
1963 to unite several black nationalist liberation
movements. Since its founding, personal rivalries have
seriously weakened FLEC's effectiveness. During the
1960s and early 1970s, the two major factions
continued to function unilaterally, one based in Congo
and the other in Zaire. Militarily, FLEC remained
largely dormant until the coup in Portugal in April
1974. Encouraged by Angola's imminent
independence, Cabindan nationalism soared, and, in
November 1974, FLEC launched several unsuccessful
attacks from Zaire into Cabinda. In July 1975, FLEC
factions, in anticipation of independence, announced
the creation of rival provisional governments. FLEC
continued its sporadic attacks in Cabinda, forcing the
MPLA to call on the Cubans for assistance in
protecting the oil installations.
Ever since independence and the 1975-76 civil war,
Luanda's vastly superior. forces and factionalism
within FLEC have allowed the MPLA government to
maintain control over the exclave. At present, there
are two main FLEC factions, one led by Henriques
N'zita Tiago, and the other by a FLEC military
official, Gen. Francisco Xavier Lubota. N'zita's
faction is significantly larger and militarily more
active. N'zita's faction
consists of several thousand guerrillas, while Lubota's
faction probably numbers in the hundreds.
Neither faction receives external support, causing
severe materiel and logistic problems. Both have
unsuccessfully approached Zaire for financial and
materiel assistance. The N'zita faction also
approached the US Embassy in Kinshasa as recently
as February 1986.
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In our view, FLEC's small and poorly
equipped forces would not be much assistance to
UNITA leader Savimbi, although they could help
UNITA locate targets.
A lasting FLEC-UNITA union is difficult to envision,
as frictions between the groups run deep and are well
documented. Both groups want to expel Angolan and
Cuban forces from Cabinda, but they disagree on the
fundamental question of Cabinda's political status.
UNITA sees Cabinda as an integral part of Angola,
while FLEC seeks independence. Thus, FLEC is
unlikely to support UNITA's efforts without first
extracting a compromise on the issue on Cabindan
autonomy-a compromise UNITA is unlikely to give.
In addition, the two groups differ ethnically:
UNITA's support is largely Ovimbundu from Central
Angola, not Bakongo.
FLEC and the MPLA
According to US Embassy reporting, the N'zita
faction and the MPLA have discussed periodically the
possibility of reconciliation, most recently in February
in Brazzaville. The two sides could agree only to meet
again in Zambia at an unspecified date. The N'zita
faction and the MPLA reportedly agreed to a cease-
fire in 1985, and discussed the issue of greater
autonomy for Cabinda. Press reports indicate that
N'zita's faction has proposed holding a referendum in
the exclave to determine whether the people want to
remain part of Angola or opt for independence.
According to the press, the Luanda government is
prepared to grant a measure of autonomy to the
Cabindans in matters of social and economic
development. Since Luanda is unlikely to give up its
hold on Cabinda and its oil reserves, negotiations will
probably remain stalemated.
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