NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000200830001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 58
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 11, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Near East and
South Asia Review
11 April 1986
NESA NESAR 86-009
l l April l 986
441
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Articles An Iranian Victory Is in the US Interest: An Alternative View
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A credible case can be made that an Iranian victory in the Iran-Iraq
war would reduce the threat of additional Iranian military
adventures, foster political moderation in Tehran and Baghdad, and
enhance US security ties to Saudi Arabia and the smaller Persian
Gulf states.
The Iraqi Way of Death
Baghdad has been trying since the start of the Iran-Iraq war to limit
casualties, but it has not had much success, and the numerous
fatalities are having a serious short-term impact on Iraqi morale.
Saudi Youth: Coping With Slower Economic Growth
The younger generation in Saudi Arabia generally has been content
and apolitical for the past 50 years, but the economic downturn in
the kingdom is sharply reducing business and job opportunities, and
the government faces the task of preventing economic
disgruntlement among the young from developing into political
unrest.
Growing Polarization in Saudi Arabia's
Religious Community
The upsurge in Islamic fundamentalism throughout the Persian
Gulf region has strengthened the forces of religious conservatism in
Saudi Arabia and contributed to a widening rift between official
and populist Islam in the kingdom.
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NESA NESAR 86-009
11 April 1986
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Mysticism in Middle Eastern and South Asian Decisionmaking~l3
The mystical practice of divination-the attempt to foretell events
or discover hidden knowledge by occult or supernatural means-
plays aprominent role in guiding the decisions of some heads of
state, religious extremists, and terrorists in the Middle East and
South Asia.
The relationship between the Jordanian Government and
Palestinians on the East and West Banks remains uneasy in the
aftermath of King Hussein's termination of his dialogue with PLO
Chairman Arafat. While focusing on reassuring his East Bank
constituency, Hussein will take quiet steps to improve relations with
Egyptian Expatriate Labor
Already plagued with severe financial problems, Egypt may face
additional economic strains because of returning expatriate workers
seeking jobs in an economy flooded with semiskilled and unskilled
workers, and these strains are likely to worsen unrest among the
Egyptian populace.
Algeria: Shifting Stance Toward Chad
Policymakers in Algiers oppose French and Libyan involvement in
the Chadian civil war and have attempted through diplomatic
means to encourage a settlement, but Algiers appears to be moving
away from Libyan-backed rebel leader Goukouni and toward
Chadian President Habre.
Moroccan-French relations are based on strong historical, cultural,
and social influences. With Paris giving economic and commercial
assistance and Rabat serving as a pillar for French policy in North
Africa, the outlook for these ties is good.
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Inspired by ambitious leaders and by ideologies that incorporate the
myth of a single Arab nation, Arab states have frequently attempted
mergers over the last 30 years. Even though these efforts have
failed, the notion of unity is attractive to many Arabs and will
continue to be a rationale for further merger efforts.
India-Pakistan: Growing Interest in Electronic Warfare
India and Pakistan have shown increased interest in electronic
warfare, driven in part by its demonstrated importance in conflicts
outside the region. Both militaries have only a limited electronic
warfare capability and will require considerable training before they
can use their new equipment effectively.
India-Pakistan: NBC War-Fighting Capabilities ~
Indian and Pakistani military forces are unprepared to fight in a
nuclear, biological, or chemical environment despite concerns in
each country over the other's nuclear weapons potential and reports
of chemical weapons use in Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war, and
neither country is likely to move rapidly in this area.
Nuclear Scenarios in South Asia: Impact on the 43
Nonproliferation Regime
Nuclear weapons acquisition efforts by India and Pakistan are
damaging to the nonproliferation regime, with the degree of injury
depending partly on the kind of proliferation scenario that
materializes.
Burhanuddin Rabbani heads the Jamiat-i-Islami, the largest and
militarily most capable of the Afghan resistance groups. Rabbani's
personal appeal and ability to get along with rival insurgent leaders,
coupled with his skill in selecting good insurgent commanders, have
made him one of the most important and respected resistance
leaders.
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Libya: More Aid for Sudan
Tunisia: Borrowing Again
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Near East and
South Asia Review
An Iranian Victory Is
in the US Interest:
An Alternative View
Most observers believe that an Iranian victory over
Iraq would threaten US interests in the Middle East
by emboldening Tehran to export its revolution to
other Arab states. A credible case can be made,
however, that an Iranian victory would reduce the
threat of additional Iranian military adventures,
foster political moderation in Tehran and Baghdad,
and enhance US security ties to Saudi Arabia and the
smaller Persian Gulf states. In this alternative view,
an Iranian victory would include the removal of
Saddam Husayn, Iraqi admission of aggression, and
reparations to Tehran from Baghdad and the Arab
Gulf states-but not the establishment of a puppet
Shia regime in Iraq.
? Agreement by Iraq and the Arab Gulf states to give
Tehran war reparations, probably no less than $20
billion over a period of several years.
Alternative View Analysis
Although most observers believe that an Iranian
victory over Iraq would strengthen the radicals in
Tehran, the alternative view argues that a victorious
Iran is likely to become politically moderate sooner
than a defeated or stalemated Iran. This view holds
that the formidable forces of political moderation and
Westernization in Iran that have been cowed by war-
propelled Islamic radicalism would be revitalized in a
postwar Iran:
The alternative view holds that the Iranians would
claim military victory and agree to end the war
through negotiations without achieving their publicly
stated goal of toppling the Ba`thist government in
Baghdad. Iran will not hold out for the complete
military subjugation and occupation of Iraq because
this is logistically beyond its capabilities and would
risk a significant broadening of the conflict:
? Tehran realizes that it would risk a major military
confrontation with other Arab states if its objective
of establishing a Shia regime in Baghdad appeared
within its grasp.
? Syria would abandon Iran well before Baghdad's
fall because Damascus would view Iranian military
advances into Iraq as threatening its own security
interests.
? Iran would risk a Soviet commitment of combat
troops to Iraq to preserve Moscow's interests.
Still, the minimum Iranian requirements for a
negotiated settlement almost certainly would include:
? Removal of Saddam Husayn.
? Public Iraqi admission that it was the aggressor in
the war.
? Victory over Iraq would serve as an essential release
for the pervasive frustration and hostility that have
developed from the fall of the Shah, the US hostage
experience, and the increasing international
isolation of Iran. Without this release, the Iranians
are likely to remain radical, antagonistic, and
anti-United States.
? Tehran has diverted popular attention toward
external enemies to maintain the momentum of the
Islamic revolution. An end to the war would focus
attention on the country's extensive social and
economic problems, increasing antiregime sentiment
and activities.
? Moderate and Western-educated technocrats would
have a greater say in the rebuilding of Iran after the
war because developmental strategies and planning
would be emphasized and ideological pursuits would
become less important. Consequently, the influence
of the radical clerics would wane.
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NESA NESAR 86-009
l l Aprii ! 986
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? Desperation in the war has forced Iran to turn to
North Korea, Libya, and other radical states for
support. These ties will continue if there is a
stalemate. An Iranian victory ending the conflict
would open the way to better relations with more
moderate states.
A victory for Tehran would stop Iranian warmaking
efforts. Iran has neither the will nor the capability to
occupy Iraq militarily or to take on other countries in
the region. Despite its rhetoric, Tehran and the
Iranian population want an end to the death and
destruction caused by the war. The Iranians are likely
to settle for less than the establishment of a like-
minded regime in Baghdad:
? Sharply reduced oil revenues and dim prospects for
improvements in the oil market have made the
continuation of the war more costly. Another war
would be unthinkable from an economic and
military perspective.
? The defeat of Iraq would significantly weaken
Islamic fanaticism among the Revolutionary Guard
and the Basij because their rallying call to wreak
vengeance on Iraq in general, and on Saddam
Husayn in particular, would be undercut. Moreover,
there is little popular support for undertaking
another military conflict.
Iranian military pressure is promoting political
moderation in Baghdad and has led to improved ties
between Iraq and Arab moderates including Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan. An Iranian victory would
accelerate these trends by making Iraq even more
dependent on these moderate states for political and
financial support:
? The removal of the autocratic and ruthless Saddam
Husayn-a prerequisite for ending the war-is
unlikely to contribute initially to political instability
or an upheaval of the Iraqi political system. The
Ba`thist regime in Baghdad is firmly entrenched,
and Taha Ramadan-Husayn's likely successor-
probably would maintain Iraq's current more
moderate course.
? Baghdad's eagerness to subvert neighboring Arab
states-a hallmark of Iraqi foreign policy before the
war-will be sharply reduced if Iraq loses.
An Iranian victory would foster closer military and
security ties between the United States and the Arab
states of the Persian Gulf. Whether Tehran presented
a military threat or not, these states would perceive
themselves at risk. Saudi Arabia, in particular, would
look to an increased US presence in the region as the
principal deterrent to further Iranian military moves:
? To protect itself against possible Iranian retaliation
for its support of Iraq in the war, Riyadh almost
certainly would grant the United States, at least
temporarily, limited access to military facilities,
allow the pre-positioning of US military equipment
on its territory, and engage in more extensive
contingency planning with US military forces. The
Saudis would hope these moves would be sufficient
to deter Iranian aggression.
? The other states of the Gulf Cooperation Council
would follow the Saudi lead in improving ties to the
United States.
An Iranian victory would enhance US interests and
damage Soviet influence in the Middle East:
? The failure of the Soviet-trained, -advised, and
-equipped Iraqi forces almost certainly would lead
Baghdad to turn toward the West for new security
and military relationships, although it would
continue to rely on Moscow to maintain its largely
Soviet-equipped military.
? Iran's deep-rooted anti-Communism and suspicions
about Soviet intentions in southwest Asia preclude a
meaningful Iranian shift toward Moscow. After the
war, Tehran is likely to look to Western Europe and
Third World states, not to the Soviets, for arms
supplies.
? Tehran probably would devote more resources to
support the Afghan insurgents after defeating Iraq.
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The Iraqi Way of Death
Baghdad has been trying since the start of the Iran-
Iraq war to limit casualties, but it has not had much
success.
Iraqis killed in action through last year totaled
95,000. US diplomats in Baghdad believe another
10,000 died in the first three weeks of the current AI
Faw campaign that began in February. A Western
military attache based in Baghdad-extrapolating
from these figures-has concluded that 0.6 percent of
Iraq's population has been lost in the war, compared
with 0.02 percent of the US population lost in
Vietnam.'
Iraq's losses have been both psychologically and
militarily damaging. US diplomats believe that
practically every Iraqi family has lost a relative in the
fighting. According to a US diplomat based in
Baghdad, every foreigner in the Iraqi capital has a
story to tell about the death of soldiers connected in
some way to his embassy's Iraqi staff. Another US
diplomat says he is "holding his breath" because his
two domestics have six sons between them at AI Faw.
Given the high death rate, US officials say it is not
surprising that the mood in Iraq is funereal-"the
signs of death are everywhere."
The Signs of Death
Western military attaches who have visited the Al
Faw front say Iraqis who are killed are trucked to a
small town near the Kuwaiti border-Hawzah-
where they are consigned to waiting taxis for
transportation home. A taxi driver who had completed
a run to Hawzah the first week in March told an
attache that cabs were lined up by the hundreds
outside of town.
Frequently, according to a West European diplomat,
bodies of dead Iraqis cannot be returned home
because they are either too badly mangled or have
begun to decompose. if so, they are buried in a mass
grave. The victim's family is notified personally by a
government official. He confirms that the residence is
the correct one and informs the family members that
their relative is dead and that they may receive his
death benefits.
According to US diplomats, the most visible sign of a
soldier's death is a black banner with white lettering
that gives the vital details about the deceased and is
hung at the family's gate. They say such banners have
proliferated since the start of the Al Faw campaign
and that the government briefly considered forbidding
their use, hoping to disguise the extent of Iraqi losses.
No such action was taken-probably because of an
anticipated public outcry. Other signs of death are the
tents erected next to local mosques where bereaved
Muslim families traditionally receive condolences.
Muslim religious practice requires that the dead be
quickly interred, and among Iraq's Shia population
this is done immediately after the coffin has been
walked around the inner courtyard of one of the great
mosques in the holy cities of Najaf or Karbala. The
coffins are draped with Iraqi flags, signifying,
that they contain
soldiers who died honorably. The families of the
honored dead are awarded "martyrs' "ribbons.
Coffins containing the bodies of deserters are not flag
draped, and often they are inscribed with the Arabic
word for coward. Deserters' families are forbidden to
mourn in public-they cannot drape their homes,
wear black, or conduct the traditional wake.
Neighbors of such families are urged by the
government to shun them.
=Iraq's population is predominantly Muslim. The majority-55
percent-belong to the Shia sect. Twenty percent are Sunni Arabs,
Iran's losses have been much higher-probably about 300,000-
but Iran has a larger population than Iraq, and the Iranians,
inspired by Khomeini's Islamic fundamentalism, are more willing
to sacrifice their lives than arc the Iragis.0
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NESA NESAR 86-009
l 1 April 1986
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Death Benefits
To compensate the families of dead soldiers, the
government awards "martyrs"' benefits. A US
diplomatic source in Baghdad reported last year that
the family of a slain regular Army soldier received a
death gratuity of $32,000, a new automobile, a parcel
of agricultural land, a plot on which to build a home,
and a bank loan to finance it. (The source commented
that the loan was significant because, as a wartime
measure, banks have ceased lending money to
ordinary customers.) Early this year, however,
the benefits
package had been reduced-the families no longer
receive a car. Instead they get $7,400, the price of a
new Brazilian Volkswagen Passat.
since the resale value of a
Volkswagen is considerably more than $7,400, this
represents a substantial benefit cut.) Also, although
the families continue to receive a plot of land on
which to build a house, the agricultural parcel is no
longer available.
Late last year the government instituted a further
change affecting benefits for soldiers killed in
northern Iraq, the scene of a large-scale Kurdish
insurrection. A special "verification committee" is
now required to investigate the cause of death, and
only soldiers killed by Iranians are designated
"martyrs" and thus entitled to benefits. Others are
listed as "slain by insurgents," and their families are
compensated with a pension based on the soldier's pay
at the time of death.
The next of kin of slain militia recruits receive only
the equivalent of the victim's retirement pay in
monthly installments for life.
the wake, but no flag for the coffin, since that
privilege is restricted to regular Army officers.
The Affect on Popular Morale
The numerous fatalities are having a serious short-
term impact on Iraqi morale. According to US
diplomats, the atmosphere around the country is tense
as people wait for bad news from the front. There is
no panic, the diplomats report, but a "kind of numb
apprehension."
Typical of the widespread distress occasioned by the
losses is the activity in a large Shia village in southern
Iraq reported by a Western military attache. The
attache spoke with a prominent landowner who
functions as the village's shaykh. Although the shaykh
resides permanently in Baghdad, he is required to be
present at the village to officiate at funerals for the
war dead. He says he conducted six such funerals in
one day the first week in March, "and every day
brings one or two more." The shaykh claims over 500
of his people are scattered around Iraq-at the front
searching for relatives or hiding from the draft in
Baghdad. The shaykh told the attache there were 50
Volkswagen Passats in his village, all death gratuities.
Some Iraqi communities do not appear to be
accepting their losses passively. In the Kurdish areas,
morale has
seriously deteriorated.) ~ one
village of approximately 15,000 received four bodies
of slain soldiers in a single day last year, provoking
bitter criticism of the regime and Iraq's President
Saddam Husayn and his family. (Saddam's two sons
though of age, have yet to be drafted.)
Outlook
Faced with serious morale problems brought on by the
mounting casualties, Iraq almost certainly will try to
reduce its losses. It will seek to eliminate the Iranian
pocket at Al Faw with heavy artillery barrages, and
when the drier weather has set in-at the end of this
month-it will deploy its superior armor against the
Iranian forces. US diplomats in Baghdad caution,
however, that eradication of the Iranians at Al Faw
will not be possible without bloody hand-to-hand
fighting in the bombed out city. Some diplomats
believe that Iraq may not be willing to assume the
costs of such an engagement and may simply write off
the captured city.
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Saudi Youth: Coping With
Slower Economic Growth
The younger generation in Saudi Arabia generally
has been content and apolitical for the past 50 years,
but the economic downturn in the kingdom is sharply
reducing its opportunities in business and for
employment. Most young Saudis, particularly the
growing number with university educations, have
unrealistic expectations of their futures, and they are
having difficulty adjusting to the kingdom's slower
economic growth. With economic retrenchment likely
to continue in Saudi Arabia over the next five years,
the Saudi Government faces the difficult task of
preventing economic disgruntlement among the young
from developing into political unrest.
The kingdom's sluggish economy can no longer
readily absorb miseducated young Saudis nor can it
meet exaggerated expectations for high-paying jobs
that require little work. In many respects, the
economic downturn has hit Saudi youth the hardest
because they traditionally have tapped the surplus in
the system. Reduced oil revenues have sharply slashed
employment opportunities in both the public and the
private sectors:
? Cuts in ministerial budgets have greatly slowed
bureaucratic growth, and competition for these jobs
has become stiffer.
During the boom years of the 1970s and early 1980s,
virtually any Saudi with secondary level schooling
could obtain a comfortable and high-paying job in the
booming Saudi economy. Those with university-even
junior college-educations were quickly absorbed by
government ministries and private businesses wanting
to raise the number of Saudis on their payrolls. Saudis
educated in the United States, in particular, had
maximum lateral and upward mobility in the public
and private sectors. Meteoric rises were norms, not
exceptions. Although many of these Saudis were
conscientious and hard working, the great majority,
including those with university educations, held jobs
with prestigious titles, but little real responsibility.
? Large government contracts during the boom years
created a business environment that even Saudi
liberal arts majors could enter. Over the past several
years, however, lower public spending has sharply
shrunk the private sector.
switch career paths.
The economic slowdown has pushed the Saudi
Government to encourage more young Saudis to
pursue technical training, but the process is arduous.
Most young Saudis, especially those from the major
cities where foreign workers have long performed
manual labor, disdain menial jobs. Many believe that
the lull in the economy is only temporary and that the
boom years will soon return. Those pursuing college
degrees in liberal arts and the social sciences
generally believe that it would take too much effort to
The steady increase in the enrollment of Saudis
studying in the kingdom's seven universities has
compounded the problem of too many Saudis with
improper training for too few jobs. In 1970 less than
5,000 Saudis attended universities in the kingdom; the
number will be nearly 100,000 by 1990. Most of these
students will receive an education that is poor by
Western standards, and most will be in liberal arts
and business. Moreover, despite governmental efforts
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NESA NESAR 86-009
l l April l 986
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Saudi Arabia: University Enrollment, 1985 a
Secular schools
48,500
39,300
9,200
37,500
11,000
King `Abd al-Aziz University, Jiddah
18,000
14,000
4,000
12,500
5,500
King Saud University, Riyadh
23,000
19,000
4,000
18,000
5,000
King Faysal University, Dammam
4,000
3,200
800
3,500
500
University of Petroleum and Minerals,
Dhahran
3,500
3,100
400
3,500
Islamic schools
28,000
18,500
9,500
28,000
Umm al-Qura University, Mecca
10,000
6,500
3,500
10,000
Islamic University, Medina
6,000
3,500
2,500
6,000
imam bin Saud University, Riyadh
12,000
8,500
3,500
12,000
to promote university education in the kingdom,
graduates from Western universities receive
preferential treatment in employment, even within
government ministries.
Some 15,000 Saudi women study in universities at
home and abroad, but employment opportunities for
them are limited mainly to teaching and medicine
even though a full complement of technical and
scientific courses is available at Saudi universities.
Many are eagerly pursuing an education because it is
the only alternative to full-time home life. Some
government officials probably would like to take
advantage of the skilled pool of educated women, but
strong objections from religious leaders and social
conservatives have allowed only small increases in
jobs available to them.
Royal Family and Government Response
To inhibit the development of unrest among young
Saudis, the royal family has made a concerted effort
to appear attentive to their interests. Young Saudis
receive direct financial subsidies from the
government, including:
? Regular monthly stipends during university study.
? Free tuition and paid expenses at Saudi universities.
? Bonuses for university graduation.
? Guaranteed government employment for university
graduates.
? Marriage loans.
? Dowry grants.
? Housing and personal loans.
The rcyal family also is closely identified with the
major government organizations responsible for
overseeing youth programs. King Fahd's son Faysal
has been president of the General Organization for
Youth Welfare since 1974, and Minister of Interior
Nayif's son Saud was appointed his assistant earlier
this year. Defense Minister Sultan's son Fahd is
chairman of the Saudi Soccer Federation, and many
other princes sponsor youth clubs and soccer teams.
Moreover, the royal family gives generous awards for
scholastic and athletic achievements.
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King Fahd, a former Minister of Education, has been
taking a personal interest in the economic and social
well-being of young Saudis, according to the US
Embassy. In 1983 he told a visiting senior US official
that he follows educational matters very closely and
gives them the highest priority. Fahd meets with
Saudi university students, including those studying
abroad, two or three times a year in informal question
and answer sessions. The sessions are contrived and do
not address issues that most concern students, but the
US Embassy reports they have a positive public
relations value.
Prospects
Prospects are dim for a significant improvement in
opportunities for young Saudis over the next several
years, and, aside from general exhortations to acquire
more marketable skills, the Saudi Government is
unlikely to take significant steps to lessen the impact
of the economic downturn on young Saudis.
Competition for the better jobs will become stiffer,
and salaries will remain depressed. The government
probably will still provide jobs in ministries for all
university graduates, but many of the least
experienced young Saudis will find themselves in
clerical and secretarial jobs that foreign workers
traditionally have filled.
As long as the government can maintain free
schooling, monthly stipends to students, and grants
and loans for housing, complaints among Saudi
students may well remain muted. The government's
ability to maintain these programs at their current
levels is questionable, however, and housing grants
and loans are no longer as automatic or as large as
they were five years ago.
the government is considering cuts in
student stipends and graduation bonuses to save
money.
A protracted downturn in the kingdom's economy will
increase chances for political restiveness among Saudi
youth, and the general perception that the royal
family has been able to protect itself from cost-cutting
measures will aggravate their grievances. University
campuses in the kingdom probably would provide the
best forum for young Saudis to vent their
dissatisfaction, but there are no signs that activity
against the regime is likely to occur soon.
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Growing Polarization
in Saudi Arabia's
Religious Community
The upsurge in Islamic fundamentalism throughout
the Persian Gulf region has strengthened the forces of
religious conservatism in Saudi Arabia and
contributed to a widening rift between official and
populist Islam in the kingdom. The growth of the
conservative movement in Saudi Arabia has been
aided by the efforts of a new generation of Saudi
clerics who have come of age during a period of
Islamic fervor. Many young clerics are increasingly
questioning the legitimacy of the senior ulama and
other religious officials for allegedly failing to ensure
that the government fulfills its Islamic obligations. As
a result, the kingdom's religious community is
becoming increasingly polarized, with the senior,
more traditional, regime-oriented ulama on one side,
and the younger, more religiously fervent clerics on
the other. Although the younger clerics are unlikely to
gain ascendancy within the religious community in
the near future, any increase in their influence will
adversely affect US-Saudi ties, since they view close
relations with the United States as detrimental to
Islamic interests.
Reinvigoration of Islamic Fundamentalism
The reinvigoration of Islamic fundamentalism in
Saudi Arabia is primarily the result of the Iranian
revolution and the Grand Mosque incident in 1979
when Islamic fanatics seized the Mecca shrine and
called for the overthrow of the Saudi regime. Since
Fahd ascended the throne in 1982, the movement
toward greater Islamic conservatism in the kingdom
has gained momentum. Although personally a social
and political progressive, Fahd has gone to great
lengths to support and accommodate the religious
traditionalists to mitigate his "un-Islamic" reputation.
The conservative trend is evident throughout
government and society and is especially noticeable
among university students, inhabitants of rural areas,
and the urban lower class. Conservative religious
elements are becoming increasingly active in
attempting to enforce adherence to Islamic precepts
by both Saudis and foreigners. One example is the
growing influence of the Mutawaiin-the religious
police-who are empowered to maintain public
adherence to Islamic strictures, enforce religious
observances, and ensure public morality.
According to the US Embassy, the reinvigoration of
Sunni fundamentalism is most pronounced among the
young-over half the population of Saudi Arabia is
under age 16. The adverse reaction of some young
Saudis to Western cultural influences and exposure to
radical Islamic currents prevalent elsewhere in the
Middle East have strengthened religious attitudes.
This is most evident on Saudi university campuses,
both Islamic and secular. Student attendance at
mosques has increased, and growing numbers of
students have adopted fundamentalist dress-for
example, beards-to demonstrate their religious
conservatism. These students publicly harass more
secular-oriented peers and professors. In addition, the
US Embassy reports that some zealous professors are
actively working to desecularize education and are
known to hold discussion groups in their homes, away
from government informants.
This trend has contributed to the emergence of
fundamentalist groups. While still small, they are
growing in size and influence.
the popularity of the Muslim
Brotherhood is steadily growing in universities, as well
as in high schools. Many teachers in Saudi high
schools and colleges are deeply pious Egyptians who
maintain connections to the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt.
Private religious societies have also sprung up as
religious conservatives find official Islamic
organizations inadequate in either orientation or zeal.
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-009
/! April 1986
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Islamic Awareness is one such society, according to
the US Embassy. Its members are primarily high
school and college students. Known to exist in Mecca,
Jiddah, and Riyadh, Islamic Awareness promotes a
more rigorously Islamic society through example,
persuasion, and pressure against fellow students and
government authorities. 0
The New Generation of Clerics
There is not much information available on the young
clergy-either Saudis or expatriates-but US
Embassy officials report they are active behind-the-
scene promoters of their brand of Islamic
fundamentalism. They maintain a low profile to avoid
attracting the attention of the security services. They
would be quickly deported or arrested for subversion
if found to be engaged in activities perceived to be
against the regime. For the most part, many of these
clerics temper their messages intended for public
consumption-relying on innuendo and nuance to
convey their views-while espousing more
fundamentalist views in private. They operate
primarily from the universities, and some have ties to
radical religious groups in other countries-for
are two of the traditional seats for Islamic
scholarship. A few of these expatriate scholars have
attracted a popular following among Saudis by
publishing religious articles, giving sermons in
mosques, and making appearances on radio and
television shows. Shaykh Ibrahim Sarcasic, a well-
known Egyptian cleric, is the imam of one of Jiddah's
more popular mosques and is a regular religious
columnist in the newspaper al-Madina.
Growing Criticism
Many religiously conservative Saudis, particularly
zealous young clerics, are increasingly critical of the
criticism as grown despite King Fahd's efforts to
accommodate religious conservatives and demonstrate
his government's commitment to Islamic values and
practices. Ironically, Fahd's efforts have only served
to strengthen the legitimacy of the religious
conservatives and helped to give them momentum.
example, Syria and Egypt.
The young clerics are attuned to popular religious
sentiments and are in positions to assert greater
influence over Saudis who are not satisfied with the
government-controlled religious authorities. Some of
the junior clergy enjoy significant appeal among
Saudis. An example is Shaykh Salih bin Sa`d al-
Luhayden, 39, whose conservative religious television
program was canceled by the government because of
his growing following among religious traditionalists,
according to the US Embassy. After acooling-off
period, he was appointed deputy president of the
department in charge of the Mutawaiin, the
Organization for the Promotion of Virtue and the
Prevention of Vice. Many junior clerics also lead
university discussion groups that debate social,
religious, and political issues in closed sessions. In
addition, the US Embassy reports that many young
khatibs (speakers) at local mosques have gained
personal followings.
The US Embassy reports there also are many
renowned non-Saudi religious scholars resident in
Saudi Arabia, primarily because Mecca and Medina
Criticism has been directed toward Saudi religious
authorities as well. The ulama's traditional function is
to serve as the nation's institutionalized conscience to
ensure that the government fulfills its Islamic
obligations, thus providing the religious and moral
authority that legitimizes the government. Over the
past 30 years, however, the ulama has gradually lost
its ability to operate independently. All appointments
to religious ministries, councils, and boards are
strictly controlled by the government, and generous
subsidies have made the ulama reluctant to criticize
the regime.
The ulama-specifically the senior clerics-is
increasingly viewed as merely an adjunct to the
regime, rather than an independent protector of
Islamic values. The majority of the ulama are elderly,
socially and religiously conservative, openly
supportive of the royal family, and longtime members
of Saudi Arabia's religious community. These senior
clerics are widely viewed as unacceptable religious
leaders by younger fundamentalists who believe that
they merely rubberstamp decisions made by the Al
Saud princes.
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The trends observed in the Sunni religious
establishment are also evident in the kingdom's
minority Shia population, located primarily in the
Eastern Province oases of Qati1' and Hasa.
Government eJ3'orts to improve conditions for the
kingdom's most disadvantaged minority have not
dampened religious sentiment among the Shias, and
fundamentalism is on the rise, especially among the
young. there is a
generational split within the community that is
deepening and becoming increasingly bitter.
older Shias tend to follow more
conservative imams and show a greater sense of
loyalty to Saudi Arabia. In contrast, younger Shias
are increasingly attracted to radical Shia leaders
inside Saudi Arabia and in Iran.
a slight majority of younger Shias
are followers of a radical brand of Islam that is
anathema to many of their elders.
dynamic force in the oases-especially in Qatil-and
are gradually assuming positions of i-t(luence in
religiously based public institutions.
Young Shias may become increasingly willing to
exert pressure on the regime ~ctheir sense of religious
repression sharpens and their economic status erodes.
Although the emergence of an active Shia opposition
would not fundamentally threaten the regime as long
as it did not have major external support, it would be
a headachelor Riyadh and would lead to worsening
conditions for the entire Shia community
Outlook and Implications
We expect the fundamentalist trend in Saudi Arabia
to grow over the next few years, increasing the
possibility of friction between the more traditional,
regime-oriented ulama and younger, more activist
religious figures. A public fissure would have far-
reaching implications for the government because it
would be the first time in recent Saudi history the
regime lacked the full backing of the religious
community. This would call into question the regime's
Islamic legitimacy and possibly spark antiregime
activity.
Although the more radical fundamentalist movement
in Saudi Arabia does not pose an immediate threat to
the regime, the onset of financial difficulties brought
about by sharply lower oil prices probably will provide
opportunities that religious radicals can exploit.
Domestic spending cutbacks will fuel Islamic
criticism of regime failures, especially if extravagant
royal family spending does not abate. In addition,
there are other elements of Saudi society with either
political or economic grievances against the regime.
They criticize the government on religious grounds
because this is a less risky way to vent their
frustrations. Nonetheless, these elements and the
fundamentalists lack adequate means to organize and
do not pose a threat to the regime's stability in the
near term. Furthermore, there is little prospect the
close relationship between the ulama elite and the Al
Saud will soon be dramatically altered in view of the
interest each has in the strength and well-being of the
other.
With the significant increase in Islamic fervor in the
kingdom, there has been a concomitant increase in
anti-Western sentiment. Although many Saudi youths
are generally positive toward US society and
individual Americans, there is a widely shared belief
that the openness of American society is contributing
to its moral decay. More important, many Saudi
youths-and especially the religiously conservative
clerics-are highly critical of US Middle East policy,
charging it is exploitative and morally wrong. Should
religious criticism of the regime increase, Fahd could
be compelled to put distance between himself and the
United States to shore up his domestic support.
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Mysticism in Middle Eastern and
South Asian Decisionmaking
The mystical practice of divination-the attempt to
foretell events or discover hidden knowledge by occult
or supernatural means-plays a prominent role in
guiding the decisions of some heads of state, religious
extremists, and terrorists in the Middle East and
South Asia.' Divination gives decisions special
legitimacy and also gives the decisionmaker greater
confidence that he is acting correctly.
The use of divination as well as other mystical
practices seems rational to many people in the region.
In Arab culture, for example, such practices as
reading lines in the sand, palmistry, and astrology are
widely regarded as sciences. Even practical and
sophisticated leaders, such as Saudi Petroleum
Minister Yamani, appeal to the supernatural to guide
and justify their decisions
Mysticism and National Policy
Mystical experiences have influenced decisionmaking
by at least two leaders in the region, President Zia of
Pakistan and former President Nimeiri of Sudan. In
Nimeiri's case, a religious conversion caused him
focusing almost exclusive y on tmposmg is s amtc
beliefs on Sudan, while ignoring the sensitivities of
Sudan's non-Muslim south. Zia, although he believes
he is on a divinely inspired mission that includes a
program of Islamization, conceives his role more
broadly, and he has been considerably more flexible
than Nimeiri in implementing Islamization. Divisions
among Pakistan's various Islamic sects and the
disaffection of Shias have led him to slow
Islamization in response to political reality.
Zia developed a mystical bent even before becoming
President of Pakistan in 1977,
He had interpreted his
appointment as Chief of the Army Staff in 1976 and
the later successful surgery on his youngest child, who
had been chronically ill, as omens that he had a
' Awareness of the supernatural is not new to intelligence analysis.
During World War [I, Winston Churchill hired a noted astrologer
to tell him what Hitler's five astrologers were most likely advising
Foretelling the Future Through Divination
Belief in divination reJiects a world view in which all
events, past and future, are connected. Believers in
divination assume that nothing happens by chance or
without symbolic meaning.
Divination has forms but is generally of two types:
? Inspirational. An individual sees a blueprint for the
future in what he believes to be a divine revelation.
Some examples are dreams, crystal-ball gazing,
and visions or trances, which usually are the result
of psychological or physical stress.
? Noninspirational. An individual believes the future
can be interpreted through such omens as black
cats or through deliberate attempts to guide and
justify decisions by using astrology, numerology, or
the reading of tea leaves.
special role to play as leader of Pakistan, and this
would include an Islamization program.
Since becoming President, Zia has employed Ashraf
Kamal, a Lahore-based astrologer, according to the
US Consulate in Lahore. Zia paid the diviner more
than $60,000 for initial services and continues to pay
him a retainer of $600 a month. Kamal told
Consulate officers that he travels to Rawalpindi four
days a month to meet with Zia, but he gave no
indication that Zia follows his advice. Kamal had also
advised former President Bhutto and predicted he
would be overthrown. The Consulate reports that Zia
apparently also consults with an expatriate Pakistani
mystic, Ghulam Hussein Bilioawalla, when he travels
to Saudi Arabia on special pilgrimages.
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-009
11 Aprit /986
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Nimeiri began to Islamize Sudan's political system
after a spiritual awakenin that followed a stroke he
suffered in 1980.
He apparently interpreted
his brushes with death as omens to change his lifestyle
and impose his newly found Islamic beliefs on Sudan.
In his book The Islamic Way ...Why?, which was
published in 1981, Nimeiri said that God had
intervened a number of times to protect him from
political and personal danger.
Nimeiri's religious commitments strengthened
throughout the early 1980s. Before he was deposed in
a coup in 1985, he adopted the practices of Sufism
(Islamic mysticism). He made no secret that he
followed the religious and political guidance of his
Sufi advisers in establishing an Islamic state. He
planned to have. the Sudanese Constitution amended
to describe the president as "Commander of the
Faithful" and "Imam of the Whole Sudanese
People." Nimeiri increasingly believed that he was a
divinely guided leader similar to the Prophet
Muhammad or the Mahdi (Muhammad Ahmad ibn
Abdallah, 1844-85), the legendary 19th-century
messianic leader of Sudan.
Arab Stargazing
Sultan Qaboos of
Oman has increasingly depended on astrological
prediction for planning his public and private
activities. He employs five astrologers, including three
Indians, a Tanzanian, and an Omani. The Sultan
believes strongly in astrological predictions and often
changes his daily schedule to accommodate such
Just before Vice President Bush's visit to Oman in
May 1984, Qaboos delayed sailing the royal yacht to
Muscat for two days on the advice of his astrologers,
The delay caused
considerable problems for Omani security officials,
who needed the Sultan's approval of preparations for
the Vice President's visit.
Political Violence
We believe the inspiration and timing of some
political violence in the region are based on divination.
Press reports indicate that the four Sikhs accused of
assassinating Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in
October 1984 were inspired by the sighting of a
falcon-a favorable omen for Sikhs. The assassination
conspiracy had been brewing since Gandhi ordered
the assault on the Sikh's Golden Temple in Amritsar
in June, but the four conspirators decided to kill the
Prime Minister only after they noticed that a falcon
had nested in a tree near her residence. They believed
that the falcon carried a message from the 10th Guru
of the Sikhs that they should avenge the attack on the
Golden Temple, according to press sources.
We also believe that divination is used by terrorists,
particularly those Muslims with intense religious
convictions, such as Shia suicide bombers. We
speculate that such common practices as randomly
opening the Koran and interpreting passages are
employed to affirm or reject terrorist plans.
Conditions Promoting Mysticsm
The use of divination to formulate national policy or
trigger political violence is most likely in conditions
of:
? Social disintegration. Rapid social change-due to
Westernization, urbanization, or an economic
downturn-that undermines cultural values leads
many individuals to turn to mystical aspects of their
religion. In Saudi Arabia, for example,
petroleum engineers, including those educated in
the United States, have quit their jobs, adopted
Islamic dress, and are leading ascetic lives of
contemplation and study.
? War and conquest. Defeat or victory in battle
provide a psychological environment that breeds
mysticism. Former Egytian President Nasir, a
secularist, publicly declared that Egypt's defeat in
the 1967 Arab-Israeli war was its punishment for
turning away from Islam. In the weeks following the
war, thousands of Egyptians-Muslims and
Christians alike-allegedly witnessed a vision of the
Virgin Mary near a Coptic Christian church in
Cairo. o
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Among elites, indicators of a turn toward mysticism
include:
? Religious conversion. "Born again" individuals,
who previously had separated their religious and
pragmatic world views, move permanently to a
religious perspective. We judge that individuals who
experience these conversions-Nimeiri, for
example-believe they have had a mystical
experience and are prone to attach religious
significance to random events as keys to the future.
? Personal tragedies or escapes from death. Saudi
Petroleum Minister Zaki Yamani, for example,
began taking divination seriously after being held
hostage by Palestinian terrorists in Vienna in 1975,
He became
particularly interested in practices such as ramal, a
technique of reading impressions in sand created by
sweeps of the hand.
Combating Mysticism
Concern about the growing popularity of mysticism
has led the Egyptian Government to propose criminal
penalties for individuals claiming to be the Mahdi,
according to the US Embassy in Cairo.z The
government is responding to the recent emergence in
Alexandria and elsewhere of several Mahdist
movements that have attracted thousands of
followers. The government claims that its proposals
answer the demands of the Islamic religious
establishment and the Muslim community at large.
We believe, however, that Cairo is wary of these
Mahdists because past visionaries-including the
leader of the Islamic extremist group, Takfr wa
Hijra-have been involved in violence, terrorism, and
the assassination of former President Sadat.
' In Sunni Islamic theology, the Mahdi is the divinely guided leader
who will appear on earth to rule in the last days before judgment.
Prospects
We believe that as long as economic, political,
military, and social conditions remain unstable in the
Middle East and South Asia, some government
officials and leaders of terrorist and insurgent
movements will be inclined to seek mystical advice.
For the most part, mystically influenced
decisionmaking will reinforce traditional cultural
values that promote religious fundamentalism and
anti-Westernism. Some mystical experiences,
particularly those of visionary extremists, will be
capricious and politically destabilizing.
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Jordan: Relations With
the Palestinians
The relationship between the Jordanian Government
and Palestinians on the East and West Banks remains
uneasy in the aftermath of King Hussein's
termination of his dialogue with PLO Chairman
Arafat. Although the King intended in his speech on
19 February to undermine the PLO's influence on the
West Bank by casting doubt on Arafat's leadership,
government-staged demonstrations of support have
instead reawakened fears among Jordan's Palestinians
that Hussein is attempting to dominate the
Palestinian movement. Moreover, Arafat's popularity
on the West Bank has been rekindled because of
Hussein's clumsy handling of the affair, his failure to
address West Bank political and economic concerns,
and Arafat's restrained reply to the King's speech. As
a result, the King is likely to concentrate on internal
Jordanian matters to reassure his East Bank
constituency, while taking quiet steps to improve
relations with the Palestinians.
The US Embassy says, however, that a series of
government-staged demonstrations of Palestinian
support damaged the King's image among
Palestinians. His call for them to consider a new PLO
leadership was widely taken as confirmation of
longstanding suspicions about Hussein's interest in
dominating the Palestinian movement and regaining
control of the West Bank.
In the refugee camps-where the PLO's image sank
dramatically in the latter half of 1985 as the Arafat-
Hussein dialogue stalled-the mood has changed
markedly, according to Embassy sources. The anti-
Palestinian outburst of many Jordanians angered the
camp residents, who resented their enforced
appearances at the palace to demonstrate support for
the King. Furthermore, camp residents have noted
Hussein's lack of support from other Arab leaders
following his speech. The US Embassy says a sense
has developed over the last few weeks that Hussein
has lost Arab backing, that he has wronged Arafat,
Peace Process
King Hussein for many years has had to strike a
delicate balance of authority and loyalty with his
Palestinian subjects, who make up at least 65 percent
of Jordan's population. Jordan's Palestinians have
learned since the 1970 civil war to accept Hussein's
authority as sovereign of Jordan, but they have never
considered him their spokesman-a role they continue
to accord to Arafat and the PLO.
Hussein's relations with East and West Bank
Palestinians have been complicated by his political
cooperation with the PLO. Jordanian officials
continue to state publicly that Jordan will not enter
peace negotiations with Israel without the PLO, but
at the same time they apparently hope to sway
Palestinian opinion in Jordan's favor to undermine
PLO influence and woo the support of an independent
West Bank leadership. Immediately following the
King's toughly worded speech on 19 February, which
detailed Jordanian efforts to bring the PLO to the
negotiating table, many Palestinians began to
question Arafat's leadership ability and his
and that he has tried to exploit the Palestinians.
Hussein was made acutely aware of the failure of his
efforts to find an independent West Bank leadership
by the murder in early March of Zafir al-Masri, the
moderate mayor of Nablus. The assassination is
widely viewed as a warning by Palestinian
rejectionists-most likely, the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-that they will not tolerate
cooperation with Israeli or Jordanian authorities on
peace negotiations. As a result, West Bank leaders
have become even more reluctant to participate in
Israeli- or Jordanian-sponsored autonomy efforts.
PLO Presence
Contrary to Prime Minister Rifa`i's public
statements, the breakdown of the Hussein-Arafat
dialogue is likely to affect the future of the PLO
offices and military presence in Jordan.
commitment to a political solution.
Secret
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Western Sector head
Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) has marked for closure
several Western Sector offices because of pressure by
More significant, however, is the provision allowing
each East Bank Palestinian refugee camp to elect a
delegate to parliament, with the number to count
toward the West Bank's allocation of 71 seats. In the
Jordanian offiicials.
the PLO liaison office, which serves as the
link between Jordanian offiicials and PLO members
entering the country, was closed in March.
A wholesale removal of PLO offices from Jordan is
not likely, but Jordanian officials will probably press
the PLO to reduce its presence to prevent attacks
against Israeli targets on the West Bank. Jordanian
offiicials retain a lingering hope that the threat of
removal will force Arafat over the long term to adopt
a more conciliatory policy toward Jordan.
Tangible Steps
King Hussein's appointment of Zayd Rifa`i as Prime
Minister last April signaled a new emphasis on
foreign policy issues, particularly Jordan's relations
with the PLO and West Bank Palestinians. Hussein
was frustrated by the inability of the former Obeidat
government to develop an effective policy toward the
West Bank and counted on Rifa`i's ties to some of the
area's families to enhance Jordan's influence there.
At least nine of the 23 ministers Rifa`i selected to
form his government are of Palestinian origin. The
most significant holdover is Foreign Minister Tahir
al-Masri, who comes from an established West Bank
family. Rifa`i's choice of Tahir Kan`an, an
international financial technocrat, as Minister for
Occupied Territories also heralded a new, pragmatic
approach to improving West Bank relations.
Moreover, the King's reconvening in January 1984 of
the Jordanian parliament after a 10-year hiatus was
designed in part to give him a means to assert his
claim to represent the Palestinians if his dialogue with
the PLO remained deadlocked. The lower house
consists of 60 members-30 each from the East and
West Banks. The even balance between East and
West Bankers has been maintained with the passage
of a new electoral law in March that expanded the
size of the lower house to 142 seats.
past, refugee camps were not represented.
Under Prime Minister Rifa`i, Jordan has also become
more involved in West Bank issues. The US Embassy
says that Jordan approved several candidates for
appointment as mayors on the West Bank, made
several proposals for dealing with the Jerusalem
Electric Company's budget deficit, began work on a
West Bank development plan, and eased trade
restrictions applied to the West Bank.
Despite these improvements, many Palestinians are
unhappy that more has not been done, according to
the US Embassy. Rifa`i's early public promise to ease
bridge-crossing restrictions has not been realized
because of bureaucratic inertia and opposition from
East Bank interest groups who fear competition from
West Bank farmers and manufacturers. Palestinians
point to this unkept promise as an example of how
little the day-to-day realities of Jordanian-West Bank
relations have changed.
Outlook
Although the King would like a period of reflection to
reassess his foreign policy, he is likely to find it
increasingly diffiicult to remain detached from the
Palestinian question. He probably will continue to
receive conflicting advice from the activists within his
government led by Rifa`i and from the East Bank
traditionalists who remain suspicious and fearful of
the Palestinians.
The King will have to weigh carefully the limited time
remaining before the scheduled turnover of power in
Israel in October to the hardline Likud bloc against
the risks that further involvement in the peace process
would entail. Hussein is unlikely to meet again soon
with the PLO Chairman, but he probably will
maintain contacts with key Fatah lieutenants in
Amman.~~
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The inability of the Rifa`i government to satisfy West
Bank demands for greater Jordanian involvement
probably contributed to King Hussein's failure to
attract apro-Jordanian constituency willing to follow
the King's lead on the peace process. Recognizing
this, Jordanian officials are likely to take long-term
steps to improve the quality of life on the West Bank
to counter PLO dominance there.
The break in Hussein's political cooperation with
Arafat clearly has not altered the PLO's ability to
block Jordan's West Bank policy. In recognition of the
PLO's continuing power on the West Bank, King
Hussein will probably focus on internal Jordanian
matters over the coming months to reassure East
Bankers that he has not forgotten their concerns. To
this end, he is likely to shore up internal security, seek
progress on bilateral agreements with Syria, and
address military needs by attempting to nail down
arms procurement deals, with European suppliers,
particularly the British.
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Egyptian Expatriate Labor
Already plagued with severe financial problems,
Egypt may face additional economic strains because
of returning expatriate workers seeking jobs in an
economy flooded with semiskilled and unskilled
workers. Although the majority of Egyptian
expatriates are professionals, there are large numbers
of unskilled expatriates who will make up the bulk of
the returnees. In addition, there are the problems of
decreasing oil prices that threaten both income from
oil sales and remittances from the expatriate
population, and the competition for jobs from both
Asian and indigenous labor within host countries.
These strains are likely to increase unrest among the
Egyptian populace.
A Cross Section of the Expatriate Work Force
Egyptian expatriates make up the largest migrant
Arab work force and range from most to least skilled.
They are found primarily in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the
smaller Arab Gulf states, Jordan, and Libya.
Who. There are between 2 and 3 million expatriate
Egyptian workers. The typical worker is male,
between the ages of 25 and 45, and unaccompanied by
his family.
What. Egyptians are the most educated of the Arab
expatriates: 37 percent have university degrees, 24
percent have secondary school certificates, and 12.5
percent have technical skills. At the bottom of the
spectrum, only about 12.5 percent are semiskilled to
unskilled construction workers.
Where. More than 2 million Egyptian expatriates
work in the Arab world. Another 500,000 work
outside the region.
Why. Egyptians have been sending teachers and
medical personnel to other Arab countries for decades
to help raise those countries' standard of living as well
as employ excess Egyptian professionals.
Two factors opened the way for large numbers of
Egyptians to leave during the 1970s. The oil and
ensuing construction boom in sparsely populated Arab
countries led to a severe shortage of labor, which was
met by overpopulated and underemployed countries
such as Egypt. Furthermore, the 1973 war and
ensuing peace with Israel allowed men ordinarily tied
to military duty to leave Egypt. The underlying reason
the workers left, however, was economic. The money,
benefits, and opportunities abroad attracted large
numbers of Egyptians desiring to improve their lot
What They Do
The majority of Egyptian expatriates are
professionals-primarily engineers, doctors, and,
especially, teachers (professors in universities,
technical institutions, and primary and secondary
schools). Egyptians are well received as teachers in
Arab states not only because of their high educational
qualifications but also because they speak Arabic. For
example, nearly all university professors in Saudi
Arabia are Egyptian, and Egyptians make up 43
percent of the teachers in Kuwait.
Although Egyptian professionals are the most widely
known and esteemed, many labor-importing countries
employ large numbers of less skilled Egyptian
laborers, primarily in construction and agriculture. In
Jordan and the two Yemens, Egyptians are filling jobs
left by indigenous workers migrating to better
opportunities elsewhere. Egyptians in Iraq are
engaged in jobs vacated by Iraqis drafted for war
duty. In addition, approximately 26,000 Egyptians
are members of Iraq's National Guard.
Importance of Remittances
Expatriate remittances have been critically important
to the average Egyptian. A typical construction
worker can save between $10,000 and $12,000 over a
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NESA NESAR 86-009
/ i April 1986
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Egyptian Expatriates by Country
Thowands of worfasn
? Cult Sfatss inalud~ Qatar. Bahrain. UAE and Oman
All fipuns, aspsolal for the Cult Stabs. an
sstimahs and probably undsrstaNd.
three-year period by working overseas. He probably
will leave his country to work with a specific goal in
mind, such as to buy land or a house (or apartment), to
make home improvements, to start a business, or just
to increase his standard of living through the purchase
of goods. Once a house has been bought or a business
started, the cost of living in Egypt is very low, as basic
consumer goods are heavily subsidized by the
government.
In recent years land and housing have become very
expensive to the average Egyptian. According to US
Embassy reporting, in urban areas, where 10 years
ago a girat (about 140 sq. meters) cost about $42, this
area now costs between $8,400 and $9,600. Housing
costs in Cairo have been increasing at a rate of 30
percent annually for the past several years, with no
end in sight. Due both to increasing land values and
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the construction boom within villages fueled largely
by expatriate remittances, good agricultural land is
disappearing from the market.
A negative side effect that is becoming more
noticeable within Egypt is the decrease in overall
productivity, mainly due to the shortage of skilled
workers. Peasants do not work as hard as they used to
because they do not have to; subsidies provide a
cushion to fall back on. As thousands of laborers go
overseas for better pay, farm workers move into the
labor-short, higher paying construction industry,
causing a shortage of laborers in the agricultural
sector. Egypt is importing close to half of its food
requirements, whereas 15 years ago it had a $300
million average annual surplus in its external trade
balance for agricultural products.
Remittances are the primary source of Egypt's foreign
exchange earnings, contributing, according to reliable
economic press, approximately 30 percent of the total.
Until recently, these funds allowed the government to
maintain high subsidies on consumer items while
increasing import quotas. Problems have arisen,
however, in meeting external payments because of the
country's dependence on hard currency sources such
as remittances and tourism, both of which are
declining. Egypt's current account deficit in January
1986 was estimated to be about $3 billion.
The US Embassy in Cairo estimates that the
expatriate community earns $6-9 billion a year, but
only about $3.5 billion enters Egypt through official
banking channels. This is due in part to the fact that
there is a wide disparity between the official bank
exchange rate and the free market rate and because
many host countries allow only a percentage of worker
remittances to leave through official banking channels
to protect their own foreign exchange reserves. The
majority of the remittance money is brought in by a
wakil or bagman who commutes between expatriates
and their banks with the workers' earnings. A worker
may also remit a portion of the money and save the
rest in a host country bank to be exchanged at the
village level through moneychangers after his work
term is completed.
remittances are dropping
sharply because of economic problems within host
countries. Iraq has moved to limit monetary transfers
by expatriate workers. Official Egyptian projections
show that as many as 300,000 Egyptian workers will
leave Iraq as a result of this. Initially the returning
workers may boost the Egyptian economy with their
savings. Over the long term the declining number of
expatriates will reduce remittance transfers to Egypt.
Trends Affecting Expatriate Labor
Three trends will determine the extent of expatriate
cutbacks: the decrease in world oil prices affecting oil-
producing countries where the majority of Egyptian
expatriates work; efforts by host countries to hire
their own citizens over expatriates; and the possibility
that Asian laborers will displace unskilled Arabs for
lower wages.
Falling Oi[ Prices. Persistence of the current
depressed oil prices will have harsh long-term effects
on Egypt. The oil-exporting countries' balances of
payments will be under severe pressure, limiting their
ability to pay foreign workers.
The construction boom that has accompanied the oil
boom is nearing completion. Most needed schools and
office buildings have been built, and many less-skilled
expatriate workers are facing the end of demand for
their services.
Preference for Citizens Over Expatriates. With the
boom in oil production in the 1970s, expatriate labor
poured into the Gulf states to meet the demand for
workers. Because of the small populations in these oil-
rich countries, labor forces soon became more than 50
percent foreign, and governments began to fear
subversion or agitation by radical or religious
activists. Such security threats are spurring labor-
importing countries to indigenize their labor forces as
much as possible.
Saudi Arabia does not reveal the number of
expatriates within its borders to conceal the extent of
its dependence on foreign labor. Other countries
freely admit their overdependence on foreign labor
and their plans to curb its growth. Kuwait, where 60
percent of the population is foreign, is working to have
an even balance by the year 2000.
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Furthermore, Egyptian teachers will eventually work
themselves out of jobs as the children they teach
replace them. Saudi Arabia is especially intent on
filling university and teaching positions with its own
people. Nonetheless, the Saudi educational system is
still expanding, and there are not enough Saudis to fill
the positions, especially in rural areas.
Labor-importing countries are not likely to expel all
expatriate workers. Shortages of local labor probably
will persist even if there is lower economic growth. In
addition, some nationals refuse to do manual labor,
allowing some less skilled jobs, such as in
maintenance, to be filled by foreigners. Egyptians will
remain in high professional posts until sufficient
numbers of qualified nationals can be trained to take
over.
Competition From Asian Labor. Non-Arab workers,
predominantly from South and East Asia, have been
pouring into the Gulf labor markets since 1975. In
1983 the tide was curbed as labor-importing countries
decided to hire more Arabs. Estimates from the US
Embassy in Riyadh indicate that of 24 countries with
expatriate populations in Saudi Arabia, 19 showed
either stable populations or decreases during the
1983-85 period. All but one of the countries with
increasing numbers were South or East Asian.
The Future for Egyptian Expatriate Workers
The number of Egyptian expatriates, both unskilled
and professional, will continue to fall because of the
effects of the severe drop in oil prices, the leveling in
economic growth resulting in less demand for foreign
workers, and the push to indigenize the labor forces.
The less skilled workers will be the hardest hit and
will make up the majority of the returnees.
The exodus of millions of Egyptians has caused a
severe brain drain for Egypt. Some professional
vacancies will be filled by returning expatriates, but
most will not. This is due to the fact that professional
and technical workers will not be affected as soon or
as severely by the changes in the Gulf.
Most returning workers will be able to live on their
savings for a while, but eventually they will be forced
to look for jobs in an Egyptian market overcrowded
with other semiskilled and unskilled job seekers.
Egypt's economy is too depressed to provide jobs for a
larger work force.
Returnees will face a lower standard of living in
Egypt than they enjoyed while earning higher foreign
wages. This will further encourage unrest among
returning workers.
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Algeria: Shifting Stance
Toward Chad
The Chadian civil war is an issue of longstanding and
growing importance to Algeria. Policymakers in
Algiers oppose French and Libyan involvement in the
fighting and have attempted through diplomatic
means to encourage reconciliation between the two
factions in Chad. Algiers, however, has never been a
disinterested party, and it now appears to be moving
away from Libyan-backed rebel leader Goukouni and
toward Chadian President Habre. The reason is
Algerian concern about Libyan leader Qadhafi's
aggressive foreign policy in Africa, the potential
threat to Algerian national security posed by
Qadhafi's adventurism in Sub-Saharan Africa, and
Algerian doubts about French resolve in Chad. Even
so, Algeria is not yet inclined to openly choose sides
but probably would do so if the Habre government
appeared to be losing control of the military situation.
quietly to mediate between Libya and France and
US Embassies in Algiers and Paris, meetings between
Algerian Foreign Minister Ibrahimi and Mitterrand
last February and a followup visit to Algiers one week
later by former French Foreign Minister Dumas
Algiers Upholds High Ideals .. .
Algeria's policy toward Chad has been consistent.
Officially, the government remains neutral. Its
primary goal is the termination of outside intervention
in Chad and the withdrawal of foreign military
personnel. The balance in Algeria's position is
reflected in a claim it has made privately to foreign
diplomats that, although Habre represents the "legal"
government of Chad, the regime in N'Djamena is not
"legitimate." Algeria has been involved in efforts by
the Organization of African Unity to facilitate a
cease-fire and negotiations between Habre and
Goukouni. Although Algeria would prefer a
government of national unity including both Chadian
leaders, it has indicated to the United States and
other countries that it would support any regime in
Chad that held out promise of uniting the country. A
settlement of the conflict is vital to Algeria because it
traditionally has advocated the status quo in Africa
with regard .to the boundaries established in the
colonial era.
Concern over the deteriorating situation in Chad has
compelled Algerian President Bendjedid to use his
diplomatic resources to find a settlement. He has tried
...While Advancing National Interests
The Algerian Government's public position masks
shifting undercurrents of favoritism. Until late 1983,
Algeria gave discreet support to Goukouni. Algiers
received Goukouni on several occasions after his fall
from power and allowed his faction to maintain alow-
level diplomatic mission in Algiers. Algiers's
treatment was attributable to Goukouni's decision in
1980, when he was President of Chad, to recognize
the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic-the
government-in-exile of the Algerian-backed Polisario
guerrillas fighting Morocco for control of the Western
Sahara-and Habre's subsequent ambivalence
toward the Polisario. Algiers also was angered at
Habre because his successful coup against Goukouni
was aided by France, which the Algerians still suspect
of having colonial ambitions in Africa. The
government openly criticized French military support
for Habre and refused French requests to allow
military overflights when fighting between Goukouni
and Habre intensified in 1982. Algiers even denied air
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-009
11 April 1986
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shipments of UN relief assistance for the Habre
regime. Strains in relations spurred the recall of
Chad's Ambassador from Algiers and the closing of
the two countries' respective Embassies in August
The Libyan invasion of northern Chad in 1983, as
well as Qadhafi's developing ties to Morocco-
Algeria's longtime adversary-encouraged Algiers to
shift position on the dispute. Algerian leaders
probably believe that Qadhafi's involvement in the
conflict will prolong the French presence on the
continent, encourage further Libyan meddling in the
region if Qadhafi is successful in Chad, and thus
challenge Algerian pretensions of dominance in North
Africa. Algerian leaders probably calculate that a
Libyan victory in Chad would encourage Tripoli to
step up subversion in Niger, Mali, and Mauritania. In
addition, the Algerians may have viewed a turn away
from Goukouni as a necessary punishment for Libya,
given Qadhafi's decision to cease support for the
Polisario as part of the bargain in forming the Libyan-
Moroccan union. Algiers also may be concerned that
Morocco's King Hassan will use his ties to Libya to
mediate an end to the Chad conflict and thus gain
international prestige, to the detriment of Algeria.
During the past year, Algerian disgruntlement with
Libyan actions in Chad has increased to the point that
Algiers is openly showing its sympathies. Meetings
last November between senior Algerian diplomats and
Habre and other Chadian officials were followed by
an unprecedented meeting the next month between
Habre and President Bendjedid in Algiers. The US
Embassy in Algiers reported that Bendjedid afforded
Habre full honors as a visiting head of state and that
the visit received prominent coverage in the state-
controlled media.
the two leaders may have discussed
Algerian military support.
The Embassy believes Algiers purposely used Habre's
visit to signal to Tripoli its displeasure over
developments in Chad.
the Algerian
overnment has become increasingly exasperated
with Qadhafi's machinations in Chad,
lgerian officials have been
particularly exercised by the fact that Qadhafi's
recent offensive in Chad was launched during high-
level consultations between both countries. They are
probably upset with Libya's disruption of last month's
proposed Habre-Goukouni meeting.
Prudence Prevails
To be sure, Algiers's shift has been gradual. The US
Embassy in Algiers reports that Bendjedid has
allowed France to transit Algerian airspace for
overflights to Chad. Otherwise, the government has
refrained from giving Habre vocal support,
e government has refrained from
mentioning either Libya or France in statements
about the last round of fighting between Habre's
forces and Chadian dissidents. Both factions in Chad
maintain low-level representation in Algiers, although
the US Embassy reports the government has
downgraded Goukouni's mission and has granted
higher status to Habre's.
Algiers's caution probably is attributable to its
distrust of all of the parties involved in the conflict
and poor relations with Libya and France. The
government also appears to be in a quandary on how
to proceed diplomatically, even though it appears to
view France as the lesser of two evils in Chad. Open
condemnation of Tripoli would jeopardize Algeria's
attempts to foster rapprochement and cooperation
with Qadhafi. Algiers hopes its contacts with Libya
will lead to settlement of a longstanding border
problem, encourage Qadhafi to cease his attempts to
subvert Tunisia, and split Libya from Morocco and
thus ease the military threat to Algeria on two of its
forestall Libya's aggression in Chad but doubt Paris
has the will. They suspect Mitterrand may strike a
deal with Qadhafi that would leave the country split
indefinitely, and that Paris would fail to foster
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stability in Chad even if French forces assisted Habre
in defeating the Libyan-backed rebels. Algiers will
look favorably upon the firmer policy by France in
Chad that is likely to come from the new conservative
government headed by Prime Minister Chirac. A
more active policy by France, however, could also
increase fears in Algiers of French neocolonialism.
Outlook
As long as the military stalemate continues in Chad,
Algeria is not likely to become deeply involved in the
dispute, except for diplomatic efforts to engage Habre
and Goukouni in negotiations. Algerian perceptions of
Libyan and French perfidy are such that Bendjedid
will want to avoid commitments that might come
undone by another Libyan-French deal on Chad.
Bendjedid, however, might consider rendering limited
covert aid to Habre, such as food and money, and take
stronger diplomatic steps to goad Libya to curtail its
activities in Chad.
Algiers would consider direct engagement in the
dispute if Qadhafi were to make military gains and
France were to withdraw. Under these circumstances,
Bendjedid probably would ofTer Habre weapons.
Algeria might also again reinforce its military units
on its border with Libya and issue a strong warning to
Qadhafi to pull back in Chad. The government
probably would be reluctant to commit military
personnel to Habre. In the event of an imminent
military victory in Chad by Goukouni and Qadhafi,
Bendjedid might consider asking the United States to
intervene and would assist Washington's actions
behind the scenes.
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Ties That Bind
Moroccan-French relations are based on strong
historical, cultural, and social influences, and the
outlook for these ties is good. Paris gives economic
and commercial assistance, while Rabat serves as a
pillar for French policy in North Africa.
Morocco-365,000 Frenchmen visited that country in
1984 compared to 104,000 Americans. Despite
budgetary restrictions that threaten funds available
for scholarships abroad, there are nearly 25,000
Moroccan students at the secondary and university
level in France.
Background
Although Moroccan-French relations have varied
since Morocco gained its independence in 1956, ties
are still strong, the French imprint remains deep, and
French is the principal European language used.
Much of the elite-in the palace, the government,
politics, and business-is French educated. The
Moroccan community in France, over 500,000 strong,
is the largest group of Moroccans abroad, as well as
the third- or fourth-largest foreign community in
France. About 35 percent of Morocco's trade is with
France. In addition, France holds a special place in
King Hassan's world view. At the beginning of his
state visit to France in November 1985, he claimed
that, because of his upbringing, he considered himself
"not an Arab who speaks French, but a man with
almost a completely double culture."
The bilateral tie matters to France as well.
Economically, France views Morocco as a potential
arms purchaser-even if it is the Saudis who
ultimately pay the bill. Politically, Morocco gives
France a foothold in North Africa and acts as a
conduit for French interactions with other African
countries. Moreover, Paris sees close relations with
Morocco as an example of its ability to serve as an
alternative point of contact for Third World
developing countries seeking relations with developed
nations.
French Assistance
France is the principal Western aid donor to Morocco.
According to the 1985 French-Moroccan Financial
Protocol, France committed $145 million to cover
Moroccan balance-of-payments deficits and $84
million for project assistance, particularly in the area
of phosphate development. French tourism also helps
Although major economic agreements have been
reached, provision of new arms and spare parts
depends on Morocco's ability to pay in hard currency.
According to the US Embassy in Rabat, between one-
third and one-half of Morocco's foreign debt of over
$3.5 billion is owed to the French Government. We
believe that prospects for a large new concessionary
military deal from the French are poor, considering
France's already substantial nonmilitary support and
Morocco's high overall debt. Since 1983 there has
been no financial military assistance, and, according
to the US Embassy, France will sell Morocco the
Mirage 2000 aircraft only if the King can come up
with funding.
Outlook
Morocco will undoubtedly continue to pursue strong
bilateral ties to France. Hassan has been eager to
contrast the "more understanding" French view of
Morocco's union with Libya to the cold reaction of the
United States. He has been especially pleased with
the number of high-level French visitors over the past
18 months, including President Mitterrand, then
Prime Minister Fabius, and on two occasions Foreign
Minister Dumas, as well as a host of other French
officials. He remembers last year when Morocco had
a serious cereal shortfall and was bailed out by the
French sale of about 1.2 million metric tons of wheat.
Although the King may say that he is unhappy that
France is not backing Morocco fully enough in the
Sahara and he may hope for more economic and
military assistance, we believe Hassan is basically
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11 Apri! 1986
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satisfied with the relationship. We believe that he will
continue to play up his French ties to generate the
impression in Washington that Paris is edging the
United States out and that the United States should
compete more vigorously for influence in Morocco.
France for its part sees relations with Morocco as
positive, and there is no fear of rupture and little
likelihood of major change. In addition, poor ties to
Algeria reinforce Paris's belief that Morocco should
remain the keystone of its North African policy.
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Arab States:
The Urge To Merge
Inspired by ambitious leaders and by ideologies that
incorporate the myth of a single Arab nation, Arab
states have frequently attempted mergers over the last
30 years. These efforts have failed because of
differences in national objectives between the
partners, lack of trust in each other, and internal
political divisions within the participating states.
Nevertheless, the notion of unity is attractive to many
Arabs and will remain a part of the Arab political
vocabulary and a rationale for further merger efforts.
Nasir and Nasirism. Nasirism was a secularist
attempt to rally the Arabs with Pan-Arab themes and
overcome past divisions created by colonialism. It
gave short shrift to Islamic principles and sought to
bring about a union based on Arab socialism. It also
provided Nasir with a personal vehicle for exercising
regional leadership. Nasir's merger ideas tended to be
predicated on Egyptian dominance-a view that
provoked a backlash in other states and ultimately
helped undermine the unions.
Recent proposals by Libyan leaders to senior Algerian
officials that they lay the groundwork for political
union represent the latest in the long series of Arab
merger attempts. Arab leaders have appealed for
unity ever since Arab independence struggles against
their Ottoman and European overlords. They based
this appeal on the notion that all Arabs belong to one
nation, united in blood and reinforced by a common
language and an Islamic heritage.
According to this notion, a major Arab task is to
overcome the artificial boundaries imposed by
outsiders. The merging of one Arab state with another
is part of this drive for reintegration and reunion.
Between the two World Wars, the unity drive took the
form of a Fertile Crescent movement and the Greater
Syria scheme, leading to the development of Ba`thism.
During the 1950s, Egyptian leader Gamal `Abd al-
Nasir offered his own version of Arab nationalism,
often called Pan-Arabism.
The urge to draw together is also motivated by
perceptions of a common external threat. The source
of this threat has shifted over time from the European
colonial powers to Israel, and, in some views, the
United States, the Soviet Union, or Iran.
Trends in Unity
Most of the attempted unions of the past three
decades fall into two clusters: those related to
Nasirism or defensive reactions to it, and those
initiated by Qadhafi.
Qadhq/i's Neo-Nasirism. Qadhafi idolizes Nasir and
considers him an exemplar. He has adopted the
Nasirist themes of "freedom, socialism, and unity"
and combined them with his own brand of desert
Islam, with mystical and fundamentalist reform
elements. Qadhafi believes that Libya has the wealth
and the sense of purpose (Qadhafism) the Arabs need
but lacks the population or key geographical position
to accomplish much by itself. He sees Libya as a
bridge between the Arab East, or Mashriq, and the
Arab West, or Maghreb.
Qadhafi's persistent unity initiatives might have fallen
on deaf ears were it not for his promises of economic
benefits. Libyan offers of political support in regional
North African disputes and the prospect of
moderating Qadhafi's meddling also entice
prospective partners. The Islamic element in
Qadhafi's ideology provides a cloak of legitimacy.
Goals and Results
Arab mergers have been attempted for several
purposes:
? To acquire the resource base needed to solve
economic problems.
? To serve as a political platform on the basis of which
ambitious Arab leaders such as Nasir and Qadhafi
can gain the spotlight.
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-009
1 l April 1986
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Secret
Arab Merger Attempts
Country/Year
Merger Name
Kind of
Union a
Why Attempted
Why Failed
Egypt/Syria
1958-61
United Arab
Republic
Unitary
Response to Baghdad Pact; Pan-
Arabism; Syrian weakness
Syrian resentment, coup; Egyptian
bureaucratism and repressive policies
UAR/North Yemen
1958-61
United Arab
States
Nominal
federation
Special Yemeni ties to Egypt
Breakup of UAR; weak linkages
Jordan/Iraq 1958
Arab
Federation
Federation
Response to UAR and the threat of
Nasirism
Military coup in Iraq
Iraq/Syria/Egypt
1963
... b
Unitary
Syrian need to balance Egypt
Nasirist-Ba`thist conflict; Syrian in-
ternal divisions
Iraq/Syria 1963
... b
Federation
Oppositicn to Nasir; Ba`thist unity
Iraqi Bath self-destructed; Iraq's
Arif turned to Cairo
Egypt/Libya/Sudan
1970
Federation of
Arab States
Federation
Qadhafi wanted recognition; Nasir
needed political boost; Sudan wanted
security
Nasir died; Sudan withdrew/
replaced by Syria
Egypt/Libya/Syria
1971-72
Federation of
Arab
Republics
Federation
Continued previous union; Sadat
needed money; reduced dependence
on USSR
Qadhafi's Islamism; demands for
unitary state; Syria withdrew 1972
North Yemen/South
Yemen 1972, 1979
Yemeni Union
Federation
Reduce tensions; resolve common
problems
Incompatibility
Libya/Tunisia 1974
Islamic Arab
Republic
Unitary
Proposed by Qadhafi to isolate
Egypt; Tunisia wanted money
Tunisia repudiated agreement one
day after signing
Syria/Lebanon/
Jordan 1975-76
... n
Federation
Alliance to balance Egypt, deal with
Lebanese civil war
Collaborative only; interests diverged
on Egypt, integration
Iraq/Syria 1978-79
... b
Unitary
Ba`thist unity; to thwart Camp
David; Baghdad hoped to dominate
Iraqi suspicions of Syrian coup in-
volvement; unbalanced power
positions
Libya/Syria 1980
... e
Unitary
Qadhafi seeking recognition;
response to United States, Camp
David; Syria seeking to end isolation
Divergent concerns; Lebanon
Egypt/Sudan
1982-83
Nile Union
Unitary
Outgrowth of close ties; Egyptian
protection
Collaborative only; domestic
preoccupations
Algeria/Tunisia/
Mauritania 1983
Greater
Maghreb
Union
Federation
Economic, labor benefits; hoped for
Morocco, too
Western Sahara dispute
Libya/Morocco
1984
Arab-African
Federation
Federation
End Libyan support for Polisario;
divide United States/Morocco;
Moroccan economic needs
Still going but threatened by
Algerian/Libyan rapprochement
~~ Specified ultimate form of merger envisioned by parties; merger
plans usually included a lengthy time of preparation during which
existing state structures would be preserved.
n Unknown or none existed.
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? To create a defensive coalition to deal with
perceived threats-from Israel or even from other
Arab states-or to weaken an adversary's coalition.
? To reduce a state's political isolation.
? To reduce dependence on a single source of aid and
provide greater bargaining leverage.
? To reduce tension between the merging parties.
Some mergers actually attained some of these goals.
In many instances, the union was probably intended
as little more than a method of packaging agreements
to cooperate on a range of bilateral issues. These
typically have consisted of a statement of intentions, a
series of meetings, a few agreements, and a lengthy
period of 3ecline.
Most serious merger attempts have had little lasting
impact. Problems have inevitably arisen once
agreements in such innocuous areas as cultural
exchanges and trade programs have been initialed.
Whenever the pivotal issues of unification of political
organizations, unified military commands, and the
roles of the leaders in a new power structure have to
be addressed, conflicts rise to the surface.
None of the recent mergers have progressed as far as
the United Arab Republic experiment between Egypt
and Syria in 1958, the earliest modern example and
most serious union attempt. Nasir's dominance
enabled him to demand real integration of Egyptian
and Syrian parties and institutions according to an
Egyptian model, but the process created a strong
Syrian nationalist backlash. The disastrous results
may well have poisoned this and subsequent unity
attempts.
To the extent that Arab unions were intended to
promote Arab unity, they have failed. Real
unification requires a higher degree of trust between
governments and peoples and similarities in outlook
than has ever existed in the Arab world. Short-term
interests have not provided an adequate foundation
for lasting unity.
Pan-Arabism and the Arab State
Pan-Arabism is no longer fashionable. Neither is
there any charismatic leader to act as a catalyst for
Arab union. Qadhafi may offer financial or political
incentives, but other Arab leaders take neither his
ideology nor his leadership capabilities seriously.
Arab scholars have speculated that the post-World
War I state system has taken root in the region,
undermining the foundations of Pan-Arabism. Islamic
fundamentalism may have replaced Pan-Arabism as a
unifying theme. There is probably also an increased
awareness that Pan-Arabism failed to produce
concrete results.
Nevertheless, the concept of unity has widespread and
deep-rooted popular appeal in the Arab world.
Bilateral unity efforts are still advertised as preludes
to even wider Arab unio ~. Arab unity will probably
persist as a dream and along-term goal in the
political vocabulary of the Arab world and will
continue to be offered as a rationale-or
rationalization-for future merger efforts.
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India-Pakistan: Growing Interest
in Electronic Warfare
India and Pakistan have shown an increased interest
in electronic warfare, driven in part by its
demonstrated importance in conflicts outside the
region. India's desire to buy modern electronic
warfare equipment will draw it closer to the West,
whose offerings are superior to those of the USSR.
Pakistan's emphasis on electronic warfare will
reinforce its established relationship with the United
States. Both militaries have only a limited electronic
warfare capability and will require considerable
training before they can use their new equipment
effectively.
Purchases and Plans
Electronic warfare equipment is quickly becoming a
feature of the Indo-Pakistani arms race, which thus
far has been dominated by purchases of major items
such as tanks and fighter aircraft.
military planners in both countries are budgeting
more money to buy the latest electronic
countermeasures (ECM) and electronic counter-
countermeasures (ECCM) equipment.
Pakistan plans to
spend $500 million-almost one-fourth of its
expenditures for foreign military equipment-for
electronic warfare equipment over the next few years.
India plans to spend a similar amount before 1990,
equal to
over 15 percent o its expecte oreign arms
purchases.
The air force in each country is leading the way. The
services want to be able to identify, locate, and jam
each other's air-to-ground transmissions and radars.
the Indian Air Force is
interested in upgrading and au menting its current
electronic warfare assets
is soliciting technical information and
price quotations for vehicle-mounted microwave
surveillance systems designed to detect, analyze, and
locate enemy communications and radar sites.
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has set aside $90 million for the purchase of electronic
warfare equipment to upgrade communications and
set up 40 radar-jamming systems along the border
with Pakistan.
The Indian Air Force is buying protective electronic
systems for its most valuable aircraft. It has a
squadron of 10 MIG-21 M fighters equipped with
the Air Force
plans to install 150 chaff-and-flare electronic
countermeasures systems on its Jaguar and Mirage
2000, a program estimated to cost $5-14 million.
More systems may be purchased to equip the Air
Force's Soviet-desi ned MIG fi hter aircraft. Last
year the
The Pakistani Air Force is making a parallel effort to
improve its electronic warfare capabilities. It began
negotiations in 1985 to purchase its first
communications jamming equipment for a C-130
aircraft,
The Pakistanis also want to equip their F-16s with
jamming pods that can disrupt enemy radars and is
looking for Western electronic countermeasures pods
for its Chinese A-5 attack aircraft,
The ground forces of both countries are acquiring
electronic warfare equipment at a slower pace.
and could not deal effectively with enemy attacks if
their communications with higher commands were
disrupted. the Pakistani
Army has budgeted $40 million for an advanced
electronic warfare system capable of locating and
Secret
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// April /986
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jamming Indian Army communications.
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Electronic warlare is the disruption of enemy use of
the electromagnetic spectrum (electronic
countermeasures) and the attempt to counter such
efforts (electronic counter-countermeasures).
Jamming, one of the principal means of electronic
countermeasures, consists of broadcasting on the
same frequency that the enemy is using for
communications or sensors. Some jamming signals
make the enemy believe his equipment is defective
and can only be countered by well-trained troops.
Chaff jamming consists of strips of aluminum foil
that form a cloud that active sensors cannot
penetrate. Flares draw off missiles that home in on
heat. Electronic noisemakers deflect radar-homing
missiles.
One of the simplest lorms of electronic counter-
countermeasures involves increasing the power of the
transmitter and burning through the enemy jamming.
Another technique consists of burst transmissions in
which a message is electronically compressed and
transmitted in a powerful and brie/'burst of energy.
Automated frequency hopping also counters
jamming. The favorite form of electronic counter-
countermeasures for missile guidance systems is to
have more than one type of guidance.
appears to be another deal, the Pakistani Army began
last year to take delivery of ashelter-mounted
electronic warfare system to monitor and jam
communications purchased for $21 million with funds
supplied by Saudi Arabia.
Far less information is available on Indian Army
procurements of electronic warfare equipment. The
reports that
electronic warfare is just beginning to receive
attention in the Indian Army.
is testing frequency hopping radios from six different
Western firms in its armored vehicles.
The Indian and Pakistani navies are even further
behind in electronic warfare.
for its three new
Godavari-class frigates, but these have yet to be
installed. The Navy has also expressed interest in
attending a US Navy electronic warfare course and is
interested in electronic countermeasures systems for
its new West German Do-228 maritime patrol
aircraft,
systems for its new British-built frigates.
and is considering similar
Behind the Increased Interest
We believe that the importance of electronic warfare
in the wars in the Falklands and Lebanon in 1982
prompted New Delhi's and Islamabad's rowin
interest.
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The officers were also impressed by
the damage inflicted by
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Electronic countermeasures
pod mounted on F-l6 aircrq(t
slamabad is
concerned about the Soviet ability to conduct
electronic warfare along the border with Afghanistan.
? Indian Air Force officers looking for secure voice 25X1
communications equipment failed to specify
important parameters including whether they
wanted equipment that would transmit encoded
Soviets have large amounts of such equipment in their
military district adjacent to Afghanistan. We believe
that Moscow could jam 90 percent of the Pakistani
military's communications and signals processing if it
decided to disrupt Pakistani air operations along the
border or to mount a major ground incursion.
Increased Capabilities?
We believe the armed forces of both countries will
require considerable time and training before they
begin to use the new electronic warfare equipment
effectively. hat,
although many Indian and Pakistani officers involved
with electronic warfare purchases seem relatively
knowledgeable, there have been cases to the contrary:
? Indian Air Force officers soliciting technical
information and price quotations for microwave
surveillance systems failed to identify the number of
systems they wanted or the targets they would be
used against,
data as well as voice,
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Indian and Pakistani naval personnel had little idea
how to use the electronic warfare equipment on
their ships and, in some cases, even where it was
located.
We doubt that Indian and Pakistani purchases of new
electronic warfare equipment will substantially
change the military balance between the two
countries. India's quantitative advantage in men and
ground forces equipment will not be offset by
Pakistan's somewhat greater attention to new
developments in electronic warfare. On the other
hand, increased Indian electronic warfare assets will
not overcome the rigid command and control systems
and lack of initiative among the Indian officer corps.
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Implications for the United States
India's interest in electronic warfare will draw it
closer to Western producers because of the latter's
edge over the Soviets in technology and computers.
any Indian
Air Force officers believe US electronic warfare
equipment cannot be matched by the Soviets, who
have been reluctant to inform the Indians about
Soviet electronic equipment, let alone supply the
equipment. US denials of Indian requests for
advanced Western electronic warfare systems because
of possible leakage to the USSR and its allies could
dampen Indian interest. Electronic warfare is not one
of the areas for military cooperation agreed to by
New Delhi and Washington, but Indian requests can
be expected.
Islamabad's growing interest in electronic warfare
will strengthen the position of military and political
officials who believe that a close security relationship
with the United States is in Pakistan's interest.
Pakistan's need for advanced US weaponry such as
electronic warfare equipment will outweigh
arguments by many military officials who believe the
United States has been an inconsistent ally; that its
Middle East policies are anti-Islamic; and that a close
US-Pakistani relationship needlessly provokes
Moscow.
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India-Pakistan: NBC
War-Fighting Capabilities
Indian and Pakistani military forces are unprepared
to fight in a nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC)
environment. Despite concerns in each country over
the other's nuclear weapons potential and reports of
chemical weapons use in Afghanistan and the Iran-
Iraq war, neither military establishment has
developed adequate doctrine, procured sufficient
equipment, or trained realistically to support an NBC
battlefield mission. The Indian and Pakistani officer
corps, prompted largely by foreign professional
contacts and outside reading, are increasing their
discussions of the need for modern NBC war-fighting
capabilities. We believe each country will take only
gradual steps in these areas, especially in biological
and chemical warfare, where they perceive the least
threat from the other.
Potential NBC Environment
Both India and Pakistan possess the technological
infrastructure for nuclear weapons programs,
India's "peaceful nuclear explosion"
of 1974 and its large civil nuclear power program and
research and development give New Delhi a strong
foundation for a nuclear weapons effort. Pakistan has
had personnel and facilities involved in the design,
fabrication, and testing of nuclear weapons parts since
1971, and Pakistani officials boast openly of their
capability to enrich uranium to weapons grade.
According to press reports, Pakistan last year illegally
obtained and used US-made krytron triggers for a test
of nonfissile components of a nuclear device.
lack of protective preparation
suggests neither country expects the other to use these
weapons. Unlike the Iran-Iraq and Arab-Israeli
conflicts, where development of chemical agents has
proceeded steadily, biological and chemical weapons
research in South Asia has been assigned a role
secondary to nuclear research. India's Defense
Research and Development Establishment at Gwalior
has studied bacterial and viral compounds and has
successfully synthesized small amounts of lethal nerve
agents for research purposes. Other Indian facilities
produce riot control agents, regularly used for internal
security. The small Indian insecticide industry
produces basic poison gases for agricultural use. The
Although these efforts represent only a
potential for biological and chemical weapons
production, they could be developed rapidly.
The Indian and Pakistani military establishments are
aware of the proliferation of biological and chemical
weapons elsewhere and their serious battlefield
threats. Pakistani officers have carefully scrutinized
Iraq's use of chemical weapons. They are also
concerned about Afghan insurgent claims of Soviet
use of chemical weapons in the Afghan war,
moved the Indian debate from whether New Delhi
should acquire nuclear arms to when, but discussion
has yet to proceed toward formulation of a doctrine on
the use of nuclear weapons.
and it has made arrangements with
other countries for similar training. The small number
Indian military officers are gravely
concerned about how a
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-009
II April 1986
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Nuclear
(in order of occurrence)
Electromagnetic pulse Damage to electronic equipment and components
Shut down equipment before pulse
Blast Overpressure, shock, winds, debris, structural
collapse
Reinforced shelter, foxhole, culvert, intervening
terrain
Thermal radiation Flash, thermal burns, fires
Shield eyes and skin
Nuclear radiation Radiation sickness (nausea, diarrhea, lethargy,
mental disorientation)
Protective mask and clothing, medical aid, decon-
tamination procedures
Biological Poisoning, infection, disease, unexplained illness
Protective mask and clothing, medical aid, immuni-
zation sanitation
Chemical
Nerve agents Breathing difficulties, dimmed vision, nausea,
convulsions, death
Protective mask and clothing, medical aid, decon-
tamination procedures
Choking agents Choking, coughing, headache, nausea, lung
damage
Protective mask, medical aid
Blister agents Blisters, temporary blindness, respiratory tract
damage
Protective mask and clothing, medical aid, decon-
tamination procedures
Blood agents Headache, dizziness, convulsions, coma, death
Protective mask, medical aid
Riot control agents Headache, dizziness, respiratory difficulties,
tearing of eyes
Protective mask, airing and washing face and eyes,
medical aid
of personnel involved in these programs suggests little likely to initiate a nuclear warfare course to train
more than a basic interest in biological or chemical
threats.
on y recent y egan reviewing NBC warfare in a few
professional schools and are starting to develop basic
NBC doctrine. the Army's
training directorate has be un drawin u an NB
training syllabus, and an
is writing a manual
forte rmy ased on the course material he brought
home. A 1983 article in India's National Defense
College Journal discusses New Delhi's chemical and
biological weapons options,
young infantry officers to lead their units
independently after a nuclear attack has disrupted the
command chain. The writings of the National
Defense College students represent a professional
discussion of NBC warfare, but one engaged in by
only a small number of senior student officers, while
the Junior Leaders School is unimportant in
establishing
equipment-alarms, decontamination kits,
According to press
reports, the Indian Army Junior Leaders School is
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examined or bought.
he Indians tested Italian protective suits
last year, but they have yet to buy these suits or make
their own
Indian troops often carry protective masks in internal
security operations where tear gas is used, but masks
are not included in soldiers' standard combat kits.
some Indian Air Force pilots
have worn protective masks on occasional training
flights.
The special headgear, dress, and beards
allowed many servicemen, moreover, militate against
the effectiveness of protective masks and suits.
Few, if any, Indian military vehicles have internal
NBC protective systems. We believe that India's
small force of Soviet export-version T-72 tanks and
BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles may have
atmosphere pressurization systems that insulate the
crew compartments from contaminated outside air,
has yet to show interest in similar systems for its
newly acquired Swedish IKV-91 light tanks.
nuc ear exp osions are roug t mto p ay m some
sandtable discussions at senior Indian Army schools,
but no effort is made to designate ground zero,
calculate troop exposure, or take other measures
considered standard in NBC defense.
are aware of basic NBC war-
fighting principles but appear to have acquired this
knowledge through foreign professional contacts and
reading. Islamabad has solicited bids from British,
West German, Italian, Swedish, and US firms to
provide protective masks for the Pakistani Army.
No Pakistani
military vehic es ave mterna protective
systems.
chemical weapons use in Afghanistan.
The Pakistani Army
runs atwo-week nuclear warfare course at its staff
college in Quetta for middle-level officers and,
according to US Embassy sources, plans to increase
chemical warfare training in response to reports of
Outlook
India's and Pakistan's interest in NBC warfare
probably will grow as their forces continue to
modernize, as they each perceive an increasing NBC
threat from the other, and as their officers become
increasingly exposed to foreign-mainly Western-
doctrine, equipment, and training. Both countries will
continue to shop for protective masks and suits and
probably will soon procure moderate stocks of each,
but we do not believe they will buy sophisticated gear
such as warning, monitoring, and decontamination
equipment because of the high costs and the extensive
training required to learn to use it.
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If significant progress is made, it is most likely to be
in the area of measures to fight in a nuclear
environment, as both countries already perceive a
nuclear threat. Even in this area, programs are likely
to remain embryonic for several years because of the
expensive equipment and major training efforts
required to learn how to use this gear and to conduct
operations in a nuclear environment. The lack of a
well-thought-out doctrine of nuclear war will hinder
both Indian and Pakistani abilities to structure
effective procurement and training programs. If one
or the other country becomes convinced that its
adversary may deploy biological or chemical weapons,
developing abilities to fight in such an environment
may progress steadily, given that much of the
required equipment and training would already be
available from the nuclear war-fighting mission.
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Nuclear Scenarios in South
Asia: Impact on the
Nonproliferation Regime
Nuclear weapons acquisition efforts by India and
Pakistan are damaging to the nonproliferation regime.
How injurious such nuclear weapons proliferation will
be depends partly on the kind of proliferation scenario
that materializes.
Damage to the nonproliferation regime can include
the erosion of existing institutions or commitments or
the introduction of new obstacles to the development
of stronger institutions and commitments. Effects can
be measured by changes in attitude, commitments, or
policies of full participants; partial participants within
the circle of advanced nuclear supplier countries-
whether or not they are strongly committed to the
nonproliferation regime; and those outside that circle
who are potential emerging suppliers. The effects on
the regime can also be seen in the strength of support
for and the universality of adherence to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA}--
including its safeguards system-and the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Nuclear Freeze Scenario
Joint Indo-Pakistani undertakings that freeze or ban
the development of nuclear weapons in the
subcontinent would strengthen the nonproliferation
regime. Substantial benefits would accrue if Indo-
Pakistani arrangements were of long duration,
integrated IAEA safeguards, and closely conformed
to NPT and full-scope safeguards criteria. Prospects
for heading off covert nuclear weapons programs or
overt programs and a nuclear arms race in the
subcontinent would be greatly enhanced.
The benefits for the nonproliferation regime would be
less clear if Indo-Pakistani arrangements were of
short duration and without international guarantees,
including verification. An arrangement that suggested
to other countries that a double standard was
permissible in the subcontinent would give rise to
cynicism, especially among states whose commitment
to the NPT is already shaky. Even imperfect regional
arrangements, however, could buy time for the
development of more effective arrangements.
Undeclared (Covert) Nuclear Weapons Programs
Both India and Pakistan have certain incentives to
emulate the Israeli approach-an unassembled
"bomb in the basement"-that is ambiguous and
deniable. 'This approach would do less damage to the
nonproliferation regime than overt nuclear weapons
capabilities postures but would still be injurious. The
adverse impact on the NPT regime would be inversely
related to the plausibility of denial. In any event,
deniability is likely to break down over time.
Suspicion or growing knowledge of clandestine
weapons programs in India and Pakistan would
stimulate other countries to emulate the pattern of
clandestine acquisition. Some neighboring nations
might seek to establish special security or nuclear
cooperation relationships with either India or
Pakistan-or both.
States strongly committed to the nonproliferation
regime, however, probably would attempt to
coordinate more closely their nuclear export and arms
transfer policies and make fresh efforts to devise
effective international security measures. The Soviet
Union probably would cooperate with these measures.
One Goes Nuclear, One Holds Back
A situation where either Pakistan or India-but not
both-went nuclear is less predictable because it
would be perceived as unstable and inconclusive, a
transitional stage to something more clear-cut.
Participants in the nonproliferation regime would
explore military preventive measures or other steps to
deter Pakistan from going nuclear if it had held back
while India went nuclear, or from racing ahead if it
'This paper was prepared by an outside contractor. It was not
coordinated within this Agency. The views expressed are those of
the author.
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went nuclear alone. But NPT participants probably
would not view pressure on India as a realistic option
if New Delhi went nuclear, because India has a
largely indigenous nuclear capability and is a regional
power whose influence cannot be ignored. Other
effects on nonproliferation regime participants would
depend heavily on the degree to which the advanced
nuclear states react with cohesion, consistency, and a
perceivably sensible approach.
A one-nation nuclear scenario probably would not
cause a breakdown of the nonproliferation regime but
would present serious obstacles to its strengthening.
Moreover, this scenario would be prone to evolve into
a nuclear arms race.
Nuclear Arms Race in South Asia
A nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan
could be limited or all-out. Given their different
resources, a race confined to the subcontinent
necessarily might be an all-out one for Pakistan, but a
limited one for India. Once India goes nuclear,
however, it would also face the issue whether to seek
nuclear parity with China, implying massive
superiority over Pakistan.
An all-out arms race could have a quite different
significance if India and Pakistan receive aid from
outside the region. Such aid either could be intended
to redress Pakistani disadvantages or could flow to
both countries from various sources, including the
major powers. The effects on international security as
well as on the nonproliferation regime from an arms
race supported from the outside would be more
difficult to confine to the subcontinent.
A South Asian nuclear arms race probably would lead
to weakened nonproliferation commitments in the
Middle East and South Asia and perhaps other states
outside the region, and result in greater politization of
the international institutions of the nonproliferation
regime, particularly the IAEA. On the other hand, if
the advanced nuclear powers are not involved, an
Indo-Pakistani nuclear arms race would be likely to
forge even stronger nonproliferation commitments
and policy convergence among the advanced powers
and stimulate nonproliferation regime-strengthening
measures of other kinds.
The damage to the nonproliferation regime that
would result from nuclear conflict in the subcontinent
is much harder to predict. The historical pattern
suggests that the lessons learned from the experience
of a general, protracted, or cataclysmic war tend to
have much greater effect on international institutional
and arms control development than the playing out of
traditional hostilities prior to war. The costs of
learning the hard way could be catastrophic, however,
for India and Pakistan.
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Burhanuddin Rabbani:
Academician of the
Afghan Resistance
Burhanuddin Rabbani heads the Jamiat-i-Islami, the
largest and militarily most capable of the Afghan
resistance groups. Under his aegis, the Jamiat has
become the dominant resistance group in northern
and western Afghanistan. Rabbani's personal appeal
and ability to get along with rival insurgent leaders,
coupled with his skill in selecting and maintaining
good insurgent commanders, have made him one of
the most important and respected resistance leaders.
His organization, however, shows signs of serious
factionalism, which could erode combat effectiveness.
Rabbani will begin athree-month stint as spokesman
for the insurgents' seven-party alliance in April.
Middle-of-the-Road Fundamentalist
The 46-year-old Rabbani, a former dean and
professor at Kabul University and a Tajik from
Badakhshan, is an Islamic fundamentalist who wants
an Islamic political and social order in Afghanistan.
At the same time
Rabbani supports the free election of political leaders
and multiparty politics. A Western scholar familiar
with Afghanistan believes that Rabbani occupies the
ideological middle ground between the dogmatic
fundamentalists, such as Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, and
the pragmatic fundamentalists, such as Yunus Khalis.
Rabbani flatly rejects any role for former Afghan
monarch Zahir Shah in a future Afghan government.
Rabbani has long been involved in antiregime politics.
According to Western observers, he became active in
the Muslim Brotherhood while at Kabul University in
the 1960s. Along with Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, now
leader of a Hizbi Islami faction, Rabbani led
Brotherhood protests against the Daoud regime and
fled Kabul in 1973 to organize resistance activity
against Daoud. Following the failure of the
fundamentalist-led uprising in the Panjsher Valley in
credentials in three areas: classical Islamic culture,
Sufism, and political Islam. His doctorate in theology
is from Al Azhar University in Cairo, and he has
written a book on rationalist philosophy in Islam.
Habbani has a strong following among the Sufi
brotherhoods of western Afghanistan, where he is well
known for his translations of Sufi poetry and his thesis
on the 16th century Sufi poet Nur-al-Din Jami.
Rabbani's role in translating the works of Muslim
Brotherhood leader Sayyid Qutb from Arabic to Dari
has earned him respect among more political
members of the fundamentalist resistance.
Rabbani's popularity among resistance members also
reflects his apparent lack of personal ambition. His
longstanding efforts as diplomat and mediator among
resistance factions have enabled him to attract
support from diverse segments of Afghan society.
According to observers, he has shown the greatest
tendency among resistance leaders to compromise and
put together a united front
the near future.
Although he is often ill at ease with Western customs,
Rabbani is generally pro-Western. He has traveled to
France and several Arab countries in search of
support for the resistance. He has developed good
relations with his Pakistani benefactors and with the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Rabbani is planning
to travel to Europe, the United States, and China in
good Jamiat relations with Iran.
Tehran's cooperation for movement of supplies
through Iranian territory to Jamiat fighters in
western Afghanistan has been a major sticking point
in the relationship.
1975, Rabbani moved to Peshawar.
According to a Western scholar with long experience
in Afghanistan, Rabbani has a sound reputation
among resistance leaders stemming from his strong
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Rabbani's Regional Commanders
procrastinate over tough decisions have sometimes
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Ahmad Shah Masood ...Jamiat commander j'or
Panjsher Valley and neighboring areas . .
Masood has some 12,OOO.fighters in the
Panjsher and another 3,000 men outside the
valley ...has fought of/'eight Soviet offensives in the
Panjsher since 1980 ... generally good relations with
Rabbani aided by marriage between Masood s
brother and Rabbani's daughter.
Ismail Khan ...commander for Herat
Province ...group has reputation for effective
intelligence network in Herat and good relations with
local populace ... small Khan's
group has penetrated local ~1Jghan army and
government intelligence organizations.
Maulawi Alam Khan ...commander for Balkh
Province ... Alam was being
challenged by rival Jamiat.fighterfor leadership
position in Balkh in 1985.
Province ...leads 7,000 to 8,OOO.fighters
Fazlullah ...commander oj'S,000 to 10,000 men in
Lowgar Province ...conducted two offensives against
.grghan army in 1984.
Rabbani as Leader of the Jamiat
Rabbani has sought to centralize control of the
Jamiat and to make himself the final authority in all
major decisions.
Rabbani personally controls
an a ocates all the money and materiel received by
Jamiat. He is considered highly adept at dispensing
the organization's limited resources in such a way that
subordinates do not feel slighted if their requests for
support can be only partly satisfied.
Rabbani is no autocrat, and his reluctance to crack
down on unruly subordinates and his tendency to
Despite flareups of infighting, cooperation among
Jamiat groups is generally growing. Improved
communications, political awareness, and application
of force have enabled skilled Jamiat commanders to
develop spheres of dominance in northern and western
Afghanistan. Ahmad Shah Masood has made the
most extensive effort to spread cooperation, although
Masood must often deal with strong rival insurgent
groups as well as with intense Soviet pressure. In
Balkh Province, Malawi Alam Khan has been trying
to rebuild the strong organization that Zabiullah
Khan had developed before his death in 1984. In
Herat Province, Jamiat leader Ismail Khan has
maintained an extensive organization. We believe the
three commanders exchange personnel for training,
exchange letters, and communicate indirectly through
the Jamiat office in Peshawar. The Balkh and
Panjsher insurgents also communicate periodically by
Rabbani's Relations With Other Insurgent Leaders
Rabbani-long a proponent of closer cooperation
among the insurgent groups-pushed for formation in
May 1985 of an alliance of the seven major moderate
and fundamentalist groups. His moderate views and
pragmatism will make him an effective spokesman for
the alliance for three months starting in April.
In our view, Rabbani's political savvy is considered an
asset by fellow alliance leaders. In January 1984 he
was designated by the alliance as spokesman at the
meeting of the Islamic Conference Organization.
When trying to decide last year the order in which
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leaders would serve as alliance spokesman, the others
wanted Rabbani to serve his term in November 1985
to coincide with the UN General Assembly's debate
on the Afghan issue.
Rabbani has succeeded in maintaining relatively
correct relations with the three moderate insurgent
groups in the alliance.
Rabbani respects Sibghatullah Mojadedi, leader
of the Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli, but that the weakness of
Mojadedi's forces and the corruption of Mojadedi's
family impede closer ties. Although Rabbani has had
little personal contact with moderate leader
Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, head of the Harakat-
i-Inqilab-i-Islami, he consulted with Mohammadi on
the choosing of a successor to slain Jamiat
commander Zabiullah Khan, despite rumors that
Harakat fighters were responsible for Zabiullah's
death.
had sometimes rocky relations with fellow
fundamentalist leaders Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and
Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, who heads one faction of
In recent talks with US officials, Rabbani said
that Saudi backing and money were the only reasons
Sayyaf remained in the alliance. Rabbani's relations
with Gulbuddin have been marred by clashes between
their groups inside Afghanistan.
Outlook
Rabbani's reputation and personal skills will, in our
view, enable him to contain serious factionalism
within the Jamiat and help maintain Jamiat's position
as the dominant insurgent group. Rabbani's
reluctance to crack down on dissenters and rein in
headstrong field commanders probably will hinder the
group's operational capabilities from time to time.
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Near East and
South Asia Briefs
Libya More Aid for Sudan
support for Libya's position in Chad to keep aid deliveries on track.
Libya continues to provide military and economic assistance to Sudan. The US
Embassy in Khartoum, on the basis of sources of varying reliability, says that
Libya has moved as many as 300 trucks filled with food and military supplies to
western Sudan to aid government efforts to dislodge rebel forces. In addition, the
US Embassy says Tripoli probably will supply up to 100,000 metric tons of crude
oil this year, although the terms of the agreement are not yet settled. Unlike the
300,000 metric tons of free oil Libya supplied last year, the new oil may be in
barter for Sudanese goods and services. Qadhafi's largess is a ploy to increase
Libyan leverage in Sudan, and he probably will demand that Khartoum put
distance between itself and the United States and Egypt and ask for Sudanese
Tunisia's growing foreign exchange gap has pushed the government to seek $175
million on the Eurodollar market, the first borrowing in 18 months. Moreover,
Tunisia's financial troubles may be aggravated by Prime Minister Mzali's
replacement of the governor of the Central Bank with a less competent manager,
according to the US Embassy in Tunis. Although loan terms of 0.5 to 0.63
percentage points over LIBOR indicate favorable views of Tunisia's
creditworthiness, the new loan probably will be insufficient to cover the projected
financial gap of at least several hundred million dollars caused by low oil prices
and drought this year. With a foreign debt of $5 billion and an already troubling
debt service ratio exceeding 25 percent, Tunis will have to cover new financial
needs by making hard choices between development priorities, taxation, and lower
domestic consumption.
of the year
Oil barters-mostly with Iran-produced losses of at least $120 million in 1985
for an Austrian firm, Voest Alpine Intertrading (VAIT), one of the world's largest
barter companies, according to press reports. Iran, which probably barters more
than any other country in the world, concluded a deal in 1985 to barter $2 billion
of Iranian oil-the price of which was fixed at the time the contract was signed-
for food and machinery. When the price of Iran's oil fell, VAIT earned less on spot
market sales. To recoup, the company raised the markups on its exports to Iran,
but Iran responded by reducing the amount that it imported. Furthermore, the
company could not recover anything from the escrow account since the contract
provided that any unused balance be automatically transferred to Iran at the end
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As a result of the losses, all board members of the company were replaced, some
may face charges of criminal negligence, and the company will be reorganized.
Although VAIT's loses were unusually high, the company's problems are similar
to those encountered by other Western countertraders-accepting oil that they
cannot use and whose value can decline rapidly before it can be resold, and dealing
in a specialized market without the necessary expertise
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Secret
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