AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000100560001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 21, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Africa Review
ALA LAR 86-006
2! March ! 986
Copy 3 8 4
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secret
Africa Review~~ 25X1
a major Libyan effort
is under way to establish a network in Mali to destabilize the
increasingly pragmatic regime of President Traore.
President Momoh, who assumed power last November with a pledge
to clean up corruption, has so far made little effort to curtail the
illicit activities of the Lebanese business community. ~~
French assistance is badly needed for President Conte's ambitious
and politically risky program to liberalize Guinea's state-controlled
economy.
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. 25X1
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Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief;
Production Stct/J; D.f.Jice of African and Latin American Analysis~~
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i Secret
ALA AR 86-006
1l March 1986
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Secret
Mali: Increasing
Libyan Subversion
Mali's expanding contacts with France and the
United States over the past several years apparently
have led Libyan leader Qadhafi to target Bamako.
Qadhafi probably hopes apro-Libyan government
there would give him a foothold for subverting
neighboring moderate regimes in Senegal and Ivory
Coast.
Libyan effort is under way to
destabilize the increasingly pragmatic regime
of President Traore. Qadhafi's visit to Mali last
December almost certainly was intended in part as a
signal to Malian dissidents of his personal support.
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Libya is 25X1
expanding contacts among Malian youth groups,
workers, and artisans by including them in the
Libyan-Malian Friendship Association founded last
Ina ition, the Libyans
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reportedly attempted to obtain information on the
different languages spoken in Mali and have hinted
that they intend to beam radio programs into the 25X1
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suspect that Libya supplied the Soviet-made
equipment captured from Burkina during the
The Christmas War
The US Embassy reports that Malians strongly
officials in Tripoli reportedly gathered information
last spring on Mali's military ties to France.
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forestalled Libyan intervention
The Embassy reports that, after Traore prevailed in
the conflict, Qadhafi injected himself into the peace
process by proposing a Libyan peacekeeping force for
the disputed area. Although a peace plan arranged by
Traore and other moderate regional leaders
Secret
ALA AR 86-006
2! March 1986
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Secret
Traore continues to see Libya as a threat
to his regime. Traore, however, is unlikely to air
publicly his suspicions for fear of Libyan retaliation.
Libyan Motives
In our view, there are several reasons why Traore has
attracted Qadhafi's attention. Mali has broadened its
contacts with the United States in the past year and
has expressed an interest in acquiring US military
equipment.
In addition, Mali maintains good relations with
France, whose interests worldwide also are priority
targets for Qadhafi. Libyan officials probably were
displeased by Bamako's efforts last April to arrange,
on behalf of France and without Libyan approval, a
reconciliation meeting between Chadian President
Habre and Libyan-backed Chadian rebel leader
Goukouni.
Libya probably also regards Mali as a base for
subversion against other moderate regimes in the
region, particularly neighboring Senegal and Ivory
Coast. Both governments have what Qadhafi sees as
uncomfortably close relations with Washington and
Paris and are the leading powers in West Africa along
with Nigeria. Moreover, in the case of Ivory Coast,
Abidjan recently announced the resumption of
relations with Tel Aviv, setting a precedent for similar
moves by other African governments.
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Sierra Leone:
The Lebanese Community and
Middle Eastern Influences
We believe radical Middle Eastern countries-Iran,
Libya, and Syria-may be capitalizing on the public's
growing frustration with economic decline and
exploiting the large local Lebanese and Muslim
communities.
The Lebanese Community
According to academic studies, Lebanese first
migrated to Sierra Leone around the turn of the
century, and became the dominant entrepreneurial
class. About half of the present population of 35,000
has arrived in Sierra Leone since the Lebanese civil
war began in the 1970s. Embassy reporting indicates
that the Freetown regime has not granted citizenship
to many Lebanese for fear of provoking antiregime
protests by Sierra Leoneans who resent the Lebanese
higher standard of living. Anti-Lebanese violence
erupted briefly in 1977 and 1984.~~
Although most Lebanese are small traders, a handful
have become multimillionaires and dominate key
economic sectors. According to US Embassy
reporting, Jamil Muhammed controls Sierra Leone's
sale of diamonds and gold through the state
enterprises that he manages and funds. He uses his
control of these industries to facilitate a lucrative
diamond-smuggling business that the US Embassy
reports nets Jamil as much as $25 million annually.
The Embassy says that he also brokers the country's
oil imports, because the government lacks the hard
currency necessary for purchases. Jamil reportedly
buys Iranian oil, resells it on the spot market-the
crude is unsuitable for Freetown's refineries-and
then purchases Nigerian light crude, which he sells to
indicates that he and other Lebanese businessmen
provide the government with the funds to purchase
rice, Sierra Leone's staple food.
Although Momoh pledges0 to reduce the
Lebanese stranglehold on the economy and
particularly Jamil's preeminent position, so far he has
initiated only limited reforms, fearing that Jamil will
end funding for the gold and diamond enterprises and
cut off oil imports. According to the Embassy,
Momoh has upgraded the capabilities of the
government antismuggling squad, and in December
he expelled two Lebanese for illegal business
activities. Moreover, he claims he will implement
IMF-suggested reforms, such as currency
devaluations, which will hurt the Lebanese business
Embassy, Momoh believes that neither the seizure of
Lebanese property nor their mass expulsion would
solve Sierra Leone's ills.
Secret
ALA AR 86-006
21 March 1986
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US Embassy and press reporting indicates that Jamil
Muhammed is the wealthiest man in Sierra Leone,
and dominates almost all economic sectors. Jamil s
private holdings include a bank, hotel, construction
company, and Sierra Leone Airlines, and he employs
some 7,000 Sierra Leoneans. He also has business
interests in Europe and Liberia. According to
Embassy reporting, Jamil manages two state
enterprises, the Precious Minerals Marketing
Company and the Government Gold and Diamond
O.~ce, which control diamond and gold exports. For
the last several years, Jamil has served as the
country's "bank of last resort" because the Bank oJ'
Sierra Leone's foreign exchange reserves usually are
low. ~~
sources reported that, during former President
Stevens's rule, Jamil served as the country s
unof.I~cial " co president. "According to the Embassy,
he.Jreguently engineered cabinet changes,
particularly in the Finance Ministry, and blocked
IMF agreements by threatening to cut olfoil imports
and funding for state enterprises. ~~
Jamil has forged fairly close ties to key Momoh
administration officials. He is closely linked to First
Vice President Minah,
and Minister of
Finance Development and Economic Plans Amara-
P
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Although Jamil has never held an of.~cial government
position, since the late 1970s he has played an
in/luential role in Sierra Leonean politics. Embassy
The Middle East Presence
Iran. Since establishing diplomatic relations in 1983,
Tehran has forged fairly close ties to Freetown and, as
a result of Jamil's influence, provides at least half of
Sierra Leone's oil supplies. According to the Embassy,
Freetown sponsored an Islamic Unity Conference of
the Hajj in 1984, attended by delegates from some 90
countries, which Iran funded and local Shiite leaders
Bangal i,
Embassy reporting
Momoh replace Stevens as president,
reports that Jamil J'unded Momoh's presidential
campaign last year, although Momoh claims he does
not "owe" him,for this. ~~
The Embassy reports that Jamil maintains close
personal and.f~nancial ties to Middle Eastern
countries. Besides his links to Iran-which he claims
are solely for business purposes-he collects $50,000
in contributions a month for the Lebanese faction,
Amal, is afriend of Nabbi Berri-who attended
Momoh's presidential inauguration-and has
business interests in Jordan and Morocco.
some 1 SO PLO members serve as
is o yguar s, an Jamil's dynamite factory
provides the PLO with explosives. ~~
helped to organize. The conference served as a forum
for Iranian propaganda and condemned Soviet,
Israeli, and Iraqi policies. The Embassy reports that
in May 1985 then Sierra Leonean Foreign Minister
Kanu condemned Iraqi "aggression" during his five-
day visit to Tehran.
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Iran is likely to increase its propaganda activities and
financial support to Sierra Leone's Muslims-who
comprise some 40 to 60 percent of the population-
and may attempt to gain influence in the relatively
moderate Shiite Lebanese community. Embassy and
press reporting indicates that in the past two years
Tehran has funded the construction of an Islamic
school, a mosque, and has offered trips to Tehran to
local clerics. The local Lebanese Shiite leader, Sheikh
Chadade, reportedly receives financial assistance
from Tehran, according to the Embassy.
Libya. Tripoli may also attempt to exploit Freetown's
economic decline and seek to cultivate disenchanted
students. The Embassy reports that in January a
small group of pro-Libyan students demonstrated
against US policies in front of the US Embassy.
Although Freetown will not allow a People's Bureau
to operate in the country-Libya is limited to a
"caretaker" presence-Tripoli probably recruits
sympathizers through the Sierra Leone-Libya
Brotherhood Society and the "Green Book" study
group, which operates a college in Freetown. The
Embassy also reports that Libya occasionally recruits
Sierra Leoneans to serve in the "Islamic Legion" of
the Libyan Armed Forces and to study in Tripoli.
Syria. Sierra Leone's Foreign Minister A. K.
Koroma-who seeks closer ties to Arab countries-
visited Damascus in December in search of financial
assistance and petroleum,
Outlook
Momoh's reluctance to move decisively against Jamil
and other key Lebanese businessmen may eventually
provoke civil unrest and pressures from the Army. In
our view, Momoh will continue to try to placate anti-
Lebanese sentiment by expelling a few less influential
businessmen and by introducing other token reform
efforts. However, as the economy continues to
deteriorate-fuel and food shortages are growing-
public frustrations may spill over into anti-Lebanese
violence. We also believe Momoh may come under
pressure from more reformist officers-such as Force
Commander Tarawallie or Freetown garrison
commander Lt. Col. L. S. Turay-to move against
corrupt Lebanese and introduce substantial economic
reform or be overthrown.
We believe Iran and Libya will step up their
subversive and propaganda activities in Freetown,
including the recruitment of disaffected students and
proselytizing among the Muslim community. We 25X1
believe Sierra Leone will be a fertile ground for
Islamic fundamentalism if the country's economic
decline continues and Momoh is unable to create jobs
for the swelling number of unemployed high school
and university graduates. In our view, Momoh is
probably unaware of Iranian and Libyan activities
dependent on Iranian oil, Freetown is unlikely to
challenge Tehran's activities.
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Guinea-France:
Rebuilding Close Ties
France has reestablished close political ties to Guinea,
which had been severed for 26 years under former
President Sekou Toure. French assistance is badly
needed if President Conte's ambitious and politically
risky program to liberalize Guinea's state-controlled
economy is to succeed, according to the US Embassy.
France has provided modest military supplies and has
increased its military training program. The number
of newly arrived French expatriates has grown over
the past two years-the French community is now
estimated at some 2,000-and is likely to increase,
according to the US Embassy. Despite these
contributions, increased French presence has opened
Conte to criticism for relying too heavily on Paris.
Political Relations
Official relations are steadily improving, but the
French do not enjoy close personal ties they have
elsewhere in Francophone Africa, according to the
US Embassy. The French diplomatic presence,
although still small, is growing, and President
Mitterrand has accepted an invitation for a state visit
to Guinea at an as yet unspecified date. Embassy
ofFicials report that France supports Conte as the best
available leader but remains concerned about Conte's
indecisiveness and lack of experience in government.
Backing for the Reform Program
The French have steadily increased economic
assistance, helped reform the banking system, and
have increased their private-sector involvement. The
US Embassy in Paris reports that French assistance
more than doubled from $33 million in 1984 to $80
million in 1985. Moreover, Guinea is one of the few
African states scheduled for a significant increase in
aid this year.
The centerpiece of the aid is a $25 million grant in
support of economic reforms over the next several
months, according to the Embassy. Much of this will
be used to assure adequate stocks of food and essential
consumer goods to help ease the effects of devaluation
and other major economic reforms. A portion may
also be used for bridge financing until IMF and
World Bank funds come on line later this month. The
French Fund for Aid and Cooperation-not welcomed
under Toure-accepted an invitation from Conte
shortly after he assumed power to open an office in
Conakry and has contributed $2.5 million to support
reform of the educational system. Additional aid has
been devoted to improving urban transportation,
radiobroadcasting, and Conakry's airport.
The Embassy says the French are particularly visible
in the banking sector, with advisers in the Ministry of
Economy and Finance, as well as among the IMF and
World Bank teams. Last December, Conte began to
dismantle the government banking system, which had
virtually collapsed under the weight of rampant
corruption and the rapid devaluation last fall of the
syli. Several European consortiums are establishing a
new banking system to be run in large part by the
French.
French activity in the private sector has grown
considerably in the past two years, according to the
Embassy. French companies are the leading foreign
investors in two joint venture bauxite mines-Halco
and Friguia-which produce almost 9 million metric
tons each year and account for 95 percent of Guinea's
total export earnings. In addition, French trading
companies are taking over much of the wholesale
import-export trade, replacing ineffective and corrupt
state-owned companies. Other French companies are
involved in the hotel, transport, construction, and
fishing industries.
Military Assistance
French military aid has gradually increased over the 25X1
past two years. Conakry used some $1.5 million in
French funds to buy a helicopter, two small patrol
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ALA AR 86-006
2/ March 1986
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boats, engineering equipment and vehicles, and Paris
plans to provide an additional $1.2 million this year
for the purchase of a presidential helicopter and two
the United States, frequently complain about the poor
quality of Soviet equipment and training, Guinea's
lack of hard currency necessary to shop in the West
will strongly curtail Conte's efforts to become less
Army trucks, according to the Embassy
dependent on the Soviets.
France's unequal influence on policy decisions,
The Governor of the Central Bank is seeking other
nationals as advisers to offset what he views as
commercial sectors
Growing Anti-]French Sentiment
Guineans fear that France is intent on reasserting
colonialist control by dominating the banking and
The US
French as condescending, while
Embassy reports that Guineans frequently see the
a recentscufl~e between a French
French military training of Guinean soldiers has
expanded significantly, particularly in the wake of the
failed coup attempt last July, according to the US
Embassy in Conakry. The Embassy reports that
Conte's 40-man Presidential Body Guard was trained
in Guinea last year, a 200-man Presidential Guard
Company is receiving French training in Guinea, and
some 40 officers and NCOs will be trained each year
in France. Conte recently approved a plan for Paris to
construct three military schools, staffed with French
military instructors, to provide general military,
cavalry, and naval training to about 200 cadets
annuall
According to the Embassy, there are no French
military advisers or technicians in any regular unit of
the Guinean armed forces. Some 50 Soviet military
advisers are the only foreign presence. When Sekou
Toure declared Guinea independent and severed
relations with France in 1958, the Soviet Union
became Guinea's major source of military supplies
and training. Although members of the Guinean
armed forces, particularly those trained in France or
and Guinean employee of the French Embassy led
Conakry to lodge a formal diplomatic protest with
Paris. The incident
represents one of many that could lead to violence
against French citizens by resentful Guineans.
Senior officials of the Foreign Ministry are concerned
over the anticipated increase in French presence
expected in coming months,
Both governments worry that resentment
toward the French community may increase as
Guineans begin to feel the bite of IMF-supported
austerity measures.
Guinea's suspicion of French intentions stems from its
colonial legacy and years of hostility and nationalistic
rhetoric under Sekou Toure. Toure, one of the most
nationalistic leaders south of the Sahara during the
1960s, broke with France to pursue state socialism
and close ties to the Soviet Union and other
Communist countries. Upon Toure's death in 1984
and the quick takeover of Conte, the new leadership-
in search of new sources of economic aid-moved to
restore close relations with France. A continued
increase in French presence and activity and the
appearance that Conte is relying too heavily on Paris
probably would provoke a backlash of anti-French
sentiment among those who prospered under Toure's
state-controlled regime.
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Outlook
The success of Conte's economic liberalization
program will hinge on crucial French economic
assistance and expertise in the coming months. Conte
will seek still greater levels of assistance to counter
popular pressure for economic improvement. The
French presence is likely to increase as a stronger
economy attracts more foreign investors and if plans
for a military base and training schools move foward.
This increase in French assistance and participation
will fan Guinean fears of French neocolonialist
intentions. If public expectations for economic
recovery are not realized, the French could become a
target of Guineans' frustration in isolated incidents of
violence or outbreaks of anti-French demonstrations.
For their part, the Soviets would try to play upon
these sentiments to discredit Western intentions in
Guinea.
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Angola-Spain:
A Budding Relationship
The visit of Spanish Foreign Minister Fernandez
Ordonez to Angola in early February successfully
promoted commercial ties between the two
governments and provided the Spanish with an
opportunity to express moral support for Luanda
immediately after UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi's
prospect of Spanish participation in dam construction
projects initiated by the Soviets and Cubans. In
addition, he expressed a willingness to send
technicians and advisers should Luanda ever decide to
replace Cubans working in Angola's civilian sector.
Highlights of the Spanish Visit
Ordonez told the US Ambassador in Madrid that his
visit was requested by Spain's Economics Ministry
and motivated largely by Spain's interest in
strengthening its position as a leading supplier to
Angola. Spain, according to press sources, is Angola's
fourth-largest supplier and second-largest market.
Madrid provides consumer products and other
manufactured goods,, while Angola's primary export
to Spain is crude oil.
During his 48-hour visit, Ordonez met with a variety
of senior officials, including President dos Santos,
Foreign Minister Van Dunem, Cooperation Minister
Fernandes, and Planning Minister da Silva.
hearing.
the level of trade and commercial dealings
probably will increase substantially as a result of
Ordonez's visit. The Angolans apparently regard
Spain as one of the most sympathetic West European
nations in Luanda's struggle against UNITA. Even
so, we believe the Spanish will be unlikely to break
ranks with their EC partners on broader regional
issues in southern Africa involving Angola, such as
the Namibia question. Madrid is unlikely to do more
than continue to work behind the scenes within the
EC to ensure that Angola's concerns receive a
Meanwhile, the Portuguese are likely to work harder
to protect and improve their standing in Luanda. US
Embassy reporting from Lisbon indicates that
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The Angolans were no doubt heartened by Ordonez's
expressions of support for the MPLA, which Madrid
regards as the legitimate government of Angola. In
addition, the Angolans used the occasion to put on
record their views about Savimbi's US visit. The
Embassy reports that Luanda told Ordonez that it
would respond vigorously to US aid to Savimbi, if
need be with more Cuban and Soviet advisers and
arms to meet the threat. The Angolans also told the
Spanish Foreign Minister that US aid to UNITA
works against the desire of Spain and other Western
countries to wean Angola away from the Soviet Bloc.
Outlook
Political relations between Angola and Spain are
likely to remain friendly, and
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ALA AR 86-006
1! March 1986
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Secret
recently inaugurated President Soares and Prime
Minister Cavaco Silva have been trying to strengthen
Portuguese relations with all five Lusophone African
states-especially Angola-and recently held
separate; much publicized luncheons with the
Angolan Ambassador to Lisbon. The new government
could have an uphill battle, however, because of
Portugal's unwillingness to close a UNITA office in
Lisbon-or to curtail its activities there. In addition,
the US Embassy reports that the MPLA dislikes
Soares and was not eager to see him elected.
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Secret
officials estimate that some 69,000 hectares (170,000 acres) are required for
current settlers and more than 45,000 hectares (110,000 acres) for anticipated
settlers. Suppliers estimate only 50 percent of the needed fertilizers and quality
seeds will reach resettlement areas. Several government planners have called the
officially projected harvest for the areas-90,000 metric tons-"totally
unrealistic." Although the government has admitted publicly that some abuses and
difficulties have occurred in the resettlement program, this is the first indication
that the agricultural shortcomings are being recognized. The cost and time
involved in reclaiming the needed area make it unlikely that enough land will be
ready for spring planting. Food shortages, already found in some resettlement
resettlement scheme is unsuitable for agriculture.
areas will worsen by the end of the year.
Uganda Economic Policies Take Form
Africa
Briefs
President Museveni appears to be charting an economic policy that includes a
greater role for the private sector than the statist policies of his predecessors.
Museveni claims that economic efficiency is his main priority and has
acknowledged the importance of the private sector. He says, however, that the
government will continue to play a significant part in the economy. Cabinet
members, in discussions with US Embassy personnel, have advocated increases in
agricultural producer prices, reductions in government spending, devaluation of
the shilling, and a review of all government-owned enterprises.
The En-ibassy reports increased economic activity and business optimism since
Museveni took over in January. Nonetheless, inadequate transport has inhibited
coffee exports, which generate about 90 percent of Uganda's foreign exchange
earnings. The Army is using most all available trucks in the drive to subdue rebel
resistance in the north. Economic recovery is likely to proceed slowly despite the
regime's willingness to cooperate with donors and to encourage private enterprise.
The return of thousands of displaced persons to their homes, economic
rehabilitation of areas savaged by previous governments, and continued northern
opposition to-Museveni's rule make it unlikely that Uganda's economic woes will
soon ease.
13 Secret
ALA AR 86-006
2/ March 1986
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IMF Standby Not Needed
social pressures brought on by continuing rapid population growth.
Kenya and IMF officials have concluded that Kenya does not require a new
standby arrangement this year because of the improving coffee market and
declining oil prices. The IMF has revised its 1986 balance-of-payments projections
for Kenya from abalance-of-payments financing gap of about $100 million to a
surplus of about $170 million. Although Kenyan officials have said they will still
adhere to IMF stricutures, even without a standby arrangement, this economic
boomlet and lack of IMF oversight make it unlikely Kenya will fully implement
badly needed economic reforms. Moreover, despite this year's rosy outlook, Kenya
faces foreign payments difficulties over the medium term, as well as economic and
The new military regime headed by General Lekhanya is moving quickly to
consolidate power since overthrowing Prime Minister Jonathan on 20 January.
The government appears to be taking a hardline stance toward the deposed
leaders, and has warned Jonathan not to stir up opposition. Some members of the
old regime may be prosecuted for crimes committed while in office. In mid-March,
Colonel Sehlabo, who led an unsuccessful military
mutiny s ort y e ore t e coup, died in detention, reportedly of natural causes.
Brigadier Ramotsekhane, a supporter of
Jonathan and a rival of coup leader Lekhanya, has died while in custody.
following the coup.
The new regime has sought to expand economic and political relations with South
Africa. The two governments in late February discussed renewing negotiations on
the Highlands Water Project. The project, proposed in 1983, would exploit
untapped hydroelectric and water resources to provide energy and water for South
Africa and revenue for Lesotho. Lekhanya also may establish resident consular
offices in South Africa, according to US Embassy sources. Maseru already has
reestablished diplomatic ties to South Korea, after evicting North Korean workers
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Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000100560001-7