NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000100250001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 25, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Near East and
South Asia Review
Supplement
25 October 1985
2, 5
Top Secret
NESA NESAR 85-023C
25 October 1985
Copy 2 5 9
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Articles Pakistan: Improved Defenses Along the Afghan Border
Islamabad has given its border forces surface-to-air missiles for the
first time and increased their artillery and armored personnel
carriers in response to increased Soviet and Afghan cross-border
attacks against insurgent positions in Pakistan, but the border, forces
will continue to react cautiously to these attacks.
Iran: Limited Effectiveness of Ground-Based Air Defenses) I5
Iranian air defenses are likely to remain ineffective against Iraqi
airstrikes despite recent efforts to improve them, and growing
civilian criticism of Iran's air defense forces could prompt the
removal of senior officers and cause a shift in responsibility for air
defense from the regular military to the Revolutionary Guard.
Iran: Civil, Religious, and Revolutionary Law Enforcement
Tehran's efforts to consolidate its control nationwide and bring
order to the bureaucracy have led to the reinstatement of
prerevolutionary law enforcement agencies and the imposition of
discipline on new revolutionary organizations.
Nabih Barri, Lebanon's mainstream Shia leader, is facing
increasing challenges and dissent within his Amal organization and
from the Shia fundamentalists within the Hizballah movement, but
in the near term the Shia community is unlikely to come up with an
alternative to Barri.
Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items
will be designated as noncoordinated views.
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NESA NESAR 85-023C
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Pakistan: Improved Defenses Along
the Afghan Border
Islamabad has given its border forces surface-to-air
missiles for the first time and has increased their
artillery and armored personnel carriers in response to
increased Soviet and Afghan cross-border attacks
against insurgent positions in Pakistan. The
Pakistanis have used the missiles cautiously and have
refrained from using their artillery. If the Pakistanis
use the missiles more aggressively, they might force
the Soviets and Afghans to adopt somewhat less
effective air tactics against insurgent positions. If the
Pakistanis shoot down a Soviet or Afghan aircraft, the
two sides probably would try to prevent the incident
from leading to greater military escalation.
the province governor, it has reported to Army Corps
headquarters in Peshawar and Quetta since cross-
border air attacks began in 1980.
since the Soviet invasion
about 30 kilometers from the border, and some 20,000
troops are in Quetta about 45 kilometers from the
Pakistani authorities moved four air defense
batteries equipped with six 23-mm guns each and
three light artillery regiments equipped with 18 105-
mm guns each to four major crossings at Landi Kotal,
Chaman, Kuz Tsapparai, and near Parachinar in 25X1
1980. Most of the Army units near the Afghan
border, however, are still in cantonments back from
the border. Some 10,000 troops are in Parachinar
The Border Forces
Pakistan's Army remains oriented toward India
despite the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan almost six
years ago my three
of Islamabad's 18 divisions face Afghanistan.
Pakistani military officers have told US officials that
they believe full-scale hostilities are most likely with
India, but they expect Moscow to step up its military
pressure along the Afghan border.
Primary responsibility for the defense of the Afghan
border lies with the paramilitary Frontier Corps.
Pakistani authorities have increased the number of
Frontier Corps personnel from about 35,000 before
the Soviet invasion to approximately 50,000. The
Corps is organized into some 70 battalion-size
"wings" of 750 men each. Some of these wings are
broken down into 10-man squads that occupy posts
every 15 to 20 kilometers along much of the border;
larger posts are located at major border crossings.
Corpsmen are armed with light infantry weapons,
heavy machineguns, and 76-mm light artillery. Even
though the Frontier Corps is nominally subordinate to
the Interior Ministry and has traditionally reported to
border.
New Missile Defenses
Frontier Corps and Army border units received their
initial surface-to-air missiles during the first half of
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Islamabad deployed them with the border forces
because the number of Soviet and Afghan air attacks
against insurgent positions in Pakistan increased in
1984. Islamabad probably hopes that the missiles will
deter Soviet and Afghan attacks or at least discourage
Moscow and Kabul from intensifying them.
25 October 1985 25X1
Top Secret
NESA NESAR 85-023C
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Top Secret
The heat-seeking Redeyes and Stingers also have
suffered from technical problems. The Redeye, which
was first manufactured in the 1960s, is often
deflected from its path by bright clouds, sunlight, hot
rocks, flares, or even the contrast between the ground
and sky and can only be fired at the rear of an
aircraft's exhaust system. The Stinger is less easily
deflected from its target because it operates in a
portion of the infrared spectrum that is less
susceptible to background clutter and is more lethal
because it can be fired at any part of an attacking
aircraft. But even the Stinger can be deflected from
its path, particularly in mountainous areas, such as
the Afghan-Pakistani border region.
We believe that the missiles could cause the Soviets
and Afghans to adopt somewhat less effective tactics
against the insurgents if the border forces shot down
an aircraft or consistently fired more missiles at
attacking aircraft. Soviet and Afghan aircraft might
bomb from a higher altitude, above the 5-kilometer
range of the surface-to-air missiles, or shorten the
amount of time over target to avoid the missiles.
Marginal Improvements in Artillery
and Mobility
Islamabad has increased the Frontier Corps' artillery
and mobility.
We doubt that the Frontier Corps' new artillery and
armored personnel cars will deter Afghan Army
shelling of insurgent positions in Pakistan or prevent a
major ground incursion. The Corps' new arms are
outmatched by the Afghan Army's armor and heavy
officers have told US officials that they do not want to
give the Afghans a pretext to increase their shelling of
Pakistani territory.
Frontier Corps Strengths
We believe that the Frontier Corps with their small
arms and light artillery could inflict significant losses
on small Soviet and Afghan units in a future ground
incursion.
Frontier Corps members know the local terrain well
and are highly motivated because they serve in their
native areas. They also receive nearly the same salary
and rigorous training as regular Army troops and are
superior to them in marksmanship and the use of
camouflage.
Outlook
We believe the Frontier Corps and Army border units
will continue to react cautiously to Soviet and Afghan
territorial violations. Pakistani officers have told US
officials that the border forces are under orders not to
shoot at an aircraft unless they believe it will crash in
Pakistani territory. The officers also have indicated
that they can tolerate the current level of air
violations, although the Pakistanis do not want to give
the impression that Moscow and Kabul can act with
impunity in the border area
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If the border forces shot down a hostile aircraft, we
believe the two sides would try to prevent the incident
from leading to a significantly greater military
escalation. In our view, the Soviets would minimize
the incident, particularly if a Soviet rather than an
Afghan aircraft were involved, to avoid drawing
domestic and international attention to a violation of
Pakistani airspace. We believe, however, that the
Soviets and Afghans would renew air attacks against
insurgent supply lines relatively quickly.
Islamabad also probably would try to contain the
damage to its relations with Moscow to prevent Soviet
military retaliation. We believe Pakistani officials
would turn over quickly any of the crew members who
survived the crash; Islamabad returned a Soviet pilot
captured by the insurgents in 1981.
If the Soviets chose to punish Pakistan militarily, we
believe they would retaliate against the Pakistani
Army posts on the border. The posts are easily visible
to Soviet reconnaissance, unlike the smaller Frontier
Corps posts. We doubt the Soviets would attack the
larger Army cantonments or Air Force airfields
farther away from the border because of the
diplomatic costs.
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Iran: Limited Effectiveness
of Ground-Based Air Defenses
Iranian air defenses are likely to remain ineffective
against Iraqi airstrikes despite recent efforts to
improve them. Iran's ability to detect and destroy
Poor Performance Against Iraqi Attacks
Protecting Khark Island-the shipping point for over
85 percent of Iran's oil exports-is a priority concern
high-flying targets is limited, and Tehran is having for Iran's leaders.
difficulty acquiring new air defense equipment
because few countries are willing to act as suppliers.
Moreover, the Iranian military is suffering from
worsening shortages of equipment useful against low-
to-medium-altitude targets and of trained operational,
maintenance, and repair personnel. Civilian criticism
of Iran's air defense forces is likely to grow in the
wake of Iraqi attacks on Khark Island, and this could
prompt the removal of senior officers. It could also
cause a shift in responsibility for air defense from the
regular military to the Revolutionary Guard, a move
that would further weaken Iran's capabilities.
The Shah's Legacy
Iran was only beginning to build its air defenses when
the Shah was removed by the revolution. The Shah
had counted first on a strong Air Force to engage
attacking aircraft and only secondarily on air defense
weapons to shoot down enemy aircraft that escaped
his Air Force. As a result, Iran suffered from a severe
shortage of deployed surface-to-air missiles (SAM) at
the start of the Iran-Iraq war. Less than half of the
216 HAWK launchers obtained by the Shah were
deployed when the war began, and Iran had only
about 30 British Tigercat and 52 Rapier SAM
launchers. Gaps in radar coverage, especially
altitudes, combined with mountainous terrain
border regions also made air defense difficult.
in the
Over the last five years, the deterioration of Iran's Air
Force and the paucity of ground-based air defenses
have allowed the Iraqis to penetrate Iranian airspace
easily. Nonetheless, before this year most of the
airstrikes were ineffective, and the Iranians displayed
comparatively little concern about them. In recent
months, however, Iraqi air attacks have become more
effective-causing some 5,000 to 10,000 casualties in
the cities and threatening Iran's oil exports from
Khark Island-and Tehran is stepping up efforts to
improve its air defenses.
Flawed Radar Coverage
Iran's few radars are deployed to provide overlapping
coverage of the western border and Gulf coast.
Shortages of radar equipment leave much of the
interior of the country with weak detection
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systems and cannot use the ones they have effectively.
The HAWKs have not been a signficant threat to
Iraqi aircraft because the Iranians have too few of the
crew ineptitude apparently results in misfires.
Personnel cannot perform the necessary maintenance
or obtain parts to keep the systems operational, and
Breakdowns and malfunctions aggravated by
shortages of spare parts and experienced repair
personnel frequently cause serious gaps in radar
With few surface-to-air missiles, Iran relies on small-
to-medium-caliber antiaircraft artillery to try to
protect its combat forces, to supplement missile air
defenses at large installations, and to protect smaller
facilities throughout the country. Air defense artillery
battalions in the infantry and armored divisions are
equipped with towed and self-propelled 23-mm or
57-mm antiaircraft guns and SA-7 surface-to-air
Early in
the war Iraqi pilots crossed the border at very low
altitudes to take advantage of terrain masking to
defeat Iranian radar. The Iraqis also are now flying
high-altitude missions, beyond the range of Iran's air
defense capabilities
Missiles and Antiaircraft Artillery
Iran suffers from a chronic shortage of surface-to-air
missiles, especially for medium-to-high-altitude air
defense, because it cannot find a supplier for the
British and US missiles it needs. Most of Iran's
surface-to-air missile sites are located around Tehran
and other major cities in the west and at important
oil, military, and industrial facilities. The Iranians use
their Rapier and Tigercat systems for low-altitude
point defense of cities and key facilities. They
generally use HAWK systems, which can also counter
some medium high-altitude airstrikes, to strengthen
air defenses in areas threatened by Iraqi airstrikes.
Because of shortages, Iran can only provide
reasonably effective coverage in some areas by leaving
others with little or no protection.
missiles.
Iran has achieved its greatest rate of success against
Iraqi aircraft with antiaircraft artillery. The Iranians
had about 1,300 towed and just over 120 self-
propelled guns on hand in 1980 and have had limited
success obtaining Soviet-origin antiaircraft
equipment. The guns are easier for the Iranians to
operate and maintain than surface-to-air missiles.
Antiaircraft personnel have had a considerable
amount of experience at the front, and we believe they
generally are more capable at utilizing their weapons
than surface-to-air missile crews. In addition,
although Iraqi pilots usually try to attack from high
altitudes, in some cases-for example, attacking point
targets or flying ground-support missions at the
front-they must sometimes fly at low levels where
they are exposed to Iranian antiaircraft fire.
Efforts To Remedy Deficiencies
Tehran has attempted to acquire new air defense
systems since early in the war with limited results.
More aggressive Iraqi bombing of cities last spring
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and Khark Island this fall have caused Tehran to step
up its efforts.
Iranians have recently obtained Soviet-
manufactured SA-2 surface-to-air missile launchers
but we doubt that they will quickly or
significantly improve Iran's ability to shoot down
Iraqi or other sophisticated aircraft. The SA-2,
designed to shoot down targets flying at medium to
high altitudes, is not effective against aircraft flying
at low altitudes. The system is difficult to move
quickly and is vulnerable to electronic
countermeasures aboard Iraqi aircraft. In addition,
Iran will be unable to effectively use the SA-2s until it
obtains the accompanying radar for the system.
Iranian personnel will have to be trained to operate
and maintain them. Iranian personnel in the past have
been unable to adequately master Iran's other
surface-to-air missile systems.
Other efforts to upgrade Iran's air defense capabilities
Tehran's desperation to overcome shortages of
surface-to-air missiles and to acquire supplies from
foreign sources has resulted in ineffective attempts to
use naval missiles to fill gaps in its air defense net.
Outlook
Supplier-imposed constraints probably will prevent
Iran from obtaining enough weapon systems in the
near term to improve significantly its air defense
capabilities. We believe that even a doubling of Iran's
current operational stock of air defense systems would
not have a dramatic impact in the short to medium
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term because Tehran would still suffer from a
shortage of adequately trained personnel to operate
and maintain them. Iran probably will have to
continue to rely on its most effective air defense-the
hours of darkness when Iraqi pilots seldom fly-to
launch its attacks or supply and move its forces
Iran's shortage of fighter aircraft will continue to
magnify the weakness of its ground-based air
defenses. We doubt that Iran will be able to stop or
inflict significant losses on Iraqi aircraft conducting
determined, intensive strikes on its cities or important
economic facilities.
Khark Island or alternative oil loading facilities will
remain particularly vulnerable. The single-point
mooring terminals that Iran is constructing between
Khark and the mainland will be open to attack
because Iranian air defenses in the area are weak.
Although the mooring terminals will slightly increase
Iraqi targeting problems, Iranian air defenses would
be no better able to defend the new facilities than they
can defend Khark.
In the event that Saudi or other forces launched
retaliatory strikes in response to Iranian attacks
against shipping or oil facilities in the Persian Gulf,
Iranian air defenses probably would present little
threat. The Saudis, with relatively well-trained pilots,
probably could effectively exploit gaps in Iranian air
defense coverage. Although the Iranians might be
able to shoot down a few Saudi aircraft making low-
to-medium-altitude attacks, their record suggests that
their ability to do so would be governed more by luck
than skill.
Rising civilian criticism of the air defense forces could
prompt changes in command and responsibilities that
probably would harm rather than improve their
effectiveness.
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Iran: Civil, Religious, and
Revolutionary Law
Enforcement Agencies
Tehran's efforts to consolidate its control nationwide
and bring order to the bureaucracy have led to the
reinstatement of prerevolutionary law enforcement
agencies and the imposition of discipline on new
revolutionary organizations. This is causing a gradual
reduction in the continual turf battles among the wide
variety of religious, revolutionary, and civil law
enforcement agencies with overlapping mandates that
operate in Iran. One of the most important results of
the consolidation process is that the Revolutionary
Guard has been steadily losing clout in domestic law
enforcement.
Civil Law Enforcement
Civil law enforcement agencies have gradually
recovered from their collapse at the end of the
revolution and are being fully integrated into the
bureaucracy. In late 1978 and early 1979, police and
gendarmerie installations and the homes of their men
were being threatened or attacked by revolutionaries
seeking weapons and revenge. Many law enforcement
personnel simply abandoned their posts
In the early months of
the new regime, pro-Khomeini technocrats tried to
maintain the police and gendarmerie as the primary
law enforcement agencies. They probably hoped to
limit the power of their rivals who controlled the
Revolutionary Guard and komitehs-the parallel
Islamic power centers that sprang up throughout the
Iranian social and governmental structure after the
revolution. They failed, however, and many policemen
and gendarmes were arrested or killed, and most of
their installations and equipment were seized by
komiteh or Guard forces.
In 1980 the central government declared an amnesty
for former civil law enforcement personnel, and
rebuilding of the 40,000-man police and 70,000-man
gendarmerie began. Nonetheless, radicals demanded
further purges, and the police and gendarmes were
given only mundane responsibilities
There were often 25X1
conflicts between them and revolutionary or religious
law enforcement personnel, especially when the
populace complained to one group about the actions of
another. Conflicts also occurred over Revolutionary
Guard resentment that other forces played only minor
roles at the warfront or enjoyed higher pay and
perquisites.
More recently, as the heavyhanded methods of the
Islamic security forces have antagonized the
populace, the police and gendarmerie have regained
many of their former responsibilities. Their gains have
been largely at the expense of the Revolutionary
Guard.
Police. Iranian police forces-now numbering about
70,000 are
divided into two forces and are subordinate to the
Interior Ministry, as they were under the Shah:
? The city police (Shahribani) are responsible for
dealing with urban criminal activity but have no
jurisdiction over religious or revolutionary law
enforcement groups.
? The traffic police (Rahnamai) are used for urban
traffic control.
According to an agreement between national-level
police and komiteh leaders announced in August
1985, the police have regained most of the traditional
duties they had under the Shah. The new accord takes
the police out of activities that could have a political
connotation-a move that may further increase
popular respect for them. According to the agreement,
the police are responsible for traffic control; liaison
with foreign police forces; operation of police stations;
provision of security for railroads, airports, banks,
hotels, embassies, municipal services, public places,
official guests of the government, and international
conferences; and patrolling at official ceremonies and
demonstrations that have been approved by the
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NESA NESAR 85-023C
25 October
1985
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Interior Ministry. Iranian press reports also indicate
that police duties will include urban fingerprinting
services, detective work, and pursuing and arresting
The force uses a number of specialized units, most of
Police now undergo strict background investigations
and training designed not only to ensure at least a
minimal commitment to the regime, but also to instill
discipline and foster professionalism.
an average of 300 police recruits are chosen each
year from about 10,000 applicants, all of whom must
have completed military service and be recommended
by a cleric. Most are given three-to-six-month courses
at the police "university" in Tehran; officer
candidates attend a three-year program there.
Gendarmerie. Like the police, the gendarmerie has
been regaining the responsibilities it lost after the
revolution. According to the Iranian press, the regime
plans soon to negotiate a similar agreement between
the gendarmerie and the komitehs that will cover
criminal and traffic law enforcement outside urban
Gendarmerie personnel are as closely monitored by
the regime as are the police.
The gendarmerie
air unit was reactivated last month and will take on
most of the logistic support for gendarme units in the
warfront areas of northwest and southwest Iran. A
gendarmerie coast guard unit patrols coastal waters in
the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman and navigable
rivers in southern Iran. Five gendarmerie brigades
have recently been established along the border with
Afghanistan and the USSR to try to halt drug
smuggling. They probably are part of a gendarme unit
formed in late 1983 called Jondollah (Army of God)
that patrols border areas for smugglers, deserters, and
draft dodgers
Religious and Revolutionary Law Enforcement
The komitehs and qazi police stand out among the
religious and revolutionary law enforcement agencies
created after the revolution, for their organization,
nearly nationwide mandate, and sponsorship by the
central government.
announced in August.
Komitehs. This autonomous, national, mosque-
centered network was put under the control of the
Interior Ministry in 1984 as part of the regime's
rationalization program, and komiteh security forces
became subject to central discipline. Early this year,
the central government announced that the komiteh
forces-known as komiteh guards (Komiteh
Pasdaran), not to be confused with the Revolutionary
Guard (Sepah-e Pasdaran)-should develop working
relationships with the police rather than the
Revolutionary Guard. These efforts apparently led to
the agreement between the komitehs and police
When told that the komitehs should work with the
police, komiteh leaders tried unsuccessfully to absorb
the police. They managed only to assume officially
some of the most important police functions. Under
the agreement, the komiteh guard network-
composed of 28,000 men under the age of 35-will be
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considered a law, order, and security enforcement
agency alongside the police. Komitehs will be
responsible for the security of major political figures
and public places; combating narcotics, antireligious,
and counterrevolutionary activities; and controlling
disturbances, unauthorized demonstrations, and
strikes. Another duty, according to the Iranian press,
is forming special-purpose patrols-which in Tehran,
at least, early last year were "too numerous to name
or count." The Interior Ministry, which took over the
previously autonomous komiteh network in mid-1984,
plans to set up komitehs under its control in all towns
and villages.
Qazi (Judicial) Police. This agency, which began to
operate in early 1982, is similar to West European
judicial police and the US Marshal's office. Its
mandate is based on the Shia emphasis on correctly
implementing religious law as a means of providing
universal social justice. The qazi police is
administered by the Justice Ministry, but it is
ultimately under the control of the Supreme Judicial
Council
The qazi police has been responsible for significant
increases in the speed and efficiency of the court
system, according to the Iranian press. After a crime
is committed, the qazi police follows cases to their
conclusion. It investigates and files the case; pursues,
interrogates, and arrests suspects; collects and
preserves documents, including the prior record of the
accused; serves judicial papers; escorts the accused to
and from the court; and quickly carries out verdicts.
The qazi police also oversees work done at criminal
investigation offices, identification offices, coroners'
offices, gendarmerie, and police posts. It keeps an eye
on the entire judicial system, according to the Justice
Minister. He says it "prevents the interference of
incompetent and impious individuals" in the judicial
process.
Reflecting its importance to the regime, the qazi
police has expanded within a year from 20 stations in
Tehran to forces in all or part of six provinces, with at
least token representation in 30 cities. Despite rapid
expansion, the selection of qazi police has remained
closely controlled, and its personnel receive detailed
training. Standards are so high that only 75 of the
first 1,500 applicants were selected, and only 650
were hired in the first year of operations. The first
complement of qazi policemen were required to have a
"high moral commitment," have completed secondary
school, or been known as reliable police, gendarmerie,
komiteh, or Revolutionary Guard members.
Subsequent recruits had to be college graduates.
Members of the qazi police take a shortened version
of the Tehran police "university" curriculum dating
from the Shah's era as well as a new program run by
the Justice Ministry. According to the Iranian press,
the Revolutionary Guard also provides some training.
National Political Security Committee (Komiteh-e
Amniyat-e Siasi-e Melli). This unit was created
within the Interior Ministry around 1983 to deal with
security problems caused by the influx of Afghan and
Iraqi refugees The 25X1
committee relies on cooperation with the police,
Revolutionary Guard, and komiteh personnel to carry
out its duties.
Tehran Security Nucleus or Islamic Guard. This
group is a 100-man riot control unit under the Prime
Minister. Once a part of the intelligence and security
apparatus attached to the Prime Minister's office, the
unit remained there when other sections were
absorbed into the new Intelligence Ministry last year.
It may become the nucleus of a planned 6,000-man
national riot control force under the Interior Ministry.
This unit was charged earlier this year with
preventing antiregime demonstrations among crowds
that collected at the scene of Iraqi bombings.
Joint Security Patrols. These armed teams of police
and intelligence officers search for evidence of
Revolutionary Guard and judicial corruption or
malfeasance. They were largely responsible for
collecting the evidence against the former director of
Evin Prison. Similar anticorruption, antihoarding, and
antiprofiteering patrols are called Ansarollah
(Supporters of God)
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Rabble in Arms
Most other Iranian revolutionary/ religious law
enforcement groups are far less organized than the
komiteh and qazi police. More important, they have
not received central government approval through
formal inclusion in the bureaucracy. The Iranian
press has accurately noted that at any given time
there are so many independent patrols operating
under a variety of sponsors throughout Iran that they
cannot be counted and often are not named.
One result is that members of one group have
been ordered to eliminate "illegal" activities that have
been authorized by another group.
Among the best known are:
? Hezbollahi (Party of God).
these are ill-defined bands that
exist throughout Iran but have no known national
leadership or organized structure. They seem to be
made up of hired mobs or the private armies
traditionally attached to influential bazaaris and
clerics. They are used by individuals trying to
influence government policies and by the
government to intimidate the populace. Turf battles
and conflicting mandates have led to particularly
acrimonious relations between the hezbollahi and
the Revolutionary Guard.
? Jondollah (Army of God). Almost all of these
forces-composed of Army, gendarmerie,
Revolutionary Guard, and Basij personnel-are now
active along the warfront, primarily in northwest
Iran. Formed in 1983 to seek out draft dodgers, the
Jondollah units were gradually pulled out of the
cities in 1984 at the same time that the
Revolutionary Guard lost its civil law enforcement
powers. In Yazd, Jondollah patrols were banned by
the senior local cleric who preferred the
gendarmerie and police. In Esfahan, on the other
hand, a Jondollah force is used by the senior cleric
to offset the local Revolutionary Guard, which is not
under his control. Other Jondollah groups are
attached to the gendarmerie and komitehs.
? Sarollah (Revenge of God). These all-male religious
morality police, controlled by the Revolutionary
Guard, quickly developed a reputation for brutality
after the revolution. They were particularly known
for atrocities on females arrested for wearing un-
Islamic attire and for their humiliating
interrogation of fathers and brothers walking with
The Sarollah is still being used in some
capacity because Iranian press reports indicate that
as recently as October 1985 the Guard was
recruiting youths over 17 for the Sarollah from
among conscripts and those who have already served
at the front.
? Sisters of Zahra (Khahari-ye Zahra). Composed of
armed females who patrol cities in vehicles, the
Sisterhood probably was formed because of protests
against the Sarollah. In Tehran, the Zahra was
controlled by the prosecutor-general who was also
director of Evin Prison. A controversial character,
he was ousted by moderates in 1985 after prolonged
efforts. In Tehran and some other cities, the Zahra
may have been absorbed this year into the Ershad
patrols.
? Sisters of Zaineb (Khahari-ye Zaineb). This
organization may also have been formed in response
to complaints of misconduct by Sarollah patrols. Its
personnel patrolled in vehicles with two men and
two women, and it quickly developed a nasty
reputation. In Tehran, Zaineb had been supervised
by the former prosecutor-general and director of
Evin Prison; it may have been absorbed into the
Ershad patrols after his ouster.
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? Ershad (Guidance) Patrols. These mixed male-
female patrols are controlled by the office of the
Tehran prosecutor-general or by the komitehs.
According to the Iranian press, Ershad patrols
"control debauchery." Some patrols use vehicles
marked with the insignia of the Islamic courts.
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Lebanon: Will Nabih Barri
Survive?
Nabih Barri, Lebanon's mainstream Shia leader, is
facing increasing challenges and dissent within his
Amal organization and from the Shia fundamentalists
within the Hizballah movement. To retain power,
Barri must prevent Hizballah from further infiltrating
Amal's lower and middle ranks and maintain Syrian
military and political support. We believe Barri has
lost control of the Bekaa Valley to Hizballah, and his
control over southern Lebanon and South Beirut is
slowly eroding.
Barri continues to control Amal's bureaus and cells.
He allocates supplies to militia commanders who
demonstrate their loyalty and allegiance to him.
According to the US Embassy in Beirut, however, his
movement is fraught with factionalism, and
disagreements on key issues within the leadership are
common.
Barri is having difficulty controlling the activities of
Amal militia commanders who are sympathetic to
Hizballah. These include Mustafa Dirani, security
chief for South Beirut; Zakaria Hamzah, military
commander for the Bekaa Valley; and Daud Daud,
one of Amal's two top military officials in southern
Mahmud al-Fayih, military commander for southern
Lebanon; and Aqil Hamiyah, military chief for
Beirut.
Barri's archrival and the key contender for power
within Amal is Hasan Hashem, chairman of the
Executive Committee. Hashem has close ties to
several of Amal's militia commanders and often
challenges Barri's right to interfere in militia
activities.
IHe has been unable to muster enough
support to get rid of Barri, however, and we have seen
nothing to suggest that he could fill Barri's shoes.
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Most of the support for Barri comes from inside
Amal's political command structure. Key loyalists
include Rabab Sadr Sharaff al-Din, the sister of
Musa Sadr (the founder of Amal); Hasan al-Masri, a
spokesman for Amal; and Ghassan Siblani, a key
aide. Barri's supporters in the militia include Qabalan
Qabalan, chief of military security for Beirut;
Vulnerabilities
Barri is vulnerable on several issues. He is often
accused by his opponents of lacking charisma,
religious conviction, and the credentials necessary for
leadership of the Lebanese Shia community. He is
often accused by Hizballah of subverting the original
Top Secret
NESA NESAR 85-023C
25 October 1985
Nabih Barri ... must prevent
radicalization of Amal if he is
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teachings of Imam Musa Sadr. Barri is also
vulnerable on his policy toward Israel. He has
advocated a militant stance only to achieve the full
liberation of Lebanon's southern territories. Unlike
Hizballah, Barri has shown little interest in carrying
the struggle into Israel. He realizes this would bring
Israeli military retaliation against southern Shia
villages, which would prompt additional flows of Shia
refugees to overcrowded South Beirut.
Hasan Hashem ... key con-
tenderfor power within Amal.
deal with Amal but realize that Barri is under
pressure from the more extreme Shia organizations to
maintain his Shia credentials by continuing to
confront Israel.
Barri is vulnerable to the charge that he often pursues
his own interests at the expense of the Shia
community. Moderate and extremist clerical
opponents of Barri accuse him of serving Syrian not
Lebanese Shia interests in Lebanon. They argue that
his militia's attacks on the Sunnis and their
Palestinian allies in West Beirut last spring is a case
in point. They point out that his alliance with the
leftist forces of Walid Jumblatt, although shaky and
unpredictable at times, reinforces the secular image
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Barri argues that the problem of the south would not
exist had it not been for the Palestinians. He insists on
eliminating the incentive for Israeli retaliation by
denying the Palestinians or the Hizballah freedom to
operate there. But sensing an erosion in support for
his policy toward Israel, Barri has adopted more
militant rhetoric over the past year to recoup his
political losses and maintain credibility as a
paramount Shia leader. These setbacks include:
? His inability to extract more concessions from
President Amin Gemayel and the Christian
Lebanese Forces militia.
? His failure to transform the victory of his Amal
militia over the Lebanese Army in February 1984
into concrete political gains for the Shia community.
? His inability to force Israel to relinquish its security
zone in southern Lebanon.
Barri is frustrated over his failure to bring about the
demise of the Israeli-supported Army of South
Lebanon and Amal's lack of control over all of the
south. The Israelis will not give up their security zone
until they are satisfied that they will not be
threatened from the north. They would like to strike a
and direction of Amal under his leadership.
The threat of assassination by Hizballah elements has
forced Barri to become extremely conscious of
security in the past year. He is known to have
barricaded himself in his residence for fear of being
assassinated. This did not prevent him, however, from
showing up in Baalabakk, deep in Hizballah's
heartland, in early September to deliver a speech
commemorating the disappearance of Musa Sadr and
to criticize openly Iran's role in Lebanon.
Barri's Political Background
Barri's ascendance to power was not coincidental. He
was a protege and confidant of Imam Musa Sadr.
Barri quickly rose through Amal's ranks following his
appointment as the movement's attorney, a position
that introduced him to the inner workings of Amal's
various cells and bureaus as well as to its financial
and legal transactions.
Two years after the disappearance of Musa Sadr,
Barri succeeded, with Syrian complicity, in seizing
the reins of power of Amal from Husayn Husayni, a
traditional Shia notable from the Bekaa Valley. The
election of Barri, a southerner, to the leadership of
Amal was a consequence of the movement's
development out of the economic, political, and social
ills in southern Lebanon. It also signified the triumph
of southern Lebanese over their traditional political
rivals in the Bekaa. Barri's current role as Minister of
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State for the South and Reconstruction gives him an
opportunity to strengthen his position among skeptics
in the Shia community who accuse him of
transforming Amal into a modern, urban-oriented
political institution.
Barri is first and foremost a politician. He insists that
Amal is primarily a people's movement and that the
military wing is secondary to the political,
informational, educational, cultural, social, economic,
and labor wings. As if to emphasize the nonsectarian
nature of Amal under his leadership, Barri insists that
there is no difference between a deprived Shiite and a
deprived Maronite. Barri's wife is involved in
philanthropic activities helping the muhajjreen, the
rural emigres from southern Lebanon.
Political Style and Attitudes
For now Barri is viewed as the legitimate leader of
Amal by both his foes and his supporters. Despite his
shortcomings, he retains power because he is seen as
the only leader capable of keeping the organization
intact, and no one has been able to build a strong
enough coalition to pose a serious challenge to his
authority. Outside Amal, the Iranians and the
Hizballah supporters have failed to produce an
alternative to Barri. His ability to deal with a variety
of political forces and personalities on the Lebanese
and international scenes appears to be central to his
survival.
Last summer's TWA hijacking indicates some of the
limits of Barri's influence. He succeeded in voicing
the Shia community's grievances about Israel's
detention of Shias from southern Lebanon, but he
appeared incapable of extricating himself from the
controversial political position that he took regarding
the hostages. In the end, he was forced to rely on
Syrian assistance to resolve the crisis.
Barri's political style is dictatorial. He uses his
position as the Shia warlord to co-opt, sideline, and
punish opponents. Barri believes that achieving a
political consensus within the Lebanese Shia
community is unnecessary so long as he addresses the
material and security needs of its members. Barri
often employs coercion, manipulation, and arm
twisting to get his adherents to abide by his decisions.
Barri prides himself on being instrumental in the
expulsion of the Christian-dominated Lebanese Army
from West Beirut in February 1984 and often praises
his tactical alliance with Druze militia leader Walid
Jumblatt as necessary and proper. Although Jumblatt
supported Barri's efforts to contain the power of the
Sunni Nasirite militia in West Beirut, he played a
neutral role in the Amal militia attacks on the
Palestinian camps in the capital.
In Amal and the Shia community, Barri has
consistently supported the secularization of the
Lebanese state, has called for a larger Shia share of
the political pie, and has opposed the role of religious
leaders in the political future of the country. He
rejects the idea of an Islamic state for Lebanon, a
position that has put him on a collision course with the
Hizballah. On this important issue he has drawn the
wrath of moderate Shia religious leaders such as
Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams-al-Din, vice
president of the Higher Shia Council, and Shaykh
Abd al-Amir Qabalan, the Ja'afari Mufti of Sidon:
? Shams-al-Din on one occasion accused Barri of
collusion with the United States and called upon
Barri to be more accommodating toward both the
Palestinians and the West Beirut Sunni population.
? Press reports indicate that Mufti Qabalan has
implied that Barri may have violated the spirit of
Amal's compact when he ordered the attack on the
Palestinians. Article 7 of the compact alludes to the
special relationship between the Palestinians and
Amal.
Barri maintains links to the United States and is
considered friendly toward the West. Barri comes
from humble origins and prefers a secular, Western
lifestyle. He is reported to have told Shaykh
Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, the Hizballah
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Abd al-Amir Qabalan
... claims Barri violated Amal
compact when his militia at-
tacked Palestinian camps in
Iran for its part continues to accuse Barri's loyalists of
harassing the Lebanese Shia clergy, especially in the
south. It is demanding that Amal declare itself a
political rather than an Islamic Shia movement.
spiritual leader, that he prefers Beirut to maintain its
cosmopolitan, Western-oriented flavor. Barri has
visited the United States and maintains some contact
with his former wife and six children in Dearborn,
Michigan. Barri has resident alien status but has not
met the residency requirement as prescribed by US
law.
Relations With Syria and Iran
Barri believes his Syrian link is necessary to continue
Amal's military struggle in Lebanon and urges a more
aggressive political role for Syria in solving his
country's problems. Barri has become increasingly
dependent on Syrian arms shipments as evidenced by
the delivery of T-54 tanks to the Amal militia in late
August. The Syrians want Barri to remain strong
enough to carry out their policies in Lebanon, but
weak enough to keep him under their direct control.
Barri's close relations with Syria make him a target of
severe criticism from Hizballah sympathizers within
Amal, who accuse him of being hostile toward Iran.
Barri claims that Iran has ignored Libyan culpability
in the disappearance of Musa Sadr. He has warned
Iran that, if it does not stand by him now, it may not
have a chance to do so when Amal seizes power in
Lebanon.
Outlook
Barri must continue to rely on Syrian support if he is
to retain his leadership post. Barri will have difficulty
maintaining control of Amal because it is a movement
composed of many different groups and factions. His
reliance on persuasion, coercion, co-optation, or force
to get Amal adherents to support his decisions will be
increasingly challenged by Hizballah. Monetary
rewards and outright bribes given by Barri to
individual militias and rank-and-file members
ultimately may prove insufficient to maintain their
allegiance to him.
In the near term, however, the Shia community is
unlikely to come up with an alternative to Barri. Since
the early 1970s, Amal has become identified with the
Lebanese Shiite community. Barri benefits from and
exploits Amal's historical background as the only
broad-based Shia movement, its spiritual connection
with Imam Musa Sadr, and the material and military
needs of the individual members.
Barri's proven skills as a manager and coordinator
probably make him indispensable in the short run,
despite the growing strength of Hizballah. He will
probably retain leadership if his claim to moral
legitimacy as Sadr's successor continues to be
accepted by the mainstream Shia community.
Material support from middle- and upper-class
Shiites who resent the encroachment of Hizballah's
fundamentalist practices will buttress Barri's
popularity and staying power.
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