NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000301260001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 23, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of ~ COPY
Intelligence
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Near East and
South Asia Review
12(o
NESA NESAR 86-012
23 May 1986
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Emerging Issues in the Middle East and South Asia
Many of the major problems that will face the Middle East and
South Asia over the next several years will be variations of existing,
long-festering difficulties, but there is no reason to assume that the
region will not experience dramatic new developments in the next
decade comparable to those that have occurred since 1976.
Arab States: Social Changes Increase the Appeal of Islamic 5
problems.
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Social dislocations triggered by changing economic conditions are
continuing to heighten the appeal of Islamic fundamentalism in the
Middle East. Fundamentalism is attractive because it offers
simplistic solutions to seemingly intractable social and economic
Jordan's Yarmuk University: Flashpoint for Unrest?
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pressing social and economic problems.
Campus unrest in early May at Yarmuk University demonstrates
growing student frustration with King Hussein's centralized
governing style, poor employment opportunities, and subversive
efforts by a minority of radical activists, and future unrest will
depend largely on Hussein's ability to find solutions for Jordan's
Syria: Implications of Economic Decline
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The economic crisis in Syria has begun to hurt all.segments of
Syrian society, but the Assad regime seems unwilling to take the
necessary steps to reverse the decline. Although economic problems
place new pressures on the regime, President Assad has sufficient
power to control the political impact.
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NESA NEASR 86-012
23 May 1986
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Soviet-Syrian Relations: The View From Damascus) 17
The compatibility of Syrian and Soviet interests in the Middle East
has led to close and mutually supportive policies in most cases. Syria
believes that it basically is in control of the relationship; that it can,
within limits, manipulate Moscow to achieve its goals; and that it
has Soviet influence within Syria well in hand.
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Sikh Militants: Divided, Down, But Not Out
The Indian Government's evolving strategy-employing political
concessions and security crackdowns simultaneously in dealing with
Sikh militants in Punjab-is paying dividends. The militants, while
crippled, will continue-and perhaps step up-their terrorist attacks
to keep the pressure on moderate Sikhs and New Delhi.
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The status of Sikhs in the Indian Army remains clouded two years
after Operation Bluestar-the Army's attack on the Sikhs' Golden
Temple. The rift between Sikhs and the rest of the Army will
weaken the Indian Army and leave open the possibility of future
mutinies.
India's military is improving its ability to intervene in Sri Lanka
should that island's increasing instability force New Delhi to make
such a decision. Although Indian forces could control the major
cities and seize the most important facilities on the island in a
matter of days, they would be much less prepared for guerrilla war.
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Emerging Issues
in the Middle East
and South Asia
explores the principal forces and trends
that will drive events in the region through the next
decade and the sorts of major changes political,
social, economic, and military-that might occur
there. Its purpose is to stimulate and guide research
and analysis on the region by highlighting
possibilities and important issues rather than offering
definitive answers.
Many of the major problems that will face the Middle
East and South Asia over the next several years will
be variations of existing, long-festering difficulties.
There is no reason to assume, however, that the region
will not experience dramatic new developments in the
next decade comparable to those that occurred during
the past 10 years, such as Egyptian President Sadat's
peace initiative toward Israel, the Iranian revolution,
and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
An issue already with us that will assume a different
form in the mid-1990s is the impact of the world oil
market on the region. By 1995 oil prices may once
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again be skyrocketing. If so, we are likely to be faced 25X1
with a rejuvenated, reorganized, and perhaps a 25X1
trimmed-down OPEC that will be a potent regional
and political organization as well as an economic
cartel.
In the near term, however, the region must weather
the economic and political effects of lower oil prices.
The issues that a soft oil market pose for the region
are:
? Economic effects. How severe will be such problems
as debt servicing, capital flight, increased 25X1
dependence on foreign aid, a brain drain, and slow
growth?
? Political impact. How will regimes handle the hard
choices between implementing economic austerity
now to pave the way for future development versus
buying off discontented groups to preempt
challenges to regime authority?
? Interstate relations. How sharp will disagreements
become among oil producers trying to maintain
revenues, and how aggressive will larger, resource-
poor states be in trying to extract aid and other
concessions from smaller, richer neighbors?
In addition to the oil glut, the region will face
problems associated with a shortage of other natural
resources. There will almost certainly be discord over
access to water-particularly in the Levant, the
Fertile Crescent, and the Nile Valley. Land resources,
especially in South Asia, will be taxed by population
growth and bad management.
In the face of these problems, governments will try
new ideological, political, and economic formulas.
Many regimes will take steps to privatize portions of
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NESA NESAR 86-012
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their economies-particularly agriculture, small
industry, domestic commerce, and foreign trade.
Economic liberalization and the enlargement of the
middle class may prompt expanded political
participation, calling into question the future role of
several of the region's monarchies. In other
countries-probably including Syria, Iraq, Iran, and
Morocco-continued authoritarianism and popular
alienation from politics are more likely. In still other
states, heightened instability may prompt increased
repression and possibly lead to radical populist
regimes.
Although we will search for early signs of the next
broad, regional ideological trend-comparable to pan-
Arabism in the 1950s and 1960s and Islamic
fundamentalism in the 1970s and 1980s-we need to
concentrate on analyzing the parochial sentiments
and concerns that will shape the ideologies in
individual states in the region. The most significant
currents are likely to be:
? State-oriented nationalism. Arab unification efforts
by Libyan leader Qadhafi and others will continue
but will inspire little enthusiasm.
? Religious revivalism. Rather then asking whether
religious sentiment in general is rising or waning, we
will be looking at contests between reformist,
conservative, modernist, or other strains of Islam
and the more extreme fundamentalist movements.
Hindu revivalism in India will assume equally
diverse forms, while religious extremism might
increasingly polarize Israeli politics.
? Pragmatism. The region is likely to see much
ideological eclecticism, as even those regimes that
have a strong revolutionary ideology pay less
attention to party dogma than to what works.
We can assume that in many cases the new solutions
will not work and that many regimes will face serious
internal instability. As a result of the economic
slowdown, existing inequalities and competition
among social groups will be magnified. In the more
heterogeneous states (Algeria, North Yemen, Sudan,
Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, India, and Pakistan, for
example), religious and ethnic divisions are likely to
sharpen. In more homogeneous societies (such as
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, and Tunisia), class
distinctions will become the focus of economic and
political competition.
The increasingly uneven distribution of job
opportunities will spur the migration of labor, causing
economic dislocations, social friction, and political
tensions in both the sending and receiving areas.
Returning workers from the oil-producing states will
become more disaffected as they fail to find new jobs.
Migration to the cities will severely strain urban
services. Large cities throughout the region will be
focal points for social tensions as well as growth, with
young city dwellers frustrated by unemployment and
high prices becoming likely participants in periodic
civil disorders.
Crime and anarchic violence could produce more
Beiruts, with central governments losing effective
control of larger cities and with rival ethnic, religious,
or class groups claiming authority over different
sectors. As disorders grow, governments are likely to
call more frequently on their armies to restore order,
increasing the politization of these forces and
undermining their external defense missions. The
unrest will bring opportunities for meddling by
unfriendly neighboring states or by the USSR.
The management of social and economic problems
will be complicated by a spate of leadership changes,
after a decade or more of surprising continuity.
need examine the role of various interest groups,
including students, internal security elements, and the
military to explain what may come to be a wave of
military coups.
Certain worst case scenarios growing out of internal
instability will have to be kept in mind. One is for
fractionation of unstable states along ethnic or
regional lines, with Sudan, Iran, India, and Pakistan
probably the most vulnerable. Another scenario,
which could hit the more homogeneous states as well,
is a broader political collapse and drastic
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realignment-with Egypt potentially the most
When it comes to interstate conflict, the region is
likely to be at least as unstable in the next several
years as it is now. Many external conflicts will be
fueled by nationalist, religious, and ethnic fervor as
regimes exploit restive minorities in rival neighboring
states. Moreover, inexperienced leadership and
imperfect brinkmanship will increase the risk of
armed conflict.
The Arab-Israeli stalemate is likely to remain a
fixation of Middle Eastern politics and diplomacy for'
some time to come. With domestic pressures in Israel
reducing the possibilities for a territorial settlement
and the Arabs hamstrung by disunity and a de facto
Syrian veto over settlement efforts, the risk of a new
Israeli-Syrian war, extensive violence on the West
Bank, and Palestinian unrest in Jordan will grow.
Nonetheless, we will need to be attuned to less likely
but more sanguine scenarios that would involve, if not
an outright settlement of the dispute, at least a
reduction in its intensity.
As for other interstate conflicts, the Indian
subcontinent probably will have the greatest danger of
tensions leading, inadvertently or otherwise, to a
major shooting war. In this case, Indian and Pakistani
mutual suspicions over the nuclear issue carry the risk
of preemptive action leading to war.
Elsewhere in the area, the dominant scenario is for
wars already under way to continue-especially the
two largest ones, between Iran and Iraq and in
Afghanistan. Although the possibility of expansion or
escalation of any of the conflicts, particularly the
Iran-Iraq war, will deserve continued attention, we
will also need to examine the possibilities for peace.
Specifically, we will need to look at what events could
serve as catalysts for settlement, which mechanisms
could get belligerents to the peace table, what would
be the likely terms of a settlement, and what would be
the ramifications for regional stability and US
interests.
Wars in the region will tend to be more lethal because
of the acquisition of new types of military hardware.
Nuclear programs in Pakistan, India, and Israel, and
possibly those in Iran and Iraq, will increase the
danger of a conflict or incident involving nuclear 25X1
weapons. Many countries in the region also will 25X1
develop and stockpile chemical and biological
munitions as a supplement or cheaper alternative to
nuclear weapons. During the next several years, a few
states are likely to acquire new long-range weapon
systems, and several will attempt to acquire and
exploit high technology to develop their own arms
industries.
Domestic grievances and regional tensions will fuel
additional terrorism, which is likely to become more
diverse and widespread. A growing proportion of
terrorism originating in the area is likely to feature
nihilistic violence by ad hoc groups, while regimes in
the region probably will continue a more calculated,
coercive brand of terrorism. Middle Eastern terrorists
will continue to strike targets of opportunity within
the region but are also likely to step up operations in
Europe and possibly the United States. Terrorism
within the region may undercut the legitimacy of
governments and compel some of them to curtail civil
liberties further.
The growing military potential of a few of the larger
Middle Eastern and South Asian states will
contribute to the expansion of their regional influence.
India, in particular, will use its large population,
extensive resource base, and pool of talent to secure a
major regional role. It also has the potential to
become the major naval power in the Indian Ocean by
the mid-1990s. Iran, once it extracts itself from war,
is likely to become more active in Afghanistan and
throughout the Persian Gulf, and Egypt retains the
military capability to keep the Libyans off balance
and the Sudanese mindful of political missteps.
Both the United States and the USSR will find it
more difficult to protect their interests in the area for
several reasons, including:
? The increased strength of regional powers.
? An overall trend in favor of nonalignment.
? Increased regional cooperation.
? Greater involvement of other states, including
Western Europe, Japan, China, and the newly
industrialized states of East Asia.
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As a result, we will need to be on the lookout for
where, and how far, US ties to allies in the region will
slip and where there will be the best openings for
enhanced US influence in states with traditionally
strong ties to Moscow.
Besides the factors working against both superpowers,
each will face its own obstacles to influence. The
United States will continue to be handicapped by such
things as the perception that it is ignoring Arab
interests in the Arab-Israeli dispute, fundamentalist
resentment of Western cultural intrusions, and
identification of the United States with the interests
of local elites.
The USSR will make every effort to exploit these
weaknesses but will face major handicaps of its own.
These include resentment over Afghanistan, suspicion
of Soviet expansionist and subversive intentions, the
anti-Communist aspects of Islam, and, perhaps most
of all, well-founded skepticism about the Soviets'
ability to provide sustained economic and
technological assistance. This last factor will provide
an opportunity for the United States to expand
nonpolitical ties to states that appear to remain in the
Soviet political and diplomatic orbit.
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Arab States: Social Changes
Increase the Appeal of
Islamic Fundamentalism
Social dislocations triggered by changing economic
conditions are continuing to heighten the appeal of
Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East.'
Fundamentalism is attractive because it offers
simplistic solutions to such seemingly intractable
social and economic problems as unfulfilled
expectations among educated youth, growing
unemployment as migrant workers return from major
oil-producing countries, crime, drug abuse, and
deteriorating social services in burgeoning urban
centers. Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria are
typical of Arab countries that are experiencing
different degrees of social change and fundamentalist
activity.
Economic Contraction and Social Change
Egypt. Islamic fundamentalism is the most serious
opposition force to President Mubarak's regime. After
nearly a year of calm, Egypt is experiencing another
cycle of fundamentalist activity. Declining economic
opportunities are frustrating university students and
graduates, who have been the mainstays of radical
fundamentalist groups in the past. The downturn is
proving wrong the widely held notion that education is
the key to a better life.' Good jobs are increasingly
scarce, and salaries for even educated Egyptians
usually are low. An Egyptian primary school teacher
may earn as little as $60 per month, and a graduate
with a degree in business will receive about $180 per
month in a public-sector corporation
' Islamic fundamentalism, in our view, is a symptom of the inability
of many individuals to cope with rapid social, cultural, and political
change. Radical religious movements are almost always associated
with the modification of a culture as a result of contact with a
different society. This process is usually accompanied by social
disintegration and individual emotional stress.
Z In spite of the bleak job prospects, Egyptians are persistently
pursuing educations. Even very poor Egyptians pay tutors up to $4
per hour to enhance their children's education and to compensate
for overcrowded facilities and poor teaching, according to the US
Embassy in Cairo. University medical students pay as much as
$400 per course for individual instruction.
Economic Expansion and Islamic Fundamentalism
Ironically, Islamic fundamentalism seems to grow
during periods of both economic growth and decline.
The rapid social and cultural changes that
accompanied the economic boom in the Middle East
in the 1970s and early 1980s also created an
environment for the growth of radical religious
movements:
? Migration of the rural lower classes to major cities
exaggerated the disparity in living conditions
between the cities' poor and wealthy. Conservative
migrants were also dismayed by the un-Islamic
values of the urban, Westernized elite.
? Expanding educational opportunities and the media
exposed the masses to foreign ideas and culture.
Many Middle Easterners who studied or traveled in
the West became disillusioned with Western
culture. Many educated Saudi women, for example,
particularly appreciated the traditional personal
protection afforded them by the kingdom's
conservative Islamic society.
The high demand for urban housing, declining
construction activities, and low salaries are preventing
many graduates from finding affordable housing. The
US Embassy in Cairo reports that rent-controlled
apartments ($4 to $40 per month for a large
apartment) in Cairo and Alexandria are scarce. The
price of a new apartment ranges from $6,000 in a poor
neighborhood to $30,000 in a middle-class area.
The lack of housing forces many male Egyptian
university graduates to abandon their aspirations for
their own apartment, which traditionally has been
equated with high status and enabled a man to
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arrange for a higher class marriage partner. Most
graduates are forced to accept one of several
unpleasant options:
? Pay an owner or tenant of a rent-controlled building
for the privilege of leasing an apartment. Although
illegal, such payments of "key money" are
frequently made. Payments range from $1,500 for
an old apartment in a poor area to $15,000 in a
middle-class neighborhood.
? Borrow money, if possible, from family or friends to
buy an apartment.
? Live with parents after marriage and hold several
jobs to save enough to buy an apartment.
? Postpone marriage and compete for the declining
number of jobs in the oil-producing Gulf states.
Jordan. Fundamentalists have been gaining strength
in Jordan over the past several years and are
challenging the legitimacy of King Hussein. Social
tensions are increasing as returning expatriate
workers raise unemployment, worsen the housing
shortage in Amman, and depress the hopes of
university students and graduates. Engineers and
doctors, who have been prominent figures in the
Islamic fundamentalist movement, are being hit
hardest by the return of expatriate workers.
According to the US Embassy in Amman, an official
of the Jordanian Engineers Association estimates that
30 percent of Jordan's 16,000 engineers are
unemployed. The official said that engineers are being
eased out of jobs in Saudi Arabia by employers who
offer new contracts but at drastically reduced salaries.
He believes that the increasing job shortage will most
affect recent graduates because they will have to
compete with experienced workers returning from the
Gulf. Physicans in Amman told the Embassy that as
many as a third of Jordan's 3,000 doctors are
unemployed. Despite the grim job prospects,
engineering and medicine continue to attract large
numbers of university students, which will enlarge the
pool of disillusioned youth who are likely to be an
attentive audience for fundamentalist rhetoric.
Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia still has the financial
resources to insulate many of its citizens from the
impact of falling oil revenues, but it probably cannot
cushion the population against economic realities over
the longer term if the oil market remains weak.
Educated Saudi youth are finding their job
opportunities shrinking. During the boom years of the
1970s and early 1980s, nearly all youth with
secondary educations could find well-paying jobs.
University graduates were assured of positions in
government ministries and private businesses.' Such
social dislocations born of the economic downturn are
likely to provide the environment in which more
religious fervor will grow.
Although social instability in Saudi Arabia is limited
compared with other Arab states, a few signs of social
disintegration are beginning to occur. US Embassy
reporting indicates serious crime is on the upswing,
Algeria. We believe the appeal of fundamentalism is
likely to increase as declining revenue puts more
pressure on already strained social services. With the
population increasing at more than 3 percent per year
(one of the highest growth rates in the world), housing,
education, and job opportunities are increasingly
inadequate, according to the US Embassy in Algiers.
Limited space has forced Algerian universities to use
rigorous examinations for placement. Last year, for
example, less than one-fourth of the nearly 150,000
students passed the exams. The nation's vocational
schools can absorb only about 10 percent of the youth
who do not attend a university. According to
government statistics, nearly two-thirds of the 4
million Algerians between the ages of 15 and 24 are
unemployed.
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Although unemployment has not yet erupted in
political turmoil, these unemployed youth are
beginning to respond to Islamic fundamentalism.
Some youth, according to the US Embassy in Algiers,
are turning to Islam as a shield against the
frustrations of unemployment. Others are criticizing
modernization programs that have brought US and
French television programs, rock music, and
materialism, which they believe have eroded the
Islamic principles of Algerian society.
technocrats.
Coping With Social Change
For the past two years, the Saudi Government has
made limited attempts to accommodate social change,
but major issues have been untouched. King Fahd has
repeatedly called on Islamic scholars to use
independent judgment (Ijtihad) to determine correct
Islamic methods to adopt new technology. In a
meeting in April the scholars approved such issues as
the storage of the Koran in computers and the
performance of autopsies on females by male
personnel but skirted the greater social implications of
technological change. By involving the religious
establishment in the process of cultural change, the
King probably believes he can neutralize future
fundamentalist criticism as well as appear to be
responding to the demands of modernizing
shrink.
The government has also tried to devise ways to deal
with the increasing numbers of educated Saudi
women who are trying to find a new role in the male-
dominated society. The Saudis have mounted a media
campaign aimed at finding jobs for educated women.
The campaign is given considerable legitimacy by
featuring the wives of various ruling family members
in newspaper stories advancing women's education
and employment. Although the effort to expand the
role of women is not an attempt to challenge the
established order, the US Embassy in Riyadh believes
that it may be part of an effort to cope with new
economic and social realities in the kingdom. The
government is probably attempting to find additional
opportunities for families and individuals who are
being forced to seek new sources of income as
government largess and economic opportunities
We believe Algerian President Bendjedid is
purposefully exaggerating the negative impact of the
oil price decline so that the economic realities will
seem much better than his dire predictions. Press
reports indicate Bendjedid is overstating by as much
as 50 percent the economic downturn in an attempt to
prepare Algerians for future austerity measures. The
Western press reports that Bendjedid is considering
restricting the number of Algerians going on the hajj
to Mecca and slowing construction on hospitals,
roads, and the projected subway in Algiers. Bendjedid
is calling for more self-reliance by Algerians and is
telling them to expect a reduction in imported
consumer goods, which have been in great demand
since the end of the austere regime of President
Boumediene. To blunt fundamentalist criticism, the
President has included more Islamic provisions in the
Constitution and is trying to build an Algerian
national identity based on a combination of Islamic,
socialist, and Western values, according to the US
Embassy in Algiers.
Jordan and Egypt are responding to the symptoms of
economic and social change with more traditional
political and security measures:
? Jordan is beefing up security at universities to
monitor fundamentalist activities. In May, student 25X1
frustrations at Yarmuk University turned into the
most significant antigovernment demonstrations in
many years, according to the US Embassy in
Amman. Three students died and 18 policemen
were injured when the security police entered the
campus to restore order.
? Egypt is attempting to reduce the power of campus
Islamic radicals through a tacit alliance between the
government and the more moderate Muslim
Brotherhood. The government, however, will most
likely use repression to stop radical violence if it
appears to be getting out of hand. Fearing a
repetition of the 1977 food riots, the government
will consider lowering subsidies on food and other
consumer goods only as a last resort to stave off
Egypt's looming economic crisis.
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Prospects
We expect social dislocations driven by economic
fluctuations to be a lasting feature in the Middle East.
These social and cultural changes will continue to
provide fertile ground for the growth of Islamic
fundamentalism. Fundamentalist solutions are
appealing because they transform the problems into
moral absolutes, such as:
? Society is disintegrating and the economy is
worsening because they are imitating Western, un-
Islamic models. Society will be harmonious and the
economy will be equitable if true Islam is adopted.
? Iran is in turmoil because the leaders have failed to
follow the correct path of Islam.
? Israel, the United States, un-Islamic Arab regimes,
and Western culture are responsible for the decline
in oil revenues.
Algeria's attempt to blunt the social impact of
economic downturn by shaping a new Algerian
identity probably will contribute to polarization
between the growing number of religious
conservatives and the modernized elite. We believe
most Arab regimes will join Egypt and Jordan in
attacking the symptoms of social turmoil with more
repression against fundamentalists.
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Jordan's Yarmuk University:
Flashpoint for Unrest?
Campus unrest in early May at Yarmuk University-
Jordan's second largest university, located north of
Amman-resulted in the deaths of three students
during confrontations with Jordanian security. The
demonstrations were attributed to discontent with
academic policies, but the outbreak also demonstrates
growing student frustration with King Hussein's
centralized governing style, poor employment
opportunities, and subversive efforts by a minority of
radical activists. Future student unrest will depend
largely on Hussein's ability to find solutions for
Jordan's pressing social and economic problems and
on the willingness of the government to relax its
restrictions on student organizations.
Student Discontent
The immediate cause of the May riots was the
expulsion and arrest of over 30 student "ringleaders"
who had organized demonstrations since March. US
Embassy sources say that university officials earlier
met unsuccessfully with student leaders to discuss
their grievances. After violence erupted, Jordanian
security forces cordoned off the campus and used tear
gas to disperse large numbers of rock-throwing
demonstrators. The three students who were killed
apparently were trampled to death by fleeing crowds.
In a rare move, Jordanian authorities temporarily
suspended classes and final examinations.
Student discontent at Yarmuk apparently has festered
in the past several months over increased tuition fees
and demands for greater involvement in university
decisionmaking.
initial protests began in early March when about 300
engineering students protested against fee increases
assessed for the summer session. Many Yarmuk
students come from low-income, predominantly
Palestinian families and are hardest hit by tuition
hikes.
US Embassy sources say that students at all of
Jordan's universities-Jordan, Mutah, and
Yarmuk-have become increasingly discouraged with
A University Education: The Reality
Facing Jordanian Students
More than one-third of all Jordanians-Palestinians
and East Bankers-are enrolled in full-time schools
and universities. With more than half the population
under the age of 18, there will continue to be a large
percentage of Jordanian young people attending
school and acquiring skills they believe entitle them
to attractive employment opportunities. Educational
attainment, particularly acquisition of an advanced
degree, is highly valued; engineering and medical
degrees remain the pinnacles of professional
achievement. The economic downturn in Jordan and
the Gulf however, has tarnished the value of
advanced degrees for many disenchanted students
who find themselves faced with limited job prospects.
In the 1970s and early 1980s the Gulf provided a
ready market for Jordanians, and, as a result,
Jordanian unemployment was practically
nonexistent. Continued depressed economic
conditions in the Gulf, however, have slowly
contributed to Jordan's growing unemployment and
reduced the flow of expatriate worker remittances to
Jordan. As Jordanian workers return in larger
numbers from the Gulf states, the unemployment rate
may jump dramatically from the current 8 percent to
15-20 percent by 1990. Prospects for university 25X1
graduates-whose unemployment runs significantly
higher than the national average-are further
clouded by their refusal to accept jobs in the
construction, agricultural, and service sectors. US
Embassy sources estimate that 30 percent of Jordan's
engineers and physicians are unemployed.
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bleak postgraduation employment prospects.
a growing
number of students believe a university education
does not guarantee them employment after
graduation. At a time when the job market for
university graduates is contracting, Jordanian
students are acquiring engineering and medical
degrees in record numbers. This dilemma has
generated a pervasive sense of gloom and cynicism
among student bodies
Palestinian Radicals and
Islamic Fundamentalists
The majority of Jordan's approximately 27,000
university students are not involved actively in
political or religious issues, but a radical minority
appears able to draw support by focusing on common
grievances. The US Embassy says that at Yarmuk
University a substantial minority is seeking to exploit
growing discontent over both university and national
government policies.
One serious grievance against the government centers
on the issue of religious freedom. Embassy sources say
students are sharply critical of the government's
recent move to control the Islamic clergy through a
new law prohibiting sermons on political issues in
mosques. King Hussein's letter to Prime Minister
Rifa'i in November 1985 instructing him to crack
down on the Muslim Brotherhood also caused a stir.
Despite the growing appeal of fundamentalism, the
movement remains small and disorganized-there
does not appear to be a formal network linking
Islamic groups on university campuses.
Some Palestinian student radicals also have exploited
political frustrations. The early March
demonstrations at Yarmuk had political overtones,
with many in the crowd denouncing the government
and the King's speech on 19 February that ended his
dialogue with PLO Chairman Arafat.
Efforts To Counter Student Unrest
King Hussein is attempting to neutralize student
unrest by increasing surveillance of political and
religious activists on campuses. The US Embassy says
students on both the left and the right of the political
spectrum are angry with what they see as
heavyhanded suppression by the General Intelligence
Directorate (GID). Students apparently are unhappy
with the sizable GID presence on campus and resent
the fact that they must petition the GID for clearance
These tactics appear to have eroded King Hussein's
personal image and legitimacy among students. We
believe a small but growing student minority has
come to perceive the King as a glorified, isolated
monarch running a corrupt and repressive
government. Many religious students in particular
oppose government efforts to control religion, which
they see as a side effect of a broader policy to control
radical political activity.
Outlook
Prospects for widespread, violent student disturbances
on the scale of Egypt's 1977 riots are unlikely in
Jordan's current social and political setting.
Discontent with the government may be widespread,
but most students appear preoccupied with academic
pursuits.
Nonetheless, small groups of radical Palestinians,
leftists, and fundamentalists have proved able to
generate explosive confrontations at Yarmuk
University. US Embassy officials say that if job
prospects after graduation remain bleak-as they are
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likely to be-and the government continues its
heavyhandedness in dealing with student political and
religious activity, more disturbances at Yarmuk are
likely.
King Hussein's success in preventing the further
spread of student unrest will hinge on his ability to
deal with doubts about his leadership and to find
solutions to Jordan's unemployment problems. If he
fails, he eventually could face an increasingly restive,
potentially radical group of unemployed or
underemployed professionals.
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Syria: Implications of
Economic Decline
The economic crisis in Syria has begun to hurt all
segments of Syrian society, but the Assad regime
seems unwilling to take the necessary steps to reverse
the decline. Damascus's ineffective economic policies
and excessive military expenditures have exhausted
government finances, and the black-market
crackdown in January has curtailed Syria's strong
underground economy. The impact of commodity
shortages and surging inflation on the population has
been uneven, with fixed-income workers hit hardest
by price increases.
Although economic problems place new pressures on
the regime, President Assad has sufficient power to
control the political impact. Syria's strong and
ruthless internal security apparatus, combined with
extensive price subsidies on food staples, will
discourage popular revolts for the time being. Assad's
biggest potential economic challenge may be to retain
control over Syria's powerful military leadership if
economic constraints eventually force him to cut
military spending.
Economic Conditions Worsening
The Syrian economy, in terrible shape for the past five
years, has taken a sharp downturn in the past six
months. An expanding military budget-over half of
current expenditures in 1985-and shrinking
domestic output since 1982 have wrecked government
finances. The government's severe foreign exchange
shortage has limited imports of food and other
consumer products and inputs for public- and private-
sector businesses. Shortages of necessities have forced
consumers and businesses to rely on smuggled goods
and to circumvent official channels, depriving the
government of vital foreign exchange. In the past six
months, the Syrian population has witnessed a rapid
erosion in its purchasing power as prices have risen 30
to 100 percent. There are several reasons for the
economy's inflationary spiral:
? The deterioration of the Syrian pound in offshore or
illegal markets has raised prices for illegal imports.
? Official prices have risen as subsidies have become
too costly.
? Embassy reporting indicates some hoarding in
anticipation of further price increases.
Foreign aid payments from oil-exporting donors have
fallen off with the slackening of the world oil market
and general Arab dissatisfaction with Damascus's
regional policies. Interruptions of oil shipments from
Iran have forced Syria to purchase crude oil for its
refinery operations on the spot market, further cutting 25X1
into its foreign exchange. Declining worker
remittances from the Gulf states have compounded
Syria's financial problems.
The Government's Response
The Syrian Government has taken few steps to shore
up domestic finances and reverse the decline of the
pound. In late January and early February the
government-panicked by the pound's 25-percent
drop in five weeks-arrested 1,500 moneychangers to
reduce speculation and restrict capital flight. In
March the government intensified its crackdown by
closing 154 shops in Damascus for dealing in
smuggled goods and other illegal activities. In
addition, Prime Minister Kasm issued a decree-
almost certainly endorsed by Assad-prohibiting
imports from Lebanon and tightening border controls
to restrict travel of private citizens to Lebanon. The
decree was probably aimed at pressing the
recalcitrant Lebanese Christians who profit from
illegal exports to accept the Syrian-sponsored
Tripartite Agreement, but the result was to curb
imports vital to Syria's economy. To cut government
spending and encourage conservation, official prices
on domestic products and legal imports such as tires,
steel, fuels, sugar, and coffee have been raised, but no
increase in food staple prices has been announced.
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private statements indicate he probably has a
distorted view of the situation. In a meeting with US
officials in April, Assad offered a positive view of
Syrian economic developments and gave no indication
of recognizing the extent of the recession, according to
Embassy reporting. The economy is a low priority for
Assad, and reform is usually limited to vague calls for
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Economy Minister `Imadi has tried to stimulate the
private sector, but his influence is limited and he is
opposed by the traditional Bath Party establishment
led by Prime Minister Kasm. `Imadi has devalued the
tourist exchange rate to 8.25 pounds to the US
dollar-versus the official rate of 3.90 to the dollar-
and shifted most legal commercial transactions to the
lower parallel rate of 5.40 to the dollar, which will
stimulate exports. In addition, he directed an
unpublicized change that allowed proceeds from
agricultural exports to be redeemed at the tourist rate,
which gives farmers a higher return. Despite his good
intentions, Imadi's reforms have made little impact.
Assad's support is necessary for any major policy
shift, and, thus far, he has shown no sense of urgency.
Although Assad has devoted some attention to the
economy in recent speeches, he appears relatively
unconcerned over Syria's economic crisis, and his
greater "sacrifice" and ending "corruption."
Syrians Feel the Pinch
Syria's economic crisis has touched all segments of
Syrian society, but its impact has been uneven. The
smaller shopkeepers and artisans and low-level
government workers with few means of supplementing
their incomes have been hurt the most by commodity
shortages and inflation. Many of the privileged groups
whose support is crucial to the regime-businessmen,
bureaucrats, and especially the military-have also
experienced falling living standards.
Residents of Damascus have suffered
disproportionately in the present crisis, especially
from the surging inflation. Bitterness is increasingly
apparent in Damascus. Consumers face a shortage of
vital imported goods, and business is depressed from a
lack of raw materials. Smuggling has resumed, but
only on a limited scale. The housing shortage has
worsened and will continue in the near term as
building projects are suspended for lack of
government funds. Even Assad's palatial residence
near Damascus remains unfinished. In addition to
sewage, water, and transportation problems,
electricity around Damascus is shut off for two or
more hours a day.
Government workers-mostly based in Damascus-
and others with a fixed income have seen their
purchasing power erode significantly. The US
Embassy reports that inflation averaged at least 10 to
20 percent since 1983 before accelerating over the
past six months. Meanwhile, public-sector employees
received 10- to 25-percent pay increases in late
1985-their first in five years.
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relatively better
Like Damascus, the larger cities-
Latakia, Aleppo, and Homs-depend on imports, but
there is apparently less concern with inflation and the
black-market crackdown than in Damascus, possibly
because government efforts have been less intense
than in the capital. Moreover, outside Damascus more
citizens are in the private sector and have greater
autonom to raise prices and incomes to offset
inflation
Many commodities in short supply in Damascus are
practically unobtainable in cities such as Aleppo. In
our view, this is partly because of the capital's higher
priority for the distribution of goods. In addition,
consumer goods smuggled from Lebanon are less
likely to reach cities farther from the border, such as
Aleppo. Northern Syria's economic problems are
worsened by severe shortages of water and electricity
from drought and Turkey's diversion of some
branches of the Euphrates River to flow inside its own
territory. Several hydroelectric generators located
along the Euphrates are not operating because of lack
of water.
The military elite, who supplement their incomes by
controlling smuggling out of Lebanon, have had their
activities largely curtailed in the recent crackdown.
We believe they will seek to circumvent reforms
aimed at promoting legal trade through official
channels. The US Embassy in Damascus reports that
Assad's crackdown was resisted by elements in the
Security Services. In addition, some members of the
The small minority of wealthy Syrians are also
threatened by government measures to conserve
foreign exchange. In February air fares were
increased 61 percent and the automobile sales tax was
increased 400 percent. In addition, there was
speculation over a similar increase in real estate taxes
and a higher exit fee-equivalent to $90-for Syrians
traveling abroad.
The rural poor have probably been hurt the least by
the recent downturn. They are less dependent on 25X1
imports than the urban population and less affected 25X1
by inflation. Moreover, many in the countryside have
benefited over the past decade from extensive
government efforts such as irrigation projects, rural
electrification, and paved roads. As a result, the rural
poor probably remain an important base of support
for the Bath Party and strong backers of the Assad
regime. Projects aimed at expanding the economic
infrastructure and improving living conditions in the 25X1
countryside also help stem the flow of population into
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Assad's Position Still Secure
Despite increasing criticism of the regime's economic
management, President Assad's internal position
remains strong. Popular indignation has been directed
at the military, the police, and Bath officials, as well
as others who control smuggling and feed off public
funds. Economy Minister `Imadi also faces growing
criticism for his apparent role in causing the price
increases.
Despite his strong position, Assad is conscious of the 25X1
possible political fallout from an economic crisis. He
is doubtless aware that similar economic crises have
led to political unrest in many Arab states. For the
near term, Assad will remain content to call for
greater austerity rather than risk the effects of
reform. The much needed exchange rate realignment
has been approached slowly, probably because of its
inflationary potential for food and other imports.
Although Syria's strong and ruthless internal security
apparatus makes bread riots unlikely, bread prices are 25X1
kept low through extensive subsidies-about 2.5
billion pounds in 1985. There is no evidence linking
the economy's problems to recent car bombings in
Syrian cities.
Threats to Assad's power from the military and police
apparatus resulting from the economic crisis are
unlikely. Assad has erected several competing security
services that depend on him alone for direction. The
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military leadership engaged in smuggling has the
economic strength to weather the setback imposed by
Assad's recent crackdown. It will profit when
smuggling inevitably returns to its former level.
Assad's biggest challenge in handling the military
could come if economic constraints force him to cut
the military budget and reduce arms purchases. Assad
would then have to pacify and control the large
network of profit takers associated with the military
limited scale. The net effect of the arrests has been to
erode confidence in the government, which should
stimulate capital flight.
establishment
The US Embassy in Damascus reports that Assad is
resisting cutbacks in military spending. Over the past
decade, Syria has devoted a large share of its
resources to arms purchases and overextended itself
through massive long-term debts to the Soviet Union.
We believe Assad is so determined to achieve
strategic balance with Israel that the Syrian leader
will do his utmost to avoid reducing military
expenditures.
Outlook
We believe Assad will take additional limited steps to
spur the economy but will hold to the traditional
socialist path. Efforts to reform the economy and free
the private sector will probably fall short as
entrenched military leaders and bureaucrats fight to
retain privileges. Plans of a US firm to boost crude oil
production at Syria's Thayyem field to more than
50,000 barrels per day by September have buoyed
Assad's confidence that Syria will become less
dependent on Iran and the spot market for oil
supplies. Syria's profits from the inceased output,
however, will not erase the regime's economic
problems
The black market for imports and moneychangers-
in Syria and in Amman or Beirut-will remain
integral to the Syrian economy. The black market's
pervasiveness is reflected by the numerous
government-run companies sanctioned by the Prime
Minister's office to make illegal transactions up to the
day arrest orders were issued, according to US
Embassy reporting. The crackdown has already been
eased as most of the currency dealers arrested have
been released and resumed business, although on a
enough to discourage dissidence.
The Syrian economy will probably deteriorate over
the next year. Although the worsening economic
situation could prompt unrest among several groups,
expectations in most of the population remain low.
Assad's hold on the government and the military also
appears firm, and his security apparatus is strong
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Soviet-Syrian Relations:
The View From Damascus
The compatibility of Syrian and Soviet interests in the
Middle East has led to close and mutually supportive
policies in most cases. The Syrians, however, have
managed to maintain their own programs and
policies, occasionally forcing the Soviets to defer to
Syrian interests in the area, particularly in respect to
Syria believes it basically is in control of the Soviet-
Syrian relationship and can, within limits, manipulate
Moscow to achieve its goals. Damascus also is
confident that it has Soviet influence within Syria
The Limited Defensive Relationship
Syria has received large amounts of Soviet military
aid but has not acquiesced to Soviet influence. Soviet
commitment of military aid to Syria provides the
USSR with entry into the region, but it has not won
commensurate political influence because of President
Assad's independence, the lack of immediate
alternatives for the Soviets to expand their influence
in the Middle East, and Soviet recognition that
relatively unqualified support of Syria is necessary for
the USSR's broader regional interests.
The Soviet commitment to Syria increased after the
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. It is aimed
primarily at providing Syria the means with which to
defend its territory. It is highly unlikely, unless Syria
were facing a major defeat including a significant loss
of territory to Israel, that the Soviets would intervene
with their own military forces on Syria's behalf.F_
President Assad almost certainly realizes that the
Soviets will be quite reluctant to assist in Syrian
aggression against Israel, a strong US ally. The
Soviets have consistently sought to avoid having to
choose between direct intervention on Syria's side,
which runs the risks of defeat and direct confrontation
with the United States, and staying out, which would
be a heavy blow to their credibility as a reliable ally
and to their posture in the region.
Nonetheless, the Syrians seem to believe that they
have a Soviet safety net. Should war begin with
Israel-even on Syrian initiative-the Soviets will
have to come to Damascus's aid if Israel moves
decisively against Syrian forces and Damascus. Assad
may well believe that drawing Israel into a major
military engagement would force the Soviet Union to 25X1
increase the supply of sophisticated Soviet military
equipment and, in the event of a Syrian military
defeat, intervene with its own forces to protect
Damascus and to ensure his regime's survival.
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Nonetheless, even Assad would have to take into
serious consideration the superpower consequences of
such an action and certainly would realize that such
considerations would rank high in Soviet policy
decisions. Assad also realizes that, although the
Soviets place the Middle East high on their list of
priority areas in the Third World, East-West relations
clearly take precedence over the Middle East. Despite
the signing of a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty
with Syria in 1980, the USSR has refused to give
Assad a defensive security clause that would commit
Soviet forces to Syria's defense.
President Assad, a frequent visitor to Moscow,
with Soviet leader Gorbachev during the troubled
Moreover, Syria has experienced the USSR's failure Soviet interests, notably Syrian support of the
to come to its aid in Lebanon in 1982 and has seen Lebanese Shia group Amal in its attacks on
Moscow fail to come to the assistance of an Arab Palestinian refugee camps, the Soviets can be
country under attack when the United States bombed expected, at a minimum, to acquiesce.
Libya. As Israeli media have pointed out, Syria may
have drawn inferences from these cases and may have Tensions in Soviet-Syrian relations arose during
concluded that it must not "cross the red line" in Assad's "working visit" to Moscow in June 1985,
provoking the United States and its allies in the during which Moscow made clear its displeasure with
region. several of Syria's policies, as was demonstrated by the
The Unbalanced Political Relationship
Assad probably believes that he has virtually a free
political hand in the Middle East, given past limited
Soviet responses when policy differences have
occurred. The most notable cases of conflicting Syrian
and Soviet interests and policies are the Syrian
intervention in Lebanon in 1976, Assad's tough policy
toward Arafat and the PLO, and Syrian support for
Iran in the Iran-Iraq war. In all these cases Moscow
disagreed with Syria but ultimately decided to let
Assad pursue his own course.
Syria has taken a strongly independent stance, Assad enjoys more independence and leverage than
adopting Soviet policies only when they coincide with other Soviet friends in the Third World partly because
Syrian interests, and, in certain cases, Moscow has of Syria's prominence in the Middle East and the fact
deferred to Syrian goals and policies, working quietly that it is the only "frontline" country not aligned with
toward its own goals. Particularly on the question of the West, but more because Assad refuses to accept
hegemony in Lebanon, according to the US Embassy
in Damascus, the Soviets since 1981 have not bucked
Damascus. Even when Syrian actions directly cross
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Soviet dominance. Assad has guarded zealously his
ability to make major domestic and foreign policy
decisions, although the Soviets can use their influence
to affect Syrian policy formulation and use local
media for the regular expression of Soviet views.
According to US Embassy reporting, Syrian press use
of Soviet news service reports as a basis for their
coverage of events outside Syria must be seen as
partial "payment" for the military, political, and
economic assistance received from Moscow. Areas in
which there are disputes between Syrians and Soviets
are never explored in the media.
President Assad knows that Syria must remain on
good terms with Moscow to maintain access to Soviet
weapons, and that he needs the USSR as a diplomatic
counterweight to the United States in any peace
negotiations with Israel. On the other hand, he knows
the Soviets have already invested much in Syria-
economically, militarily, and politically. Particularly
in light of the strong Soviet desire to gain a firm
foothold in the Middle East, the Soviets have much to
lose by not fully backing Assad. Assad is also well
aware that he is the best instrument through which
the Soviets can work at present. President Assad
certainly knows that it behooves Moscow to keep him
happy, but he must also know that there are limits
even the Soviet Union must insist upon.
Assad doubtless is watching Soviet activities in the
area very closely, as the Soviets have been directly
courting not only various factions in Lebanon-
notably the Druze Progressive Socialist Party and
Amal-and the moderate PLO groups, but also the
moderate Arab states including Egypt and Jordan. By
doing so, the Soviets, in addition to expanding their
influence in the region, intend to increase Soviet
leverage with Syria and help ensure that Damascus
takes Soviet interests into account. Nonetheless,
according to the US Embassy in Moscow, the Soviets
will almost certainly continue to avoid steps in the
Middle East that could be construed as a direct
challenge to Damascus.
The Soviets and Syrian Internal Affairs
The Soviet Union has few internal "levers" in Syria.
Because of strong Syrian nationalism and Assad's
determination to remain the sole source of power in
the country, we believe the traditional avenues of
Soviet influence abroad have not been effective in
Syria. Assad keeps tight control over institutions
through which Moscow typically operates, such as
local Communist parties and other opposition groups,
civil and military security services, and the military
and bureaucracy.
The Syrian Communist Party (SCP) is small and
badly divided. It is unlikely that it will be a major
force in Syrian politics in the near future. We believe
Assad allows this party to operate to placate the
Soviets and create a symbolic link between the two
countries. The SCP is a relatively unimportant force
in Syrian politics, having "won" only nine seats out of
195 in the People's Council election in February 1986.
Many Syrian Communist activists are currently in
prison. In spite of the SCP's small size, as long as it
exists Moscow has a nominal opening into Syrian
internal politics.
The SCP has been compelled to align itself with the
ruling Syrian Bath Party and adopts policies that are
acceptable to it as a precondition for official
current leadership generally accepts the foreign policy
pursued by President Assad and the Bath Party,
whereas the opposition faction pursues a more radical
line that is unacceptable to Assad, and therefore also
to the Soviets. As long as the SCP pursues policies
within acceptable limits, Assad is likely to allow it to
continue functioning.
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Although the large number of Soviet and East
European advisers working with the Syrian military,
supervising aid programs, and implementing
commercial contracts suggests a high level of Soviet
activity in Syria, this does not automatically translate
into an ability to influence political events.
Syrian authorities watch Soviet
and East European advisers and Soviet- and East
European-educated Syrian bureaucrats, officers, and
teachers very closely, limiting their influence within
their fields. Also, although virtually all Syrian
students who study in the USSR and Eastern Europe
are employed by the Syrian Government, those with
Western educations are generally more respected and
hold higher positions. Nonetheless, by sheer weight of
numbers, Soviet-educated Syrians will begin
occupying more and more decisionmaking positions in
the future.
President Assad has been a staunch supporter of
strong Syrian ties to the Soviet Union, but he has also
been somewhat of a maverick in Moscow's eyes-far
too open to Western overtures that play to Syrian
goals and strategies without concern for Soviet
interests. A sudden departure by Assad may offer the
Soviets a good opportunity to meddle in Syrian
internal affairs, but we know of no major Syrian
politician who is a Soviet protege or could be called
"Moscow's man" in Damascus.
The Soviet Union is keenly interested in the
probably fear that a pro-Western or highly
independent successor to President Assad-possibly
the President's brother, Rif`at-will lead to a decline
in Soviet influence in the country and the region.
We believe, however, that Soviet prestige and
prominence in Syria is not likely to decline
significantly regardless of who among the current
contenders succeeds to the presidency. Most of the
President's inner circle of Alawi officers were trained
and educated in the Soviet Union and are likely to
retain the strong relationship with Moscow after
Assad's death. Syria's confrontation with Israel will
force any successor to court the Soviets to continue
receiving military aid. With few exceptions-most
notably Rif`at, who they fear is too pro-Western and
whose policies and personality they believe are too
divisive-the Soviets are probably indifferent as to
who becomes the next Syrian leader. There is no
indication of any Soviet manipulation or influence in
the selection of the next president. The Soviets have
apparently adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude,
watching Assad and his followers carefully for
indications from Damascus or decisions from Assad
on which to base their own actions.
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Secret
Sikh Militants: Divided, Down,
But Not Out
The Indian Government's evolving strategy-
employing political concessions and security
crackdowns simultaneously in dealing with Sikh
militants in Punjab-is paying dividends. Sikh
militants have lost the political initiative and are
divided among themselves. The paramilitary incursion
into the Golden Temple in late April dislodged the
militants for the second time in two years-driving
underground the five hardliners who had declared
independence for "Khalistan," the Sikh homeland,
and resulting in the arrest of several hundred other
militants. At the same time Gandhi may be setting
the stage for a new appeal to Sikh moderates by
implementing provisions of the Punjab accords on
territorial transfers and water sharing and by giving
Sikhs more prominent positions in his Cabinet. New
Delhi will continue to operate through the moderate
Sikh government in Punjab, avoiding direct
confrontations with the militants that win them
popular support and putting distance between itself
and possible failure. The militants, while crippled, will
continue-and perhaps step up-their terrorist
attacks to keep the pressure on moderate Sikhs and
New Delhi.
Sikh Militants Today
In the two years since Operation Bluestar-the Army
assault on the Sikhs' Golden Temple in Amritsar-
the militants regrouped, conducted repeated terrorist
attacks, and regained but then lost a firm political
toehold in Punjab. They are divided into three major
factions: the religious fundamentalists (the Damdami
Taksal), the politicized "student" activists (the All
Indian Sikh Student Federation), and a catchall
splinter group (the United Akali Dal).
Damdami Taksal. Sikh militant fundamentalists have
taken the name of a centuries-old Sikh religious
seminary, the Damdami Taksal, for their faction.
Damdami Taksal members are outspoken in their
belief that Sikhism must be protected against
absorption by Hinduism and cleansed of secular
influences. Mohkam Singh controlled the Taksal until
his arrest on 25 March. An older, more conservative
cleric, Baba Thakar Singh, has taken over and is
attempting to mediate between the student hardliners
and the fundamentalists.
The All India Sikh Student Federation (AISSF).
Under the leadership of Harinder Singh Kahlon, this
group has become the most powerful extremist group
in Punjab. The AISSF uses violence to undermine the
authority of both New Delhi and the Punjab state
government and to press the Sikh case for an
independent homeland. Kahlon helped lead the
takeover of the Golden Temple last January and has
backed a five-member Panthic Committee
(Committee of the Faith) to lend religious legitimacy
to the Khalistan declaration of independence last
month.
Manjit Singh established a separate AISSF faction in
mid-April 1986, accusing Kahlon of usurping his
authority. The two factions have spent as much time
bickering with each other as plotting against the
government, according to Indian press accounts.
Manjit Singh has created his own religious
legitimizing group, the Panthic Presidium, to counter
Kahlon's committee and a similar moderate
organization.
United Akali Dal (UAD). Led by Baba Joginder
Singh, octogenarian father of Jarnail Bhindranwale,
who was killed in Operation Bluestar in 1984, this
catchall faction prefers nonviolent political
demonstrations to press Sikh grievances against New
Delhi. The UAD led an unsuccessful boycott of state
assembly and parliamentary elections in September.
Despite the UAD's failure, Joginder Singh still
attracts many militant followers because of his
relation to Bhindranwale.
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-012
23 May 1986
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Secret
Mohkam Singh,
Damdami Taksal
Militants Take on Sikh Moderates
In January 1986 the AISSF and Damdami Taksal
followers successfully challenged the Sikh moderates
at their religious base. Mohkam Singh, leader of the
Damdami Taksal, and Harinder Singh Kahlon, leader
of the AISSF, put aside their differences to seize
control of the Golden Temple from the Sikh clerical
hierarchy nominally aligned with Punjab Chief
Minister Surjit Singh Barnala and his moderate Akali
Dal Party. The militants claimed the titles and
authority vested in the Sikh temple management
committee, called a meeting of the Sikh congregation,
and began dismantling the "impure" repairs to the
Golden Temple made by Army personnel following
the assault in June 1984.
With the Golden Temple once again their base of
operations, all three militant factions stepped up their
activities in Punjab. The AISSF extremists increased
their attacks on Hindus, hoping to provoke a
communal backlash that would prompt Hindus to
leave and Sikhs to return to Punjab. The UAD
organized a march and demonstration against the
state assembly, forcing its adjournment, but the
demonstration ended inconclusively when the police
dispersed the crowd. The Damdami Taksal and
AISSF also organized voluntary labor to dismantle
and repair the inner sanctum of the temple. They
excluded Hindus, who traditionally had participated
in such activities.
The arrest of Mohkam Singh on 25 March
precipitated intense jockeying for dominance of the
militant movement,
that ultimately fragmented the fragile alliance
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Secret
We believe the overriding issue for Rajiv Gandhi in
Punjab is the preservation of his reputation. This is
his first major test as a leader. We have seen no
evidence that he is playing out personal psychological
conflicts even though Sikhs killed his mother, Indira
Gandhi, and have threatened to assassinate him.
Gandhi's concern for his reputation-especially for
proving he is a better leader than his mother-has
guided much of his political behavior. For example,
he has:
? Aggressively attempted to solve problems that
festered during his mother's rule, taking a
conciliatory approach in contrast to his mother's
confrontational style.
? Assiduously avoided sullying his image by using
surrogates such as Arun Nehru to perform tasks
that would compromise his reputation.
? Shown a determination to avoid mistakes through
extensive consultation. According to the US
Ambassador, he will not act unless he has the
problems. He frequently postpones a decision while
he gathers information and assesses options. He has a
predilection for formulating his policies in secret,
consulting only his top few advisers. Thus, when he
takes action, such as concluding the Punjab
agreement, it can come as a surprise.
Gandhi has structured his approach to Punjab
primarily as a law-and-order issue. This allows him 25X1
to isolate the radicals, whom he views as terrorists,
and to support a moderate Sikh government. It also
enables him to put distance between himself and
direct responsibility for failure and to shift blame to
the terrorists and the weak state government. F 25X1
We expect Gandhi to continue to pursue a cautious
course of action. In our judgment, however, he is not
opposed to using force or directly involving the
central government. His behavior after his mother's
assassination shows that he can take decisive action
to deal with an imminent threat. But he will need to
be convinced that force is necessary and will lead to a
positive outcome. He will want to be seen as a winner.
assent of the majority of his advisers.
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Gandhi's approach to policymaking is reactive and
based on a determination to find efficient solutions to
between the radical Sikh groups. While conservative
cleric Baba Thakar Singh took over the nominal
leadership of the Taksal, the AISSF and United Akali
Dal competed for Mohkam Singh's followers. A
month after Mohkam Singh's arrest, the AISSF split
into the contending factions headed by Kahlon and
Manjit Singh. The squabbling probably contributed
to a temporary lull in violence in Punjab in late
March and helped to weaken popular support for the
militants.
In a dramatic move to regain momentum and bring
down the Barnala government, five senior AISSF
leaders declared independence for Khalistan in late
April. The move backfired, however, when New Delhi
used the declaration to rally Sikh moderates and sent
paramilitary forces into the Golden Temple. The five
leaders evaded arrest, but the militants who stayed
behind in the temple offered no resistance. At least
300 were detained, but most were released within
days of the sweep, according to press accounts. The
AISSF faction led by Kahlon is believed by the Indian
press to be responsible for the resumption in killings of
Hindus-presumably hoping again to provoke a
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incorrectly that Barnala's decision to take credit for
the security sweep of the temple would bring down his
Akali Dal government in Punjab.
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New Delhi Using Moderates as a Fig Leaf
Gandhi's response to the militants continues to shift
from a largely conciliatory posture to a carrot-and-
stick strategy. Following Gandhi's signing of a formal
settlement of Sikh grievances in 1985 and subsequent
elections, New Delhi carefully watched events from
the sidelines, perhaps hoping Sikh moderates would
isolate and weaken the militants on their own.
When the militants retook the Golden Temple and
increased assassinations in February, New Delhi
probably calculated it could no longer stand by while
Barnala lost the struggle with the extremists. To avoid
becoming the direct target of the Sikh militants,
however, Gandhi orchestrated New Delhi's responses
to the militants through the security and political
apparatus of Barnala's state government.
On the security front, Gandhi has worked through
state officials:
? Gandhi convinced Punjab officials to name Julius
Rebeiro to lead the beleaguered Punjab police force.
Rebeiro, according to Indian press reports, is widely
respected as a law enforcement troubleshooter.
? National security officials put their resources at
Barnala's disposal.
? Barnala ordered the paramilitary incursion into the
Golden Temple in late April.
On the political side, Gandhi has taken several steps
to bolster the standing of the moderate Sikhs:
? He appointed a new commission and set a June
1986 deadline to resolve the territorial issues
blocking the transfer of Chandigargh to Punjab.
? He ordered his bureaucrats to promptly settle all
outstanding compensation claims from Sikh victims
of the riots following Indira Gandhi's assassination.
? He convened the dormant National Integration
Council in New Delhi that issued public statements
in support of the Barnala government.
? He named a Sikh, Buta Singh, to head the Home
Ministry and added a second Sikh to his Cabinet as
Agriculture Minister.
Sikh Militants on the Ropes in Punjab
In our view, New Delhi has the Sikh militants on the
ropes as the second anniversary of Operation Bluestar
approaches. Over a two-year period the militants have
failed to build a unified front or win additional
popular support. Personal rivalries among the militant
leaders, differences over tactics, and conflicting
priorities have intensified and will almost certainly
continue to make the movement vulnerable to
government efforts to turn one group against the
other. The success of the government's sweep of the
temple-and the implied threat that Punjab
authorities can order another-probably will keep the
hardliners operating underground.
Sikh militants still pose a significant terrorist threat,
however, and could regroup. Deprived of the high-
visibility haven they enjoyed in the temple, militants
may resort to more spectacular terrorist attacks-
along the lines of the earlier transistor radio bombings
and airline hijackings-to attract public attention and
keep the pressure on Sikh moderates and New Delhi.
They are likely to attempt to kill Gandhi or
precipitate Hindu-Sikh communal conflict outside
Punjab. The AISSF hardliners are certain to continue
to receive support from radical Sikhs overseas.
Can New Delhi Deliver a Knockout Punch?
Gandhi probably can weaken the Sikh militant
movement further if he patiently wields the security
stick-using moderates as his proxies-against both
Sikh and Hindu militants and offers political
accommodation to the moderates.
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Secret
New Delhi's chances of success depend heavily on
Police Chief Rebeiro's ability to strengthen state and
local police forces while keeping the heat on the
militants. The Indian press reports, however, that
Rebeiro will have a difficult time restoring confidence
in the Punjab police-a force the press claims is
riddled with militant Sikh sympathizers. Rebeiro has
cautioned that training, weapons, and confidence-
building measures will be necessary to change the
demoralized and corrupt police into an effective
counterterrorist force. Until that transformation is
well along, we believe Rebeiro faces a high risk of
assassination and leaks that will compromise efforts
by government forces to arrest AISSF and Damdami
Taksal extremists.
New Delhi cannot expect to undermine the militant
movement until it addresses longstanding Sikh
grievances. Gandhi's moves this spring to enlist
national political support for the Barnala government
suggest he will discipline the Haryana Congress Party
recalcitrants and enact the commission
recommendations on territorial transfers and water
sharing. New Delhi probably will continue to prop up
a moderate Sikh government in Punjab at least
through 1986-calculating that a buffer is needed to
prevent recurrence of the direct confrontations
between the militants and the central government that
win the militants popular support.
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Secret
Sikhs in the Indian Army:
Two Years After
Operation Bluestar
The status of Sikhs in the Indian Army remains
clouded two years after Operation Bluestar-the
Army's attack on the Sikhs' Golden Temple. The
Army is still feeling the effects of the Sikh mutinies
that followed the attack and has instituted long-term
personnel policies to reduce the impact of future
troubles in Punjab. These efforts, however, are being
interpreted by many Sikh officers and enlisted men as
de facto discrimination. Recent attempts by the new
Chief of Army Staff to allay these fears will not be
completely successful because of the continuing
troubles in Punjab. The rift between Sikhs and the
rest of the Army will weaken the Indian Army and
leave open the possibility of future mutinies.
We estimate there are over 120,000 Sikhs in the
1-million-man Indian Army. The Sikhs have played
an important role in Indian military history since the
period of British rule, and, despite their non-Hindu
status, they were, until recently, considered among
the best and most loyal soldiers in the Army. Despite
government efforts to make the Army more
representative of the national population, Sikhs
account for 25 percent of the officer corps and 11
percent of the enlisted ranks. Fifteen of the Army's
over 300 battalions are made up exclusively of Sikhs,
who are also present in many integrated infantry,
artillery, armor, and support units.
The 1984 Mutinies
The importance attributed to Sikh units increased the
impact of the numerous mutinies that occurred in
1984 shortly after Indian Army and paramilitary
forces attacked the Sikhs' Golden Temple in
Amritsar. Mutinies broke out in at least six widely
separated Sikh infantry battalions and regimental
training centers. Most of the mutineers deserted their
units and attempted to make their way back to
Punjab,
Sixty-seven were killed, 2,778 were arrested, and 30
are still missing. Most of those apprehended were
charged and found guilty in military courts. Roughly
equal numbers were either sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment, summarily punished by their
immediate superiors and discharged, or rehabilitated
and transferred to paramilitary units.
Because the Army is sensitive to any suggestion that
its troops are less than professional and that its
officers could be poor leaders, most of those convicted
were charged not with mutiny but with lesser crimes
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Those receiving tile harshest sentences were 25X1
Sikh officers who did not keep their men informed
and under control, but rather saw trouble coming and
took measures to protect themselves, according to
Indian press articles.
Throughout the trials, the Army and the central
government attempted to balance military justice with
national political considerations. New Delhi rejected
appeals by the moderate Sikh Akali Dal leadership to
pardon the mutineers. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
repeatedly stated that this was a military issue and
the government would not interfere. Gandhi probably
wanted to maintain good relations with the Army, on
which New Delhi depends for civil order in Punjab
and other trouble spots. The Army reduced three Sikh
battalions to cadre status by dispersing their men to
other units and disbanded the 9th Sikh Battalion.
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These actions were widely interpreted as harsh 25X1
punishments because of the strong attachments to
battalions held by active and retired servicemen alike
in India's regimental system.
At the same time, the Army made sure that Sikh
officers were on all of the tribunals and that the
tribunals gave fairly lenient sentences to most of those
on trial.
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-012
23 May 1986
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Discrimination
While showing leniency toward the guilty, the Indian
Army proceeded to punish the innocent.F---]
are concerned that their chances for
promotion have been significantly curtailed since
Operation Bluestar. As assignment cycles come up,
Sikh officers are being sent to command non-Sikh
units in the south and the northeast. Some of these
officers were previously scheduled to command units
from Sikh regiments. These reassignments are
unusual, in our judgment, because of India's
regimental system in which officers and men serve
together throughout their careers. By separating these
officers from their men, the Army is attempting to
calm fears that Sikh officers will lead Sikh enlisted
men in future mutinies.
Unofficial discrimination has also been practiced in
general officer promotions.
for
promotion earlier this year. Twelve were promoted to
lieutenant general, but all three Sikhs were passed
over. Retired Field General Mannekshaw, Chief of
Army Staff during the war with Pakistan in 1971 and
the highest ranking officer in the history of the Indian
Army, traveled to New Delhi and successfully
intervened with Prime Minister Gandhi, who ordered
another review. All three Sikh major generals were
promoted, but of believe any of them
will ever command a corps, the most prestigious
assignment for lieutenant generals in the Indian
Army.
The Army has instituted official personnel policies
that are being interpreted by Sikhs as indications of
continuing distrust. Former Defense Minister Rao
announced in April 1985 that the Army would only
raise additional regiments on an all-caste basis. This
decision was interpreted as not only ruling out new
Sikh regiments, but also limiting the number of
positions open for Sikhs who consider soldiering to be
one of their principal occupations. Former Chief of
Army Staff Vaidya reinforced this perception in
November 1985 when, in one of his last actions, he
ordered the elimination of ethnically pure regiments.
Integration was to be accomplished by including three
different ethnic companies (for example, Rajputs,
Sikhs, and Garhwalis) in each regiment's battalions.
This indicates, in our judgment, that
the decision was political and probably influenced by
the Sikh mutinies
Almost simultaneously, Vaidya attempted to increase
the number of Nepalese Gurkhas in the Army. He
visited Nepal in October 1985 to ask permission for
the Indian Army to raise the number of Nepalese
Gurkhas in the Army from 80,000 to 100,000.
the Nepalese
Government would probably agree after consulting
with the British.' This move was perceived by the
international Sikh community as another act of bad
faith by New Delhi
Gestures of Good Will
New Chief of Army Staff Sundarji has made several
goodwill gestures toward Army Sikhs since taking
office last February. Sundarji, in our judgment, wants
to parallel Gandhi's efforts to resolve the Punjab crisis
and end the Hindu-Sikh rift, which threatens to
reduce the effectiveness of the Army. In interviews he
has praised the efforts of Sikh soldiers and minimized
the importance of the mutinies by noting that most
Sikh soldiers and officers did not rebel in 1984. He
has also ordered the reestablishment of those Sikh
battalions that were reduced to cadre status last year.
He has not, however, waived Army regulations that
forbid the 9th Sikh Battalion from being reactivated
for five years. We believe Sundarji has decided not to
waive this rule in order to balance the requirements of
the military justice system with his prudent, but
politically motivated, personnel decisions.
' A tripartite agreement regulates the number of Nepalese Gurkha
mercenaries recruited for the Indian and British Armies. The
Indian Army and paramilitary forces have about 200,000 Nepalese
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Sundarji also has New Delhi is successful in controllin Punjab
g
units and are being replaced by Sikh companies.
These changes are meeting with approval from Sikh
soldiers and have had a positive effect on morale.
quietly reversed Vaidya's policy of integrating Sikh Sundarji will be able to improve the morale of his
units. Non-Sikh units that have recently joined Sikh Sikh units and restore their status as one of the most
regiments are being ordered to return to their parent effective and combat-ready elements in the Army.
the Army.
In our judgment, these actions carry more weight with
both non-Sikh and Sikh officers and enlisted men
because Sundarji was Western Army commander
during Operation Bluestar and had overall authority
over the attack on the Golden Temple in 1984.
Coming soon after his appointment to Chief of Army
Staff, they also signal a break with the tone of
Vaidya's efforts to reduce the importance of Sikhs in
Army.
Outlook
We believe Sundarji's actions will help reverse the de
facto discrimination that has been practiced against
Sikhs within the Army since Operation Bluestar.
Sundarji probably also will have to issue direct
instructions to promotion boards, indicating that
discrimination against Sikhs will not be tolerated.
Most important, he will have to continue to lobby
against the use of the Army in maintaining civil order
in Punjab. Although the recent successful raid on the
Golden Temple by armed state police and federal
paramilitary forces rather than the Army augurs well
for the continuation of this policy, continuing internal
security problems in Punjab are likely to require
constant high-level lobbying against the use of the
Sundarji's initiatives, however, will not effectively
insulate the Army from morale problems caused by
the Hindu-Sikh discord in Punjab. Non-Sikh Army
officers will continue to discriminate against their
Sikh comrades, and the morale of Sikh soldiers will
continue to depend on events in Punjab. The mutinies
of 1984 were not caused by poor treatment of Sikh
soldiers, but by events in Amritsar. Conversely, if
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COLOMaO*Sri Lanka
4
Sri Lanka
0 100 Kilometers
0 100 Miles
COLOMBO*
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Secret
India: Increasing
Military Capabilities
Toward Sri Lanka
India's military is improving its ability to intervene in
Sri Lanka should that island's increasing instability
force New Delhi to make such a decision. India is
acquiring more amphibious ships and transport
aircraft, establishing new bases in the south, and
conducting joint service exercises to enhance its
ability to deploy larger forces to offshore islands. Sri
Lanka's security forces could not stop an Indian
invasion and would soon be overrun. Both the
Sinhalese and Tamil communities, however, are
capable of waging a guerrilla war against an
occupying Indian force. Although Indian forces could
control the major cities and seize the most important
facilities on the island in a matter of days, they would
be much less prepared for a guerrilla war. A
prolonged stay would keep them in the middle of Sri
Lanka's communal conflict.
seeks military aid from foreign powers, including
India's rivals, Pakistan and China, and as the
insurgents strengthen ties to international arms
marketers and radical groups. The violence
aggravates the refugee problem in India's south as
Tamils flee the island and settle among their ethnic
cousins in southern India. It also encourages unrest
among India's own Tamils-a problem that probably
would worsen if the Sri Lankan Tamils succeeded in
gaining independence.
Prime Minister Gandhi already has publicly warned
Colombo that India cannot tolerate indefinitely the
more than 130,000 Sri Lankan refugees in southern
India and stated that he does not consider a separate
Tamil state viable. In our judgment, he will do his
utmost to prevent one from coming into existence. We
believe that, although New Delhi is not ready to
intervene in Sri Lanka, it would do so if it believed its
Potential for Indian Intervention
India has long been concerned that instability in
neighboring states threatens regional security by
creating refugee problems, internal pressure on New
Delhi to take action, sympathetic unrest among
India's many minority communities, and involvement
by outside powers. As a result, the Indians have
adopted a policy of confronting and containing
instability in neighboring states by both political and
military means. In cases where unrest in neighboring
states has led to a breakdown in public order, such as
Bangladesh in 1971 and Sikkim in 1978, India has
intervened militarily to reestablish stability and to
further its hegemony. New Delhi accepted Colombo's
1971 invitation to send forces to Sri Lanka to help
restore order in the wake of political insurrection in
that country-four frigates, six helicopters, and about
150 troops were deployed to Colombo for less than a
week early in the year.
Public statements by Indian officials indicate that the
three-year-old conflict between Sri Lanka's Sinhalese
and Tamil communities increasingly threatens Indian
interests. The unrest invites outside involvement,
which New Delhi views as detrimental, as Colombo
interests were sufficiently threatened.
Buildup of Military Capabilities
India is rapidly expanding the forces it would use to
project military power throughout the region.
Although New Delhi claims that these forces are
being developed to defend its offshore territories, such
as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and
Lakshadweep, we believe it would consider using
them offensively in Pakistan, Bangladesh, or Sri
Lanka if hostilities were to break out with those
countries.
The Navy has nine recently acquired Soviet- and
Polish-built Polnocny-class mechanized landing ships
and seven utility landing craft stationed with its
amphibious squadron at Vishakhapatnam on the east
coast.
is buying three more of the Polish landing ships
an -ilp'ushing ahead with indigenous production of
landing craft as well as larger amphibious ships. With
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-012
23 May 1986
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sufficient naval escort, logistic support, and civilian
transport, the amphibious squadron could carry one
and possibly two fully equipped infantry brigades-
2,500 to 5,000 men with artillery and light armor-
Sri Lanka.
used modified merchant ships as troop
transports-a lesson learned from British naval
operations in the Falklands War-during their
amphibious exercises in 1985 and 1986.
The Indian Army's 54th Infantry Division, stationed
in the south, has long experience in amphibious
operations, and its 91st Brigade is often deployed in
annual exercises with the Navy. The Army is
proposing the creation of a standing marine force,
patterned after the US Marine Corps, for which we
believe the 54th Division would form the nucleus.C
would have trouble
making an opposed landing, but it is trying to remedy
this problem by buying about 200 Swedish IKV-91
amphibious tanks to replace its aging Soviet PT-76s.
India is also improving its ability to deploy airborne
forces, which would play a key role in any
intervention in Sri Lanka. The Air Force has recently
taken delivery of six IL-76 heavy transport and over
60 AN-32 medium transport aircraft from the Soviet
Union. Two more IL-76s and 60 more AN-32s will
arrive this year. The Air Force also is augmenting its
fleet of Soviet-built MI-8 transport helicopters with
more powerful MI-17s. These aircraft and the rest of
the Air Force's transport fleet could deploy to Sri
Lanka all of the 4,600-man 50th Parachute Brigade,
the only Army unit trained in either airborne or
heliborne operations. In the event of intervention,
these paratroopers probably would try to seize an
airfield so that reinforcements could be brought in.
with the assault force receiving offshore
fire support from Navy warships. Trivandrum closely
resembles Colombo in topography-a city on a west
coast with its airport situated by the shore, close to
town.
New Delhi is establishing new bases in the south from
which to launch these types of operations as well as
holding larger and more involved exercises in the
area. The Army has created a local command at
Madurai with six infantry battalions, a likely second
echelon force for a Sri Lankan intervention. The
Navy and Air Force have established subcommands
at Tuticorin and Trivandrum, respectively. Although
no more than token forces have been committed to
these subcommands, they are well situated to
coordinate naval and air units against Sri Lanka.
departed
from the usual amphibious landing in the Andaman
Islands and, instead, involved amphibious, airborne,
and heliborne assaults near Goa with naval and air
support. We believe this exercise marks an
improvement in India's ability to carry out a large-
scale military operation against Sri Lanka.
Sri Lanka as a Battleground
How an Indian intervention in Sri Lanka would
progress depends on the circumstances under which
forces would be introduced. In our view, an Indian
intervention would most likely come, as in 1971,
following a request from Colombo for help in
restoring internal order. The possibility exists,
however, that New Delhi would intervene without
Colombo's invitation if it believed the situation had
deteriorated enough to threaten Indian interests.
Our assessment of the 30,000-man Sri Lankan
military is that its poor training, mediocre leadership,
and internal security focus leave it incapable of
offering more than token resistance to Indian military
intervention. We calculate that an Indian landing
force of about 8,000 amphibious and airborne
troops-much better trained, led, and supported than
Sri Lankan forces-could be reinforced by about
15,000 infantry within a week and would soon overrun
the major cities and most important facilities on the
island. In ensuing months, still more of the over
1-million-strong Indian Army could be deployed to
Sri Lanka.
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Although the Indians might have to deal initially with
Sri Lankan security forces, in our judgment the most
serious long-term threat in any Indian intervention
would come from Tamil, and possibly Sinhalese,
insurgents. We believe it likely that some of the more
than a dozen Tamil insurgent groups, with far better
knowledge of local terrain and with a sympathetic
populace among whom to operate, would soon direct
attacks against an occupying Indian force. Tamil
insurgents have increased their strength rapidly in the
past three years, currently fielding, by our
calculations, about 10,000 guerrillas in Sri Lanka.
Moreover, we believe that approximately 9,000 Sri
Lankan Tamils are engaged in training and
smuggling in southern India and could carry out
guerrilla operations within India itself, threatening
the rear area of the Indian force occupying Sri Lanka.
Colombo's forces also are growing in size and
amassing a larger arsenal and could become the core
of a Sinhalese resistance movement against a
prolonged Indian occupation.
We believe Indian forces would be ill prepared to
contend with the insurgency currently being waged in
Sri Lanka. The Indian Army has gained some
counterinsurgency experience in operations against
separatists in India's northeastern states, where it has
been fighting Mizo and Assamese guerrillas virtually
since independence. In Sri Lanka, however, it would
be a foreign presence and not long tolerated,
especially if New Delhi continued to oppose a
separate Tamil state. In our view, if Indian
intervention were not followed soon by a settlement
between Colombo and the insurgents, violence would
again flare between the island's communities, but this
time the Indian forces would be caught in the middle,
having failed to bring the peace to Sri Lanka that
would supposedly have been their goal.
Outlook
We believe that an Indian military intervention in Sri
Lanka would come only as a last resort and that any
forces committed would be withdrawn at the earliest
opportunity. New Delhi is pursuing several options in
its Sri Lanka policy, such as sponsorship of talks
between Colombo and some Tamil groups
Intervention is a
trump card that, in our judgment, the Indians would
rather not play because it would temporarily halt
what New Delhi sees as more potentially productive
initiatives. The Indians probably believe intervention
would only drive one or both sides from the peace
table that New Delhi has carefully set and severely
damage Prime Minister Gandhi's good-neighbor
policy without accomplishing much else.
Should the violence degenerate to a level where New
Delhi believes intervention is the only way to restore
order, we believe it will content itself with that goal
and leave as soon as it has been achieved. Military
force is unlikely to produce more. Alternatively, New
Delhi could mount a massive effort and flood the
island with military forces, but, in our judgment, the
Indians are not prepared to pay the political or
military costs of a prolonged and embarrassing
occupation of Sri Lanka.
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