EUROPEAN REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000301100001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 6, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

European Review
ll6
Seeret
EUR ER 86-013
6 June 1986
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Directorate of Seer et
Intelligence
MASTER FILE COSY
[MT C!VE OUT
OR MAN on
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European Review I 25X1
Briefs West Germany-USSR: New Strains After Chernobyl
Finland: Government Challenged on Nuclear Policy
Ireland: Major Military Maneuvers
Portugal: Problem of Unpaid Workers Worsens
CEMA: Executive Committee Meetings
Articles Yugoslavia: The Military Holds Its Party Congress
Yugoslavia's military party organization recently held its congress, 25X1
spelling out its own views on the country's troubled political and
economic systems. The meeting, convened in advance of the
National Congress of the Communist Party in late June, gave the
post-Tito leadership a somewhat stronger vote of confidence than
military officials have on some other recent occasions and tempered
its concern over the weak economy and rising ethnic nationalism and
liberalism.
Bulgaria: Post-Congress Prospects F__] 9
Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov, dean of East Bloc rulers with 32
years in power, was elected in April to his seventh term as General
Secretary with no indication that he intends to step down any time
soon. He used Bulgaria's 13th Party Congress to call for economic
modernization and to defend recent sweeping ministerial changes.
These changes are unlikely to promote economic recovery but should
keep Zhivkov's leading potential successors off balance for some
time to come.
Turkey: Update on the MEKO Frigate Program
The Turkish Navy's program to build four new MEKO 200-class
frigates designed by West Germany is proceeding on schedule and
should improve substantially the Navy's major surface combatant
force, which currently consists mostly of former US ships of World
War II vintage. If problems of sustained operations can be
minimized, the new frigates will strengthen the Navy's capability
against Warsaw Pact forces in the Black and Aegean Seas and keep
it in competition with the larger naval forces of its ostensible NATO
ally, Greece. F_~
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6 June 1986
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Viewpoint Italy: Policy Toward the Mediterranean1l 15 25X1
Looking Ahead
Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the
contents normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices
within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single
analyst; these items will be designated as uncoordinated views.
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European Review) 25X1
Public demands by Bonn for compensation for damages caused by the Chernobyl
accident reflect growing West German aggravation with Moscow's handling of the
incident and may portend a more assertive posture in general toward the USSR. A
high-ranking West German official told the US Ambassador that Bonn is serious
about claims for compensation and will consult with other European governments
on possible approaches. He added that Bonn may even go to the International
Court of Justice.
Meanwhile, the West German public has witnessed an open exchange between
Bonn and Moscow over the compensation issue. Chancellor Kohl's restatement of
Bonn's claim in a speech in Munich drew a harsh rejoinder from Pravda, which, in
turn, drew a stiff response from Economics Minister Bangemann. Interior
Minister Zimmermann and the new Soviet Ambassador, Yuli Kvitsinskiy, also
have exchanged charges in the West German press. Only Foreign Minister
Genscher has counseled caution, warning against "self-righteous" accusations
regarding Soviet behavior.F___-]
The Kohl government's actions are probably intended, in part, to shore up its
image on the eve of a crucial state election this month. West German farmers, an
important Christian Democratic constituency, suffered losses from safety
measures instituted after the accident, and Bonn would like Moscow to help cover
the costs. Kohl probably would also like to turn public attention away from his
administration's confused response to Chernobyl. The goverment's outspokenness
may also presage a more aggressive response when Moscow critcizes Bonn on
security issues. Recent Soviet statements have scored the West German role in
INF, SDI, and chemical weapons modernization, and Chernobyl may have
provided Bonn a convenient opportunity to reciprocate.F__1
Finland's Social Democratic Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa faced down a challenge
from one of the partners in his center-left coalition government in late May. The
Rural Party, which has been losing members to the Green Party-presumably for
paying little attention to environmental issues-proposed that all Finnish nuclear
plants be shut down by the year 2000. 0
Finland is currently operating two Soviet- and two Swedish-built reactors and had
been considering the purchase of an additional reactor from the USSR.
Notwithstanding the government's decision to defer action on the additional
reactor in the aftermath of the Chernobyl incident, the Rural Party's proposal was
a clear challenge to the government's policy of encouraging the use of nuclear
power.
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Sorsa declared that he would resign if the Rural Party leaders pushed the issue in
parliament. Afraid of being shut out of a new coalition government if Sorsa
followed through on his threat, the Rural Party agreed to raise the issue in
parliament without pushing for a vote. With this challenge behind him, Sorsa had
no difficulty rebuffing the Conservative Party's motion of no-confidence over the
government's handling of information after the Chernobyl accident.F__-]
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The Irish Army conducted a major field exercise in mid-May along the eastern
half of the Republic's border with Northern Ireland which, according to US
diplomats, was designed to test its readiness to respond to an attack from the
north. The maneuvers involved about 1,000 troops drawn from the Army's Eastern
and Curragh military command regions and were the largest since the special
antiterrorist exercise held near Castlebar in 1985.
The goal of the exercise was to test defensive plans for the strategic Dundalk area,
which controls the most direct route from Belfast to Dublin, and to familiarize
Army units with key defensive lines beginning just north of Dundalk and falling
back along the Fane and Boyne Rivers. The exercise was also designed to test the
Army's ability to secure roadblocks and patrol routes used b terrorists entering
the Republic from Northern Ireland. the
exercise was well organized and effectively tested Irish military readiness since
only a few key officials knew in advance which military units would be deployed.
Portugal Problem of Unpaid Workers Worsen
According to the Ministry of Labor, the number of Portuguese workers owed back
pay at the end of 1985 increased by one-third over a two-year period to almost 3
percent of the labor force. The average amount owed, including fringe benefits,
increased sixfold to $1,900. Workers in the metallurgical and machine-building
industries have been hardest hit by this unique Portuguese problem. The
Communist labor union has demanded that Lisbon pick up the tab when employers
fail to meet their obligations, while the Socialist union has pressed the government
for laws that would compel companies to pay their workers. F_~
In response to political pressure, the Cavaco Silva government has approved
several measures for unpaid workers, most notably unemployment benefits.
Nevertheless, the problem is likely to worsen because the financial positions of
many firms will continue to deteriorate as they try to compete in the Common
Market, thereby complicating their ability to meet payroll obligations. Because
Portuguese law does not penalize firms for delinquent salary payments and
economic conditions offer unpaid workers little alternative to hanging on and
hoping for the best, many employers are likely to take the easy way out and
withhold pay. We doubt that the situation will improve until a sustained economic
recovery leads to greater business profits and more employment opportunities.
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The CEMA Executive Committee has approved a draft program for the
construction of nuclear power and heat stations as part of the group's long-term
Economic, Science, and Technology Program. At its meeting in Moscow in mid-
May, the committee focused on establishing direct relations among enterprises and
scientific institutions in the member countries and on the formation of joint
enterprises and associations. The session also considered problems in creating joint
funds to finance the Economic, Science, and Technology Program. After hearing a
detailed Soviet report, the East Europeans expressed satisfaction with Moscow's
handling of the Chernobyl nuclear accident.
The Executive Committee session sets the stage for this month's meeting of
CEMA premiers, which probably will also concentrate on the Economic, Science,
and Technology Program. Comments by Czechoslovakia's Deputy Premier suggest
that the East Europeans have been reluctant to commit resources to the program
and skeptical of its benefits. Although the East Europeans probably have more
reservations about nuclear power than their public endorsements indicate, their
approval of the draft program underscores their lack of alternative sources of
energy
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Yugoslavia: The Military Holds
Its Party Congress F-]
The Yugoslav military's party organization recently
held its congress and laid out its views on the
country's troubled political and economic systems.
The meeting, convened in advance of the National
Congress of the Communist Party in late June,
underscored the military's increasing outspokenness
since its last congress four years ago, which was a
lackluster, largely apolitical, event. The congress
nevertheless gave the post-Tito leadership a somewhat
stronger vote of confidence than military officials
have on some other recent occasions. It also tempered
its concern over several endemic problems such as the
weak economy and rising ethnic nationalism and
liberalism. The military leaders are probably taking a
wait-and-see attitude in advance of a major turnover
of both the party and government leaderships, after
which they may turn up the heat once again. F__]
the regime, often peaking late in the year as a kind of
pressure tactic when the federal legislature formulates
the military budget. F_~
The YPA's political role is rooted in Yugoslav history.
As Tito's partisans, the military successfully fought
the Nazis in World War II, paving the way for the
founding of the modern Yugoslav state. Its political
role was institutionalized in the early 1970s when the
YPA's party organization was given a block of seats
on the Party Central Committee, just like the block
assigned to Yugoslavia's eight administrative regions.
It also holds a seat on the 23-member Party
Presidium. The defense minister normally is a
military man, and one of the ex-defense ministers
currently sits on the collegial nine-man State
Presidency. F__1
The Military's Role in the Political System
Since Tito's death in 1980, the Yugoslav People's
Army (YPA) has played an increasingly important
role as a force for continuity and stability in the
complex Yugoslav political system. In a diverse and
ethnically divided nation-one that is experimenting
with various political and economic reforms-the
Army has been a chief proponent of principles Tito
espoused and that held the country together during
his 35-year reign: ideological orthodoxy, Pan-
Yugoslavism, national independence, and strong party
influence. Over the last six years, the military has
generally refrained from direct intervention in the
system and has offered few concrete policy proposals.
It has preferred to work by pressuring politicians
behind the scenes while publicly calling for action
against what it sees as dangerous trends and making
occasional oblique threats. The YPA's criticism has
ebbed and flowed with developments in society and
Military Congress Views on Trends in Society
At the YPA's latest congress, held in Belgrade on 21
and 22 April, the military laid out its views on a
number of pressing political and economic issues.
Army Party Chief Georgije Jovicic gave the keynote
address, while Defense Minister Branko Mamula and
other officers spoke in the plenary debates. Following
are some highlights.
Nationalism. Jovicic and Mamula voiced continuing
concern over nationalism, long a problem in this
multinational state, but were relatively low-key in
light of some recent nationalist incidents. Jovicic
described the situation in Kosovo Province-where
7,000 ethnic Serbs in early April demonstrated
against discrimination by the province's mainly
Albanian leadership-as "very serious and difficult"
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but otherwise was terse and noncommital. Possibly
reflecting sensitivity to the disproportionate number
of Serbs within the military, Jovicic failed to mention
nationalism in Serbia-which has risen partly in
response to ethnic strains in Kosovo and which leaves
many of the other republics jittery. He also was
restrained on recent signs of assertiveness in the
northern Republic of Slovenia, which traditionally
voices parochial, anti-Belgrade attitudes. Jovicic's
remarks were all the milder considering statements of
late December-like those of General Daljevic,
another prominent military spokesman, who pointed
to the need to move "at long last" into an
"uncompromising settling of scores" against
nationalists.)
Liberalism. Jovicic noted a "deterioration" in the
ideological sphere, another longstanding focus of
military concern. He added that the military was
"most critical" of regions that allowed antisocialist
forces-a reference to a diverse group of critics of the
Communist system-whose goal is "the destruction of
our society's foundation." Jovicic maintained that
these attacks are "directed against the Army in order
to destabilize it." Jovicic's statements, while tough,
were still somewhat less polemical than those just six
months ago when Mamula demanded that political
leaders "take all measures-ideopolitical and others"
to silence critics of the Army and Yugoslavia.
Moreover, Jovicic's comments were surprisingly tame
in light of some recent events. For example, at a
recent youth congress in Slovenia, delegates called for
Western-style pluralism and a civilian alternative to
military service. Not long afterward, members of a
Slovene "Peace Movement" sent a letter to the
federal government urging Belgrade to refrain from
its lucrative arms trade and halt the military training
of foreign nationals.
Economic Issues. Jovicic labeled Yugoslavia's
"enormous inflation"-now running at a triple-digit
rate-and weak economic performance as among the
country's foremost problems. Jovicic and other leaders
indicated that inflation has hampered the YPA's
modernization drive, leading to cuts in research and
development funding and a slowing of the Army's
procurement program. While living standards of
officers are falling and construction of military
housing has been lagging, Jovicic pointed proudly to
Yugoslavia's surging arms trade; last year exports
neared $2 billion, providing important support to
Belgrade's weak balance-of-payments position. The
value of arms exports reportedly has been growing at
15 percent annually since 1981.
Leadership Competence. Military leaders voiced
greater satisfaction with the performance of the
federal government and party leadership than they
have on some occasions since the 1982 Congress.
Jovicic gave the party at least a lukewarm
endorsement when he said that Yugoslavia's leading
forces, especially the party, were "very involved"
trying to solve national problems. Jovicic blamed
lower levels, where "accepted" policy was being
implemented "slowly and inconsistently." Jovicic's
comments followed some temperate articles in the
Army weekly on improvements in the party
leadership's performance. His remarks are in marked
contrast to some past attacks on the leadership, like
one made four months ago when a senior general
complained that ideological disunity was caused "first
and foremost" by the Party leadership. The peak of
the military's criticism had come at the Army Plenum
in December 1984 when Mamula and Jovicic directly
attacked the leadership, with Jovicic charging that
"leading officials" were responsible for creating
"considerable confusion and chaos."
Trends Within the Military
Senior military officers used the congress to voice
concerns over problems within the military:
Nationalism. Jovicic expressed concern about
nationalist trends within the Army that could weaken
the military's effectiveness as the country's most pan-
Yugoslav institution. He admitted that some
"negative phenomena" existed in the military, most
stemming from "nationalist positions." Seeking
partially to absolve the Army, Jovicic argued that
most young people enter the Army "already imbued"
with nationalism. Jovicic's concern may have been
heightened by a wave of arrests of Albanian
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nationalists late last year, one of the largest in recent
years, which included a roundup of some military
organizations. The YPA will probably be watching
closely to see how the new government and party
leaderships-to be in place by early summer-react
to challenges from nationalists and liberals. If ethnic
tensions continue to mount and Belgrade appears
unable to defuse them, the YPA almost certainly will
crank up the pressure, attacking perceived dangers
with a vigor unseen in recent months. The military
might face an uncomfortable dilemma if nationalism
continues to rise among the Serbs. The military
probably looks forward to actions by new Premier
Branko Mikulic, a vigorous and toughminded Titoist,
who was installed on 16 May. It may have mixed
feelings on the new Party Presidium to be seated after
the National Congress. If the new Presidium is more
fractious and regional-minded than its predecessor, as
may be the case, the military might turn increasingly
to Mikulic and other more orthodox leaders to keep
the lid on. In the meantime, senior military officials
probably will try to mollify junior officers, who could
be adding a new dimension to Yugoslav politics.
personnel.
Recruitment. The military leaders also voiced concern
about the continuing failure of the Army to recruit
more members of certain ethnic groups into the
officer corps-a drive intended to make it more
representative of the country's diverse cultural
population. Jovicic observed that Albanians, Slovenes,
Muslims, and to some extent Croats, are still under
represented in the middle ranks of the military, which
remains dominated by Serbs and Montenegrins. Some
officials also expressed concern over the Army's
difficulties in attracting recruits into military
academies. A teacher from a military school, asking
why the military is insufficiently attractive to young
people, noted that applications are declining,
incoming students display a "lower educational
profile," dropout rates are climbing, and interest is
diminishing even among teachers at military schools.
Generational Split. The congress also offered hints
that younger officers find the senior leadership too
complacent. Jovicic, although reelected as Army
party chief, tied for the lowest number of votes
received in the publicly reported elections for
membership on the Army's party member
committee-an apparent sign of midlevel displeasure
with his performance in defending YPA interests.
One delegate implicitly questioned the toughness of
YPA senior officers when he complained that many
military men are "confused" that hostile forces are
allowed to exist in society and questioned why the
system was not defended "in a more vigorous
manner." Another delegate criticized the military
leadership for creating obedient, establishment-
minded officers instead of people who "criticize and
create and who hit the problems in the bullseye."
These midlevel officers may also reflect
disappointment over their superiors' inability to
extract pay increases for military personnel. F_~
Outlook
The military's measured response at its own congress
tends to mirror the generally uneventful congresses
being staged by Yugoslavia's regional party
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Bulgaria:
Post-Congress Prospects
Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov, who will be 75 in
September, was elected in April to his seventh term as
General Secretary with no indication that he intends
to step down any time soon. He used Bulgaria's 13th
Party Congress to trumpet his. largely rhetorical call
for economic modernization and to defend recent
sweeping ministerial changes. These changes are
unlikely to promote economic recovery but should
keep Zhivkov's leading potential successors off
balance for some time to come.
Zhivkov's Position
Zhivkov, the dean of Warsaw Pact leaders with 32
years in power, shows no sign he is ready to relenquish
control and probably will resist giving up power as
long as his health holds out. He also apparently does
not want to leave at a time when his legacy is in
jeopardy because of economic troubles and Moscow's
tainted perspective of him.F__~
Prior to the congress, press and diplomatic sources
had reported rumors that Zhivkov might step down
because of his age, declining health, and Soviet
criticism of his mismanagement. However, he has
effectively squelched the speculation at least for the
near term by his strong reassertion of control at the
congress, by his renewed call for economic reform
under his leadership, and by his shifting of leading
potential successors to new posts, which weaken their
power bases. F_~
Personnel Changes
At the plenary sessions leading up to the congress,
succession front-runners Chudomir Aleksandrov,
Ognyan Doynov, and Grisha Filipov-all influential
Politburo members-were abruptly appointed to new
positions. Filipov, 66, was moved from Premier to
Party Secretary responsible for the economy. Doynov,
50, was named Chairman of the Economic Council, a
new superministry of economics, but his Party
credentials were diminished by his release from the
Secretariat. Aleksandrov, 49, was put in charge of
Party organization and personnel, which reduces the
authority he previously enjoyed over policy as First
Deputy Premier, he still seems to have the edge as the
favorite to succeed when all factors-including the
force of his personality and personal stock in
Moscow-are weighed. Finally, Georgi Antanasov,
52, a longtime Party functionary with a reputation as
a strong personnel manager, was named Premier.
The formation of four new Central Committee
commissions and the recent extensive reorganization
of economic ministries gives the outward appearance
of meaningful reform, but the changes are not likely
to have much effect on the quality of day-to-day
management. Since old faces removed as the heads of
the former ministries are reappearing as high-level
functionaries in the new commissions, we see little
chance of greater efficiency arising from this
recycling process. F_~
Economic Reform
Zhivkov used the congress to breathe new life into the
economic reform program-the New Economic
Mechanism-he introduced in 1979. Modernization
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address. According to Zhivkov, the launching of
Bulgaria's "techno-scientific revolution" is to be
facilitated by "profound qualitative changes" in the
management and operations of the economy. Thus far
the only changes have involved the dismantling of
industrial ministries and creation of economic trusts
which are designed to give greater flexibility to
enterprises but in reality appear largely cosmetic and
probably will do little to stimulate productivity.
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identifying appropriate contacts.
touted personnel changes and ministerial
reorganization have caused confusion among
bureaucrats, who are now having difficulty
Moreover,
nothing had changed
and atmiddle- and senior-level officials appeared
"oblivious" to any impending changes in their
customary way of doing business.
Soviet Perspective
Bulgaria continues to be the Soviet Union's most loyal
ally in Eastern Europe. Strong Soviet influence in
Bulgaria stems from traditionally close political,
economic, military, and security links and is likely to
be brought to bear during the transition to a post-
Zhivkov leadership. Bulgaria is an enthusiastic
champion of the Warsaw Pact, and its economy is
second only to Czechoslovakia in the extent of
integration into CEMA.F__-]
Nonetheless, Sofia and Moscow have had their
differences. In the past year, the Soviets have been
openly critical of Zhivkov's mismanagement of the
Bulgarian economy and apparently displeased with
the regime's bungling of its internationally
condemned campaign to force the assimilation of
ethnic Turks. According to rumors reported from both
Sofia and Moscow, Gorbachev disapproves of
Zhivkov's crude, personal leadership style as well as
his inefficient management.F_~
Moscow, however, probably does not see the removal
of Zhivkov as politically cost effective at this time. He
is said to pride himself on having outlasted five top
Soviet leaders and appears confident that he can hold
on with Gorbachev in power. Largely because of
Zhivkov's skillful manipulation, no ready successor is
waiting in the wings. Zhivkov's power base is still
strong and his faculties are probably still sharp
enough to continue outwitting potential domestic
challengers for at least another couple of years.
Prospects
Zhivkov has emerged from the congress in good
political shape and speculation on the succession has
waned perceptibly in recent weeks. But the question
will almost certainly return to the surface before long
both because of Zhivkov's age and because of the poor
prospects he faces in attempting to turn the economy
around. Even if he carried out the reforms he has
outlined-an unlikely prospect, in our view-the
Bulgarian economy probably would still register slow
growth for the remainder of the decade because of
fundamental problems related to aging capital stock,
chronically low productivity, and inefficient allocation
of resources under Sofia's centrally planned system.
As it is, Zhivkov probably has neither the
determination nor the stamina to follow through even
on his own reform program. F___1
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Turkey: Update on The MEKO
Frigate Program
The Turkish Navy's program to build four new
MEKO 200-class frigates designed by West Germany
is proceeding on schedule. With advanced electronics
and sensors and an extensive weapons complement,
the new frigates will improve substantially the
Turkish Navy's major surface combatant force, which
currently consists mostly of former US Navy World
War II ships. In order to realize the full potential of
the MEKOs, however, the Turks may need foreign
assistance in developing a coordinated maintenance,
supply, and training program to keep them in
operation. If problems of sustained operations can be
minimized, the new frigates will strengthen the
Turkish Navy's operational capability against
Warsaw Pact naval forces in the Black and Agean
Seas and keep it in competition with the naval forces
of its ostensible NATO ally, Greece.
The Program
The MEKO-class frigate construction program
appears to be proceeding smoothly with deliveries to
the Turkish Navy slated for 1987-89. The program
has involved considerable West German
manufacturing planning and technical assistance, and
the first two vessels are being built at the Blohm +
Voss Shipyard in Hamburg. The last two are being
constructed at Turkey's Golcuk Naval Shipyard. The
first MEKO-200 was launched in November 1985
and is now undergoing sea trials. Work on the second
ship began in November 1984 and was scheduled to
be launched in May 1985. Construction of the first
Turkish-built MEKO 200 reportedly began in
September 1985 and is on schedule; work on the
second ship will start in mid-1986. The ships are
slated for delivery to the Turkish Navy beginning
with one in late 1987, two in 1988, and the last in
1989T___1
The Shipyards
The Turkish Navy owns and operates the country's
two shipyards at Golcuk and Taskizak, which have
built almost all of the Navy's domestically produced
ships and since 1966 have constructed some merchant
vessels. The Golcuk yard, located at Izmit on the Sea
of Marmara, is the principal construction and repair
yard and the largest and most modern in Turkey.
Golcuk can build merchant ships of up to 28,000 dead
weight tons and naval vessels up to frigate size of
some 2,000 dead weight tons. The yard also builds
submarines, patrol craft, landing craft, and small fleet
tankers. According to a study of the Golcuk yard by
the US Navy, about 70 percent of the shipwork in the
yard is repair work and 30 percent is new
construction. Overhaul of three to four destroyers and
four to five submarines can be accommodated each
year.
The Taskizak Naval Shipyard at Istanbul is smaller
and capable of building merchant ships up to only
10,000 dead weight tons. Naval construction at the 25X1
Taskizak yard is limited to landing craft and patrol
craft. Repairs are performed at Taskizak, but all
armament, fire control, and electronic work must be
done at the Golcuk yard. F_~
Although no new shipyards have been constructed
since 1945, the Turks have continually upgraded their
existing facilities with US and West German
technical assistance and equipment. Until the United
States suspended military assistance to Turkey in the
wake of the crisis with Cyprus in 1974, the Turks
relied heavily on US technical assistance. Since then,
Turkey has looked to West Germany for the
acquisition and construction of guided-missile patrol
combatants and Type 209 submarines. The
submarines are now built at the Golcuk shipyards,
and the guided-missile patrol combatants are
constructed at the Taskizak yard with German
technical assistance.
The MEKO 200 construction program will
significantly improve Turkish naval manufacturing
capabilities, but Turkey will remain heavily
Secret
EUR ER 86-013
6 June 1986
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The Turkish Straits
_ABujIgaria
.Greece
IMROZ
Kirklareli
DARDANELLES
Canakkale Average width 2 mi.
Depth 1501.330'
Bergama
Taskizak
Naval Shipyard
BOSPORUS
Mid-channel depth 801-3961
Width .5.1 mi.~ Istanbul
dependent on outside help, particularly for
components and specialty metals. Indeed, Turkey's
present capability to build some types of frigates and
submarines was developed with substantial US and
West German military, economic, and technical
assistance. Much of the material and equipment
needed to outfit the new MEKO frigates-
particularly electronics, weapons, and propulsion
systems-still cannot be produced in Turkey. Since
1960, for example, the Turks have imported finished
engines and parts from Italy's FIAT for naval ships,
although they do have the capability to overhaul and
maintain most of the engines in their naval ships.
Turkey also imports special steel plate for submarine
hulls and aluminum for surface ship superstructures.
Integrating the MEKO into the Navy
The primary missions of the Navy are control of the
Turkish Straits, defense of territorial waters and
principal ports, maritime operations in the Black Sea,
and protection of the sea lines of communication. To
perform these missions, the Navy relies primarily on
its force of 52 small patrol combatants as well as its
existing fleet of 17 destroyers and frigates and 17
submarines. The principal weakness of the Turkish
Navy is the obsolescence of its destroyers and frigates,
which are 20 to 40 years old and lack adequate
electronics, sensors, weapons systems, and
communications equipment needed to fight in a
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 Capabilities of New and Old Turkish Surface Combatants
Missiles 8 Harpoon-SSM
Sea Sparrow Aspide-SAM
Guns 1-5 inch
3 quad 25 mm
A/S weapons 6 MK 32 torpedo tubes
Range 4,000 miles
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modern war-at-sea environment. The destroyer and
frigate force is particularly weak in detecting,
analyzing, and attacking hostile submarines; it cannot
attack surface targets at ranges beyond nine nautical
miles; and it is vulnerable to air assault and attack by
most modern antiship missiles.F___-]
Acquisition of the four MEKO-class frigates with
their advanced electronics and sensor packages,
surface-to-air missile capability, and Harpoon
antiship missiles will greatly improve the combat
capabilities of the Navy against the substantial
Warsaw Pact naval threat in the Black and Aegean
Seas. The new frigates also should enable the Turks to
keep abreast of the navy of their ostensible ally,
Greece. The Greek Navy has begun to modernize
some of its former US Navy World War II destroyers
and frigates and in 1981-82 added two new Dutch-
built frigates to its inventory. The Greek Navy also
plans to procure up to 12 new frigates by the end of
the decade as one-for-one replacements for its older
destroyers. Because of funding constraints, however,
the Greeks may have to settle for fewer than 12
frigates and compensate with further improvements to
the existing fleet.
Potential Problem Areas
The low educational level of the average conscript
manning Turkish ships could be a major barrier to the
effective integration of the MEKO frigates into the
Navy's wartime operations. The Navy already is short
of trained electronics and ordnance personnel, and the
operation and maintenance of these advanced vessels
will require an even larger complement of better
trained officers and more selectively recruited and
skilled enlisted personnel. Turkish design and
technical capabilities for major naval modernization
work also remain limited, despite considerable
training assistance in construction and repair from
US Naval Mobile Training Teams and others. Both
naval shipyards have an active training program, and
a shipbuilding institute is planned. However, even
when the Turkish Navy has managed to train or hire
workers with a high level of technical competence, the
workers often leave for more lucrative positions
elsewhere in Europe or in private industry.
Outlook
Although the construction phase of the program is
proceeding smoothly, the Turks still lack the weapons
and electronics repair and maintenance facilities
necessary to keep these modern vessels in operation.
They also will need to develop supply and training
programs to provide spare parts, troubleshooting, and
operational know-how. In addition, funding
constraints may hinder their efforts-the Navy
typically receives the smallest share (about 11 percent)
of the Turkish defense budget. Nevertheless, the
addition of MEKO 200 frigates will provide a
substantial improvement in the operational capability
of the Turkish Navy.
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Italy: Policy Toward the
Mediterranean
This article does not represent a DI or CIA position;
it is solely the view of the author. It has not been
coordinated or reviewed. F-1
Relations with key countries around the
Mediterranean littoral have played an important role
throughout Italian history, and today these are among
Italy's principal trading partners. Rome's
"Mediterranean policy" is primarily a series of
bilateral policies, but at a broader level there is also a
shared perception among Italian foreign policymakers
that the problems and issues of the Mediterranean
region-encompassing North Africa, the Horn, the
Middle East, the Aegean, and Iberia-form an
interrelated whole, a web which quickly transmits any
quiver to its farthest extremity. Middle Eastern-
spawned terrorist incidents in Italy have enhanced
this perception during the past decade, fostering a
growing concern among Italian leaders that instability
anywhere in the region could have economic and
political repercussions at home.
The Threatening Littoral
Rome's present preoccupation with the
Mediterranean is in part a reflection of Italian
perceptions of East-West detente. Both political
leaders and public believe that US and Soviet military
strengths in Europe are roughly equal and that the
potential risk of conflict along the central front has
been checked. The situation in the Mediterranean, in
marked contrast, appears far more worrisome as a
result of:
? The Soviet Union's naval presence.
? The spread of advanced weaponry throughout the
Mediterranean littoral.
? Lack of progress in the Middle East peace process
and the threat of yet another war between Israel
and its neighbors.
? The possibility that the Iran-Iraq war will escalate
further.
? The continuing squabble between Greece and
Turkey over Cyprus and the apparent likelihood
that the UN-sponsored talks will soon break down.
? Qadhafi's unpredictability and undoubted eagerness
to strike back at the US and its allies.)
Seeking New Leverage
Italian leaders are still uncertain, however, about how
much, and what kind of, influence they can exert in
the region. Lacking "big power" resources, Rome's
postwar emphasis has been on mediation. Since the
formation of the EC, Rome has further sought to
increase Italian leverage in the Mediterranean by
enlisting the support of its EC partners. In addition,
Italian leaders, recognizing the key role played by the
United States in the Mediterranean, are now trying to
influence Washington to:
? Take a more comprehensive view of the region.
? Wean the moderate Arab states from the radicals
by convincing Israel to be more flexible on questions
like the West Bank.
? Further clarify the US commitment to help defend
Italy against threats emanating from outside the
NATO area.
? Offer more extensive exchanges that will enable
Rome to shape US views. F_~
Impact of Internal Political Rivalries
The differences that have arisen among Italian
leaders during the past several years over foreign
policy in general, and policy toward Libya and the
Middle East in particular, are shaped as much by
individual personalities and changes in the correlation
of political forces in Italy as by events overseas. The
Christian Democrats' waning strength at the polls
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EUR ER 86-013
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Policy Stances of the Chief Cabinet Protagonists
Although the current five party government coalition
has at times made Italian foreign policy seem more
complicated than before, Craxi, Andreotti, and
Spadolini's differences tend to revolve around
emphasis rather than objectives.
Andreotti, for example, seems more closely wedded
to the practice of advancing Italy's aims strictly
through mediation:
? He reached political maturity during the
immediate postwar era when Italy could not afford
to "take risks."
? He is also the leading exponent of the line of
Christian Democratic Party thinking that portrays
Italy as a bridge between the developed and the
developing world.
? He believes that there is room, under special
circumstances, for Italy and its European partners
to undertake initiatives without the United States.
? He is also a strong proponent of the view that
dialogue is the key to international relations and
that there is little place for force.
Andreotti has come under mounting criticism from
the press, the governing coalition, and even the
Foreign Ministry in recent weeks primarily over his
reluctance to take Qadhafi to task, but we suspect
that his position enjoys broad support among the
public at large. He ran second only to Craxi in
popularity polls published earlier this spring and
remains a force to be reckoned in the DC. Although it
is possible that Christian Democratic Party Secretary
DeMita and Craxi could strike a deal to replace
Andreotti as Foreign Minister, any setback is likely
to be temporary. Even if he did not receive another
portfolio as compensation, Andreotti would probably
remain in the running to return as Prime Minister
sometime in the future.
Spadolini would agree with Andreotti's views on
Italy's role as a mediator, but he seems to believe
that Italy must be prepared to take more risks,
especially if it wants to be taken seriously in NATO:
? He is just as aware as Andreotti of the limits on
Italy's ability to influence events in the
Mediterranean.
? He tends to believe, however, that Italy and
Western Europe as a whole can accomplish more by
working with the United States than by trying to
strike out independently.
Moreover, Spadolini would argue that circumstances
sometimes call for strong measures. During the
Achille Lauro hijacking, for example, Spadolini
insisted that Rome would have to attempt a hostage
rescue if negotiations failed. He later triggered a
government crisis over Craxi's failure to hold Abu
Abbas.
Craxi, for his part, probably occupies ground
somewhere between Andreotti and Spadolini's. He is
less well-versed in foreign policy than either of his
chief Ministers, but he is comfortable with following
the same pragmatic approach in foreign policy that he
takes in domestic politics. The domestic political
game is his principal concern, however, and we doubt
he makes any decisions in the foreign policy arena
that have not been weighed carefully against their
impact at home:
? He shares Andreotti's view that settling the
Palestinian question would help to alleviate the
terrorism problem, but he has also called for strong
measures against states like Libya that aid and
abet terrorism.
? He has decided, apparently despite opposition from
Andreotti, that Italy will reduce its commercial ties
to Libya and will attempt, in conjunction with
France, to convince the more moderate Arab states
to isolate Qadhafi.
Like Andreotti, he has reservations about using force,
but he is prepared to act in the face of a clear threat
to Italian interests. He has even hinted in public that
he is prepared to launch a preemptive strike against
Libya's Scud forces if a Libyan attack seems
imminent.
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Table 1
Italy: Trade Relations With the
Mediterranean, 1985
Million us $ Table 2
Italy: Official Development
Assistance, 1983
Exports
Imports
Percent of
Trade Total
1,382
744
1.2
711
461
0.7
117
52
0.1
United Arab 463 105 0.3
Emirates
over the past decade clearly has strengthened the
hand of smaller parties such as the Republicans and
the Socialists in intra-coalition wrangling. Foreign
policy decisionmaking, largely a Christian
Democratic preserve since World War II, has now
become another arena for party competition.F_
Aid Disbursements Official Export
Credits Extended
Cyprus 0.04
Saudi Arabia 0.06
Egypt 10.3
As long as the Prime Ministry and the Foreign
Affairs and Defense portfolios are divided among
senior political rivals like Bettino Craxi, Giulio
Andreotti, and Giovanni Spadolini, some amount of
disagreement over foreign policy probably is
inevitable.
? All three men are trying to appeal to the same
moderate, center-left voters.
? Each of them needs to appear to be pursuing policies
in harmony with the United States in order to avoid
alienating more conservative supporters.
? But none of them can afford to appear subservient
to the United States.
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Table 3
Italy: Oil Imports, 1984
Million US S
Percent of Total Oil
Imports
Turkey
220
1.2
Greece
162
0.9
Spain
47
0.2
Saudi Arabia
1,838
9.8
Iran
1,797
9.5
Egypt
1,387
7.4
Kuwait
1,147
6.1
United Arab
Emirates
361
Qatar
165
0.9
Yemen (PR)
57
0.3
Oman
18
0.1
136
4
In sum, Italy's principal concern is to avoid conflict in
the Mediterranean and to foster trade with, and
economic development among, its less well-off
neighbors. Andreotti and others, for example, have
spoken on various occasions about the posssibility of
establishing a separate CSCE regime for the
Mediterranean.)
The United States clearly will be dealing with an
Italy in the years ahead that will be more assertive
and outspoken in foreign policy generally, and matters
concerning the Mediterranean in particular. Although
Italian leaders essentially agree on what Italy's
objectives should be in the area, they are divided over
approach. The United States should be able to
continue, however, to work with those leaders whose
views are closer to Washington's to nudge Italian
policy toward that of the United States
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British Tourist Authority plans to spend $1.5 million
on campaign to bring US tourists back to Britain ...
earnings from US market last year, excluding
airfares, amounted to just under $1.5 billion out of
total $19.5 billion in tourism revenues ... travelers
account for 25 percent of overseas visitors. F--~
London established new Unfair Trade Unit under
Department of Trade and Industry to handle more
efficiently industry's complaints about unfair
international trading practices, including dumping ...
reflects government's more active role in promoting
interests of British companies ... bulk of complaints
stem from trade with newly industrializing countries
and Eastern Europe, but often involve developed
nations such as Japan. F-~
Sweden's revised 1986-87 budget message includes
simplified tax system with rate cuts, restraints on local
government spending growth, and proposal to
liberalize foreign exchange regulations ... reflects
Prime Minister Carlsson's desire to shift more
resources to private sector to provide future economic
growth ... opposition parties may accept overall
emphasis more readily than some vocal factions of
Carlsson's own Social Democratic Party. F-~
Stockholm's proposal for foreign exchange
deregulation intended to increase international
exposure of Swedish economy ... measures will
improve access of foreign shares to Stockholm
market, allow Swedes to purchase shares abroad
without restrictions ... deregulation would parallel
EC plan to remove remaining controls by 1992, but
nonmember Sweden may accomplish this effect
sooner if experience shows that capital loss is minimal
... proposal negates eight-year-old commission's
conclusion last year to make only minor changes.
Denmark's 1985 growth rate revised upward from 2.8
percent to 3.5 percent ... higher growth more
consistent with import surge that helped push current
account deficit to record $2.7 billion ... growth
expected to remain strong this year, but cheaper oil
and weaker dollar will help current account. F---]
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Austria and Hungary signed agreement providing
Austrian financing for Budapest's contribution to
hydroelectric project with Czechoslovkia ... Austria
will receive electricity as payment and will avoid
environmental costs of building new power plants at
home ... Hungarian environmentalists oppose project
... although Hungary will be spared much of the
project's financial burden, resulting environmental 25X1
damage may lend more momentum to dissident
opposition.F---]
Secret
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Looking Ahead
June/July
Western Europe Norway's oil and energy minister and OPEC officials to discuss cooperation
before 25 June OPEC ministerial ... Norway also will ease taxes on
producers ... Labor government concerned about low oil revenues, exploration
cutbacks.
Bilateral talks to review US base rights begin 10 July in Madrid ... Spanish will
ask for major cutbacks at Torrejon, Zaragoza, and possibly Moron
airbases ... presently inclined to accept largely uncut US presence only at Rota
naval base ... Madrid expects long and tough negotiations. F-~
Eastern Europe Gorbachev arrives in Budapest 9 June for bilateral meetings before 11-12 June
Warsaw Pact summit ... discussions reportedly will focus on Hungary's economic
reforms and efforts to revive the economy ... Hungarians may also seek
compensation for Chernobyl damages.F--~
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Secret
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