LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000201000001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 17, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Review
Latin America
17 January 1986
ALA LAR 86-003
17 January 1986
Copy 4 2 8
Seerct
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Review
Latin America
Cuba: Changes in the Leadership
economic and political stress.
Younger, more technocratic managers are relieving Politburo
members of day-to-day responsibility for running government
ministries, reflecting President Castro's desire to insulate the party
leadership from public criticism during an expected period of
Central America North Branch,
El Salvador: Strains in the Insurgent Alliance) 7
alliance is unlikely.
Differences between the political wing and the military front in the
insurgent alliance may be widening, but a formal break in the
Nicaragua: Keeping Labor on a Tight ReinF_~ 11
early promises of a better life for the working man.
The Sandinistas are focusing on increasing worker productivity and
strengthening their control over labor rather than on fulfilling their
Eastern Caribbean: Regional Security Update) 15
determined.
A rudimentary and defensive-oriented Regional Security System
among the island governments is designed primarily to counter
subversion, but its specific form and functions have not yet been
Eastern Caribbean: Growing Narcotics Threat) 19
A rise in trafficking, accompanied by increased official corruption
and drug abuse, is posing a serious challenge to the limited
manpower and material resources of governments in the region.
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Secret
ALA LAR 86-003
17 January 1986
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Secret
Uruguay-USSR: Relations Under Sanguinetti I 23
Although the Soviets have increased commercial and political
overtures to the new civilian government in Uruguay, Moscow is
unlikely to gain significant political influence in Montevideo over
the next few years.
Brazil: Implications of the Mayoral Elections) 27
Although the majority party in the coalition government was
weakened by the recent mayoral elections, President Sarney is likely
to receive greater cooperation from party leaders in Congress, and
he has gained a free hand to reshuffle his Cabinet and staff it with
loyalists.
Briefs Cuba: Attorney General Sacked
Trinidad and Tobago: Efforts To Revamp Oil-Based Economy
Panama: Military Reassignments
Chile: Student Elections
Belize: Leftist Maneuvers Prior to Party Convention
29
30
30
31
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief
Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis
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Secret
Cuba: Changes
in the Leadership
The major changes that have been under way in the
Cuban hierarchy since last spring reflect President
Castro's desire to insulate the leadership of the party
from public criticism as the country enters what we
believe will be a period of prolonged economic and
political stress. Politburo members are being relieved
of responsibility for the day-to-day running of
government ministries, thus allowing the regime
greater freedom to demand strict accountability for
administrative performance without damaging the
prestige of the party's elite. The trend in government
is clearly toward younger, more technocratic
managers. The revered guerrilla veterans who have
dominated the ministerial ranks for the last 27 years,
despite their managerial incompetence, are now
giving way to a new, better educated generation.
Perhaps the most significant change thus far has been
the removal in December of Interior Minister Ramiro
Valdes. A revolutionary hero with a strong reputation
for ruthlessness, Valdes was appointed to the job six
years ago to demonstrate to criminals and the
population in general that the regime was initiating a
nationwide crackdown to stem the rapidly increasing
crime rate. Despite Valdes's harsh remedial measures,
the national police force-itself weakened by
corruption and incompetence-has been unable to
reverse the trend. There are now indications that the
Interior Ministry's police functions may be tranferred
to a new ministry-level agency, that perhaps will be
created at or shortly after the party congress in early
February.
According to Cuban media reports, Valdes has been
given an unspecified job in the electronics industry.
Valdes retains his seat on
the Politburo-he is a charter member-and will
probably oversee a major new effort to develop
national expertise in the field of computers,
semiconductors, and high-tech electronics. The new
Interior Minister, Division Gen. Jose Abrahantes, has
been in charge of Cuba's internal security apparatus
for more than two decades and previously had served
as Valdes's first deputy.
Other Changes
Similar adjustments have been made with other
Politburo members over the past several months.
Public Health Minister Sergio del Valle, also a
charter member of the Politburo, was replaced by his
first deputy in December amid indications that his
ministry could not fulfill President Castro's pledge to
transform Cuba into a "world power" in the field of
medicine. The overall pattern in these changes
indicates that they are part of a larger plan to
Secret
ALA LAR 86-003
17 January 1986
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separate top-level party functions from government
functions. With the party leadership no longer holding
ministerial portfolios, sacking incompetent or corrupt
administrators without damaging the prestige of the
party or the reputations of the ex-guerrillas that
constitute Castro's inner circle will become far easier.
Recent top-level changes in the economic arena
reflect a new emphasis on economic efficiency rather
than on political considerations. Alternate Politburo
member Humberto Perez, for example, was replaced
last summer as chief of the Central Planning Board
after publicly admitting that he had mishandled his
job. He was replaced by an individual described by
the US Interests Section as one of a new breed of
technocratic managers. A number of other
technocrats have been named to important posts in
the Construction, Light Industry, and Sugar Industry
Ministries, as well as in the State Committee for
Economic Cooperation.
The only Politburo members who still oversee
government ministries are, Revolutionary Armed
Forces Minister Raul Castro and Culture Minister
Armando Hart. Hart
is expected to step down.
His successor most likely will be Alfredo Guevara,
who had been Vice Minister of Culture until being
assigned to Paris in 1983 as Cuban ambassador to
UNESCO. Guevara's relationship with Fidel Castro
dates from the late 1940s at Havana University; both
he and Fidel were members of a Cuban student
delegation that was in Colombia in 1948 during the
Bogotazo riots that swept the Colombian capital.
Raul Castro will
turn his ministry over to one of his deputies to free
himself to assume Fidel's duties as Chairman of the
Council of Ministers.
with Raul overseeing the day-to-day operations of the
government, Fidel would be able to devote greater
attention to foreign policy matters and party affairs.
Given his well-known penchant for disruptive
micromanagement, Fidel's removal from the Council
of Ministers, in our estimation, would be a major plus
for the Cuban economy and government efficiency.
Raul is largely an unknown quantity as a public
figure. When only 27 years old, he led a group of
guerrilla columns that quickly established control over
a large area and set up a rudimentary governmental
administration to provide law, education, and public
health services while the civil war was still in progress.
As Armed Forces Minister since 1959, he created an
entirely new military establishment that today is one
of the largest and most potent in the Third World.
Raul has amply demonstrated his organizational
talent, courage, discipline, and the ability to
communicate effectively with his subordinates.
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For 26 years, Raul has studiously avoided upstaging
Fidel, staying instead in the shadow of his older
brother and serving as his staunchest supporter. On
occasion, however, Raul has shown that he is
somewhat uncomfortable in this role-for example, at
a reception he stormed angrily away from a tactless
diplomat who incorrectly commented that Fidel was
the only comandante to emerge from revolution-but
he apparently does not see himself as a competitor of
Fidel's. Cuban and non-Cuban alike fault Raul for his
lack of charisma, and he has a reputation for
toughness that some would characterize as
ruthlessness. These traits could hamper or even negate
his effectiveness as he tries to shift from military to
political administration.
Nevertheless, a larger role for Raul in internal
matters seems highly likely. The ideological report of
the 10th Party Plenum in December 1984 hinted as
much when it pointedly referred to warnings from
"the first and second secretaries of our party"
(emphasis added), an allusion usually reserved for
Fidel alone, and to "instructions" given by Second
Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party Central
Committee and Minister of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces Raul Castro. Last April, Raul went to Moscow
in lieu of Fidel for the Chernenko funeral and
attended a meeting with General Secretary
Gorbachev. Since then, Raul has appeared numerous
times in activities throughout Cuba that appear aimed
at broadening his public exposure and establishing
direct links with the masses
Outlook: More Changes Coming
Additional personnel shifts are probably in the offing.
Although not a minister, 72-year-old Politburo
member Carlos Rafael Rodriguez may be relieved of
some of his government responsibilities. Rodriguez
has long been Fidel's main adviser in both foreign
policy and economic matters. Some of his economic
responsibilities may be transferred to Havana's
current Ambassador to the USSR Lionel Soto. Like
Rodriguez, Soto was a member of the pre-Castro
Communist party, and reportedly is slated to cede his
position in Moscow to Foreign Minister Isidoro
Malmierca.
Rodriguez
A host of lesser changes are likely as new ministers
begin reorganizing the bureaucracy to develop their
own managerial teams, to attract and hold
administrative talent amid bureaucratic infighting for
resources, and to improve the performance of their
respective ministries. This process probably will give
rise to a new breed of managers who, having no
history of participation in the guerrilla struggle that
brought Castro to power, will have little political
influence to protect themselves against charges of
incompetence should they fail to produce. Those who
cannot are likely to be replaced quickly-especially if
Raul is at the helm-and some probably will be used
as scapegoats to deflect popular dissatisfaction caused
by increased austerity and lagging economic
performance.
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Table I
Major Personnel Changes to Date
Ramiro Valdes
Menendez
Politburo member; Vice President
of Council of State and Council of
Ministers; Minister of Interior.
Replaced as Minister of Interior on
3 December. Retains other posi-
tions and has added responsibility
in "electronics industry."
Guillermo Garcia
Frias
Politburo member; Vice President
of Council of State and Council of
Ministers; Minister of Transporta-
tion.
Replaced as Minister of Transpor-
tation in July, but retains his other
high-level positions.
Sergio Del Valle
Jimenez
Politburo member; Member, Coun-
cil of State; Minister of Public
Health.
Gave up his Public Health portfolio
as part of Castro's plan to relieve
Politburo members of ministerial
jobs.
Humberto Perez
Gonzalez
Politburo Alternate member; Vice
President, Council of Ministers;
Minister-President of Central Plan-
ning Board (JUCEPLAN).
Dismissed from JUCEPLAN in
July; also lost position on the Coun-
cil of Ministers. Remains on the
Politburo.
Diodes Torralba
Gonzalez
Vice President, Council of Minis-
ter; Member, Council of State;
Minister of Sugar Industry.
Moved from Sugar Industry Minis-
try to "clean things up" in the
Ministry of Transporation. Retains
other positions.
Jose Antonio Lopez
Moreno
Vice President, Council of Minis-
ter; Minister of Construcion.
Assigned key position of Minister-
President of JUCEPLAN. Re-
lieved as Minister of Construction.
Retains other position.
A hardliner in Castro's inner circle.
The new Minister of Interior, Jose
Abrahantes, unlikely to change se-
curity and intelligence operations.
An inept administrator in an im-
portant Ministry frequently criti-
cized by Moscow. He is, however, a
revered revolutionary figure.
Replaced by First Deputy in Minis-
try of Public Health, Julio Tejas
Perez.
Ran the planning board as personal
fiefdom and frequently clashed
with ministry heads and other eco-
nomic officials.
Has close ties to Castro; also
worked for Raul Castro in the
Armed Forces Ministry before
moving to the Sugar Industry Min-
istry in 1972.
An engineer, with a long career in
public works. He is reputed to be
dynamic, intelligent, and able to
work smoothly with other
ministries.
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Table 2
Possible Changes To Come
Raul Castro Ruz Second Secretary, Politburo; Sec-
ond Secretary, Secretariat; First
Vice President, Council of State;
First Vice President, Council of
Ministers; Minister of Armed
Forces.
Carlos Rafael Politburo Member; Vice President,
Rodriguez Council of State; Vice President,
Council of Ministers.
Armando Hart Politburo member; Member, Coun-
Davalos cil of State; Minister of Culture.
Isidoro Malmierca Member, Council of Ministers;
Peoli Foreign Minister.
Lionel Soto Prieto Member, Party Secretariat; Am-
bassador to the Soviet Union.
Hector Rodriguez Member, Council of Ministers;
Llompart Minister-President of the National
Bank; Minister-President of the
State Committee for Economic Co-
operation (CECE).
Reported to be in line for either
President of the Council of State or
the Council of Ministers. He may
give up his Armed Forces post.
Rodriguez is expected to retain all
his posts, but he may be relieved of
some administrative and travel
tasks associated with Soviet rela-
tions and CEMA.
Will be relieved of ministerial du-
ties
but will keep seat on Politburo.
Reportedly will be named Ambas-
sador to the Soviet Union and re-
lieved of the Foreign Minister post.
Reportedly will be withdrawn from
Moscow to assume an unspecified
high-level post in Havana. Could
also be named to the Politburo
during the February Party Con-
gress.
Could be in line to assume some of
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez's duties.
Has also been named as a candi-
date for the Foreign Minister post.
Considered an excellent adminis-
trator and is likely to assume the
Council of Ministers presidency
where he would oversee day-to-day
functioning of all the ministries.
A pragmatic old-line Communist,
Rodriguez is 72 and probably will
relinquish some responsibility to
younger technocrats. His influence
as an adviser to Fidel will remain
high.
Likely
replacement is current Cuban Am-
bassador to UNESCO, Alfredo
Guevara.
As Foreign Minister, Malmierca
served primarily as a message bear-
er and had little political clout.
Has close links to Soviets; also
highly regarded economist and
could take over some of Carlos
Rafael Rodiguez's responsibilities
in foreign economic relations.
A rising star in the economic
sphere. Took over the National
Bank position in October and relin-
quished the Economic Cooperation
position.
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El Salvador: Organization of the Insurgent Alliance
Unified Revolutionary
Directorate (DRU)
Popular Liberation
Forces (F!LY
rople'a Revolwionary
PtMpytsr;l%@volatign:ir~'
Bloc (Bolt y
Popular League: if
28.February(LP 18)
Armed Forces of
National Resistance
(FARM
Central American
Workers Revolutionary
Party (PRTC)
Communist Party-Armed
forces of Liberation
(PCS-FAL)
Politcal-Diplomatic
commission (cPD)
United Popular Actior
Front (Ft1PU)
i I I ! t~ t
I'opulOr t ib ratttlni
\lo~euncot
r a~gnnl q. iie
lnion(tDN)~(Ii
Revoluttoitarv eSrjc atic
Front (F1)R)' I)~
Democratic
Front (FD)
National Revolutionary
Movement (MNR)
Popular Social
Christian Movement
(MPSC)
Independent Movement of
Salvadoran Professionals
and Technicians (MIPTES
Mixed Marxist-
Leninist
(Military
i
Marxist-
Leninist
(Political)
Democratic
Socialist
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or heMansrr,(CRMt)riat4d
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El Salvador: Strains
in the Insurgent Alliance
Tensions between the Democratic Revolutionary
Front (FDR)-the political wing of the Salvadoran
insurgency-and the Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN)-the five-faction military
front-publicly surfaced last month with press reports
that a formal split in the insurgent alliance was
imminent. Both sides denied the report but
differences over goals and
were FMLN operations taken without prior
consultation with the FDR. Moreover, during
negotiations to secure the release of Duarte's
daughter, FMLN representatives reportedly told
FDR president Guillermo Ungo-who had been
asked to involve himself by the Archbishop of San
Salvador-that the FDR was not a party to the
tactics remain. Most notably, the FDR opposed the
killing last June of the US Marines and the kidnaping
of President Duarte's daughter in September.
Although we do not believe a formal break is likely,
the gap between the political and military wings may
widen as the insurgents rely more heavily on economic
sabotage and terrorism. The FDR is likely to continue
to seek opportunities to assert its political
independence, but, in our judgment, it has few options
over the near term other than to attempt to gain
influence under the umbrella of the insurgency. In the
current political climate, we believe Duarte probably
sees few advantages to reopening the dialogue with
the weakened FDR.
the FDR has
had little success in persuading the FMLN to
abandon terror as a tactic.
FDR arguments that the kidnaping had
alienated supporters and dried up funds from
traditionally pro-FMLN governments, political
parties, labor organizations, and church groups did
not concern rebel military commanders. Moreover,
the FDR has
not been able to convince the FMLN that military
operations must respect human life, focus on military
targets, and enhance political activity among the
Signs of Strain
Last December's press reports that the FDR was set
to break with the FMLN drew public attention to the
differences between the political and military wings of
the insurgency. According to the reports, the FDR,
upset over the the FMLN's increasing reliance on
terrorism, was preparing to return exiled opposition
figures to El Salvador to compete openly for political
power. The rebels' Radio Venceremos was quick to
deny the report, claiming that it was a propaganda
ploy and reaffirming that all insurgent decisions
continued to be reached by "consensus."
In our judgment, however, these public proclamations
belie differences between a weakened political wing
and the increasingly assertive military factions.
the killing of the US
Marines in the Zona Rosa and the kidnaping of
Duarte's daughter, in September 1985, for example,
"masses."
In mid-November, the FDR reportedly refused to sign
the FMLN program for a negotiated settlement-
essentially a reiteration of the 1984 Ayagualo
proposals-because they believe it condones terrorist
operations
FDR officials also reportedly were upset that they
were asked only to comment on the document's
contents rather than coauthor it.
the
FMLN has attempted to expand its influence in the
alliance further by claiming that political organizing
in El Salvador falls within the exclusive province of
the FMLN. some
Secret
ALA LAR 86-003
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FMLN leaders also believe the military factions are
on the verge of creating a single Marxist-Leninist
party that clearly would usurp most of the functions
Trying To Regain the Initiative
US Embassy indicates
that the FDR-aware that its room to maneuver is
narrowing-is attempting to regain influence by
shifting the focus of the war from the military to the
political arena.
FDR leaders believe they must convince the
Duarte government-particularly the military
leadership-that the FDR is the best placed group to
act as an interlocutor between the government and the
FMLN and that failure to deal with the FDR would
result in a strengthening of the FMLN. As a way of
encouraging negotiations,
the FDR is willing to drop many of its
preconditions for dialogue with the government and
discuss a reduced agenda that focuses first on the
creation of a national forum and an "end to
repression."
the FDR is planning the withdrawal of
most of its representatives from Europe and that
many of these-members of the National
Revolutionary Movement (MNR)-are to return to El
Salvador in 1986 with the ultimate goal of
establishing the MNR as a legitimate party.
the FDR had
plans to establish its headquarters in Mexico City,
presumably to organize and monitor political
developments in El Salvador more effectively. In our
judgment, these moves probably reflect the FDR's
reduced economic resources, as well as concern that
the establishment in mid-October of a leftist-oriented
Social Democratic Party (PSD) by former MNR
members could further undercut the FDR's already
The FDR attempted to close out the year by
participating in a propaganda offensive that included
a series of "peace forums" held by front groups,
culminating in a weeklong "Second Conference for
Dialogue and Peace" at the national university. The
publicized hopes of FDR leaders Guillermo Ungo and
Ruben Zamora to address the conference were dashed
by Duarte's vow to arrest any insurgent leader
attending the conference. At the same time, the FDR
sought to take the lead,
in calling a Christmas truce-
eventually agreed to by both sides under the auspices
of the church. In other moves, the FDR charged-in a
two-page ad in a Salvadoran newspaper-that the
insurgents had called for a renewal of dialogue four
times in 1985, and that the Duarte government had
spurned every overture.
Near-Term Outlook
Despite the recent flurry of activity and rumors, we do
not believe a split between the FDR and the FMLN is
imminent. In the near term, we believe a weakened
FDR has little choice but to husband what influence it
has within the insurgent alliance. Differences between
the two groups, in fact, may widen if, as expected, the
guerrillas continue to rely on economic sabotage and
terrorism, which the FDR has difficulty supporting.
In response to their narrowed options, we anticipate
that the FDR will send periodic signals that its goals
do not necessarily parallel those of the military
factions. In particular, it is likely to continue using
"peace forums" and similar initiatives to portray the
Duarte government as intransigent. At the same time,
FDR leaders are likely to keep close watch on the
government's response to the PSD and other political
returnees for signs of new opportunities. We do not
expect a large-scale return of opposition figures from
exile, however, because of Duarte's promise to
prosecute them.
waning political influence.
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On balance, Duarte probably sees little advantage to
responding positively to overtures from a weakened
FDR. Instead, he probably will point to opportunities
for those who want to return to participate openly
under the constitution. By so doing, he probably hopes
to encourage further splits in the insurgency. On the
dialogue issue, he is likely to argue that insurgent
calls for dialogue are merely tactical ploys, and that
he is willing to resume the dialogue, but not on
guerrilla terms.
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Nicaragua:
Keeping Labor on a Tight Rein
The Sandinistas have made much of the revolution's
benefits to workers and have boosted organized
labor's ranks enormously, but early promises of a
better life for the working man have faded.
the regime has focused on
increasing worker productivity and strengthening its
control over labor rather than on bread-and-butter
issues. While tolerating the existence of independent
labor organizations, Managua has greatly reduced
their size and severely limited their ability to recruit,
organize, and press for worker benefits.
for fines and the arrest of workers who violate
Sandinista laws that promote discipline and
productivity.
US Embassy reporting indicates that the Labor
Ministry, with its power to impose compulsory
arbitration, grant legal status to unions, and decide
the outcome of union elections, played a key role in
establishing Sandinista control. The Ministry
frequently delayed certification of independent unions
and accepted rump elections by pro-Sandinista
factions as a means of controlling union affiliation
On taking power in mid-1979, the Sandinistas, who
had encouraged labor activism during their struggle
against former President Somoza, enacted laws to
protect jobs and wages and sided with laborers in
disputes with employers. This prolabor stance,
however, coupled with the regime's anticapitalist
rhetoric, quickly sparked a rash of strikes and plant
takeovers by workers, according to US Embassy
reporting. The Sandinistas, in our view, feared that
labor militancy threatened economic recovery and
their own consolidation of power, and moved to ensure
their dominance of the movement.
The Structure of Control
The Sandinistas created new organizations-the
Sandinista Workers' Central (CST) and the
Association of Farm Workers (ATC)-to supersede
existing labor confederations, enacted new laws to
curb labor activism, and strengthened the Labor
Ministry's authority. The CST initially advocated
traditional labor goals such as wage increases, revision
of the labor code, and worker participation in
management. By late 1980, however, its focus, along
with the regime's, had shifted to concern over
inflation and labor's activism. The CST began to back
government-mandated wage freezes, oppose strikes,
and generally encourage workers to accept their lot,
according to US Embassy reporting. Changes in the
labor code not only toughened restrictions on
businesses' ability to fire employees but also provided
and leadership selection.
the government has pressured workers
to join the CST and other progovernment labor
organizations by sending police to union elections,
arresting independent labor leaders, and attacking
their homes and offices. Not unexpectedly, the CST
claims its membership has swelled to over 100,000
since its formation in 1979.
The regime also has resorted to sweeping institutional
measures to solidify its control. In mid-1981, for
example, Managua announced a get-tough policy to
halt work stoppages and wage protests. With CST
help, the Labor Ministry mounted a campaign to
discourage strikes, and the regime subsequently
declared a national "state of economic emergency"
that banned strikes and froze wages. When the
government temporarily lifted many of these
restrictions for several months prior to the elections of
November 1984, union leaders took advantage of the
opportunity to stage a flurry of work stoppages in an
effort to obtain higher wages and other benefits,
according to US Embassy and press reporting. After
the election, however, the Sandinistas restored the
controls and, with the expanded state of emergency
decreed in October 1985, tightened the screws.
Secret
ALA LAR 86-003
17 January 1986
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Nicaragua's Labor Organizations
Political Affiliation/
Association
International
Affiliation
Size
Sandinista Workers' Central
Sandinista
World Federation of Trade Unions
100,000-150,000
Association of Farm Workers
Sandinista
40,000 +seasonal workers
Nicaraguan Health Workers'
Federation
Sandinista
National Teachers' Association
Sandinista
14,000
Non-Sandinista labor organizations
204,000-259,000 a
Nicaraguan Workers' Central
Social Christian; inter-
nal opposition
World Confederation of Labor;
Latin American Workers' Central
2,500
Confederation of Labor Unification
Social Democrats; inter-
nal opposition
International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions, American In-
stitute for Free Labor
General Confederation of Independent
Workers
Nicaragua Socialist Par-
ty; generally supports
Sandinista policy
Confederation for Action and Trade
Union Unity
Communist Party of
Nicaragua
,, Membership figures vary widely due to differences between union
claims, Labor Ministry statistics, and differing definitions of
membership.
Narrowing Options for Independent Labor
Although tolerated, non-Sandinista labor
organizations have seen their activities sharply
limited, and their membership has declined
significantly. The Nicaraguan Workers' Central
claims that its membership reached 65,000 shortly
after the 1979 revolution but now is down to less than
3,000, according to Labor Ministry estimates.
Similarly the Confederation of Labor Unification
only has about 1,500 members. The Communist
unions have generally been co-opted by the regime,
according to the US Embassy.
Even as they decrease in size, the independent
confederations have maintained strong ties to
international labor as well as to Social and Christian
Democrat groups in Europe, from which they receive
funds and with which they exchange visits. We agree
with US Embassy reporting that such links to foreign
organizations have made the regime hesitant to do
away with the democratic labor groups.
US Embassy reporting indicates that workers have
little say in negotiations over income or working
conditions. Wage hikes have not kept pace with the
rapidly rising cost of basic goods. With purchasing
power only about 50 percent of its 1978 level, the
standard of living for most workers has fallen sharply.
Outlook
In our opinion, independent labor organizations have
few possibilities for defying the regime or defending
their members' interests. The Nicaraguan Workers'
Central and the Confederation of Labor Unification,
which remain almost entirely dependent on funding
from foreign organizations, will continue to publicize
workers' grievances in hopes that international
opinion will serve as a check on the Sandinistas. They
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probably will continue to move cautiously, however, to
avoid giving Managua a pretext for harsher
repression.
The government is likely to continue tolerating non-
Sandinista labor organizations as part of its claim to
pluralism, while closely restricting their activities and
seeking to take advantage of their internal divisions.
The regime's own labor groups, meanwhile, will be
used to indoctrinate and control the majority of
Nicaraguan workers. The Sandinistas are likely to
deal firmly with any wildcat strikes or local protests
resulting from deteriorating economic conditions,
although on occasion they may choose to grant small
concessions.
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Eastern Caribbean:
Regional Security Update
Three years after a memorandum of understanding
between five Eastern Caribbean states created the
Regional Security System (RSS),' its form and
functions remain uncertain. The present rudimentary
and defensive-oriented system is designed primarily to
counter subversion, but no country has more than one
80-man Special Service Unit, and no unit is fully
trained. Severe economic constraints and the absence
of a clear threat since the US-led intervention in
Grenada in 1983 are giving some Eastern Caribbean
leaders second thoughts about implementing even this
modest security system. Eastern Caribbean
governments lack the necessary $10 million annually
to cover equipment and training for the Special
Service Units and coast guards, according to the US
Embassy in Barbados, and are also short of expertise
required to undertake an effective in-country training
program. Ratification of a draft treaty defining the
relationship between the RSS and the United States
and United Kingdom is stalled, thus placing a US-UK
joint training proposal on hold. The emergence of new
leaders in St. Vincent and Barbados, as well as
regional suspicion over the dominant role of Barbados
and its defense chief, have stymied progress. Without
outside support the system probably would founder
and could eventually disappear, leaving the islands
vulnerable to potential internal and external
subversion. No matter what form the RSS takes, we
believe that Eastern Caribbean governments will
continue to look to Washington for security
assistance.
Slow Progress on the RSS Treaty
The long-delayed RSS treaty, slated to replace the
memorandum of understanding, remains
uncoordinated and unratified. US and British officials
regard the treaty as necessary to spell out the
relationship between the RSS and the United States
' Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent
established a Regional Security System in 1982 because of their
concern about the radical Bishop regime in Grenada. St.
Christopher-Nevis joined in 1984, and Grenada followed in March
and United Kingdom, as well as to commit Eastern
Caribbean governments firmly to a collective security
agreement. Currently, US and UK funding and
training assistance must be conducted through
bilateral agreements with individual Caribbean
governments. Under a treaty, such support would be
channeled through the RSS apparatus, thus
streamlining the relationship. RSS security chiefs,
who support a treaty, complain that current security
training is ad hoc, with little or no input from the RSS
as an organization.
Slow progress on treaty ratification, in our view,
partly reflects the Caribbean style of decisionmaking.
As in other regional matters, Eastern Caribbean
leaders tend to mull over a matter until they feel
completely satisfied with it; some have pointed out
that the 1982 memorandum of understanding meets
their current needs because any country can ask other
members for assistance in a security situation, natural
disaster, or rescue operation.
Uncertainty and stalemate over the treaty has put a
US-UK joint training proposal for the RSS on hold.
Under the proposal, the British would provide basic
security training in Barbados while the United States
would conduct leadership training in Antigua. This
proposal would replace bilateral security training
arrangements between the United States, the British,
and the Eastern Caribbean states and would assure
that each country's Special Service Unit receives
equitable, acceptable training.
Changing Leadership Perceptions
Although all Eastern
Caribbean countries are experiencing severe economic
constraints and growing complacency about regional
security, some leaders have become less enthusiastic
about the RSS than others. St. Vincent's Prime
Minister Mitchell has become the most hesitant
Secret
ALA LAR 86-003
17 January 1986
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Barbados Defense Force:
? Army includes 36 officers and 429 enlisted person-
nel, equipped with rifles, machineguns, two mortars,
and six grenade launchers.
? Coast Guard, with 78 personnel, has seven boats
ranging in size from 41 to 123 feet.
? Police force of 350, of which 60 are in Special
Service Unit.
Antigua-Barbuda Defense Force:
? Army of 72 with few reserves.
? Coast Guard, with 24 personnel, has one 65-foot and
three 27-foot patrol boats.
? Police force of 350; 80 (77) in Special Service Unit.
Dominica:
? Coast Guard with 24 personnel and one 65-foot
patrol boat.
? Police force of 374; 80 (66) in Special Service Unit.
Grenada:
? Coast Guard, with 30 personnel, has one 106-foot
patrol boat and two 30-foot boats.
? Police force of 550; 80 (75) in Special Service Unit.
St. Lucia:
? Coast Guard with 24 personnel and one 65-foot
patrol boat.
? Police force of 485; 80 (72) in Special Service Unit.
St. Christopher-Nevis:
? Coast Guard with 24 personnel, one 110-foot patrol
boat and two 27-foot boats.
? Police force 301; 80 (70) in Special Service Unit.
St. Vincent:
? Coast Guard with 12 personnel and one 75-foot
patrol boat.
? Police force of 503, 80 (31) in Special Service Unit.
Eastern Caribbean leader regarding the RSS. Elected
nearly two years ago on a platform opposing increased
defense expenditures, Mitchell, according to the US
Embassy in Grenada, believes that economic
development and job creation will provide greater
security than small paramilitary units. The Embassy
in Barbados reports that Mitchell seems especially
concerned about the possibility of fully trained
Special Service Units overthrowing a government.
Despite Mitchell's misgivings, he remains a
proponent-in theory at least-of the regional
security concept, according to the Embassy in
Grenada . Bucking
domestic criticism, he allowed some of St. Vincent's
security personnel to receive training in Grenada by
US instructors during the peacekeeping operations
there. However, St. Vincent's security contingent-
the only intact unit in the islands prior to Mitchell's
election-has been largely disbanded.
less than half o t. Vincent's
unit is fully trained. St. Vincent was the only RSS
member not participating in the "Exotic Palm"
exercise in St. Lucia last September. Mitchell has
been at odds with RSS Coordinator Lewis since his
election, and some Barbadian officials blame
Mitchell's foot-dragging for complicating final
ratification of the RSS treaty.
Other Eastern Caribbean leaders are concerned over
their ability to fund Special Service Units. Even
Dominica's Prime Minister Charles, a strong
advocate of an RSS, has expressed concern about the
costs involved.
The death last March of Barbados's Prime Minister,
Tom Adams, eliminated the region's major proponent
of the system, and unlike his predecessor, Prime
Minister St. John has failed to emerge as a forceful
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Last year marked the first unified exercise between
RSS contingents and US forces in the Caribbean. The
"Exotic Palm" exercise last September in and
around St. Lucia also included troops from the
United Kingdom and Jamaica. The United States
funded the $1 million cost of the exercise, which
involved approximately 200 Special Service Unit
personnel and several hundred US troops. "Exotic
Palm" was followed last November by "Upward
Key, " a bilateral exercise in and around Antigua
between US and Antigua Defense Force personnel.
Next May, the second unified effort between the US
and RSS forces-codenamed "Ocean Venture "--will
occur in and around Grenada.
The purpose of the exercises, according to US
officials, is to assess and improved the ability of the
RSS to organize, mobilize, and deploy its ground,
air, and naval assets in response to urgent requests
for help from member states. The "Upward Key"
exercise emphasized the interdiction and capture of
drug and arms smugglers. In both cases, post
mortems pointed to problems infield
communications, a breakdown in Special Service
observers.
Prime Minister Mitchell vetoed St. Vincent's
participation primarily because he views such
exercises as militarizing the region. The US Embassy
in Bridgetown reports that Mitchell may not
participate in future RSS exercises until the RSS
treaty is ratified, a move that probably will preclude
St. Vincent's participation in "Ocean Venture" this
spring.
Publicity surrounding the exercises has highlighted
the awkward relationship between the RSS members
and the United States without a treaty. According to
the Embassy, opposition elements in the region tried
to make US "imperialism" an issue in relation to the
exercises. Leading leftists in Antigua, Dominica, St.
Lucia, and St. Vincent, for example, heavily
criticized "Exotic Palm. " Moreover, the regional
press played up seemingly different perceptions of
RSS functions held by Caribbean leaders and
It quoted several Caribbean leaders
as publicly emphasizing the potential role of the RSS
in disaster relief and providing for the region's own
security. In contrast, the press alleged a stress byC
on how the RSS could help to
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Unit discipline and performance.
One charter member of the RSS-St. Vincent-did
not participate in "Exotic Palm, " although it sent
RSS proponent.
St. John wants to prevent the RSS from
becoming an issue in national elections to be held
later this year and has adopted a low profile on
military matters. Opposition parties in Barbados, and
Eastern Caribbean leftists in general, however, appear
poised to make the RSS and defense spending priority
domestic issues, according to the Embassy in
Bridgetown.
"Big Brother" Barbados
According to the US Embassy in Bridgetown, much
of the distrust over the RSS among Eastern
Caribbean leaders stems from the location of its
headquarters in Barbados. Traditionally in the
suppress a potential leftist insurgency and serve as a
"tripwire"for US intervention.
Eastern Caribbean, Barbados has been referred to
derisively as the "Big Brother," whose influence is to
be resisted by the ministates. Concerned about
Barbadian influence over the RSS and Brigadier
Lewis's leadership, Eastern Caribbean leaders are
considering the appointment of a civilian secretary to
assist the Coordinator in operating the system. Since
Coordinator Lewis is from Barbados, the secretary
would be required to be non-Barbadian, effectively
circumscribing some of the former's power.
The addition of Trinidad and Tobago to the system
could relieve concern over-and pressure on-
Barbados, but Trinidad's participation seems unlikely
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Brig. Rudyard E. C. Lewis, Chief of Staff of the
Barbados Defense Force since 1980 and RSS Coordi-
nator since 1983... most influential and controver-
sial military leader in the Caribbean ... former Dep-
uty Chief of Staff in the Jamaican Defense
Force ... second native-born Barbadian to acquire
the highest military position in Barbados ... general-
ly regarded as competent and professional but unpop-
ular outside of Barbados ...
... feud with St. Vincent's Mitchell since July 1984,
when Lewis led a Barbadian contingent to Union
Island to quell an "uprising"... has criticized joint
US-UK training proposal ... prefers single regional
training facility in Barbodos under his control
... may be losing favor with political leadership in
Barbados, which reportedly fears that his controver-
sial nature will delay approval of RSS treaty ... St.
John to exert closer control through his defense
secretary.
at this juncture. The US Embassy in Port of Spain
reports that the leaders of Trinidad's Defense Force
favor a role in Eastern Caribbean security and have
studied the RSS with interest. During the 1970s,
Trinidad helped to establish the defense forces of
Barbados and Antigua. Strains between Trinidad and
other Eastern Caribbean countries over economic
policies and the fallout from Trinidad's criticism of
the Grenada intervention, however, work against
Trinidad's joining the system in the foreseeable
future.
professionalism and integration of forces.
Prospects
We believe that upgrading the memorandum of
understanding to treaty status would be an important
demonstration of Eastern Caribbean commitment to
regional security needs. Considering the current
snail's pace of negotiations, however, we doubt that
the treaty or the US-UK training proposal will be
approved by the Eastern Caribbean governments until
late this year at the earliest. We believe that, under
the training proposal, the Special Service Units and
coast guards would represent a major improvement
over what existed five years ago and would be
effective for internal and collective security. Given the
present lack of a serious subversive threat in the
Eastern Caribbean, we judge that the most important
benefit of the RSS and the coast guard system
ultimately might be their role in search-and-rescue,
disaster relief, and narcotics interdiction. Distrust and
uncertainty among Eastern Caribbean leaders may be
overcome by further exercises such as "Exotic Palm"
and the coming "Ocean Venture"-programs that
will point out RSS deficiencies as well as promote
No matter what shape the RSS finally takes, we
believe the Eastern Caribbean islands will continue to
call on Washington for security assistance. At a
minimum, requests for support will center on funding
and training. We believe that constabularies in the
ministates, despite RSS training, can deal with only
minor and sporadic incidents. Widespread and
prolonged internal unrest or external aggression could
strain the capabilities of even a regional quick-
reaction security force. Should the RSS collapse
altogether, it would become more likely that
Washington would be called on to take unilateral
action to restore order.
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Eastern Caribbean:
Growing Narcotics Threat'
Growing US and local interdiction efforts directed
against customary Caribbean drug trafficking routes
over the past year apparently have prompted narcotics
dealers to seek alternative routes in the Eastern
Caribbean. The rise in trafficking and its expected
side effects-official corruption and drug abuse-will
present a serious challenge to the limited manpower
and material resources of governments in the region.
islands. Local authorities doubt, however, that any
major international drug figures are operating in the
area yet. They believe that international airports and
cruise ships are the principle conduits for marijuana
and cocaine targeted for the US market. Yachts and
small interisland cargo ships often transport drugs to
lightly patrolled coastal points for reshipment to
major markets.
Production and Trafficking
Local drug production and international trafficking so
far have not had a significant economic or social
impact in the Eastern Caribbean, according to the US
Embassy in Antigua. Marijuana-grown in small
quantities on virtually all the islands-is the only
illegal drug produced in the region. Marijuana is used
mostly by local youth, particularly members of the
Rastafarian cult, who claim it is essential to their
religious practices. Although no statistics are
available on drug abuse in the islands, local officials
believe that marijuana use is rising. Officials in
Dominica, for example, estimate that up to 50 percent
of the population occasionally use it. According to
local authorities, cocaine use in the islands is limited
mainly to affluent visitors.
US Embassy reporting indicates that increased
interdiction operations have curtailed drug traffic
along customary routes, encouraging traffickers to
shift to the Eastern Caribbean to avoid enforcement
efforts. Traditionally considered a smugglers'
paradise because of their many isolated bays and
coves, the Eastern Caribbean islands provide an ideal
operating area for traffickers. Embassy reporting
indicates that loosely organized small-time
traffickers-local and foreign-operate in all the
' For the purpose of this article, the Eastern Caribbean includes
Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Christopher-Nevis, St.
Barbados. According to the Embassy, local police
believe that Jamaica is the main supplier of drugs
intercepted in Barbados-a principal transshipment
point in the area-but that Guyana and Trinidad are
emerging as secondary sources. Marijuana apparently
is shipped to Barbados for domestic consumption, sale
to tourists, and transshipment. In mid-1985, following
the seizure of some $250,000 worth of marijuana at
Grantley Adams Airport, Barbadian customs officials
estimated that they had confiscated nearly $1 million
worth of illegal drugs at the island's sea and air ports
during the first half of 1985. Since then, varying
amounts of marijuana have been discovered on flights
originating in Jamaica. Of even greater concern to
local officials, according to the Embassy, is the recent
influx of cocaine into the country, which local police
believe comes from Trinidad and Guyana. In
September, while investigating a murder, police
discovered $500,000 worth of cocaine in the home of a
wealthy Barbadian businessman. Police believe the
cocaine is imported mainly to be sold to foreign
tourists, according to the US Embassy.
Antigua. Recent seizures of drugs reveal that Antigua
is being used by Colombian traffickers as an
increasingly important transshipment point for
narcotics destined for the United States and Canada.
Last October, Antiguan police discovered 17,400
pounds of marijuana stored in a house in the capital
city of St. Johns, by far the largest drug seizure ever
made in that country. A longtime Antiguan resident,
Secret
ALA LAR 86-003
17 January 1986
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New Drug Trafficking Route
The Bahamas
Cuba
Turks and Caicos
Islands (U.K.)
Mexico Emerging
' Belize
Guatemala
EI "`'i
Saivadoc
Honduras
Nicaragua
Costa
Rica
Traditional routes
Puerto
Rico
tUS,
Bermuda
(U.K.)
Christopher
and Nevis
oorr$ ita
Maetlttique (Fr.)
St. Lucia i?
Saint Vincent and
,the Grenadines
'-Grenada.
Trinidad
and
Tobago
Boundary tepresentatton is
not necessarily aothorite i've_
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Mike Tyrell turned himself in to police as owner of
the drugs. Tyrell-with a record of several convictions
for similar offenses in Guadeloupe and the United
Kingdom-was fined the maximum penalty of $5,580
but sentenced to only six weeks of hard labor, a
sentence he has yet to begin serving.
ghat Tyrell is the main
contact for Colombian traffickers who use the island
for marijuana and cocaine transshipment. Police
believe that Antigua's busy international airport and
its considerable yacht trade-the Embassy estimates
that 500 boats anchor in St. John's harbor on any
given day during the December-April tourist season-
make the island particularly attractive to traffickers.
because of the lack of progress in recent efforts by
police to conduct investigations into official
wrongdoing. In Antigua,
several government o cia s,
are involved in narcotics traffiicking,~
The Embassy reports that
high-ranking police officials also may be involved,
Police commissioners in St. Lucia and St. Vincent
were suspended from duty last year while under
investigation for corruption, but no credible evidence
has been produced to indicate their direct involvement
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Elsewhere. Local police believe that St. Lucia and
Dominica are used for the movement of narcotics to
the nearby French Departments of Martinique and
Guadeloupe. Dominica's police commissioner has
complained to US officials about the lack of French
cooperation on drug control issues on neighboring
islands and of the absence of formal security
arrangements. The US Consul in Martinique reports
an upsurge of narcotics trafficking through the
French Departments but notes that French officials
believe that smuggling operations between St. Lucia
and Martinique are insignificant and dismiss
allegations of air shipments to Paris originating in
Dominica or St. Lucia. Similarly, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines Prime Minister Mitchell, in conversations
with Embassy officials, minimizes reports of
increasing drug smuggling activities in the
Grenadines, implying that the sources of such reports
are self-serving senior police officers.
in narcotics trafficking.
Government Antidrug Efforts
Police on all the Eastern Caribbean islands
periodically undertake special operations to disrupt
cultivation of marijuana and its trade, although in
general their governments are poorly prepared to deal
with increasing drug activities. Local police forces
already are stretched thin and only a few police
officers from Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, and St.
Vincent have participated in DEA detection or related
training courses. The two largest discoveries of drugs
by Barbadian police last year apparently were
accidental-in one case during the course of a murder
investigation and in the other during a routine
examination of unclaimed cargo at the local airport.
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Drug-Related Official Corruption
Official corruption in many Caribbean countries,
probably has increased in response to expanded drug
activities. Low wages and other meager perquisites
available in the ministates are conducive to the offer
and solicitation of bribes to police, customs officers,
and other government officials. According to the
Embassy, police in Barbados believe that customs
officials allow traffickers to operate there in exchange
for bribes of $5,000 to $10,000. They suspect that
high-level Barbadian officials may be involved
Moreover, local officials have told
Embassy officers that their governments have
increased antidrug efforts but are hampered by their
inability to patrol coastal areas adequately and by
their difficulty in obtaining hard evidence needed to
arrest and convict suspected traffickers. In addition to
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manpower shortages, limited equipment restricts the
effectiveness of antidrug operations. None of the
smaller islands' security forces, for example, has
airplanes or helicopters. Existing legislation is
inadequate to discourage narcotics offenders;
penalties generally are light and laws vary from island
to island. Although regional leaders agreed in
November that efforts should be made to coordinate
narcotics legislation, apparently nothing concrete has
resulted so far.
The well-publicized seizures of marijuana and cocaine
in Barbados and Antigua have made local
governments more aware of narcotics activities and
prompted appeals for US assistance. Government
leaders in Grenada, St. Lucia, Barbados, and Antigua
have publicly labeled narcotics activities a serious
problem for their countries. Last March Prime
Minister Blaize of Grenada announced the creation of
a high-level security task force in trafficking on drugs
and contraband. Concerned by the apparent
movement of trafficking eastward in the Caribbean,
Barbadian officials have requested US aid in forming
a narcotics coordinating committee. Antiguan Deputy
Prime Minister Bird announced plans in October to
establish a narcotics squad and requested US help in
organizing it
Outlook
Despite increased local awareness and antidrug
efforts, we see little chance of stemming the flow of
illegal drugs and accompanying problems into the
Eastern Caribbean anytime soon. Continued
crackdowns on drug activities in Jamaica and The
Bahamas will encourage traffickers to expand their
operations further in the Eastern Caribbean. US-
trained police special service units in each island may
develop a greater counternarcotics role that could
produce a pool of trained personnel to improve US-
supported antinarcotics programs. Nevertheless,
although local officials express concern about rising
trafficking and its potentially serious social
consequences, they remain reluctant to deal with the
problem aggressively. They fear endangering their
vital tourist sectors by instituting strict customs
searches or raids on hotels and nightspots despite
evidence that tourists are bringing in drugs or
purchasing them locally.
Similar to the pattern in Jamaica and The Bahamas,
increased trafficking activity in the Eastern
Caribbean almost certainly will prompt a rise in local
drug consumption and official corruption. The lure of
drug dollars will be especially difficult to combat
because the ministates already are facing high
unemployment and other economic problems. Limited
economic opportunities, especially for young people,
suggest that illegal drugs-whether as a means of
profit or escape-will pose a long-term problem for
the region.
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Uruguay-USSR:
Relations Under
Sanguinetti '
The Soviet Union has significantly increased its
commercial and political overtures to Uruguay since
the latter's return to civilian rule last March. Moscow
has agreed to purchase a variety of Uruguayan
products and has promoted several exchanges of
commercial delegations. In addition, the USSR is
cultivating contacts with leaders of Uruguay's
political parties, especially within the leftist Broad
Front coalition. Moscow exerts the greatest influence
over the Communist Party-a Broad Front
member-to which it clandestinely channels funds.
? In September 1984 Uruguay granted Moscow full
trade representation and, in return, the USSR
agreed to purchase $120 million of Uruguayan
exports in 1985, up from an annual average of
approximately $70 million.
? The USSR offered preferential trade credits in 1985
for purchases of Soviet machinery and equipment,
according to the US Embassy.
? In June 1985, the Soviets pledged to increase
purchases of Uruguayan products by 12 percent by
the end of 1985, especially in nontraditional exports.
In July, Moscow made its first purchase of
While relations between Moscow and Montevideo are
improving, we do not believe that the USSR is likely
to gain significant political influence in Uruguay over
the next few years. Moscow will probably refrain from
promoting revolutionary violence in Uruguay during
this period because it wants to develop positive state-
to-state relations and to avoid provoking the anti-
Communist military.
Increased Economic Ties
President Sanguinetti, needing to revive Uruguay's
ailing economy, has publicly emphasized the
importance of trade expansion in overcoming high
unemployment and the burdensome foreign debt.
Moscow has taken advantage of this by increasing
commercial dealings with Uruguay, probably
calculating that small economic investments would
eventually produce relatively big political payoffs.
The USSR appears eager to exploit Sanguinetti's
openness to trade and is increasing purchases of
Uruguayan goods-even though it already runs a
modest trade deficit with Montevideo. The increased
trade contacts between the two countries, which
began during the final months of military rule in
Uruguay, have included:
? In July 1984 Moscow agreed to sell Montevideo
5,000 barrels a day of oil for six months at
concessionary prices.
Uruguayan citrus fruit.
Several other projected Soviet trade initiatives could
enhance Uruguayan-Soviet economic ties in 1986.
Moscow plans to create mixed commissions and to
sponsor more commercial contacts between the two
countries. Last August, a deputy from the ruling
Colorado Party traveled to the USSR to discuss a
possible trade agreement to cover the next Soviet
Five-Year Plan (1986-91). In addition, it is possible
that Aeroflot could open an office in Montevideo
Seeking Increased Political and Cultural Influence
Moscow is also seeking to strengthen its ties to
Montevideo through various cultural exchanges. The
Soviet-Uruguayan Cultural Center in Montevideo
(ICUS)-dormant since the 1973 coup-reopened in
early November. This year ICUS plans to offer
Russian-language classes, a variety of theatrical and
cultural events, and scholarships for Uruguayan
former directors of the institute for alleged espionage
activities during the 1950s and 1960s.
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ALA LAR 86-003
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The Soviets, in our view, also hope to enhance their
political influence by courting politicians from
Uruguay's two "traditional" political parties, the
generally centrist Blancos and Colorados. Most
One of the most effective means used by Moscow to
influence PCU policy is the party's daily newspaper,
La Hora.
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important,
Moscow has invited Sanguinetti for an official visit in
1986 to mark 60 years of diplomatic relations between
the two countries.
US Embassy and other reports indicate the Soviets
are courting Blanco Party members, especially Juan
Raul Ferreira, son of Blanco president, Wilson
Ferreira, and leader of his own left-of-center Blanco
faction. According to the Embassy, Juan Raul
traveled to Moscow in February 1985 and later
attended a private dinner at the Soviet Embassy in
Montevideo. While Juan Raul's leftist views make
him a logical candidate for Soviet attention, we
suspect that Moscow is also seeking out more
moderate-and more influential-Blanco leaders.
We believe, however, that the Soviets' best hopes for
long-term political influence in Uruguay lie with the
Broad Front (FAU), a coalition of leftwing opposition
parties. Currently, the FAU ranks a poor third after
the Colorados and Blancos, but, over the long term,
we believe the party has the potential to become a
major force in Uruguayan politics. FAU leader Liber
Seregni-a well-known former general and
independent leftist-is
well disposed toward Moscow.
Moscow is
assiduously cultivating Seregni and urged him to visit
several Communist capitals during 1985 to enhance
his domestic political standing and international
exposure. In addition, the Soviets already exert
control over the strongest party within the FAU-the
Uruguayan Communist Party (PCU).
Soviet-PCU Relations
The Soviets have maintained longstanding ties to the
Uruguayan Communists. Many PCU leaders-
including party Secretary General Rodney
Arismendi-were in exile in Moscow during the last
period of military rule in Uruguay. Under democracy,
Moscow continues to invite PCU leaders to the USSR
In addition, the Soviets channel considerable financial
aid directly to the Communist Party. Legal
Uruguayan export-import companies owned by the
PCU, and the Moscow-based International Bank of
the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA),
We believe that one of the Soviets' chief objectives is
to rein in ultraleftist elements within the PCU and the
Broad Front that have tried to destabilize Sanguinetti
through constant labor and political agitation.
Moscow, in our view, believes that at present there is
little revolutionary potential in the country and views
that such actions could jeopardize its current
emphasis on good state-to-state relations and lead, in
the long run, to the return of an anti-Soviet military
regime. In a similar vein
Moscow has avoided contacts with leftist
Tupamaro ex-guerrillas because it is concerned that
publicity resulting from such activities could tarnish
the PCU's reputation and diminish the electoral
prospects of the FAU.
=the PCU has established a link to a dissident
Tupamaro faction that advocates prompt return to
for relaxation and ideological training
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armed struggle. Although we suspect that these
contacts are independent of either the PCU or any of
its factions, it is possible that Moscow-ever willing
to keep open the option of an eventual return to
revolutionary violence-has tacitly sanctioned them.
Outlook
We believe the Soviets will make modest economic
and cultural gains in Uruguay over the next year. The
USSR is starting from a position of very slight
influence, however, and progress will result primarily
from the demise of the aggressively anti-Soviet ethos
fostered by past military regimes. We judge that it
will be difficult for Moscow to translate its successes
into political influence. Both Sanguinetti's relatively
strong political standing and Uruguay's basically
liberal-democratic political culture militate against
extensive Soviet inroads.
Sanguinetti himself is dealing very cautiously with
Moreover, Sanguinetti has not yet responded to
Moscow's persistent offers of an official state visit.
We also believe that in the next few years the Soviets
will continue to oppose terrorism and destabilizing
labor agitation by ultraleftists as unwise provocations
of the military and detrimental to their efforts to
improve relations with the Sanguinetti government.
Longer run prospects for Soviet penetration will hinge
largely on internal Uruguayan politics. We doubt that
Moscow will be able to increase significantly its
leverage with the Blanco and Colorado Parties. Only
under a Broad Front government, in our view, could
Moscow potentially wield considerable political
influence. Opposition from the military, moderate
views of the majority of Uruguayans, and the Front's
internal disarray, however, will probably keep the
FAU on the political sidelines over the next several
years. Nevertheless, Moscow's rapport with Liber
Serengi and close ties to the PCU would stand it in
good stead in the unlikely event that the Front
achieved power.
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Brazil: Implications
of the Mayoral Elections
The outcome of the nationwide municipal elections on
15 November left the majority party in President
Sarney's uneasy coalition government weakened, but
the President's position probably will be strengthened.
We believe Sarney will receive greater cooperation
from party leaders in Congress and will now have a
free hand to reshuffle the Cabinet and staff it with
loyalists. The elections also enhanced the stature and
future presidential prospects of populist leaders on the
right and the left, whose campaigns exploited
working-class dissatisfaction with the pace of social
reform. In the aftermath of the vote, we expect
political parties and their leaders to show increasing
responsiveness to popular demands, auguring
difficulty for economic stabilization. With the
elections confirming new strength of political factions
on the left and right, we believe it is possible that
Brazilian political groups could polarize around
extreme positions in the future.
Winners and Losers
The Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB),
the senior partner in Sarney's governing coalition, was
hurt in the election. The PMDB, the only party
organized throughout the country, maintained its
strength in the interior of the country, capturing 116
out of the 160 contested municipalities, but it lost in
Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Sarney, who did not
campaign on behalf of the PMDB, believed the results
weakened the party's often uncooperative leadership
headed by Sao Paulo delegate Ulysses Guimares,
Moreover, we
believe the PMDB's electoral setbacks will permit
Sarney to reshuffle his cabinet, stacking it with
loyalists as he sees fit. Most of the cabinet has
publicly indicated intentions to resign in early
February.
We believe the PMDB, whose standard bearer-
Fernando Henrique Cardoso-was defeated in Sao
Paulo, will be casting about for new presidential
timber in the coming year, as well as regrouping for
the Congressional and gubernatorial elections
scheduled for November. Its setbacks are likely to
spark infighting within the party and Sarney probably
will exploit this by making alliances with leaders
outside the coalition, according to the US Embassy.
Such a strategy could prove effective in securing
support for social reform legislation in the PMDB-
controlled Congress, but will require Sarney to
fashion alliances on an issue-by-issue basis, a
politically risky proposition.
Ex-President Janio Quadros, the new mayor of Sao
Paulo, defeated the PMDB on its home turf.
According to the US Consulate, Quadros's support
came from the conservative business elite, the working
class, young voters, and the poor, who were drawn to
his promises to attack government inefficiency and
restore law and order. Over the near term, Sarney will
benefit from Quadros's return to the national scene.
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Sarney's Liberal Front Party (PFL), which endorsed
his campaign. Nonetheless, some Brazilian political
commentators speculate that Quadros may want to
succeed Sarney, and we believe his connections with
the conservative business community, grassroots
support, and charisma make him a force to be
reckoned with in the coming months.
Meanwhile, the charismatic Leonel Brizola-the
prominent governor of Rio de Janeiro-probably
enhanced his prospects to succeed Sarney. Wherever
he campaigned on behalf of his Democratic Workers
Party candidates, Brizola's personality and his record
in office were the primary issues and often helped the
candidates he supported, according to the US
Consulate. He probably will try to expand his national
organization in preparation for direct presidential
elections by striking alliances with leaders across the
political spectrum, in our view. Brizola-who makes
no secret of his presidential ambitions-has already
attempted an alliance with his longstanding rival on
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the left, Lula da Silva of the Workers Party, to push
for presidential elections before 1988, according to the
US Embassy.
boost their influence in national policymaking. Such a
shift could have adverse consequences for future
economic stability, as populists with more organized
public support demand greater wage increases and
social spending, and the creation of jobs for an ever-
New Political Concerns
The mayoral elections surfaced a range of issues that
the government will need to act on to retain popular
support. Brazilian press reports indicate, for example,
that the campaigns in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro
showed widespread sentiment for greater municipal
action against street crime. Voters also signaled their
impatience with government redtape, corruption, and
inefficiency by rejecting incumbents in many major
cities, according to local political commentators.
These same commentators also noted a stronger voter
preference for candidates who promised to deliver
more city services and increase social spending. F_
We believe that the prominent emphasis given to
issues of social reform and honest government augur
changes in Brazil's patrimonial political system.
Under civilian rule, Brazil's Congress is still drawing
criticism as an "elitist organization" in the media. We
believe incumbents facing reelection in November will
probably become more assertive about political
reform. Congress is already slated to consider
legislation transferring many federal powers back to
the states, according to the US Embassy. Labor
reform and new social welfare programs are also
likely to receive greater congressional scrutiny in the
months ahead.
Simultaneously, voters indicated the need for a
stronger party system. Although 25 parties sponsored
candidates, only six showed significant strength
among voters. We believe that most smaller parties
will now disappear, strengthening the base for
representative government.
Signs To Watch
Some Brazilian political pundits
rawing on lessons from Brazilian
history-suggest there is potential for trouble should
political reforms fail to materialize. Although their
evidence is tenuous and their assessments preliminary,
we share some of their concerns. Populist leaders, like
Quadros and Brizola, could capitalize on any popular
dissatisfaction with the pace of political reform to
expanding work force.
Moreover, the elections confirm the growing strength
of leftist forces in Brazil. Representatives of the left-
of-center Democratic Workers Party and the Workers
Party won races in Rio de Janeiro, Porto Alegre and
Fortaleza, as well as 15 interior cities. These groups
could provide fertile ground for Soviet Bloc
interference. The Cubans, East Germans, and Soviets
have increased their contacts and offers of political
training to members of the Workers Party in the past
year We
believe the Cubans may also target this party as
having the potential to become a significant leftist
force in the future.
These commentators also believe that Quadros could
become a political troublemaker. US Embassy
reporting indicates he is an erratic person-he
resigned the presidency under mysterious
circumstances 24 years ago-but he also possesses
charisma, especially among conservatives. Should
Quadros be willing and able to mold these forces into
a coordinated opposition to the left, it is possible that
politics could polarize, a development that led to
major political upheavals in the 1930s, 1940s, and
1960s. This scenario could occur if weakened centrist
parties are unable to recover from their recent
electoral setbacks, steadily lose influence, and leave
the political moderates without a representative base.
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Latin America
Briefs
Havana announced on 8 January that Idalberto Ladron de Guevara had been
removed from his post as Attorney General and that Vice Minister of Justice Dr.
Ramon de la Cruz Ochoa would replace him. Ladron de Guevara had held the
position since 1980, when his predecessor was removed as a result of the
government's initiation of a "get-tough" policy aimed at stemming the sharply
increasing crime rate. Although no reason was given for the Attorney General's
dismissal, it most likely is unrelated to the series of top-level reassignments and
personnel changes in the Cuban leadership that have occurred over the past year in
preparation for the Third Party Congress in February.
Ladron de Guevara has actually been out of circulation for more than a year. In
mid-1984, President Castro personally ordered formal charges brought against
him for shooting a young Cuban
Ladron de Guevara was in jail but attributed his arrest to unspecified charges
related to corruption. Since 1983, Cuba's legal system has been rocked by a
sweeping bribery investigation that has resulted in the arrests of dozens of lawyers
and judges-including five of the Supreme Court's seven judges,
who reportedly accepted payoffs for acquittal verdicts
or light sentences.
Trinidad and Tobago Efforts To Revamp Oil-Based Economy
Port of Spain's recent devaluation of the local dollar and proposed new investment
code will help to revitalize the country's economy over the long term, but the
devaluation is causing problems for its Caribbean trading partners. In response to
the weakening world oil market, Trinidad and Tobago has been attempting to
diversify away from the dominant petroleum sector, which presently contributes 25
percent of GDP-compared with 43 percent in 1980. To lay the foundations for
future growth, the government is seeking to lure foreign investors to the fledgling
manufacturing sector. An overvalued exchange rate, high local wages, and
restrictive government policies traditionally have limited foreign investment in
Trinidad's manufacturing sector, which currently contributes only 7 percent of the
country's GDP. The proposed liberalization of the investment code would permit
full foreign ownership of assets, thereby canceling the required joint ventureship
that has previously been a major barrier to investment.
The 33-percent devaluation will help stem heavy losses in foreign exchange
reserves, which dropped 65 percent to an estimated $500 million in 1985. Although
the devaluation exempts essential foodstuffs and a few other imports, inflation in
29 Secret
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by the devaluation.
this highly import-dependent economy probably will exceed in 1986 the moderate
7-percent rate of 1985. Moreover, based on their recent successes in liberalizing
severance pay, we believe Trinidad's influential labor unions will win wage
increases that partially offset improved international wage competitiveness caused
present $118 million standby program.
The devaluation already is putting pressure on other Caribbean Community
(CARICOM) countries dependent on Trinidad and Tobago-the largest economy
in the English-speaking Caribbean-as an export market. Difficulties are most
pronounced in Barbados, Port of Spain's largest CARICOM trading partner,
which is struggling to resist a similar devaluation. The floating currency thus far
has held steady in Jamaica, Trinidad's second-largest regional trading partner, but
slippage could further imperil negotiations with the IMF. The Seaga government's
resistance to another devaluation of the Jamaican dollar is a major sticking point
in the IMF's expected consideration in late January of whether to continue the
Panama Military Reassignments
Ow Young, for example, was transferred to a minor base command.
Defense Chief Noriega recently reinforced his control over the military through
reassignments to the General Staff and other key commands. Intelligence Chief
was implicated in plotting against the
which has a large concentration of troops headquartered near the capital.
controlled by his deputy Major Samudio, another favorite of Noriega. The Defense
Chief chose a trusted family member as commander of the key Battalion 2000,
Defense Chief at the time of the Spadafora murder scandal last September. His
replacement-Colonel Barrera, a staunch Noriega loyalist-is an ineffectual
leader, probably will be
had won the 1984 election with two-thirds of the vote.
Chile's universities are becoming a focus of political protest and will probably fuel
anti-Pinochet agitation when classes resume in March. The Christian Democrat-
led centrist coalition narrowly outpolled the Communist slate in student federation
elections at the University of Chile last October. The contests-only the second
elections at the country's largest university since the military took power-saw the
centrist ticket capture 32.6 percent of the vote compared with 32.1 percent for the
Communist-dominated and violence-prone Popular Democratic Movement (MDP),
according to US Embassy reports. A runoff between the top two slates was avoided
when the MDP conceded defeat and was then offered key positions on the
federation's executive board by the Christian Democrats, provoking charges of
collusion from the right. Pressure from moderate sectors in the Christian
Democratic Party proper and from participants in the National Accord prevented
the formation of another combined Christian Democrat/MDP student slate, which
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The elections reflect student opinion in universities throughout the country, and, in
our view, are also interpreted by the public and the regime as a measure of the
general political climate in the absence of national elections. Most Chilean
observers probably will conclude that the far left-one-third of the student
electorate-is making gains despite government efforts to reduce radical influence
on campus. Also, even the modest postelectoral cooperation between the Christian
Democratic youth and the MDP will, in our view, fuel government suspicions that
centrists are forming coalitions with Communists, making President Pinochet less
willing to deal with the moderate opposition
The small but growing leftist faction in the opposition People's United Party (PUP)
is positioning itself to try to take control of key party posts at the party convention
scheduled for this month, . Assad
Shoman, Said Musa, and V. H. Courtenay-former leftist ministers in the PUP
government that ruled from 1964 to 1984-hope to unseat the party's centrist
leadership by acquiring control of an expanded executive committee. Musa
reportedly is seeking the party chairmanship while Courtenay is angling to become
deputy party leader. Although Shoman is not vying for a key post himself-he will
probably become youth organizer-he reportedly would like to help a leftist
replace moderate Florencio Marin as PUP leader of the opposition in the House of
Representatives.
The PUP has become increasingly polarized between conservative and leftist
factions since its decisive electoral defeat in December 1984. Each faction blames
the other for losses that resulted in the return of only six incumbents to the 28-
member House. Since then the leftists have tried to discredit the moderate wing
with charges of corruption, while former Prime Minister and party leader George
Price has attempted to portray Shoman and his supporters as Communists. In our
judgment, the party convention is unlikely to resolve the internal conflicts or result
in a major ideological realignment. Although the leftists probably will increase
their representation in party councils, we believe Price has sufficient political
strength to engineer his reelection and prevent leftists from taking control of the
party.
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Cuba Chronology
1 December East Germany's Foreign Trade Minister, Horst Soelle, arrives in Havana. Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez welcomes him at Jose Marti International Airport.
Ecuadorean President Febres-Cordero sends Fidel Castro a message expressing
concern over the damage caused in Cuba by Hurricane Kate.
The second meeting of Intellectuals for the Sovereignty of Latin America is held in
Havana. Fidel Castro and Armando Hart host a reception for delegates attending
the meeting.
2 December Raul Castro presides over a ceremony commemorating the 29th anniversary of the
landing of the Granma and the Revolutionary Armed Forces. Division General
Sixto Batista Santana speaks at the ceremony.
Secretary General of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, Kaysone Phomvihan,
meets with Juan Almeida in Vientiane.
People crowd bookstores in Havana to obtain Fidel and Religion, a book about
Castro written by Brazilian theologist Frei Betto.
Granma announces that Commander of the Revolution, Ramiro Valdez, has been
dismissed from his post as Interior Minister and is being replaced by Gen. Jose
Abrantes Fernandez.
Panamanian Foreign Minister, Jorge Abadia Arias, says that his country's
relations with Cuba are excellent, very "cordial, and get closer day by day."
Politburo member Jorge Risquet transmits greetings from Cuba to the Second
Congress of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola and states that in
both war and peace Cuba will stand next to Angola.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez attends the 13th session of cooperation between East
Germany and Cuba. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and East Germany's Horst Soelle
discuss economic activities of the two countries and a protocol to establish
cooperation in the sugar, citrus, and construction industries.
The first Cuban communications specialists arrive in Vietnam to assess the
assembly and operation of a microwave network that will link the north and south
of the country.
At the 14th session of the OAS in Cartagena, Colombia proposes that Cuba rejoin
the OAS. Secretary of State Shultz says there is no reason for Cuba to return to
the organization.
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Cuban Labor leader Jesus Escandel arrives in Lima and meets with Peruvian labor
leader Isidoro Gamarra to discuss the regional labor movement. Escandel attends
the Latin American workers' meeting on debt.
4 December Vice President of the Council of Ministers, Juan Almeida, arrives in Hanoi and is
decorated with the Ho Chi Minh Order by Truong Chinh.
Ramiro Valdez will continue to be a "heavyweight"
in Cuba and that his removal as Interior Minister was planned some eight months
ago.
Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso and Jorge Risquet meet in Luanda to
discuss the struggle of the South African people against the apartheid regime.
Raul Castro visits the East German Embassy in Havana to sign the book of
condolences following the death of East German Defense Minister Heinz
Hoffmann.
Ricardo Cabrizas meets with the new President of the Soviet State Committee for
Foreign Economic Relations Konstantin Katushev to discuss Soviet aid to repair
damages caused by Hurricane Kate.
5 December In Mexico City, Flavio Bravo says that Cuba has studied the foreign debt problem
and has shown with figures that it is unpayable from a moral, economic, and
political point of view.
In an interview on Argentine television, Peruvian President Alan Garcia expresses
sympathy and admiration for Fidel Castro saying Fidel has done a lot for his
people.
At the United Nations, Cuban Ambassador Oscar Oramas accuses the United
States of being principally responsible for human rights violations worldwide.
Uruguayan Foreign Minister Iglesias tells Prensa Latina that his country's
relations with Cuba are very good, are being normalized with extraordinary speed,
and are navigating under full sail.
6 December US consular officials have started interviewing about 75 political prisoners Castro
has allowed to leave Cuba following an appeal by American Catholic churchmen.
Ricardo Cabrizas and Soviet official Boris Aristov sign an agreement by which the
Soviet Union will provide Cuba substantial donations to repair damages caused by
Hurricane Kate.
Zimbabwean Education Minister Mutumbuka announces in Harare that more
than 1,000 Zimbabwean students will travel to Cuba next year to study in a
teacher-training school.
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Jorge Risquet reiterates Cuba's solidarity with the Namibian cause for
independence to the President of SWAPO, Sam Nujoma, during a meeting in
Luanda.
7 December According to documents prepared by Cuba's leaders, the growth of exports, by at
least 5 percent per year, is the Cuban economy's first priority for 1986-90.
In Caracas, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez says US economic policy is leading the
international economy to greater recessions and that per capita income in Latin
America has dropped to the level of 1976.
8 December Juan Almeida arrives in Phnom Penh and is welcomed by Say Phuthang, member
of the Cambodian ruling party Central Committee Political Bureau.
Juan Almeida meets with Hun Sen, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of
Cambodia, and reiterates Cuba's support for the party, government, and people of
Cambodia.
Jorge Risquet meets with Soviet official Geydar Aliyev in Luanda and affirms that
both Cuba and the USSR will continue providing decisive support to Angola.
In an interview in El Pais, the president of Cuba's Episcopal Conference,
Monsignor Adolfo Rodriguez, acknowledges that there has been a thaw in
relations between the church and the government.
10 December In Mexico City, Flavio Bravo says that Nicaragua did the right thing when it
refused to sign the Contadora peace document because the document was making
more and more concessions to the United States.
11 December Jorge Risquet meets with Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos, who accepts an
invitation transmitted by Risquet to participate in the Third Congress of the
Communist Party of Cuba.
The Uruguayan Senate approves the appointment of retired Navy Cap. Bernardo
Pinura as Ambassador to Cuba.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez arrives in Italy and delivers a letter from Fidel Castro to
Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti inviting Italian Chief of State Francesco
Cossiga to visit Cuba.
In a press conference, the president of the USSR's Petroleum and Gas Workers
Labor Union, Vladimir Sedenko, says that during the next five years 2 million
metric tons of oil will be produced in Cuba, and Cuban technicians will be trained
in the USSR in gas and oil specialties.
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13 December Cuba and Hungary sign a five-year cooperation agreement. Cuba will receive a
zero-strength reactor from the Institute of Nuclear Energy, and the two countries
will exchange specialists and conduct joint scientific research.
Cuba asks Spain to extradite Manuel Antonio Sanchez Perez, a former high-
ranking Cuban official, claiming Perez tried to embezzle $499,000 in Cuban
Government funds.
The Spanish Government orders the expulsion of Cuban Embassy officials Angel
Alberto Leon Cervantes Abelardo Lopez Hernandez, Ramon Burroto Chavez, and
Ventura Corrientes.
15 December Diplomatic sources in Madrid report that Perez, who escaped a kidnap attempt by
Cuban Embassy officials, could provide the West with valuable information on
Cuban activities in Angola.
Havana press reports that Cuba's first heart transplant patient is in satisfactory
condition seven days after the operation.
16 December Fidel Castro makes the closing remarks at the Seventh International New Latin
American Film Festival, claiming that Latin American cinema has been a victim
of imperialist rule for many years.
Ricardo Alarcon and Hubert Wieland sign the final documents of the fourth joint
Cuban-Peruvian Economic Intergovernmental Commission, approving cooperation
for 1986 in eight areas.
Paris press reports that Mobuto Sese Seko, President of Zaire, received Vice
Minister of External Relations, Jorge Bolanos Suarez.
17 December Carlos Rafael Rodriguez arrives in Moscow to attend the 41st extraordinary
CEMA meeting. Discussions are held on scientific-technical programs through the
year 2000.
Havana press reports that there are over 1,500 Cuban women in Hungary working
as textile technicians and that another group works in the Icaruz bus factory.
18 December Raul Taladrid, Vice President of the State Committee for Economic Cooperation,
meets with high-level officials of Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland, West
Germany, to discuss strengthening ties.
In Angola, President Eduardo dos Santos and Levi Farah discuss economic
cooperation in housing construction, the manufacture of furniture, and forestry
work.
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Vice Foreign Minister Giraldo Mazola and Swedish Ambassador Jan Stahl sign
an agreement in Havana to renegotiate debt.
Granma announces that the Council of State has appointed Julio Tejas Perez as
Public Health Minister to replace Sergio del Valle.
Peruvian Senators Armando Villanueve and Guillermo Larco make a brief
stopover in Havana en route to Moscow. Villanueve delivers a greeting from the
Peruvian Government to Fidel Castro.
Cuba and Angola sign a five-year trade agreement for cooperation in the sugar
industry and the export of Cuban salt to Angola for consumption or reexport.
In an interview with El Pais, Perez says that Cuban Embassy officials tried to
kidnap him for fear that he would hand over or sell confidential information about
Cuba's economy that was in his possession.
Cuban Ambassador to Uruguay Joaguin Mas presents his credentials to
Uruguayan President Julio Maria Sanguinetti.
In a draft of the "Economic and Social Guidelines for the 1986-90 Five-Year
Plan" to be approved by the Third Party Congress in February, Cuba plans to
extract 2 million tons of crude oil by 1990.
21 December Levi Farah visits Libya for discussions with Libyan officials of bilateral relations
and international issues.
22 December Deputy Transportation Minister Otto Roca and Argentine Under Secretary of
Transportation, Pedro Agustin Trucco, sign a maritime transportation agreement
in Havana.
23 December In an interview on Brazilian TV, Fidel Castro says US Treasury Secretary James
Baker's proposal on debt will perpetuate the debt of Third World countries.
Argentine President Raul Alfonsin meets in Buenos Aires with Cuban National
Bank President Hector Rodriguez Llompart to discuss Latin American topics and
bilateral relations.
24 December Fidel Castro and Kurt Hager, Socialist Unity Party of Germany Politburo
member, attend the ceremony opening the "Tinima" beer factory in Camaguey,
built with East German cooperation.
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The crew and passengers of an Angolan Armed Forces transport aircraft that
made an emergency landing in Zaire on 1 December are returned to Luanda. The
plane was carrying 40 Cubans and four other foreign soldiers.
EFE reports that Cuban authorities have provided them with an interview
conducted in jail with Jose Garcia Pena, former Vice President of Cuba's National
Bank, disproving allegations by Manuel Sanchez Perez that Pena was dead.
25 December The Yugoslav Chamber of Economy assesses that Yugoslav-Cuban trade reached
$58.6 million in 1985, twice as much as the $24.9 million reached in 1984.
Peruvian Prime Minister Luis Alva Castro arrives in Havana at the invitation of
Fidel Castro, who receives him at the airport. Fisheries Minister Jose Palomino
accompanies the Prime Minister.
30 December Granma reports that Fidel Castro told the National Assembly that "Imperialism is
crazy and obsessive in its efforts to make our economic progress more difficult."
Castro also tells the National Assembly that Washington is trying to hinder
Cuban medical development by discouraging visits by doctors between the two
countries.
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