LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000201070001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 11, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
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Review
Latin America
ALA LAR 86-009
11 April 1986
Copy' 429
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Secret
Review
1 I April 1986
Articles Guatemala: Cerezo's Early Moves
President Cerezo's emphasis on consensus and compromise has
enabled him to ease military concerns about his new civilian
government and to deal gradually with domestic political issues.
Suriname: Drug Arrest Shakes Regime) 5
The arrest in Miami on drug charges of a member of the ruling
junta poses the most serious threat to the regime in several years.
El Salvador: Austerity Program Under Fire I 7
President Duarte's flexibility and willingness to compromise are
helping to prevent groups on both the left and the right from
mobilizing widespread opposition to his three-month-old economic
reform plan.
Peru: Gambling With Debt 1 1
President Garcia appears unwilling to make concessions to reach an
accommodation with foreign creditors despite Peru's serious
economic problems that are threatening social and political stability.
Brazil: New Labor Group) 15
The new General Workers Central, a reorganized and strengthened
version of Brazil's major moderate labor association, is attempting
to combat the growing influence of its leftwing rival, the Unified
Workers Central.
Secret
ALA LAR 86-009
/I April 1986
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Trinidad and Tobago: Opposition Discord
Cuba Chronology
Production Staff; Office of African and Latin American Analysis
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
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STAT
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Guatemala: Cerezo's
Early Moves
President Cerezo's initial domestic political initiatives
appear to have won widespread public backing. The
US Embassy reports that Cerezo's low-key, pragmatic
style has helped reduce concerns in the military and
private sector that the Christian Democratic
President would embark on a more populist course. By
emphasizing consensus and compromise rather than
confrontation, he has been able to begin to deal
gradually with domestic political issues, reforming the
security apparatus and developing a
counterinsurgency strategy acceptable to the military.
Over time, however, Cerezo is likely to find it
increasingly difficult to prevent criticism of
Guatemala's economic difficulties from spilling over
into attacks on his handling of political affairs.
Cerezo has
firm control of his government and reserves the right
to make all major decisions. Nevertheless,
personality conflicts, Cerezo's
willingness to tolerate long Cabinet debates, and his
demand for an eventual consensus often make it
difficult for Cerezo to reach decisions. Embassy
reporting indicates, for example, that
Cerezo's demand that his ministers give equal, if not
greater, weight to the political and social implications
of any economic austerity plan has magnified
differences between technocrats and politicians in the
Cabinet and delayed agreement on the package.
Early Political Moves
Human Rights. US Embassy reporting indicates that
Cerezo, since his inauguration, has attempted to
balance the need to avoid provoking political conflict
by focusing on past abuses with promises to oppose
further violations. Cerezo, for example, has met on
several occasions with the leaders and members of the
Mutual Support Group (GAM), the only domestic
organization demanding that military officers be
prosecuted for past human rights abuses. He has
assured group leaders that they will have a voice in a
new Human Rights Commission created to
investigate disappearances and that the congress plans
to elect an ombudsman to investigate any new abuses.
At the same time, he has criticized the GAM for
failing to work with the government and for making
unreasonable political demands on him. Cerezo also
has made it clear that he will not prosecute military
officers for past crimes.
Cerezo has used the GAM's refusal to abandon its
confrontational. rhetoric to his advantage, staking out
a moderate and constructive position. US Embassy
reporting suggests that the GAM's belligerency and
personal attacks on Cerezo have isolated the GAM
even from traditional supporters such as the Catholic
Church. Moreover, the UN Human Rights
Commission recently ended its mandate for a special
rapporteur and issued its first report in eight years
that does not condemn Guatemala for human rights
violations. In our judgment, this is likely to undercut
further domestic and foreign criticism while giving
Cerezo more time to strengthen the independence of
the judicial system and establish mechanisms to
investigate new abuses.
Reforming the Security Forces. Embassy reporting
also indicates that Cerezo's moves to reform the police
and control the military have won popular support
without creating a strong backlash among security
and military officials. The President, for example,
appointed a reformist interior minister who moved
Secret
ALA LAR 86-009
11 April 1986
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quickly to disband a 600-man secret police unit and
made some 80 changes in police leadership. In
addition, Cerezo has sought foreign training,
especially in investigations, to help bolster police
performance, according to the US Embassy. The
Embassy also reports that the recent charging of two
police officers with the death of a prisoner is
symptomatic of a new attitude of police accountability
and reflects a commitment to reform. Although
this has produced some
grumbling among officers-especially the
appointment of civilians as directors-the majority of
officers reportedly approve of internal reforms and
Cerezo's stated plans to professionalize and upgrade
equipment.
Relations With the Military. Cerezo has worked hard
to establish a good working relationship with his
Minister of Defense, General Hernandez, and the rest
of the high command. He has held open discussions
with senior and junior officers on a wide range of
topics, including his position toward the insurgents.
He also publicly has acknowledged that the military's
counterinsurgency program and support for
democratization made possible a smooth transfer to
civilian government. To back up his support for the
armed forces, he has promised to continue the model
village program, and said that he will civilianize-but
not disband-the 915,000-strong Civil Defense
Forces. Both programs,
guerrillas.
that although Cerezo has placed the Interinstitutional
Coordinating Committees-the military's rural
development program-under civilian control, he will
ensure continued military participation. In our
judgment, the formal request for moderate levels of
does not intend to confine the
armed forces to the barracks.
Cerezo's moves have
won him a surprising degree of approval from all
ranks. his measured
response to provocations by the GAM and scattered
labor strikes have increased the miltary's confidence
in his ability to maintain public order. For its part, the
military has cooperated on a wide range of issues
including turning captured insurgents over to civilian
courts, keeping a low profile when asked to respond to
policy questions by the media, and keeping Cerezo
abreast of internal security concerns through the
Defense Ministry and the National Security Council.
Outlook
We believe Cerezo's relatively cautious policy toward
implementing domestic reforms reflects his
recognition that the long-term success of his
government depends in large measure on his ability to
avoid antagonizing the military. We expect that he
will continue to seek to build bridges to the military
by consulting closely with the high command on
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civilian issues of concern to them and will avoid
meddling in internal miltary affairs. For its part, we
believe the military recognizes that its interests, at
least in the short run, are best served by cooperating
with Cerezo.
In the civilian arena, we believe that Cerezo will try to
use domestic political initiatives to blunt criticism of
his economic policies. Although we believe this
strategy probably will lengthen Cerezo's "political
honeymoon," expectations among his political
constituencies that he will implement substantive and
wide-ranging reforms are high. Faced with a
continuing economic slide and opposition to austerity
measures, Cerezo may come to believe he has no
choice but to risk embarking on a more politically
dangerous populist course.
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Suriname:
Drug Arrest Shakes Regime
The recent arrest on drug charges in Miami of Capt.
Etienne Boerenveen, a member of the ruling junta,
poses the most serious threat to the regime since the
bloody 1982 purge of moderate opposition leaders,
according to the US Embassy in Paramaribo.
Although it is unlikely that his conviction would spark
broad resistance to the unpopular government, the
affair has further tarnished the image of Commander
Desi Bouterse's regime, and probably will eliminate
any chance of its gaining new foreign aid.
Perhaps fearful that testimony during the trial would
implicate him, Bouterse has been maneuvering for
Boerenveen's release. Surinamese officials initially
reacted to the arrest by charging "North American
intelligence agencies" with framing Boerenveen. At
one point it appeared that the government might fight
Boerenveen's prosecution by claiming diplomatic
immunity. In a meeting with the US Ambassador,
however, Bouterse seemed unwilling to jeopardize
warming relations and possible aid by using this ploy.
Although there have been reports for some time
suggesting government involvement in drug
smuggling, this is the first direct evidence linking a
high official to the narcotics trade. The probability
that Bouterse was also involved could generate
conflict among key military officers, but major rifts
are unlikely, according to the Embassy. Over the
longer term, economic problems made worse by the
lack of aid could generate internal pressures, causing
the regime to abandon its recent tentative steps
toward political reform.
The Arrest and Its Aftermath
Boerenveen's arrest occurred on 24 March when he
was charged with conspiracy to import and distribute
narcotics in the United States. According to press
reports, Boerenveen, together with an executive of the
Surinamese airline and the executive's father, met
twice with US undercover agents in the Miami area.
During these taped sessions, Boerenveen allegedly
offered to guarantee cocaine smugglers safe passage
through Suriname for $1 million a shipment, and
agreed that his country could be used as a
transshipment point for ether and acetone, chemicals
used to produce cocaine. He also described himself as
the number-two man in Suriname and said he could
"guarantee safe passage to anything or anybody."
it is generally
believed by many Surinamese citizens and foreign
observers that Boerenveen could not have made these
promises without Bouterse's agreement.
Aid Pressure
The drug scandal apparently has alienated a number
of Western countries that seemed on the verge of
providing aid to Suriname. According to US Embassy
reporting, the arrest has confirmed Dutch suspicions
about the unsavory nature of Bouterse's regime, and
may well block proposed medical aid as well as
prevent any possible resumption of some $600 million
in development aid suspended since the junta's
murder of political opponents in 1982. The
Boerenveen case, coming on the heels of indications
that Suriname was involved in drug and illegal
immigrant traffic into neighboring French Guiana,
will effectively squelch Paris's previous pragmatic
sympathy for the regime, according to the Embassy.
The Venezuelan Ambassador doubts his government
will again show generosity toward Suriname, and
Brazil's reaction may be similar, according to the
Embassy.
Without new foreign aid, the economy, limping along
since the early 1980s, will register substantial reverses
this year, as foreign exchange reserves are depleted
and imports are slashed. Bouterse has been draining
hard currency stores to finance purchases of consumer
merchandise and producer goods despite the ongoing
slump in the key bauxite sector and the suspension of
Dutch aid. As a result, foreign exchange reserves of
Secret
ALA LAR 86-009
11 April 1986
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over $200 million in the early 1980s have deteriorated
to about $20 million at present, or enough to cover
about three weeks' worth of imports. Payment
difficulties recently delayed completion of a Brazilian
natural gas delivery, and similar actions by other
commodity suppliers are likely over the next few
months as arrearages mount.
Domestic Threats
Worsening economic conditions are likely to increase
popular dissatisfaction with the regime and
complicate Bouterse's efforts to create an image of
progress toward political reform.
political leaders
already are resisting pressure from Bouterse to
become full members of the Supreme Council because
they believe the government will collapse by the end
of the year. Businessmen, for their part, reportedly
are threatening to withdraw from the National
Assembly and Supreme Council to protest the
government's Marxist thrust.
The Boerenveen affair might also worsen tensions
among junta members already concerned about
Bouterse's support for democratization measures.
judgment, the rift in the junta could widen if
convincing evidence surfaces that Bouterse and
Boerenveen were working together in a major drug
trafficking scheme.
Outlook
The economic and political impact of the drug scandal
may work to reverse the slight shift toward the West
that Suriname has demonstrated over the past year. If
increasing economic problems spark popular unrest,
the regime could abandon its preliminary steps toward
political reform and crack down on the opposition to
maintain its power. With little prospect of Western
assistance, Bouterse could try once again to seek help
from Libya or the Soviet bloc.
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El Salvador: Austerity
Program Under Fire
The left and right are still criticizing President
Duarte's economic reform plan three months after it
was announced. Opponents, however, have had little
success in mobilizing widespread public support for
protests. More demonstrations are likely in the next
few months, especially if Duarte enacts additional
reforms as expected. The President, however, is likely
to remain flexible and willing to make compromises as
pressures grow.
Duarte's Initiative
The economic plan-Duarte's first comprehensive
package since taking office in June 1984-combines
government and business austerity measures with
steps to protect workers and consumers. In particular,
the initial plan froze most government spending,
effectively devalued the colon by 20 percent, sharply
increased prices for industrial and automotive fuels,
and substantially boosted coffee taxes. To blunt
consumer reaction, prices of food staples, rents,
utilities, public transportation, and medicines were
frozen, and stiff penalties for violations of new price
and exchange controls were announced.
Almost immediately after the plan was announced,
the US Embassy reported that Duarte showed his
willingness to compromise, scaling back increases in
gasoline prices and some luxury taxes. Both the
President's advisers and the Embassy have said,
however, that whatever the opposition, additional
belt-tightening measures-including hikes in food
prices and utility rates-will be needed later this
7,000 participants turned out for a demonstration in
February, organized in part by the National Unity of
Salvadoran Workers (UNTS), a recently formed labor
coalition partly controlled by the Marxist labor
umbrella organization "First of May Committee."
The protesters demanded an end to austerity and a
resumption of dialogue with the guerrillas.
UNTS
is planning additional marches and forums, such
demonstrations have yet to move beyond sporadic
protests, and have been hampered by the lack of
widespread popular support, financial difficulties, and
ineffective coordination. In addition, Embassy
reporting suggests Duarte's skill in preempting labor
issues by making timely compromises also has helped
to avoid more serious confrontations.
... And From Democratic Labor
Embassy reporting indicates Duarte has fared better
with the major democratic labor groups, although
they too have asked for a softening of the austerity
package. A progovernment rally last month by the
National Worker and Campesino Union (UNOC), a
recently formed alliance of democratic worker and
peasant unions, attracted some 25,000 participants,
according to US Embassy estimates. While pledging
support for the Duarte administration, demonstrators
also demanded lower fuel and food prices. The
UNOC also has paid for advertisements calling for
guaranteed prices for both consumers and farmers,
increased minimum wages for all workers, and more
=Marxist labor leaders have attempted to use
opposition to the plan as part of an effort to oust
Duarte. The US Embassy reported that as many as
effective price controls.
Flagging Private-Sector Confidence
Business leaders and organizations also have
criticized the program, for its lack of production
incentives and for enshrining excessive government
Secret
ALA LAR 86-009
11 April /986
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El Salvador: Selected Economic
Indicators, 1981-86
Real Per Capita GDP Growth
Percent
Consumer Price Growth
Percent
Current Account Deficit
Million US $
Estimated.
b Projected.
interference in the economy.
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rightwing
Salvadoran politicians have been attempting to
capitalize on business suspicion and popular
discontent to undermine Duarte.
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leaders of ARENA, the major
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opposition party on the right, have attempted-with
little success to date-to form a coalition of
conservative organizations and business groups to
pressure the government to revise its economic
policies. At the same time,
Outlook
We believe both moderate and leftist unionists will
continue to snipe at Duarte's package, but with
different goals. For its part, UNOC is likely to believe
that its credibility as an independent organization
depends on its ability to win concessions from the
administration. It has been criticized by both the left
and the right, for example, for close ties to the ruling
Christian Democrats, and has lost popular support
when accused of supporting the austerity program.
dominated UNTS believes that any economic
advances won from demonstrations are secondary to
the longer term political goal of furthering the
insurgency. While we believe more leftist-inspired
protests are inevitable, we do not believe that these
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unions have either sufficient rank-and-file or popular
support to launch. and sustain a general strike or
widespread work actions.
Although the US Embassy reports that Duarte's
advisers are pressing for improved communication
with the private sector, we believe that prospects for
any near-term reconciliation are poor. In our
judgment, the business community's deeply ingrained
suspicions of Duarte's populist style and the perceived
antibusiness posture of the Christian Democrats-as
constantly expressed in newspaper ads-leave
business with little room for compromise. Even if San
Salvador enacted a package with incentives demanded
by the private sector,
we believe businessmen probably would
wait for a year or so to see the changes fully
implemented before revising their gloomy assessment
of the economic climate.
Despite the maneuvering of rightist politicians
we believe it is unlikely that the right has the financial
resources or can overcome ideological differences to
gain any significant influence with insurgent-backed
unions.
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Peru: Gambling With Debt
President Garcia faces the prospect of managing
Peru's debilitated economy without foreign credit.
Despite recent minor adjustments in his tough debt
policy, we doubt Garcia is prepared at this juncture to
make the concessions necessary to reach an
accommodation with foreign creditors. His attempts
to buy time to boost reserves could backfire if he
underestimates creditors' reactions. In any case,
Peru's continuing economic malaise poses a threat to
social and political stability.
Debt Policy Under Garcia
Garcia's views on the debt issue are heavily
conditioned by his party's ideologically based
conviction that many of the problems burdening Peru
-and the region in general-result from alleged
Western economic exploitation of the Third World.
Politically, Garcia sees the debt as an impediment to
progress on social and economic reforms he wants to
implement. Moreover, Garcia-who apparently has a
fixation with his standing in domestic polls-is keenly
aware that he has tapped into a wellspring of
nationalism with his public promises last year to limit
debt payments to 10 percent of export earnings and
not to deal with the IMF. His resolve not to accept an
IMF program was underscored last October when
Finance Minister Alva Castro rejected a proposal to
send an IMF technical team to Lima, thereby
delaying an economic review by the Fund for six
months.
Lima's payment strategy has favored those willing to
provide more loans, namely multilateral institutions
(minus the IMF) and some government donors. As a
consequence, nearly 30 percent of Peru's actual debt
payments went to international organizations like the
World Bank and the Inter-American Development
Bank last year.
Garcia's intransigence last year bought his
government time to gather information on the
negotiating strategies of other Third World debtors,
Peru's external debt to Western creditors totals
$12 billion, less than 5 percent of total Latin
American debt. About $5.6 billion represents
medium- and long-term obligations owed to private
creditors primarily at floating rates. The other $6.4
billion is owed to official creditors primarily on fixed
repayment terms. US banks' exposure is $1.8 billion
of total debt, including 30 to 35 percent of Peru's
$250 million to $300 million short-term credit lines.
Debt to the Soviet Bloc, which willingly accepts goods
as payment, amounts to approximately $2 billion.
The private sector is current in servicing its
obligations-$400 million a year-which do not fall
under Garcia's 10 percent debt service ceiling. At the
end of 1985, however, the public sector was about
$1.5 billion in arrears to Western creditors. Western
bankers received the last interest payment in May
1985 under the Belaunde administration. Moreover,
Lima has yet to sign its 1984 commercial bank or
Paris Club rescheduling agreements.
explore innovative debt repayment schemes, and boost
foreign exchange reserves. Peru tried-apparently
without success-to interest Western bankers in
arrangements similar to Lima's payments-in-goods
agreement with the USSR
By the end of 1985, the limit on debt
repayments, combined with a freeze on dollar
accounts and lower profit remittances by foreign oil
companies, had pushed exchange reserves up 62
percent to $1.5 billion since July-enough to finance
9 months of imports.
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ALA LAR 86-009
11 April 1986
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Creditor Pressures
Garcia's anti-US and anti-IMF rhetoric and his
generally confrontational approach to the debt issue
have strained relations with Western creditors and
increasingly isolated Peru from international lenders:
? After Peru had suspended its $30 million monthly
payments to the IMF and failed to meet with the
bank steering committee late last year, two angry
US banks attached small deposits from Electroperu
and Petroperu-the state electricity and petroleum
companies.
Peru: Service of the Public External Million US $
Debt Due in 1985 and 1986
Payments
Due in 1986
Scheduled
Actual
Arrearages
Total
3,196
617
2,579
2,119
International
organizations
174
171
3
221
Western
government and
agencies
410
43
367
273
International
banks
1,280
133
1,147
737
Communist
countries
284
170
114
252
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? Trade credit available to the government is nearly
zero, while that for the private sector has fallen 50
percent (to about $125 million) since last July,
according to the US Embassy.
Garcia's Response
Faced with dwindling foreign loans and credits,
Garcia made several concessions early this year,
authorizing a symbolic payment to the Fund and some
payments for operating expenses to commercial
bankers. Nonetheless, at the end of January, Garcia
unilaterally lowered interest rates on some loan
contracts, and rolled over $960 million of short-term
working capital debt for the second time since he took
office last July.
Part of the unpredictability in debt negotiations may
be due to disagreements over tactics between Garcia
and his advisers:
? Both Prime Minister Alva Castro and Foreign
Minister Wagner have sought to maintain cordial
relations with creditors and have plainly been
embarrassed by the timing of some of Garcia's
inflammatory statements and actions.
? The Cabinet recently considered an upward revision
of the 10-percent debt-service limit, but opponents,
led by Justice Minister Gonzales, prevailed.
Outlook for the Rest of the Year
Peru's economic performance is not likely to improve
dramatically this year. Domestic growth will probably
fall somewhere between the 2 percent attained in
1985 and 4 percent-too low for a turnabout. The 25X1
current account deficit will deteriorate, as lower oil
prices reduce export earnings at least $200 million
from last year's $3 billion level,
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employment will remain close to 70 percent, and
inflation will probably reach three digits. Price
controls that discourage domestic production are
likely to induce more black-market activity and
sporadic food shortages.
Over the next several months, we expect Garcia to
continue his current delaying strategy of making
occasional conciliatory but largely emptyhanded
gestures toward Peru's creditors. He will probably
lobby for more time to work out differences with bank
creditors and avoid risking $500 million to $1 billion
in funds from the World Bank.
As economic problems deepen later in the year,
however, Garcia may be persuaded that he cannot
maintain a politically acceptable level of economic
performance without Western aid, trade, and
investment. Even so, Garcia would probably pay
arrearages only to favored lenders, according to the
US Embassy, because he wants to use foreign
exchange to purchase essential imports-including
food-and improve social welfare.
The prospects for a near-term improvement in Peru's
economic relations with the United States-which
traditionally absorbs 35 to 40 percent of Peruvian
exports-are bleak. US exports to Peru will probably
fall this year, continuing the downward trend begun
last year. Peru has jeopardized approximately $58
million in US aid previously scheduled for disbursal in
fiscal year 1986 because of persistent payment
arrearages, and various economic sanctions contained
in US trade laws-if invoked-could bring bilateral
commercial relations to a standstill later this year.
Bilateral problems persist over the nationalization of a
US oil company late last year and President Garcia
has indicated that he intends to review the profit-
sharing practices of a US copper firm. Moreover, he
will probably continue to play on the debt issue as a
means of maintaining his unprecedented popularity.
Relations with the United States might even sour
further if Peru's overtures to the financial community
are rebuffed and creditors threaten punitive action. If
such confrontational developments occur, Garcia
might repudiate the debt or make new moves against
US interests in Peru.
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Brazil: New Labor Group
The National Conference of the Working Classes
(CONCLAT), Brazil's major moderate labor
association, reorganized and adopted a new name at
its national convention in late March to combat the
growing influence of its leftwing rival, the Unified
Workers Central (CUT). According to the US
Consulate in Sao Paulo and press reports, the CUT
has gained thousands of new recruits in the past year
through its campaign to gain wage increases from the
Sarney administration. The new General Workers
Central (CGT) strengthened its organization by
adopting a pyramidal command structure, appointing
a National Council of full-time leaders, and hiring a
permanent staff.
the CGT now bases National Council
membership on geographic representation as well as
the strength of participating unions, thus lessening the
influence of the Sao Paulo faction that dominated the
old CONCLAT. The CGT immediately pulled off a
major membership coup by merging with the giant,
wealthy farm workers union, making it one of the
largest unions in the Western Hemisphere, according
to the Consulate.
the
longstanding moderate leadership won a heated battle
at the convention over the Communists for control of
the National Council, although the latter took the
post of first vice president and several seats on the
Council. Former CONCLAT president Joaquim
Andrade, a member of the union's nonconfrontational
"old guard," won the presidency of the reorganized
group against the Communist-backed nominee, Jose
da Silva, the popular head of the farm workers union.
Andrade probably will steer a moderate policy course
and support President Sarney's new economic
stabilization program as long as organized labor's
economic position relative to other social groups does
not appear to suffer. Antonio Magri, who heads the
Sao Paulo electrical workers and has close ties to the
US labor movement, was elected international
relations secretary over the strong objections of the
Communists.
CGT President Joaquin "Joaquinzao"
dos Santos Andrade
A former tool and die maker ... has been active in
the labor movement for over 20 years ... leader of
the Sao Paulo metalworkers since 1965.. .
recently selected for the
national leadership of the governing Brazilian
Democratic Movement Party ... approximately 59
years old.
The CGT's moderate approach probably will change
if Andrade-who may run for Congress in November,
steps down as president
later in the year. The CGT would then probably be
dominated by young and dynamic centrist leaders
such as Magri, who are eager to challenge the radical
CUT for leadership of the labor movement. These
new leaders, in our view, could take a more
confrontational stance toward the government,
particularly if the rival CUT launches numerous
strikes and agitates in support of leftwing candidates
prior to the Congressional elections. Under these
conditions, the labor movement could put
considerable pressure on Sarney to loosen wage
controls sooner than the administration plans.
Secret
ALA LAR 86-009
11 April 1986
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Military Rivalries
Avril and Interior and Defense Minister Colonel Regal
Namphy there is a personality conflict between
Rivalries among the top levels of the military have not been resolved by recent
Cabinet shifts Colonels Valles
and Avril, ousted from the ruling council last month, apparently maintained their
powerful positions as commander and inspector general of the presidential guard,
respectively. Avril continues to function
behind the scenes as a close adviser to the ruling council, particularly to President
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Belliotte reportedly also believes that Namphy circumvents the 25X1
military chain of command much the same as deposed President Duvalier did. We
have no evidence that these rivalries have disrupted the functions of government,
or that Namphy views them as a serious problem. Nevertheless, rivalry and
resentment am n Nam h 's to military leaders could undermine his authority if
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Trinidad and Tobago Opposition Discord
Front, the largest of the groups comprising the NAR.
Rivalry within the leadership of the opposition National Alliance for
Reconstruction (NAR) coalition could weaken its ability to challenge the
governing People's National Movement (PNM) in the forthcoming national
election. The NAR's deputy leader Basdeo Panday-currently leader of the
opposition in Parliament-is challenging A. N. R. Robinson, titular leader of the
party. Robinson-whose main base of support is on the small island of Tobago-
has little influence in Parliament and lacks labor support. Panday, on the other
hand, heads the sizable Sugar Workers Union and is leader of the United Labor
take over as political leader of the NAR after the election.
Panday's recent unilateral selection of leftist trade unionist George Weekes to fill
a Senate seat against Robinson's wishes has increased tensions among party
factions. Panday probably
believes the Senate appointment will enhance his labor support and enable him to
break down if Panday continues his maneuverings.
Despite these divisions, the US Embassy believes the NAR is likely to remain
intact for now because all leaders agree that a fragmented opposition cannot
defeat the entrenched ruling party in the election, which must be called by the end
of this year. Robinson, although reportedly perturbed at Panday's action, has not
made any public protest. In our judgment, however, the opposition's unity could
17 Secret
ALA LAR 86-009
11 April 1986
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Cuba Chronology
Fidel Castro and Ethiopian leader Mengistu meet in Moscow to discuss
international issues and exchange ideas on ways of strengthening their
relationship.
Acting Minister of Foreign Trade Amado Blanco receives a Chinese trade
delegation headed by Wang Pinqing. They sign payment agreements for the 1986
trade protocol.
Fidel Castro sends his deepest condolences to Swedish Deputy Prime Minister
[ngvar Carlsson on the death of Olof Palme.
2 March Bogota El Siglo reports on an interview with Cuban defector Manuel Sanchez
Perez in Spain.
Perez says there is no likelihood of Cuba coming to an understanding with the
West to better economic problems in Cuba so long as Fidel Castro is alive.
Mikhail Gorbachev and Fidel Castro meet in Moscow during the 27th Soviet
Communist Party Congress. Gorbachev pledges continued support for Cuba's fight
against the threats and provocative acts of US imperialism.
Fidel and Gorbachev also discuss the international situation and other matters of
interest. Fidel supports the nuclear arms elimination program proposed by
Gorbachev.
During the Soviet Party Congress, the Cuban delegation, including Fidel Castro,
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Jorge Risquet, and Lionel Soto, meet with former
Chilean Foreign Minister Clodomiro Almeyda; Volodia Teitelboim, leader of the
Communist Party of Chile; Mengistu Haile-Marian, Chairman of Ethiopian
Provisional Military Administrative Council; Joaquim Chissano, Chief of the
Mozambique Liberation Front; Cheddi Jagan, leader of the People's Progressive
Party of Guyana; Abdallah Al-Ahmar, Assistant Secretary General of Syria's
Socialist Resurrectionist Party; Mohamed Mura of the Sudanese Communist
Party; Fu'ad Mursi, of the Egyptian Communist Party; and the delegation from
North Korea headed by Kang Song-san, member of the Politburo.
3 March Foreign Minister Malmierca signs the condolence book at the Swedish Embassy in
Havana.
Secret
ALA LAR 86-009
11 April 1986
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While in Moscow, Fidel Castro visits the Scientific Research Institute for Eye
Microsurgery and the Organic Chemistry Institute of the Academy of Sciences of
the USSR. He speaks of his interests in biotechnology and Cuba's progress in this
field.
A mission of Cuban agricultural experts arrives in Guinea-Bissau. The mission
consists of specialists in citrus, pig breeding, rural development, and fishing.
The Italian Foreign Ministry reports that Ricardo Cabrizas, during his visit to
Rome, said Cuba wants to double exports to industrialized countries by 1990.
Politburo member Juan Almeida visits Algeria and is received by President Chadli
Bendjedid and Mohamed Cherif Messaadia, Secretary General of the National
Liberation Front.
Almeida visits the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic and delivers a speech on
the occasion of the Republic's 10th anniversary expressing Cuba's support for its
independence.
Managua Radio Sandino reports that Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega
departed yesterday for Cuba on a personal visit. He is scheduled to return home on
12 March.
Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Varkonyi departs Budapest for Cuba and
Nicaragua at the invitation of the foreign ministers of the two countries.
4 March Fidel Castro tells the Soviet press agency Novosti that Mikhail Gorbachev is a
very humble, modest, intelligent, and honorable person.
USSR First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Arkhipov receives
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez to discuss the further development of trade and economic
cooperation.
Fidel Castro and Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov sign an agreement in Moscow
on economic, scientific, and technical cooperation and a program on socialist
economic integration up to the year 2000.
Fidel Castro meets in Moscow with Nicolay Pyzhkov, Soviet Communist Party
Politburo member and Council of Ministers President, and Yegor Ligachev, Soviet
Communist Party Central Committee Secretary.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez tells Novisti that Mikhail Gorbachev's main report and
the discussions during the congress have created a great renovation in the Soviet
Communist Party.
Secret 20
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A plan for cooperation in the fields of culture, science, and education for 1986-90
is signed in Havana by Mongolian Ambassador to Cuba Nandzad and Cuban
Deputy Foreign Minister Bolanos.
Minister of Construction Overseas, Levi Farah, heads a delegation to the 21st
International Fair in Tripoli and meets with Fawzi al-Shakshuki, Libya's
Secretary of Planning to discuss economic and commercial relations.
Isidoro Malmeirca accompanies Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Peter
Varkonyi during a visit to Havana.
Varkonyi and Malmierca sign a cooperation agreement between the two ministries
for the coming five-year period and manifest the common will to struggle for world
peace.
Fidel Castro, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Jorge Risquet, Division Gen. Senen Casas,
and Lionel Soto arrive in P'yongyang from Moscow and are greeted at the airport
by North Korean President Kim II-song.
Kim 11-song decorates Fidel Castro with North Korea's Order of Hero.
The 13th meeting of CEMA member countries in the field of communications is
held in Havana. Development of communications systems to be used with artificial
Earth satellites is discussed.
10 March Fidel presents the Order of Jose Marti to Kim 11-song during a ceremony in North
Korea.
The International Sugar Conference opens in Havana. Attending are 60 foreign
delegates and 300 Cuban delegates.
Javier Rosales, representing the National Commission of Atomic Energy of Cuba,
and his Argentine counterpart, Abel Gonzalez, sign an agreement in Buenos Aires.
Argentina and Cuba also sign an agreement in Buenos Aires allowing frequent
maritime traffic between the two countries for transporting bilateral export
merchandise.
Fidel Castro and Kim 11-song discuss the international situation and agree the
situation remains tense due to an increase in the arms race and the US policy of
intervention and aggression.
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Fidel Castro, speaking in P'yongyang, declares that the solidarity of Cuba with
North Korea will remain invariable and rejects the 1988 Olympic Games being
held in South Korea.
Fidel Castro and Kim 11-song sign a cooperation treaty to exchange experiences in
socialist construction and promote increased cooperation relations between the
mass organizations.
Granma reports that during Fidel's visit to North Korea, an agreement was made
to sell Cuba 100,000 rifles and several million rounds of ammunition on favorable
credit terms.
Nicaragua's Defense Ministry announces that Cuban Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa was
replaced on 9 March as commander of Cuban military advisers in Nicaragua.
Cuban Gen. Nestor Lopez will be his successor.
Vice Minister of Foreign Relations Raul Roa Kouri meets in Prague with
Bohuslav Chnoupek, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia.
12 March Fidel Castro and Mikhail Gorbachev meet in Moscow after Fidel returns from
North Korea.
In an interview in Havana, Jose Felipe Carneado, Chief of the Communist Party
of Cuba Central Committee Religious Affairs Office, says the Pope will not visit
Cuba this year.
Havana press announces that the United States in its 1987 fiscal budget has
included $2.6 million to be invested in the Guantanamo Naval Base.
The work sessions of the Mixed Commission for Technical-Scientific and
Economic Cooperation between Nicaragua and Cuba end in Managua with the
signing of a 1986 cooperation agreement.
Isidoro Malmierca and John Eckstein, Trinidad and Tobago's Minister of Health
and Environment, discuss information on medical services and matters of mutual
interest during a meeting in Havana.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez meets in Moscow with Ivan Arkhipov, 1st Deputy
Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers to discuss economic
and trade relations for 1986-90.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Lionel Soto depart Moscow for Sweden to attend the
funeral of Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme.
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Carlos Rafael Rodriguez meets with Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson and
delivers a message from Fidel Castro expressing the Cuban leader's most sincere
condolences on Palme's assassination.
Winston Murray, Guyana's Minister of State for Internal Trade and Consumer
Protection, arrives in Havana to participate in the 11th meeting of the joint
Intergovernmental Commission.
Fidel Castro presides over a meeting of the Politburo and Secretariat of the
Central Committee at which he gives a broad report on his recent trip to the
USSR and North Korea.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez meets in Stockholm with former Venezuelan President
Carlos Andres Perez to discuss Latin American problems, particularly the
situation in Central America.
Secretary General of the Central Organization of Cuban Trade Unions Roberto
Veiga meets with Soviet trade official Vladimir Sergeyev to discuss bilateral labor
relations and international trade.
17 March Havana press announces that Antonio Perez Herrero will be Cuba's Ambassasdor
to Ethiopia.
Foreign Minister Malmierca greets Guyana's Minister of Foreign Affairs
Rashleigh Jackson at Jose Marti International Airport.
Havana press reports that, according to a senior Cuban Government source,
Cuba's relations with the United States have sunk to an alltime low and offer little
prospects of a thaw.
The chief of staff for intelligence for the Angolan insurgents, Brig. Gen. Huambo
Casito, says Cuban General Ramires, has arrived in Angola's Kuando Kubango
Province to command the government's Cuban and Soviet-backed offensive.
Minister of Foreign Trade Cabrizas and Yugoslav official Milenko Bojanic sign a
five-year trade protocol in Havana. A trade agreement is also signed.
Ethiopian Industry Minister Hailu Yemanu arrives in Havana and is greeted by
Marcos Portal, Basic Industry Minister, and Lester Rodriguez of the State
Committee for Economic Cooperation.
In an interview in Havana, Vice Minister of Foreign Relations Ricardo Alarcon
tells El Pais that disagreements between the United States and the Latin
American governments are constantly increasing.
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20 March Jose Ramon Fernandez, Vice President of the Council of Ministers, inaugurates
the fourth general conference of news agencies from nonaligned countries.
Cuba is elected to preside over this organization for the next three years. Pedro
Margolies Vallanueva, Director General of Prensa Latina, is selected president.
21 March Carlos Rafael Rodriguez meets with Rashleigh Jackson to discuss bilateral
relations, the international situation, and the Nonaligned Movement.
Politburo member Juan Almeida and his delegation arrive in Prague to attend the
17th Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.
Jorge Risquet receives Hailu Yemanu, and they discuss Central America and
Cuba's and Angola's willingness to withdraw Cuban troops when the Namibian
people achieve true independence.
A delegation headed by Foreign Minister Malmierca arrives in Nassau and is
greeted by Minister of External Affairs and Tourism Clement Maynard.
Oliver Tambo, President of the Executive Committee of the African National
Congress of South Africa, arrives in Havana and is welcomed by Jorge Risquet.
Foreign Minister Malmierca and Vo Dong Giang, Vietnamese Vice Minister of
Foreign Affairs, meet in Havana to exchange opinions on the international
situation and the Nonaligned Movement.
Spain turns down a request from Cuba to extradite former Cuban Economic Vice
Minister Manuel Antonio Sanchez Perez. Cuba has charged Sanchez with trying
to embezzle $500,000 of public money.
24 March Granma announces that Silvio Rivera Perez has been named Cuban Ambassador
to Guinea.
25 March In a statement issued by the Foreign Ministry, Cuba emphatically condemns the
US show of force and sinking of Libyan naval units in the Gulf of Sidra.
Ivan Arkhipov meets with Cuban Ambassador to the Soviet Union Lionel Soto to
discuss the increase in bilateral cooperation in the technical and economic sectors.
Fidel Castro decorates Tambo with the Playa Giron Order. Jorge Risquet and
Tambo speak at a ceremony expressing solidarity with the African people's
struggle.
Jorge Risquet accompanies Tambo to the Isle of Youth.
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Konstantin Katushev, Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Foreign
Economic Relations, and Ernesto Melendez sign a cooperation protocol in Moscow
for 1986-90.
With national and foreign journalists in attendance, Tambo says that violence has
stirred the South African people's rage and that the people have given everything
in this struggle.
The Soviet ship Dimitri Gulia arrives at the Port of Matanzas with some 12,400
tons of aluminum sheets, ferrous metals, pipes, bars, tires, and levers to repair
damages caused by Hurricane Kate.
Havana TV reports on agreements made at the party congress resulting in a new
methodology effective in state planning that implies a structural remodeling of the
Cental Planning Board.
30 March Ulises Estrada, Chief of the Nonaligned Movement division of the Cuban Foreign
Ministry, arrives in Zambia.
31 March Zambian Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Sikao and Ulises Estrada discuss
nonaligned matters and the nonaligned summit to be held in Harare, Zimbabwe.
STAT
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