AFRICA REVIEW SPECIAL ISSUE: INSURGENCIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000100430001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 4, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Africa Review
Special Issue: Insurgencies in Sub-Saharan
Africa F I
ALA AR 85-022
4 October 1985
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Africa Review
4 October 1985
Special Issue: Insurgencies in Sub-Saharan
Africa
This issue explores several key active insurgencies in Sub-Saharan
Africa and assesses their prospects. In view of the area's regional,
ethnic, and religious cleavages, its severe economic inequities, and
the fragilities of many of the area's governments, we foresee long
struggles between weak governments and insurgent challengers,
with continued appeals from all sides for external help. F__1
Angola: New Challenges for UNITA
The government-helped by increased use of Soviet-supplied
aircraft and closer advisory support from the Soviets and Cubans-
has demonstrated significantly improved military performance in
this year's dry-season offensive against UNITA. The insurgents
probably will have to adjust their strategy, perhaps reverting to
more classic guerrilla tactics. F_~
could call on the Soviets to increase their military support.
Prospects for a negotiated settlement between the Machel regime
and the antigoverment Mozambique National Resistance
(RENAMO) appear to be dim. The insurgents lack the military
resources and urban support to threaten the regime's presence in the
cities, and they have yet to form a coherent political program for
reform. If the survival of the regime is threatened, the government
Secret
ALA AR 85-022
4 October 1985
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Ethiopia: The Northern Insurgencies
Addis Ababa has been unable to defeat the well-organized and
determined insurgencies in the northern Provinces of Eritrea and
Tigray, despite large commitments of men, material, and money
over the years and extensive Soviet military assistance to the
Ethiopian armed forces. The insurgent leaders apparently believe
that prolonged fighting will eventually lead to the collapse or
disintegration of the Army.F_~
The African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress
are unlikely to become military threats to the government in the
foreseeable future. Pretoria's military and economic prowess has
discouraged neighboring black states from openly supporting the
guerrillas, and its pervasive security apparatus has prevented both
groups from establishing effective support networks inside South
Africa.
Uganda: Rebels Hold the High Cards
The effective and disciplined National Resistance Army, led by
former Defense Minister Museveni, is on the verge of attaining at
least a share of political power in Kampala. Such an outcome,
nonetheless, is unlikely to bring peace and stability to Uganda.
Chad: Insurgency in the South
Antigovernment rebels in the south are militarily weak and are not a
direct threat to President Habre's regime, but they drain the
government's military resources needed to counter Libyan and
dissident forces in the north, disrupt the economy, and undermine
the President's national reconciliation efforts.)
Zaire: Growing Rebel Activity
Dissident activity has increased in the past year in eastern Zaire.
Although not a direct threat to the Mobutu regime at this time, the
rebel attacks have embarrassed the government, forced it to expend
scarce resources on military operations, and slowed economic
activity in the area.
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Central African Republic:
Nascent Insurgency in the North
An attack last November by northern tribesmen on a government
garrison near the Chadian border signaled the beginning of a low-
level insurgency by rebels resentful of the southern-dominated
central government. F_~
The South-West Africa Peoples's Organization is recognized by the
Organization of African Unity and the United Nations as the sole
representative of the Namibian people. It probably has the support
of most black Namibians, but continued military setbacks at the
hands of South Africa and a trend toward political radicalism have
led to serious morale problems.
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief
Production Staff Office of African and Latin American Analysis
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Insurgency-broadly defined here as organized,
sustained, violent, internal opposition, usually rural
based, to established governments-is a widely
employed means for contesting and attaining political
power in Sub-Saharan Africa. This issue of Africa
Review explores several key active insurgencies and
assesses their prospects.
In contrast to Soviet aid to counterinsurgency
campaigns, Libyan involvement south of the Sahara
currently focuses on the side of insurgencies-in
southern Chad and Zaire, for example. If it suits
Qadhafi's purpose, however, Libya could weigh in on
the side of Sudan's new government or a successor
northern regime dominated by Muslims against
southern Sudanese insurgents. F__1
African insurgencies were instrumental in some
independence struggles against European rule-in
Kenya and in the former Portuguese colonies of
Angola and Mozambique, for example-and in
ending the white minority regime in Zimbabwe.
Insurgencies today, however, are no longer associated
almost exclusively with independence, black majority
struggles, and radical ideologies. Insurgencies at the
heart of regional turmoil in Angola, Mozambique,
and Ethiopia are themselves directed against radical
Marxist black regimes. F_~
Those insurgencies are stalemated, unable to bring
down or alter the Soviet-backed governments they
oppose, but capable of reverting to flexible querrilla-
style tactics and retreating into the countryside or
foreign sanctuary whenever the conventional army
goes on the offensive. As a result of the standoffs and
their clients' need for long-term, intensified
counterinsurgency help, the Soviets are able to
entrench themselves more firmly with the beleaguered
regimes. F_~
In southern Africa, the insurgencies that seek to end
white minority rule in South Africa and Namibia-
ANC, PAC, SWAPO-lack the effective support of
neighboring black states, which must deal with
insurgents at their own doorstep.
Uganda offers an example of an insurgency that
appears to be on the verge of winning a share in
government. This success, should it be achieved,
would prove illusory, we believe, because it would lead
to full-scale north-south civil war and another cycle of
instability and appeals for outside intervention.
Several factors ensure that insurgencies will play a
prominent part in African politics for the foreseeable
future:
? Regional, ethnic, and religious cleavages within and
between countries.
? Severe economic dislocations and inequities.
? The fragility of many African governments.
? The vulnerability of many of those governments to
externally supported challenges.
In these circumstances, the prospects are for long,
draining seesaw struggles between weak governments
and insurgent challengers in several parts of Sub-
Saharan Africa, with continued appeals from all sides
for external help. F__1
Secret
ALA AR 85-022
4 October 1985
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*- + Railroad Road
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Angola:
New Challenges for UNITA
Angola's civil war has dragged on for 10 years with no
end in sight. Until recently, South African-supported
UNITA insurgents enjoyed the initiative as the dos
Santos regime retained control of the urban centers
but was unable to counter UNITA advances in the
countryside. However, this year's dry-season offensive
demonstrated significantly improved government
military performance-buttressed by increased use of
Soviet-supplied aircraft and closer advisory support
from the Soviets and Cubans. UNITA has suffered its
first significant military reverse since beginning a
push in 1982 to expand operations and to secure more
territory.
The regime has received a welcome morale boost and,
no matter how temporary present gains may be,
probably believes it can repeat its performance in next
year's dry-season offensive. UNITA probably will
have to adjust its strategy, perhaps reverting to more
classic guerrilla tactics. For both UNITA and the
Angolan Government, the importance and direct role
of their main foreign backers-the USSR and South
Africa-seem likely to increase.
A Different Offensive This Year
The military objectives of this year's offensive were
roughly the same as those last year, only this time
government forces captured Cazombo-held by
UNITA since late 1983-and nearly took Mavinga
until driven back by South African airstrikes.
Cazombo is important to UNITA because it gave
control to the insurgents of a small portion of the
border with Zaire and served as a support base for
northern operations. Mavinga is important because it
was the first town of any size to be captured and was
the site of the 1982 UNITA Party Congress as well as
a way station on UNITA's supply line to the north. It
is unclear whether the government plans to hold the
ground it has regained or pull back to its original
position with the onset of the rainy season that
traditionally has given UNITA a seasonal edge.
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Luanda's Strategy
Luanda is pursuing a 25X1
combined military-political strategy that it hopes will
ultimately defeat the insurgents in a protracted
conflict. In addition to improving the military's
performance, Luanda seeks to revitalize the party and
reform the government administration to win the
"heart and minds" of the population. We believe the
military's improved performance during the recent
offensive probably will encourage the government to
move ahead with some overdue reforms during a
scheduled party congress in December. 25X1
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The government has long refused to enter into a
negotiated power-sharing arrangement with UNITA;
such an alternative is considered only by a 25X1
small minority, generally when the government has
been under extreme military pressure from UNITA.
The hostility between the governing Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and
UNITA is reinforced by ethnic and racial differences,
and by Luanda's fear of UNITA commander Jonas
Savimbi's leadership qualities and considerable 25X1
charisma, both markedly stronger than that of
President dos Santos. The government's approach to
reconciliation is usually limited to offers of amnesty
for UNITA's rank and file but not for its leadership.
Growing Government Strength
The government has an armed strength of roughly
100,000 men in the regular Army and other security
forces plus another 50,000 or more auxiliaries. There
are some 1,200 Soviet advisers. In addition, there is a
35,000-man Cuban military contingent, including
some 27,000 combat troops, that backs the Angolan
Army, guards rear bases, provides essential support
services, and frees an equivalent number of Angolan
troops for field operations.
Secret
ALA AR 85-022
4 October 1985
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The recent improvement in the Angolan armed forces
represents the culmination of the large Soviet military
deliveries that began in August 1983 when UNITA
took the town of Cangamba, a loss that shocked
Luanda and catalyzed its Soviet backers. In addition
to defending well-prepared base areas, the Angolan
Army has now shown that it can penetrate UNITA-
held territory, meet and overcome UNITA
conventional forces in a standing battle, and take
positions defended by the insurgents. F_~
Angola's better performance is the result of
improvements in training and organization as well as
more extensive Soviet assistance in planning and
directing combat operations. Moreover, the
government is now exploiting its advantage in
weapons more effectively. Soviet aircraft delivered in
1984 reached the field in significant numbers only in
mid-1985 and in
the offensive this year, Luanda made extensive
sustained use of tactical air support. Substantial
Soviet arms deliveries have provided the Angolan
Army with the full range of conventional weapons,
including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and
artillery in contrast to the lightly armed insurgents,
who have only small arms and other light infantry
weapons.
The government holds most of the conventional
military advantages. It has a better than two-to-one
advantage in manpower and, although many troops
are tied down in defense of fixed positions, Soviet and
Cuban-flown transport aircraft allow fairly rapid
redeployment and concentration of forces throughout
the country. UNITA's troops, in contrast, move
primarily on foot, and redeployment for them is
normally a matter of weeks or months.F-7
25,000 fully armed and trained regular forces
organized in battalions, most of whom are deployed in
UNITA-held territory. In addition, there reportedly
are 30,000 to 35,000 other guerrillas operating in
smaller units throughout the country, many of whom
are ill armed and ill equipped. In the past, UNITA
has had the advantage in quality of manpower,
although this edge may be narrowing as government
forces improve their military skills.
Until the recent government offensive, UNITA has
held the southeastern quadrant of the country, which
it defends with regular forces and administers with a
rudimentary but apparently effective civil
administration. UNITA-held territory, although
sparsely populated and economically unimportant, is
significant to UNITA primarily as a sanctuary and
support base for supply lines to guerrillas elsewhere in
the country. The territory also abuts South
African-controlled Namibia, affording the otherwise
geographically isolated insurgents easy access to
outside support and the protection of South African
military forces.
UNITA conducts guerrilla operations throughout
most of the remainder of the country but is strongest
in the well-populated central highlands centered on
Huambo, which is inhabited mainly by the
Ovimbundu ethnic group from which UNITA draws
its primary support. In the last two years, UNITA has
pushed its guerrillas into northern Angola to increase
both the military challenge to Luanda and to garner
support among Angola's other main ethnic groups.
UNITA has succeeded in maintaining operations in
this region despite difficulties in supplying these
extended forces.
Outlook
The recent government offensive has disabused
Savimbi of the idea, expressed frequently earlier this
year, that he can achieve a quick win by increasing
military pressure on the government and forcing
Luanda to the bargaining table. UNITA will have to
face the prospect of improving government military
performance, the more active use of government
superiority in airpower and firepower, and the
difficulties of supporting extended guerrilla
operations.F_~
Savimbi probably will have to adjust his tactics and
strategy, a move we believe he is capable of making.
The insurgents may have to cut back on
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semiconventional operations in favor of more purely
guerrilla tactics. Moreover, the insurgents may
conclude that it is better to give ground than to
challenge government forces in fixed battles.
Although Savimbi for the present may have been
knocked off stride, he is far from beaten, and we do
not believe he will pull back from operations in
northern Angola or elsewhere in the country with the
approach of the rainy season in late October. The
necessity of challenging the government throughout
the country, distracting Luanda from concentrating
on his base area, and expanding his area of support
and recruitment probably will compel Savimbi to try
to keep up the pressure. Savimbi may even increase
bombings in cities and redouble his efforts to knock
out Angola's oil facilities in Cabinda and in northern
coastal regions to cut Luanda's only reliable source of
foreign exchange. F-~
For both UNITA and the government, the
importance and role of their main outside backers
seems likely to increase. Savimbi probably will seek
improved antitank and antiaircraft weapons to
compensate for government superiority. South
African aircraft intervened at least once on behalf of
Savimbi's forces last month, and Pretoria may feel
compelled to commit additional forces to defend
UNITA's sanctuary and its headquarters at Jamba.
The threat of greater South African involvement
could prompt new Soviet weapons deliveries and more
direct Soviet and Cuban involvement in Angolan air
and ground operations.F-~
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Mozambique:
Evolution of an Insurgency
After 10 years of independence, President Machel's
self-proclaimed Marxist regime faces the combined
challenge of a widespread insurgency, a faltering
economy, and a lingering drought. The
antigovernment Mozambique National Resistance
(RENAMO), which claims to be pro-Western,
numbers between 12,000 and 15,000 guerrillas. They
have expanded their military activity in the past year
to all 10 provinces of Mozambique, but they still lack
a coherent political program for reform. RENAMO
has nearly twice as many guerrillas, is active in more
than double the territory, and is opposed by
substantially fewer government troops than was the
case when the now-ruling Front for the Liberation of
Mozambique (FRELIMO) was at its peak during the
preindependence struggle against Portugal. F__1
Prospects for a negotiated solution appear to be dim.
The insurgents lack the military resources and urban
support to threaten the regime's presence in the cities,
but they retain the tactical advantage in the
countryside, where their support appears to be
growing. The Mozambique Armed Forces-which
need more troops, material, and training-are being
assisted by some 8,000 to 9,000 Zimbabwean troops.
A recent joint Mozambican-Zimbabwean offensive
appears to have temporarily disrupted RENAMO,
but it probably will not result in any long-term gains.
RENAMO is expected to resume the initiative once
the rainy season commences in November, and any
series of spectacular government military setbacks
could spark a coup in Maputo or a rapid collapse of
FRELIMO's will to fight. Should the guerrillas
appear to threaten the survival of the Machel regime,
the USSR could increase its military support
substantially and thus deny an insurgent victory.
RENAMO'S Origins and Growth
Shortly after Mozambique became independent in
1975, disparate anti-FRELIMO elements joined
together-with the encouragement of Rhodesia's
white-ruled government-to form what later became
RENAMO. Included were conservative whites who
had fled black-ruled Mozambique, blacks from small
political parties that refused absorption into
FRELIMO, disenchanted FRELIMO officials,
colonial Army veterans, secret police agents, and
some tribal leaders. Several academic sources report
that Rhodesian intelligence officials used RENAMO
in the late 1970s to conduct sabotage and
reconnaissance operations against Mozambican-based
guerrillas of Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African
National Union, which was fighting the white-ruled
regime in Rhodesia. F_~
When Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, South
Africa took over sponsorship of RENAMO to
discourage Maputo from tolerating the presence of
anti-South African guerrillas in Mozambique.
Operating from sanctuaries in South Africa and
Malawi with a nucleus of a few hundred guerrillas,
RENAMO rapidly gained adherents among
disaffected rural dwellers, and it expanded operations
to nine Mozambican provinces by early 1983 and to
distant Cabo Delgado Province last year. F__1
capital last month.
Military Performance
RENAMO today holds the tactical advantage
throughout rural Mozambique, although, in our
judgment, it probably cannot defeat the Mozambican
Army decisively and has yet to mount a significant
attack against any major government urban garrison.
Activity is heaviest in the central and northwestern
provinces, where the guerrillas are hitting roads and
rail lines, other economic facilities, and government
forces. In the south, RENAMO seeks to isolate
Maputo and gain maximum publicity from incidents
such as the explosion of a munitions dump in the
Political Liabilities
In our view, the scope of its activities suggests that
RENAMO is overcoming its unsavory origins as a
Secret
ALA AR 85-022
4 October 1985
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Expansion of RENAMO Operations, January 1981-August 1985"
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Cibore Besse Dam
August 1985
1 April 1983
January 1981
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Province boundary
Railroad
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creation of Rhodesia and South Africa and may enjoy
a slightly wider rural following. Even so, the
organization still suffers from a narrow tribal base,
lack of urban appeal, and an incoherent political
program. F__1
Tribal Base. Since beginning operations near the
then-Rhodesian border, RENAMO has recruited
heavily among the rural dwelling Shona-speaking
tribes of central Mozambique. Insurgent recruiters
were effective in pointing out that FRELIMO is
dominated by southern Shanganas and mixed-race
city dwellers, and many Shona-speakers volunteered
to join the guerrillas.
Although tribal appeals fueled RENAMO's early
growth, we believe that the group's image of being
dominated by Shona speakers hinders its expansion
beyond the central region. Tribal divisions also proved
a barrier to FRELIMO in the 1960s when it tried to
organize among the Maconde in northern Cabo
Delgado Province but was resisted by the rival Macua
farther south. In our judgment, the independent
Maconde probably resist both RENAMO and the
government today. In the south, the Shanganas are
more likely to support FRELIMO because they are
well represented in FRELIMO's senior ranks, and
because RENAMO's Shona speakers are traditional
rivals.
Rural Appeal. RENAMO realizes that it needs to
broaden its base of support if it is to evolve into a
national movement. The guerrillas, however, appeal
primarily to rural dwellers, who harbor a long list of
grievances against FRELIMO. The complaints stem
from the collapse of the economy at independence in
1975. FRELIMO made matters worse for rural
peasants by adopting plans for a rapid transition to a
socialist economy. The government not only converted
plantations and private farms into Soviet-style state
farms, but also imposed collectivization of agriculture
and tried to replace tribal leaders and customs with
Marxist officials and social values.)
Structural Weakness. Despite its impressive military
expansion and apparent growing support in the rural
areas, RENAMO still lacks a grassroots political
structure and a well-defined ideology. The insurgents
are heavily reliant on sympathetic tribal leaders to
organize recruitment and local support, according to
US Embassy reporting. They have failed to establish
the modern political organization that we believe is
needed to gain support beyond the central provinces.
RENAMO's political pronouncements are little more
than simplistic slogans in support of anti-
Communism, democracy, and a free market economy.
divisions.
guerrilla fighters are loyal to RENAMO Commander
in Chief Alfonso Jacama, who is a fellow Shona
speaker from the central provinces, but that they are
suspicious of the group's political wing led by Evo
Fernandes, a Mozambican of partial Indian descent
Mozambican Strategies
Maputo's boldest step to try to end the RENAMO
threat was to sign the Nkomati Accord in March
1984 with South Africa. The accord bound both sides
to deny military aid and encouragement to each
others' opposition movements. Machel appears bitter
that RENAMO activities have actually increased
significantly since the accord was signed, and many in
his government suspect that South African material
support for RENAMO never stopped, a belief
reinforced by South Africa's recent admission of
technical treaty violations. Nevertheless, Embassy
reporting suggests that Machel does not seem ready to
repudiate Nkomati and invite renewed confrontation
with Pretoria.
On the economic front, the Machel regime is realizing
that unproductive socialist programs have increased
support for the insurgents, and it belatedly has begun
to revise its strategy. In recent years, Maputo has
closed or turned over to the private sector most of the
state-owned businesses, deemphasized the collective
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Reported RENAMO Incidents, January-August 19858
RENAMO incident
"Not all incidents are plotted
-location unknown.
Powerline
Railroad
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Province boundary
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farms, and in 1983 announced a new emphasis on
peasant agriculture and small-scale development
projects. Alternating droughts and floods during the
past four years and RENAMO's attacks on vital
transporation routes, however, have prevented overall
economic recovery.
Militarily, Maputo is becoming increasingly
dependent on the presence of some 8,000 to 9,000
Zimbabwean troops to help contain RENAMO.
Described by some Western military attaches as one
of the worst armies in Africa, Mozambique's 35,000-
man regular military forces are ill trained and
critically short of troops and material. Their 4-to-1
manpower advantage over the guerrillas is
inadequate, according to most authorities on
counterinsurgency, and the ratio probably is declining
because of a high rate of desertion and draft
avoidance, and RENAMO's continuing growth.
Moreover, the Army has not been able to compensate
for its insufficient manpower with superior
equipment. Much of the nearly $1 billion in military
equipment provided by the Soviet Bloc-FRELIMO's
principal supplier-is not only inappropriate for
fighting guerrillas but also beyond the capability of
the Mozambicans to operate and maintain. F__-]
expansion is likely to be slow in the south.
Mozambican Army units are concentrated near
Maputo, and the civilian populace in the south is
likely to resist RENAMO. The Army may put up
greater resistance as it withdraws from many rural
areas and concentrates around the cities, key
transportation arteries, and a few other economically
important areas. Moreover, increased RENAMO
activity in the coming weeks could delay Zimbabwe's
plans to withdraw some of its forces from
Mozambique. Spectacular government setbacks could
spark a coup or a rapid collapse of FRELIMO's will
to fight. If the guerrillas threaten the survival of the
regime, the Soviets probably would increase their
military support substantially in an attempt to deny
an insurgent victory.
Machel is capable of bold initiatives and might follow
up on the government's recent military offensive by
offering unconditional talks with the guerrillas. He
probably would refuse to talk with RENAMO's
externally based political representatives, whom he
condemns as "neocolonials" interested only in
recovering property that they lost at independence.
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The Army is increasingly reluctant to fight on its own,
and its options against RENAMO are limited. With
RENAMO active throughout the countryside, a
strategy of containment is not feasible.
The joint offensive by Mozambican and Zimbabwean
forces in August has temporarily disrupted
RENAMO, according to US Embassy reporting, but
Maputo did not score a major victory. The offensive,
which owed its modest success largely to the efforts of
Zimbabwean troops boosted FRELIMO's morale by
overrunning RENAMO's headquarters and capturing
some arms and supplies. Few insurgents were found or
killed, however, and, when the rainy season begins in
November, we believe RENAMO will mount renewed
attacks against government forces and transportation
targets.
Prospects
Although RENAMO probably will retain the military
initiative barring the exhaustion of its stockpiles, its
In the unlikely event that RENAMO came to power
soon, the group probably would establish a tribal
dictatorship-its claims to prefer a democracy
notwithstanding. If the fighting continues over the
longer run, as seems probable, RENAMO is likely to
try to broaden its ethnic and political base in an effort
to undermine the Machel regime.
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WELEGA
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Ethiopia
Mt?rnat onal boundary
-d-~~ Province boundary
C National capital
O Province capital
-~---- Radroad
Road
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Ethiopia:
The Northern Insurgencies
Addis Ababa has been unable to defeat the well-
organized and determined insurgencies in the
northern Provinces of Eritrea and Tigray, despite
large commitments of men, material, and money over
the years and extensive Soviet military assistance to
the Ethiopian armed forces. The Mengistu
government reportedly hopes that the creation of a
People's Republic next year-with its plan for
regional autonomy-will bring an end to the
rebellions. The insurgent leaders, however, are
unwilling to settle for autonomy on Mengistu's terms.
Although they probably realize that they cannot
defeat the regime militarily, they apparently believe
that prolonged warfare will eventually lead to the
collapse or disintegration of the Ethiopian Army.
Background and Objectives of the Insurgencies
The Eritrean and Tigrean insurgencies have different
regimes and goals, although the major rebel groups in
each province work closely together and share a
common Marxist ideology. The Ethiopian
Government-itself engaged in institutionalizing its
Marxist revolution-is committed to forming a
centralized state and is not inclined to make
significant concessions to end the fighting in the
north, according to the US Embassy.
Eritrea Province. The beginnings of the Eritrean war
date from 1952, when the United Nations joined the
former Italian colony of Eritrea and Ethiopia in a
federal state. Neither party was pleased with this
arrangement: Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie
wanted to annex Eritrea outright, and proponents of a
political affiliation with Ethiopia were a minority in
Eritrea. Over the next decade the Emperor carefully
dismantled the federal structure, and, in 1962, the
rump Eritrean parliament voted to dissolve the
federation, making Eritrea another Ethiopian
province.
According to a Tigrean spokesman, the TPLF aims to
transform the Government of Ethiopia into a civilian-
led federation that will provide for the equal
participation of the various ethnic and tribal groups in
the country. Failing this, he stated that the TPLF
would like to acquire nearly complete internal
autonomy or full independence for the province. We
' Several other Eritrean factions have offices in Sudan from which
they conduct extensive propaganda campaigns. None of them,
however, has a military arm of note and the conduct few
operations within Ethiopia.
This move sparked an armed rebellion that was
initially led by the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF),
an umbrella organization that included all religious
Secret
ALA AR 85-022
4 October 1985
groups and political beliefs. The movement split in the
early 1970s over religious and ideological issues, and
the breakaway faction later became the Eritrean
People's Liberation Front (EPLF). After several years
of internecine fighting, the EPLF defeated its rival
and became the major Eritrean rebel group.' F 25X1
The EPLF claims it is not a secession movement
because it refuses to accept the legality of the former
UN-sponsored federation. Its stated goal is the
creation of an independent Eritrea organized along
Marxist lines.
Tigray Province. The Tigrean rebellion began in
March 1975, when former imperial officials in the
province initiated an uprising against the military 25X1
government that overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie in
September 1974. To a great extent, however, the
rebellion reflected the centuries-old struggle for
domination of Ethiopia between the Tigrean and
Amhara ethnic groups, since several of the leaders of
the revolt belonged to the royal family of Tigray.
Several other smaller groups also took up arms at this
time, and one of them, the Marxist-led Tigrean
People's Liberation Front (TPLF), soon defeated its
rivals and became the dominant force in the province.
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believe, however, that the Tigrean leadership's
primary long-term objective is to supplant the current
Amhara-dominated regime with Tigrean hegemony,
an objective stemming from the ancient Tigrean-
Amhara rivalry.
Government Objectives
The Mengistu government, like the former imperial
regime, is deeply committed to maintaining Ethiopia's
territorial integrity and creating a centralized state.
Addis Ababa claims-erroneously-that Eritrea was
a part of Ethiopia until colonized by Italy in 1885 and
that the Eritrean rebels have little internal support.
Addis Ababa views the Tigrean insurgency as an
offshoot of the Eritrean rebellion rather than a
reflection of Tigrean nationalism and refuses to
regard it as a separate conflict.
The Mengistu government, with strong Soviet
military and advisory support, is determined to secure
a military settlement to the northern conflicts, and is
unwilling, in our view, to make any meaningful
political concessions to the rebels. Addis Ababa, for
example, continues to table the idea of regional
autonomy as a basis for a peace in Eritrea despite the
fact that the EPLF has consistently rejected the
proposal. We believe the anticipated new constitution
for a People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia will
continue to pay lipservice to the concept of regional
autonomy in a vain attempt to weaken insurgent
support.
The Military Balance
The EPLF has an estimated 25,000 regular troops in
Eritrea or in camps within Sudan. EPLF regular
forces are well organized and possess artillery
weapons and armor, giving them a conventional as
well as a guerrilla capability.
Eritrean military strategy is designed to exploit
Ethiopian weaknesses and to undermine the morale
and fighting capabilities of the government's units in
the north. The EPLF has used conventional tactics to
score several major victories over the regime during
the past 18 months, and it conducts highly successful
guerrilla operations against Ethiopian supply lines
and small, isolated garrisons.
Almost all of the EPLF's weapons are captured from
the Ethiopians or are purchased on the international
market and smuggled into Eritrea from Sudan, Saudi
Arabia, and North Yemen. Because of its Christian
and Marxist makeup, the EPLF receives little
assistance from the Arab states, which traditionally
had supported the Eritrean struggle when Islamic
elements were dominant.
The TPLF, with approximately 15,000 troops, is
organized along traditional guerrilla lines and rarely
conducts conventional-type operations. It has few
heavy weapons and depends on mobility and the
element of surprise to attack isolated or poorly
defended government garrisons. Because of its
Christian-Marxist base, it, too, has had little success
in acquiring Arab assistance. The TPLF does have
close ties to the EPLF, which provides training and a
limited amount of weapons to supplement what the
Tigrean insurgents themselves capture from the
government.
The EPLF and the TPLF use Sudan to infiltrate
troops, weapons, and supplies into Ethiopia. The
border area is used as a safehaven by the rebels, and
they actively, recruit among the refugee camps that
dot the border area. The Ethiopians are aware of this
activity and have made the improvement of relations
between Addis Ababa and Khartoum contingent on
the Sudanese ending this activity. Sudan, however,
lacks the manpower to patrol its borders effectively,
and the insurgents have developed several alternative
infiltration routes if needed.)
The Ethiopian Army is a heavily mechanized force
and controls the cities and major towns in Eritrea and
Tigray Provinces. Over 100,000 Ethiopian troops are
stationed in the north. Using its superior firepower,
the regime has been able to contain, but not defeat,
the insurgents. Characteristically, government forces
launch offenses that temporarily dislodge the
insurgents-such as the counterattack that forced the
Eritreans recently to withdraw from Barentu and
Tessennei-but usually are unable to hold captured
territory for any length of time. The capability of the
Ethiopian Army is severely weakened, however, by
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low morale, poor leadership, logistic shortcomings,
and high casualty rates, especially among junior
officers and noncommissioned officers. The military
also has had little counterinsurgency training and
receives little support from the local population.
The Ethiopian military effort in the north is supported
by the Soviet Union, which provides arms,
maintenance support, and advisory assistance to
Ethiopian units.' In addition, Soviet officers are
involved in planning military operations against both
the Eritrean and Tigrean rebels, according to several
US Embassy sources.
In conjunction with its military efforts, the Mengistu
regime has tried several political and economic
programs in recent years in an effort to undercut local
support for the insurgents. Although primarily a
military venture, Addis Ababa's ill-fated 1982 "Red
Star" campaign included the commitment of
economic assistance designed to rebuild the economy
of Eritrea. The current resettlement campaign, during
which over 500,000 people have been moved from the
famine-stricken north to other parts of the country, is
also designed in part to weaken the Tigrean
insurgency by separating the rebels from their rural
supporters. F_~
Outlook
Neither the government nor the insurgents have the
capability to decisively defeat the other. We believe
the present military status quo will continue for the
near term, although both sides will occasionally
achieve an isolated victory or initiate offensive
operations. Ethiopia will continue to see Sudanese
duplicity in Khartoum's inability to end insurgent
operations from its territory. Relations between the
two will remain strained over this issue and
Mengistu's retaliatory measures, such as continuing
Ethiopian support to southern Sudanese dissidents.
] The 2,000 to 2,500 Cuban combat troops in Ethiopia are stationed
near Dire Dawa, in the Ogaden region, and are not involved in the
northern fighting.F_~
Prospects for a political settlement also will remain
bleak. The Eritreans recently announced the end of
their participation in a series of negotiating sessions
with the Ethiopians. In fact, however, no progress on
any issue was made during the two years of meetings.
We believe the Tigrean leadership will reject the
regime's proposal for regional autonomy as not going
far enough in allowing Tigrean participation in
governing the country. F__1
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South Africa: The ANC and PAC
at a Glance
The main South African insurgent groups-the
African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-
Africanist Congress (PAC)-are unlikely to become
military threats to the government in the foreseeable
future. South Africa's military and economic prowess
in the region has discouraged neighboring black states
from openly supporting the guerrillas of either group.
Pretoria's pervasive internal security apparatus-
backed by extensive security legislation-has
prevented the ANC and PAC from establishing
effective support networks inside the country. The
antiapartheid activities of both groups, however, will
continue to draw international sympathy and create
problems for Pretoria. F_~
Profile of the ANC
The ANC, formed in 1912, is the most popular group
among South African blacks, but has been unable to
transform its popularity into widespread, active
support in the townships. The government banned the
group in 1960 following the Sharpeville incident. A
military wing formed the next year launched a
campaign of sabotage bombings against government
targets. Mass arrests in 1963-65 crippled the
leadership and forced the group into exile. The
military wing, "Umkhonto we Sizwe" (Spear of the
Nation), recruited thousands of young blacks fleeing
the country during the 1976-77 Soweto riots and
renewed its bombing campaign in the late 1970s.
A 30-member National Executive Committee
oversees the group's political and military wings. The
political wing, headquartered in Lusaka, Zambia, has
several hundred active members. The military wing,
headquartered in Luanda, Angola, consists of 4,000 to
5,000 guerrillas. Most are in camps in central and
northeastern Angola. The Soviet Bloc supplies almost
all military training and equipment and provides
limited funding. Most of the group's financial and
nonmilitary support comes from Scandinavian states,
the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the
The ANC officially espouses very broad political
views, and its diverse membership reflects this. The
leadership, in our judgment, is controlled by black
nationalists pursuing mildly socialist goals as outlined
in the group's "Freedom Charter" drafted in 1955.
The ANC, however, has a long history of ties to the
South African Communist Party; pro-Soviet
Communists, a minority of whom are whites, are well
represented in the ANC leadership and exert
considerable influence. The majority of the rank-and-
file members are black nonideologues, anti-
Communist nationalists, and moderate socialists.
Since 1981, the ANC has averaged about three
bombings per month, mostly directed at government
buildings and energy and transportation targets. On
occasion, it also has bombed businesses involved in
well-publicized labor disputes with black employees.
The group generally has avoided inflicting casualties
on white civilians. A notable exception was the ANC
car bombing of the South African Air Force
Headquarters in May 1983 in which 19 people died
and 219 were injured, including many white civilians.
The group claimed the attack was in retaliation for
the South African raid into Lesotho in December
1982 in which 30 ANC members were killed.
Following a conference in Zambia in June 1985,
ANC Acting President Tambo said that the group
would not be as careful in guarding against white
civilian casualties when it attacks government targets
and that it would begin attacking off-duty white
security personnel. There is no evidence that these
new directives have influenced ANC operations.
The ANC's military wing is extremely disciplined but
erratic. Its operations range from clumsy efforts in
which guerrillas accidentally blow themselves up to
highly sophisticated operations such as the bombing
United Nations.
Secret
ALA AR 85-022
4 October 1985
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of the Koeberg nuclear facility in 1982 that delayed
its opening for almost a year. The group's standard
method of operation is to gather information on a
target using an unarmed reconnaissance team,
infiltrate a second team to cache explosives and
weapons, and send in a third team to unearth the
weapons, carry out the attack, and escape. Until
Maputo signed a nonaggression pact with Pretoria in
March 1984, the group had planned and staged most
of its operations from Mozambique. It has not yet
fully recovered from the expulsion of its military
personnel from Mozambique. ANC efforts to expand
its infrastructure in Botswana prompted a South
African raid against the group's personnel in
Gaborone in June 1985.1
PAC Problems
The PAC is the ANC's smaller and more feckless
rival. The PAC was formed in 1959 by an antiwhite,
anti-Communist faction that broke away from the
ANC. Outlawed in 1960, the group formed a military
wing-Pogo (Pure)-and began carrying out attacks
against the government and white civilians in the
early 1960s until a crackdown forced its members to
flee the country in the mid-1960s. The PAC's 600-
man guerrilla force, trained primarily by the Chinese
and Libyans and centered in Tanzania, has been
dormant since the mid-1970s. The group has been
planning to launch a new military campaign for years
but has been unable to overcome a host of problems,
foremost being internal dissension. A new PAC
campaign probably would be much bloodier than the
ANC's bombings to date because the PAC has less
qualms about attacking white civilians. F__-]
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Uganda: Rebels
the High Cards
1962.
The effective and disciplined National Resistance
Army (NRA), led by former Defense Minister
Museveni, is on the verge of attaining at least a share
of political power in Kampala. Such an outcome,
nonetheless, is unlikely to bring peace and stability to
Uganda, a country plagued by sharp ethnic and
regional animosities that have been aggravated by a
series of repressive governments since independence in
also received modest support from Libya.
Background
Former Defense Minister Yoweri Museveni
established the National Resistance Movement
(NRM) in early 1981 following elections in which
both Museveni and his political party, the Uganda
Patriotic Movement, had been badly beaten at the
polls. Starting in the bush with only a few dozen men,
he was able to build an effective and disciplined
guerrilla force, now numbering some 3,500 largely
Ankole and Baganda tribesmen from the south.
Museveni's rebels captured most of their weapons
from Ugandan security forces, and through 1982 they
Weakened by NRM gains and internal tribal strife,
the government of Milton Obote fell to dissident
northern elements of his own Uganda National
Liberation Army (UNLA) led by Gen. Tito Okello in
July. Museveni, however, was abroad at the time, and
his forces played no immediate role in Obote's ouster.
Museveni, now headquartered in Nairobi, is
attempting to marshal regional support for his
insurgency as his forces-now holding several towns
in southwestern Uganda-exert pressure on the
Okello regime to obtain a key role in the post-Obote
northern-dominated governments since independence
in 1962. Museveni's central objective is to break
northern ethnic domination and to install a more
effective government under his leadership
Over the years, Museveni's forces have gained added
credibility among significant segments of the Bantu
population by ensuring that the NRA's arrival-
unlike that of the Army-has not signaled widespread
violence and looting. Indeed, in some rural areas
Museveni has become a folk hero akin to Robin Hood.
According to the US Embassy in Kampala, he has
several times led his forces against a government
facility, raided its bank and stores, and then
distributed a good portion of the booty among the
local populace.
Since the coup in July, Museveni's insurgents have
refused to lay down their arms and have, in fact,
expanded and consolidated areas under their control.
Museveni has effectively used both military action
and political propaganda to pressure the Okello
government at the fitful August-October peace talks
in Nairobi between NRM representatives and
Ugandan Government officials.
NRM Objectives and Tactics
Southern Bantu tribesmen comprise roughly two-
thirds of Uganda's population of 14.3 million, but the
country has been controlled by a series of repressive
Secret
ALA AR 85-022
4 October 1985
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Uganda
Butere
ill,
0 50 100 Miles
0 _ 50 100 Kitonnrters
502748 9-77 (541826)
Mercator Projection
Scale 1:4,100,000
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
Kampala
Railroad
Road
Airport
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Since the coup, Museveni has also actively and
skillfully cultivated regional political leaders. Kenyan
President Moi, who has presided over the peace talks
in Nairobi, has been won over by Museveni
Museveni has visited at least
five other African countries in the past two months-
Tanzania, Ethiopia, Zaire, Zambia, and
Mozambique-and has been received by the head of
state in each.
We believe Museveni is on good terms with senior
NRA commanders. Army chief Elly Tuhinruie-
Tumwine, who lost an eye in combat and has been in
Nairobi for several months to recover, has worked
smoothly with Museveni and other senior NRM
National Resistance Army
The NRM's military arm, the NRA, has about 3,500 NRA firepower consists mostly of small arms and
hardcore members, and its ranks have been bolstered
since the coup by an influx of Army deserters,
returning refugees from Zaire, and new recruits
obtained from rebel-held areas in western Uganda.
Before its overthrow, the Obote government estimated
NRA strength at 12 battalions, with over half its
numbers drawn from the Baganda tribal area
northwest of Kampala known as the Luwero Triangle.
All of the NRA locations in the Luwero Triangle are
near major roads that provide year-round access to
Kampala and Entebbe Airport, 20 miles south.
Over the past three months, the NRA has expanded.
and consolidated its control over southwestern
Uganda. Starting in June with Bundibugyo, a small
town near the Zairian border, the NRA has slowly
fanned out over most of Uganda's southwest quadrant
and now controls the important towns of Fort Portal,
Kasese, and Kabale. Moreover, the insurgents have
isolated Army garrisons at the key crossroads cities of
Mbarara and Masaka, and they also control most of
the countryside. As a result, food deliveries to
Kampala have been irregular, and prices for some
staples have tripled since mid-September, according
to the US Embassy in Kampala.
In recent weeks the NRA has expanded its field of
operations to include numerous hit-and-run attacks on
towns and Army units near Kampala. This tactic has
served to keep the capital on edge, increase pressure
on government negotiators in Nairobi, and draw the
Army out of Kampala, according to US Embassy
reporting.
rifles, but also includes a few antiaircraft guns, some
mortars, and communications equipment. NRA
strength lies not with its armaments or numbers, but
rather in its effective leadership and good discipline.
The Okello Government
The government of General Okello suffers from a lack
of public support and internal direction, and the 71-
year-old Okello
has tried to broaden its appeal by
appointing certain of Obote's political opponents to
head various ministries, co-opting minor former anti-
Obote insurgent groups, and releasing political
detainees from the Obote era. These steps, however,
have generally failed to boost the government's
standing because they are essentially superficial
gestures: political power resides not in the ministries
but in the ruling military council, the co-opted minor
insurgencies played no role in ousting Obote, and no
known Museveni supporters were among the hundreds
of detainees released.
The Okello government's lack of credibility at home
has been repeatedly underscored. On four occasions
since August, panics have beset Kampala as
unfounded rumors of imminent hostilities or
government collapse have inspired short-lived mass
exoduses from the capital, according to US Embassy
and other reporting.
The government's lack of coherence and direction is
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military council's decision to recruit hundreds of
former Idi Amin supporters to strengthen the Army
and to appoint two prominent former Amin backers to
the council was similarly ill considered. In a single
stroke, Okello managed to anger Museveni, undercut
civilian support in the south, increase ethnic animosity
in his own Army, and alienate President Nyerere,
whose Army had invaded Uganda in 1979 to depose
As the government's lack of ability has become
increasingly apparent, Uganda's international ties
have withered. In August the Sudanese closed their
Embassy in Kampala following the limited evacuation
of employees and dependents conducted by various
Western countries. In mid-September the United
Nations decided to evacuate all dependents and
nonessential staff from Uganda. And in late
September the British advised their nationals not to
travel to Uganda. In short, the credibility of the
Okello government is dwindling.
Uganda National Liberation Army
By all accounts, the roughly 15,000-man Uganda
National Liberation Army (UNLA) is an ill-trained,
poorly equipped, and badly led force possessing low
morale and a high desertion rate.
The UNLA is only capable of undertaking operations
at the infantry battalion level, and its willingness to
stand and fight in the face of NRA attacks is highly
suspect. During NRA's steady advance in the
southwest, many UNLA soldiers have quietly
surrendered their weapons while other units remained
in their barracks hoping to avoid contact
The UNLA has a well-deserved reputation for
brutality toward noncombatants. During Obote's
reign, there were UNLA
rape and pillage throughout the Luwero Triangle, and
UNLA performance under the Okello government
has been little better. The Army sacked the capital
while ousting Obote, and this was accompanied by
wide-scale violence against the civilian population in
and near Lira, Obote's home tribal area. UNLA
looting in the Lira area was continuing in late
September. Jinja has also been subjected to
widespread UNLA pillaging in August and
September.
The UNLA's reputation for ill discipline and brutality
has recently worsened by the recruitment into its
ranks of hundreds of former Idi Amin soldiers from
the West Nile, and the ethnic animosity that prevails
between these new recruits and Okello's fellow Acholi
tribesmen, who comprise about 80 percent of the
UNLA, is severe.
during battles against the NRA, Acholi and West
Nile UNLA soldiers have opened fire on each other,
The UNLA is equipped with only a few Soviet
antiaircraft guns used in a ground support role,
mortars, light and heavy machineguns, rocket-
propelled grenades, and a variety of small arms,
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including AK-47 and G-3 rifles. Five armored
personnel carriers equipped with machineguns are the
UNLA's heaviest armored vehicles.
Uganda's small Air Force consists of nine helicopters
and two fixed-wing trainers. The Air Force has
generally not been a factor because of its limited
ordnance capabilities, poor maintenance, low pilot
skills, and the hit-and-run tactics of the NRA.
Outlook
The prospects for the fragile Okello government are
dim, and we believe Museveni's NRM stands a
better-than-even chance of coming to power-either
by force of arms or through political talks with the
Kampala regime, a government whose credibility
seems to melt almost daily. Despite recent
government efforts to improve its military position by
redeploying troops from the West Nile to Kampala
and outlying areas of tactical significance, the UNLA
remains an ineffective and unpopular instrument of a
weak and narrowly based government. Though
Okello's northern Acholi control both the government
and the Army, as Uganda's ninth-largest tribe they
constitute only 5 percent of the population. We judge
that Uganda's large southern Bantu majority is
unlikely to be won over by Okello's promises that
things will improve, particularly when his UNLA
continues to inflict pain and suffering on large
segments of the civilian population.
If Museveni's insurgents take over Kampala, we
believe the stage will be set for civil war between his
predominantly southern forces and northern
Ugandans who have dominated since independence. A
defeated and largely Acholi UNLA would probably
retreat with their weapons to their tribal homeland,
and some embittered Acholi leaders would probably
set about plotting a return to power. In addition,
many former Amin soldiers would probably continue
to oppose Museveni by force of arms. In sum, a
Museveni victory may herald the end of northern
domination, but it is unlikely to bring peace to
Uganda.
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Chad:
Insurgency in the South
Rebels in the south are militarily weak and are not a
direct threat to President Habre's regime, but they
drain the government's military resources needed to
counter Libyan and dissident forces in the north,
disrupt the economy, and undermine the President's
national reconciliation efforts. Libyan support to the
southern rebels is designed to exert pressure on Habre
on two fronts, and possibly bring down the regime
without direct Libyan intervention. French pressure
and support have played a key role in forming Habre's
successful counterinsurgency strategy, which over the
past year has improved the security situation in the
south and reduced rebel numbers. We believe
divisions among the insurgents and the success of the
government's amnesty program will enable Habre's
forces to continue to hold the military initiative in the
south. Habre's reconciliation efforts, however, will
meet with only limited success because of deep-seated
southern mistrust of his northern regime and behind-
the-scenes Libyan maneuvering. Moreover, Habre
will move slowly on ethnic issues to avoid alienating
his key northern backers, many of whom oppose any
further concessions to the south.)
Civil War: A Way of Life
Chad's history has been marked by a bitter struggle
for dominance between northern Muslims, led by the
fiercely independent Toubous, and southern groups
dominated by black Sara tribesmen. Northerners held
sway during the precolonial period and terrorized the
south with frequent slave raids. After French
colonization began in the late 19th century, however,
southerners quickly adapted to French culture and
exploited opportunities for education and
advancement. While the French tried to subdue
northern armed resistance to their presence, the stage
was set for the south's rise to political dominance
shortly before Chad gained independence in 1960.
The facade of national unity established by the
French was shattered, however, when a Sara-
dominated government cracked down harshly on
Muslim leaders following independence. French
troops intervened in 1969 to save the southern-led
regime from a Toubou-led alliance of northern
factions that threatened to overrun N'Djamena.
Successive weak southern regimes, however, and
Libyan support to the dissidents finally resulted in
northerners regaining control of N'Djamena in 1979,
bringing full circle the age-old struggle between north
and south. President Hissein Habre, a Toubou
factional leader, assumed power in June 1982 when
his forces defeated those of the Libyan-backed
Transnational Government of National Unity
(GLINT)-a coalition government of several northern
groups. For the past three years, Habre's regime-
while battling Libyan and GUNT forces in the
north-has faced a chronic insurgency in the south
composed of Sara tribesmen and some northern
groups. F---]
Southern grievances center on the occupation of the
south by Habre's northern troops, who do not respect
local customs and abuse southern civilians. In
addition to the removal of northern troops from the
south, southern leaders hope to gain additional
representation in Habre's regime and some autonomy
in governing local affairs. Although southern
insurgents are motivated by longstanding antipathy
toward northerners, dismal economic conditions last
year in southern Chad led many peasants to join the
rebels because this provided them a means to pillage
food and other necessities for themselves and their
families. Some insurgents operating in the southeast
are former members of the GUNT-the coalition of
northern groups that Habre defeated to assume
power-and are motivated by a hatred of Habre and a
desire to see the GUNT regain control of N'Djamena.
Problems Among the Insurgents
In our view, southern insurgents have become
militarily weak and fragmented over the past year.
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ALA AR 85-022
4 October 1985
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Sara tribesmen have grouped themselves under
various commando appellations that operate
independently of one another primarily in the
southwestern Prefectures of Moyen Chari, Lagone-
Oriental, and Logone-Occidental. US Embassy
reporting estimates their numbers reached a high of
15,000 in November 1984, but we believe effective
counterinsurgency operations have reduced their
ranks over the past year by at least a third.
Meanwhile, 500 to 1,000 Muslim insurgents operate
independently in the southeastern Prefectures of
Guera, Salamat, and Ouaddi. All rebel groups in the
south are poorly trained and equipped, and their
military operations usually consist of ambushing
government troops on patrol, pillaging villages, and
destroying crops. Ethnic divisions and lack of a strong
charismatic leader have obstructed efforts by rebels to
merge their armed bands, according to the US
Embassy.
In addition to their limited military capabilities, the
southern insurgents lack a political structure and have
made little effort to mobilize the local populace. The
rebels operate independently of both exiled southern
dissidents and Libyan-backed dissidents in the north,
despite unsuccessful efforts by some rebel leaders to
form alliances with northern dissidents and
oppositionists in Brazzaville and Paris. Dissident
abuses of the civilian population often rival those of
Habre's troops and have limited their support among
the people. Moreover, US Embassy reports indicate
that, despite their antipathy for northern troops, most
southerners are preoccupied with daily survival and
do not support the armed struggle.
Libyan Assistance
Libyan support to the southern rebels has been a key
element in Tripoli's strategy to overthrow Habre and
replace him with a pro-Libyan regime. In our view,
Libyan leader Qadhafi hopes that by providing
substantial assistance to southern rebels he can
eventually put enough military pressure on
N'Djamena from two fronts to bring down Habre
without direct Libyan intervention. Tripoli's support
is designed to keep the rebels in the south active so as
to sap Habre's scarce resources that otherwise would
be available to confront Libyan forces in the north.
According to the US Embassy, Libyan aid includes
large sums of money, small arms and ammunition,
and powerful radio equipment to enable the rebels to
maintain contact with Libyan military commanders in
southern Libya and northern Chad. US Embassy
reporting also indicates that Libya has effectively
used large sums of cash to encourage dissident
intransigence at reconciliation conferences and to
prevent armed rebels from rallying to the government.
Libya supplies
the southern rebels through Congo, northern Central
African Republic, and western Sudan.
-probably built by the
Libyans-may have been used to airlift these supplies
to the rebels. The US Embassy in Bangui reports that
Tripoli has established a logistic network in the
Central African Republic that it uses to deliver
supplies to Chadian rebel bases in northern Central
African Republic. Since the fall of Sudanese
President Nimeiri in April, Tripoli has significantly
increased its influence and presence in western Sudan
through which the US Embassy in N'Djamena
believes supplies are now reaching Chadian rebels.
Habre's Counterinsurgency Strategy
Successful military and political counterinsurgency
operations by the Habre regime over the past year are
largely responsible for the insurgents' deteriorating
position. Rebel attacks reached an unprecedented
high in late November 1984, but government troops
had by June reduced dissident activity to only isolated
and sporadic attacks. Athough government troops in
the south numbered only about 5,000, giving the
rebels a 3-to-1 numerical superiority, their lack of
coordination and the Habre forces' superior mobility
and firepower proved to be decisive in the seven
months between November and June, according to
the US Embassy. Joint operations with Central
African Republic troops along the northern CAR
border, where a number of dissident bases are located,
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probably also disrupted rebel operations. Although
rebel activity has increased in the past few months
because the rainy season has impeded the mobility of
government troops, Habre's forces continue to
maintain the initiative and the level of violence is
significantly less than last year at this time, according
to the US Embassy. F_~
Habre's strategy has included efforts to improve his
political standing in the south. The improved security
situation earlier this year allowed him to tour the
region for the first time since assuming power, and,
according to the US Embassy, he was well received in
principal southern cities. Habre met with local
officials and tribal leaders and promised to curb
mistreatment by northern officials and troops.
According to the US Embassy, Habre followed up on
these meetings by replacing a number of the
incompetent and corrupt northern officials with
southerners. Habre has also made an effort to punish
abuses by his troops;
Habre's political and military successes have led to
significant increases in the number of rebels who have
reconciled with the government this year. We
estimate that about 4,000 rebels have rallied to the
government since January, and talks continue with
the leader of the largest rebel faction. Moving ralliers
away from their home regions to bases in the north, or
to training camps in Zaire, has significantly reduced
the number of ralliers who have returned to the rebel
ranks. Nevertheless, the government continues to have
serious difficulties meeting its payroll obligations and
integrating southerners into the armed forces,
according to the US Embassy. Ethnic tensions in the
Army have resulted in several bloody clashes recently,
French pressure and support have played a key role in
Habre's counterinsurgency efforts. The US Embassy
in Paris reports that France has used its budgetary
support-critical to Chad's financial solvency-as
leverage to encourage Habre to be more flexible in
dealing with the south. According to the US Embassy,
the French have provided most of the funds to pay
rebels who have rallied to the government. Moreover,
we believe Habre's fears earlier this year that Paris
was planning to throw its support to a southern leader
as part of a deal with Libya also was responsible for
Habre's greater efforts to achieve national unity.
Prospects
We believe Habre's forces will continue to hold the
military initiative in the south because the insurgents
are unable to unify under one command and the
government's amnesty program is depleting their
numbers. In our view, most southerners are tired of
the violence and have come to recognize Habre as
their best bet for bringing peace to southern Chad.
Rebel activity, however, probably will remain high at
least until November as the rainy season continues to
impede government troops' mobility. The rebel's
limited military capabilities, however, will prevent
them from attacking major towns or controlling large
rural areas. Efforts by Habre's troops, most of whom
are northerners, to stem increased rebel activity
probably will lead to additional abuses of civilians and
may erode Habre's efforts to improve his standing in
the south.
In our view, Habre's reconciliation efforts will meet
with only limited success because of the deep-seated
ethnic and regional divisions and behind-the-scenes
Libyan machinations. Although Habre has shown a
willingness to crack down on abuses by his troops and
negotiate with the rebels, he will move slowly on
ethnic issues to avoid alienating his key northern
backers, many of whom oppose any further
concessions to southerners. Longstanding southern
distrust of Habre and his regime also complicates the
reconciliation process, and Habre's unwillingness to
move forcibly to curb northern abuses and increase
southern representation in his government is likely to
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heighten southern discontent. In addition, Tripoli will
continue to obstruct Habre's reconciliation efforts by
resupplying rebel forces and using cash payments to
encourage intransigence among southern dissident
groups that are negotiating with the government.
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Zaire:
Growing Rebel Activity
Dissident activity has increased in the past year in
eastern Zaire, long a hotbed of government
opposition. We believe the rebels are not a direct
threat to the regime at this time, but their attacks
have embarrassed President Mobutu, slowed
economic activity in the area, and forced the
government to expend scarce resources on military
operations. Tanzanian-based rebels attacked and held
the small town of Moba in eastern Shaba Province for
two days last November-the first rebel incident since
a major invasion from Angola in 1978. Since
November, despite numerous search and destroy
missions by government troops, rebels have
sporadically ambushed government soldiers,
committed acts of banditry against the local
population, sabotaged economic targets, and again
attacked Moba in late June. We believe that the
group carrying out the incidents numbers about 50 to
100 men and that most are members of the Popular
Revolutionary Party, a local group that has been
involved in antigovernment activity, banditry, and
gold smuggling since the early 1960s.
that Tripoli does provide limited amounts of training
and financial support. Libyan diplomats in Tanzania,
Burundi, and Congo funnel aid and recruit Zairians
for training in Libya.
Although we believe Zairian dissidents are not
receiving direct support from any neighboring state,
'Tanzania and Congo are turning a blind eye to
dissident activity while allowing Libyan diplomats
substantial freedom of movement.
his support for UNITA.
The Angolan-based Front for the Liberation of the
Congo (FLNC), at one time Zaire's principal
opposition group, has been inactive since it invaded
Shaba Province in 1978. Although at least 1,000
FLNC rebels with military experience are spread
throughout Angola, their capabilities have
significantly deteriorated in the past seven years
because of inadequate Angolan support, ethnic
divisions, leadership struggles, and UNITA's control
of much of Angola's border with Zaire. According to
the US Embassy, harsh living conditions in Angola
and the return to Zaire of former Prime Minister
Nguza-probably Zaire's most prominent dissident-
has led several hundred FNLC dissidents to consider
returning to Zaire under Mobutu's amnesty program.
Despite these problems, however, the FLNC remains
a potential threat to Mobutu, particularly if Luanda
renews its support in an effort to press Mobutu to end
Although geographic, economic, and political
conditions in and around eastern Zaire are tailor
made for an insurgency, Zairian dissidents have
longed lacked the leadership, organization, and
resources to conduct effective military operations. In
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working to improve communications among the
various groups in hopes of establishing a viable
insurgency. In addition, Tripoli is likely to continue its
efforts to gain influence in neighboring states-
particularly Tanzania, Burundi, and Uganda-with
the objective of eventually establishing insurgent
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ALA AR 85-022
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bases. In our judgment, however, Tripoli is unlikely to
be forthcoming with large amounts of assistance until
the rebels show both a willingness and ability to
conduct successful operations. We believe that
significant Libyan support-primarily arms, money,
and training-along with the inability or
unwillingness of neighboring states to crack down on
dissident activity in their territory probably would
lead to an increase in rebel incidents and to a
potentially viable insurgency in eastern Zaire.
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Central African Republic:
Nascent Insurgency
in the North
An attack last November by some 60 northern
tribesmen against a government garrison near the
Chadian border signaled the beginning of a nascent
insurgency by rebel forces resentful of the southern-
dominated central government. The low-level
insurgency has been characterized by sporadic attacks
designed to intimidate and sometimes kill government
officials, acquire arms, and garner local support,
recruits, and funding. The US Embassy reports that
rebel attacks have been concentrated in the northern
border provinces and have been primarily directed
against government officials and installations.
The dissidents are few in number, perhaps no more
than 100, and are led by Gen. Alphonse Mbaikoua,
Mbaikoua has been
one of the few northerners to hold a ministerial
position in President Kolingba's government, but his
abortive coup attempt in 1982 forced his flight into
exile in Chad. Mbaikoua has publicly criticized the
pro-Western Kolingba for not allowing northerners to
The rebels lack an organized support infrastructure
and well-defined political objectives. They receive
passive support from the northern population but
remain dependent upon the ethnically related
dissidents in southern Chad for logistic and material
aid. In turn, the seasoned Chadian rebel fighters use
the Chadian refugee camps in the Central African
Republic as a safehaven and base of operations
against Chadian Government troops and occasionally
carry out operations with the dissidents in the CAR,
according to the US Embassy. The two rebel groups
joined forces and robbed a state-run cotton company
in the CAR in February. The US Embassy reports
there is no evidence to indicate that the Libyans-
despite direct aid to the Chadian insurgents-are
instigating or directly supporting the CAR insurgency
in the north.
The government so far has been unable to quell rebel
activity or ease northern ethnic tensions. According to
the Embassy, a joint CAR/Chad military operation
along their common border in April heightened north-
south tensions when undisciplined Central African
In our view, the insurgency does not yet pose a serious
threat to the government, but we believe prospects for
a settlement are dim until the government addresses
northern grievances. In our estimation, any increase
in government military operations in the north is
likely to further sap already limited government
resources or could precipitate a generalized northern
reaction-such as the economic slowdown in 1982 in
which northerners refused to plant cotton, resulting in
the lowest harvest since independence. Moreover,
continuing if not worsening regional and ethnic
tensions in the north will offer additional
opportunities to Tripoli, already seeking to undermine
the Kolingba regime for facilitating French support to
Chadian President Habre.
Secret
ALA AR 85-022
4 October 1985
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Namibia:
The SWAPO Insurgents
The South-West Africa People's Organization
(SWAPO) controls no Namibian territory and has had
its political and military headquarters in Angola since
1960, but the Organization of Africa Unity and the
United Nations nevertheless recognize it as the sole
representative of the Namibian people. SWAPO has
between 7,000 and 8,000 men under arms. The group
is dominated by the Ovambo tribe, the largest in
Namibia, and probably has the political support-as
it claims-of the majority of black Namibians.
SWAPO once represented a variety of political views,
but in recent years more radical elements of the
Ovambos have come to dominate the movement's
leadership. In the process, SWAPO has moved closer
to the Soviets and their allies for support, come
increasingly under their influence, and has received
large amounts of Soviet money, arms, and training-
although the exact amount is not known.F-1
Although South Africa has failed so far to undermine
substantially SWAPO's political strength, Pretoria
has succeeded in containing and reducing its capacity
for guerrilla action. Continued military failures and
the trend toward political radicalism have contributed
carried out isolated terrorist acts and attempted
kidnapings inside Namibia. The South Africans claim
that the kidnapings, aimed at abducting villagers to
serve as guerrilla fighters, are having a negative effect
on SWAPO support inside Namibia, particularly in
the group's traditional Ovambo homeland.
SWAPO's prospects for coming to power in the near
future are dim. South Africa installed an interim
government in Windhoek in June and appears intent
on pursuing a unilateral solution in Namibia.
Moreover, the South African and Namibian
territorial forces appear confident that they can
contain the remaining guerrilla threat.
Secret
ALA AR 85-022
4 October 1985
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