LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 28, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
/
01.?????????????????????.??????????????????????.M.m..........., MASTER FILECRY
DO NUT GIVE OUT
OR MAI1K ON
Directorate of
Intelligence
2?
25X1
Latin America
Review
28 February 1986
ALA LAR 86-006
28 February 1986
Col" 429
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
Latin America
Review
28 February 1986
Page
Articles
South America: Views on Nicaragua and the 1
Contadora Process
Most of the South American countries that are involved in the
Contadora talks blame Nicaragua for the deadlock in the talks, but
they continue to support the negotiations as the best hope for a
solution to the Central American conflict.
Venezuela: Changing Relations With Central America
President Lusinchi is forging closer ties to several Central American
countries in an effort to constrain and isolate Nicaragua.
5
Cuba: Personnel Changes at Third Party Congress
Shifts in the Politburo and the Central Committee at the party
congress in February reflect the regime's concern about its economic
difficulties and public image. Members with tarnished reputations
were replaced by technocrats more capable of dealing with economic
problems.
7
Cuba: Characteristics of Central Committee Members
The makeup of the new Central Committee indicates that President
Castro has partially succeeded in reversing the trend of dominance
by aging white males who participated in the guerrilla struggle in
the 1950s.
Cuba: Foreign Policy Themes at Third Party Congress
15
President Castro did not set any dramatic new directions in foreign
policy at the congress. He emphasized his "moderation" and
solidarity with new civilian governments in Latin America, while
reiterating support for Cuba's key Nicaraguan and Angolan clients.
19
Secret
ALA LAR 86-006
28 February 1986
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02: CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
25X1
Cuba: Economic Performance and Prospects 25
25)(1
25X1
at best in
-of-payments
The country's economic performance has been mediocre
recent years, and low growth, austerity, and balance
difficulties are likely to continue for the rest of the
decade.
25X1
25X1,
2bAl
Argentina: Peronism at the Crossroads 27
Leaders of various Peronist factions are vying for
control of the
party in a struggle that could affect the structure
of the country's
party system and prospects for long-term political
stability.
25X1
25X1
Brazil: New Military Equipment
33
25X1
The Sarney government plans to double the defense
budget this
year, a move that will bolster the government's support in the
military but will impede efforts to reduce inflation
and could cause
25X1
new regional tension.
Briefs
Cuba-Argentina: Planned Talks on
35
Bilateral Nuclear Agreement
25X1
Cuba: Ecclesiastical Meeting
35
25X1
36
25X1
Brazil: Communist Party Activities
Mexico-Israel: New Trade Initiative
37
25X1
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Production Staff Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
Secret ii
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
Articles
South America: Views on Nicara
and the Contadora Process
ua
The South American members of the Contadora
Group?Colombia and Venezuela?and the
Contadora Support Group?Argentina, Brazil, Peru,
and Uruguay?have dwindling hopes for the success
of the Central American peace process, but will
continue to support it as the best chance for securing a
"Latin American" solution to the conflict and
avoiding a US-Nicaragua confrontation. South
American disillusionment with Nicaragua is growing
but has yet to be translated into a harder stance
toward the Sandinistas, either on a bilateral basis or
in the multilateral Contadora talks. Although most
regional powers believe Nicaragua is largely
responsible for the deadlock in the talks?and in some
cases regard the Sandinistas as a strategic threat in
the region?the South Americans continue to believe
that the United States should make concessions to
keep the Contadora process going.
Disillusionment With Nicaragua
The South American participants in the Contadora
talks have hardened their private attitudes toward
Nicaragua over the past six months, even though their
public positions have not, in most cases, changed.
Reports from US
Embassies in the region indicate that the prime causes
of this growing disillusionment are the Sandinistas'
failure to open a political dialogue with their domestic
political opposition, Nicaraguan aid to South
American guerrilla movements, and negative regional
reactions to incessant Sandinista requests for political
and economic support. Area governments are also
anxious not to have their Central American policies
affect generally satisfactory relations with the United
States articularly concerning debt negotiations.
We believe that for Colombia, which because of its
proximity to Central America has always been
concerned about conflict there, recent developments
at home have had a particularly dramatic impact. An
M-19 terrorist assault in November on the Palace of
Justice in Bogota killed 12 members of the Supreme
Court and many other civilians and destroyed
extensive case records. Arms left at the site have been
traced to Nicaragua
The US Embassy in Bogota has learned
that Foreign Minister Ramirez told another foreign
representative that the Colombian Government
believed the Sandinistas would promote more M-19
terrorism if the incident became a stumblingblock in
bilateral relations. Nevertheless, press accounts of the
Sandinista role and the participation of a key
Nicaraguan leader in a memorial service for the
guerrillas who were killed have aroused public opinion
in Colombia?and to a lesser extent in neighboring
countries?against the Sandinistas.
Managua's
increasingly obvious Marxist-Leninist orientation is
intensifying Caracas's suspicions of the Sandinistas
and fueling Venezuelan President Lusinchi's distrust
and dislike of the Ortega regime.
Venezuela signaled
support for Quito's decision to break relations with
Managua by giving a particularly warm welcome in
November to visiting Ecuadorean President Febres-
Corder?, in contrast to the cool receptions being given
to Nicaraguan officials. Venezuela is also continuing
25X1
25X1
LX1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
1
Secret
ALA LAR 86-006
28 February 1986
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
to withhold petroleum shipments, cut off since 1982,
until Nicaragua pays for past deliveries
Argentina has become increasingly critical since mid-
1985 of the Sandinistas' failure to adopt any of the
democratic reforms suggested by the Support Group
and has become more alarmed over the extension of
Soviet-Cuban influence in Nicaragua. Last March
Foreign Minister Caputo told US representatives that
Buenos Aires wanted a peaceful political settlement in
Central America that was acceptable to Washington,
respected the principle of nonintervention, and
favored diminished Soviet and Cuban presence in the
area.
We believe that Brazil and Uruguay also find the
Sandinistas politically distasteful, but, being farther
from the area of conflict than Colombia and
Venezuela, do not regard Managua as a direct
strategic threat. Former Brazilian Foreign Minister
Setubal told Senator Kennedy in January that
Nicaragua was a Marxist regime moving increasingly
into the Soviet orbit. The US Embassy says that
neither the Brazilian Government nor the local
business community is anxious to strengthen relations
with Managua. Uruguay, according to Embassy
reporting from Montevideo, is primarily interested in
resuming its traditional role as a mediator in Latin
America and sees no gain in closer bilateral ties to
Managua.
Peruvian President Garcia's attitudes toward
Nicaragua are more ambiguous. We believe that
Garcia is strongly committed to the nonaligned and
anti-imperialist ideology of his American Popular
Revolutionary Alliance party and that he feels an
instinctive sympathy for governments that claim to
embody these principles. Nevertheless, he is
attempting to balance rhetorical support for the
Secret
Sandinistas and pursuit of any available trade
opportunities with Managua against his strong desire
to avoid complicating relations with the United States
over the debt and narcotics issues. Garcia has begun
negotiations for trade among Peru, Nicaragua, and
the USSR to offset some of Lima's debts to Moscow
for military equipment, but
J remains reluctant to cultivate closer
ties because of Managua's growing Marxism and pro-
Soviet orientation.
One More Try
We believe that the South American governments'
private disillusionment with Nicaragua is largely
responsible for their determination to revive the
failing Contadora peace process. They are skeptical
that Managua will introduce voluntarily democratic
political reforms, cease aid to Central American
guerrillas, or reduce the local Soviet and Cuban
presence. The South Americans believe such policies
are necessary to reduce the threat of US intervention,
which has been one of their greatest concerns, but
they rule out unilateral US pressure to achieve these
goals as a violation of Latin American self-
determination and nonalignment. Most South
American leaders believe multilateral diplomacy is
their only option, even though persistent reports
indicate that they judge the chances for a peaceful
settlement are remote. The six governments attribute
much of the deadlock to Nicaraguan intransigence,
Area political leaders are also pushing hard for a
negotiated solution because, in our view, they fear the
domestic political repercussions of a US-Nicaraguan
confrontation or greater US involvement in Central
America. The Sandinistas enjoy relatively good press
treatment in most of South America, and area
governments want to avoid being forced to choose
between Washington and the popular cause of Latin
American "solidarity" with Managua. Argentine
Foreign Minister Caputo's public statement in
January, for example, that Nicaragua was a
2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1,
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
"beachhead of the East" produced such a strong
reaction from the Argentine media and the left that
he quickly softened his remarks. The US Embassy in
Brasilia reported last May that Brazilian officials,
who wanted to avoid any political problems with the
pro-Nicaraguan deputies who control the
Congressional Foreign Affairs Committee, have taken
a low profile on Central American issues.
This renewed commitment to the peace process was
underscored by the Caraballeda Declaration, issued in
January by all eight countries involved in the
Contadora process in response to Nicaragua's call for
a six-month suspension of the talks. The Declaration
advocated nine simultaneous actions by the United
States, Nicaragua, and the other Central American
nations including a freeze in arms acquisitions,
national reconciliation, a freeze on all international
military maneuvers, an end to aid to insurgents, and
continued negotiations among the Central American
states. the Contadora
foreign ministers supplemented the Declaration
accepting the basic ideas of an Argentine plan for
reviving the talks, in which all the Contadora
countries would assume equal roles in promoting new
talks, pressuring Managua to liberalize its rule and
open a dialogue with the Contras, and urging the
United States to refrain from new unilateral
measures.
Outlook
Over the next few months, we expect the Contadora
participants to do all they can to preserve the peace
process without simultaneously improving their
bilateral relations with Nicaragua. Colombia and
Venezuela, in our view, will continue to regard
Managua as a security threat, while Argentina and
Brazil will still find the regime ideologically
distasteful. Aside from Peru, no area government is
likely to seek signficant new trade or aid
arrangements, and even Lima will probably find its
economic opportunities limited.
3
The talks will continue to serve South American goals
even if they do not contribute to resolving the Central
American crisis. As long as the Contadora process
remains alive, South American leaders can partially
disarm their domestic leftist opposition by claiming
that they are doing all they can to promote peace and
avert stronger unilateral US action. Participation in
the talks also enables these leaders to demonstrate
some independence of Washington even while they
cultivate good relations with the United States to
facilitate debt negotiations and solutions for various
bilateral problems. Furthermore, a multilateral forum
provides a good substitute for closer bilateral relations
with Nicaragua and gives area governments a
convenient way to rebuff the Sandinistas' calls for
stronger diplomatic support.
We believe that Contadora members will continue to
press the United States to take unilaterally many of
the steps proposed in the Caraballeda Declaration,
such as suspending military aid to the Contras and
resuming talks with Managua without preconditions.
If the Contadora process were to break down or the
United States were to take strong, unilateral action,
we believe that the South Americans would criticize
Washington, but do little more, thereby seeking to
avoid any lasting impact on their bilateral relations
with the United States.
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
Venezuela: Changing Relations
With Central America
President Lusinchi is shifting his diplomatic stance
toward Nicaragua from one of public neutrality to a
policy that is increasingly willing to confront and
oppose Managua's revolutionary activities in Central
America. During his first 18 months in office,
Lusinchi focused on economic matters and, until
recently, seemed content to maintain a low profile in
regional affairs, working through the multilateral
Contadora framework. Impatience with the so-called
peace process, however, and the perception that
Managua is a threat to the region's democracies?
including Venezuela?have impelled him to forge
closer ties to several Central American governments
aimed at constraining and isolating Nicaragua.
Long-Term Strategy
Traditionally, Caracas has pursued a foreign policy in
Central America designed to strengthen its own
leadership and to promote democratization. These
goals have been interrelated, as Caracas expects new
Central American democracies to seek guidance from
Venezuela, which has enjoyed stable democratic
government since 1958. Conversely, Caracas has been
concerned by?and sought to limit the influence of?
both leftwing and rightwing authoritarianism within
the region.
The overthrow of President Somoza and the
proclamation of the Nicaraguan revolution in 1979
were at first enthusiastically endorsed by Venezuela,
but the repressive tactics and Marxist orientation of
the Sandinistas soon caused strains in relations
between the two countries. Caracas began to walk a
diplomatic tightrope. Initially, it tried to persuade
Managua to abandon Marxism by offering support on
certain issues?for example, opposing the US
embargo?in exchange for democratic reforms, but in
recent years Caracas has taken some diplomatic and
economic moves aimed at signaling its disapproval of
the Sandinistas' repressive policies. In 1982 Caracas
cut off oil shipments to Managua, which it has not
resumed, and during 1982-83 it began to channel
funds to various democratic opposition groups in
5
Nicaragua, including private-sector and church
organizations. Even then, Venezuela kept its distance
from US policy initiatives by defending Nicaragua's
close relations with Cuba and the USSR as
understandable overreactions to US pressures. For the
most part, Caracas has tried to address the
Nicaraguan situation through the regional
multilateral framework of the Contadora talks.
25X1
25X1
Shifting in Approach
Lusinchi, who took office in 1984, until recently was
unwilling to adopt openly hostile policies toward the
Sandinistas, but the growth of Managua's military
might and its border incursions against Costa Rica, in
particular, apparently convinced him that more
bilateral initiatives would be necessary to protect
Venezuela's regional interests. As a result, he has
forged closer ties to the leaders of several Central
American countries.
Increasingly, Lusinchi has become an open supporter
of El Salvador's President Duarte. Last September, he
openly condemned the terrorist kidnaping of Duarte's
daughter and voiced his solidarity with the
Salvadoran leader. In the United Nations, during the
past year Venezuelan representatives worked hard to
obtain a favorable resolution on El Salvador's human
rights?one that supported the government and
criticized the insurgency. According to US military
sources, El Salvador has received unspecified military
assistance from Venezuela, although Caracas publicly
denied a claim last July that it was providing
counterinsurgency training to Salvadoran troops.
Current democratization efforts in Guatemala have
fostered a new cordiality in bilateral relations. Last
October, the Guatemalan Foreign Minister told US
Embassy officials that Venezuela had granted
Guatemala favorable credit terms for oil purchases,
Secret
ALA LAR 86-006
28 February 1986
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
allowing it to postpone payment or to obtain a
development loan outside existing obligations. At the
same time, a senior Venezuelan official informed US
diplomats that Lusinchi was considering additional
economic assistance, such as commercial credits and
investments. Caracas also has repeatedly offered
security assistance since the election in Guatemala.
Venezuela's strongest ties in Central America are to
Costa Rica, with whom it shares a common bond as a
comparatively stable democracy. Persistent reports of
Nicaraguan aggression along Costa Rica's border
apparently have reinforced Venezuela's determination
to help defend its Central American ally should this
become necessary. Last August?following an
incident in which Costa Rican civil guards were killed
by Sandinista mortar fire?Caracas promised a high-
level Costa Rican delegation military aid in the event
of a major Nicaraguan attack acc rdin
Embassy.
Caracas has not significantly upgraded its diplomatic
relations with Honduras probably because it sees
Tegucigalpa as too closely identified with US interests
in Central America. Venezuela, however, indirectly
assists Honduras by promoting Core Four positions in
the Contadora talks. It also provided low-key
encouragement to democratization efforts by sending
observers to the Honduran national elections last
November.
Recent Diplomatic Maneuvers
Caracas has recently stepped up efforts to
demonstrate its displeasure with the Sandinistas.
Lusinchi warmly received Ecuadorean President
Febres-Cordero last November after Quito severed
diplomatic relations with Managua.
Outlook
The shift in Venezuela's regional policies results from
a growing frustration with the paralysis of the
Contadora peace process and a belief that Nicaragua
is primarily to blame. Lusinchi may also believe that
Managua poses a threat to the region through its
suppression of internal dissent and its military
adventurism. Caracas is likely, therefore, to increase
its bilateral contacts with Central America's
democracies and to be more receptive to international
efforts aimed at isolating Managua.
Recent reports of Nicaraguan support for Andean
terrorists?particularly in Colombia, where
subversive activities can easily spill over into
Venezuela?are likely to strengthen Caracas's resolve
to counter the Ortega regime. Lusinchi is unlikely to
take dramatic steps, but he can be expected to pursue
increasingly active policies of diplomatic support and,
in some cases, to provide security assistance to
Central America's democracies.
Nonetheless, Lusinchi is unlikely to identify himself
too closely with US policies toward Nicaragua, as he
does not want to be viewed as an instrument of
Washington. Caracas will probably remain in the
Contadora talks, despite its disillusionment with the
peace process, because it sees the talks as a Latin
American bulwark against US military intervention.
Venezuela is also unlikely to support the political or
military activities of Nicaraguan opposition groups
because it does not want to undercut its public stance
as an impartial participant in the peace process.
Moreover, he
reportedly has rebuffed recent Nicaraguan requests
for support in the Contadora talks.
Secret
6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25X1
25X1,
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
LOA I
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Cuba: Personnel Changes
at Third Party Congress
The dramatic changes made in the Cuban Communist
Party leadership at the Third Party Congress in
February underscore the regime's concern about its
economic plight as well as its public image. The
personnel shifts in the Politburo and Central
Committee were aimed at removing those whose
political or administrative credentials had become
tarnished, replacing them with technocrats who can
do a better job of addressing the country's economic
ills, and creating the illusion that the "new" party
leadership is more responsive to Cuban society as a
whole. Despite the influx of new faces?many of them
a generation younger than Fidel Castro and his ex-
guerrilla colleagues who have dominated the
leadership since 1959?into the Central Committee,
we believe that body will continue to function
essentially as a rubberstamp for Castro's policy
decisions. We see no indication that the Central
Committee will serve as a restraining influence on
Castro or cause him to try to reduce tensions with the
United States.
The wholesale reshuffling of personnel carried out at
the Congress is almost certain to be followed in the
coming months by additional changes in the
government and mass organizations. Loss of
membership on the Politburo or Central Committee
carries with it a connotation of failure and disgrace,
official disclaimers notwithstanding, and some of
those who lost their seats may find their government
positions in jeopardy as well. Moreover, the
revamping of the upper ranks of the party appears to
be only the beginning of a complex process of change
designed to convince the population, Cuba's allies,
and the leadership itself that the mistakes of the past
are being righted and that a wiser, more competent
management team is in charge.
Politburo Castoffs
The most surprising shifts occurred in the party's
most important policy deliberation chamber, the
Politburo. Three honored veterans of the Sierra
Maestra guerrilla campaign of the 1950s?Ramiro
7
Secret
Valdes, Sergio del Valle, and Guillermo Garcia?lost
the seats they had held since the Politburo was
founded in 1965. Their formal departures will help to
dampen criticism that guerrilla veterans?many of
them administrative incompetents?hold too many
positions of influence in the party and government.
We believe the three, all of whom retained their seats
on the Central Committee, will continue to play an
important advisory role informally in the ranks of the
elite, however, by virtue of their longstanding ties to
Fidel Castro.
Valdes, who was dismissed as Interior Minister in
December, had been in charge of Cuba's police and
internal security apparatus and had developed a well-
earned reputation for ruthlessness. He was unable,
however, to halt the steady increase in street crime in
recent years, and his own ministry had become
infected by the wave of corruption it was tasked to
eliminate. As the US Interests Section in Havana
noted, his heavyhanded methods of guaranteeing
internal security are no longer appropriate in the era
of "socialist legality" that Castro is promoting and
Valdes failed to change with the times. For example,
he apparently resisted Castro's campaign to improve
relations with the Cuban Catholic Church;
immediately after his removal from the Interior
Ministry, church officials were informed that one of
Havana's historic cathedrals, closed on government
orders since 1966, was being reopened and repaired at
government expense.
Valdes is by no means in disgrace. He has been tasked
with supervising a major new bureaucracy that is
being set up to develop an electronics industry. This is
apparently another of Fidel Castro's grandiose
schemes designed to earn hard currency and make
Cuba a world leader in the field of computers and
other areas of science. The selection of Valdes to
oversee this pet project attests to his continued high
standing with Castro.
Secret
ALA LAR 86-006
28 February 1986
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
The Cuban Communist Party
1980 Political Bureau
Full Members
Fidel Castro?First Secretary
Raul Castro?Second Secretary
The Cuban Communist Party
1986 Political Bureau
Full Members
Fidel Castro?First Secretary
Raul Castro?Second Secretary
Juan Almeida
Arnaldo Milian
Juan Almeida a
Esteban Lazo a b
Julio E. T. Camacho
Pedro Miret
Julio E. T. Camacho
Jose Machado
Osmani Cienfuegos
Jorge Risquet
Osmani Cienfuegos
Ventura
Osvaldo Dorticos
Blas Roca
Abelardo Colome
Pedro Miret
Guillermo Garcia
Carlos Rafael
lbarra b
Jorge Risquet
Armando Hart
Rodriguez
Vilma Espin b c
Carlos Rafael
Jose Machado Ventura
Ramiro Valdes
Armando Hart
Rodriguez
Sergio del Valle
Roberto Veiga b
1980 Alternates
Alternates
Armando Acosta
Jesus Montane
Luis E. Alvarez b
Jose Ramirez
Sixto Batista
Antonio Perez
Senen Casas
Julian Rizo a b
Miguel Cano Blanco
Humberto Perez
Jose R. Fernandez b
Ulises Rosales b
Senen Casas
Jose Ramirez
Yolanda Ferrer b c
Rosa Simeon
Abelardo Colome lbarra
Roberto Veiga
Raul Michel Vargas a b
Negrin b c
Vilma Espin
Lazaro Vazquez b
Like Valdes, Public Health Minister Sergio del Valle
lost his ministerial rank in December. According to an
official announcement, he asked to be replaced in the
position that he had held since 1979 so "another
comrade with more technical knowledge and
organizational experience in the area of public
health" could carry out "the important progress
Castro is encouraging in the field." As with the
electronics industry, Castro wants to develop Cuba
into a "world power" in public health to bolster his
regime's image and to earn hard currency from the
people who theoretically would flock to Cuba for
treatment.
Guillermo Garcia is fondly remembered in Cuba as
the first peasant to join Castro's beleaguered guerrilla
team in the Sierra Maestra shortly after it infiltrated
eastern Cuba from Mexico in 1956. His total loyalty
to Fidel over the years allowed him to be promoted far
beyond his level of competence, and last year he was
finally removed from his post as Minister of
Secret
Black/mulatto.
b New.
c Female.
Transportation after problems in that ministry had
become a national embarrassment. Moreover,
Garcia had used his
position for personal enrichment?importing horses
by air from Mexico at government expense?and had
become a liability for the regime.
The removal of 78-year-old Blas Roca, another
charter member of the Politburo, was expected. Roca,
who had served since 1934 as the Secretary General
of the pre-Castro Communist party, has been in poor
health for years and asked to be released from his
duties. He apparently will now devote all his energies
to overseeing the legal team that is drafting Cuba's
new civil code.
8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
Ramiro Valdes's removal from
the Politburo surprised many
Cubans and probably pleased
them as well.
The ouster of Politburo alternate member Humberto
Perez was also expected. He had lost his job as
Minister-President of the Central Planning Board in
mid-1985 and had exhausted his political credibility.
His habit of dealing with other Cabinet-level officials
in a dictatorial fashion had created enemies, and his
planning mistakes made him vulnerable to their
counterattacks. His abject self-criticism in an
interview in Cuba's national news magazine last
March is probably what saved him from dismissal
from the Central Committee as well.
Division General Sixto Batista lost his alternate seat
apparently as a result of the poor performance of the
few dozen Cuban military officers in Grenada during
the US-led intervention in October 1983. As head of
the Armed Forces Ministry's Central Political
Directorate at the time, he was to have instilled in all
military personnel the determination to fight to the
death against US forces. He was removed from his
position as the chief political officer of the armed
forces in mid-1984 following a formal probe of the
Grenada affair, but his subsequent assignment as
head of the Central Committee's Military
Department suggests that his banishment was largely
symbolic. Although dropped from the Politburo in
February, he was appointed at the same time to the
Party Secretariat with specific duties yet to be
announced.
9
Guillermo Garcia probably
owes his ouster from the
Politburo to his gross incompe-
tence and his predilection
for Mexican cattle.
Armando Acosta, who heads the regime's largest
mass organization?the Committees for the Defense
of the Revolution (CDRs)?also lost his alternate seat
on the Politburo. He apparently fell out of favor in
1980 as a result of the Peruvian Embassy incident
(when many local CDR officials joined the 10,000
Cubans seeking asylum in the Embassy) and the
Mariel boatlift (Acosta reportedly demanded that
Fidel halt the wave of officially organized beatings of
people who registered to emigrate via the boatlift). He
was not sanctioned at that time, however, because the
regime wanted to maintain an aura of unity in the
leadership. In fact, Acosta was promoted, along with
the leaders of the other mass organizations, to the
Politburo as alternates at the Second Party Congress
in December 1980 as part of the regime's effort to
demonstrate that?in contrast with the situation in
Poland?no gaps had developed in Cuba between the
masses and the leadership.
Miguel Cano Blanco, party chief in Holguin Province,
was also brought into the Politburo as an alternate in
1980. Apparently the regime at that time felt
compelled to increase the representation of blacks in
the leadership. His service at the national level in the
intervening five years seems to have been singularly
unexceptional. His removal from the Politburo in
February was unexplained.
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
The removal of Jesus Montane from his alternate seat
also was unexpected. Although he retained his
Central Committee seat, he apparently was removed
as head of the Central Committee's General
Department of Foreign Relations, which handles
relations with foreign political parties in countries
outside the Western Hemisphere. He is now described
in the Cuban media as simply an assistant to Fidel.
There had been no hint that Montane's performance
was in question, nor had he been linked to corruption.
According to the US Interests Section, diplomats in
Havana attributed his removal to health problems.
One diplomat claimed Montane had asked to be given
less demanding responsibilities, and another said he
was accompanied by a physician when traveling in
East Asia late last year. As a participant in both the
historic attack on Moncada Barracks in 1953 and the
Granma landing in 1956, the 63-year-old Montane
has impeccable revolutionary credentials.
Politburo Newcomers
The most significant promotion to full membership in
the Politburo was that of alternate member Division
General Abelardo Colome Ibarra, one of three First
Vice Ministers of the armed forces. He thus bypassed
alternate member Division General Senen Casas,
whose appointment as First Vice Minister predates
Colome Ibarra's. This promotion may presage a
reshuffling in the Armed Forces Ministry in which
Colome Ibarra will become minister when the current
minister, Army General Raul Castro, resigns to
assume a much broader role in government. Colome
Ibarra, one of only three Cubans to be awarded the
nation's highest distinction of Hero of the Republic,
has served in Angola and Ethiopia and is in charge of
all Cuban military forces abroad.
The last of the three First Vice Ministers of the armed
forces, Division General Ulises Rosales del Toro, was
elevated to the Politburo as an alternate member.
This means that the regime's top-ranking military
officers, including Fidel and Raul Castro, presently
hold five of the 24 full or alternate seats on the
Politburo. Like Colome Ibarra, Rosales del Toro saw
duty in Africa and, as chief of the General Staff, he
plays an important role in military operations
overseas. For example, he was the military
Secret
representative on a delegation that went to Moscow
recently to take part in a high-level Soviet-Cuban-
Angolan meeting on southern Africa.
Like Colome Ibarra, Vilma Espin and Roberto Veiga
also were promoted from alternate to full membership
in the Politburo. Espin, a guerrilla veteran of the
Sierra Maestra campaign, is more widely known for
her advocacy of women's rights in Cuba. As president
of the regime's mass organization for women, the
Cuban Women's Federation, she represents a major
segment of the population. She is an outspoken
proponent of women's equality and is certain to add
life to the Politburo's deliberations. Although she
continues to make public appearances with Raul
Castro and to accompany him on trips abroad
ostensibly as his wife, she is widely reported to have
been divorced from him years ago. Espin studied in
the United States prior to the revolution and is known
to be vehemently anti-US.
Veiga also heads a mass organization?the Central
Organization of Cuban Workers?which includes all
of Cuba's legally recognized unions. His promotion, in
our opinion, was meant to give the impression to
Cubans and foreign observers alike that organized
labor in Cuba has a representative at the highest level
of the regime. He played little or no role in the
revolution and apparently has not served overseas in
either a military or civilian capacity, which is likely to
put him at a serious disadvantage in Politburo debate.
Jose Ramon Fernandez Alvarez, who is Minister of
Education, was also elevated to the Politburo as an
alternate, as were Secretariat official Julian Rizo
Alvarez. Rosa Elena Simeon Negrin, head of the
Academy of Sciences; Yolanda Ferrer, a women's
organization official; and three provincial first
secretaries of the party, Luis Alvarez de la Nuez
(Havana Province), Raul Michel Vargas
(Guantanamo Province), and Lazaro Vazquez Garcia
(Camaguey Province). A fourth provincial first
secretary, Esteban Lazo Hernandez of Matanzas
10
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
Province, was given full membership in the Politburo.
Of these eight only Fernandez Alvarez is likely to
carry much weight in Politburo debate, in our
judgment.
Fernandez Alvarez is a professional military officer
who received training in the United States during the
early 1950s. Jailed for over two years for plotting
against the Batista regime, he was released in January
1959 and became one of Raul Castro's top aides.
Fernandez Alvarez played a major role in the defeat
of the exile contingent at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 and
is generally credited with turning Castro's ill-
educated rebel army into a professional military
establishment, rising to the position of armed forces
Vice Minister before being reassigned to the
Education Ministry as a troubleshooter in 1970. His
wife, Asela de los Santos, is also a Central Committee
member and, as First Vice Minister of Education, is
in line to succeed her husband if, as we believe likely,
he is reassigned to broader duties. Asela served in
Raul Castro's guerrilla column in 1958 and was in
charge of the Department of Education in the civil
administration that Raul set up in guerrilla-controlled
territory.
None of the other new Politburo alternates can match
Fernandez Alvarez's executive experience or his
longstanding links to Raul Castro. Alvarez de la
Nuez, for example, has spent his entire career in low
and midlevel party organization and indoctrination
work. The same is true of new full Politburo member
Lazo Hernandez, who is only 42 years old. A black
who was too young to participate in the revolution,
Lazo may owe his lofty appointment primarily to his
race. The retirement of Blas Roca had reduced the
number of blacks with full membership on the
Politburo to one, an embarrassment for a regime that
openly boasts of its African origins and its alleged
lack of racial prejudice.
The Central Committee
The same trends?removing questionable performers,
reducing the profile of the guerrilla elite, promoting
technocrats, and bolstering the representation of the
lower ranks of the party and the mass organizations?
were evident in the remaking of the Central
Committee. Reinaldo Castro, for example, whose only
11
claim to fame was his prowess as a canecutter a
decade ago, was dropped as was Irma Sanchez,
Minister-President of the State Committee for
Material and Technical Supply. Sanchez's career had
been developing well until last December when one of
her deputies defected in Spain with what the Castro
regime alleges to be $500,000 in Cuban funds. A
diplomat in Havana has told the Interests Section that
Sanchez was actually married to the defector; if so,
she may well lose her Cabinet post and disappear
from the hierarchy entirely.
Also dropped were Orlando Fundora and Col. Jose
Luis Padron. Fundora had been head of the Central
Committee's sensitive Department of Revolutionary
Orientation under Politburo and Secretariat member
Antonio Perez Herrero until January 1985, when
Perez Herrero's policy differences, poor performance,
and objectionable personal behavior caused him to be
relieved of all his party functions except his Central
Committee seat. Fundora, who was Herrero's chief
aide, now heads the Cuban affiliate of the World
Peace Council and ironically has as his deputy an
official who was dropped from the Central Committee
in 1975 at the First Party Congress.
Colonel Padron, an Interior Ministry officer who until
recently headed the Cuban front company CIMEX,
almost certainly owes the loss of his alternate seat on
the Central Committee to corruption. During his
official duties, he managed to acquire several
automobiles and even a recreational vehicle,
maintaining a standard of living that contrasted
sharply with the austerity that most Cubans face. At
times, he had served as a conduit between the US
Interests Section and Castro, but those days
presumably are over.
More than 10 guerrilla veterans, including seven
generals and an admiral who had been full Central
Committee members for two decades, lost their seats.
Although one of them apparently has had health
problems and another took the blame for the Cuban
"intelligence failure" after the Grenada intervention
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
in 1983, most appear to have been dropped simply to
lower the profile in the leadership of the group of
veterans of the revolution who have played such a
dominant role in Cuba since 1959.
Despite these removals, the military establishment as
a whole is still well represented on the Central
Committee with 13 division generals and 14 brigadier
generals in addition to seven other officers of lesser
rank as full or alternate members. The Navy,
however, appears to have been badly embarrassed. Its
chief, Rear Adm. Jose Cuza Tellez-Giron, who is a
Vice Minister of the armed forces, lost his seat, and
the only Navy officer now on the Central Committee
is newly appointed alternate member Rear Adm.
Pedro Perez Betancourt, chief of the Western Naval
District. Two other naval officers, both ship captains,
lost the alternate seats they had gained in the previous
party congress in 1980.
Conclusions
The Third Party Congress seems to have given
Cubans the relief from the old guerrilla elite they
were avidly seeking. In discussing the removal of so
many heroes of that era,
a public opinion poll had indicated
the changes had been viewed as very positive,
I The ouster of such hallowed figures as
Valdes, Garcia, and del Valle from the Politburo
appears to have convinced many Cubans that Havana
is making a clean break with the past, and this has
bought the leadership some time to regroup and try to
come to grips with the country's economic problems.
We believe the process of change is gathering
momentum. Prior to the Congress, reports from
numerous sources indicated that Raul Castro would
be assuming a much broader role in government;
perhaps moving into Fidel's job as chairman of the
Council of Ministers and becoming, in effect, a prime
minister. His frequent public appearances throughout
the country over the past year had all the earmarks of
a public relations campaign to bolster his popular
appeal preparatory to expanding his governmental
responsibilities. The increased status granted to
Secret
Raul Castro's public appearances increased
dramatically last year, suggesting that the Cuban
people are being prepared for his assumption of a
broader role in government.
Colome Ibarra at the Congress suggests he is being
positioned to succeed Raul, and this, too, lends
credence to reports of an impending change in Raul's
duties. Such a development could result from the next
scheduled meeting of the Central Committee or
National Assembly in late June, or could come at any
time in the form of an edict from the Politburo or the
Council of State.
Many other governmental changes are also likely in
the coming months as the impact of the changes made
at the Congress begin to take effect. Those dropped
from the Central Committee?and their subordinates
as well?will be trying to cope with their reduced
status while newly appointed members will be testing
the limits of their enhanced influence. Moreover,
officials of mass organizations and government
bureaucrats at all levels will probably see in the
Congress a mandate to carry out their own
reshuffling, with an eye to improving the position of
blacks and women, possibly at the expense of
holdovers from the revolutionary generation.
12
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25X1
25X1
?,?..
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
Notwithstanding the unusual personnel shifts made at
the Congress, we believe Castro will continue to lean
heavily on his colleagues of the guerrilla struggle
when faced with critical decisions. He almost
certainly is wary of placing his faith in the younger
element of the new Central Committee and probably
believes they have not yet paid their dues in the
revolutionary society that he and his generation of
rebels have sacrificed so much to create. Many of the
new faces clearly were picked as window dressing?
for example, the black, female hydraulics engineer
from Jaguey Grande, the director of the Biological
Research Center, or the female professor of medical
sciences from Pinar del Rio?and these people have
no incentive to challenge Castro or the ranking
members of the leadership on any vital policy issues.
Given the nature of the Cuban political system, we
believe these new members of the party elite know
what their role is and will respond by giving Castro
their full support. They are unlikely, therefore, to
press for innovations in Cuban policy and cannot be
expected to militate for any diminution in Cuban
hostility toward the United States.
13 Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
Cuba: Characteristics of
Central Committee Members
President Fidel Castro claimed to have increased
black, female, and youth representation on the
Central Committee that was named at the Third
Party Congress in February, according to a variety of
press reporting. Although all the data are not yet
available, the preliminary statistical analysis that
follows indicates that the basic demographic
composition of Cuba's party elite?as reflected by the
Central Committee?may be changing. Early Central
Committees were clearly dominated by white males
from Oriente Province who had participated in the
guerrilla struggle against Batista.' Our analysis of the
changes in Central Committees formed between 1965
and 1986 reveals that with regard to race and age
Castro has been at least partially successful in
reversing this trend, but that little progress apparently
has been made in the proportional representation of
females as full members.
Background
The Cuban Communist Party, in its present form, was
established in 1965 after a merger of Fidel Castro's
26 July Movement, the 18 March Student
Revolutionary Directorate, and the pre-Castro
Communist Party (then called the Popular Socialist
Party). The Central Committee named in 1965
consisted of 100 members, two-thirds of whom had
military rank in either the armed forces or the
security services. The First Party Congress?at which
a new Central Committee was named?was not held
until 1975. The party statutes adopted at that time
called for party congresses to be held every five years,
with a new Central Committee being "elected" at
each as a means of renewal of the leadership.
The Second Party Congress was held in December
1980, but the Third Party Congress, originally
scheduled for last December, was postponed until
'Oriente Province was broken up into five new provinces during the
political-administrative reorganization of the country in December
1976. For purposes of comparison in this article, however, the
original geographical boundaries of Oriente Province have been
retained.
15
February?apparently because the government had
insufficient time to prepare for the historic event.
Thus, there have been three Central Committees prior
to the one named in February, all of which have been
headed by Fidel Castro as First Secretary and Raul
Castro as Second Secretary.
The Central Committee theoretically is the highest
decisionmaking body of the party, but in reality it has
functioned only as a rubberstamp for policy decisions
made by Fidel Castro, usually after discussion in the
Politburo. The Central Committee convenes regularly
only twice a year. Unscheduled meetings are held
infrequently, primarily to provide the appearance of
unified leadership in support of major policy decisions
made by the Politburo.
While it lacks power, the Central Committee does
possess significant political symbolism. Virtually
every individual holding a key post in the government,
party, armed forces, or mass organizations is a
member of the Central Committee. Membership is
rarely a source of an individual's elite status; instead,
it almost always is evidence of that status. More than
any other body in Cuba, its members form the "power
elite" of the Cuban political systemJ
Trends in Leadership Composition
In 1965, when the Castro regime established the party
and appointed its first Central Committee, the
importance of ideological correctness and
participation in the guerrilla struggle was reflected in
the membership of the committee. The leadership of
the Castro regime represented an extremely narrow
band of the political spectrum. Many elements of the
loose coalition that had participated in the anti-
Batista struggle gained only token representation. The
committee as a whole confirmed the political
dominance of those who had participated most closely
with Castro in the guerrilla struggle.
Secret
ALA LAR 86-006
28 February 1986
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
When the party held its First Party Congress in
December 1975 and appointed its second Central
Committee, the revolution had long since been
consolidated. The Castro regime had a clear
opportunity to broaden the base of its leadership and
incorporate the representatives of new sectors or
groupings that had been excluded in 1965 or had
appeared during the ensuing decade. This
opportunity, however, was ignored. Even though the
turnover in personnel was large, the composition of
the new committee virtually duplicated that of its
predecessor and reconfirmed the dominance of the
guerrilla elite.
By the 1980 party congress, the trends in leadership
composition that we see today had begun. At that
time, Cuba had experienced the massive emigration
pressure of the Mariel refugee boatlift, and, fearful of
internal problems similar to those in Poland, Cuba's
leaders acted to close the gap that had developed
between the party and the masses. The number of
members on the Central Committee increased
dramatically, and the position of alternate Politburo
member was created. In a bid to increase the popular
base of the party, many of those added were leaders of
the mass organizations. The chiefs of the mass
organizations were all added as Politburo alternates.
Age. The individuals who joined the guerrilla struggle
were, for the most part, relatively young when Castro
achieved power in 1959. Castro himself was 32, and
many of his guerrilla comrades were even younger.
More than half of the 1965 Central Committee
members belonged to the "guerrilla generation" born
between 1926 and 1937. A comparison of age profiles
of the 1965 and 1975 Central Committees shows that
little effort was made to incorporate younger age
groups into the leadership. The proportion of younger
individuals increased only slightly, the number of
older politicians was reduced even further, and the
already heavy dominance of Castro's generation was
strengthened.
Comparing the 1975 and 1980 Central Committees,
however, we see the beginnings of a greater
representation of the postrevolutionary generation,
Secret
with the percentage of members born after 1938
growing by 8.4 percentage points. In the 1986 Central
Committee, the guerrilla veteran age group had fallen
by 11.3 percentage points, and the membership born
after 1938 had grown only slightly. This last figure
may be deceiving, however, since it is possible that a
large proportion of members in the unknown age
category belong to post-1938 generations. Despite the
probable growth in younger generation membership,
40 percent of the Central Committee still belongs to
the guerrilla veteran age group.
Comparing average age of the party leadership over
time gives us another indication of Castro's
willingness to hand over the reins of power to the
postrevolutionary generation. In December 1965, the
average age of members was 37.6. Ten years later, the
average had increased to 46.4. In 1980, the average
age of the members had risen to 49.9. By 1985, the
average age of those full members whose age is known
was 53.5. Between 1965 and 1975, the Central
Committee membership seemed to age by almost 10
years, but age analyses of later committees show the
membership aging by less than five years, indicating
an infusion of younger members.
Race. A large proportion of the Cuban population can
be classified as black or mulatto. Nevertheless,
Central Committees have done a poor job of
mirroring the racial composition of Cuban society.
The membership of the 1965 Central Committee was
predominantly white, with only 11 percent black or
mulatto. There was no effort made in 1975 or 1980 to
alter this situation; the percentage of blacks and
mulattoes showed virtually no change. Perhaps the
most dramatic change in leadership composition was ,
evident in the 1986 Central Committee, in which 21.2
percent of full members could be described as black or
mulatto?an increase of more than 8 percentage
points from 1980. However, this figure still falls far
short of representing the true racial makeup of the
Cuban people, and maintains the predominately white
character of Cuban leadership.
16
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
2qW
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
25X1
25X1
Table 1
Generation Groups of
Central Committee Full Members
Percent
Table 4
Provincial Origins of
Central Committee Full Members
Percent
1965
(100)
1975
(112)"
1980
(147)
1986
(146)
1965
(100)
1975
(112)
1980
(147)
1985
(146)
Born in 1913 or earlier
12
10.7
6.8
3.4
Oriente
45
45.5
36.0
22.6
1914-25
24
18.8
11.6
6.1
Other
45
43.7
45.5
40.4
1926-37
53
51.8
51.7
40.4
Unknown
10
10.7
18.4
37.0
1938+
11
14.7
23.1
24.6
"Number of members.
Unknown
0
4.5
6.8
25.3
" Number of members.
Table 2
Average Age of
Central Committee Full Members
Table 5
Composition by Sex of
Central Committee Full Members
Percent
1965
1975
1980
1986
(100).
(112).
(147).
(146).
1965
1975
1980
1986
Male
95
94.6
87.7
86.9
(99)"
(101).
(137).
(107).
Female
5
5.4
12.2
13.0
37.6
46.4
49.9
53.5
"Number of members.
"Number of members for whom data are available.
Table 3
Racial Composition of
Central Committee Full Members
Provincial Origins. Most of the guerrilla struggle
Percent that brought Castro to power was waged in Oriente
Province, thus the heavy dominance of members from
eastern Cuba in the early Central Committees is not
surprising. Of the members of the 1965 Central
Committee whose birth place was known, half were
"Orientales." There was virtually no change in this
pattern when the 1975 committee was selected;
1965
(100).
1975
(112).
1980
(147)"
1986
(146)"
White
89
87.5
86.4
78.8
Black/mulatto
11
11.6
12.9
21.2
Other
0
0.9
0
0
Unknown
0
0
0.7
0
"Number of members.
however, the 1980 membership reflects about a 10-
percentage-point decline in members born in Oriente
Province. In 1986, the percentage of members born in
Oriente declined again, this time by 13.4 percentage
17 Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
9Y1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
points. If this trend holds for the large unknown
category, a dramatic shift may have occurred with
non-Oriente representation exceeding Oriente
representation by almost 2 to 1.
Composition by Sex. The original 1965 Central
Committee of 100 members had only five female
members. By 1975, only one woman full member had
been added, and analysis of the 1980 and 1986
Central Committees shows only slight improvements
in the female-to-male ratio. Moreover, several of the
women "elected" to the various Central Committees
have been related to male members. For example,
Vilma Espin, the only female on the powerful
Politburo, ostensibly is still married to Raul Castro.
The small number of women in the Cuban party elite
apparently is a reflection of the guerrilla origins of the
party leadership as well as a traditional Cuban bias
against women.
Outlook
As additional information on the new 1986 Central
Committee becomes available, we believe that the
pattern of a younger, more racially balanced
membership will be borne out. It is possible that
future Central Committees will show greater female
representation; approximately one-third of the new
committee alternate members are women. Although
alternates clearly have a secondary status, they have
sometimes been promoted to full membership at
subsequent party congresses. As Cuba prepares for
the post-Castro era, we are likely to see this trend
toward a leadership with a broader popular base
continue.
Secret 18
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
Cuba: Foreign Policy Themes
at Third Party Congress
President Castro used Cuba's Third Communist Party
Congress to emphasize several foreign policy themes:
? He contrasted Cuba's "solidarity" with the Third
World with the alleged heightening of tensions by
the United States and, although he left the door
slightly ajar for an eventual improvement in US-
Cuban relations, gave no indication that he will
make any effort toward a rapprochement.
? Although he emphasized his "moderation" and
Havana's solidarity with new civilian governments
in Latin America, Castro strongly reiterated Cuba's
support of key clients Nicaragua and Angola, and
threatened to increase aid to them if the United
States increased assistance to rebels.
? Lastly, although Castro praised the fraternal
Soviet-Cuban relationship, he may have irked
Moscow by concentrating far more on Latin
America and regional issues than on East-West
strategic concerns.
Although Castro did not set any dramatic new
directions, he tried to demonstrate that, despite
increased US pressure on Cuban foreign policy,
Havana will strengthen, rather than back off, its
commitment to Third World socialist governments
and revolutionary movements. His hard line on
Nicaragua and Angola, however, as well as his
warning that even Soviet-US "detente," would not
affect Washington's policy in regional trouble spots or
betray Castro's grave concern about continuing US
foreign policy resolve in the Third World.
Relations With Moscow
During his reading of the Main Report, Castro
thanked Moscow for its longstanding and continuing
military and economic assistance, and called the
Soviet Union "our closest friend and our best political
ally." Castro noted, as he has in the past, that Soviet-
Cuban economic relations should serve as a model for
relations between underdeveloped and developed
19
President Castro presenting his six-hour Main
Report to the Third Party Congress.
countries. He clearly placed the Soviets first among
socialist brethren, but in doing so, as the US Interests
Section points out, he seemed to emphasize that
Soviet leadership of the Communist Bloc results more
from its economic and military strength than from
anything else. Moreover, Castro took pains to assert
that all members of the socialist movement, regardless
of their size, deserve "absolute reciprocal respect."
From Moscow's perspective, Castro probably added
insult to injury by glossing over Soviet-US strategic
issues?such as space-based defensive systems?in his
main foreign policy address. The Cuban leader barely
acknowledged recent Soviet initiatives on arms
control?initiatives for which Moscow is actively
seeking international support?before launching into
a much fuller discussion of developments in Latin
America.
Secret
ALA LAR 86-006
28 February 1986
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
The Soviet delegation's annoyance at Castro's light
treatment of strategic issues may have been
responsible for the hasty preparation and approval of
a resolution on foreign policy two days later. The
resolution, read by Cuban Vice President Rodriguez,
contained much more explicit statements of Cuban
support for detente between Moscow and Washington
and emphasized the need for all socialists to struggle
for peace. It called for peaceful coexistence, dialogue
and constructive negotiations, general and complete
disarmament, and a broad and active international
campaign to oppose the US policy of confrontation.
Another significant departure in the resolution from
Castro's Main Report was its clear hierarchical
differentiation among Cuba's allies. He expressed
Cuba's close collaboration with the Soviet Union and
the socialist community, Havana's strong links to
Communist and revolutionary movements, and
solidarity with national liberation movements
(emphasis added). This may have been intended to put
into context Castro's lengthy discussion of Cuba's ties
to and support for non-Communist?including
capitalist and pro-Western?governments and parties,
particularly those in Latin America. Castro, perhaps
displaying his own pique over the apparent Soviet
imposition, did not publicly associate himself with the
resolution. Moreover, in his closing remarks to the
congress, which again heavily dealt with Third World
issues, he scarcely mentioned Soviet-Cuban ties.
Despite this apparent slight by the Cubans, the
Soviets undoubtedly were pleased with the overall
domestic thrust of the congress, with its emphasis on
improving economic efficiency and worker discipline,
and Castro's stress on meeting Cuba's trade
commitments to its Soviet Bloc partners. Over the
past year or more, these issues have been the source of
persistent Soviet-Cuban frictions, and, in the Main
Report, Castro clearly appears to be telling Moscow
that he is addressing their concerns.
Promoting Latin American Unity
Castro devoted the major portion of his foreign policy
comments in the Main Report to developments in
Latin America. Portraying the United States as the
constant aggressor in the hemisphere, Castro stated
Secret
that the Reagan administration?despite "recent
signs of the possibility of a return to detente" with the
Soviet Union?is increasing its role as "imperialist
gendarme" in Central America and other regional
flashpoints. He saluted the Salvadoran guerrillas for
"showing the empire the limits of its might and
power" and hailed the Sandinista revolution, while
claiming that the "war, financed, directed, and
implemented by the Pentagon and the CIA," has
caused over "12,000 deaths and more than $1 billion
in property damage." In a highly charged, emotional
closing speech, Castro asserted that, if more US aid is
extended to the Nicaraguan insurgents, Cuba would
do everything possible to increase its assistance to the
Sandinistas.
Aside from restating Cuba's strong commitment to its
radical allies in Central America, Castro focused on
promoting Latin American unity and portraying
Cuba?unlike the United States?as a natural
member of that community. Consistent with his
public relations campaign of the past year or so, the
Cuban leader tried to project an image of himself as a
moderate and flexible regional partner. Toward that
end, Castro applauded the rise of civilian, democratic
governments in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay and
noted that the election last year of Cuba's National
Assembly into the Latin American Parliament was "a
great expression of solidarity and respect.'
Castro expressed his support for the Contadora
negotiations process, noting that, while it is still weak
because some participants have a tendency to make
concessions to the United States, the framework is an
"expression of Latin America's growing will to resolve
its problems by peaceful means without intervention
or demands from the United States." Castro singled
out Guatemala in several places, noting with
satisfaction the ascension to power of a civilian
government. The Cuban leader's positive words on
developments in Guatemala may be a subtle attempt
to encourage President Cerezo to maintain a neutral,
nonaligned policy in Central America and to distance
Guatemala from Core Three positions in the
Contadora Group.
20
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
Foreign Participation at the Congress
According to press reports, representatives of some
186 national parties, movements, and other
organizations from 110 countries attended the
congress, making foreign participation at this
congress the largest ever. Only two heads of state,
President Ortega of Nicaragua and President Vieira
of Guinea-Bissau, were present, although the Soviet
Union was represented at a high level by Secretary of
the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee,
Yegor Ligachev, who is described by US Embassy
officials in Moscow as Gorbachev's top deputy. Most
of the foreign attendees addressed the congress, led
by Ligachev's statements on the second day.
Yegor Ligachev, Soviet Union
Ligachev spoke approvingly of Castro's Main Report,
commenting that it "convincingly shows that you
have a realistic economic strategy." The Soviet
leader also noted "with satisfaction that Cuban
Communists are not resting on their laurels," a
reference to Castro's emphasis on overcoming
economic bottlenecks and inefficiency that have been
heavily criticized by Moscow during the past several
years. Ligachev promised Cuba that it can rely on the
Soviet Union, which has fulfilled and will fulfill
"meticulously and undeviatingly our commitments to
Cuba." Although he did not say it, of course,
Ligachev may have been subtly reminding Havana
that its failure to meet delivery schedules and export
obligations to the Soviet Union is a source of
considerable irritation to Moscow. Ligachev 's words
on Third World problems were perfunctory, although
he signaled Soviet approval of Castro's foreign debt
initative, calling the debt burden a "new channel of
international plunder" and 'financial colonialism."
He focused more heavily, however, on strategic
issues. Contrasting Gorbachev's "plan of peace and
disarmament," with the United States' continuation
of "its efforts to literally cram the sky full of
offensive weapons," he challen ed Washington to
respond to Soviet initiatives.
President Daniel Ortega, Nicaragua
In his brief presentation to the congress, Ortega
stressed that relations between Cuba and Nicaragua
are "unalterable and nonnegotiable" and are "sealed
with the blood of Cuban internationalists who have
fallen on Nicaraguan soil." He castigated the United
States for supporting Nicaraguan insurgents and
asserted that Washington "may approve $130 million
or $1.3 billion for the mercenary forces but they will
be defeated." During a press conference in Havana, he
reiterated his charge that the United States is using
bacteriological weapons along the Nicaraguan-
Honduran border. He endorsed the Contadora
negotiation efforts but reiterated Managua's line that
a peace agreement is not possible until "the United
States' direct, indirect, or covert aggressive policy
ends." Ortega made an indirect appeal to members of
Congress to reject the Reagan administration's
request for renewed funding for Nicaraguan
insurgents. He asserted that the humanitarian aid
approved last year by the Congress "strengthened a
warmongering trend in the US administration."
Asked whether his trip to Havana will affect
Congressional approval of new aid, Ortega replied
that "his trip could be manipulated by the US
Government, but Nicaragua will not sacrifice its
friendly and brotherly relations with Cuba."
Antonio dos Santos Franza, Angola
Dos Santos, a Politburo member and Angola's Chief
of the Armed Forces Staff, spoke longer than either
Ligachev or Ortega and, after statements of solidity
with Cuba, spoke in harsh terms about developments
in southern Africa. Like Ortega, dos Santos talked of
the indestructible brotherhood between Angola and
Cuba that is 'founded in the bloodshed in defense of
socialism and against imperialist aggression." He
paid tribute to the Cubans who "have stood side by
side with the Angolan combatants to defend Angola"
and asserted that 'for the United States (Yankees),
Angola represents an African Bay of Pigs." He
claimed that, because South Africa has the capability
to produce nuclear weapons, even Namibian
independence does not guarantee Angolan security.
He said a total withdrawal of Cuban forces is not
possible because of this threat. Echoing Castro's
words, dos Santos argued abolition of apartheid will
be the only guarantor of peace in the region. He
accused the United States of worsening tensions in
the area and said Washington's reception of Savimbi
represents "an authentic declaration of war" against
Angola.
21
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
Castro also returned to the debt issue to emphasize
Cuba's unity with Latin America and to project the
reasonable?rather than revolutionary?nature of his
ideas. Although he defended his argument that the
Latin American debt is unpayable, he tried to appear
both pragmatic and in step with the large debtor
nations?who have rejected his prescriptions?by
asserting that he was not proposing a breakup of the
international financial system. Rather, he reiterated
his proposal that the developed, creditor nations
assume the Third World debt by saving 12 percent of
their annual defense expenditures to pay off the loans.
In keeping with the moderate image he was trying to
project, Castro restated Cuba's commitment to
"proletarian internationalism" but did not dwell on
Cuba's "principled" right and duty to support armed
revolution. In his closing speech, Castro told the
Chilean leftists attending the congress not to grow
impatient and, comparing their situation now with
that of the Cuban rebels in 1956, assured them that,
while Chilean President Pinochet will fall, it will take
time. Castro said he "trusts the Chilean left will give
Pinochet a hard time this year but, if you cannot
make it in 1986, then it will be in 1987, or 1988."
Painting Washington and Pretoria
With the Same Brush
Castro used the congress forum?which, by Castro's
count, was widely covered by more than 200
journalists?to score the Reagan administration for
its southern Africa policy. He used UNITA leader
Savimbi's recent visit to Washington as his point of
attack. Backing up his charge of alleged US?South
African collaboration, he asserted that any US aid to
Savimbi's insurgents would have to pass through
South Africa. This, he claimed, would provide proof
of the US alliance with the "fascist, racist South
Africans."
Castro's rhetoric also included strong backing for the
Angolan Government. In his emotional closing
speech, he declared that the Reagan administration is
wrong if it believes that providing support to the
Angolan insurgents is a way to achieve a Cuban troop
withdrawal and that Cuba is willing to maintain its
Secret
troops in Angola for 10, 20, or 30 years. In his Main
Report, Castro stated that a negotiated settlement in
southern Africa is possible based on the application of
UN Resolution 435 for the independence of Namibia
and an end to South Africa's aid to Angolan
insurgents. He gave tougher conditions, however, for a
Cuban departure from Angola in his closing speech,
implying that a total withdrawal of Cuban forces
could only occur after apartheid is abolished.
Other Foreign Policy Highlights
One of the most interesting points made by Castro in
his addresses, which represented a departure from
past Cuban policy, was his positive view of
developments in China. Although he noted that
Chinese hostility toward Vietnam still impeded
stronger ties between Beijing and Havana, Castro
hailed the improvement in Soviet-Chinese relations,
Beijing's rejection of "star wars," and China's policy
regarding Central America. He noted with approval
that China supports the idea that the next Olympic
games?scheduled for 1988 in Seoul?should be
shared with North Korea. Castro declared that Cuba
would not send a team to the Olympics unless the
games were divided between the two Koreas.
Castro paid special homage to several of his guests
and to certain world leaders, particularly leading
members of the Nonaligned Movement. He eulogized
Indira Gandhi, saying that her death deprived all
mankind of a great stateswoman, but added that
Rajiv Gandhi already has shown the maturity and
determination to carry on the family tradition. Castro
congratulated Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert
Mugabe on his election as the next chairman of the
Nonaligned Movement, noting that the holding of the
Nonaligned summit next summer in Harare not only,
confirmed Mugabe's prestige but also demonstrated
the importance that Nonaligned countries attach to
the South African situation. Of those present in the
conference hall, Castro perhaps saved his warmest
words for South-West Africa People's Organization
leader Toivo Jo Toivo, who Castro compared with
Jose Marti, and held up as a heroic fighter for
Namibian independence from South Africa
22
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25)6
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Implications for the United States
Although Castro's Main Report was less emotional in
tone than usual?perhaps reflecting his efforts to
project an image of moderation and flexibility?the
Cuban leader denounced the United States at every
turn and portrayed Washington as responsible for the
escalation of international tensions. The Cuban leader
warned that, even if the Reagan administration
reached agreements with the Soviet Union on
strategic weapons, its aggressive attitude will not
necessarily change regarding regional conflicts.
Castro's closing speech to the congress was far more
vitriolic, with Castro indirectly comparing President
Reagan to Hitler and castigating capitalist society for
living off war and the arms race and, like vultures and
vampires, the blood of others.
There was no hint of an olive branch. Indeed, Castro
made the point more than once that Washington's
alleged hostility and aggression had only made Cuba
stronger and that "like it or not, the United States
will have to put up with a revolutionary Cuba." He
reiterated, nonetheless, his familiar line that Cuba is
willing to discuss its problems with the United States
and seek better relations on the condition that the
United States "makes up its mind to negotiate in
earnest and is willing to deal with us in a spirit of
equality, reciprocity, and the fullest mutual respect."
He cited the immigration accord reached in late 1984
as evidence of Cuba's willingness to negotiate, but
intimated that the agreement was breached because
the initiation of Radio Marti broadcasts indicated
that the United States was not yet ready to deal with
Cuba on the basis of "sovereign equality."
Despite the apparent Soviet and Cuban differences
over foreign policy priorities?Moscow's focus on
strategic issues and Havana's concern with regional
conflicts?Castro's addresses reinforced their close
bilateral ties and coherence of foreign policy views in
a number of areas. His positive remarks on China
parallel the warming trend in Sino-Soviet relations
over the past two years. Moreover, the overall
domestic thrust of Castro's Main Report, that of
economic reform and improved efficiency, is sure to
please the Soviet leadership that has been pressing
Cuba to improve its economic performance and stop
wasting Soviet assistance. Castro is out ahead of the
23
Secret
Soviets on his boycott of a Seoul-only Olympic games,
but this probably will not cause Moscow any
consternation
Castro's views on support for revolutionary
movements and on Cuba's involvement in regional
conflicts were, despite his protestations to the
contrary, as uncompromising as ever. He was careful,
however, not to undermine his efforts to woo the new
civilian governments in South America with undue
revolutionary rhetoric. Moreover, he reiterated
Cuba's willingness to find negotiated, political
settlements to regional disputes, although he clearly
made no offers of concessions to enhance the
prospects of such settlements.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Despite Castro's typically uncompromising rhetoric,
he gave several indications that he is concerned that
Washington will increase further its pressure on
Cuban interests in the Third World. His tough
language, threatening to strengthen Cuba's
commitment to Angola and Nicaragua, probably was
adopted, in part, to influence US public and
Congressionial opinion regarding US assistance to
insurgents in those countries. Moreover, in contrast to
his 1980 address to the Second Congress, when he
headlined Angola, Nicaragua, and Grenada as
evidence of the inevitable swing in the balance of
forces toward socialism, this year he cited no similar
"victories" for celebration. Indeed, aside from
congratulating Luanda, Managua, and the
Salvadoran insurgents for holding on against their
opposition, Castro was forced to hold up the return of
several Latin American governments to democratic 25X1
rule as the greatest "victory" over imperialism in the
past several years. Finally, Castro's sparse mention of
the prospect of Soviet-US "detente" and any potential
agreement on strategic weapons may betray a real
concern that Moscow's desire to improve bilateral
relations with Washington could negatively affect its
commitment to Third World allies 25X1
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
Cuba: Economic
Performance and Prospect
Cuba's economic performance in the last five years
has been mediocre at best. In addition to the problems
caused by the inefficiencies inherent to a centrally
planned economy, the hard currency current account
has deteriorated, forcing the country to reschedule
some of its debt principal repayments to the West
since 1982. Moscow has also been pressuring Havana
to get its economic house in order and is unwilling to
increase economic assistance. The economy is unlikely
to improve much over the remainder of this decade,
and we foresee continued low growth, austerity, and
balance-of-payments difficulties. We also doubt that
President Castro will significantly reduce the state's
grip on the economy.
At the Third Party Congress, Castro devoted much of
his lengthy Main Report to economic issues, reflecting
Havana's concern with the country's serious economic
problems. Although Castro pointed to positive
indicators?such as an average annual growth rate for
gross social product of more than 7 percent and a 25-
percent decline in energy consumption over the 1981-
85 period?the growth figure was inflated and, in any
event, overshadowed by broad criticisms. The Cuban
leader castigated inefficiency in agriculture and
industry, inadequate central planning, and failure to
adopt new technologies. Looking ahead to the next
five-year plan, he continued the austerity or
"economic war" theme introduced in late 1984 and
promised the beleaguered Cuban consumer only a
moderate rise in the standard of living.
The draft five-year plan and the party program?also
discussed at the party congress?indicate that
economic policy will be oriented toward greater
reliance on market mechanisms, further austerity,
and increased integration with other CEMA
countries. The new emphasis on market mechanisms
is reflected in the attention given to profitable
enterprises, worker incentives such as bonuses and pay
linked to the quantity and quality of output, and an
enhanced role for wholesale prices. The need for
continued austerity is highlighted by the importance
25
placed on energy conservation, import substitution,
and a reallocation of budget priorities from social
welfare to the productive sector. In addition, the plan
calls for a move away from rationing by reducing
subsidies on a number of basic consumer products.
The documents also stress that Cuba must fulfill its
obligations with CEMA partners, implicitly
recognizing that it has not done so very often in recent
years.
Moscow's refusal to increase economic aid and its
criticism of Cuban waste and mismanagement
undoubtedly underlie the central themes of the new
five-year plan
Moscow informed Havana in late 1984 that it would
not increase its economic aid or petroleum deliveries
during the 1986-90 period. At the same time, the
Soviets were reportedly calling the Cuban rationing
system a political embarrassment and were censuring
Havana for wasting oil and investing in the depressed
sugar industry. Moreover, the two countries failed to
reach agreement on a new aid package as late as last
October following strained talks.
. These developments
probably convinced Havana that it would have to
assume more responsibility for its own economic
welfare, continuing its austerity program and
liberalizing the economy to some degree to improve
efficiency.
Moscow's displeasure with Cuba's inability to meet
export quotas over the past year as well as its threats
to cut certain critical supplies if quotas were not
satisfied. As a result, Havana was forced to make
fulfillment of its CEMA quotas a major goal on its
economic agenda.
The short-term outlook for the economy is poor, and
Cuba probably will fall well short of the 3.5-percent
growth target set by Castro for 1986. The markets for
Cuba's primary hard currency exports?reexport of
Soviet oil, nickel, and sugar?are weak. Last year's
Secret
ALA LAR 86-006
28 February 1986
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
drought and hurricane have devastated the island's
sugar harvest and other agricultural production. In
addition, Havana's commitment to meeting CEMA
quotas will detract from its ability to expand exports
to the West. Cuba has already requested Western
banks to reschedule some of its debt obligations that
are due this year. The leveling off of Soviet oil
deliveries and economic aid will be especially harmful
because of Cuba's dependence on both to maintain
even basic investment and consumption needs. The
lower priority afforded to social welfare and consumer
goods will add to growing labor discontent and is
likely to decrease productivity. The unemployment
rate will probably rise as enterprises reduce their
labor costs to improve profits, and as hard currency
shortages make it increasingly difficult to purchase
Western imports needed for production.
Over the rest of the decade, the economy will most
likely continue on its present course of low growth,
necessitating further austerity. Any beneficial effects
of economic liberalization measures probably will be
slow in coming because of efforts by the more
hardline ideologues in the leadership to block or delay
such reforms. The high profile given to economic
reform most likely represents an attempt to reduce the
concerns of Havana's Soviet and Western creditors
rather than a serious commitment to a fundamental
shift in economic policy. Castro probably will not
permit anything but a limited liberalization because
of his ideological opposition, and because it could
weaken the government's political strength. It is also
unlikely that Havana will be able to diversify its
export base quickly enough to increase its hard
currency earnings significantly. The best that Havana
can probably hope for is to continue struggling to cope
with rising popular discontent and Soviet pressure for
better economic performance. In the meantime,
Havana probably will have to continue rescheduling
its debt repayments, thereby further increasing its
future burdens.
It is possible that the economy could change either for
the better or the worse in the next five years, although
the latter scenario is more likely. If, for example, oil
prices continue their downward trend, Havana may be
forced to limit interest payments on its Western debt
because the reexport of Soviet oil is Cuba's leading
Secret
hard currency export. Moreover, if the Soviets
substantially cut aid or oil shipments, the Cuban
economy could be reduced almost to a subsistence
level. Under certain unlikely circumstances the
economy could noticeably improve. Such a
development could occur, however, if the Soviets
increase aid or petroleum deliveries, if prices for
Cuban exports increase significantly, if Western
investment and lending rises steeply, or if Havana
quickly and seriously implements economic
liberalization measures.
26
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1_
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
Argentina: Peronism
at the Crossroads
The Peronist party, Argentina's driving political force
for over 30 years, is undergoing a serious crisis.
Pervasive factionalism, ideological conflicts, and a
leadership vacuum have virtually paralyzed the party.
Moreover, the erosion of Peronism's popular
support?especially among the middle class?was
reflected by the two resounding defeats the movement
received at the polls in 1983 and 1985. Leaders of
various Peronist factions, ranging from moderate
reformists to leftwing and rightwing extremists, are
now vying for control. The winners of this contest will
help determine the future direction of Peronism and,
more important, the structure of Argentina's party
system and the country's long-term prospects for
political stability.
The Downhill Path
Created by Col. Juan Peron in the late 1940s and
early 1950s, the Peronist party built massive support
by mobilizing the previously passive Argentine
working class. This group, attracted to Peronism's
nationalist, prolabor stance, and other populist
policies, propelled the movement to a position of
virtually unassailable dominance. The party?also
aided by a substantial following among the middle
class and from the country's interior provinces?
triumphed in every election it contested between 1945
and 1973.
This wave of popularity broke with the death of Peron
in 1974. Peronism degenerated into a host of
squabbling factions that could produce no individual
with Peron's ability to rally popular support and unite
the movement's disparate elements. Moreover, the
party made serious mistakes that began to tarnish its
image, even among its most ardent supporters.
According to the US Embassy, the poor performance
of the last Peronist government, from 1973 to 1976?
which presided over economic chaos and rampant
terrorism?and the ties of certain party factions to
subsequent military juntas, seriously discredited the
Peronist movement. The most enduring damage, in
our view, was done by rightwing party boss Herminio
27
la
sza wak
El
Ea
In a
a a
a a
a la
a
Ei El a
a a si
al al a a
Salmitaa
ES a
a a
a
a a a
a
Ell
la Et EN
BE Ell
es
ma En
la 0 EN
a
Por Londru
a sa
a a
a
Ba la a es
Ei IL?
MOVINHENTO
JUST.CIALISTA
la al
a a
Ea
al a
a la
FM la
a a
a
" lel Ell
El 641
a EN 131
a a a
a a
oca
Ei
a a
a a
a a
a a
a
a
a a
a a a
a la
a
a la
Ell a
(I(
?Voy 0eeP000,0e0 Ifaccionee se dIvIc10 noes. rrohniento
a
ll explain how our movement is organized."
(11)
Iglesias and his allies in organized labor, whose
Mafia-style tactics gave Peronism a corrupt,
antidemocratic image.
Peronism's lack of a dynamic leader and its unsavory
image played into the hands of the movement's
traditional rival, President Alfonsin's Radical Party.
In the 1983 election the Radicals successfully
portrayed Peronism as a spent force, hopelessly
divided and temporarily incapable of inaugurating a
new democratic era for Argentina. The government
also used this strategy to a lesser degree in the
congressional election last November. In the 1983
presidential contest, Peronist candidate Italo Luder
Secret
ALA LAR 86-006
28 February 1986
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
Key Leaders of Peronist Factions
Herminio Iglesias . . . about 48. . . National Deputy
and key leader of the Officialist faction in Buenos
Aires Province. . . powerful
politician irnbodies the roughneck
traditions of Peronist street politics . . . ultra-right-
wing trade unionist with close ties to military and
police . .
Antonio Cafiero . . 63. . . National Deputy from
Buenos Aires Province, moderate leader of the
Reformist faction and advocate of modernizing and
unifying the party. . . one of the party's most
respected economists, he is not tied to labor . .
former Minister of Commerce under both Juan and
Isabel Peron. . . leading Peronist candidate for the
governorship of Buenos Aires Province in 1987.
Carlos Saul Menem . . . 53. . . Governor of La Rioja
Province, moderate mainstream Peronist, one of the
best known members of the reform movement. . . has
presidential ambitions. . . lawyer and wealthy
landowner, projects image of independent, old-
fashioned provincial leader. . . respected for his role
in reviving and modernizing his province's economy
. . . criticized by rivals for maintaining good relations
with Alfonsin.
Italo Luder. . . . 69. . . lawyer, teacher, moderate
politician, former presidential candidate in 1983
election. . . important leader of the Reformist faction
. . . poise and objectivity lend him a pragmatic and
rational image. . . remains above party infighting,
urbane, low key, and thoughtful. . . age and lack of
party support hinder his
prospects as long-term party leader.
Secret
28
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25X6
25X6
25X6
25X6
25X1
25X6
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
won only 40 percent of the vote compared with
Alfonsin's 48 percent; two years later, the Peronists'
share declined to 35 percent and the party lost 10
seats in Congress.
Peronism Under Democratic Rule
Factionalism. The political reverses suffered by
Peronism since the return to civilian rule have
exacerbated the party's already fierce factional
infighting, as various groups blame each other for
electoral losses and assert their roles in the party's
reorganization. On the congressional level alone, the
US Embassy has identified at least four competing
Peronist groups in the Chamber of Deputies and two
in the Senate. These factions, along with several
minor ones, are now actively trying to rebuild the
party so it can successfully challenge the Radicals'
political hegemony in the gubernatorial elections
slated for 1987 and the presidential contest of 1989.
In our view, the main division is between the old
guard Officialist sector?represented by former
Secretary General Iglesias on the right and current
First Vice President Saadi on the left?and the self-
proclaimed Reformist Peronists. ' The old guard
largely seeks to maintain the party much as it has
been?a militant, ultranationalist and populist force
run by a handful of bosses relying on support from
organized labor. This group, however, is highly
discredited because many party members and the
general public perceive its leadership style as largely
responsible for Peronism's negative image and recent
setbacks, according to US Embassy reports. The old
guard, moreover, while aping some of Peron's political
tactics, has no leader who even approaches the stature
and charisma of the party's founder.
The Reformists, led by attractive figures such as
Deputies Antonio Cafiero and Carlos Grosso and the
popular Governor of La Rioja Province, Carlos
Menem, are attempting to modernize and
democratize the party. Although still adhering to
many of Peronism's populist policies, they hope to
'The party's titular president is Juan Peron's widow, Isabel, who
lives in Madrid and has totally divorced herself from party affairs.
She remains Peronism's nominal standard bearer only because the
movement has so far been unable to overcome its internal
contradictions and elect strong leaders.
29
turn the movement into a respectable alternative to
the Radicals that would be palatable to Argentina's
increasingly moderate electorate. The emphasis on
democratic procedures and the avoidance of rhetorical
excess paid handsome dividends in the November
congressional elections, according to US Embassy=
reporting. In Buenos Aires Province?a
longtime Peronist bastion?a slate of Reformist
candidates led by Cafiero beat Iglesias's Officialist
slate by a 3-to-1 margin, and Governor Menem's La
Rioja was one of the few interior provinces that did
not come under Radical Party control.
The Reformists' electoral successes have encouraged
them to intensify their efforts to take over the party.
The group has already appointed its own executive
board?which includes Cafiero, Grosso, and
Menem?to organize strategy at the party congress to
be held this spring, some
differences in the Reformist camp, mainly in the area
of organization tactics, but we believe that these are
relatively minor and will not hinder the strength of
the faction as a whole.
Leadership Crisis. Aggressive infighting has so far
stymied efforts at selecting a party leader?a crucial
step, in our view, toward progress in party
reunification. The US Embassy reports that nearly all
party militants agree that Iglesias is no longer an
asset to Peronism; last December the National Party
Council removed him from his post as Secretary
General and also ousted the party's Buenos Aires
Province Supervisory Board, which supported him.
The Officialist sector's other boss, Saadi, has been
mentioned in the press as a possible alternative to
Iglesias. Saadi, however, has had a checkered
career?involving several expulsions from the party
and association with the now-dormant Montonero
guerrillas?and is opposed by the Reformists, who
could probably block his elevation to the presidency.
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X6
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
Although the Reformists' star is rising, they currently
appear to lack sufficient support to impose one of
their own as party president, according to Embassy
reports. Internal party elections are not democratic,
and the old-guard bosses still control large blocks of
convention delegates, which they could use against a
Cafiero or Menem candidacy. Moreover, while the
Reformist sector has worked well in opposition to the
party hierarchy, some of its cohesion may dissipate if
one of its leaders makes a clear-cut bid to head the
party.
For these reasons, we believe that the most likely
leader is Italo Luder, the Peronist candidate in the
1983 presidential election. Luder has been above the
political fray for the past two years, but
he is preparing to step
in. He is probably the candidate most palatable to all
Peronist factions and would serve the immediate
purpose of papering over party differences because he
is not strongly committed to either side in the
Reformist-Officialist struggle. Luder's age (69) and
drab style, however, make him an unlikely choice to
lead the party for any length of time. Over the long
run, we believe that the Reformists will probably
consolidate their base of support and will have a good
chance to place one of their three top leaders in
control, especially as the 1989 presidential election
approaches.
The Role of Organized Labor
Organized labor, in our view, will play a decisive role
in fashioning Peronism's future. Peronist labor leaders
control both the powerful General Confederation of
Workers and one of the party's congressional factions.
Although they have traditionally been linked to the
Officialist sector, the US Embassy reports that key
labor chiefs?especially Metallurgical Union kingpin
Lorenzo Miguel?are now looking to disassociate
themselves from Iglesias. We believe that Miguel
probably prefers to continue to work with an
Officialist sector purged of Iglesias and his followers,
but Embassy and press sources indicate he could
eventually opt for realignment with the Reformists.
Other Peronist labor groups, however, are all but
working for the Reformists already. One of these, the
"Commission of 25," has ties to Reformist Deputy
Secret
Grosso and will probably join him. We believe that
active support by some labor sectors for the Reformist
faction will force Miguel to take sides in the
intraparty dispute, if only because further vacillation
could tarnish his reputation as the most powerful and
politically savvy of Peronist labor leaders.
Outlook
We doubt that the Peronist party will significantly
reorganize before 1987. Although a congress
scheduled for this spring will probably select a
nominal leader, factionalism will continue to plague
the party because the Officialist and the Reformist
sectors are not close to finding any common platform.
We believe Luder has a good chance of leading the
Peronists' reorganization efforts, with Reformists
such as Cafiero and Menem playing an important
secondary role. The relative influence of the
Reformist and Officialist groups over the next year
will, in our view, largely hinge on which sector Miguel
and his fellow labor Peronists ultimately support.
Strongman Iglesias will continue to agitate from the
sidelines, but he is not likely to regain a prominent
role in Peronist politics, even if the Officialist sector
reemerges as the party's dominant faction.
Regardless of the near-term fortunes of the party's
various factions and leading personalities, it is our
judgment that the Reformists have the best long-run
prospects to unite and revive Peronism. Their leaders
represent a younger generation of Peronists who can
capitalize on the Argentine electorate's preference for
more democratic politics to broaden their base of
support. If the Reformists deal generously with the
Officialist and labor sectors, they can retain
Peronism's working-class constituency while reaching
out to the middle class and provincial groups that
gave the party its margin of victory in the past.
We believe Reformist domination of the party would
bring Argentina closer to a strong, two-party
democratic system. The Reformists' more flexible and
pragmatic approach could enable Peronism to
challenge the Radical Party successfully on a national
level, making Argentina's political system more
competitive and reducing the opportunities for the
30
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
military to intervene in politics. Reformist control of
Peronism, however, will not immediately change the
movement's basic ideology or induce the kind of
moderation Alfonsin has imposed on the Radicals.
The Reformists will continue to follow a populist and
nationalist line, advocating radical action on the
foreign debt and aggressively criticizing US policy in
Central America and elsewhere in the hemisphere.
Although the eventual revitalization of Peronism
seems most likely, the party might not reconcile its
differences and could split permanently. The
Reformists and some provincial leaders would
probably form one party, with the labor-oriented, old
guard politicians and other regional chiefs
constituting another. This development would
irreparably weaken Peronist electoral strength and
might confirm the Radicals as the single dominant
force in Argentine politics, thereby preventing the
emergence of a democratic alternative to the current
government. This could eventually allow the military
to reinsert itself into Argentina's political life. It is
also possible that Peronism's demise might cause
some party militants to look for a home elsewhere,
such as in the far-left Intransigent Party, which has
been steadily winning support since the return to
democracy. A strong Intransigent Party would create
a viable civilian alternative to the Radicals?but one
that is even more populist, nationalist, and anti-
American than the current Peronist movement.
25X1
25X1
25X1
31 Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
Brazil:
New Military Equipment
Defense spending was a low priority under the old
military regime, but the Sarney government is
planning to double the defense budget this year.
Much of the increased spending is being earmarked
for force modernization with equipment purchased
from domestic and foreign sources. Although we
believe the new budget will bolster support for
President Sarney among the military, large increases
in defense spending will impede efforts to reduce
inflation and may touch off new regional tension.
Force Modernization Plans
Brazil's defense budget for 1986 has been increased to
nearly $4 billion
. This would be the first real increase in several
years. Each Brazilian armed service will share in the
spending bonanza.
The Army plans to form five helicopter battalions
with 30 helicopters each
It will also upgrade existing armored and mechanized
brigades with the new Osorio tank and additional
Cascavel armored fighting vehicles. More than 200
Osorios and hundreds of Cascavels?each
manufactured in Brazil?will probably be acquired by
the mid-1990s. Most of this equipment, which could
begin entering the inventory next year, will be sent to
forces near the border with Argentina and Uruguay,
The Air Force's top priorities for the near term,
are to purchase 30 to
40 used F-5s, or an equivalent small fighter-
interceptor. It plans to upgrade its attack capability
by acquiring the new AMX?a subsonic fighter-
bomber and ground attack aircraft with roughly a
4,000-kilogram external payload?being built jointly
with Italy. Plans call for the eventual procurement of
79 A MXs, with the first arriving in 1989. Research
and design efforts for a "Brazilian" supersonic fighter
are also under way, according to press reports.
33
Osorio prototype undergoing field training in
Brazil.
The Navy will also receive a large spending increase,
in part to assuage their concerns about defending
Brazil's large coastline that were raised by the
Falklands war. The Navy plans to acquire four 1,900-
ton Corvettes?equipped with Exocets, torpedoes,
guns, and helicopters?two of which are currently
under construction in Brazil. Naval spokesmen
recently made public their plan to build 12 to 16 fast
patrol boats ranging in size from 400 to 1,600 tons.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
is 25X1
also going forward with the acquisition of four West
German?type 209 diesel submarines, three of which
will be built under license in Brazil. Funds are also
being expended for research and development work on
a nuclear submarine. The Navy is funding part of the 25X1
procurement effort through a 1-percent royalty on
offshore petroleum production.
Domestic and Foreign Impact
The services are beginning a modernization drive now
that civilian rule has returned to Brazil to bolster their
professional capabilities and to carve out a new
societal role. The government will support this effort
to keep the military satisfied and out of politics.
Nonetheless, the Sarney administration will pay a
price as the expense of these programs adversely
affects Brasilia's objective of controlling inflation,
currently running at 300 percent annually. Despite
Secret
ALA LAR 86-006
28 February 1986
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
Italian version of AMX during flight-testing.
the use of royalties, we believe that the increase in
defense spending will only be partly financed through
higher taxes, portending a larger federal budget
deficit this year.
Additionally, foreign policy objectives could suffer as
Brazil's neighbors nervously watch this rearming and
worry about security motivations that underlie it. For
example, Argentine military and opposition political
officials have already noted the planned increases and
in response will probably lobby for significant
increases in the Argentine military budget. As the
new equipment begins to enter the Brazilian
inventory, we believe the current improvement in
bilateral relations with Argentina could begin to
suffer.
Implications for the United States
Although not all of the equipment will be purchased
this year, the projected budget increases will enable
the services to go on an immediate buying spree for
both domestic and foreign weapons. Most of the
purchases will support domestic arms producers, but
some will also be made from foreign manufacturers.
We believe competition between European and US
manufacturers will be intense for the helicopter
contract. the
Brazilian services are showing renewed interest in
working out a security of military information
agreement with Washington. Both the Chief of the
Navy General Staff and the Army Minister have
recently suggested a willingness to negotiate on the
issues. Although no concrete proposals have yet come
from the Brazilians, a willingness to discuss such an
agreement is a departure from their previous attitude.
If an agreement can be reached, Brazil will be
interested in acquiring a wide variety of systems,
particularly electronic warfare.
Secret 34
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
Latin America
Briefs
Cuba-Argentina Planned Talks on Bilateral Nuclear Agreement
A high-level official of Cuba's nuclear energy agency is scheduled to visit
Argentina in March to discuss a draft agreement for bilateral nuclear cooperation.
Havana delivered the draft to Buenos Aires in September, and it is now under
study by the Argentine nuclear commission.
Cuba and Argentina have been discussing possible nuclear cooperation for at least
a year. Cuba, for its part, may be seeking reprocessing technology, although the
Soviet Union, which is building two large reactors in Cuba, will require that all
spent nuclear fuel be returned to Moscow. Buenos Aires could provide laboratory-
scale reprocessing technology, but its main objective is to generate income through
nuclear exports, and Havana is short of hard currency. The political and
nonproliferation sensitivities involved in such a technology transfer also present a
major obstacle. The two countries will probably negotiate a watered-down
agreement that simply continues present bilateral technical and training
exchanges.
Cuba Ecclesiastical Meeting
Catholics held their first National Ecclesiastical Meeting in mid-February to
discuss the church's relations with the state. Attending were 181 church officials
and laymen from throughout the country, as well as guest prelates from Jamaica,
the Dominican Republic, Panama, Ecuador, Brazil, Spain, the United States, the
Vatican, and the Latin American Bishops Conference. The meeting was five years
in the making and was preceded by preparatory conclaves in all seven of Cuba's
dioceses. According to a church spokesman, its final document?not yet public?
asks the Castro regime to: end social discrimination against believers, terminate
the ban against Catholics in the Cuban Communist Party, cease the promotion of
atheism in the education system, and give the church access to the media.
In recent comments to the press, Cuban church leaders have been cautiously
optimistic about improving relations with the Castro regime, although they
acknowledge that some of their parishioners are not yet ready for an
accommodation. The leaders view the February meeting as only a "first step" in
what will be "a long process" of dialogue with the regime and clearly are
concerned that the meeting may raise expectations among their followers that
cannot be fulfilled. They also recognize that the dialogue risks conflict within the
Catholic community that could result in the creation of a "popular church" that
would badly split the Catholic laity. Nevertheless, they apparently see an
opportunity to ease pressures on Cuba's Catholics by exploiting Castro's desire to
improve his image in Latin America and Europe through better ties to the church.
35 Secret
ALA LAR 86-006
28 February 1986
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
secret
Castro is also cautious about the domestic impact of the meeting. It received scant
attention in the Cuban media except for Prensa Latina and Radio Havana, which
provided foreign audiences with ample coverage spiced with carefully selected
quotes from church officials. Castro is expected to meet shortly with the church
hierarchy, and we believe he is likely to offer marginal benefits to the church as a
means of continuing the dialogue and perhaps gaining a papal visit. We see no
chance, however, that he will make any major concessions such as those requested
in the meeting's final document.
Brazil Communist Party Activities
Secret
The Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), lacking a strong party organization and
large campaign war chest, emerged chastened from the November mayoral
elections without a single victory and plagued by internal bickering. The PCB
displayed its greatest voter support in conservative Belo Horizonte, where it built
its campaign around the middle-class image of its candidate, including his close
ties to the Catholic Church, rather than emphasizing his Communist credentials as
the orthodox "old guard" of the party would have wished.
Despite their poor showing in the municipal races, the Communists have
undergone a sizable jump in membership in recent months.
I the party leadership,
buoyed by its membership gains, is now talking about winning control of 5 percent
of the Chamber of Deputies in the congressional elections this year.
Party members, however, are divided over the tactics they should pursue to
increase their political strength. The "old guard,"
believes the party should continue to work through the center-left Brazilian
Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), the senior partner in President Sarney's
coalition government, to elect members to the Chamber of Deputies under the
PMDB label. They are at odds with the new generation of party leaders who seek
an active, independent PCB. a growing conviction that the
PCB must make maximum use of television and radio campaign spots, and target
the middle class, women, and students for support rather than the lower class and
labor as the party did in the past. Moreover, a third faction believes the party
should dramatically change its electoral strategy.
many PCB rank and file are in favor of an electoral alliance with the
militant Workers Party, which made a good showing in Sao Paulo and the
northeast during the recent elections. We believe the internal party struggle will
probably be resolved in favor of those calling for a more active and less
ideologically strident PCB, enabling the Communists to compete more effectively
in the coming elections.
36
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
Mexico-Israel New Trade Initiative
The Mexican and Israeli Governments have agreed to establish a joint company to
promote bilateral trade. Impetus probably came from Israel, which would like
Mexico to buy more Israeli goods. Mexico currently supplies about 25 percent of
Israel's petroleum imports?about 50,000 barrels per day?but plays down the
relationship publicly so as not to offend Arab states, according to the US Embassy
in Mexico City. Israeli sales to Mexico are miniscule.
Mexico City probably believes that formation of the trading company will at least
temporarily quiet Israeli complaints about the unfavorable trade balance. Mexico
is unlikely to buy significantly more Israeli goods, however, because of its efforts to
reduce imports and its limited need for Israeli exports. Tel Aviv, for its part,
probably will not abandon its long-term relationship with Mexico City because the
Israelis view Mexico as a reliable supplier. Perhaps with this in mind, Israel's
Ambassador to Mexico last month announced his government will not reduce
purchases of Mexican petroleum in the near term. Officials of the countries are
renegotiating payment terms, however, and Israel is likely to receive significant
price concessions as a result of recent declines in international oil prices.
37 Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP87T00289R000201040001-2