EUROPEAN REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000301160001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 15, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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European Review
15 August 1986
EUR ER 86-019
15 August 1986
Copy 4 5 7
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Secret
European Reviei
United Kingdom-South Africa: Commonwealth Minisummit on 1
Sanctions
France: Increase in Defense Spending
Turkey-United States: Renewal of Cooperation Agreement
Uncertain
Greece: Tough Measures for an "Ailing" Enterprise
Bulgaria: Soviets Honor Leading Succession Candidate
Articles East-West Germany: Learning to Live With the Berlin Wall
After 25 years the Berlin Wall remains the most potent symbol of
the division of Germany and a world landmark in man's inhumanity
to man. The Wall today, however, is no longer an all-consuming
issue for Germans, even Berliners, but rather an everyday-if
grotesque-fact of political life. Still, the way the two Germanys are
learning to live with The Wall has important implications for Allied
rights in Berlin.
of no confidence.
After 100 days in office, the minority Labor government's socialist
rhetoric has led to little change in Norwegian policies. Political and
economic realities have held the government of Prime Minister
Brundtland to a centrist path and induced a switch from impractical
social democratic ideals to moderate policies intended to avert a vote
Yugoslavia: Prospects for Nuclear Power Development
the public.
The future of nuclear energy in Yugoslavia, once bright, is now
uncertain owing to antinuclear sentiment. Belgrade has put on hold
plans to build several nuclear facilities, including a $2.5 billion plant
in Croatia on which US and other foreign firms are bidding.
Although chances are still better than even that the Croatian plant
ultimately will be approved, the decision probably will come only
after lengthy study and controversy among both the leadership and
Secret
EUR ER 86-019
15 August 1986
STAT
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Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but
the contents normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other
offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent the views
of a single analyst; these items will be designated as uncoordinated
views. Comments may be directed to the authors,
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Secret
European Review) 25X1
United Kingdom- Commonwealth Minisummit on Sanctions
South Africa
The "agreement to disagree" on South African sanctions between Britain and six
of its Commonwealth partners in early August limited the damage to Prime
Minister Thatcher's political standing, but she will face renewed domestic pressure
if Washington adopts measures tougher than those she has suggested. Thatcher is
particularly concerned that the United States will sever airlinks to South Africa.
She probably expects US support for her position on airlinks as another favor in
exchange for past and future cooperation.
At the London minisummit, Australia, The Bahamas, Canada, India, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe argued that Thatcher's offer to ban imports of South African coal, iron,
and steel and her "voluntary" bans on new investment and tourism were
insufficient. They went ahead not only with the tougher sanctions agreed on at the
Commonwealth meeting last October but also with additional measures, including
a ban on new bank loans.
Next month at the EC meeting, Britain is likely to go along with the consensus,
especially because the measures Thatcher offered the Commonwealth at the
minisummit are close to those the EC proposed last June. Thatcher will try to get
West German Chancellor Kohl, who shares her dislike for sanctions, to help hold
the line against tougher steps. She almost certainly will argue, for example,
against a mandatory ban on new investment in South Africa.
France Increase in Defense Spending
The French Government projects 5-percent real growth in defense spending in
1987, according to press reports. The increase will go toward new equipment at the
expense of other government programs and defense operations. The money will
enable France to continue developing a replacement for the S-3 IRBM,
constructing the first of two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, and pursuing the
purchase of an AWACS aircraft.
The projected defense budget is a significant change from the no-growth budgets
of the former Socialist government. The French will face a serious resource crunch
by 1990, however, as programs that had been stretched out or postponed by the
Socialists-including a new fighter aircraft, aircraft carrier, and tank-begin to
enter production. F__1
Without sustained increases in defense spending, France may be forced to limit
further conventional modernization or make deeper cuts in operations and
readiness. Prime Minister Chirac's government intends to announce its longer-
term defense plans this fall.
Secret
EUR ER 86-019
15 August 1986
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Secret
Turkey-United States Renewal of Cooperation Agreement Uncertain
The Turks have several reservations about the latest US proposals for renewing the
bilateral Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement. Their criticisms center
on the absence of a US commitment to reschedule debts for military purchases and
the length of the proposed extension of the agreement. Turkish officials also
continue to prefer establishing specific levels of military assistance in place of the
existing "best efforts" formula and explicit disavowal by Washington of the
congressionally mandated 7:10 ratio for military aid to Greece and Turkey.
Ankara may be in no hurry to conclude the talks before Foreign Minister
Halefoglu visits the United States in September. As they have throughout the
talks, the Turks claim that the US proposals offer no incentive for a five-year
renewal of the agreement instead of the two-year extension they propose. They
may prefer to let the agreement continue on a year-to-year basis-as allowed by its
provisions-if they are unable to obtain terms they consider favorable. Ankara
probably believes that its recalcitrance poses no threat to continued US assistance,
which they expect to decline in any case because of US budgetary constraints.
Tough Measures for an "Ailing" Enterprise
and are faced with total debts of $2.2 billion, or 6 to 7 percent of GDP.
The Greek Government's recently announced measures to increase productivity in
the state-controlled mining concern LARCO may portend a new policy in dealing
with the 60 or so "ailing enterprises" the state has taken over in order to prevent
their bankruptcy. The LARCO measures include layoffs, the setting of production
quotas, a prohibition against strikes, and abolition of wage indexing. The measures
are Prime Minister Papandreou's first real attempt to address the problem of
overextended firms whose borrowing has become a significant burden on the
already financially strapped public sector. The "ailing enterprises" own 60 percent
of the assets of the top 30 Greek industrial concerns, employ about 35,000 workers,
extended to the embattled private sector as well.
The LARCO measures are probably intended to be a trial balloon to gauge public
reaction. The Communist-controlled ESAK-S labor organization already has
protested the announcement, declaring that the measures would ultimately lead to
the "enslavement" of Greek workers. The Communists may hope to benefit from
the issue at the expense of Papandreou's PASOK Party in the municipal elections
in October. Buoyed by his successful hardline handling of the Olympic Airlines
pilots strike, however, Papandreou probably feels confident that he can manage
any labor protests against the new measures. Greece's business community
probably will support the new measures, hoping that they may eventually be
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Bulgaria Soviets Honor Leading Succession Candidate
The Supreme Soviet, in an unusual move, awarded Bulgarian Politburo member
Chudomir Aleksandrov the Order of Red Banner of Labor in honor of his 50th
birthday on 26 July. None of the four other leaders usually mentioned as
contenders to succeed aging General Secretary Todor Zhivkov-Politburo
members Georgi Atanasov, Milko Balev, Grisha Filipov, and Ognyan Doynov-
has received comparable recognition from Moscow at such a young age. While the
award is not a particularly high honor within the Soviet Union, it has rarely been
given to non-Soviets. F__1
Aleksandrov is an able administrator whose succession prospects have grown
steadily over the past few years. While not openly stating a preference, Moscow
has been leaning toward Aleksandrov for some time, 2.5X1
. Zhivkov, who will be 75 next month, is said to favor Aleksandrov and 25X1
seems to have propelled him through the ranks. Zhivkov, of course, has elevated
other leaders in recent years, only to demote them before they could establish a
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Articles
East-West Germany:
Learning to Live With the
Berlin Wall
After 25 years the Berlin Wall remains the most
potent symbol of the division of Germany as well as a
world landmark in man's inhumanity to man. At the
same time, however, The Wall is no longer an all-
consuming issue for Germans, even Berliners, but
rather an everyday-if grotesque-fact of political
life. Bonn has essentially dropped Cold War rhetoric
in favor of finding pragmatic ways of making The
Wall more porous, and East Berlin's success in
consolidating itself behind The Wall has made it more
confident in dealing with West Germans. The way in
which the two Germanys are learning to live with The
Wall, however, has important implications for Allied
rights in Berlin. F__-]
Background
East German security forces, backed by Soviet units,
sealed the boundary between Berlin's three Western
sectors and the Soviet sector (East Berlin) on 13
August 1961 and, under the direction of then security
chief Erich Honecker, immediately began
constructing the first relatively crude wall. This bold
stroke climaxed a Berlin crisis that had begun in
November 1958 when Soviet leader Khrushchev
announced his intention to end the occupation regime
in Berlin and to force the Allies to withdraw. The
Allies rejected Soviet and East German threats and
made clear their intention to defend the status quo in
Berlin, but in the end the three Western Powers could
not prevent The Wall's erection and were able to
defend their position principally on legalistic grounds.
The accompanying tension and anxiety of the two-
and-a-half year crisis induced the so-called rush for
the door by East German refugees-primarily
through West Berlin-which reached a high point of
47,000 in the first 12 days of August 1961. All told,
some 2.7 million East Germans fled the Soviet
Occupation Zone (East Germany) in 1949-61, a
population exodus that then GDR leader Walter
Ulbricht believed would fatally undermine his regime.
For Ulbricht, therefore, the immediate purpose of The
Wall was to halt this refugee flood through Berlin
rather than to challenge Allied rights in the city.
The massive Wall,' which splits the city and
surrounds West Berlin on all sides, appears to have
fulfilled Ulbricht's intention. Since August 1961, only
about 200,000 East Germans have fled to the West,
but less than 20 percent of these have done so by 25X1
daring The Wall or the similarly tough intra-German
frontier. (Most refugees have fled through third
countries.) Both barriers are fitted with mine-filled
death strips, electronic warning devices, and guard
towers manned by troops with "shoot-on-sight"
orders. Moreover, the vast majority of these escapees
managed it in the early 1960s while the fortifications
around Berlin and along the intra-German border
were still being tightened. In recent years, only about
200 annually make it out by this route, a small
handful over The Wall itself. Some 80 people have
been killed at The Wall.
The Wall as Viewed From the East
Walter Ulbricht later privately admitted that The
Wall was a catastrophic moral defeat for his regime
and an international public relations disaster
'The 165-kilometer-long, 12-foot-high Wall is made of solid
concrete and painted white for better visibility. It is crowned with a
concrete tube on which it is virtually impossible to get a handhold.
The Wall, however, is merely the centerpiece of a much wider
floodlit border strip with additional fences, antitank traps, mines,
dog runs, and 290 guard towers, all of which are manned by more
than 8,000 border guards.F__~
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constantly reinforced by the death of every would-be
escapee. Moreover, erection of The Wall probably has
contributed greatly to the regime's "legitimacy
deficit" with its populace, and the shortfall is unlikely
to be overcome so long as The Wall stands. F_~
Publicly, however, the regime aggressively asserts
that its so-called anti-Fascist protective rampart was a
justifiable defensive measure to ward off an
impending NATO military assault on the GDR.
Subscribing to the thesis that the best defense is a
good offense, the GDR goes out of its way each year
to mark the events of 13 August 1961 as a defeat for
"Western imperialism." This year, in fact, the GDR
has even issued a special commemorative stamp! The
East Germans further claim that, far from being an
inhumane act, building The Wall was a positive
contribution to peace and a necessary prerequisite for
detente. By their logic, The Wall serves human
rights-in particular the right to live in peace-by
ensuring the status quo on the confrontation line
between the Warsaw Pact and NATO.
Indeed, once freed of the threat of being bled to
death, the regime successfully achieved its internal
consolidation. The best evidence is that the populace
bitterly resented the "closing of the door," but the
majority subsequently resigned itself to making the
best of a bad lot. The regime constructed such a stable
police-welfare state on the foundation of this popular
resignation that within 15 years it felt confident
enough to pursue a more forceful policy toward the
outside world, especially West Germany. Thus, the
existence of The Wall has become the prerequisite for
East German dealings with West Germany, including
ironically, the GDR's willingness to make The Wall
and other barriers to intra-German relations
marginally more porous.
The Wall as Viewed From the West
As press commentary following every abortive escape
attempt makes abundantly clear, The Wall provides
the West Germans with a vivid reminder of the
repressive nature of Communist rule in East
Germany. West German experts of all persuasions
believe examples of just this sort account for the
dismal postwar record of Communists in FRG
elections. At the same time, many West Germans
recognize the connection between The Wall and East
Germany's willingness to engage in its own
Westpolitik. The construction of The Wall, and
particularly the West's failure to respond forcefully,
caused a drastic shift in West German perceptions of
how to deal with the GDR and eventually shaped
West Germany's approach to Ostpolitik.
The difference in attitudes before and after The
Wall's construction are telling. Prior to 1961 the West
Germans subscribed to the theory of rolling back
Communist rule in Eastern Europe from a position of
strength, a policy that led Konrad Adenauer to bring
West Germany into the Atlantic Alliance. When the
West failed to respond forcefully to the challenge of
The Wall's construction, many leading West
Germans concluded that "rollback" had been only a
convenient Cold War myth, primarily of service to the
US-Soviet confrontation and not one intended to
bring about the reunification of Germany. The East
German regime was seen as essentially permanent
and thus Bonn would have to pursue its own policy in
the East to effect the rapprochement necessary in
which the spirit of a common German nation could
survive. This necessitated, at the least, the de facto
recognition of East Germany rather than its
subversion. In fact, one leading West German official
publicly stated a few years ago that Bonn no longer
wants instability in the GDR because that would only
force the East Germans to crack down and undo
recent improvements in intra-German relations.
In effect, the pursuit of better relations with the East
Germans has become an end in itself and the focal
point of West German policy to this day, one which
abhorence for The Wall and all it represents will not
displace. To most West Germans, the era of detente
has produced tangible benefits by creating
opportunities to visit relatives, reunite families,
engage in cultural, athletic, and scientific exchanges,
and just meet Germans from the other side. These
exchanges have also created the one hope the
Germans have to keep alive the idea of a common
nation.
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The Wall and the Quadripartite Agreement
Ironically, The Wall not only led to the GDR's
internal stabilization, but also, by creating a new
context for Berlin, contributed indirectly to the
signing of the Quadripartite Agreement (QA) on
Berlin. The QA was concluded in 1971 by the four
victorious powers of World War II and established the
new status quo for Berlin that has endured to this day.
The QA has affected the attitudes and policies of both
Germanys toward the divided city and the meaning of
The Wall, even though neither is a party to the
agreement. More generally, by enshrining the
practices governing Allied access and rights that had
evolved since the war, the QA removed much of the
tension surrounding Berlin affairs. The resulting
environment has contributed much to the ability of
the two Germanys to promote improved ties. In
particular, Bonn has developed a more benign view of
East German intentions regarding intra-German
relations.)
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For its part, however, East Germany has viewed The
Wall as instrumental in the GDR's policy of isolating
West Berlin-the only part of the city to which the
QA applies, according to the East-from West
Germany and trying to establish that part of the city
as a completely separate "third" Germany. For the
GDR, the operative clause of the QA is that West
Berlin "continues not to be a constituent part of the
Federal Republic of Germany and is not governed by
it." The GDR's recent aborted attempt to institute
passport and visa controls for diplomats crossing The
Wall at Checkpoint Charlie was another in a long
series of efforts to establish The Wall as an
international boundary, contrary to the QA. More
recently, the GDR has sought to channel West Berlin
and West German resentment over the flood of Third
World refugees through West Berlin-in part
engineered by the GDR-into pressure on the Allies
to establish visa and passport requirements at
intersectoral crossing points.
For West Germany, its commitment to West Berlin is
inseparable from the desire for closer German-
German ties. Bonn, therefore, accents the QA
language stating that the connections between West
Germany and West Berlin are to be "maintained and
developed." Administrations from left to right,
including that of Helmut Kohl, have all reiterated this
commitment. These administrations also have
fostered the growth of federal institutions in the city,
and Bonn also supplies more than half of the West
Berlin budget. At the same time, the West Germans
have postponed concluding numerous agreements with
the East because of disputes about the inclusion of
West Berlin and over the right of West Berliners to
participate as members of West German delegations.
The recent cultural agreement with East Germany
and one governing scientific and technical exchanges
with the Soviet Union came about only after years of
delay and after Bonn was satisfied with the language
regarding West Berlin
Outlook: When Will The Wall Fall?
GDR leader Honecker has a pat answer when
Western journalists-or US Congressmen-ask him
when The Wall is coming down: it will be torn down
"when the conditions that caused it to be erected
disappear." For all intents and purposes, this means
West Germany continues to search for new ways
to overcome The Wall.
never, because "the conditions" are not any alleged
NATO military threat but rather the mere existence
of West Germany as a more prosperous, democratic,
and open society than the GDR. The average East
German's strong attachment to his native region-
Thuringia or Saxony, not the GDR-would probably
avert a radical depopulation of the GDR if The Wall
fell. However, the GDR's population is currently
declining and labor is in short supply, so even a
modest additional loss of skilled workers or
professionals could cause economic disruption. In
addition, the regime would be hard pressed to counter
the effects on its own populace of frequent, direct
exposure to life in the West.F__1
In the meantime, The Wall offers East Germany a
ready card to play in the intra-German game by
bargaining temporary "doors" in The Wall in return
for financial and economic advantages, such as untied
loan guarantees. The regime also encourages the West
German political left to lobby Bonn for recognition of
GDR citizenship and sovereignty-a longtime East
German demand-by implying these concessions
would be the prelude to removing The Wall. F_~
Most West Germans have come to accept the Berlin
Wall. They certainly do not like it, but neither do they
expect it to go away any time soon, and only the most
conservative forces maintain the Cold War rhetoric of
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"rollback." As a result, governments in Bonn will
continue to seek ways to overcome the inhumane and
divisive nature of The Wall. The routes they chose
will depend to a large extent on the issue at hand,
Allied management in Berlin, and the West German
assessment of the motivation of their Eastern
brethren. Although Bonn continues to support the
Allied position in disputes involving Berlin's status, we
expect the West Germans to view these matters
increasingly through their intra-German prism, as
they did in the recent GDR attempt to impose
passport controls on diplomats at the sector-crossing
boundaries. In that case, the West Germans initially
perceived it as a German-German problem, rather
than one of quadripartite status, and moved to settle it
on their own terms
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Norway:
New Labor Government Held to
Moderate Course
After 100 days in office, the minority Labor
government's socialist rhetoric has led to little change
in Norwegian policies. Posturing that characterized
the Labor Party's days in opposition has continued,
but political and economic realities have held the
government to a centrist path. Indeed, the government
of Prime Minister Brundtland has backed away from
earlier positions on fiscal retrenchment, footnotes as a
means of expressing reservations in NATO
communiques, a European chemical-weapons-free
zone, and cooperation with OPEC. Labor also appears
to be tempering its own views-from trying to make
policy out of impractical social democratic ideals to
quietly promoting moderate solutions-albeit only
fast enough to prevent a vote of no confidence. In
theory, such a vote could come anytime after
parliament reconvenes in October. But the
Conservative Party and its coalition partners-the
Center Party and the Christian People's Party-will
probably opt to remain in opposition for at least a
year, expecting to gain popular support as Labor
struggles to bring the economy through its current
difficultiesi
Labor Comes to Power
Labor Party leader Gro Harlem Brundtland returned
to the prime minister's seat on 9 May, nine days after
Conservative Prime Minister Kare Willoch
announced his resignation. Willoch's nonsocialist
coalition lost a vote of confidence when it failed to
gain support for its economic austerity package. All
political parties had unanimously called for fiscal
retrenchment after declining oil prices caused a drop
in government revenue, but disagreements over the
structure of the package soon hardened into matters
of principle and party prestige. The rightwing
Progress Party, whose two votes the Conservative
coalition usually depended on for its parliamentary
majority, refused to agree to any tax increase. The
Labor Party, meanwhile, said it would agree to the
government's proposed gasoline tax increase only if
income taxes were also raised to ensure a "fair"
distribution of the higher overall tax burden.
Prime Minister Gro Harlem
Brundtland
Exasperated by the refusal of these parties to
compromise, Willoch announced his government's
own refusal to discuss further the structure of the
package and made the vote on the measures a
question of confidence in his Cabinet. Rather than
forcing support for the austerity package, however,
the move cemented the parties' positions, and the
government was brought down. F_~
Brundtland took office reluctantly, conscious of the
difficulties her government would face with a
nonsocialist majority in parliament. She evidently
decided, however, that Labor should take every step
possible to see that the party, once in power, would
not be thrown out. Her choice of moderate Cabinet
ministers, many of whom have past government
experience, reflected an immediate effort to appeal to
the center of the Norwegian political spectrum. On
specific issues, Labor has proven moderate and
flexible, courting the votes of the nonsocialist Center
and Christian People's parties. For example, the
Labor government's own austerity measures, which
were supported by the center parties, resemble those
proposed by the Willoch government-specifically, a
gas tax increase without an income tax increase.
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Distribution of Parliamentary Seats
After the 1985 Elections
Labor Party 71
Socialist Left Party 6
Socialist Parties 77
Defense Minister Johan Jorgen
Hoist
Brundtland's ability to remain in office depends
greatly on the nonsocialist parties' desire to remain in
opposition. The largest of these, the Conservative
Party, has already begun to gain from public
perceptions that the Labor government has not been
effective in improving the country's economy or
managing its security policy: a recent opinion poll
shows a 2-percentage point Conservative gain at
Labor's expense since Brundtland took office. The
Conservatives also want to let the Progress Party sulk
under a Labor government after voting a more
ideologically compatible government out of power.
(Before returning to office, the Conservatives and
their coalition partners are likely to demand a formal
commitment from the Progress Party to support the
government's policies.) The Center Party and
Christian People's Party, freed from the compromises
demanded by minority participation in a coalition
government, are using the respite to recommit
themselves to party ideals. According to the US
Embassy, some party leaders even perceive that their
influence has increased since the Willoch government
fell because Labor must now solicit their support on
an issue-by-issue basis. The Labor Party, however, is
far from achieving its goal of breaking the
nonsocialist consensus on returning to a Conservative-
led coalition government when the time appears ripe.
Socialist Posturing
Despite its centrist slant, the Labor government, in
good socialist fashion, has been outspoken on a
number of foreign and security policy issues. In many
ways, these challenges to US and NATO positions are
merely remnants of Labor's rhetoric as an opposition
party, but they now limit Brundtland's
maneuverability. The new government also
undoubtedly felt a need to distinguish its policies from
those of its predecessor. Personalities have played a
role in the Labor government's posturing as well.
The most striking example of Labor's stormy entrance
is Defense Minister Johan Jorgen Hoist's clash with
US delegates at the NATO Defense Planning
Committee (DPC) ministerial in May and his
subsequent footnote to the communique, expressing
Norwegian reservations. Hoist,
got into a heated
argument with US Assistant Secretary of Defense
Richard Perle when a consensus of delegates refused
to alter communique language giving tacit support to
the SDI program. Although a parliamentary
resolution expresses Norwegian opposition to SDI, the
nonsocialists were sharply critical of Hoist's handling
of the matter. A vote of no confidence in the Defense
Minister launched by the Progress Party, however,
was defeated with the cooperation of the nonsocialist
coalition.)
STAT
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Other examples of attempts by the Labor government
to make policy out of impractical social democratic
ideals include:
? A senior member of the Norwegian mission to
NATO, on orders from Oslo, expressed support for
a European chemical-weapons-free zone and hinted
at a Norwegian initiative toward this end. (The
NATO position is that a CW ban should be global,
not regional.)
? Oslo has spoken out in favor of a Nordic Nuclear-
Weapons-Free Zone and has indicated its
willingness to create a Nordic working group to
prepare a study on the zone.
? Oil Minister Arne Oien declared that Norway was
willing to consider cooperating with OPEC by
cutting oil production to boost world prices. Oien
later met with Saudi Oil Minister Sheikh Yamani,
and Prime Minister Brundtland met with OPEC
President Hernandez Grisanti.
? The government increased Norwegian aid to
Nicaragua for 1986 by $1.3 million (15 percent) and
suggested the establishment of a Norwegian "peace
corps" office in Nicaragua.
? Oslo confirmed its policy of permitting whaling
after the United States announced that, as required
by US law, it was beginning to take steps toward
imposing sanctions on fish exports because of
Norwegian violations of International Whaling
Commission rules.)
Little Change From Previous Government's Policies
The posturing has not, however, led to much change
from the previous Conservative government's policies
and, in some cases, the Labor government's actions
have effectively reversed its more liberal statements.
? Following the DPC ministerial footnote, Holst, in a
gesture of reconciliation, visited the American
ambassador to discuss the matter. He said he did
not want to insert a footnote but instructions from
Oslo left him no choice. Brundtland, Holst, and
Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund have all since
gone on record against footnotes.
? After sharp criticism in NATO and a British
demarche to Oslo, Norway denied any intention to
initiate a process to create a separate 6 European
chemical-weapons-free zone.
? Except for one ambiguous sentence in the Foreign
Minister's June foreign policy speech, the
government has not commented further on the
Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone or the
proposed working group.
? Both Prime Minister Brundtland and Oil Minister
Oien have revised their wording on oil policy to say
that Norway would only consider decreasing the
rate of growth in its oil production if OPEC could
first agree on production quotas for its member
countries.
? The government has privately expressed to our
Embassy its reservations about the Sandinista
government and indicated that it will not target
substantially greater sums to Nicaragua. Oslo
further indicated that the primary function of its
"peace corps" office would be to monitor the use of
Norwegian aid funds. More recently, Norway has
publically criticized the Sandinistas for closing the
only remaining opposition newspaper but has
continued to oppose US aid to the contras.
? Oslo announced it would replace commercial
whaling with "scientific" whaling, thus complying
with International Whaling Commission rules and
avoiding US sanctions. F__1
How Long Can Labor Last?
The Labor Party hopes to stay in power and the
nonsocialist parties intend to keep it there-at least
for now. The US Embassy speculates that Brundtland
will remain in office well into 1987 but points out a
number of gates through which Labor must pass.
First is the opening of parliament in October and the
1987 budget debate. Assuming that Labor remains
flexible and moderate, it will probably gain the
support of the Center parties on the budget package.
Another is the September 1987 municipal elections. If
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Labor appears to have made large gains since forming
a government, the opposition may conclude that it is
time to retake power. Conversely, if the nonsocialists
make large gains, they may feel strong enough to once
again assume leadership. Elections that show little
evolution in political sympathies, however, would
probably lead the nonsocialists to continue their
waiting game. In sum, Labor will stay in office as long
as the nonsocialists believe they have more to gain
from being out of government rather than in it.
While a Conservative-led government would support
US policies more openly and promptly, Brundtland is
a moderate leader, and Labor's dependence on the
center parties for support forces the government to
promote moderate policies. An increase in Labor's
representation in parliament after the 1989 election,
by contrast, could encourage the party to turn to more
adventurous policies. For the time being, however,
trends favor the nonsocialists: the public is blaming
Labor for the economic malaise, and, as the outcry
over the DPC footnote suggests, has begun to question
Labor's approach to security policy. The key point for
US interests in Norway seems to be that for now,
while dealing with a Labor government requires more
patience and firmness, the constraints on the
government are so strong that it matters little if Labor
is in power or not.
Secret 14
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Yugoslavia:
Prospects for Nuclear Power
Development
The future of nuclear energy in Yugoslavia, once
bright, is now uncertain. Growing and unusually
broad-based antinuclear sentiment has forced
Belgrade to put on hold plans to build several nuclear
plants, including a $2.5 billion plant in Croatia on
which US and other foreign firms are bidding.
Chances are still better than even that the Croatian
plant ultimately will be approved. But the decision
probably will come only after lengthy study and could
cause further controversy among both the leadership
and the public.
Current Status
Yugoslavia's nuclear power development program, in
particular, plans to build its second nuclear plant at
Prevlaka near the Croatian capital of Zagreb, has
been sidetracked but not derailed. Pronuclear forces,
previously virtually unchallenged, have suffered
serious setbacks. Several regional bodies have
eliminated or postponed commitments to nuclear
plants. F__1
Moreover, the issue has been bucked up to the federal
level, where a special new commission reportedly has
been formed to reexamine nuclear power in the
context of the country's long-term energy
development plans. Premier Branko Mikulic and top
leadership bodies in recent weeks have indicated that
no plants will be approved until the government
finishes its study.
Nonetheless, the program is far from dead. The
nuclear lobby remains a potent force, relatively few
top officials have rejected the nuclear option, and the
review of bids and other preliminary work for
Prevlaka is continuing. Mikulic has noted that one of
the purposes of the commission is to provide a cooling
off period. The complex series of agreements among
governmental and economic organizations to build the
plant also remain intact.
Prevlaka was to be the first of a four-unit series of
1,000 megawatt plants-following the opening in
1982 of the country's first 664 megawatt plant built
The successful operation of the country's first Yugoslav Source
nuclear plant, built by Westinghouse in the
Slovenian town of Krsko, is an argument used by
nuclear proponents. F__1
by Westinghouse in Krsko, Slovenia-with the
possibility of an eventual seven to 11 plants
nationwide. The $2.5 billion Prevlaka plant was
planned to be built by a consortium of utilities from
Croatia, Slovenia, and possibly Vojvodina.
Construction was originally slated to begin in mid-
1988 with commercial output beginning in 1995, but
that timetable has continued to slip. Bidders include
firms from the United States, France, Great Britain,
West Germany, Canada, Japan, and the USSR.
Pronuclear Lobby
If Prevlaka is approved, it will be thanks to a hardcore
of pronuclear officials motivated by both conviction
and self-interest. They consist of scientists, academics,
and-even more vocally and visibly-regional and
federal energy officials, utility officials, and industrial
organizations producing power equipment. They tend
to draw their strength from three common arguments:
? Yugoslavia is an energy deficient and import
dependent country with no viable domestic long-
term energy alternatives to nuclear power.
Secret
EUR ER 86-019
15 August 1986
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? The decision to develop nuclear power has been
legitimized through a series of accords between
regions, industries, and various layers of
government-in keeping with the country's
traditional system of economic decision making-
and verified through national economic programs
based on economic and scientific analysis.
? The successful operation of the Krsko plant
demonstrates the safety, reliability, and efficiency
of nuclear power.
Though recently thrown on the defensive, pronuclear
officials employ hard-hitting charges in rebutting
their critics. They argue that safety and
environmental concerns often have been used as a
smokescreen by groups motivated more by political or
economic interests. They maintain that those regions
not slated for nuclear plants, mostly in the poorer
south, are simply jealous or fearful that the country's
limited capital must by necessity be committed to
selected republics. They accuse opponents and the
press of spreading grossly inaccurate data concerning
cost and safety, trying to create an atmosphere of
hysteria. F-I
Circumstantial evidence suggests that nuclear
advocates and their sympathizers may be more
numerous than their current visibility suggests.
Antinuclear activists continue to characterize them as
a strong and determined force. Few advocates have
been known to retract their commitment to nuclear
power in the face of the protest wave. And support for
increased energy supplies from any sources could
increase if a hard winter approaches and utility
companies resort to electricity brownouts. F__1
Antinuclear Forces
The pronuclear lobby, however, faces a formidable
opponent in the form of unusually widespread
antinuclear sentiment. The breadth of opposition to
an established government policy such as nuclear
power in fact is unprecedented in recent years as is the
success of nuclear opponents in gaining a
reassessment of the energy program.
The antinuclear forces, though largely uncoordinated,
consist of a number of disparate groups with normally
unrelated interests. They include several regions that
have sufficient energy resources of their own, some
official youth organizations, parts of the scientific
community and the media, the public at large,
veterans, and apparently some circles within the
military. F_~
Regardless of the latest furor, antinuclear agitation in
itself is nothing new and even has won some modest
victories. The decision to locate the current plant at
Prevlaka, for instance, came about only after plans to
build it on the Adriatic Coast near Zadar were upset
in 1979. Local officials maintained a reactor would
threaten the area's tourism industry. Opposition to
nuclear power was strong and growing even before the
Chernobyl accident. Nonetheless, Chernobyl gave
antinuclear forces important new impetus, especially
when the regime ordered-and the media
publicized-preventive measures against radioactive
fallout affecting most of Yugoslavia.
Several common themes run through Yugoslav
antinuclear sentiment, cutting across the diverse
groups. One is that new nuclear plants are financially
unsound. Critics argue that building four new plants
would double the country's $20 billion foreign debt
and compromise the nonaligned country's economic
and political independence. They assert that foreign
credits to build even the Krsko plant so far have not
been repaid, only rescheduled. Another is that they
are unnecessary, since the country purportedly has
sufficient untapped alternative domestic coal and
water resources. And, especially since Chernobyl,
there has been a growing belief that they pose a real
threat to the public's safety and the environment.
Outlook
The leadership seems to be playing for time, hoping
that antinuclear sentiment eventually will subside and
a decision on Prevlaka, pro or con, can be made on
practical economic and other grounds. The regime
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Antinuclear views have received
ample coverage in the press,
including this Zagreb magazine
feature on the nuclear debate.
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Following are some of the key antinuclear pressure
groups and outlines of their motives and impacts:
Regional Interest Groups. Interest groups from
several regions have cause to be unsupportive of, and
even antagonistic to, Prevlaka. Serbia, Kosovo, and
Premier Mikulic s home republic of Bosnia-
Hercegovina each have substantial untapped coal
resources of their own and a vested interest in further
developing alternative energy sources in their own
regions. Even Slovenia, a junior partner in Prevlaka,
is only lukewarm about the project, US diplomats
have reported. F__1
Youth Groups. Some youth groups have been among
the most vocal and visible opponents of nuclear
plants. The official youth group in Slovenia, the
country's most Westward-looking and tolerant
republic, has come out against nuclear energy.
Members of Croatia's youth group have protested the
lack of say on nuclear planning and have discussed
staging sit-ins at Prevlaka with their Slovene
counterparts. Some 70,000 Serbian youth reportedly
signed an antinuclear petition.
Military. Some evidence suggests that circles within
the military have reservations about nuclear power.
One military commentator in March warned that
nuclear plants would make Yugoslavia more
dependent on big powers and could be vulnerable to
attack even from small Balkan neighbors. Nikola
Ljubicic, a Serbian leader and ex-defense minister,
also has spoken against nuclear power. F__1
Veterans. The veterans, a conservative and vociferous
pressure group, called for the suspension of all new
nuclear plants at a congress in June. Individual
delegates-including some from Croatia protested
a lack of public voice-on nuclear planning and warned
that Yugoslavia could become a nuclear waste
disposal dump. F__1
Scientific Community. The experts seem sharply
divided over the safety and appropriateness of
nuclear plants. Many scientists and engineers
reportedly have signed antinuclear petitions sent to
national leadership bodies
Public at Large. The antinuclear issue has strong
appeal to the man in the street. A public opinion poll
taken at about the time of Chernobyl found that 75
percent of adult respondents nationwide believed
nuclear plants are unnecessary, and an "absolute
majority" asserted that they are environmentally
more threatening than other power plants.
The Media. Some of the country's increasingly
freewheeling media have seized on nuclear power to
sell papers and mold opinion. The press gave
extensive, largely unvarnished coverage to the
Chernobyl disaster and has reported openly and often
sympathetically on the views of nuclear opponents.
Courts. The nuclear program may hit a legal snag.
The country's Constitutional Court reportedly has
begun to examine whether the issue falls within its
competence. The court flexed its muscle last year
when it ruled unconstitutional another established
government policy on foreign exchange. F__1
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may be underestimating the intensity of feeling on
both sides, and the test of strength between pro-
nuclear and antinuclear forces within government
channels is likely to be lengthy and bitter. At this
point, however, the odds seem to favor an eventual
positive decision on Prevlaka but a negative
recommendation on any other plants, including the
three that previously had been approved.
A number of variables could change in the coming
months and weaken Prevlaka's chances. The process
of decisionmaking itself is in flux, with the ability of
elites to disregard public opinion increasingly in
doubt. The country's financial picture also could turn
suddenly for the worse, jeopardizing Belgrade's ability
to finance any ambitious new projects. And it is
unclear whether memories of Chernobyl will soon dim
or whether antinuclear sentiment will coalesce into
some kind of coalition.
Even if government bodies eventually decide in favor
of Prevlaka, they may not have the last word. The
decision could turn into a new point of contention
within the leadership, possibly pitting Croatia against
other republics. Moreover, it could spark increasingly
serious public protests, including at the Prevlaka site,
which the regime may have difficulty controlling.
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may be underestimating the intensity of feeling on
both sides, and the test of strength between pro-
nuclear and antinuclear forces within government
channels is likely to be lengthy and bitter. At this
point, however, the odds seem to favor an eventual
positive decision on Prevlaka but a negative
recommendation on any other plants, including the
three that previously had been approved.
A number of variables could change in the coming
months and weaken Prevlaka's chances. The process
of decisionmaking itself is in flux, with the ability of
elites to disregard public opinion increasingly in
doubt. The country's financial picture also could turn
suddenly for the worse, jeopardizing Belgrade's ability
to finance any ambitious new projects. And it is
unclear whether memories of Chernobyl will soon dim
or whether antinuclear sentiment will coalesce into
some kind of coalition.
Even if government bodies eventually decide in favor
of Prevlaka, they may not have the last word. The
decision could turn into a new point of contention
within the leadership, possibly pitting Croatia against
other republics. Moreover, it could spark increasingly
serious public protests, including at the Prevlaka site,
which the regime may have difficulty controlling.
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the filming of a Gothic horror novel. I was surprised
when an elderly Romanian Communist Party official,
during an exchange of pleasantries, sighed for a
moment and remarked nostalgically that "You really
should have seen Bucharest in the 30s-It was quite a
city then!"
Spotty attempts are made to clean up certain
buildings or refurbish certain points in the city,
although the grime produced by industries and
vehicles with no pollution controls conspire to defeat
the most well-meaning efforts. One partial success is
the large parks-especially Herastrau in the north,
which was built in the interwar days around several
partially artificial lakes. In the spring Herastrau's
colorful flower gardens, newly cleaned statues, and
graceful trees can even make the Stalinist Scinteia
(party daily) building look attractive in the distance.
The park also brings out that most unusual species-
the smiling Romanian: young lovers, with few other
places to go, strolling hand-in-hand or necking in
secluded spots, young families with well-dressed
children out for the sun on clear days. In contrast,
pedestrians in Bucharest normally walk quickly with
blank, self-involved, and vaguely angry expressions,
reflecting the general harshness of life in modern
Romania. The lighter expressions of spring are as
much manifestations of relief over the survival of yet
another winter of shortages as anything else.
The approach of winter brings a different mood to
Bucharest. Following the disastrous winter of 1984-
85, when cold temperatures and heavy snowfall (in
fact, no worse than the average New England winter)
combined with cutbacks in heating, electricity,
lighting, public and private transit, and food supplies
to cause widespread misery and even death, the
autumn of 1985 saw Bucharest as a city in the grip of
suppressed panic. Government announcements on
virtually any topic were scoured for hints of new
shortages or cutbacks, with everyone expecting only
the worst. President Ceausescu's discussion of yet
another eccentric scheme-the opening of a chain of
"workers' canteens" for the mass provision of
preprocessed meals to city dwellers-was immediately
interpreted (wrongly) as a hint that other food stores,
already nearly bare, would close. Word in early
November that Romanians would be able to witness a
full lunar eclipse metamorphosed in hours into rumors
that Japanese or Western scientists had predicted
another major earthquake similar to the one that
destroyed large areas of Bucharest in 1977. Western
embassies were flooded with queries from anxious
Romanians more trusting of foreigners than their own
authorities, and large numbers of otherwise rational
people arranged to be away from the city that
weekend.
Shortages
Although a firm commitment to Stalinist theories of
economic development and a series of failed and often
arbitrary and irrational government policies have
reduced Romania to the second lowest standard of
living in Europe after Albania, its citizens still live far
better than the unfortunate masses of the Third and
Fourth Worlds. In extensive travel throughout the
country 1 know who
has traveled in Romania ever witnessed the types of
hunger or severe malnutrition common in much of
Africa or parts of Asia. Instead, the problem is the
monotony and lack of quality of the foods consumed.
The average Romanian diet features a lot of starch
(bread, macaroni, and corn mush) occasionally
enlivened with poor sausage, cabbage, and pickled
vegetables. Canned fish and bottled vegetables are
freely available but are regarded with suspicion by
most consumers because of their low quality and poor
sanitary standards. Also easily available are several
peculiar items such as Vietnamese shrimp fritters or
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Greek stuffed olives, the legacy of industrial
countertrade deals, which are either alien to the
Romanian diet or not potential staples.
As several Romanians explained, the problem for
them was not that decent food was impossible to
obtain but that it was so difficult to obtain. I was
invited to a wedding at which the couple's families
served a fairly impressive (by Romanian standards)
spread; afterward, the couple explained that it had
taken them more than two months of careful planning
and bribery to assemble the feast. During summer
evenings, Romanian families often spend their time
together in their small flats pickling and preserving
enormous quantities of fruits and vegetables to get
them through winter months when the markets offer
only onions, small yellow carrots, and old, wormy
apples.
The shortages in Romania have also led to an
extremely effective means of social control. In order
to survive, most Romanians build up over the years an
intricate web of personal connections; bribery and
trade in forbidden Western commodities such as Kent
cigarettes (100s, in the white pack) and coffee; and
illegal hoarding. This widespread corruption and
evasion of government norms on food storage is known
to the security forces, which in most cases do not
prosecute average citizens for these violations.
Instead, records are kept of these infractions. Only
when a Romanian citizen falls afoul of the authorities
for some other reason are these records used, in order
to inflict a punishment for something other than the
real offense. Thus, I once attended the trial of a
physician who had had a disagreement with a local
security official; he in turn had her prosecuted for the
acceptance of small bribes in exchange for medical
care, a common practice among Romanian doctors.
The effect of this practice is to make the average
citizen extremely wary of any action that might bring
him into the government's view; even fully legal
actions that might be disapproved of, such as talking
for too long with a friendly foreigner, are avoided lest
the authorities decide to shake this delicate web.
In general, Romanians I encountered had little
confidence that they could ever seriously influence the
government of their country and tended to speak of
Young Romanians shopping in one of Bucharest's
large open markets.
the current regime in terms we would reserve for
natural disasters such as tornados or earthquakes.
Rather than draw general conclusions from their
suffering, the typical Romanian reaction seems to be
to accept the way things are, hope they may change,
and labor to find one's own place in a hostile world.
Attitudes Toward the West
Perhaps because they have so little exposure to us and
in reaction to the widespread hatred of the Soviets,
who are correctly viewed by most Romanians as the
ultimate source of their sufferings, the average
Romanian attitude toward the West in general and
the United States in particular is overwhelmingly
positive. Prior to World War II, the Romanian elite
tried to identify itself with other Latin nations,
especially France, and elite culture was so avant-
garde and Francophile that it was almost devoid of
genuinely Balkan elements. The tendency to look
westward for cultural inspiration remains, despite
government efforts to combat it and despite
Romania's very real cultural roots in the Eastern,
Byzantine world. This is reinforced today by the
widespread perception, also staunchly but
unsuccessfully contested by Bucharest, that life in the
West is far better than in the East.
As elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Romanians who
meet an American and feel able to conduct a safe
conversation are first curious about Western
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Religious Revival
The combination of steadily deteriorating living
conditions, widespread feelings of political
powerlessness, and the traditionally mystical
Romanian mind have bred a quiet and largely
unorganized religious revival in Romania. Although
the phenomenal growth of various Protestant sects,
especially the Baptists, has attracted much attention
in the West, the vast majority of Romanians retain
some degree of loyalty to the dominant Orthodox
Church. On Sunday mornings, even in the heart of
Bucharest, church bells can be heard and the
churches are crowded with worshipers of all ages.
Orthodox Easter night in Bucharest is easily the
year's most popular holiday, akin to New Year's Eve
in New York, with the streets filled with people
dressed in their finest (including youngsters in full
Romanian punk regalia) for the colorful candlelight
ceremony. Perhaps in recognition of this fact, the
Romanian militia is also out in force on that night,
helpfully directing traffic and clearing the streets for
the crowds. There are limits to this official tolerance,
however-one of the most popular spots during the
1985 Easter celebration, the "Greek Temple" (a
Greek Orthodox Church in central Bucharest), was
closed during this year's Easter. In general, however,
Bucharest has not sought to interfere with relatively
passive worship in Orthodox churches; even Party
members can be seen at services, and officials from
the President on down have sometimes referred to the
Orthodox Church as Romania's "national religion."
Government ire has only been aroused against those
few Orthodox priests, such as Father Calciu, who
have tried to inject political meaning into religion or
who have objected to the Church's passive acceptance
of government authority
The "new Protestant" sects, and especially the
Baptists, are another story. More activist faiths, with
traditions of independence from government
authority, their growth in recent years, and the fact
that many of their new converts come from the
Orthodox Church or are young professionals with
little previous religious identification, are viewed by
the State as an ideological challenge. Thus, although
the most rapidly growing group, the Baptists, number
at most 150,000, or less than 1 percent of the overall
population, and, although most Romanians have
never even met a Baptist, their most active clergy are
often subject to official harassment and obstacles are
put in the way of the expansion of their church
facilities. Most Baptists see little prospect of
mounting a successful political challenge to the
system, and hope instead to win the government's
toleration so they can go on propagating their faith,
albeit with the hope of eventually creating an even
more religious Romania that by definition could not
be Communist. They tend to be fervent believers, and
even mainstream Romanian Baptist services are
fairly charismatic by American standards, although
practices such as faith healing that took root in some
of the more activist congregations in recent years are
actively discouraged by the national Baptist
leadership
Many other minority faiths, especially those with
ethnic links such as the Muslims, are quietly
tolerated by Bucharest in the belief that they will
eventually die out. One formerly influential minority
that is now virtually gone from Romania are the
Jews
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Prior to World War II, several regions of Romania
boasted large Jewish populations, with major cities
like Iasi and Suceava being between a third and a
half Jewish. Jews concentrated especially in northern
Moldavia and Bessarabia, which was annexed by the
Soviet Union in 1940 and proclaimed the Moldavian
SSR. It was in this region that the Yiddish theatre,
which eventually had strong influence on American
theatre, originated and that the words to the Israeli
national anthem were written; the small Jewish
villages or "shtetls"of this region and their cousins
just across the border in Russia and Poland were the
birthplace of the folklore tradition that has been
brought to the West through the paintings of Marc
Chagall and the writings -of Shalom leichem and
Isaac Bashevis Singer.
Approximately half of the Jews of Romania were
killed in the war, mostly in Romanian forced labor
camps or during pogroms involving Romanian
civilians and troops. More than 150,000 were
deported in the closing days of the war by Hungarian
troops to German death camps in Poland. In the
years since then, 97 percent of the survivors have
emigrated, virtually all to Israel, and the tiny, aged
community of 25,000 who remain produce
approximately 1,500 further emigrants every year. In
some areas of northern Romania, they have left
behind virtual ghost towns. While hundreds of
smaller synagogues have fallen into disuse or have
been converted to office space, some of the larger or
more historic synagogues of the region, now far too
large for their miniscule congregations, are
nonetheless lovingly preserved with the help of
charitable contributions from the United States
funneled through the local communities. A common
feature in the Moldavian synagogues are colorful
murals, some centuries old, depicting fanciful
Biblical scenes or imaginative Oriental landscapes-
mute testimony to the generations who lived their
entire lives in the remote and snowy Carpathians yet
dreamt of Zion.
The Jews who remain today, in the twilight of their
presence in the country, enjoy better relations with
the government than at any other time in the history
of modern Romania. Oddly enough, this in itself
seems to be a paradoxical result of the persistence of
some old canards. Outsiders who have dealt with
President Ceausescu on this issue have noted that he
seems to take seriously old myths of exaggerated
Jewish political power in the West, but, acting in his
shrewd peasant manner, he has decided that, by
allowing relative freedom to his Jews, including the
freedom to emigrate, he can convince their
coreligionists abroad to help Romania in other areas.
The Chief Rabbi of Romania, a shrewd survivor of 40
years of Communist government, has become
extremely skillful at using these misperceptions to
allow an unusual amount of breathing room for his
shrinking and dying community, which in any event
poses no conceivable threat to the regime
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standards of living. Unlike the Soviet diplomats I met,
who sometimes assumed that things in the West could
not be all that good and disbelieved much of what I
said, I found myself challenged by Romanians only
when I described negative aspects of life in the West,
never the positive. Romanian youths try with some
ingenuity to mimic Western fashions to which they
have little or no direct exposure: on Easter night,
teenagers wander the streets in relatively tame,
homemade "punk" outfits apparently copied from
pictures in Western magazines that have been passed
through hundreds of hands. Romanian nightclubs
almost always feature Western music, usually with
only a few obligatory Romanian folk tunes thrown in,
and certainly with no Russian music and only rarely
selections of the sort of saccharine-sweet pop tunes
featured on the state radio. Young bands tend to be
better in the western border region, where they can
easily pick up Hungarian or Yugoslav radio
broadcasts-one image indelibly printed in my
memory is of sitting in a cold but very smoky
restaurant in a border city one winter evening
listening to fair renditions of old American tunes,
including "Oh, Susanna" while Romanian teenagers,
still dressed in heavy overcoats and hats, tried doing a
square dance. Another is of a Romanian entertainer
in the largest nightclub in the Black Sea resort area,
dressed in a cheap imitation of glittery Las Vegas
style, wowing his audience with fake Country and
Western tunes, crooning in Romanian about leaving
his sweetheart out on the lone prairie. Some Western
tunes are uncritically picked up, recorded, and played
publicly-on another occasion, I was amazed to see
Romanian youngsters in a discotheque in an industrial
town dancing to an obviously pirated recording of a
Reggae tune celebrating the liberation of Grenada. I
am sure no political message was intended; no one
understood the lyrics, least of all the Russian tour
group at the next table.
Politically, these sympathies manifest themselves in
several ways. Most obviously, the average Romanian,
to the extent he feels safe in doing so, will react with
almost instantaneous friendship to any American.
Even in official circles, aside from special cases, the
only negative comments I heard in two years in
Romania concerned the frequent accusation of alleged
US naivete at Yalta. (Most Romanians are incapable
of seeing any responsibility on their own part for their
current dilemma and tend instead to blame the West
for having "abandoned" them to the Soviets, about
whom few Romanians, even in official conversation,
have anything positive to say.) People will look for an
acceptable opportunity to make their feelings known;
the Challenger disaster provided one recent such
opportunity. I remember especially a neighbor in my
apartment bloc grabbing me by the arm shortly after
that tragedy. After looking around quickly to be sure
we were alone, he started by expressing his
condolences for the American loss. He said he had
heard on the radio (virtually every interested
Romanian listens regularly to Radio Free Europe)
that the loss of the Challenger might slow down
Washington's SDI research. With increasing
intensity, he pleaded, "You cannot slow down, or even
remain at the same pace. You must go faster,
FASTER! It is our only hope!"
What Next?
Returning after two years in this paradoxical Balkan
state, I find people wondering what will become of it.
Can its people survive much more of the deprivation
they have lived with in recent years? How much can
the system there be changed, and in what ways? With
the usual caveats about overgeneralization and crystal
ball reading, I would offer the following brief
observations:
? Things are unlikely to change very much so long as
Ceausescu remains in power. He appears thoroughly
committed to his current economic and political
policies, although he has, in the past, shown
sufficient flexibility to grudgingly change certain
tactics when he runs into immovable obstacles.
? The Romanians, first and foremost, are survivors.
One of the most common expressions, frequently
heard in Romania, is "ne descurcam" (we get by).
The peasantry of the country has had centuries to
learn how to satisfy its basic needs in the face of
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Secret
oppressive and incompetent government, and, on
the whole, is not really that much worse off than
they have been throughout their history. City
dwellers, not being able to see any way in which
they can meaningfully influence their government
and preoccupied with personal and family survival,
are not likely to react politically until even that
survival becomes impossible, and there is still a long
way to go before that happens.
? The Romanians are a deeply divided people. They
have no truly national, independent institutions such
as the Polish Church to unite them and, despite
current Communist historiography, little tradition
of common action to achieve national goals. When
and if a final reaction comes, history suggests that it
will be spontaneous, spasmadic, and violent, without
central direction or even internal coordination. By
that point, a palace coup is far more likely to alter
the government than a popular uprising. And, in the
final analysis, Romania's options remain narrowly
limited by the need to avoid a situation that might
be viewed as threatening by its large eastern
neighbor.
? No matter who succeeds Ceausescu, the one positive
legacy he will leave his people will be their
nationalistic foreign policy. While accommodations
must be made with the Soviet Union, he has
demonstrated to the Romanian elite that it is
possible to consider Romanian national interests
first in formulating policy and get away with it. This
has always been a delicate tightrope to walk in
Eastern Europe and will be even more so under a
new and untested leadership, but no future leader of
Romania will be able to avoid trying to pull it off.
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Economic News in Brief
Western Europe and Canada
The EC, led by France, has derailed progress on
agenda for GATT round over agriculture subsidies.
underscores French determination to protect EC's
Common Agricultural Policy ... EC remains
supportive of early GATT negotiations.
US Embassy reports West Germany plans trade law
revisions by next year to provide prosecutions, stiffer
fines for export control violations ... now treated as
misdemeanors ... probably responding to US
concerns over technology leaks to East. F_~
Nordic stance on South African economic sanctions is
diverse, with Norway and Denmark taking a harder
line than Finland and Sweden ... Oslo likely to ban all
South African trade when parliament reconvenes in
fall, while Danish parliament voted in June to ban
commercial links ... Helsinki has urged Finnish
companies not to trade with South Africa, and
Stockholm is hesitant to undertake total boycott
because of potential harm to domestic mineral-
dependent industries ... if UN or other international
initiatives do not emerge, joint Nordic sanctions
policy likely.F___-]
Canada announced sale of 55,000 tons of wheat to
South Africa ... Ottawa needs to dispose of wheat,
increase political support in western Canada ...
critics charged government hypocritical in urging
sanctions.
Spanish-Portuguese trade conflict over local content
of Portuguese goods has become more tense ... due to
recent EC decision to set requirement at 20 to 40
percent of value added ... Spain fears flood of EC
goods through Portugal at preferential rates ... may
try to step up nontariff barriers. F___1
Secret
EUR ER 86-019
15 August 1986
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Secret
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