AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000100460001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 15, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
MASTER ILE COPY
NOT %I E OUT
- OR MARIKI Gm
Africa Review
Seeret
ALA AR 85-025
/5 November /985
copy 3 5 6
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Articles Somalia: Dissident Challengers in Disarray
Somalia's two chief dissident groups will continue to harass
President Siad's regime, but are unlikely to mount a serious
immediate challenge. Leadership disputes, lack of broad tribal
appeal, and resistance to Ethiopian-sponsored merger proposals have
undercut the insurgents' political and military strength. F__1
Ethiopia: Possible New Maritime Facility
Construction has begun on what eventually could be a shipbuilding
or port facility on Ethiopia's Haleb Island, near the southern end of
the Red Sea.
Angola: Oil Boom Amid Economic Decay
Oil production-90 percent of Angola's exports-has roughly
doubled since 1982 and is projected to double again by about 1990.
All other sectors in the economy, however, are suffering from the
impact of fighting between the government and UNITA insurgents,
and as a result little relief for hardpressed consumers is likely
through 1986.
Botswana: Diamonds, Diversification, and Economic Growth
Botswana's economy has maintained an impressive 11 percent
average annual growth since 1965, but a weak international
diamond market caused the growth rate to slip to 2 percent last
year. F_~
President Traore has been trying-so far unsuccessfully-to secure
Western military aid that would help him gradually replace
unsatisfactory Soviet equipment.
Secret
ALA AR 85-025
15 November 1985
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Mauritius: Preparing for Municipal Elections
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Cape Verde: Pereira to be Reelected 20
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Production Staff, Office of Arican and Latin American Analysis,
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Secret
Somalia: Dissident Challengers
in Disarray
toward their disgruntled tribal supporters.
Somalia's two chief dissident groups-the Somali
National Movement (SNM) and the Somali
Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF)-will continue to
harass, but not mount a serious immediate challenge
to the regime of President Siad, in our view. The
insurgents' leadership disputes, lack of broad tribal
appeal, and resistance to Ethiopian-sponsored merger
proposals continue to undercut their political and
military strength. Siad consequently has been able to
undercut the dissidents with conciliatory gestures
SDSF ranks.
Recent Developments
US Embassy reporting indicates that both dissident
groups have experienced internal convulsions over the
issue of regaining the initiative from the Siad regime.
At a leadership conference in London in late August,
the Central Committee of the SNM-composed of
Issak tribal leaders who seek autonomy for northern
Somalia-decided to change its tactics from attacking
Somali Army camps to conducting terrorist raids on
Somali towns In
addition, the Central Committee reportedly urged
SNM Chairman Silyano to seek a merger with the
SDSF-which draws support from the Majertain
tribe of central Somalia-on the condition that its
leader, Colonel Yusuf, be deposed. The US Embassy
in Addis Ababa reports that Yusuf-long opposed to
a merger-was subsequently arrested by Ethiopian
military personnel, and his headquarters closed in
mid-October. We believe Addis Ababa did this to
clear the way for a union of the dissident groups, a
move that probably will create further turmoil in
Despite these signs of internal upheaval, both
dissident groups have recently demonstrated an
ability to mount effective military operations against
Somalia. The SNM launched several raids-
supported by Ethiopian artillery-against northern
Somali border towns in mid-September, and may
have been involved in the bombing of a Somali
military officers' club in early October. The SDSF,
operating alongside Ethiopian units and supported by
Ethiopian air and artillery, launched a large-scale
attack on Somali Army positions along the central
.Ogaden border in mid-July. While all of these attacks
were repelled by Somali forces, they illustrate that the
insurgents can-with Ethiopian assistance-pose
problems for the ill-trained and poorly equipped 25X1
Somali Army. F_~ 25X1
Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu eagerly supports the
Somali insurgencies as a counter to Siad's support of
Western Somali Liberation Front raids into the
Ogaden. The Somali-Libyan rapprochement in April
reportedly ended Tripoli's support for the dissidents,
leaving, in our judgment, Ethiopia free rein to
influence the insurgencies.
Addis Ababa tightly controls the
movements of the dissidents, the choice of targets, and
the timing of the groups' raids.
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The Government Approach to the Dissidents
In our view, the fortunes of the dissidents depend in
large part on Mogadishu's policies toward their tribal
support bases. According to US Embassy reporting,
most dissident grievances stem from Siad's policy of
tribal favoritism and his continued manipulation of
tribal rivalries to maintain power. Recently, however,
Siad has also shown himself capable of conciliatory
gestures to these groups, including a highly successful
government amnesty program that resulted in 25X1
hundreds of dissident defections. In addition, Siad
continues to seek a reconciliation with the Issaks,
Secret
ALA AR 85-025
15 November 1985
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Secret
P.D.R.Y. yt
(South Yemen) Aden
a`/ , Galcaio_
.Getlinsor G
Indian Ocean
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Percentage of Clan Families
and Major Subclansa
Ethnic Minorities 6%
NEGROID
OTHER
Rahanwein 17%
Darod 20%
DO(BOHANTA
MAJERYAIEN
MAREHAN
OGADEN)
WARSANGEU
Somalis outside the borders would increase the
percentage of Darod substantially.
/ monoo
/ 1atabaan
Hawiya 25%
ARGAL
AJURAN
DEGOntA
HARR GEDIR
HAWADtE
MUROSADE
tsharak 22%
EJDAttf
HAR AWAL, ,~?
HARE TOLL tALA
HARE ^YUNJS ,
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The SNM and SDSF trace their origins to the period
following the 1977-78 Ogaden War when President
Siad turned increasingly to the Marehan and
Ogadeni tribes for political support in the wake of the
Ethiopian and Cuban defeat of invading Somali
forces. Although they evolved along different lines,
each group relies on support from tribes alienated by
Siad, and both movements are committed to the
overthrow of his regime. While tribalism led to the
early success of the dissidents, it has also limited
their political appeal and caused serious disputes in
their ranks. Nevertheless, we believe the dissidents
have contributed significantly to the long-term
erosion of Siad's support base, and could pose a
greater threat should Siad fail to reverse Somalia's
military and economic decline.
The Somali National Movement
The Somali National Movement-which fields 3,000
fighters and was organized in London in 1981-
draws support almost exclusively from the Issak
tribe that is predominant in northern Somalia, but is
excluded by Siad from political, military, and
economic influence in Somalia. The dissidents claim
to seek the establishment of an autonomous Issak
government in the north, economic liberalization, free
elections, and international nonalignment for
Somalia.)
headquarters in Addis Ababa, and
Ethiopia supplies the SNM with
training, small arms, ammunition, and funding.
Because of its narrow tribal base-Issaks comprise
90 percent of the movement-the SNM is not as
vulnerable to Ethiopian influence as thefaction prone
SDSF; consequently, the SNM does not attract as
much Ethiopian support as the SDSF, and is forced
to employ a guerrilla strategy of infiltrations and hit-
and-run raids. According to the US Embassy in
Mogadishu, the SNM receives most of its funding
from the Somali expatriate community in Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf states, although we believe some
funds also are donated by sympathetic Issaks within
Somalia.
The Somali. Democratic Salvation Front
The SDSF, with an estimated strength of some 1,500
fighters, was formed with the Ethiopian- and Libyan-
sponsored merger of the Somali Salvation Front and
two smaller anti-Siad groups. Since its inception and
until his recent arrest, the organization was led by
Colonel Yusuf, and continues to be dominated by his
Majertain clan. According to the US Embassy,
Yustff's authoritarian leadership and close ties to
Ethiopia handicapped efforts to expand the SDSF s 25X1
appeal to other Somali tribes, factors that we believe
probably contributed to Ethiopia's decision to arrest
him.F_~ 25X1
In addition to its goal of removing Siad, the SDSF
proposes to establish a democratic form of
government in Somalia that is free of tribalism,
corruption, and international capitalism. The SDSF
charter also calls for a nonaligned foreign policy, a
rapprochement between Somalia and Ethiopia, and
an end to the US military presence in Somalia. To
achieve these goals, the SDSF employs a more
conventional type of military strategy-made .
possible by Ethiopian-supplied heavy weapons,
including tanks-and often participates in joint
operations with Ethiopian Army units stationed
along the central Ogaden border.
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often sending high-level government delegations to
the north with offers of amnesty, compensation, and
concessions]
We believe Siad may have shifted tactics toward the
dissidents with a view to undercutting their strength
at a time of internal division. Government treatment
of returned dissidents has been very lenient, according
to the US Embassy, and many have been taken back
into the Army. Siad almost certainly realizes that the
harsh government crackdowns in the north in late
1984-which included summary executions-only
increased opposition to his regime and swelled
dissident numbers.
Outlook
The dissidents' continuing internal disarray, lack of
wide tribal support, relative military weakness, and
inability to unify make them unlikely replacements to
the Siad regime. Although both groups will continue
to overrun Somali defensive positions on the border,
neither movement can occupy territory nor project
itself as a viable alternative to the Siad regime, in our
judgment. In addition, we see little prospect of a
successful merger of these two movements, because of
deep-seated tribal differences and the reluctance of
both leaderships to share power. Nevertheless, we
judge Ethiopia will continue to supply materiel
support, training, and bases for both groups, with the
aim of further undermining the Siad regime and its
territorial claims in the Ogaden. F__1
In our view, the prospects for a peaceful settlement in
the north remain dim, in spite of recent signs that
Siad may be becoming more flexible with the
insurgents and their tribal supporters. Growing
internal criticisms of the Somali military and
economic decline probably will force Siad to continue
playing off tribal rivalries to bolster flagging support
for his government. Moreover, we believe the
dissidents may increase attempts to capitalize on
Siad's political weaknesses through disinformation
and propaganda campaigns. In a recent example, a
false report of US nuclear waste dumping in
Somalia-initiated by the rebels' jointly run,
Ethiopian-supplied radio transmitter-forced the
Siad regime to issue embarrassing denials, and
probably furthered doubts among Siad's critics over
Somalia's close ties to Washington. F_~
Unless Ethiopia substantially expands its present level
of support, however, we believe Somali dissident
activities will remain at a low level. In addition, we
concur with the
that the insurgents pose no immediate threat to US
military personnel and installations in Somalia.
Although the dissidents have penetrated within 65
kilometers of the port at Berbera for sabotage
operations, both groups have eschewed attacking US
facilities so far. We believe this could change,
however, if the rebels came to believe the United
States was actively supporting Somali moves against
them.
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Ethiopia: Possible New
Maritime Facility
Construction has begun on what eventually could be a
shipyard on Ethiopia's Haleb Island, near the
southern end of the Red Sea. We believe that the
long-term project may also include a new port facility
intended to relieve congestion in the nearby crowded
port of Aseb, and-if it can accommodate oceangoing
vessels-that Soviet naval ships might use the facility
a new road and
causeway are being built to connect Haleb Island,
about 17 kilometers southeast of Aseb, with the
mainland. The island is undeveloped except for
several small structures, which are new since 1983
and whose purpose is not yet clear. When the road
reaches Haleb, it could be used to transport building
materials and support equipment for a major
Haleb Island is located along the eastern channel
entrance to Aseb and some 50 kilometers from the
Strait of Bab El Mandeb. It is fairly isolated from
settled areas. The island is surrounded by coral reefs
and shallow water. The coral reefs would require
either extensive blasting or the construction of a quay
wall to enable large ships to approach the facility. We
would also expect to see dredging and pile driving
activity before berthing facilities were constructed.
Berthing facilities such as piers and quays would be
needed before any ships, including naval craft, could
operate from Haleb. We would expect to see
construction of building ways, an outfitting area, and
a component storage area if the Haleb project is a
shipbuilding project. F__]
Purpose
We estimate that construction of a shipyard or a port
facility on Haleb Island would take a minimum of
three to five years, and projections of its final
configuration, or whether it is intended for military or
the Soviets are
sponsoring naval-related construction on Haleb
Island, and we believe there will be at least some
Soviet naval involvement.
According to an Ethiopian press report, the
Ethiopians signed a 6 million birr (2.9 million US
dollars) loan agreement with North Korea on
8 November in which the North Koreans agreed to
provide equipment and material for a shipyard on
Haleb. The Ethiopians may anticipate a need for
small coastal cargo crafts and lighters. They lack,
however, the skilled labor force and support industries
necessary to initiate and sustain a shipbuilding facility
without large-scale, sustained outside assistance.
The projected facility may also ultimately serve as a
port for the small, Soviet-assisted Ethiopian Navy and
could provide an out-of-the-way transshipment point
for delivery of Soviet military equipment to the
Ethiopian military forces. These deliveries currently
come almost exclusively through Aseb, where port
facilities are inadequate and open to Western
observers. According to US Embassy reporting,
Western aid donors have threatened to suspend
famine relief shipments through Aseb if Ethiopian
authorities do not expedite the flow of cargo through
the port, an indication of Aseb's chronic congestion.
Moving Ethiopian naval craft and some Soviet
military aid deliveries to Haleb would serve Ethiopian
commercial, relief, and security needs.
For their part, the Soviets do not appear to have a
pressing need for new facilities in the area. They 25X1
extensively use Ethiopia's Dahlak Island,
approximately 445 kilometers northwest of Aseb, for
crew rest, naval re airs and support of their Indian
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Secret
ALA AR 85-025
15 November 1985
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1-: Bedell " ~ "r '
Btu F'.suntd
Gof~. Aparo / ~
Ak'ardat
Bareritu
\: Gttmi r
Mersa
? Gulbub
Ag
, vim 6
' Aw3sa Gob
Dille , ' sa
16ABOUTt'
,Djibouti
Ethiopia
----- Loose surfaced, all-
weather road
Dry season road
or track
--- Railroad
0 50 100 150 Kilometers
0 50 100 150 Miles
YEMEN
(Aden)
'Gods pb
gadary repreaantation .
:not necesaari/y authontattvg.
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prepositioning naval fuel oil or water on Dahlak. They
also enjoy naval access to Aden, 200 kilometers east
of the Strait of Bab El Mandeb. Nevertheless, their
requirements could change, and in view of the possible
Soviet involvement on Haleb and the close
Moscow-Addis Ababa relationship, we believe the
Soviets would make use of future facilities on the
island.
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Angola: Oil Boom Amid
Economic Decayl
The costs of battling the UNITA insurgency probably
offset most of the economic benefits of the current oil
boom in Angola, in our judgment. Oil production,
which accounts for 90 percent of Angolan exports, has
roughly doubled since 1982 and is projected by
industry experts to double again by about 1990. Every
nonoil sector in the economy, however, is suffering
from the impact of fighting between the government
and the UNITA insurgents. We believe that Luanda
has used most of its foreign exchange windfall from
oil exports to make hard currency payments to the
USSR, Cuba, and other Communist military
suppliers and, consequently, has done little to alleviate
domestic hardships and spur investment. Even though
arms deliveries have declined this year, requirements
to service existing military debt will continue to drain
foreign exchange reserves. As a result, little economic
relief for hardpressed consumers can be expected
second to oil among Angola's exports. Management
and technical deficiencies since the Portuguese exodus
following Angola's independence in 1975 and UNITA
attacks have cut production sharply in both industries:
? Only about one-fourth of the area planted in coffee
when colonial rule ended is in full production,
according to a recent press statement by the
Angolan Vice Minister of Agriculture for Coffee.
Production totaled less than 25,000 tons in 1984-
only about 10 percent of preindependence output-
and is estimated by the Angolan Minister of
Industry to have declined by an additional one-third
this year,
through 1986, in our judgment
The Oil Boom
Oil production currently totals almost 250,000 b/d,
according to press accounts. Western oil companies
are expanding investment in exploration and
development of offshore oilfields, and Luanda has set
a production target of 500,000 b/d by 1987. The
government's optimistic target jibes roughly with
press accounts of estimates by private foreign
petroleum corporations, which project output of about
550,000 b/d by 1990.F--]
We believe that Angola's prospective volume
increases in oil production over the next several years
will more than compensate for any income losses from
market-induced cuts in oil prices. Any downturn in
world oil sales probably would not significantly affect
demand for high-quality Angolan "light" crude oil,
which is exported mainly to US east coast markets.
Prospects appear to be good, therefore, for significant
increases in foreign exchange earnings from oil
exports over the next few years.
Although rising oil exports have more than
compensated for the loss of foreign exchange earnings
caused by the decline of the coffee and diamond
industries, new employment opportunities in oil
production have fallen far short of the number lost on
coffee plantations and diamond mines. Employment
in coffee and diamond production has fallen from
more than 325,000 workers before independence to
about 50,000 to 60,000 currently, according to press
Declining Nonoil Exports
In contrast, prospects are poor for any increases in
exports of coffee and diamonds, which rank a distant
Secret
ALA AR 85-025
15 November 1985
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Angola: Export Earnings
1974 - 1984
MIWONS OF U.S. DOLLARS
3000
*Data reflect average
price of South African
diamonds
reports. In contrast, the oil industry employs only a
few thousand workers, and many of these are
expatriate technicians and managers.F__1
Economic Shortages
Production of corn and cassava, the main food staples
in Angola, has dropped sharply as a result of the loss
of the Portuguese-run transportation and marketing
systems that provided ready distribution channels for
output by small farmers. In addition, more than
200,000 people have been driven from central and
southern food-producing regions by the fighting,
according to Red Cross data. These problems have
forced Angola, which had exported corn and cassava
before independence, to devote up to one-fourth of its
export earnings to food imports. Severe food
shortages, nonetheless, are widespread in both urban
and rural areas, according to press reports
The economy-wide shortages of imported parts and
raw materials, electric power outages, transportation
interruptions, deficiencies in technical and managerial
expertise, and the loss of purchasing power in local
markets have severely depressed manufacturing
output. Sketchy reporting in the press indicates that
few factories are operating at more than about 40
percent of capacity. Food-processing plants, which
normally account for about one-third of
manufacturing output, have suffered from difficulties
in acquiring supplies because of transport problems
and foreign exchange shortages. Shortages of
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imported raw materials may force the important
textile enterprise in Luanda, ENTEX, to close down
before the end of the year, according to reporting in
the city's major daily and official regime mouthpiece,
Jornal de Angola. Angola's only tire factory is still in
operation but has been forced to shut down for several
days on repeated occasions this year because of
frequent loss of electric power
industry and agriculture were paralyzed and that
the exchange of goods between the countryside and
urban centers had virtually collapsed.
supplies and equipment and added that most
hospitals suffer from neglect in maintenance.
Luanda is experiencing increased
shortages of food, signs of malnutrition, and a
dramatic fall in the standard of living.
shortages of medical
widespread hunger, particularly
1985-according to our estimates.
Angola also pays hard currency for Cuban combat
forces that supplement the Angolan Army in defense
of fixed positions. Payments to Communist countries
currently total as much as $1 billion annually-
almost one-half of total export earnings in 1984 and
support.
The Communist Arms Drain
Payments to Communist suppliers significantly
reduce Luanda's ability to alleviate economic
shortages, in our judgment. We believe that Angola
pays in hard currency for most of its military
assistance, including weapons, foreign personnel, and
Government Measures "
Public statements by government leaders indicate
growing concern about the dismal performance of the
economy. Economic problems, for example, were a
major theme at the ruling party's first national
conference in January 1985. Two newly created
commissions were instructed to present reports at the
party congress next month on ways to improve the
economy's performance. speculate
that the congress will call for increased reliance on
private enterprise to supplement operations by large
state enterprises.
The regime is seeking Western economic help. Angola
signed the Lome Convention in April 1985, opening
the possibility of EC credits and aid. It signed an
agreement with France in January 1985 for aid to
help restore coffee production. Angola also has called
on Western firms-particularly the oil companies-
for help on a variety of economic projects, such as
road repairs, hotel construction, and agricultural
Prospects
Prospects for increased Western investment outside of
oil production, however, are poor because of the civil
war and the aversion of potential investors to Angola's
little change in the planned economy is apparent.
UNITA leader Savimbi's public threat earlier this
year not to release foreign technicians and workers
captured by UNITA in Angola has dampened the
already marginal enthusiasm of Western firms for
further investment,
. UNI s recently announced intention
to target Angola's petroleum industry also
undermines prospects for Western investment.
Prospects for achieving an economic turnaround in
1986, therefore, are poor, in our judgment, despite the
probability of significant increases in oil production.
Major problems such as food shortages, disrupted
transport, electric power interruptions, and below-
capacity manufacturing will continue.
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Angola
Zambia
aft
Botswana
-~. Trans-Na/nh
South
Africa
eoanddty ratiraaal5tattnn la
not ttaddaearity a.thdrttalwo
Economic Activity
r#j Diamond mine id Tourism
Copper-nickel
mine and mill Beet processing
Coal mine Cattle corn,
Coal resources sorghum
Soda ash deposit Cattle
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Botswana: Diamonds,
Diversification, and
Economic Growth
If it were not for the downturn last year in the
international diamond market and a leveling off of
diamond output, Botswana's economy might have
maintained its impressive 11-percent average growth
toted up annually since 1965. As it was, the country's
economy recorded a 2-percent growth in 1984,
The economy probably will
continue to expand at this slow rate over the next few
years because of the weak diamond market.F_~
In addition to the rapid expansion in diamond mining
over the past 15 years, Botswana's growth has been
helped by sound economic management. The
government's conservative policy of building up
foreign exchange reserves in good years as a hedge
against bad years has kept the level of foreign debt
low and allowed stable growth.
Diamonds
Botswana ranks as one of the largest diamond
producers in the world. A succession of mining
projects rapidly increased Botswana's production,
beginning with the Orapa mine in 1970. The opening
of the rich Jwaneng mine in 1982 more than doubled
the country's total diamond output. Diamonds now
account for about 70 percent of Botswana's foreign
exchange earnings, 30 percent of its GDP, and 40
percent of government revenues. De Beers Botswana
Mining Company, in which South Africa's De Beers
Consolidated Mines and the government each hold a
50-percent interest, now operates all of Botswana's
diamond mines-at Jwaneng, Orapa, and
Letlhakane-and the diamonds are marketed by the
De Beers-controlled cartel, the Central Selling
Organization in London. F__1
The decline in growth during 1984 was due largely to
a slowdown in the expansion of output from the
Jwaneng diamond mine as it reached its full
productive capacity. The current low diamond prices
preclude the development of new diamond mining
projects and we expect stagnating production will
keep growth to more modest levels over the next few
years. F_~
Unsuccessful Diversification Efforts
Gaborone has tried to diversify the economy to reduce
dependence on diamonds, but its efforts thus far have
been largely ineffective. Two devaluations of the
Botswana pula in 1984 totaling about 20 percent were
designed in part to promote import substitution and
encourage exports in agriculture, mining, and 25X1
manufacturing, including items such as food, clothing,
beef, copper, nickel, and vaccines. The government 25X1
also has offered incentive packages to attract foreign
investment.) 25X1
Areas of the economy other than mining have been
depressed. Some growth in manufacturing has
occurred as a result of government promotion
schemes, but the sector, consisting of light
manufacturing-paints, chemicals, matches,
furniture, and pharmaceuticals remains very small
with little prospect of expansion. Agriculture and
livestock, the main economic activity of about 70
percent of the population, have been affected
adversely by the persistent drought. Grain production
remains low, equivalent to about 10 percent of
domestic requirements, while the livestock population
has been depleted. F__1
Dependence on South Africa
Botswana's economic well-being is highly reliant on
South Africa. Eighty to 90 percent of all imports
come either from or through South Africa, including
all of the country's oil, most of its food needs, and
almost all of the machinery and vehicles needed as
production inputs. About 25 percent of Botswana's
exports depend on South African rail and port
facilities to get to their overseas markets. Gem quality 25X1
diamonds are shipped by air to London. Jobs in South
African mines represent 15 percent of the country's
formal sector employment.
The financial connection with South Africa is also
important. Receipts from the Southern African
Secret
ALA AR 85-025
15 November 1985
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Botswana: Economic Indicators
Composition of Exports
Percent
Real GDP Growth
1978-84
PERCENT
0
20-
15
15-
10
10-
5
5-
0-
0 'I9 80 .6 .9~ 6
Inflation Rate
Inflation
1979-84
Balance Of Payments
1978-84
0
-501
-100
Secret 14
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Secret
Customs Union ' account for 20 percent of Botswana's
total government revenue. South Africa is the major
source of capital and investment, and South African
companies dominate Botswana mining and
manufacturing. F_~
The instability of the South African rand, to which
the Botswana pula is linked has led Gaborone to
consider severing the connection. If the pula is
allowed to fall with the rand against the major
currencies, the prices of imported goods not wholly
produced in the Southern African Customs Union
area could rise enormously. Oil purchased by South
Africa for refining and reexport to Botswana would be
particularly vulnerable to sharp price rises.
On the other hand, since the pula is not in itself a
weak currency, the government could delink it from
the rand and let it remain stable against the major
currencies. Delinkage, however, would undermine the
small businesses trying to compete with South
African goods within the Customs Union area, its
major market. The effect would be to make Botswana
goods more expensive than rand-valued products and
thwart the development goal of diversifying the
economy through import substitution. If Gaborone
were to leave the Customs Union and protect local
industry, it would face a loss in customs receipts that
could not be replaced by local duties because of the
favorable division of receipts offered by South Africa.
It would also lose any chance of exporting to the
South African market.)
Outlook
The prospects for expanding nonmining areas of the
economy are bleak. Stagnating diamond production
and higher import costs probably will force Gaborone
to depend more on foreign borrowing to fund social
services and diversification projects. Nevertheless, we
expect Gaborone to maintain cautious fiscal policies.
Economic planners forecast an increase in debt of
$85 million over the next six years and a rise in debt
' Southern African Customs Union-made up of South Africa,
Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland-allows for a duty-free flow of
goods among member countries. The Union also has a common
policy on tariffs and other duties on goods imported into the area.
The import duties are collected by South Africa and placed in a
common customs pool. These funds are then distributed to the
members according to a fixed percentage.F__1
service from 5 percent to 10 percent. We believe
Gaborone will maintain its currency link to the South
African rand, despite a fall in the rand's value, as a
means of promoting diversification and import
substitution goals. Meanwhile, a likely increase in
unemployment and a shortage of imports will lower
the current standard of living. F___]
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Mali: Search for Military
Aid
In recent months Malian President Traore has been
unable to secure Western military aid that would help
him gradually replace unsatisfactory Soviet
equipment, according to US officials in the field.
Traore's moves to diversify his military supplies
apparently are opposed by some members of the
7,500-man Army, who are closely linked to the Soviet
military pipeline to Mali. We see little chance that
Mali will be able to make a dramatic break with the
Soviets unless alternative aid sources become
available)
After a review this spring revealed that much Soviet
equipment was unusable and unneeded, Traore began
to question Mali's long dependence on Soviet supplies
and training.
the Soviet Union
provided $138 million in military equipment,
including T-34 tanks, six MIG-21 and 21 MIG-17
fighter aircraft, and MI-8 helicopters.
Mali would continue a Soviet
military training program, but E] would seek new
sources of equipment to replace the present arsenal
gradually
Military aid from the West has fallen far short of
Mali's requests. The US Embassy reports that F
J making it a distant secon tot e U R which
has 55 military and 500 economic advisers in Mali.
(South Korea is prepared to provide
equipment and technical assistance to Mali-in part
as a gift, with the rest for purchase under very
generous terms
an agreement was
reached in early October, marking the first
breakthrough in Traore's search.
Disappointment over the West's response has not yet
made Mali more receptive to new Soviet
entanglements.
The Soviets would provide 61 military advisers and
technicians in 1985, a reduction of 11 from 1984,
from the Malians
an adviser to the Chief of Staff after strong opposition
Despite these setbacks, the Soviets have continued to
seek an active role in the Malian military and among
student groups. With construction of a military
airfield at Gao with a 3,000-meter runway nearly
completed, the Soviets are now making plans for a
field near Segou,
US officials indicate t at the Malians have no use for
such airstrips, and the Soviets, although currently
denied landing rights, may hope to use the fields to
transport arms and supplies to southern Africa or
even Latin America. In addition to providing military
training, Soviet universities have long been attended
by Malian students, particularly to study in technical
fields.
The Soviets have long sought an
independent Mali/USSR Friendship Society,
according to the US Embassy.
Soviet Union in 1986, and
occasion to push for the Friendship Society
Secret
ALA AR 85-025
15 November 1985
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Africa
Briefs
New Tanzanian President Mwinyi has appointed former Minister of Justice and
Attorney General Joseph Warioba as the country's Prime Minister and first Vice
President. Warioba is part of the "Butiama Mafia," a small group of trusted
confidants who all hail from former President Nyerere's native Musoma region.
His appointment, made only hours after Mwinyi's formal inauguration on 5 25X6
November, suggests that Nyerere will have a substantial measure of control over
the Mwinyi government. US Embassy reporting indicates that Warioba is
intelligent, pragmatic, and well-disposed toward the United States. 25X6
. We believe his selection will disappoint those
who had hoped for a dynamic leader able to reverse Tanzania's disastrous
economic slide, although his appointment may ease tensions among Musoma
military officers whose plans for a coup were disrupted before Mwinyi's election.
25X6
Mauritians go to the polls next month to vote in municipal elections, the first test
of popular sentiment since the general elections in 1983. Prime Minister
Jugnauth's moderate three-party governing coalition-the Alliance-and two
opposition parties, the Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM) and the Mauritian
Labor Party (MLP), are fielding candidates for mayor and council members in the
five urban municipalities. The Marxist-oriented MMM has controlled the cities
since the last municipal elections in 1982. According to the US Embassy, party
leaders view the elections as a popular referendum both on Jugnauth's political
record and on the MMM administration of the urban centers.)
The Alliance campaign has emphasized government efforts to improve the
economy and create job opportunities as contrasted with the MMM's poor city
planning and failure to reduce urban crime, drug use, and pollution. The MMM
has concentrated on Mauritius's increasing foreign debt, growing rural
unemployment, and other national issues. The elections are likely to be close, but
the outcome will depend on whether the pro-West, predominantely Hindu MLP
attracts a significant number of voters away from the Alliance in the urban Hindu
constituencies that in the past have supported the government. Regardless of the
outcome, municipal authority will be limited by the federal government's control
over the city budgets. In our view, the vigorously contested elections will reaffirm
Mauritius's strong democratic tradition since independence from the United
Kingdom in 1968.
Secret
ALA AR 85-025
15 November 1985
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Secret
President Pereira, Cape Verde's only leader since independence in 1975-will be
reelected to another five-year term by the National Assembly, after its 83 deputies
are chosen in general elections earlier the same day. Although the 61-year-old
Pereira probably will make several ministerial and senior level changes, no
significant change in his nonaligned foreign policy is likely.
Although initially associated with West Africa's other leftist leaders, Pereira
purged his Cabinet of pro-Soviet radicals in 1981 and since has pursued a more
pragmatic foreign policy, according to the US Embassy. Despite Cape Verde's
dependence on the Soviet Union for military aid, it has turned to the West for
economic and humanitarian assistance, particularly because of chronic drought.
The country's needs have enabled Pereira to balance factions within the
government that would like to move the country permanently into the East or West
bloc.
According to the US Embassy, Pereira has sought to establish himself as a
statesman and to expand his role in international and regional forums. In recent
years, the President has helped to arrange talks between Angola and South Africa
brokered by the United States, and has become the spokesman for the Lusophone
countries on foreign policy matters. Although Pereira allows South Africa aircraft
landing rights in Cape Verde-primarily for financial reasons-he has joined with
other African leaders in openly denouncing apartheid.F_~
In our judgment, Pereira's position is secure, despite his inability to reverse Cape
Verde's economic decline. The President enjoys the support of the country's 2,200-
man Army and the steady emigration of disgruntled Cape Verdeans has provided
an important safety valve. Pereira's considerable domestic prestige has kept in
check the influence of remaining radicals. Pereira's sudden demise, however,
would leave the country vulnerable to a power struggle and external meddling.
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