(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000200700001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 3, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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MASTER COPY
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Supplement
3 January 1986
Top Secret
NESA NESAR 86-OOI J
3 January 1986
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Directorate of Top Secret
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Supplement
3 January 1986
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001J
3 January 1986
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Articles Iran-Iraq: Prospects for an Iranian Offensive in the South
The buildup of men and materiel in Iran's southern sector indicates
Tehran is contemplating a major offensive around Al Basrah, but
there is a less-than-even chance it can succeed in reaching its
objectives.
Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items
will be designated as noncoordinated views.
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NESA NESAR 86-OOIJ
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Iran-Iraq: Prospects
for an Iranian Offensive
in the South
The buildup of men and materiel in Iran's southern
sector indicates Tehran is contemplating a major
offensive around Al Basrah. If Iran should launch
such an attack in the near future, we believe there is a
less-than-even chance it can succeed in reaching its
objectives. Weaknesses in Iraq's leadership and its
defensive posture, however, could give the Iranians an
opportunity to achieve a breakthrough.
The southern front offers advantages to Iran largely
because the terrain and weather in the area limit
Iraq's capabilities more than Iran's. The marshes and
rivers in the south slow and sometimes stop the
movement of the mechanized vehicles Iraq depends
upon for its counterattacks. Also, if Iran attacks
during the spring (as it has in the past), the rain, wind,
and low cloud ceilings normal for that region and
season will hinder Iraqi air support. The open plain of
the central region, on the other hand, offers Iran's
infantry no immediate objective or protection from
counterattacks by Iraqi armor. The mountainous
terrain in the north aids Iraq's defense, although it
gives some advantge to infantry-the mainstay of
Iran's forces-over armor.
Iran's Objectives
Iran's strategic objective would be to capture enough
territory and inflict enough casualties to break Iraqi
morale, achieve a psychological victory, and sustain
domestic Iranian support for the war. Iran's minimum
tactical objective would be to establish a foothold and
then quickly expand it to the Tigris River, capturing
the strip of land between Al Qurnah and Qalat Salih.
After consolidating its positions in preparation for
Iraqi counterattacks, Iran could cut the main highway
to Al Basrah through direct and indirect fire from the
Iran has launched major offensives in the marshes in
each of the past two years. In the late winter of 1984,
after a series of brigrade-size feints in the central
sector, Iranian forces attacked from the far eastern
side of the marshes. Uncoordinated and insufficiently
supported Iranian assaults and Iraq's use of chemical
warfare led to Iran's defeat, although the Iranians
captured the northern Majnoon Island. In March
1985, Iran used this island as a starting point to
attack again and established a bridgehead on the
western side of the marshes before being pushed back.
Only the lack of cooperation between Revolutionary
Guard and Army forces and Iraq's use of chemical
weapons prevented an Iraqi defeat.
Iranian Preparations
Iran has been preparing since October 1985 for an
offensive north of Al Basrah. As of early December
the Iranians had concentrated six regular Army
divisions and at least 11 Revolutionary Guard
divisions in the area. Iran also is stockpiling the
equipment needed for an offensive.
The Iranians are in good positions from which to
attack. Numerous small attacks since May 1985 have
gradually given Iran almost total control of the Al
Hawizah marsh. Iran's lines are much closer to the
Iraqi defenses than they were at the start of its failed
offensive in March 1985. Iran now can move men
more quickly across the marsh.
east bank of the Tigris.
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NESA NESAR 86-OOIJ
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Iran claims to be deploying to the front large numbers
of the Basij, the lightly trained reserve force attached
to the Revolutionary Guard. Since October 1985
there have been regular announcements on the
mobilization of reserve units. The Basij units would be
essential for an Iranian offensive.
Estimated Manpower and Equipment-
Southern Front, December 1985
a Operational vehicles only.
b Includes irregular forces currently being mobilized, estimated to
be between 100,000 and 150,000 troops.
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along the Tigris River precludes the Iraqis from
concentrating many of their forces and heavy weapons
operations with sufficient fire support.
Iranian Problems
Iran has many shortcomings that reduce its chances
for success. In particular, logistic problems and poor
coordination between Army and Revolutionary Guard
units limit the Iranians' ability to conduct sustained
Iran's medium-size offensive in the
Balance of Forces
Iraq has a significant advantage in firepower on the
southern front. Baghdad has many more tanks and
artillery pieces as well as large stocks of ammunition.
Iraq also has a proven chemical warfare capability,
which it has used successfully in the past against
massed Iranian forces.)
Much of Iraq's apparent superiority, however, is
negated by the tactical requirements of fighting in the
south. Baghdad must spread its units along the entire
front, while Iran can mass its forces to achieve local
superiority. Additionally, the narrowness of the area
northern sector in September 1985, which was jointly
planned by the Army and Revolutionary Guard,
quickly fell apart because of ineffective air and
artillery support. Despite over six months of
preparations, the Iranians could not coordinate their
fire control or mass their forces at critical points.
Desertions increased as losses mounted,
suggesting poor morale and bad leadership. Iranian
efforts to reorganize the Revolutionary Guard and
eventually merge it with the regular military will not
significantly alleviate these problems for at least the
next several months.
Iranian troops
doing without uniforms, fuel, and many other
supplies. Iran particularly suffers from a shortage of
heavy equipment.
Tehran has lost over 20 percent of its heavy weapons
to battle losses and equipment failures during the past
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year. Although much of this equipment would not be
necessary for a southern offensive, the lack of artillery
and other heavy weapons would inhibit Iran's ability
to exploit the opportunities provided by its infantry. If
Iran established a bridgehead, it would have to move
this type of equipment forward to defeat what would
certainly be a heavily armed Iraqi counterattack. F_
Iran probably will not be able to replace the past
year's losses until the middle of 1986. This, however,
will not necessarily prevent Tehran from taking
advantage of the rainy season in the south (November
through April). Iran has attacked in the past despite
shortages of critical equipment. It would, however,
make a breakthrough less likely.
Iraqi Weaknesses
Political interference in military operations is Iraq's
biggest handicap. Iraqi commanders, wary of
criticism from Baghdad, probably will continue to
react cautiously to Iranian actions. Iraq's
unwillingness to take casualties or lose equipment
(particularly warplanes) has been evident as Baghdad,
after ceding most of the marsh to Iran, has been slow
to stop or harass the Iranian buildup. Despite its air
superiority, Iraq has not made full use of its airpower
to bomb enemy concentrations, causeways, or bridges.
Baghdad's timidity could provide the Iranians with an
opportunity to push forward quickly and consolidate
their gains before an Iraqi counterattack.
The Iraqis also will have to contend with Iranian
activities on other fronts, even though Iranian forces
in these areas are insufficient to threaten Iraq
seriously. In particular, brigade-size attacks in the
central sector similar to those of 1984 and Kurdish
attacks in the north could draw Iraqi units from the
south or at least distract Baghdad's attention from the
Al Basrah area.
Finally, Iraqi morale is fragile. Even limited Iranian
success in the early part of a battle, particularly if it
resulted in high Iraqi casualties, might be enough to
demoralize frontline Iraqi troops.
Timing
In our judgment, Tehran probably will not attempt a
major offensive before March 1986. Despite public
pronouncements of an impending operation, we
believe that the Iranian leadership, aware of Iran's
weaknesses and the risks involved, will wait until it
has replaced more of its losses and conducted
additional training.
current mobilization may be only an exercise to
improve training, maintain fervor, and heighten Iraqi
anxiety. In the meantime, the Iranians probably will
launch occasional battalion-size attacks to improve
their position and contribute to Iraqi war weariness.
Preparations could be completed sooner, however, and
Iran has sufficient forces in the south to start an
attack with little warning.
Outcome of an Offensive
We believe Iran has a significant, but less than even,
chance to secure the narrow strip of land along the
Tigris between Al Qurnah and Qalat Salih and to cut
the main Baghdad-Al Basrah highway. Such a
victory, however, would depend at least as much on
Iraqi mistakes and failures as on Iranian efforts.
Iran would increase the likelihood of success if it:
? Took advantage of inclement weather that impedes
Iraqi air operations and counterattacks.
? Expanded its bridgehead from the edge of the
marshes across the highway within the first 48
hours of the operation.
? Brought its available heavy equipment across the
marsh before the Iraqi counterattack.
Iraq would contribute to the odds of an Iranian
success if it:
? Failed to block Iran's concentration of forces or
their movement across the marshes.
? Failed to mount a timely counterattack.
? Did not use its chemical warfare capability.
Baghdad's defenses are such that Iran will suffer
heavy casualties. If Iran consolidated its initial
position along the Tigris, Iraq would also suffer major
losses in any attempt to push back the Iranians.
Iraqi morale would become a critical factor if the
Iranians succeeded in gaining a solid foothold on the
Tigris. The Iraqis probably would go into a limited
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retreat before counterattacking, and they might not
counterattack at all if the Iranians established
defensive berms around their position.
If Iraq did not drive the Iranians back into the
marshes, support for President Saddam Husayn's
regime would erode, while Tehran's resolve to
continue the war would be strengthened. In
desperation, Iraq might act on its threats to increase
air and missile attacks against Iranian cities and
economic targets.
In our judgment, the most likely outcome of an
Iranian offensive is another Iranian failure similar to
the one in March 1985. Although Iran probably
would gain a foothold in the Iraqi lines, we believe
that Iraqi forces, if they respond quickly, could push
the Iranians back within a few days. An Iranian
debacle would almost certainly follow if:
? Iran could not reach its objectives quickly.
? Iraqi warplanes vigorously attacked Iranian bridges
and causeways, preventing heavy equipment from
reaching the bridgehead.
? Iraq brought all of its weapons (including chemical
munitions) to bear on the Iranian position.
Under these circumstances, an Iranian defeat in
conjunction with a stepped-up Iraqi propaganda
campaign could lead to demonstrations in Iran similar
to those in March 1985. As long as Ayatollah
Khomeini is alive, however, Iran will almost certainly
continue the war.
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