LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000201020001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 31, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence MASTER FILE CaPY
Directorate of Top Secret
CO CT GIVE OUT
OR MARK OH
Paz
Review
Latin America
Supplement
31 January 1986
Top Secret
ALA LAR 86-004J
31 January 1986
Copy 2 6 7
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Latin America
Review n 25X1
The guerrillas are constructing at least 11 elaborate defensive
strongpoints to counter the military's recent, more aggressive
operations. F--]
Cuba: Recent Military Acquisitions
Soviet deliveries to Cuba of advanced communications equipment
and other military hardware, together with improvements in Cuba's
coastal defense missile system, are part of an effort to upgrade
Havana's military capabilities.
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
Top Secret
Top Secret
31 January 1986
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Guerrillas Dig In
We have identified 11 elaborate defensive
strongpoints in areas occupied by the Farabundo
Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). This
supports reporting that the guerrillas are feeling
pressure from government forces and are preparing
these strongpoints to better withstand the military's
recent, more aggressive operations. The guerrillas are
reportedly making extensive use of landmines to
strengthen their defenses and ambush government
forces. The rapid construction of these 11 strongpoints
suggests that the General Command of the FMLN
probably is planning and directing the work. This
strengthening of guerrilla defenses will most likely
result in higher government casualties. F__1
New Guerrilla Strongpoints
in Central El Salvador
Cton y Crio San
Jeronimo
Sitio El Ingles
Omoa
Cerro Verde
Aqua Fria
Las Charcas
Las Canitas
El Quebradero
Tremedal
reveals that guerrilla forces of the FMLN
have established at least 13 base areas or zones of
control in remote areas of central and eastern El
Salvador. The guerrillas use these zones as safe areas
to plan operations, recruit, train, and resupply their
forces. Operating from makeshift camps in the zones,
the guerrillas easily overcome local opposition. During
this time frame, if attacked by larger government
forces, the guerrillas avoid direct confrontation, often
abandoning an area until the government forces
withdraw. Choosing not to defend terrain, the
guerrillas prepare a limited number of trenches and
foxholes to temporarily secure their supply routes, the
approaches to camps, and the corridors into the zones
of control. Since late 1984, successes by government
assault forces appear to be compelling the guerrillas
to adopt new defensive measures. F__1
Description
In June 1985,
guerrilla forces were constructing more elaborate
defensive positions or strongpoints in the FMLN zone
in northern San Vicente Department
13-45-55 N 88-44-35 W Active
13-46-52 N 88-45-51 W Active
13-31-04 N 88-38-27 W Inactive
13-51-48 N 88-57-50 W Inactive
14-12-07 N 89-06-15 W Inactive
14-14-10 N 89-04-30 W Active
14-13-40 N 89-05-30 W Active
14-11-58 N 89-03-30 W Inactive
Laguna 14-03-48 N 88-52-45 W Active
El Amate 14-03-05 N 89-24-34 W Active
a Names have arbitrarily been assigned to these strongpoints that
reflect the identity of the nearest feature on the 1:50,000 series
maps, second edition, of El Salvador published by the Instituto
Geografico Nacional.
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under heavy pressure by government forces during the
past eight months. Although defensive positions are a
common feature in FMLN zones of control, these
strongpoints stand out because of their unusual size,
distinctive features, and rapid pace of construction.
While there are differences in the size and shape of
the strongpoints, they share the following
characteristics:
? Are larger and more elaborate than previous
FMLN defensive positions.
? Include a series of interconnecting trenches and 25X1
foxholes in rough, easily defended terrain, usually
on high ground.
? Occupy new sites away from previous guerrilla
positions.
central El Salvador confirms the presence of similar
strongpoints in five other FMLN zones. All six of the
zones that have the new-style strongpoints have been
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Top Secret
ALA LAR 86-004J
31 January
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occupying the zones. This improved government
the guerrillas are reinforcing their capability probably motivated the FMLN to construct
defensive positions and have used landmines the new strongpoints.
extensively to ambush government forces.
The
strongpoints are located in six of the 13 guerrilla base
areas. The first strongpoint was identified in northern
San Vicente Department in June 1985.1
Six of the 11 known strongpoints were active in mid-
October 1985, and the other five appear to be
unoccupied and overgrown with vegetation. Because
of the dense vegetation that covers much of rural El
Salvador, it is possible that other strongpoints exist
but remain undetected.
Purpose
The strength of the insurgent movement in El
Salvador is in its control of the countryside. The
FMLN's base areas or zones of control are
sanctuaries in which the guerrillas can rest, recruit,
plan operations, conduct training, and organize
logistics. To maintain its credibility as a potent
political-military force, the FMLN must remain in
control of these zones. Since late 1984, and continuing
through 1985, the Salvadoran armed forces have
launched a series of counterinsurgency operations
deep into the FMLN zones of control. For the first
time, ground force units of the Army and Treasury
Police, joined by Air Force ground attack aircraft,
helicopter gunships, and airmobile assault teams were
able to achieve a measure of surprise against specific
guerrilla concentrations. This change in government
tactics has reduced the guerrillas' warning and
reaction time and increased the level of risk for
guerrilla units, support columns, and civilians
The new strongpoints provide the guerrillas with
better prepared positions from which to engage
government forces. In contrast, government forces are
faced with more difficult objectives and must
anticipate higher casualties if they assault the
strongpoints, especially if the approaches are seeded
with landmines. By positioning the strongpoints in
new locations, the guerrillas may also be attempting
to avoid detection as well as relieve pressure on areas
already hard hit by government operations.
choose to defend a strongpoint or abandon it just
before it comes under attack, they can slow the pace
of government counterinsurgency operations, thus
buying time for withdrawal. F_~
Significance
We believe that the guerrillas are constructing
strongpoints in the zones of control because the
FMLN feels the pressure of recent government
counterinsurgency operations and has ordered
additional defensive preparations to help them
counter the faster paced government assaults. The
FMLN also probably realizes that to remain credible
in the eyes of the local population they must better
defend their zones of control. FMLN control of
sizable areas of El Salvador provides the guerrillas
with their most powerful bargaining chip in any
future peace negotiations with the government.
the
FMLN's commitment to improve its organization of
the rural population as well as the FMLN's concern
over the success of government air assault forces
operating against these zones. The number, location
in six base areas, and rapid construction of new
strongpoints suggest that the program is being
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directed and expedited by a central authority, such as
the General Command of the FMLN. The presence of
the strongpoints and landmines increases the
likelihood that government forces will suffer greater
casualties in future counterinsurgency operations and
that the armed forces' morale will suffer, thereby
achieving one of the guerrillas' goals in their war of
attrition
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Cuba: Recent
Military Acquisitions
The recent delivery of advanced communications
equipment and resupply of other military hardware
from the Soviet Union, in addition to the
identification of an improved coastal defense missile
system in Cuba, reflect a continuing effort by Havana
to upgrade its military capabilities with Moscow's
help. the Soviet
arms delivered to the Cuban port of Mariel in early
January included three MIG-23 Flogger fuselage
crates, nine T-54/55 tanks, one set of R-410M/Twin
Plate communications equipment, and at least three
sets of Spoon Rest D air defense radar equipment.
The equipment apparently was delivered by the Soviet
merchant vessel Bratslav, which departed the Black
Sea on 19 December after loading at Nikolayev
South-Moscow's major arms transhipment port for
the Third World. Although most of this equipment
probably is intended for military units in Cuba,
some-particularly the T-54/55 tanks-may
ultimately be destined for Cuban forces in Angola.
The January delivery marks the first identification of
the R-410M/Twin Plate tropospheric scatter
communication system in Cuba. This system is used
in the USSR by the Soviet High Command's signal
units for secure communications. Acquisition of the
equipment by Havana will significantly enhance
Cuban communications by providing an increased
range, greater resistance to jamming, and an
improved reliability in a nuclear environment over
current microwave systems. In addition, the Twin
Plate equipment will complement the ongoing
installation of an islandwide coaxial cable system.
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The first indication that Havana possesses an
improved coastal defense missile system came in July
1985 when a fragment of an antiship missile-later
identified as associated with the Soviet-built SSC-3
coastal defense missile system-was found off the
Florida coast. US technicians established that the
missile probably was fired from a ground-based 25X1
launcher rather than from a Cuban missile patrol
boat.
The transporter-erector-launcher for the SSC-3
system-now used in the Warsaw Pact countries and
exported by the USSR to Syria, Libya, Al eria and
South Yemen-was subsequently observe 25X1
in an area southwest o 25X1
Cienfuegos in mid-January. The deployment of the
SSC-3 system in Cuba will modestly improve
Havana's coastal defense capability. In wartime, 25X1
Cuba's use of the radar-guided missile-with a
maximum range of 50 nautical miles-would pose a
threat to shipping in the Yucatan Channel, the
Florida Straits, and other sea lanes in the Caribbean.
Top Secret
ALA LAIR 86-004J
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