LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000201060001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 28, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP87T00289R000201060001-0
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Latin America
Review
28 March 1986
ALA LAR 86-008
28 March 1986
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Articles Brazil-China: Prospects for Closer Commercial Ties
of military equipment.
Latin America
Review
Expanding Sino-Brazilian ties are reflected in increased trade and
technical cooperation, but several obstacles will impede the
deepening relationship, particularly in technology transfer and sales
Mexico: Chihuahua Prepares for Elections ~ 5
opponents if, as expected, it rigs the vote.
The ruling party is expected to use all of its resources to win a hotly
contested gubernatorial election in Chihuahua this summer, but
probably will face localized violent protests by disgruntled
Jamaica: Anticipating Local Elections 9
The ruling party's performance in elections for local parish councils
later this year probably will determine whether Prime Minister
Seaga can resist opposition calls for a general election before his
term ends in 1988.
Argentina: Possible Constitutional Reform
Brazil: New Presidential Chief of Stafl'~
Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Secret
ALA LAR 86-008
28 March /986
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Brazil-China: Prospects for Closer
Commercial Ties
The warm reception Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang Brazilian industry leaders
received from Brazilian President Sarney during ]believe that China is a large and potentially
Zhao's trip to Brazil in November reflects recent lucrative market for their products.
improvements in already cordial ties between their the Brazilian military
countries. Underlying this cordiality, which contrasts would like to gain access to Chinese technical
with Brasilia's correct but cool ties to Moscow, has expertise, especially in nuclear and rocket technology.
been a steady expansion of trade between the two Normally wary of close political ties to Communist
countries from negligible amounts in 1975 to an states, Brasilia views Beijing's pragmatic foreign
estimated $1 billion expected this year. Moreover, policy as nonthreatening to Brazilian political
technical cooperation is progressing smoothly, while
China's recent posting of a defense attache to Brasilia
may set the stage for large-scale arms sales. We
expect each country to continue efforts to expand ties,
but obstacles will impede a deepening relationship,
especially in technology transfer and military sales.
Growing Mutuality of Interests
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations
between Brazil and China in 1975, bilateral relations
have improved steadily. Press and US Embassy
reports indicate that growing trade fostered the
expansion of ties, especially after 1979 when China
increased exports of crude oil and petroleum products
to Brazil to help buffer Brasilia's import disruptions
caused by the Iran-Iraq war. Subsequently, Sino-
Brazilian political relations improved as well. F_~
According to the US Embassy in Beijing, Brazil's
relatively advanced level of technology and Beijing's
interest in greater cooperation with other Third
World countries made Brazil an especially valuable
trade partner for China. Beijing views Brazil as an
important developing country and an activist for
Third World interests in international organizations.
Chinese press reports stress that Brazil is a leader in
Latin America, and may serve as an entree to the
region. In particular, Beijing may hope that Latin
American nations will use Sino-Brazilian relations as
a model for their own relations with China.F__1
Bilateral Relations Blossom
According to trade statistics from the two countries,
Sino-Brazilian bilateral trade amounted to more than
$800 million in 1984. Brazil's favorable balance of
trade grew to $45 million in 1984. As Beijing has
initiated new infrastructure projects, Chinese imports
of Brazilian iron and steel, which account for
approximately 50 percent of Brazilian sales, have
surged. China also has increased imports of plastics,
textile fibers, and industrial equipment. Petroleum
and petroleum products, particularly crude and partly
refined oil, constitute over 95 percent of China's
exports to Brazil. Indeed, Brazil bought almost 10
percent of China's crude oil exports last year. F_
Bilateral technical cooperation commenced in 1984
with the signing of nuclear and scientific
agreements-the culmination of Brazilian President's
Figueredo's visit to China. Included was a Nuclear
Cooperation Agreement for peaceful purposes,
according to the respective Embassies. Although the
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ALA LAR 86-008
28 March 1986
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Beijing's "Economic Diplomacy"
In the past three months, China has increasingly
emphasized its interest in expanding economic ties to
the Third World as part of its drive to increase the
foreign trade and investment that Beijing needs to
finance its ambitious modernization program. For
example, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang told a
conference of Chinese ambassadors in December 1984
that diplomatic success will depend on the successful
expansion of China's economic relations with foreign
countries. Zhao added that such economic diplomacy
would ultimately advance China's political
objectives. We believe that this policy, implemented
after the Communist Party Conference last
September, may have been endorsed by the senior
Chinese leadership during their meetings in August at
Beidaihe.
We believe that Deng Xiaoping and other reformers
may be touting the prospect of large foreign trade
agreements concluded under the rubric of "economic
foreign policy" to deflect domestic criticism of the
"open-door" policy. The Chinese have been using
such a policy for some time to undermine Taiwan's
position abroad, particularly in Latin America, and
to put pressure on Taipei to negotiate-a goal on
which all Chinese leaders agree.
China has made a special effort to increase its
economic and political ties to other Third World
countries. We believe that declining world oil prices
and increasing protectionism in the industrialized
countries against Chinese textiles may be motivating
Beijing to tap Third World markets to shore up
Chinese exports. Beijing also seeks to enter into joint
ventures, probably to increase China's foreign
currency earnings and gain access to high technology
more cheaply. 0
accord does not commit either party to purchase
nuclear services and technology, it requires that
international safeguards be applied to all sales.
Under a Science and Technology Agreement, a
Chinese delegation from the Ministry of Aeronautics
visited Brazilian facilities for advanced aeronautics
research in August 1984.
the Chinese expressed
interest in Brazilian satellite design, fabrication, and
propulsion systems. Soon after, Brazilians toured
several sensitive Chinese installations that reportedly
had not previously been shown to foreigners.
the two governments
then prepared drafts of a space cooperation annex to
the Science and Technology Agreement. The drafts
call for Sino-Brazilian cooperation in satellite attitude
control and power supply, image processing, and
improving telemetry and ground command systems.
China and Brazil indicated in 1984 that they would
exchange military attaches,
he agreement probably stemmed
from Brazes interest in selling military equipment to
China. Although the actual agreement was not
announced until last year, this is the first time Brazil
has allowed such an exchange with a Communist
country, a harbinger of further deepening ties.
Closer Ties Last Year
In 1985, Sino-Brazilian relations expanded in several
new directions. As part of its worldwide drive to
reduce imports of finished products and bolster
Chinese technical capabilities, Beijing began
negotiations for the acquisition of Brazilian
technology. Embassy and press sources report Chinese
interest in technical plans and processes related to
transportation, offshore oil exploration, hydroelectric
power, and the steel industry. According to
Beijing may also be interested in military
technology, particularly for the manufacture of light
aircraft.
China is also planning to use Brazilian construction
companies on major civil projects. For example,
Beijing approved Brazilian participation in China's
port reform project, designed to open Chinese ports to
supertankers. Brazilian firms would like to participate
in construction of the proposed 14-million-kW
capacity Three Gorges hydroelectric dam on the
- Yangtse River.
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Both countries continued to express interest in
cooperation in the nuclear field, but reached no
specific agreements. Nonetheless, the Brazilians were
attempting to join forces with the West German firm
Kraftwerk Union AG (KWU) to land a nuclear power
reactor construction project in China.
China, which has scaled
back plans for nuclear power, has recently postponed
this project indefinitely.
In space cooperation,
Brazil's Sonda IV rocket, which has been
test-flown twice, is currently too inaccurate to be used
as a weapon. China is
interested in acquiring Brazilian solid-fuel
technology, and hope to arrange an exchange in these
areas. Nonetheless,
negotiations, which have
not yet begun in earnest, are likely to be difficult.
Zhao's Visit
To cement these new ties, Zhao Ziyang spent five
days in Brazil last November, as part of a 16-day trip
that also included Argentina, Colombia, and
Venezuela. US Embassy and Brazilian press sources
indicate that he received red-carpet treatment during
the visit-including a meeting at the airport with
Sarney, an honor normally reserved for heads of state.
During the visit, Zhao signed new protocols on
cooperation in geological sciences and other technical
areas, as well as an agreement for cultural and
educational exchanges. Moreover, Zhao and Sarney
also agreed to annual Foreign Ministry discussions on
the international situation as well as bilateral
relations. Zhao sounded the only cautionary note by
expressing Chinese concern over Brazil's growing
trade surplus with Beijing, which sur ed to $245
million in the first half of 1985.
According to press reports, Sarney and Zhao privately
discussed a large sale of Brazilian military equipment
to China. The Chinese, according to these accounts,
industries for Chinese defense officials.
presented a very ambitious shopping list, indicating an
interest in acquiring 3,200 armored vehicles and
tanks; 500 Tucano military trainers; AMX attack
planes; and various types of communications
hardware, military computers, and radios. In an effort
to realize some of these sales, which could total more
than $3 billion, China's newly accredited attache will
probably arrange tours of Brazilian military
bilateral ties.
Outlook
Sino-Brazilian bilateral cooperation is proceeding
smoothly, with no signs of flagging interest from
either side. We expect each country to continue
efforts to expand trade and technical cooperation.
Nonetheless, important obstacles will plague the
overall relationship, and may delay the deepening of
For trade to expand to the $1.2 billion level planned
for this year, while accommodating China's desire to
reduce Brasilia's burgeoning trade surplus with
Beijing, Brazil would need to increase imports from
China. On the basis of an analysis of Brazil's current
import requirements, we judge the Chinese will
encounter difficulty increasing their export sales to
offset large new purchases of Brazilian raw materials
and manufactured products. Moreover, a likely
decline in Chinese oil revenues and textile exports
worldwide will probably lead Beijing to press Brasilia
to arrange new countertrade agreements to conserve
hard currency. For example, China probably will
press Brazil to accept more oil to balance trade. We
believe Brazil's preference for cash will complicate
the negotiations to arrive at mutually acceptable
terms of trade for long-lived contracts, and will work
to slow the growth of trade between the countries.
We believe the negotiations for military sales are
likely to be a slow, arduous process. Although periodic
agreements for small purchases are likely to be
announced, we doubt that a major agreement will be
concluded this year. Among the problems that could
stand in the way are:
? Brazil's difficulty in providing financing for any
large-scale purchases of arms.
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? COCOM regulations that require clearance from
member countries to sell their components, some of
which are in Brazilian military products.
? Brazilian defense industries' possible reluctance to
transfer technology for proprietary products to
protect their competitive position.
Beijing will probably require Brazilian companies to
transfer technology with licenses to allow
coproduction as a requirement for military equipment
sales. This demand could impede sales. Although
Brazil has licensed the production of Tucano aircraft
to a British firm in Northern Ireland, manufacturers
may hesitate in Beijing's case . We believe China's
lower labor and manufacturing costs could raise fears
that Beijing would undercut Brazil as a manufacturer
of ostensibly Brazilian products. Moreover, in our
view, the license fees paid to Brazilian manufacturers
probably would not fully compensate for their
potential loss of markets.
We believe that scientific exchanges will probably
increase in nonsensitive areas, such as food irradiation
using nuclear isotopes. We judge the prospects of a
large commercial sale to China of Brazilian nuclear
power components or of Chinese assistance in the
sensitive areas of reprocessing or uranium enrichment
technology are low. Despite denials by Brazilian and
Chinese officials, reports of space cooperation
continue to appear periodically in the Brazilian press.
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Mexico: Chihuahua Prepares
for Elections
Mexico will hold elections this year for governor in 13
states. Of these, the race in the northern border state
of Chihuahua is likely to be the most hotly contested
and to receive the most publicity in the Mexican and
US press. Although the conservative National Action
Party (PAN) commands considerable support and has
nominated a popular candidate, we expect the ruling
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) to retain
control of the statehouse. The PRI is also likely to
recapture some of the state deputy positions and
mayoralties PAN won in elections three years ago.
We believe localized violence will erupt this year, as it
did last year elsewhere in the country
was forced to go on extended leave, an act tantamount
to resigning, last September. He was under attack in
his own party for an alleged lack of leadership and for
allowing the PAN to make unprecedented electoral
gains.F_~
The Candidates
The PRI and the PAN, the two major parties
contesting the Chihuahua elections, formally
announced their gubernatorial candidates in January.
Each party selected men who are respected natives of
the state and are likely to wage strong campaigns,
according to the Embassy. ~
The Coming Elections
In addition to the 13 governorships, 230 state deputy
posts and 1,158 mayoralties will be at stake
nationwide.'
however, the government views the Chihuahua races,
to be held on 6 July, as the most potentially
troublesome. Perhaps for this reason, Chihuahua was
among the first states in which the PRI named a
gubernatorial candidate this year. PAN currently
controls seven of Chihuahua's largest cities,
containing over 70 percent of the state's population,
including Ciudad Juarez and Chihuahua City, the
capital. Moreover, PAN made its strongest showing in
Chihuahua during midterm congressional elections
last July. It was declared the winner in three of the
state's 10 congressional districts and would have won
at least one more had election officials acted
impartially, according to the US Embassy.
The PRI also cannot take the elections lightly in view
of factional infighting that in recent years has left the
ruling party in the state in considerable disarray.
Oscar Ornelas Kuchle, the PRI governor of the state,
' Other states holding gubernatorial races in 1986 are Aguas-
calientes, Baja California Sur, Durango, Guerrero, Michoacan,
Oaxaca, Puebla Sinaloa, Tamaulipas, Tlaxcala, Veracruz, and
Zacatecas. 77
The PAN standard bearer, Francisco Barrio
Terrazas, 34, is currently mayor of Ciudad Juarez.
He is youthful, energetic, and has cultivated the
image of a man of the people. Barrio is also politically
shrewd]
as evidenced by his adept handling of PRI
attempts to embarrass his mayoral administration and
his success in obtaining federal funds from PRI
officials for projects in Ciudad Juarez.
The PRI candidate, Fernando Baeza Melendez, 44, is
widely respected in the state as an effective
administrator and an accomplished politician, the
Embassy reports. Baeza is now serving as a Federal
Deputy representing a constituency in northern
Chihuahua. He previously held the post of Deputy
Federal Attorney General in Mexico City, where he
established close ties to a number of government and
ruling party officials. He also was formerly the mayor
of Delicias, Chihuahua, his hometown.
Baeza is regarded as a moderate within the PRI,
according to the Embassy. The fact that he was once
a member of the PAN should make him more broadly
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acceptable to many middle-class Chihuahuans and to
the state's business community, from which the PAN
derives much of its support. On the other hand,
organized labor, in view of Baeza's conservative bent,
only reluctantly endorsed his candidacy, according to
the US Embassy. Rural Chihuahuans, for their part,
have strongly supported the PRI in the past and are
likely to favor Baeza by a wide margin, despite
dissatisfaction with producer prices set by the
government that in recent months have led to protests
in several areas of the state.)
Election Tactics
The PRI will use its patronage powers and pork-barrel
projects to good advantage in its Chihuahua
campaign.
the ruling party is prepared to spend
heavily to ensure an impressive victory. We expect the
government to devote fewer resources to funding PRI
campaigns in other states with gubernatorial elections
in 1986, particularly in view of Mexico City's
exaggerated promises to cut this year's budget deficit.
Baeza and other PRI candidates in Chihuahua will
also benefit from the ruling party's control over
electoral machinery. To improve its electoral
prospects in Chihuahua, the PRI-controlled state
administration late last year amended election laws.
PAN officials assert, probably with reason, that the
controversial changes will make it easier for the PRI
to practice fraud. Among the new provisions are ones
that restrict the access of poll watchers and give
officials in each precinct greater discretion in deciding
Diccionario Biografico del
Gobierno Mexicano
whether voters without identification can cast ballots.
In case such tactics fail, however, the government
recently deployed a 900-man Army unit to the state to
maintain order during the election period
The PAN, for its part, is likely to campaign hard,
particularly in urban areas of the state. The party will
devote fewer resources to rural areas, where
historically it has not made a strone showing.
much of its
support is likely to come from the business community
and clergy. Business will provide the main source of
campaign funds for the PAN, which, unlike other
major political parties, does not accept government
subsidies. Reflecting a trend toward greater church
involvement in politics, the Bishop of Ciudad Juarez,
Manuel Talamas Camandari, recently was among
those publicly critical of the changes in the state's
election laws.
At the state level, PAN will seek to capitalize on the
popularity of Barrio, who is well known throughout
the state. It probably will also seek to exploit
discontent with the PRI's management of the
economy and the limited accomplishments of the
Ornelas administration. In addition, the PAN may
publicize allegations of several other opposition
parties that Baeza did little to combat corruption and
drug trafficking while a top official in the Attorney
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Outlook
The PRI, which has not lost a governorship since it
was founded in 1929, will not cede the Chihuahua
statehouse in 1986, in our judgment. Even if Barrio
and the PAN captured a plurality of the votes cast, we
believe it highly unlikely that the government and
ruling party would recognize the results. As the
Embassy has noted, whether the PAN triumphs will
not depend on the adequacy of its campaign
financing, the popularity of its candidate, or even its
vote totals. The key will be the willingness of the PRI
to acknowledge an opposition victory. Nonetheless,
the nature of Barrio's campaign and whether the PRI
unites behind Baeza almost certainly will affect the
ease with which the PRI wins.
some PAN leaders in
Chihuahua already have privately conceded there is
little chance Barrio can capture the governorship.
The outcome of state deputy and local contests
appears far less certain. On the one hand, the de la
Madrid administration, as reflected in the results of
midterm elections last July, appears to be pursuing a
strategy aimed at divesting opposition parties of many
of the offices they now hold. Mexico's leaders
probably believe they cannot afford greater political
liberalization at a time when, because of poor
economic conditions, the overwhelming support of
voters for the ruling party is no longer assured. As a
result, we believe the PAN will lose at least some of
the local offices it now controls in Chihuahua.
We believe there almost certainly will be isolated
political disturbances in Chihuahua between early
July, when elections occur, and late September, when
those elected are sworn in. PAN leaders in the state
have suggested violence could result if the elections
are stolen, an observation that PRI officials could
interpret as a threat. The PAN almost certainly will
protest the results if it dislikes the outcome.
According to the Embassy, the PAN asserts that the
PRI has inflated voter registration lists in the state by
almost 400,000, or approximately one-third of the
total, to facilitate fraud. As a result, protest activities
are likely, including public rallies, occupations of
town halls, petition drives, and hunger strikes.
Election-related violence also is probable, in our
judgment, but most likely will be localized and
quickly contained.
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Jamaica: Anticipating Local
Elections
Elections for Jamaica's 13 local parish councils, which
by law must be held by 31 July, probably will
determine whether Prime Minister Seaga can resist
opposition calls for a general election before his term
expires in 1988. Although Seaga has some political
capital on which to draw, there are indications that
voters will use the local contests to express
dissatisfaction with his ruling Jamaica Labor Party
(JLP) and give People's National Party (PNP) leader
Michael Manley a victory that will strengthen PNP
calls for a national showdown soon. Manley recently
has become more active in trying to generate
enthusiasm among his supporters for the coming
contests.F___1
Seaga has postponed the local polls, originally
scheduled for June 1984, three times purportedly for
technical reasons, prompting opposition charges that
he was tampering with the democratic process.
Although Seaga has not yet announced a date for the
contests, it is unlikely he will postpone them again
because such a move would encourage Manley to
increase his pressure for early national elections.
The Communist Workers' Party of Jamaica also
attaches major significance to the forthcoming local
vote and aims to win one or more council seats to
substantiate its claims to be a legitimate player on the
national political stage, according to the Embassy.
Although small, the party reportedly has stepped up
efforts to build broader grassroots support and portray
itself as the only real alternative to the two major
parties. the
Communists are generally having limited success in
their effort to exploit popular dissatisfaction over
current economic conditions.
Manley's Challenge
Manley hopes to use the elections as a referendum on
Seaga's policies, according to US officials. His party
recently assumed a more active and aggressive stance,
organizing several protests against government
economic policies. The biggest event so far was an all-
night vigil and procession to Jamaica House, the seat
of government, where protesters demanded that
savings from lower world oil prices be used to
subsidize food and medical care. The Embassy
estimates that Manley attracted no more than 15,000,
failing to increase his crowd-drawing ability over a
Both Seaga and Manley view the local contests as the
first genuine test of their parties' electoral strengths
since the national election in 1980, according to the
Embassy. Although 189 parish council seats will be at
stake, control of the councils themselves means little
in terms of political power. Nevertheless, analysis of
past elections shows that the outcome of the
municipal polling often is an accurate predictor of the
next national election. Moreover, a high-ranking
official of the JLP has told the Embassy that a sizable
sweep of council seats by Manley's party would
probably necessitate calling national elections within
six months of the local contests. Manley would
portray a large margin of victory as a vote of "no
confidence" in the government. He would use the
victory to gain leverage to push for early national
elections, according to the Embassy. F__1
comparable event last October.
the party leadership
success.
In addition, Manley has been quick to take advantage
of the government's education policy. According to
the Embassy, the government's announcement in
February of the introduction of college tuition is
highly unpopular, and
Manley views the issue as one he can focus on to help
overcome inertia in his party.
Secret
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Manley's recent aggressiveness marks a departure
from a relatively passive strategy that had appeared to
lack momentum and direction from the leadershi ,
Manley seemed to be
satisfied with the position of de facto leader of the
opposition and content to let Seaga make unpopular
but necessary economic decisions. Even if Manley is
privately reluctant to seek an early national election,
however, internal party pressure may be forcing him
to become more strident in his challenges to Seaga.
there was
widespread criticism in the party of Manley's lack of
activism.
Seaga's Strengths and Weaknesses
The Embassy reports that events this year have
produced some good news and political pluses for the
government, but overriding economic problems
probably will drain ruling party support in the local
elections. External developments such as the
formation of the Caribbean Democratic Union under
Seaga's leadership, the Jamaican role in former
Haitian President Duvalier's decision to step down,
and the Prime Minister's visit to Trinidad and
attendance at the Grenada minisummit all helped to
improve the government's popular standing at home,
according to the Embassy. Much of the political
capital that Seaga gained from these developments
was diminished, however, by an acrimonious 13-
month salary dispute with the Jamaica Teachers'
Association that led to disruption in the school system
and some violence, according to US officials.
Labor problems are symptomatic of broad
dissatisfaction with Seaga's attempts to follow IMF-
recommended austerity measures. Several currency
devaluations have raised consumer prices 220 percent
in Jamaica's import-dependent economy since Seaga
took office in 1980. Small employment gains in the
manufacturing sector have been offset by layoffs of
civil servants and bauxite workers, and the
unemployment rate continues to hover at about 30
percent. Despite Seaga's strict economic policies,
noncompliance with IMF targets has interrupted aid
flows several times, while real per capita income has
fallen about 13 percent since 1980.F__-]
These difficulties are sapping support for the JLP.L
several
major Jamaican business corporations intend to
withhold funding to Seaga's party, or contribute to
Manley's party, for the local elections because of
discouragement with the government's economic
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Several incidents this year may point to the
reemergence of political violence as a campaign
tactic.'
? Members of a Jamaica Labor Party youth ct iliate
disrupted a parents-teachers' organization meeting
in January with shouting, egg-throwing, and tire-
slashing. These actions were quickly disavowed and
condemned by the party, according to the Embassy.
? Street thugs-traditionally drawn to political
rallies-marred a People's National Party's march
on Jamaica House in March by attacking and
robbing participants and passers-by, according to
the Embassy.
Paul
Burke, a high-ranking People's National Party
official, is attempting to regenerate the notorious
"Hot Steppers" armed gang as a base for political
support. The gang reportedly now has
approximately 10 to 12 members.
The Prime Minister reportedly intends to use the bulk
of the estimated $40 million in oil savings for public
works jobs in road repair this spring that would help
reduce unemployment in time for the elections.
Nevertheless, these projects are unlikely to overcome
recent PNP gains. The electorate's accumulated
grievances and desire to send the government a
message probably will give Manley a victory large
enough to give added weight to his demands for an
early national election.
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performance. A recent public opinion poll indicates
that Seaga would attract only 27 percent of eligible
voters in a general election. Seaga believes many of
his supporters will boycott the local contests to protest
against the government's austerity program,
Outlook
Once a polling date is announced, the implications for
national politics could cause a resumption of the
violence that has characterized past parliamentary
elections. Proponents of violence are stepping up
activity, even though such actions will hurt the vital
tourism industry.
Seaga's strengths may be enough to avoid a massive
defeat. He is counting on superior finances and public
works projects to give his party a respectable showing.
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Latin America
Briefs
Argentina Possible Constitutional Reform
The Argentine Congress may consider a constitutional amendment later this year
that would allow President Alfonsin to run for a second term when his current
term expires in 1989, according to press reports. Such an amendment might also
shorten the presidential term from six to four years.
'Alfonsin favors this move, although he has not stated his position
publicly. A similar measure passed during the first presidential term of Juan
Peron-and repealed by a subsequent military government-reinforced Peron's
increasingly undemocratic image and ultimately aided in his downfall by uniting
key political groups against him.
Altering the constitution to provide a second presidential term would require a
two-thirds majority vote in Congress, which Alfonsin and the Radical Party could
only muster through sizable defections from the opposition. The Peronists, in our
judgment, are not likely to support constitutional reform because they probably
believe they could not defeat Alfonsin in the 1989 presidential election. Even if the
Radicals manage to railroad the change through Congress, Alfonsin's insistence on
a second term would cast doubt on his willingness to leave office and tarnish his
image with the voters as a defender of democratic institutions.
President Sarney named Marco Maciel, leader of the centrist Liberal Front Party,
as his chief of staff in a cabinet reorganization in February. The appointment
heralds a stronger civilian presidency. Unlike his predecessors, who took a
backseat to the head of the military household, Maciel obtained broad new powers
to bolster his effective political control of the executive branch. According to the
US Embassy, he now will name second- and third-echelon officials throughout the
government, a power that will ensure more coherent policymaking. To enable
Sarney to be more assertive in dealing with Congress and his opponents, the new
chief will control the $77 million government information and propaganda budget
and the President's emergency reserve fund, and allocate funds to municipalities-
keys to the political pork barrel for Congressional elections in November. Maciel
has picked a seasoned and well-respected civil servant--Henrique Hargreaves-as
his liaison with the Congressional leadership.0
Maciel intends to use his new powers to lay
the groundwork to succeed Sarney in 1991. Using his access to government funds,
Maciel plans to assist moderates and conservatives in the coming election
campaigns. The next Congress will draft Brazil's new constitution in 1987, and
13 Secret
ALA LAR 86-008
28 March 1986
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many observers believe it will shorten Sarney's six-year term in office.
Nevertheless, Maciel wants the Congress to keep Sarney in
power until 1991 when, Maciel believes, his current rivals for the presidency-
notably Leonel Brizola and Janio Quadros-will be too old to run. Sarney will
probably support Maciel's efforts, but we judge that Maciel's ability to achieve his
goal will largely depend on the President's popularity with the electorate, which is
currently linked to the success of the new economic stabilization program.
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Cuba Chronology
3 February Carlos Rafael Rodriguez receives the credentials of Guinea-Bissau's new
Ambassador to Cuba, Constantino Lopes da Costa.
Soviet Communist Party officials Slyunkov, Korolev, and Kapto arrive in Havana
to attend the Cuban Communist Party's Third Party Congress.
Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega and Salvadoran rebel officials Jorge Hander
and Ruben Zamora arrive in Havana to attend the Third Party Congress. They
are welcomed by Manuel Pineiro.
Puerto Rican Socialist Party Secretary General Carlos Gallisa arrives in Havana
for the Third Party Congress. He is welcomed by Ricardo Alarcon.
Fidel Castro opens the Third Party Congress. He blames the United States for
most of the world's major problems, but says he is willing to open negotiations to
resolve his differences with Washington.
Fidel calls for a more efficient economy, tells of the growing problems of crime and
juvenile delinquency, and says he will fire officials guilty of incompetence and
irresponsibility.
During his speech at the Congress, Fidel says that Cuba has rapid deployment
formations that are permanently combat-ready, highly mechanized, and have high
firepower.
Fidel discloses in his speech that Cuba will not participate in the 1988 Summer
Olympics in Seoul unless Olympic officials adopt his recommendation that the two
Koreas cohost the games.
The Supreme People's Council of the Lao People's Democratic Republic decorates
Fidel and Raul Castro for their great contributions to strengthening friendship and
cooperation.
Raul Castro reports that a US SR-71 spy plane made a flight today along the
coast without violating Cuba's territory. He says it was Ronald Reagan's greeting
to the Congress.
At the Third Party Congress, Soviet official Yegor Ligachev says the Soviet people
will continue to be a firm defender of internationalist principles and that ties
between Cuba and the USSR will broaden.
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ALA LAR 86-008
28 March 1986
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At the Party Congress, East German official Horst Sindermann praises Cuba for
its solidarity toward anti-imperialist movements and its self-sacrificing
internationalist aid throughout the world.
Nicaraguan President Ortega blasts the United States during his speech at the
Party Congress.
Czechoslovakian official Milos Jake's speech at the Congress praises Cuba for
strengthening Communism and labor movements.
Vietnam's official at the Party Congress, Nguyen Van Linh, says his country
supports Cuba's domestic and foreign policies and demands the United States
discontinue its blockade against Cuba.
Three men believed to be members of the terrorist anti-Castro group Omega 7
plead guilty to conspiring to murder Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations
Raul Roa in March 1980.
7 February At the Party Congress, Fidel Castro names the full Politburo members, alternate
members, Central Committee Secretaries, and Central Committee alternates.
Ramiro Valdes, Sergio del Valle, Guillermo Garcia, and Bias Roca are ousted
from the Politburo. Roca requested to be relieved because of ill health.
Vilma Espin is appointed the party's first woman Politburo member and Esteban
Lazo Hernandez, the party's second black, is promoted to provincial party chief.
Fidel also mentions that sex discrimination has been more prevalent than ethnic or
racial discrimination in Cuba.
At the Party Congress, Fidel is reelected First Secretary of the Communist Party.
Raul Castro is reelected Second Secretary and will take over if Fidel dies or is
assassinated.
The Third Party Congress approves guidelines for Cuba's 1986-90 Five-Year Plan
and the creation of a new government commission with ministerial rank to
recommend economic reforms.
In his closing speech at the Party Congress, Fidel warns Washington that any
interference in Nicaragua or Angola would meet with stiffer Cuban resistance.
During his closing speech, Fidel accuses capitalists of living like vultures and
vampires, living off the blood of others, and profiting from the arms factory to kill.
Fidel Castro says he has not given up smoking for health reasons, but to promote a
public health campaign against smoking. He has not smoked since 26 August.
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The Mozambique National Resistance Movement claims responsibility for
shooting down a troop-carrying transport aircraft, killing three Cubans and 21
Zimbabweans.
8 February The Soviet Communist Party delegation led by Yegor Ligachev meets with Fidel
and Raul Castro before departing for Moscow.
In an interview in Nicaragua, President Ortega stresses Fidel Castro's statements
that Cuban assistance to Nicaragua would increase if the United States increases
its aid to the counterrevolutionaries.
An eight-man Cuban delegation led by Deputy Minister for Sugar Gilberto
Illerena arives in Tanzania to help boost that country's sugar production.
Minister of Culture Armando Hart travels to Nicaragua to participate in a Latin
American and Caribbean political parties' conference for peace and
nonintervention.
11 February The 1 1 th meeting of the International Radio and Television Organization is held
in Havana. President of the Cuban Institute of Radio and Television Ismael
Gonzalez presides.
Ismael Gonzalez notes that Cuba has two national and seven provincial television
channels operating, as well as 53 radio stations.
13 February Carlos Rafael Rodriguez discusses ties between the Italian and Cuban Communist
Parties with Renato Sangieri of the Italian Communist Party at the Third Party
Congress.
Isidoro Malmierca, during a meeting with South Yemen's Ambassador to Cuba,
Umar Husayn al-Hurubi, affirms Cuba's firm stance and solidarity with the
Yemeni Socialist Party and Yemeni revolution.
14 February Granma announces that Heriberto Feraudy Espino has been named Cuban
Ambassador to Nigeria.
17 February The first Cuban national ecclesiastical meeting is held in Havana. Msgr. Adolfo
Rodriguez affirms that the church in Cuba must be open and provide for dialogue
and participation.
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18 February Pope John Paul sends a message to the meeting calling for Cuban Catholics to
remain faithful to the church's teachings.
19 February The ship Bahia de Manzanillo arrives in Havana Bay. This is the first of 12 ships
under construction in European shipyards that are expected to arrive in Cuba
before the end of the year.
Granma condemns President Reagan's visit to Grenada, calling it the newest insult
to Latin America's dignity.
Brazilian Foreign Minister Abreu Sodre asserts after meeting President Jose
Sarney in Brasilia that Brazil will resume diplomatic relations with Cuba this
year.
21 February Construction Minister Raul Cabrera Nunez arrives in Mexico City to inaugurate
the first school constructed with Cuban assistance since the September
earthquake.
22 February Politburo member Jorge Risquet and Engombale Nueru, Politburo member of the
Revolutionary Party of Tanzania, sign a document renewing cooperation between
their organizations.
23 February Church sources in Havana report that Msgr. Dario Castrillon, Secretary General
of the Latin American Episcopal Conference was received by Fidel Castro a few
days ago.
A final document issued by the Cuban National Ecclesiastical Encounter stresses
the church's commitment to spreading the gospel through a dialogue with other
sectors of society.
Prensa Latina reports that Fidel Castro met with the Pope's special envoy to the
ecclesiastical meeting, Cardinal Eduardo Pironio.
24 February Foreign Trade Minister Ricardo Cabrizas meets with Yosihiro Inamaya, the
President of Keidanren-a powerful federation of Japanese economic and
industrial groups-to discuss economic development.
Cuban and Yugoslavia sign a protocol in Havana that includes economic
cooperation for 1986-90. Central Committee member Jose Lopez Moreno and
Milos Sindic of Yugoslavia sign the document.
Commander of the Revolution Juan Almeida stops in Algeria en route to the
Saharan Democratic Arab Republic, where he will attend events commemorating
the 10th anniversary of its founding.
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In a statement for Prensa Latina, Papal envoy Cardinal Eduardo Pironio notes
"satisfaction" with his meeting with Fidel Castro and says they discussed the
misery and underdevelopment that many people in the area suffer.
Cardinal Pironio also says that a visit by the Pope to Cuba is not foreseeable in the
near future.
China has received orders from the Ocean Property Company of Cuba for three
10,000-ton, multiple-purpose container ships, construction of which was to begin in
Shanghai today.
Fidel Castro, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and Jorge Risquet, arrive in Moscow to
attend the Soviets' 27th Communist Party Congress. Soviet Minister of Foreign
Affairs Shevardnadze greets them at the airport.
25 February Foreign Minister Malmierca and Rene Rodriguez Cruz attend a ceremony in
Havana commemorating the 10th anniversary of the Saharan Democratic Arab
Republic.
Cuban Ambassador to Mexico Jose Fernandez de Cossio asserts that the Cuban
Government supports the measures Mexico has taken to confront the economic
crisis.
Vice Minister of Foreign Relations Ricardo Alarcon and his Nicaraguan
counterpart, Jose Leon Talavera, sign a cultural protocol for 1986.
26 February The Foreign Ministery issues a communique asking for an urgent mobilization
against the Reagan administration's granting more aid to the Contras.
Construction Minister Balmaseda visits Budapest to discuss cooperation in the
construction industry and the employment of Cuban workers in Hungary.
At the Soviet Congress, Fidel Castro condemns the irresponsible course of
imperialist states for ignoring the realities of the nuclear age and praises the
peaceloving policy of the USSR.
During the closing session of the Congress, Fidel Castro warns that, if the United
States increases its aid to the Contras, Cuba will do everything possible to increase
its aid to Nicaragua.
In Moscow, Fidel Castro receives Libyan Staff Major Abd Al-Salam Ahmad
Jallud to discuss cooperation between their countries and US-Zionist threats and
provocations.
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27 February Guillermo Garcia receives the credentials of the new Jordanian Ambassador to
Cuba, Abdallah Salah.
Fidel Castro and Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos meet in Moscow to
discuss matters of interest for their nations.
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