NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000100270001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 8, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
MASTER ALE
gE 0 11j! 9
3 MARK Gil
2-
Near East and
South Asia Review
Supplement
8 November 1985
Top Secret
NESA NESAR 85-024CX
8 November 195
259
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Riyadh has decided to reduce the size of the 15,000-man Pakistani
military contingent garrisoned in Saudi Arabia, and, depending on
the size of the reduction, the decline in remittances from Saudi
Arabia could adversely affect Pakistan's military modernization
programs and increase disgruntlement within the Pakistani officer
corps.
Tehran relies on its "Qods" reserve battalions to strengthen the
regular army, but coercing more men into longer terms of military
service will not dramatically improve Iranian effectiveness on the
battlefield, especially if Tehran cannot obtain weapons to equip
them adequately.
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Nuclear cooperation with Argentina will offer several Middle
Eastern and South Asian countries limited access to nuclear
technology and equipment that the major supplier nations have
refused to sell them, but political and technical factors will limit the
Argentine role.
Top Secret
NESA NESAR 85-024CX
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Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items
will be designated as noncoordinated views.
Top Secret ii
NESA NESAR 85-024CX
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Thinking It Over: Saudi Arabia's
Pakistani Corps
Riyadh has decided to reduce the size of the 15,000-
man Pakistani military contingent garrisoned in
Saudi Arabia.
Depending on the
size of the reduction, the decline in remittances from
Saudi Arabia could adversely affect Pakistan's
military modernization programs and increase
disgruntlement within the Pakistani officer corps.
Some of the Pakistani troops will probably be
replaced by a contingent of several thousand
personnel from Bangladesh.
Background
To improve its defenses, particularly against Israel,
Saudi Arabia turned to Pakistan in the mid-1970s for
troops to augment its understrength and poorly
trained military establishment. At the time Pakistan
was attempting to modernize its military in the wake
of its defeat in the 1971 war with India, and it
accepted the Saudi offer as a way to finance new
programs and to help maintain the size of its military
forces. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan also agreed to
cooperate on a wide range of military matters,
including joint exercises and Saudi training at
Pakistani military schools.
Approximately 13,000 Pakistanis serve in the Saudi
army and Air Defense Command. More than half of
these troops form a complete armored brigade that is
based at Tabuk in northwestern Saudi Arabia. Other
Pakistani units, including three independent artillery
battalions, two construction engineer units, and a
number of 35-mm antiaircraft batteries are also
deployed near Tabuk and in southwestern Saudi
Arabia near the borders with North and South
Yemen. Some Pakistani personnel serve as
maintenance and logistic personnel at major bases,
An additional 1,500 Pakistanis serve in the Saudi Air
Force. The vast majority are aircraft maintenance
and logistic personnel, with only a few serving as
flight crews or operations officers,
The Pakistanis serving as aircraft
mechanics work primarily on F-15 maintenance.
Approximately 400 Pakistanis serve in the Saudi
Navy as technicians and crewmen. The Saudi Navy is
hampered by even greater personnel shortages than its
sister services. The Navy rapidly expanded at the end
of the 1970s and is currently taking delivery of four
frigates and two replenishment ships purchased from
France, which will further aggravate manpower
shortages.
Pakistani personnel provide a number of services for
Riyadh that the Saudis cannot provide from their
limited manpower resources. The Saudi army does not
have the personnel to man the additional armored
brigade now staffed by Pakistanis. The Saudi army
and Air Force also do not have the qualified personnel
to perform the maintenance provided by the
Pakistanis, and military readiness levels will be
seriously hampered if the Pakistanis are withdrawn.
The Seeds of Change
Riyadh's search for additional troops to replace or
augment the Pakistanis is motivated by a number of
concerns:
? The presence of Shias in the Pakistani units.
? Declining oil revenues that are straining the Saudi
military budget and forcing Riyadh to look for ways
to reduce expenses.
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85-024CX
8 November I Y6)
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? Cultural differences between Saudi and Pakistani
personnel that are probably aggravated by
professional jealousies.
? Saudi questions about the utility of the Pakistani
units in a crisis.
Riyadh's search for replacements almost certainly
intensified as a result of a border clash with North
Yemen in January 1984. After the initial incident, the
Saudis moved additional troops into the area. Some
Pakistani units were already stationed in the area,
and additional
from Tabuk as part of the buildup.
Islamabad quickly objected to the deployment of
Pakistani units into a potential combat situation,
Pakistani commanders
at Tabuk immediately reported to their superiors in
Islamabad that some of their units were being sent to
the border as part of the Saudi buildup. Islamabad
protested to Riyadh that this was a violation of their
agreement, and the Saudis agreed to halt the
deployments,
Riyadh and Islamabad were probably also
embarrassed by rumors that North Yemen had
captured some Pakistanis during the fighting. F
Islamabad's immediate and vociferous objections to
Riyadh's first attempt to use Pakistani troops in a
potential combat situation dismayed the Saudis, in
our view. Riyadh probably believes that the potential
for additional border clashes with North Yemen will
remain moderately high and that they will be unable
to use Pakistani units there. This incident must have
raised questions about the utility of Pakistani ground
troops in any future Saudi confrontation with Iraq,
Iran, or Israel, in our view.F___-]
View From Pakistan
We believe that Islamabad places a high priority on
maintaining its military assistance relationship with
Riyadh. The Pakistani Government has publicly
sought to obscure its difficulties with the Saudis by
maintaining that relations are cordial and mutually
beneficial. The Pakistanis have also insisted that they
have fully complied with the terms of the military
Behind the scenes, however, the Zia government has
moved to shore up the relationship by substituting
Sunnis for Shia troops scheduled to serve in Saudi
Arabia. According to the US Embassy in Riyadh, the
head of the Pakistani military mission in Saudi
Arabia, who had a reputation for being abrasive and
difficult to deal with, has been relieved and recalled to
Pakistan, and other disruptive individuals have also
been rapidly replaced.
We believe that Islamabad will find it difficult to
show more flexibility about Riyadh's use of Pakistani
troops in combat situations. President Zia, while
asserting that Pakistani troops will continue to live up
to their commitment to defend Saudi territory, refuses
to allow Pakistani troops to be used in any offensive
operation or inter-Arab conflict. Pakistan has military
advisers or support personnel in virtually every
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Top Secret
country in the region-including North Yemen,
Oman, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq,
and Iran-and will not risk the political complications
of having its military personnel, especially ground
troops, involved on both sides of a conflict or in a
dispute with another Islamic country.
Riyadh Looks for Troops
Riyadh has negotiated with Bangladesh and Turkey
to obtain troops to replace the Pakistanis serving in
Saudi Arabia. The negotiations have included high-
level visits to both countries, according to Embassy
From the beginning, Bangladesh was eager to supply
troops for Riyadh, primarily because of its desperate
need for foreign exchange
By mid-1985 rumors were circulating
in both countries that a decision had been made to
replace the Pakistani units and that a "Bangladeshi
Brigade" was coming,
We believe that an agreement may be announced as
early as mid-December when the Saudi Minister of
Defense visits Bangladesh. A number of factors make
Bangladesh troops attractive to Riyadh:
? Riyadh believes that Bangladesh Army units receive
the same training as Pakistani units and are of
similar quality.
? Riyadh will probably pay considerably less for
Bangladesh units.
? Bangladesh, which desperately needs additional
income, will probably place fewer restrictions on the
use of its personnel in Saudi Arabia.
? Bangladesh units will not have any Shia personnel.
agreement with Dhaka to station Bangladesh
personnel in Saudi Arabia. The bulk of the Pakistani
units, however, including the armored brigade and the
Air Force maintenance personnel, will almost
certainly remain in Saudi Arabia. Riyadh still feels
the need for Pakistani personnel to provide a credible 25X1
military presence in northwestern Saudi Arabia and
to supply the military expertise and vital technical
skills that its own forces lack, in our view. Saudi
Arabia will continue cooperative military ventures
with Pakistan, including joint naval exercises and the
training of Saudi personnel in Pakistani military
schools.
The introduction of another contingent of foreign
troops into Saudi Arabia will probably have a
marginally negative impact on military efficiency, in
our view. Bangladesh troops are probably capable of
adequately performing their likely roles, such as
logistic and maintenance. Their introduction into the
Saudi army, however, will further complicate military
administration and perpetuate the presence of
potentially unreliable or unusable units in important
positions in the army.
The Saudis will probably have more flexibility 25X1
deploying Bangladesh troops than Pakistani units. If
Riyadh can utilize the Bangladeshis in potential
combat situations such as border tensions with North 25X1
or South Yemen, Riyadh will be better able to deal
with local conflicts without having to appeal
immediately to the United States for assistance. F_~ 25X1
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ecting the hol
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Islam.
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Any increase in Bangladesh's financial resources
cannot help but improve its economy. The potential
monetary benefits of serving in Saudi Arabia will
improve morale within the military, in addition to
providing better training opportunities. The possibility
of future direct Saudi financial aid also raises
Dhaka's hopes for beginning a significant military
modernization program. In addition, Dhaka will
receive a boost in its international prestige by being
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Outlook
Riyadh will probably further reduce the size of its
Pakistani contingent in the near future and reach
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A reduction in Saudi-Pakistani military relations will
be potentially costly to Pakistan. Islamabad will lose
the remittances of at least some of the 15,000 troops
who are paid Saudi scale wages. In addition, Pakistani
troops will no longer be able to train on the more
advanced weapon systems present in the Saudi
inventory. In the event of a major rupture in the
relationship-unlikely, in our view-the Pakistanis
might also lose Saudi financial assistance that, in the
past, has helped pay for major military modernization
programs, such as the F-16 fighter-bomber and the
Redeye surface-to-air missile system. In addition, the
diminution in its international reputation will
probably rankle and embarrass Pakistan's military
establishment. Reductions in the military budget,
moreover, will increase the sense of frustration and
disgruntlement within the officer corps.
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Top Secret
The Qods: Iran's Active
Reserve Forces
Tehran relies on its "Qods" or "Jerusalem" reserve
battalions to strengthen the regular army, particularly
as it has suffered high casualties at the front. The
formation of such reserve units in 1982 represented an
effort conceived but never implemented under the
Shah to boost military manpower by using war
veterans.' The Qods are providing a pool of trained
and experienced soldiers to continue the fighting.
After the war, Tehran hopes the existence of a large
reserve force-Revolutionary Guards Basii, and
Qods-will deter new attacks on Iran.
New Source of Manpower
Tehran's need to strengthen Iranian ground forces
was an important reason for the formation of the
Qods reserve battalions. In November 1982, Majles
(Parliament) speaker Rafsanjani announced to the
Iranian Supreme Defense Council that the formation
of the Qods would enable Iran to take proper
advantage of "volunteer popular forces with their
revolutionary morale." A few months earlier, the
Iranians had suffered heavy casualties in Iraq while
attempting to take Al Basrah, and Tehran hoped to
launch another large attack in early 1983. To improve
their chances for success, the Iranian army needed
more trained manpower.
Widening the Obligation
Iran's subsequent military efforts against Iraq
continued to be ineffective while casualties increased.
As a result, we suspect Iran had considerable
difficulty getting a sufficient number of soldiers to
volunteer for the Qods forces. The need for additional
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substantially by 1984-Iran had suffered 500,000 to
750,000 casualties since the beginning of the war. As
a result, Rafsanjani announced that the Qods forces
would no longer consist entirely of volunteers, but also
of troops serving the last six months of their two-year
military obligation.
the new system also was an attempt to dispel
increasing criticism of the regime for its arbitrariness
in assigning troops to the front. After additional
training, all Qods forces would be sent to assist
regular units at or near the front.
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Tehran moved quickly to establish and deploy the new
battalions. The army began hiring discharged
personnel at the start of 1983, and the first units were
dispatched to the front in January. The reservists
received six-month extendable contracts with the
proviso that after their additional service the
reservists would return to civilian life, would be
recalled quarterly for three days of refresher training,
and would be available for future full-time service.
Tehran's creation of the Qods appears to reflect an
effort to strengthen the army while keeping it small
enough so that it will not become a threat to the
regime. Tehran probably views the new mandatory
reserve program as a means to augment manpower at
the front without upsetting the balance between the
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~ 85-024CX
November 85
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regular military and irregular forces-Revolutionary
Guard and Basij-that are considered more loyal to
the regime.
Role and Organization of the Qods
Qods forces are lightly armed infantry commanded
mostly by regular army officers and cadre personnel.
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Qods battalions, unlike Basij forces-the poorly
trained volunteer mass militia created in 1979 and
recruited and used by the Revolutionary Guard as
shock troops-come under army control and take
somewhat broader roles in the fighting because of
Effectiveness
We believe that most Qods battalions are only as
effective as regular light infantry units. Qods
personnel have the advantage of having had 18
months of previous military experience and training
that new recruits in the regular forces lack.
Outlook
By establishing an obligatory reserve program Iran
will be able during the coming years to increase the
number of experienced personnel available for
we estimate that 70 to 90 percent of the
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army is comprised of conscripts, and they presumably
will become reservists after completing regular
service. This additional manpower will help Tehran to
continue its war of attrition. Coercing more men into
longer terms of military service, however, probably
will not dramatically improve Iranian effectiveness on
the battlefield, especially if Tehran cannot obtain
weapons from abroad to equip them adequately. The
morale of the reserves also may deteriorate as
personnel are kept on active duty for longer terms,
particularly if casualties in the units increase.
After the war ends, Tehran probably will maintain a
small regular army, which will be less of a threat to
the regime, while retaining the option of recalling a
very large force of trained and experienced
reservists-including Revolutionary Guard, Basij,
and Qods-in the event of war. The total of these
reserve forces could amount to 500,000 men or more.
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Iran already has expressed hopes that the existence of
reserves will deter future aggression. For example,
according to Majles speaker Rafsanjani, " ... the
Jerusalem [Qods] reserve forces ... can intimidate our
enemies so that even the thought of imposing another
war will not enter anyone's head."
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Crashing the Nuclear Suppliers' Club:
Argentina's Activities in the
Middle East and South Asia
role.
In our view, nuclear cooperation with Argentina will
offer several Middle Eastern and South Asian
countries limited access to nuclear technology and
equipment that the major supplier nations have
refused to sell them. Although Argentina is publicly
committed to applying international safeguards to its
nuclear exports, it does not demand safeguards on all
of a recipient country's nuclear activities.
Accordingly, to earn hard currency, trade for needed
technology, or gain international prestige, Buenos
Aires may be willing to offer technical assistance in
such fuel cycle activities as reactor construction,
reprocessing, and nuclear fuel fabrication without
demanding full-scope safeguards. Political and
technical factors, however, will limit the Argentine
Argentina's Drive To Export
We believe that Argentina has launched an intensive
drive to export nuclear technology and equipment to
the Third World. The Argentine nuclear industry
needs new markets to compensate for slack demand at
home. Sales of nuclear technology abroad are also a
source of international prestige
few years.
In our view, Argentina has the technical know-how,
although only limited manufacturing capability, to
supply a complete nuclear fuel cycle built around
heavy-water-moderated research or power reactors.
The Argentine Atomic Energy Commission has
already exported a research reactor to Peru that runs
on highly enriched uranium. We believe that a new
unsafeguarded Argentine enrichment plant may be
capable of producing limited quantities of low-
enriched fuel for power or research reactors within a
A Year of Intense Activity
India. Argentina and India are considering an
exchange of nuclear technology
Our Embassy in Buenos Aires reported in June that
the two countries first signed a nuclear a reement in
1974, but, formal
negotiations on cooperation did not begin until 1982.
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NE SA AT~SAR 5-024CX
8 November 5
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We believe that Pakistani-Argentine cooperation will
remain limited to minor information exchanges and
visits because Islamabad is meeting its equipment and
training requirements from Japanese and West
European sources. If forced to choose between India
and Pakistan, Buenos Aires will probably decide for
closer nuclear ties to India because of the potentially Libya. We believe that Libya is also on the list of
greater technical and economic payoff.F___-] potential Argentine partners.
Algeria. An agreement this summer with Algeria
specifies that Argentina will sell a research reactor,
low-enriched uranium fuel, and a nuclear fuel
fabrication plant to Algeria. We believe that Algeria
accepted the Argentine proposal over a competing US
offer that had been under negotiation for two years
because Buenos Aires was willing to impose fewer
safeguards. Buenos Aires is publicly committed to Outlook: Under-the-Table Technology Transfer
requiring safeguards only on what it exports, while the We believe that Argentina would harm US nuclear
US offer required Algeria to accept safeguards on all nonproliferation policy interests in the Middle East
present and future nuclear facilities. This fall a and South Asia by offering some high-risk countries
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access to technology through scientific exchanges,
including sensitive aspects of the fuel cycle such as
reprocessing, or information obtained from the major
supplier countries. Argentina could build a heavy-
water-moderated, natural-uranium-fueled research
reactor for Iraq or help India improve its power
reactor design.
We believe that several factors will limit Argentina's
role as a nuclear supplier in the Middle East and
South Asia:
? Argentina wants to be accepted as a responsible
nuclear exporter and is sensitive to major supplier
state opinion, but Argentine Foreign Ministry and
nuclear program officials seem to differ on the
limits of permissible conduct. Last March
Argentine Foreign Ministry officials told the US
Embassy that they would not "break the fence"
placed around India's nuclear development by
supplier nations. Argentine nuclear officials,
however, appear to believe that the occasional
technical expert can discreetly slip under that
"fence."
? Regional rivalries may force Argentina to choose
sides in current disputes, such as the Iran-Iraq war.
? Buenos Aires may not be able to deliver equipment
economic uncertainty were causing the nuclear
industry to stagnate. For example, we speculate that
Algeria will wait several years for completion of its
research reactor and fuel fabrication plant.
? We believe that India, Pakistan, and probably Iran
will be able to find alternative sources to meet most
of their equipment needs by buying dual-purpose
items on a piecemeal basis on the world nuclear grey
market.
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