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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000100220001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 27, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
MASTER FILE COPY
10 NOT GIVE OUT
on MAIM( IN
Near East and
South Asia Review
Supplement
27 September 1985
Top Secret
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coPy260
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Growing domestic discontent with Qadhafi's political and economic
policies strengthens the chance that a lone gunman will assassinate
him, and, if he is succeeded by members of his tribe, they could turn
to the West for economic assistance and, in return, could curtail
Libyan support for subversion against Western interests. F_~
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Israel-Syria: Cautious Warriors) 9
The chances of an intentional major outbreak of fighting between
Israeli and Syrian forces in Lebanon or elsewhere are slight for at
least the next year, but the potential for limited conflict clearly
exists because of the volatile situation in Lebanon.
Syria's Offensive Chemical Warfare Capability
Syria has developed a chemical weapons stockpile of significant size
since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, but it views use of chemical
weapons as a last resort either in an all-out war with Israel if defeat
appears imminent, or if it believes an enemy is about to launch a
chemical warfare attack.)
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NESA 85-021 JX
27 September 1985
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Iran: Acquiring a Chemical Warfare Capability) 19
Spurred by the demands of the war with Iraq, Iran has intensified
its development of a chemical weapons program. Iran's threat to
retaliate for any Iraqi use of chemical weapons will not deter
Baghdad, but will instead increase the likelihood of a chemical
exchange.F--]
Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items
will be designated as noncoordinated views. Comments may be directed to the
authors,
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NESS 85-021 JX
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Growing domestic discontent with Qadhafi's political
and economic policies strengthens the chance that a
lone gunman will assassinate him. In our view,
Qadhafi's removal would be followed by a period of
intense and possibly bloody political maneuvering for
control. Qadhafi's departure also would have
significant implications for US interests. In the likely
event that Qadhafi is succeeded by members of his
tribe, we believe that the new regime's initial concern
will be to ease widespread grumbling over
deteriorating economic conditions. In support of this
objective, Libya's new leaders could turn to the West
for increased imports of consumer goods and other
economic assistance. Qadhafi's successors might offer
to reciprocate Western assistance by curtailing costly
Libyan support for subversion against Western
interests worldwide. In our view, however, Libyan
foreign policies would continue to emphasize Tripoli's
arms supply relationship with the Soviet Union as well
as an anti-US bias on regional issues.
Background
We judge that Qadhafi's prospects for survival are
poorer now than at any time since he came to power
16 years ago.
mismanaged socialist economic policies, economic
constraints imposed by the soft oil market, and
wasteful spending in support of radical causes
worldwide are seriously eroding the relatively high
standard of living that was regarded by most Libyans
as one of the principal fruits of Qadhafi's revolution.
These developments, in our view, combined with
widely resented abuses of power by Qadhafi's
extremist supporters, are creating a political climate
that encourages plotting by Qadhafi's many
opponents and increases their chances of penetrating
his elaborate security network.
would have widespread popular support in Libya.
Other motivations might include:
? A personal sense of grievance emanating from the
killing of a relative or close friend by Qadhafi's
security forces or by extremists in the Revolutionary
Committees.
? Outrage over Qadhafi's unorthodox interpretation
of Islam, his abuse of the pilgrimage to Mecca over
the past two years to smuggle arms and explosives
into Saudi Arabia and to stage violent
demonstrations there, and last year's hanging of
students on television during Ramadan, the Muslim
holy month.F__1
Members of Qadhafi's tribe, in our view, are best
placed to take power immediately following his
Although Hunaysh is Qadhafi's choice as his
successor, we believe several other tribesmen would
challenge any effort he made to consolidate power.
Two tribesmen who are particularly ambitious are
Qadhafi's cousins Ahmad Qadhaf al-Dam, who serves
as the Libyan leader's most trusted diplomatic envoy,
and Col. Hasan Ashkal, who is assigned to some of
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Who Takes Power?
In our judgment, Qadhafi's ouster might be
accomplished by a lone assassin believing his action
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NESA NESAR 85-021JX
27Sepe"1985
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Libya's most sensitive security posts.
candidate might be another Qadhafi cousin, Masud
Abd al-Hafiz, a career military officer. In our view,
he could try to use contacts developed during prestige
command assignments to gain support from other
senior officers.
Challenge From Outsiders
Sustained political infighting among members of the
Qadhafi tribe would lessen their chances for retaining
power, in our view. Reporting from unclassified
sources indicates the Qadhafi tribe is a relatively
small one whose status in Libya is based almost
entirely on Qadhafi's leadership. We believe a divisive
internal power struggle would increase the Qadhafi
tribe's vulnerability to criticism by domestic
opponents, weaken its control over the security forces,
and encourage plotters to try to remove them.F_~
In our view, Qadhafi's principal deputy, Abd al-
Salam Jallud, is the strongest single opponent.
Qadhafi has
In addition, prestigious members of the 11-man Free
Officers' group that participated in the 1969 coup
that brought Qadhafi to power might regard
Qadhafi's assassination as an opportunity to assume
Could the Qadhafi Tribesmen Survive?
The ability of Qadhafi's fellow tribesmen, including
Hunaysh, to weather the challenges from outside the
family would depend in part on their ability to co-opt
their opponents. In our view, the Qadhafi tribesmen
permitted Jallud to sprinkle supporters in various
ministries and the military, apparently to try to buy
try to remove the Qadhafi tribesmen.
Another senior officer who might try to
engineer a coup is Armed Forces Director General
Abd al-Rahman al-Sayyid.
would have to choose between the Revolutionary
Committees or the armed forces
We believe that
a failure by the Qadhafi tribesmen to take into
account the interests of Revolutionary Committee
leaders could lead to armed opposition by the fanatics,
who have been given authority by Qadhafi to cache
some arms and munitions. It might also push the
Revolutionary Committees to cement their alliance
with Abd al-Salam Jallud and his supporters. On the
other hand, senior officers are unlikely to tolerate a
Qadhafi-dominated regime that assigned important
positions to the extremists, in our view. Qadhafi's
insertion of the Revolutionary Committees into the
armed forces as political watchdogs, his involving the
Revolutionary Committees in the People's Militia to
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build them up as a counterweight to the regular
armed forces, and his reliance on the Committees to
support revolutionary causes unrelated to Libyan
national interests are behind the officers' opposition.
We believe that a protracted power struggle could
prompt the Qadhafi tribesmen to try to broaden their
support by inviting the return of exiled Libyan
dissidents. The Qadhafi tribesmen might focus on
former Free Officer Abd al-Munim al-Huni, whose
refusal to participate openly in organized opposition
activity has helped him maintain contacts with
Libyan officials and military officers as well as
popular support
The position of Muhammad al-Muqaryaf
as leader of the National Front for the Salvation of
Libya, Libya's largest and most active exile
organization, makes him the other exile leader most
likely to be co-opted, in our view. F-7
There are other options open to Qadhafi tribesmen
that would discourage further plotting. High on the
list would be an increased emphasis on consumer
welfare and backtracking on Qadhafi's disruptive
economic socialization policies that have caused
serious shortages of foodstuffs and consumer goods.
at least important
members of the Qadhafi tribe would reject revolution
in favor of pragmatic economic reforms.
Implications for the United States
The focus of a government composed primarily of
Qadhafi tribesmen would be a reduction of Libyan
support for revolutionary causes worldwide, a
domestic issue that has become troublesome even for
Qadhafi New
economic priorities would require the regime to try to
improve its tarnished international reputation to
facilitate increased access to Western consumer
goods, foodstuffs, technology, managerial expertise,
and education. This, in our judgment, would offer
opportunities for the United States to reestablish full
diplomatic relations and promote trade ties.
We believe, however, that the prospects for improved
relations would at least initially be tempered by
suspicions in Tripoli that the United States
orchestrated Qadhafi's assassination. Such suspicions
would reinforce the regime's fierce determination to 25X1
reaffirm its nonaligned credentials and to resist
strongly any temptation to move quickly toward
rapprochement with Washington. The regime's anti-
Western posture also would be a continuing reaction
to Libya's experience as an Italian colony earlier this
century. F__1
The nonaligned posture of the new regime would
mean no change in Libyan reliance on the Soviet
Union for military training, advisory assistance, and
advanced weaponry, in our view. The USSR's ability
to influence the new regime would be reduced,
however, if, as we anticipate, West European
governments were willing to substantially increase
arms supplies. Tripoli could cut back or even end
Soviet naval visits and periodic use of Libyan facilities
by Soviet reconnaissance aircraft to encourage West
Europeans and the United States to offer
sophisticated arms and technology previously denied
Libya.F_~
A less likely scenario involving an alliance of the
Qadhafi tribe and Revolutionary Committees
probably would result in a more radical and unstable
government. In our view, a continuing emphasis on
unpopular revolutionary programs would prevent the
new government from winning firm domestic support.
In addition, participation by the revolutionaries would
increase pressure on the regime to support the use of
terrorism and subversion as foreign policy
instruments. Although the radicals reject Soviet
ideology, any US attempt to counter Libyan
aggression would risk pushing Tripoli closer to
Moscow. In our view, this might open up opportunities
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policy that would use moderate tactics to undermine
US interests in the region. F_~
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Israel-Syria:
Cautious Warriors
We believe the chances of an intentional major
outbreak of fighting between Israeli and Syrian forces
in Lebanon or elsewhere are slight for at least the next
year. The Syrians will concentrate on gaining control
over Lebanese factions, while the Israelis will seek to
consolidate their control over their security zone in
southern Lebanon and prevent Shia and Palestinian
terrorist attacks across the border into northern
Israel. The potential for limited conflict between the
two adversaries clearly exists, however, because of the
volatile situation in Lebanon.)
The Lebanese Arena
Syria continues to strive for preeminence in the Arab-
Israeli dispute. Although President Assad probably
believes that time is on the Arabs' side in their
struggle with Israel, he almost certainly realizes Syria
alone cannot inflict a decisive military defeat on the
Israelis. Instead, he appears convinced that the Arabs
must strive to restrain Israel primarily through
political means and sees himself as the leader in this
eflort.l
Lebanon figures prominently in Assad's campaign
against Israel.
ensure that Syria, not Israel, controls the situation in
Lebanon-a country that historically has been linked
with Damascus and is, in Assad's view, vital to Syria's
security.
system and restore at least a semblance of stability
while preserving Syrian influence there. His more
immediate objectives include:
? Rooting out and destroying remaining pro-Arafat
Palestinian elements in Lebanon and preventing the
return of pro-Arafat contingents.
? Strengthening the hand of the Shia Amal movement
vis-a-vis the radical Hizballah.
? Forcing Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, who has
been cautiously pursuing independent relations with
the USSR, to be more supportive of Syrian policies.'
? Driving the Army of South Lebanon out of the
Jazzin area.
? Reducing intercommunal violence, especially in
Beirut.
Assad has made little progress in pursuing his
objectives. The latest round of violence in Beirut in
August was one of the worst in years. Damascus has
been working behind the scenes to prevent a major
flareup among Shia, Palestinian, and Sunni militias in
Sidon, but tensions remain. All of the ingredients exist
there for another "war of the camps." Observers
believe that an outbreak of violence in Sidon would
encourage General Lahad's Army of South Lebanon
to attempt to recapture Christian villages east of
Sidon that were vacated last spring. F__1
Assad will attempt to reassert his control over his
Palestinian clients. He will also strive to prevent a
permanent reconciliation among pro- and anti-Arafat
elements. F_~
and possibly limited attac s against
targets in northern Israel. Suicide car bombings in the
Israeli security zone carried out under the banner of
the Syrian Social Nationalist Party are the most
recent examples of this aggressive policy.
Near-Term Prospects for Syrian-Israeli Conflict
Assad wants to avoid a war with Israel that would
result in a humiliating defeat and domestic
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Before he can turn his full attention to the struggle
with Israel, Assad must bring events in Lebanon
under greater Syrian control. Ultimately, he would
like to reform the Lebanese confessional political
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Syrian Troop Withdrawal
Despite the continuing factional violence, Assad has
begun to pull troops out of Lebanon. In June there
were nearly 60,000 Syrian troops in the country or on
the border, but the withdrawal of the 1st and 3rd
Armored Divisions, major elements of the 11th
Armored Division, and several combat support units
reduced this figure to about 30,000. According to
units of the new 14th Airborne Division have entered
Lebanon to offset the removal of regular ground force
units. Damascus could quickly reinforce its troops in
Lebanon if the need arose because Syrian units are
constantly manned at a relatively high level and
many are stationed near the Lebanese border.
This troop reduction is driven by several factors. It
mirrors Assad's determination not to become
entangled in Lebanon by using Syrian soldiers to
quell sectarian violence. The partial withdrawal also
reflects the fact that Israel has removed most of its
recriminations. Ever since Egypt decided to make
peace with Israel, the Israelis have been free to
concentrate most of their formidable combat power
against Syria. We believe only an unexpected
breakthrough in peace negotiations between Israel on
the one hand and Arafat and King Hussein on the
other might cause Assad to initiate even limited
hostilities against Israel.
The Peres government will not seek to embroil Syria
in any direct confrontation but will concentrate on
helping the Israeli armed forces to recover from the
ravages of three years of war in Lebanon. Israel,
however, would counter any major Syrian movement
southward in Lebanon, any major attack on Israeli
troops in the security zone, or any attack on northern
Israel that is directly traceable to the Syrians.)
troops from Lebanon-less than 2,000 remain in the
security zone Israel maintains in southern Lebanon-
thereby somewhat allaying Syrian fears.
Furthermore, the return of these troops provides
Assad with more forces for use in intimidating
Jordan if King Hussein pursues peace with Israel too
vigorously.
Syria can now concentrate on improving the readiness
and combat efficiency of its ground forces.
Syria money and facilitate the reorganization and
modernization of Syrian ground forces.
have stated repeatedly that they have no intention of
reentering Lebanon with major units, but they will
not hesitate to mount ground or air operations north
of the security zone to head off guerrilla operations or
retaliate for attacks.
The volatile situation in Lebanon could still spark
limited clashes between the two antagonists. Syrian-
backed attacks by Shia and Palestinian guerrillas on
Israeli and Army of South Lebanon troops in the
security zone or possibly on settlements in northern
Israel risk punitive Israeli strikes that could lead to
limited conflict. Nevertheless, Assad probably will
feel compelled to sponsor attacks to maintain Syria's
credibility as the premier Arab confrontation state.
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Over the next several months, Israel will concentrate
on strengthening the Army of South Lebanon and
preventing attacks on northern Israel. The Israelis
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Danger of Miscalculation
If Damascus were to underwrite a guerrilla raid that
resulted in a major loss of life and Israel traced the
attack to Syria, Israel would retaliate against Syrian
targets in Lebanon and might also attack targets in
Syria. In response Syria would probably move to
defend its units and facilities in Lebanon against
retaliatory strikes and would certainly do so if the
strikes were aimed at targets in Syria.' We believe
Syria recognizes that Israeli retaliation would be swift
and that Damascus will take great pains to mask its
support of major guerrilla operations.F--]
There also is a modest but continual danger of air
clashes. The Israelis continue to assert their right to
operate in the skies over Lebanon, conducting aerial
reconnaissance operations there-including many
along the Lebanese-Syrian border-almost on a daily
basis. Each reconnaissance aircraft is accompanied by
a combat air patrol that guards against would-be
attackers. If a reconnaissance aircraft entered Syrian
airspace in any substantial way, the Syrians would
attempt to shoot it down. The Israelis would almost
certainly retaliate for a shootdown by attacking
military targets in Syria, and Syria would be obliged
to defend itself.)
The Syrians also are considering limited military
operations in Lebanon that might elicit an Israeli
military response. For months Damascus has wanted
the Israeli-backed Army of South Lebanon to
withdraw from Jazzin-the last Christian stronghold
have to use Syrian forces to secure Jazzin. The
Syrians probably could displace the lightly armed
Army of South Lebanon without too much trouble if
they committed several heavily armed battalions to
' Israel has warned Syria that it would not tolerate the
reintroduction of such tactical air defense missiles into Lebanon as
the SA-6 and SA-8 that can defend major ground force units. By
and large, Syria has heeded this warning, although on occasion it
has stationed SA-8s just across the border in Lebanon. It has never
deployed them south of the Beirut-Damascus highway. Syrian units
in Lebanon rely mainly on short-range weapons-SA-7s, SA-9s,
and ZSU-23-4 self-propelled air defense guns-for protection
against enemy aircraft.
An assault on Jazzin, however, might be
misinterpreted by Israel and provoke a military
response. Jazzin is protected to the east by the Jabal
al Baruk ridge. If Syria sent troops around the eastern
flank of the ridge to swing north for an attack on
Jazzin, Israel might perceive the movement as being
directed at Israel and attack the units as they moved
south in the valley. Knowing that this sort of
misunderstanding could arise, the Syrians might
choose instead to attack Jazzin from the north using
ground units. A surprise helicopter-borne assault
might dislodge Lahad's forces quickly, but such an
operation might also be misinterpreted by the Israelis
as being directed at them, even if the units involved
staged through the Beirut area. F__1
Another Syrian operation in Lebanon that might
result in a clash with the Israelis involves military
construction in the Bekaa Valley. In any future
general war between Syria and Israel, Damascus
probably expects the Israelis to attempt to drive
northward up the Bekaa and turn toward Damascus.
The ease with which Israeli armored columns moved
up the valley in 1982 and threatened to cut the
Beirut-Damascus highway probably left Assad
determined to prevent a recurrence.
The Israelis razed most fortifications and facilities of
military value when they withdrew from their
northernmost positions in the valley last spring, and a
Syrian program to construct major fortifications or
obstacles could trigger an Israeli attack. If the
Syrians limit their activities to the construction of
modest obstacles in the area they occupied before
June 1982, the Israelis may tolerate the situation for
the time being, believing that they could overcome the
obstacles fairly easily during a campaign. F__1
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Derailing the Peace Process
If peace negotiations between Israel on the one hand
and Jordan and the Palestinians on the other were to
gain substantial momentum, Assad would attempt to
derail them. He probably would first choose to step up
substantially terrorist attacks in the Israeli security
zone and possibly limited rocket attacks into northern
Israel-using Lebanese client forces. Such attacks
would strengthen the hand of Israeli hardliners who
oppose peace negotiations. Assad also could pursue
other more direct, but riskier, options by initiating an
open confrontation with the Israelis in Lebanon using
ground or air forces, or by seriously violating the force
limitation agreement on the Golan Heights.
Assad, in our view, would hope that the resulting
tension or clashes would disrupt or derail any
negotiations. At a minimum, neither Hussein nor
Arafat could muster moderate Arab support while an
Arab state was engaged in open conflict with Israel.
Alternatively, Assad might choose to intimidate
Jordan into withdrawing from the negotiations by
threatening to invade, as he did in November 1980, or
by undertaking a terrorist campaign aimed at the
royal family and Hussein's supporters. He might also
move against Arafat and his lieutenants.
Longer Range Prospects for Conflict
As long as Israel's southern border is secure, we do
not believe Assad would initiate a major military
confrontation with Israel. He is much more likely to
continue using terrorists recruited from Lebanese
client groups. Syria will continue to pursue military
parity with Israel because the Syrians almost
certainly believe redressing the present imbalance of
forces would restrain Israeli aggression and afford
Syria a wider range of foreign policy options in the
region. F_~
Syria cannot hope to achieve parity during this
century. As Syrian force expansion and
modernization progresses, the probability increases
that Damascus might miscalculate the balance of
forces and prematurely attempt military
demonstrations or operations against Israel, thus
precipitating a conflict. In the next couple of years
Syria might believe that its air defense forces had
The continuing introduction into Syrian forces of
late-model Soviet weapons such as the improved
T-72 tank and the improved MIG-23 Flogger G
(both shown here with Soviet markings) could
eventually make Syria overconfident of its im-
proving military capabilities.F_~
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improved to the point that it could openly take credit
for a major terrorist attack on Israel and still deter an
Israeli retaliatory strike. We believe that the Israelis
would retaliate, despite improvements in Syrian air
defense forces. The risk of such a miscalculation
would probably rise if Assad were removed from the
scene.F---]
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Syria's Offensive Chemical
Warfare Capability
Syria has developed a chemical weapons stockpile of
significant size since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. We
believe Syria has produced indigenously some binary-
type chemical munitions, principally aerial bombs and
SCUD warheads, to be filled with the nerve agent
initially on the military expertise of a small number of
senior Syrian military officers who led ostensibly
defensive chemical warfare units. In 1973, for
example, Brig. Gen. A'dib Trabzali-an expert on
Soviet chemical warfare doctrine and head of the
Syrian Army's Chemical Administration Branch-
was charged with the responsibility of developing an
offensive chemical warfare capability for Syria.
Trabzali and others may have helped identify suitable
delivery systems for lethal chemical agents and may
have been charged with training Syrian chemical
Origin of Syrian CW Capability
Syrian resolve to develop an indigenous chemical
warfare (CW) production capability intensified in the
final days of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, when the
Syrians believed that the fall of Damascus to
advancing Israeli forces was imminent.
chemical munitions inventory then consisted of aerial
warfare units to handle such agents.
Syria's CW Research Center
The chemistry department of the Centre d'Etude et
Recherche Scientifique (CERS), headquartered in
Damascus, is responsible for Syria's chemical
weapons research.
bombs and artillery rounds, which probably were CERS is subordinate to the Syrian Ministry of
provided by Egypt in 1973. Defense and functions as Syria's authority for weapon
systems research and development
Syria's suspicions that Egypt and Israel were engaged
in CW research may have spurred its own CW
program.
research activities in agricultural and medical
research programs. The small CERS staff is involved
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in many projects that probably have no direct 25X1
connection with chemical weapons research, such as
nuclear technology, aviation (particularly drone)
technology, surface-to-surface missiles, electronics,
optics, and explosives.F__1 25X1
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Development of the CW Program
Syria's chemical weapons development program,
although a closely guarded secret, probably relied
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The Syrian Army's Defensive
Chemical Warfare Capabilities
Syria has considered the prospect of chemical
warfare a serious threat for more than 20 years, and
the measures it has taken during that time to provide
its troops with defensive training and equipment laid
the foundation for subsequent development of an
offensive capability. The Syrian Army has, since the
1960s, worked closely with Soviet military advisers
to train and equip defensive chemical units, which are
assigned to all of its major elements. As a result,
most Syrian military personnel probably have at
least a basic understanding of the uses and effects of
chemical weapons and how to protect themselves.
Units of the Army's 28th Chemical Regiment are
assigned to the Army General Headquarters, the
divisions, and maneuver brigades. These elements are
officially charged with providing smoke concealment
for maneuvering forces, and with destroying enemy
forces and materiel with flamethrowers. Below the
brigade level, chemical units are assigned as needed
by the brigade commander. F--]
Each of these precursors is
relatively nontoxic and can be stored without the
elaborate safety precautions needed for lethal
chemical agents.
mixed before a weapon can be fired.
In
contrast, traditional unitary chemical weapons are
filled directly with the actual chemical agent and
stored until the weapon is used. Unitary weapons are
dangerous because they frequently develop leaks over
time and require elaborate handling and alarm
systems, as well as frequent inspection. In addition to
being safer, binary weapons allow more political
control over their use, since the chemicals must be
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We estimate that Syria was ready to begin full-scale
production of the DF precursor to sarin, and
ultimately the nerve agent itself, by the beginning of
In the years since Syria began its CW program, some
Syrian military personnel have heard rumors of
chemical weapons, but few apparently have detailed 25X1
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Syria probably selected the SCUD missile as its
primary means of launching a chemical attack
because it has a much greater range than the FROG
or SS-21, the only other surface-to-surface missiles in
Syria. Israeli cities and military installations-
probably the primary targets of Syria's CW
program-are well within the SCUD-B missile's 300-
kilometer maximum effective range.
Future Developments
Syria probably will apply its chemical weapons
research to conventional artillery systems within the
next five years. CERS probably already has done this
with the Soviet-made BM-21 rocket, which has twice
the range (20.5 kilometers) of other rockets in Syria.
The BM-21 would be a particularly suitable delivery
system for sarin because it has excellent mobility, its
rockets spin during flight thereby mixing the nerve
agent, and its 40 rounds can quickly disperse the
nerve agent over a large area. F_~
Syria may also develop a persistent chemical agent
because Assad probably wants the flexibility it would
provide. A persistent agent, unlike sarin, can be used
to neutralize enemy rear areas that the attackers do
not plan to occupy immediately. If it does undertake
this project, Syria probably will develop the persistent
agent soman or VX as a binary weapon.
Intentions
We believe Syria views the use of chemical weapons
as a last resort either in an all-out war with Israel if
its own defeat appeared imminent or if it believed an
enemy was about to launch a chemical warfare
attack. The prospect of chemical warfare almost
certainly remains abhorrent to Syria, despite the
possibility that Iraq's use of chemical weapons against
Iran may have lowered the threshold for chemical
warfare in future Middle East conflicts.)
We believe President Assad controls the development,
testing, storage, and use of all chemical weapons in
Syria. As long as he is in power, there probably is
little chance that Syria would try to surprise Israel by
using chemical weapons early in a war because of the
threat of Israeli retaliation. In the event of Assad's
death or removal from power, a successor regime-
eager to establish its legitimacy-probably would seek
to prevent chemical weapons from falling into the
hands of potential opponents.
Syria's intentions regarding its surplus chemical
weapons are unclear. Assad probably considers the
extra weapons as a safeguard against more effective
international trade restrictions on the sale of
chemicals and materiel with CW-related uses to
Syria.
Outlook
Syria's capability to wage chemical warfare will be a
factor in the next major Middle East war involving
Syria-regardless of whether Damascus uses this
weapon. In evaluating their respective military
strengths and weaknesses, parties to the conflict
cannot afford to forget this new factor. Countries
concerned about Syria's CW capability may decide
that their only recourse is to develop a retaliatory
chemical capability themselves or, at least, to
strengthen their defensive CW capabilities.
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Iran: Acquiring a Chemical
Warfare Capability
Spurred by the demands of the war with Iraq, Iran
has intensified its development of a chemical weapons
program. Tehran's initial emphasis was on defensive
equipment, but it now has a growing interest in
offensive chemical weapons. Moreover, the Iranian
regime's reluctance to use chemical weapons on the
battlefield may be diminishing.F-7
In the mid-1970s, Iran placed little emphasis on
chemical warfare, although some steps were taken to
improve the protective posture of the Iranian military.
The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war and Iraq's sporadic
use of riot-control agents during the first two years of
the fighting led Iran to increase its defensive chemical
warfare capability. Tehran began purchasing
additional protective equipment, including gas masks,
decontamination equipment, and medical supplies.
Iraq's subsequent use of lethal chemical agents
beginning in 1983 was a major impetus behind the
initiation of an Iranian chemical weapons program.
acquired a limited capability and is making a major
effort to develop and expand its chemical warfare
program
engineers from its domestic petroleum industry
capable of installing and operating facilities to
produce chemical warfare agents.
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NESA NESAR 85-021 JX
27 September 1985
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The Iranians lack experience in producing chemical
weapons, but this deficiency could be eased through
an exchange of technical information with friendly
nations, such as North Korea and Syria, or by
contracting with foreign chemical weapons experts.
Outlook
Tehran's mounting frustrations over the muted
international response to Iraq's use of chemical
weapons may be leading Iran to decide to use them as
well, at least in retaliation. In April, Iranian
spokesmen publicly reiterated their threat to retaliate
for any Iraqi use of chemical weapons.
Iran's threat to retaliate with chemical weapons is
unlikely to deter Iraq from engaging in chemical
warfare. Instead, Tehran's possession of such weapons
increases the likelihood of a chemical exchange on the
frontlines. There is a lesser, but significant, possibility
that such an exchange might involve civilian targets
as well.
Iranian use of chemical warfare would still be
reluctant and against only a few targets. Tehran
would lose the propaganda advantage it now possesses
for having abstained from the use of chemical
weapons. The regime may also believe that it would
be more severely condemned than Iraq has been for
resorting to chemical warfare. Moreover, the Iranian
stockpile and delivery capabilities are probably
insufficient for extensive tactical use.
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