AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000100510001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 24, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
MASTER FILE COPY
QO NOT GIVE OUT
OR MARK 014
Africa Review
t
51
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ALA AR 86-002
24 January 1986
Copy 384
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The decision reached at a national conference of black community
leaders in late December to call for the end of nearly 18 months of
widespread school boycotts marks a significant effort by blacks to
address the education crisis.)
Angola: Party Congress Strengthens dos Santos's Hand
President dos Santos consolidated his grip on power by removing a
number of potential political rivals at a party congress of the ruling
MPLA last month. The MPLA now appears more united, in our
judgment, than at any time in recent years.
Western aid donors are in a quandary over how to respond to Addis
Ababa's attempt to resettle 1.2 million peasants from the drought-
stricken north to more fertile land in western and southern Ethiopia.
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Following a landslide election victory last summer and the
consolidation of political power, Prime Minister Mugabe has
assumed a more visible role in southern African affairs. Despite this
new activism, Mugabe hews to pragmatic policies that are dictated
by Zimbabwe's self-interests and constraints imposed by South
Africa.)
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ALA AR 85-002
24 January 1986
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corruption and drug involvement by high-ranking officials.
Prime Minister Jugnauth's moderate three-party coalition
government is suffering from a decisive municipal election loss last
month, communalism, personal rivalries, and allegations of
Transshipment Area
Sub-Saharan Africa is becoming an increasingly important
transshipment point for narcotics destined for the United States and
Europe. One side effect of this activity is escalating drug abuse and
increased cultivation of illicit drugs within Africa. The growing
dimensions of the problem are attracting high-level concern and
emerging in bilateral discussions with US officials. F_~
Zimbabwe-Mozambique: Honeymoon Over
Uganda: The Economy Suffers
Ivory Coast: Renewed Diplomatic Ties to Israel
Equatorial Guinea: Continuing Economic Crisis
Government
Central African Republic: Steps Toward Representational
Preferential Trade Area: Little Accomplished at Summit
Botswana: Trade Surplus F_~
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Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
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South Africa: Efforts
To Solve the Black
Education Crisis
The decision reached at a national conference of black
community leaders in late December to call for the
end of nearly 18 months of widespread school boycotts
marks a significant effort by blacks to address the
education crisis. A suspension of the boycotts
probably would reduce tensions in townships, but
militant youths are likely to continue to press for
boycotts. Moreover, as Pretoria is unlikely to meet
other conference demands, including an end to the
state of emergency, before the end of a three-month
deadline, the credibility of these moderate black
groups could suffer irreversible damage, undermining
their attempt to end school boycotts this year. F_
Background to the Crisis
Most blacks regard education as a prime concern and
are angered at the overall poor quality of black
education. Many black schools, especially those in the
homeland and rural areas, are overcrowded,
underfunded, and poorly staffed. Recognizing that
education is a critical political issue for blacks,
Pretoria has expanded efforts to improve black
education over the past 10 years. Most black children,
however, still do not attend secondary school, and pass
rates on high school graduation examinations remain
low.
Black children frequently have resorted to school
boycotts and violence to protest the poor quality of
their education. Over the past decade, education has
become an increasingly politicized issue, and township
unrest often has been sparked by protests over
education issues. During the past 18 months, township
unrest has been marked by a growing militancy
among youths, and militant youths have focused on
school boycotts this year to mark the 10th anniversary
of the Soweto riots.)
Emergence of Community Groups
The Soweto Parents' Crisis Committee (SPCC)-a
coalition of Soweto parents, teachers, and community
leaders-has emerged as a driving force behind a
national conference and a nationwide call for an end
to school boycotts. The SPCC was formed in early
October as an adjunct to the Soweto Civic Association
to negotiate with Pretoria on issues directly affecting
school children, according to US Embassy sources.
Negotiations with Department of Education officials
in late October resulted in a deferral of Soweto
matriculation examinations until 1986. Soweto school
principals quickly endorsed the deferral, declaring
1985 a "no exam" year. ~
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Following these negotiations, the Soweto community
gave the SPCC a mandate to negotiate the school
boycott issue with the government. According to US
Embassy sources, officials from the Ministries of Law
and Education were noncommital when asked to
address troop withdrawals, the unbanning of the black
student union, the Congress of South African
Students (COSAS), and student representative
councils. Despite less-than-positive government
assurances that demands would be met, the SPCC
asked the Soweto community and youth groups to 25X1
urge students to return to school in January. This
"local" decision presaged the national conference and
call for an end to the boycott.
Representatives from 160 black community
organizations-and other black leaders, including
Bishop Tutu-met in Johannesburg in late December
to discuss the education crisis. The conference, held
Secret
ALA AR 85-002
24 January 1986
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under the auspices of the SPCC, called for a
nationwide return to school on 28 January, 20 days
after the official opening date. The delay was
designed to give authorities time to repair damaged
schools and to enable community leaders to notify
their constituents of the decision, according to press
reports. Conference leaders, however, linked their call
to other demands and gave the government until 31
March to comply. The demands include: an end to the
state of emergency; the unbanning of the COSAS; the
withdrawal of defense forces from the townships; the
release of all detained parents, teachers, and students,
and reinstatement of fired teachers; and government
recognition of student representative councils. F_
Pretoria rejected the call to delay the school session
until 28 January, but Department of Education
officials announced that late registrations would be
dealt with flexibly. Reports indicate that the numbers
of children returning to school to date have been
mixed:
? US Embassy Pretoria sources reported a near 100-
percent stayaway in Soweto and Pretoria's
townships.
? In other parts of the Transvaal and Natal,
attendance reached near 50 percent.
? Department of Education officials confirmed an
almost total stayaway at black secondary schools in
eastern and western Cape Province.
In some cases, students registered for school but did
not attend classes, preferring to start school on 28
January.
Other communities have taken the lead from the
SPCC and organized community groups to deal with
the boycott issue, challenging the rallying cry of
militant youths-"liberation before education." Local
education crisis committees have gained grassroots
support in the western Cape and in some
Johannesburg townships, according to press reports.
Pretoria, however, has banned meetings of these
groups, and, in one Indian township outside
Johannesburg, security forces fired tear gas to disrupt
a committee meeting. Moreover, some suspended
teachers and pupils who have recently been released
from detention are still banned from teaching or
attending school, according to press reports. Thus far,
the government response to the demands made at the
conference has been negative, and black community
efforts to deal with the education crisis are unlikely to
be enough to encourage blacks to support school
attendance this year.
Disingenuous Role of the ANC
The ANC endorsement of the conference decision
probably did not come as a surprise to SPCC leaders,
who met with ANC officials in Harare on the eve of
the conference. The ANC welcomed the national
education meeting, announcing that it would abide by
the decisions of the conference, according to US
Embassy sources. The ANC, which has previously
endorsed school boycotts, probably doubts that
Pretoria will meet the conference demands by the end
of March, thereby freeing it to press for a renewal of a
sustained boycott campaign.
Outlook
Early indications are that Pretoria is unlikely to meet
any of the demands presented at the national
conference. Disenchanted community leaders, who
stand to lose their nascent credibility if Pretoria fails
to come through on any of the demands, may be
forced to support the call from militant youths for a
total school boycott. In our view, if community efforts
to create a bridge between students and the
government are dismissed out of hand, Pretoria will
face another year of school boycotts. Futhermore, the
ANC will be quick to endorse a resumption of school
boycotts this year, in our judgment, as backers of
"liberation before education" bring renewed support
to their cause.)
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Angola:
Party Congress Strengthens
dos Santos's Hand FI
President Eduardo dos Santos consolidated his grip on
power by removing a number of potential political
rivals, including Marxist ideologue Lucio Lara, at a
party congress of the ruling Popular Movement for
the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) held in Luanda last
month. The MPLA now appears more united, in our
judgment, than at any time in recent years as dos
Santos's military supporters gained increased
representation on the party's central committee.
Prosecution of the war against UNITA was made the
regime's number-one priority, closely followed by
emphasis on getting the domestic economy moving.
Tribute and thanks were given to Moscow and
Havana for their support of the MPLA. The heads of
the Soviet and Cuban delegations addressed the
congress and expressed their determination to
Hermino Escorio,
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head of the Angolan state oil enterprise, was dropped
altogether from the central committee. Escorio's
abuse of power made him
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widely unpopular, and dos Santos apparently came to
view him as a political liability. 25X1
The new central committee met two days after the
party congress and named a new politburo made up
almost entirely of dos Santos's close supporters. The
most important new politburo members are Foreign
Minister van Dunem (Mbinda)' and Minister of
Energy van Dunem (Loy). Two former alternate
members of the politburo, Kundi Paihama and
Antonio Jacinto do Amaral Marins, were promoted to
full members.
continue support for the dos Santos regime.
Personnel Changes
Dos Santos made a number of important changes in
the makeup of the party's central committee and
politburo. dos
Santos was settling old scores with political rivals,
increasing the number of men closely associated with
his policies in top party decisionmaking bodies, and
jettisoning unpopular members
of the leadership in an a ort to gain greater popular
support. In general, mulatto ideologues as well as
extreme black nationalists suffered in the shakeup.
The party central committee was expanded from 55 to
90 members, and a number of military officials from
a variety of provinces received seats, apparently to
undercut criticism that the party is dominated by a
Luanda clique. Former Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge
was demoted to alternate central committee member
as was Air Force chief Iko Carreira. In Jorge's case,
the move had been rumored for some time, but
Carreira's sudden drop may have resulted from a
combination of the Air Force's poor showing during
the 1985 government offensive-especially the failure
to challenge the South African air strikes that staved
Lucio Lara, the party's secretary general with
responsibility for party organization, and three other
longtime politburo members were dropped, although
each retains full membership in the central
committee:
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? Lucio Lara was a founder of the MPLA in the
1950s and led the mulatto faction of pro-Soviet
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primary conduit for Soviet influence in Luanda. The
demotion of the unpopular Lara-the focal point for
black resentment of the disproportionate influence
of mulattoes in the MPLA leadership-appears to 25X1
reflect a trend over the past 18 months which saw
him increasingly on the periphery of the
decisionmaking process. Dos Santos has moved
closer to the Soviets since 1983 in return for
increased military assistance to fight UNITA,
probably leaving the Kremlin little or no reason to
block Lara's downgrading.
' Names in parentheses are ones given to individuals during the
preindependence guerrilla struggle. Today many officials are
off UNITA's defeat at Mavingo
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ALA AR 85-002
24 January 1986
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? Joao Luis Neto (Xietu), a former defense minister,
had been on the slide for some time, and his removal
appears to reflect dos Santos's call for removing
deadwood from positions of authority in the party.
Dos
Santos's efforts to bring the military more directly
into the decisionmaking process probably is designed
to boost morale and diffuse this potential center of
opposition. In our view, however, dos Santos and his
closest civilian associates will continue to call the
shots in the party and will deny much real power to
the newly elevated military officers.
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? Evaristo Domingos (Kimba)
accused of promoting factionalism within the
Ideological Tightening
Throughout much of 1985,
rumors that the party congress
would adopt significant economic reforms
deemphasizing orthodox Communism and stressing
the need for greater reliance on private farms and
businesses. A team of Hungarian economists was said
to be in Angola for several months to draft the
reforms. Economic resolutions that emerged from the
congress, however, put greater emphasis on discipline,
central planning and decisionmaking, and Communist
orthodoxy. In our view, the reemphasis on Soviet-style
economic orthodoxy may be part of the ideological
price dos Santos is paying for stepped-up Soviet and
? Ludy Kissassunda, formerly commissioner from
Malange Province, was
a potential threat to dos Santos.
damaged economy moving.
Dos Santos's Speech
In his speech to the congress, dos Santos thanked the
Soviet Union and Cuba profusely for their support of
the MPLA in its struggle against UNITA. He stated
that the prosecution of the war was the number-one
priority for the MPLA. Dos Santos admitted the
heavy toll the war is taking on the nation's economy
and urged the party to redouble its efforts to win the
hearts and minds of the people and to get the war-
In a candid admission of past mistakes, dos Santos
said a reform program is under way to weed out those
in the MPLA who are indifferent to the party. Here,
the President returned to a theme he emphasized a
year ago at a national party conference. His words
appear to indicate that more personnel changes can be
expected in the not too distant future. F_~
Expanding Military Role?
Dos Santos's determination to press the war against
UNITA was reflected in the increased representation
Cuban support of his regime.
Less than two weeks after the congress closed, the
official Angolan news agency carried an authoritative
commentary condemning petit bourgeois tendencies in
society. The commentary decried the rampant
corruption that exists in Angola and left little doubt
that there will be no move away from orthodox
Communist economic theory and planning. Dos
Santos repeated the attack on the petite bourgeoisie in
his New Year's address to the nation.
Outlook
The successful staging of the congress, coupled with
the large number of shifts in the party's hierarchy,
paves the way for additional personnel reshuffling by
dos Santos. In addition, dos Santos's hints that the
MPLA's failure to win widespread grassroots support
is due to shortcomings at the provincial and local
levels suggest that a shakeup at these levels may be in
the offing.F_~
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Further personnel changes on dos Santos's part would
reinforce his control but probably not signal any
major changes in Angola's domestic or international
orientation. We believe dos Santos's military
dependence on the Soviets and his apparent
determination to seek a military victory over UNITA
militate against greater flexibility on the issues of a
regional settlement and a Cuban troop withdrawal
from Angola. F-~
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Ethiopia: Donors Divided
Over Resettlement
Western aid donors are in a quandary over how to
respond to Addis Ababa's attempt to resettle 1.2
million peasants from the drought-stricken north to
more fertile land in western and southern Ethiopia.
Soviet logistics assistance to the resettlement is
adding to the donors' problems. Meanwhile, Addis
Ababa is committed to the program despite negative
publicity in the West and high mortality rates in some
of the camps. Western donors face the dilemma of
whether to provide food to the victims or deny relief
because of the human rights violations inherent in the
program. F_~
human rights abuses in the program, but some may
hedge or limit their contributions:
? The Canadians and Australians are sympathetic to
resettlement and, while opposing some of its
coercive features, plan to assist the program. The
Canadians believe the United States is using
resettlement as an East-West issue against the
Soviets and favor giving more support to the Relief
and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) in an effort
to correct the severe shortcomings in the camps,
according to US Embassy reporting.
Western Donors
The Ethiopian Government and the Marxist political
party-The Workers Party of Ethiopia-are unable
to provide food, water, housing, tools, medical
services, and other bare necessities to support
Chairman Mengistu's overly ambitious resettlement
goals.' The government is allowing Western observers
inside some of the least presentable resettlement
camps, apparently to try to obtain Western relief and
development aid for the program. US Embassy
officials report that conditions in the Pawe and
Gambella areas are primitive and that mortality rates
in Pawe are extremely high. Conditions in other
resettlement areas are unknown because Western
access to the camps is limited. The government
nonetheless maintains that resettlement is the only
way to break the cycle of drought and starvation that
has afflicted northern Ethiopia.
Of the major Western donors, only the United States
and the United Kingdom have consistently opposed
aid to resettlement camps. France also recently
announced that it has no intention of contributing
even indirectly to the resettlement program. F_~
According to Embassy reporting, other Western and
international donors still plan to extend aid to
resettlement victims despite their concern over the
? Italy is heavily involved in construction in the
resettlement area of Pawe and plans to provide $195
million of support for the project. It believes the
United States has denounced resettlement
prematurely-without considering the positive
aspects of the program, according to US Embassy
reporting.
? The European Community is delaying its 1986
commitment because of human rights concerns. The
European Parliament recently called for a three-
month suspension of resettlement and an
independent assessment of the program.
? Catholic Church representatives say they feel
morally obliged to provide medical assistance for
resettlement victims but hope the church's limited
medical assistance will not be interpreted as a stamp
of approval on the resettlement program. F-7
The United Nations has not yet taken a formal
position but appears to be leaning toward supporting
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24 January 1986
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the resettlement program. Reports of human rights
violations prompted the UN special representative in
Ethiopia to make a demarche to the RRC in
November, a move that has raised the subject to the
Politburo level in Addis Ababa. In January, however,
the UN representative in Addis Ababa declared
himself convinced that adequate steps have been
taken to alleviate the deficiencies of the resettlement
camps, according to US Embassy reporting. He told
US diplomats and AID officials that he personally
supports resettlement and believes it to be a "100-
percent valid option" for Ethiopia. The official UN
policy on resettlement is currently under review.
Countering the Criticism
Addis Ababa has not been impervious to criticisms of
the resettlement program. The government recently
expelled the French emergency medical relief
organization, Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF), for its
public allegations of massive deaths and human rights
violations in the resettlement camps. The Dutch
chapter of MSF, however, has criticized the French
doctors for unwise statements about resettlement that
could jeopardize the work of the whole organization.
Most Western donors believe that MSF's claims are
highly exaggerated, according to US Embassy
reporting.
To counter growing public criticism of its resettlement
drive, the government recently released an official
statement emphasizing support for the program from
the Italian Government and three nongovernmental
relief organizations: The Irish Concern, The Lutheran
World Federation, and People for People. The
statement pointed out that previous studies by the
World Bank and the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization recommended resettlement programs
that shifted the population in the drought-stricken
north to the more fertile areas of the south. F_~
Villagization
The newer and less-publicized villagization program
provides another dilemma for Western governments
and nongovernment donor groups. The villagization
program removes peasants from their traditional rural
dwellings and forces them to live in newly constructed
central villages and work on collective farms. The
regime has instructed a nongovernment donor group
not to undertake any recovery or rehabilitation
activities in any areas except those being villagized,
according to US Embassy reporting. Party officials
maintain that it would be futile to establish services in
areas from which the farmers will soon be moved.
The donor group is generally reluctant to support a
program it sees as strengthening the party's physical
and political control of the people. Most Western
donors have not yet decided on their attitude toward
The Swedish Government intends to cut its aid in
1986 because of the continuing adverse effect of
villagization on Ethiopian agriculture, according to
the US Embassy.
Soviet Involvement
The Soviets approve of the resettlement program
because they wish to encourage government control
and administration of Ethiopian agriculture. Moscow
has lavished praise on the program in an authoritative
Soviet journal and is actively aiding the resettlement
effort with helicopters, 12 Antonov- 12 cargo aircraft,
and more than 300 trucks. The relatively limited
Soviet food assistance is provided to resettlement
areas-not to the drought-afflicted regions in the
north, according to the US Embassy. The Soviets'
massive military aid program is a principal means by
which the Soviets maintain their dominant influence
in Addis Ababa.l
We have no evidence that other Bloc nations are
following the Soviet example in supporting the
resettlement program.
other Bloc nations are critical of the
management of Addis Ababa's resettlement scheme
and believe it will have little chance of success. The
East Germans and Poles, however, have sent a few
transport aircraft and helicopters to move food to the
famine relief centers in northern Ethiopia.
Outlook
Many official and nongovernment Western donors
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believe that Mengistu will continue to push
resettlement forward with or without Western
approval. Many donors will continue to be critical of
the program but probably will feel they have no
choice but to assist the resettled peasants or thousands
will face starvation and disease in 1986. Significant
levels of Western assistance, on the other hand, would
allow Addis Ababa to proceed with its population
relocation plans at a faster pace and further its major
effort to collectivize agriculture and increase control
of the peasants. We believe that Addis Ababa will
pursue a calculated campaign to garner increased
Western aid for its resettlement and villagization
programs and ultimately could acquire some support.
Nevertheless, we believe the resettlement scheme is
likely to produce disastrous short-term results-unless
Mengistu orders a slowdown in the program.
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Regional Role
military establishment.
In the last six months, Prime Minister Mugabe has
assumed a more visible role in southern African
affairs. Mugabe's greater activism follows his
landslide election victory last summer and the
consolidation of his internal political base. Moreover,
we believe Mugabe is responding to overtures from
African and Third World leaders who see him as a
man in the forefront of the struggle against apartheid,
buttressed by his country's strong economy and
Despite the appearance of a new foreign policy
activism laden with radical rhetoric, Zimbabwe under
Mugabe continues to hew to cautious and pragmatic
policies that are largely dictated by the country's self-
interests and constraints imposed by South Africa-
the region's dominant power. Mugabe undoubtedly
would like to assume a more assertive role in the
region, but we believe he is unwilling to push policies
that directly challenge Pretoria's interests.
Aiding Mozambique
Mugabe's decision to provide military assistance to
the Mozambican Government best demonstrates
Zimbabwe's new activism in the region. The US
Embassy reports the decision followed a meeting in
mid-1985 with President Machel, who pleaded for
help to contain Mozambican insurgents. During the
summer of 1985
early tripled the number of its
troops in Mozambique-to about 9,000-and began
undertaking joint counterinsurgency operations
against antigovernment guerrillas. Despite a
drawdown of 3,000 to 4,000 Zimbabwean troops,
Mugabe has publicly reaffirmed his support to
In part, the decision to intervene appears to be an
attempt by Mugabe to repay Machel for Mozambican
assistance to Zimbabwean guerrillas during the
Rhodesian civil war. More important, in our
judgment, the intervention stems from a growing
concern over the Mozambican insurgent threat to
Zimbabwe's vulnerable transportation routes and oil
pipeline through central Mozambique. Harare also
would like to avoid becoming dependent on South
African railroads.
Dealing With Pretoria
Mugabe's strident public attacks against South Africa
and its system of apartheid have intensified in recent
months. His government nevertheless continues in
private to maintain a careful and effective dialogue
with Pretoria to avoid jeopardizing extensive
economic ties (see table). This two-tracked approach is
illustrated by the quiet diplomatic handling of the
landmine explosions in South Africa's northern
Transvaal Province in November and December that
Pretoria blames on anti-South African guerrillas.
Despite the hostile rhetoric on both sides, Zimbabwe
and South Africa moved effectively to calm the crisis
and prevent a further souring of relations.
Secret
ALA AR 85-002
24 January 1986
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Malawi
Mozambique
South Africa
Zambia
41,635
33,678
40,361
45,505
20,653
16,232
14,966
12,837
16,193
22,718
15,139
5,015
21,832
13,572
8,093
12,673
27,336
12,518
8,964
102
405,999
316,191
257,163
182,366
35,765
32,904
22,843
20,803
We believe Mugabe is hoping to revitalize the PAC as
an effective counterweight to ANC domination of the
South African liberation movement, rather than
trying to escalate the level of violence against Pretoria
in the near term. Mugabe is deeply suspicious of
Moscow's close ties to the ANC and to his political
opposition at home. Moreover, by all accounts,
Harare continues to refuse to allow its territory to be
used as a springboard for attacks against South
Africa by either the PAC or the ANC. F--]
A Venue for Antiapartheid Meetings
Zimbabwe is becoming the scene for a growing
number of antiapartheid meetings. In early
December, South African students and clergy met
with ANC and PAC representatives in Harare
following an emergency session of the World Council
of Churches, according to US Embassy reporting.
Later that same month, several members of a Soweto
parents' group also held talks with the ANC in
Harare, according to press reports. Moreover,
Zimbabwe is scheduled to play host to the next
summit meeting of the Nonaligned Movement in
August, and we believe Mugabe is likely to use the
conference to castigate Pretoria as the main cause of
instability in the region.
Outlook
In our view, the increased attention paid by Mugabe
to regional affairs does not signify a major policy
watershed. Appearances to the contrary, we believe
Harare's regional policies are limited in scope and are
firmly rooted in its own perception of narrowly
defined self-interests. Mugabe's more active role is in
large part reflective of the government's growing
confidence at having successfully resolved pressing
domestic problems. In addition, Mugabe probably is
trying to enhance his exposure before assuming
chairmanship of the Nonaligned Movement at the
summit meeting in August. F-7
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Mugabe is aware of his country's extreme
vulnerability-both economic and military-to South
African retaliation should his policies be seen as
posing too great a threat to Pretoria's interests.
Zimbabwe lacks the necessary diplomatic, economic,
and military resources to challenge effectively South
African hegemony in the region. With this in mind,
Zimbabwe is likely to continue to provide limited
support to South African liberation groups but deny
them the use of its territory for launching military
operations. Mugabe's verbal attacks against Pretoria
nevertheless will not only continue, but his rhetoric is
likely to intensify as the date of the summit
approaches.
Harare is likely to continue to provide troops to
safeguard its transportation routes and the oil pipeline
through central Mozambique. It may begin to reduce
the scope of its operations and play a less aggressive
counterinsurgency role, however, in order to avoid
becoming entangled in a protracted conflict that
threatens to sap scarce resources. F_~
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Zambia: Keeping a Watchful
Eye on the Army
maintenance of existing equipment.
the Army's combat capabilities. Economic difficulties 25X1
probably will force Zambia to delay the purchase of
needed spare parts and are likely to undermine
Kaunda has governed Zambia
since independence in 1964 and to date the country
has never experienced a coup attempt. Grumbling
within the ranks over economic reforms has grown,
but few open protests have been reported. In our view,
more serious and politically oriented opposition would
of the force's different tribal groups to cooperate
effectively. While a coup attempt cannot be ruled out,
we believe that isolated outbursts by small pockets of
soldiers are more likely to occur and that Kaunda's
rule will not be threatened over the near term. F_
Overview of the Army
Of the two principal services-the Army and the Air
Force-the Army is by far the most important and
the only force capable of toppling the government.
The mission of the Army is to defend Zambia from
outside attack and to assist the police in maintaining
internal security and public order. The Army's some
14,000 men are divided into five regular infantry
battalions, one artillery regiment, and one armored
regiment. Major tribal groups appear to be fairly
evenly represented among midlevel, junior, and
noncommissioned officers, as well as in the enlisted
ranks he
infantry battalions are based strategically in Lusaka,
Kabwe, and Ndola in central Zambia, as well as in
Chipata in the east and Kaoma in the west. The
artillery and armored regiments are based in Lusaka.
late 1970s has been the Soviet Union
The Army is equipped with a variety of international
arms and equipment, but its major supplier since the
that the diverse cation o
arms over the years has created a logistic nightmare,
made maintenance extremely difficult, and impaired
Austerity's Impact on the Military
Military personnel, especially the enlisted ranks, have
been hard hit by budget cuts over the past several
months. These austerity measures-which include
reductions in food and fuel subsidies and a sharp
currency devaluation-have led to complaints about
pay and living conditions from enlisted personnel and
some junior officers
Although the military has had some morale
and discipline problems for years, the government has
become more sensitive to the grumbling since the
economic reform measures were implemented. At
worst, civilian officials fear violent protests by the
population in general and the military in particular.
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Kaunda himself is still favorably regarded by the
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for austerity measures on the mismanagement and
corruption of other government officials. Kaunda
seems to have forestalled more outspoken criticism by
appointing officers to positions traditionally held by
civilians. According to the US Embassy in Lusaka,
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the President has made several Army commanders
district governors and promoted Gen. Malimba
Masheke from Commander of the Army to Minister
of Defense, a position previously held by a civilian.
difficult to obtain. Moreover, we believe Kaunda's
intelligence service is loyal and effective enough to
uncover any meaningful coup plotting.
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Tightening Command and Control
Rumors of military coup plotting in 1980 led Kaunda,
the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, to
restructure the military command to ensure civilian
authority and independent monitoring of the Army.
military chain of command extends from the
President through the Secretary of State for Defense
and Security Alex Shapi, then to Minister of Defense
Gen. Malimba Masheke, to the Commander of the
Army, Lt. Gen. Christian Tembo, and finally to the
commanders of the field brigades. In order to prevent
any one tribal group from dominating the Army,
Kaunda has appointed members of different tribes to
the top security positions. Shapi is a member of the
Ushi tribe, Masheke is a Lozi, and Tembo is an
Ngoni.
Outlook
While we judge that a well-organized coup attempt
over the near term is probably remote, we believe that
spontaneous and isolated demonstrations are likely to
continue as austerity cuts deeper into the standard of
living of the troops. Despite some grievances with the
Kaunda government, there does not appear to be a
significant organized opposition within the military at
this time. Any bid for a takeover from the military
would require the cooperation of members of several
different tribal groups, which we judge would be
possibility of a takeover by junior officers.
However, should disgruntled military units overcome
hurdles and muster sufficient support to launch a
coup attempt, we believe it would probably come from
the junior officer or noncommissioned officer level.
Faced with such a prospect, there is a chance that
relatively moderate and pro-Western senior officers
might seize power to forestall the unwelcome
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Mauritius: Moderate
Government in Trouble
At the halfway mark of its five-year term, Prime
Minister Aneerood Jugnauth's moderate three-party
coalition-the Alliance-may fail to complete its
mandate. In addition to the Alliance's decisive loss to
the leftist opposition Mauritian Militant Movement
(MMM) in municipal elections last month,
communalism, personal rivalries, and allegations of
corruption and drug involvement by high-ranking
officials are fragmenting the coalition's unity and
eroding its popular support. The recent arrest of four
Alliance parliamentarians for drug smuggling and the
resignations of several influential ministers further
weaken the government and may encourage the
opposition to call for early general elections.
Background
The Mauritian democratic process has been lively and
often tempestuous since independence from the
United Kingdom in 1968. With a population of 1
million, the island nation's politics are highly
personalized, revolving around figures who appeal to
specific ethnic, economic, or interest groups. Of the
coalition partners, for example, Jugnauth's Militant
Socialist Movement (MSM) and Beergoonath
Ghurburrun's smaller Mauritian Workers Assembly
(RTM) are supported by the majority Hindu ethnic
community, and Deputy Prime Minister Gaetan
Duval's Mauritian Social Democratic Party (PMSD)
appeals largely to the Creoles, who make up 30
percent of the population. Of the opposition parties,
the small, pro-West Mauritian Labor Party (MLP),
led by Satcam Boolell, also has Hindu support, and
the larger MMM, led by Paul Berenger, a white,
draws leftwing support from various ethnic
communities as well as from most trade unions and
labor groups.F__1
Communalism
We believe that the Alliance's inability or reluctance
to overcome the communal nature of Mauritian
politics and expand beyond its traditional Hindu
constituency will reduce its chances of retaining
power. Although Hindus comprise slightly over one-
half of the population, the Alliance probably does not
have the full backing of the Hindu community. MLP
Hindu supporters, for example, probably cost the
Alliance at least one victory out of five in last month's
municipal elections. The Alliance also alienated
potential supporters by appealing only to Hindus
according to Embassy reporting.
Seeking the Hindu Vote. The Alliance must come to
an accommodation with the MLP, in our view, if it is
to avoid splitting the Hindu vote and strengthening
the position of the MMM. The Alliance, however, has
little to offer MLP leader Boolell in return for
political unity. According to Embassy reporting, the
ambitious Boolell may believe his chances of
becoming prime minister are better if he allies his
smaller party with the MMM, which needs a well-
known Hindu candidate for the prime minister's post,
traditionally held by a Hindu. F__]
Another obstacle to political accommodation is the
rivalry between Jugnauth and Boolell dating from
early 1984. Boolell was finance minister and a
member of the coalition but broke away from the
government over personal and policy differences with
Jugnauth and led the MLP into joint opposition with
the MMM. The death last month of independence
leader and first Prime Minister Seewoosagur
Ramgoolam, in our view, also affects prospects for
Hindu unity. The widely revered and influential
Ramgoolam had worked to reconcile Jugnauth and
Boolell to ensure a united Hindu governing party, and
without his influence reconciliation will be difficult to
achieve.)
Political Wild Card. The entry of Ramgoolam's son
Nuvin, a British-trained physician, into the political
fray will affect prospects for Hindu unity. Nuvin
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ALA AR 85-002
24 January 1986
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Anerood Jugnauth
Prime Minister since June
1982... lacks a dedicated
personal following ... has not
proved his leadership ability,
proclaimed, self-styled socialist
but has made determined steps
toward openly pro-Western
policies ... soft peddles
Mauritian claims to Diego
Garcia, where a US military
Beergoonath Ghurburrun
Appointed Minister of Trade
and Shipping in recent Cabinet
shuffle ... had served as
Minister of Economic Planning
and Development since
1984... leader of RTM. which
is composed of MLP members
who stayed with the Alliance
after other MLP members
followed Boolell into
opposition ... of Indian origin,
leader of island's low-caste
Hindus ... 57 ... physician ...
brother, Rabindrath, a former
Cabinet minister,
Sir Charles Gaetan Duval
Deputy Prime Minister,
Minister of Tourism and
Employment ... had served as
Attorney General and held
Justice portfolio from 1983
until recent Cabinet
shuffle ... leader of
PMSD ... openly
contemptuous of Jugnauth,
disregards instructions and
preempts official
announcements ... active in
foreign affairs, effectively
attracts foreign investment to
Mauritius ... openly
bisexual ... close ties to drug
trafickers,
56.
Sir Satcam Boolell
MLP leader ... currently being
wooed both by ruling and
opposition parties ... has held
several Cabinet portfolios, most
recently Minister of Economic
Planning and Development
under Jugnauth during 1982-
84 ... stripped of that post for
his independence, criticism of
the Alliance, and alleged secret
meetings with the
opposition ... 65 ... Brahmin
1982-83 Jugnauth
administration ... 41.
Paul Berenger
Founder and leader of
MMM ... member of
Parliament, suspended until
Jugnauth calls a new
session ... would like to
become prime minister but his
white, Franco-Mauritian
heritage is a liability with the
predominately Hindu
electorate ... strong support
from labor
organizations ... pro-leftist
orientation and charismatic
personality appeal to
Mauritian youth ... Minister
of Finance and Economy under
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returned to Mauritius from the United Kingdom last
year and announced his intention to enter politics in
the next general election campaign. The Alliance,
MLP, and MMM solicited his endorsement during
the municipal election campaign, but Nuvin remained
attract foreign investment to Mauritius.
Tarnished Government Image
Political infighting among Alliance leaders and within
the MSM, aggravated by the opposition's continual
muckraking, has undercut Jugnauth's efforts to
project an image of a united and honest government.
Influential Alliance officials have been increasingly
critical of Jugnauth for ignoring other ethnic groups
and for retaining the flamboyant Duval, whom they
regard as an embarrassment, as Deputy Prime
Minister. US Embassy reporting indicates that
recently resigned Foreign Minister Gayan resented
Duval's interference in foreign policy through the
Deputy Prime Minister's largely successful efforts to
Rumors of drug dealing and corruption by high-
ranking officials, if proved, could precipitate the
government's downfall. The arrest late last month of
four Alliance parliamentarians in the Netherlands for
smuggling heroin may lead to the implication of other
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trade, according to the US Embassy.
and corruption.
reports widely circulating rumors that both the
conservative former Chief Whip Harish Boodhoo and
RTM leader Ghurburrun are involved in narcotics
Resignations. In our view, the resignations this month
of four Alliance ministers-including Foreign
Minister Gayan-and Jugnauth's top aide, Boodhoo,
are highly damaging to Jugnauth. The officials
stepped down in protest against government policies,
especially the Prime Minister's failure to clean up
corruption. In addition, the Alliance's majority over
the opposition in the Legislative Assembly has
dropped to 12 seats following the four arrests. This
majority would be diminished further should the ex-
ministers ally with the opposition in a vote of no
confidence.
The MMM further plans to broaden support beyond
its traditional urban strongholds into the rural areas
that back the Alliance. For its part, the MLP
probably has not ruled out an eventual merger with
the Alliance but first may wait and assess its ability to
stand alone in elections if Nuvin Ramgoolam joins the
party.
Outlook
The coming weeks will test Jugnauth's leadership
skills as he attempts to balance competing factions in
his government and retain popular support. According
to the Embassy, he has shuffled his Cabinet and
introduced four new ministers with what he believes
are unblemished reputations in an effort to clean up
the government's image. He also has adopted a tough
posture on prosecuting narcotics traffickers. Barring
additional defections from the Alliance, or proven
allegations of corruption and drug trafficking by high-
ranking officials, Jugnauth may recoup much of his
lost popular support by mid-March. In addition, the
MMM may lack the strength to force a no-confidence
vote because five MMM parliamentarians, including
Berenger, have been suspended from the Legislative
Assembly. The MMM has the option of boycotting
parliament, however, a move that almost certainly
would precipitate the government's collapse.
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Sub-Saharan Africa: New
Importance as a Narcotics
Transshipment Area
Sub-Saharan Africa's historic role as a small-scale
exporter of marijuana to Europe is expanding to
include transshipping Southwest Asian heroin and
South American cocaine. Increased shipments of hard
drugs through Africa en route to the United States
are a marked departure from concentrated use of
European channels and underscore the traffickers'
determination to extend and diversify operations. One
result of this heightened trafficking is escalating drug
abuse and increased cultivation of illicit drugs within
Africa. Another is the potential for increased tensions
in US-African diplomatic relations as the drug issue
begins to surface in bilateral discussions.
susceptible to recruitment as couriers and to perform
other kinds of tasks for traffickers. In many countries
the overall political environment is easily exploited by
drug smugglers.
Expanding Trafficking Center
We believe that the transshipment of Southwest
Asian heroin and opium through Africa poses an
immediate threat to US drug interdiction efforts. US
Customs officials report that the amount of Golden
Crescent heroin transiting African nations,
particularly Nigeria and Ghana, is steadily
increasing. The number of Nigerian heroin smugglers
arrested at US airports increased sixfold from 1983 to
Why Africa?
The immediate cause for Sub-Saharan Africa's
emergence as a transshipment zone and trafficking
center is most likely the increased law enforcement
pressure on traditional smuggling routes into the
United States and Europe. The strategic location of
the African continent with airline connections
between Southwest Asia and US and European
distribution points makes it a likely transshipment
zone. In many cases, Southwest Asian and Middle
Eastern expatriates living in Africa provide the initial
links between smugglers, sources of supply, and the
consumer. Muslim African nationals also have some
advantages in gaining access to normally closely held
drug networks in Islamic Pakistan. Communities of
African expatriates in the United States and Europe,
particularly Nigerians, often provide contacts for
home-country drug traffickers seeking to establish
markets. We judge that the abundant supply of
cocaine out of South America will encourage
traffickers not only to develop the African market but
also to explore new smuggling routes through Africa
into the United States.)
In addition to these external factors, Africa's
widespread economic and political problems facilitate
illicit narcotic activities. An underpaid, corrupt
bureaucracy makes it easy for drug traffickers to
strike lucrative deals with government officials. At
the same time, economic hardships make many people
1984.
Nigeria is the most highly developed, large-scale
drug-smuggling center in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Murtala Muhammed Airport-the air hub of West
Africa-is considered to be a key transit point.
Recent DEA evidence suggests that to counter greater
US interdiction and enforcement efforts, Nigerian
traffickers are expanding centers of operation to cities
throughout the United States, Canada, Latin
America, Europe, Southwest Asia, and East Asia.
One report indicates that some Nigerian couriers
travel through Mexico into the southwestern United
States, and others from Europe to Tokyo and on to the
United States. The increasing sophistication of
Nigerian traffickers-mobilizing hundreds of couriers
often of different nationalities with multiple
passports-suggests that they will pose an even
greater problem for law enforcement in the future. F
Heroin shipments also move along the coastal
highway linking Nigeria and neighboring Benin,
Togo, Ghana, and Ivory Coast. DEA reports suggest
that Lebanese, Indian, Pakistani, and Syrian
expatriates use this route for hashish and heroin
destined for the United States.)
Secret
ALA AR 85-002
24 January 1986
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Recent Embassy reporting suggests that Kenya and
Mauritius are developing as transshipment centers
comparable to Nigeria. Kenyan Customs officials
express concern over the increasing flow of illicit
narcotics through Mombasa-first port of call for
ships originating in Southwest Asia-and Nairobi.
Less than 1 percent of all containerized cargo in
Mombasa is examined, and there is ample opportunity
to offload contraband prior to docking. In Mauritius,
imports of opium and heroin
from the Golden Crescent are increasing. Brown
Sugar-a liquid heroin and caffeine mixture whose
fumes are inhaled after being burned on a piece of
paper-has become a local drug abuse problem of
particular concern to law enforcement offiicials.F_
We have only limited information on heroin and
opium trafficking groups and routes elsewhere in Sub-
Saharan Africa. According to DEA sources, however,
large-scale trafficking groups smuggle unknown
quantities of heroin from Pakistan through Kenya,
Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswana for sale in South
Africa. It is possible that some of this heroin is also
shipped on to the United States.
Evidence of cocaine transshipment through Sub-
Saharan Africa is less extensive than that for heroin.
We believe, however, that recent developments
indicate the emergence of a cocaine network between
South America and Sub-Saharan Africa that
probably has links to US markets:
an increased
number of cocaine seizures at Murtala Muhammed
Airport over the last two years. In each case, the
cocaine arrived from Brazil for onward shipment to
European and African destinations. One route
allegedly used by traffickers runs from Bolivia to
Brazil to Lagos.
? A Ghanaian trafficking group-known to import
Peruvian cocaine for export to Europe and the
United States-is examining additional smuggling
routes to increase volume of shipments to the United
States, according to Embassy officials.
attribute
the increased availability of cocaine in West Africa
to the growing number of airline flights and routes
between Brazil and Nigeria, Senegal, and Ivory
Coast.
? DEA reports that cocaine traffickers in South
Africa are selling discounted, trial-size "lines" of
cocaine to expand their market. One international
trafficking group is said to smuggle cocaine into
South Africa through Cape Town.
Trafficking and use of marijuana occur throughout
Africa. Kenya, Malawi, Uganda, South Africa,
Lesotho, Swaziland, and the West African countries
are major suppliers of marijuana products to
European and, to a lesser extent, US illicit markets.
Marijuana trafficking from all Sub-Saharan African
countries to Europe showed an increase in 1984-13
tons or 12.5 percent of all marijuana seized-
according to Interpol and DEA statistics. We judge
that much of the marijuana trafficking follows
trading lines established with Europe during the
colonial period. Sub-Saharan Africa's European
orientation does not, however, preclude the
development of US routes. According to US Embassy
officials, in early 1985 Nigerian and Ghanaian
trafficking groups tested a route to North America
via The Gambia and London. In addition, there are
recorded incidents of Malawian-produced
marijuana-usually smuggled through seaports in
South Africa and Mozambique-as well as marijuana
from Swaziland and Madagascar being imported into
the United States.
A growing drug control problem in Africa is the
influx of mandrax (methaqualone) from India and
West Germany. Mandrax, a synthetic sedative, is
generally smuggled through Kenya, Malawi,
Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Zaire, and Swaziland
for final sale in South Africa.
Pakistani and Indian nationals appear
to control the traffic between Southwest Asia and
eastern Africa. Recent allegations implicating
Zambian officials and prominent businessmen in
mandrax smuggling, however, imply more direct local
involvement. Future use of these smuggling channels
for other drugs is a distinct possibility should efforts
by mandrax traffickers continue unimpeded.
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There is no credible evidence to suggest the
transshipment of mandrax to the United States and
Europe. The political and social implications of
mandrax trafficking in Africa are of concern,
profits available from trafficking mandrax to South
Africa will make this a continuing problem for many
African countries.
A Tradition of Drug Cultivation
Marijuana cultivation has existed for many years, but
some evidence suggests that the cultivation of
marijuana is becoming increasingly commercial,
supplying the international trafficking networks
operating in Africa rather than the traditional
domestic market. As far back as 1983, US Embassy
officials in Kenya-a key source for high-grade
marijuana for international drug traffickers supplying
Europe-reported the presence of British drug
syndicates recruiting local farmers to cultivate
marijuana for export. Other evidence suggests that
foreign nationals control large segments of the
Kenyan illicit drug business. DEA sources allude to
suspected Indian and Italian-with alleged ties to
organized crime in Italy-expatriate involvement in
drug trafficking and marijuana production.
Climatic conditions are suitable for opium poppy and
coca plant cultivation in Sub-Saharan Africa. We
have sporadic reports but no evidence of extensive
production. Embassy officials in Burkina reported
poppy cultivation in the southeastern part of the
country in 1984. DEA sources detected opium poppy
cultivation in Rwanda, Kenya, and Uganda and coca
farms in the highlands of Guinea. A 1980 DEA report
alleges that traffickers promoted coca production in
Nigeria, Ghana, and Ivory Coast in order to supply
the cocaine market in Europe and Asia. F__1 25X1
Local Drug Problems and Enforcement
Sub-Saharan Africa's growing drug abuse problem is
an outgrowth of its increased use as a trafficking area.
Drugs diverted while in transit support a burgeoning
addict population. Mounting evidence of hard drug
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Mauritian nationals has aroused government concern
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US Embassy officials in Kenya, Nigeria, and Ghana
report that high-level concern is prompting requests
for US aid and technical assistance to combat the
drug problem. We judge that the continued economic
recession and social tensions will contribute to higher
levels of drug abuse.
Extensive marijuana cultivation in Africa and
imported mandrax support a large user population.
Traditionally, marijuana use was restricted to the
aged for the reduction of pain. 25X1
point to the appearance of marijuana abuse 25X1
in urban centers and among the youth. Although
South Africa is still the leading center of mandrax
abuse worldwide, there is evidence to suggest growing
user populations in the transit countries of Zambia,
Zimbabwe, and Botswana. F_~
Regional and local drug enforcement capabilities have
not kept pace with the rapidly expanding narcotics
business in Sub-Saharan Africa. Official efforts are 25X1
limited by insufficient funds, manpower, and training; 25X1
by widespread corruption; and by low government
priority for the drug problem. Stiff penalties for the
cultivation, trafficking, sale, and use of illicit
narcotics exist but are rarely implemented. In some
cases, fear of tribal reprisal inhibits governments from
strenuously prosecuting offenders. The thrust of
government enforcement activities is to crack down on
low-level couriers, but this has little or no impact on
the drug trade.
We believe official concern over the growing problem
of drug abuse and smuggling within Africa will
prompt greater government emphasis on drug law
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enforcement. West and East African governments are
supporting stricter laws, such as the death penalty,
and waiving diplomatic immunity and privileges for
officials involved in drug smuggling.
The expanding nature of drug smuggling operations is
prompting greater regional cooperation among
African nations. Last June, government officials from
Benin and Togo assisted in a French-initiated effort to
curb the traffic of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana to
France and the United States via Cotonou, Lome, and
Accra. Attempts to curb trafficking networks based in
Lagos from extending into other West African
countries led Burkina and Ghana to conclude an
agreement to curb trafficking and cooperate on drug
abuse. Similar agreements, including joint marijuana
eradication efforts, are under consideration between
South Africa and Swaziland. We believe that, in
addition to enhancing regional efforts, Sub-Saharan
African countries may begin looking to the United
States for funding and technical assistance
Future Trends
Cultivation and trafficking of illicit narcotics occur
throughout Africa, but we judge that several more
countries are likely to become involved on the same
scale as Kenya and Nigeria:
? Ghana, Benin, Togo, Ivory Coast, Senegal, The
Gambia, Liberia, Mali, Mauritius, Seychelles, and
South Africa are developing extensive opium-,
heroin-, and cocaine-trafficking networks within
Africa as well as between Southwest Asian and
South American sources and US and European
markets. We expect narcotics operations to
strengthen amid continuing economic and political
problems.
? Marijuana cultivation in Uganda, Tanzania,
Rwanda, Swaziland, and Lesotho reportedly
exceeds estimated local demand. We believe exports
of marijuana products to Europe will continue to
increase and may lead to onward shipment to the
United States.
? Increased mandrax imports to Zambia, Zimbabwe,
Botswana, Mozambique, and South Africa suggest
a growing addict population in these countries.
Moreover, we judge that smuggling routes may
eventually be used for other drugs. F_~
We judge that the narcotics issue will take on greater
importance in US-African bilateral relations.
Embassy officials in Kenya report US interests are
being directly affected by Kenya's enhanced role as
an international distribution center for illicit
narcotics. The port of Mombasa is a major liberty
station for the US Navy, raising concern about drug
use by US personnel. According to Embassy officials
in Nigeria, the number and intensity of the searches
of Nigerians entering the United States have elicited
threats of reciprocal treatment of US nationals
entering Nigeria. The Embassy expressed concern
about the potential spillover effect on other issues
being discussed by Nigerian and US officials. F_~
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Africa
Briefs
The Zimbabwean Army, after providing extensive support to the Mozambican
Government in central Mozambique for six months, is becoming increasingly
critical of its ally's lackluster performance in fighting antigovernment rebels.
Despite grumbling by the Zimbabwean Army, as well as the substantial financial
and material cost of maintaining a large number of troops in Mozambique, Prime
Minister Mugabe is unlikely to abandon his commitment to Maputo. Mugabe
probably feels indebted to President Machel for his assistance during the
Rhodesian civil war and also would like to avoid becoming dependent entirely on
South African transportation routes. If the situation fails to improve, however,
Mugabe may again limit his support to the more defensive role of guarding
Zimbabwe's vital transportation and communication lines through central
Mozambique, which Zimbabwe has done since 1982.
The world's second-largest platinum mine, located in the nominally independent
black South African homeland of Bophuthatswana, shut down on 6 January after
its South African owner, Impala Platinum Holding Ltd., fired 20,000 miners. The
miners were dismissed after a wildcat strike over increased wages and better
working conditions. Platinum futures prices for April delivery have since soared.
The mine closure also has renewed concern over the possibility that tensions in
southern Africa might disrupt future metal supplies, even though it is unlikely that
the closure will be prolonged or have much impact on supply. Replacement
workers can readily be drawn from the vast pool of unemployed blacks in
Bophuthatswana and South Africa, and mine officials claim that platinum
stockpiles will prevent any break in consumer supplies.
25 Secret
ALA AR 85-002
24 January 1986
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The seizure of power by Gen. Tito Okello in July has not stemmed the economic
downturn that began under President Obote in 1984. Civil strife, rebel activity in
the southwest, ill-advised economic policies, and reduced aid flows have slowed the
economic progress achieved in the early 1980s. Market agriculture growth fell to
an annual rate of 3 percent in 1985-86 from 10 percent during the period 1982-84.
According to US Embassy reporting, inflation jumped to 160 percent in late 1985
from 30 percent over the first half of 1984. The increase was prompted by higher
defense expenditures, a substantial rise in civil service wages in June 1984, and
lower domestic production. Debt service consumes about 70 percent of export
earnings, up from 38 percent in 1983-84, according to a press report.
Continuing rebel rule in southwestern Uganda, where the insurgents control about
50 percent of the coffee crop, will seriously undermine coffee exports. Coffee
accounts for almost all of Uganda's exports and is a principal source of
government revenue. Substantial shortfalls in exports will further dampen
economic activity, force expenditure cuts or inflationary borrowing, and aggravate
the critical foreign exchange shortage. The recent increase in coffee prices is only
minimally benefiting the Ugandan economy because the unsettled security
situation has created processing and marketing problems. The government has
devalued the Ugandan shilling by about 67 percent since the coup and increased
petroleum prices, but we believe that further adjustments, along with domestic
reconciliation, will be required to stem economic decline.F__-]
President Houphouet-Boigny and Israeli Prime Minister Peres announced the re-
establishment of diplomatic relations after secret meetings in Geneva last month,
according to the US Embassy in Abidjan. Ivory Coast becomes the first black
African state-after Zaire and Liberia in 1982 and 1983 respectively-to resume
relations and only the fourth since Israel's expulsion from most of black Africa
following the 1973 Middle East war. Abidjan has permitted Israel an Interest
Section and has maintained unofficial security and technical assistance ties since
the mid-1970s.1
Tunisia and Algeria already have threatened to withdraw their ambassadors from
Ivory Coast in response to the move, according to the Embassy. Although the Arab
League denounced the renewal of ties between the two countries, the Arab Bank of
African Development has not funded any development projects in Ivory Coast
since 1983. Leaders representing Ivory Coast's 30,000 Lebanese, who have
extensive commercial interests in the country, have assured the President of their
passive support following the resumption of ties, according to the Embassy. In our
view, however, Libya may attempt to exploit Ivory Coast's large Muslim sector,
which makes up 25 percent of the population, to undermine the Abidjan
government and dissuade Cameroon and other moderate West African states from
following suit. F__1
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Equatorial Guinea Continuing Economic Crisis
Equatorial Guinea's inability to increase cocoa, timber, and coffee exports, which
World Bank officials predict could fall short of 1984's levels, are hampering efforts
to revive the country's declining economy. A shortage of foreign exchange and a
local liquidity crisis have made it difficult to meet the IMF's expenditure
restrictions and have delayed payment of military salaries. The government's
inability to meet limitations on credit ceilings and external debt, stipulated in the
IMF standby agreement, could force new negotiations. Plans to host a Central
African Customs and Economic Union Conference in December 1986 probably
will further drain the economy and will not be welcomed by the IMF. F--]
Poor salaries and consistently late pay have led to grumbling throughout the
military, and the government has heightened security and is monitoring activities
of the Defense Ministry, according to the US Embassy. Presidential security
concerns prompted the ouster of 60 military officers and enlisted men last month
and more are expected to follow soon. The government's insecurity is likely to grow
as economic problems deepen and the potential for unrest within the military and
general public mounts.
Central African Republic Steps Toward Representational Government
The US Embassy in Bangui reports that President Kolingba plans to create a one-
party state, form a new political party, and schedule presidential and national
assembly elections, possibly by 1987. The President has called for a constitutional
committee to produce a constitution by the end of the year, according to the
Embassy. The President wants the former constitution, which he suspended when
he assumed power in the military coup in 1981, rewritten because it provides for
multiparty democracy. He believes such a government is unworkable at this point
in the country's development, according to the Embassy. The creation of the
committee fulfills Kolingba's pledge, made during his National Day address in
December, to return the country to civilian rule.
The President last month also outlined an amnesty program for dissidents and
released 89 political prisoners.
The release of political prisoners and the possible rallying of
dissidents reflect an increase in Kolingba's popularity and probably will help him
to broaden his political base before he forms the new national party.
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Preferential Trade Area Little Accomplished at Summit
According to US Embassy reporting, the mid-December summit meeting of the
Preferential Trade Agreement for Eastern and Southern African states (PTA) in
Lusaka, Zambia, was poorly attended by heads of government and yielded few
results. Only four leaders of the 15 PTA member countries-Burundi, Tanzania,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe-participated and, as a result, no decisions were taken on
outstanding major issues such as a proposed reduction in the minimum level of
local ownership for firms benefiting from preferential tariffs and the development
of a framework for the reduction of nontariff barriers. Members did agree,
however, to establish a PTA Trade and Development Bank, effective this month.
We believe only slow progress toward economic integration is likely, because the
political links between PTA members are fragile at best.
Botswana Trade Surplus
Botswana recorded its first trade surplus last year, according to press reports.
Exports totaled $652 million, exceeding imports by $185 million. Diamonds
remain Botswana's largest export, contributing over 70 percent of total export
earnings. Government officials expect an increase in both imports and exports in
1986 as a fifth consecutive year of drought forces Botswana to increase food
imports, while a stronger diamond market improves export earnings. F___]
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Secret
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